Pour voir les autres types de publications sur ce sujet consultez le lien suivant : Sovereign wealth funds – Law and legislation.
Articles de revues sur le sujet « Sovereign wealth funds – Law and legislation »
Créez une référence correcte selon les styles APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard et plusieurs autres
Consultez les 50 meilleurs articles de revues pour votre recherche sur le sujet « Sovereign wealth funds – Law and legislation ».
À côté de chaque source dans la liste de références il y a un bouton « Ajouter à la bibliographie ». Cliquez sur ce bouton, et nous générerons automatiquement la référence bibliographique pour la source choisie selon votre style de citation préféré : APA, MLA, Harvard, Vancouver, Chicago, etc.
Vous pouvez aussi télécharger le texte intégral de la publication scolaire au format pdf et consulter son résumé en ligne lorsque ces informations sont inclues dans les métadonnées.
Parcourez les articles de revues sur diverses disciplines et organisez correctement votre bibliographie.
1
ROZANOV, Andrew. « Definitional Challenges of Dealing with Sovereign Wealth Funds ». Asian Journal of International Law 1, no 2 (28 octobre 2010) : 249–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2044251310000081.
Texte intégralRésumé :
International policy-makers so far have successfully pre-empted any new major national legislation in the G7 countries aimed specifically at sovereign wealth funds by getting the International Monetary Fund to work with them on formulating a set of best practices commonly known as the Santiago Principles. However, some observers stress that this is just the beginning. How does one measure and evaluate compliance with these principles? Is voluntary self-regulation really sufficient? Or is there a need for new rules and regulations? As the discussion shifts from policy and economics to governance and regulation, we move firmly into the realm of law—legal norms, rules, and statutes. However, the required clarity and commonality of definitions and terms have been elusive. There does not seem to be universal agreement about the precise meanings of even the most fundamental terms in the SWF debate. This article hence focuses on the definitional challenges inherent in this debate.
2
Hsu, Locknie. « SWFs, Recent US Legislative Changes, and Treaty Obligations Sovereign Wealth Funds, Recent US Legislative Changes, and Treaty Obligations ». Journal of World Trade 43, Issue 3 (1 juin 2009) : 451–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2009019.
Texte intégralRésumé :
A confluence of events has highlighted the role of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in recent times, giving rise to debate as to their role, governance, and how national investment regimes view their investments. Important amendments to US investment-screening legislation in 2007 have given rise to some concerns on the part of SWF investors. Apart from national investment-screening laws such as those of the United States and Canada, recipient countries of such funds’ investments may have also international or bilateral treaty obligations towards SWFs as foreign investors. Recent international efforts have also produced some ‘soft law’ instruments to address the governance structures of SWFs and recipient countries’ approaches to their investments. This article provides a composite picture of the recent US amendments, relevant international and bilateral treaty obligations, and the recent ‘soft law’ instruments that together have an impact on SWF investments.
3
Clarke, Warren. « Sovereign Patent Funds : Sovereign Wealth Funds 2.0 ? » Global Policy 7, no 4 (23 juin 2016) : 577–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12353.
Texte intégral
4
Поветкина, Наталья, et Natalya Povetkina. « Legal Regime and Importance of Sovereign Wealth Funds of the Russian Federation ». Journal of Russian Law 4, no 6 (30 mai 2016) : 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/19770.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article is devoted to the study of the legal regime of the sovereign wealth funds of the Russian Federation — the Reserve Fund and National Welfare Fund. The article reveals the role and importance of sovereign wealth funds for the implementation of efficient financial activity of the state and the achievement of socially significant results. The article studies the evolution of the development of the Russian legislation on sovereign wealth funds, funds’ specific characteristics and their attributes and functions, presents the actual currency structure of these funds. The author pays special attention to the specifics of managing sovereign funds. The author argues that the Sovereign Wealth Fund represents a portion of the Federal budget funds, established to ensure the state’s financial stability, managed by a special body and intended for the financial support of the execution of the state’s objectives and functions, in the event of risks and threats to the budget balance. The author emphasizes that the transformation of the main purpose of sovereign wealth funds — from “Fund of financial stability” under the crisis, to the Fund — “Protector of stability and prosperity” presents itself as rather promising.
5
Joseph, Sally-Ann. « Taxing Sovereign Wealth Funds : Looking to Singapore for Inspiration ». Federal Law Review 45, no 1 (mars 2017) : 17–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x1704500102.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The taxation of sovereign wealth funds is an important issue for governments as they are both investors and need to attract investment. Operating in global markets, how these funds are taxed can affect investment location decisions. In Australia there are currently no legislative provisions for these investments and issues of residency, applicability and terminology hamper the use of tax treaties. The basis of how sovereign wealth funds are taxed in Australia is administrative where tax exemptions are provided on the basis of private ruling applications. It is an inefficient and costly process which lacks certainty. Over the period 2009 to 2011 the government of the day proposed legislating its practices dealing with sovereign wealth funds. In 2010 Singapore introduced a fund exemption scheme, markedly different from that proposed in Australia. Yet it is a method that is able to be adapted to the Australian income tax legislation. It avoids definitional issues by targeting the entities the policy aims to cover, is compatible with a self-assessment system and provides flexibility in policy making. Recommendations with accompanying considerations are made with respect to incorporating Singapore's tax exemption for sovereign wealth funds into the Australian tax legislation.
6
Bahgat, Gawdat. « Sovereign Wealth Funds : An Assessment ». Global Policy 1, no 2 (mai 2010) : 162–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00008.x.
Texte intégral
7
McVea, Harry, et Nicholas Charalambu. « Game theory and sovereign wealth funds ». Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 22, no 1 (4 février 2014) : 61–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-12-2012-0049.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Purpose – The purpose of this article is to assess strategies available to recipient states for managing the putative risks posed by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the context of global, liberalized, and capital markets. Design/methodology/approach – The paper employs a game theory analysis in assessing these risks. Four basic scenarios are outlined whereby recipient states may interact with SWFs: “unselfish recipient state – unselfish SWF” (Option 1); “unselfish recipient state – Selfish SWF” (Option 2); “Selfish Recipient State – unselfish SWF” (Option 3); and “Selfish Recipient State – Selfish SWF” (Option 4). Findings – In the light of this analysis, and the balance of risks which the authors perceive recipient states are exposed to in practice, the authors claim that recipient states ought, rationally, to adopt a selfish regulatory strategy irrespective of the strategy which SWFs adopt in practice. Originality/value – This claim does not deny the importance of voluntary international measures – such as the “Santiago principles” – in the way SWFs are regulated. Rather, it seeks to show that according to a game theory analysis, and an attempted application of that analysis in practice, undue reliance by recipient states on international “soft law” regulatory initiatives to regulate SWF activity (which constitutes the current international consensus) is strategically unwise.
8
András, Kecskés. « The Legal Background of Sovereign Wealth Funds and Their Role in National Economies ». European Company and Financial Law Review 18, no 1 (10 février 2021) : 141–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ecfr-2021-0001.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are a type of fund which are established and operated by the state. They came into the limelight after the financial crises of 2007–08, when they saved the most emblematic listed companies in the USA and Europe. The aim of the article is to explore certain key issues related to sovereign wealth funds. The paper discusses the origins of the term and certain related economic concepts, including factors which resulted in the creation of sovereign wealth funds. The legal background is also elaborated on both international and national levels, giving an insight to the regulatory framework. The article closes with propounding a sovereign wealth fund in Hungary based on the National Investment Agency model proposed by Hockett and Omarova. This section gives an overview of state property management and its legal background. The increasing activity in the management of international reserves by the National Bank of Hungary and the expansion of the regulatory background for trust-like institutions are all pointing towards the possibility of a Hungarian sovereign wealth fund.
9
Buckley, R. P. « The Law of Sovereign Wealth Funds. By FABIO BASSAN ». Journal of International Economic Law 15, no 1 (21 février 2012) : 311–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgs006.
Texte intégral
10
Liang, Hao, et Luc Renneboog. « The global sustainability footprint of sovereign wealth funds ». Oxford Review of Economic Policy 36, no 2 (2020) : 380–426. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa010.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract With the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) around the world managing equity of over $8 trillion, their impact on the corporate landscape and social welfare is being scrutinized. This study investigates whether and how SWFs incorporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations in their investment decisions in publicly listed corporations, as well as the subsequent evolution of target firms’ ESG performance. We find that SWF funds do consider the level of past ESG performance as well as recent ESG score improvement when taking ownership stakes in listed companies. These results are driven by the SWF funds that do have an explicit or implicit ESG policy and are most transparent, and by SWF originating from developed countries and countries with civil law origins. In relation to engagement, we find by means of two natural experiments with exogenous shocks (the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe and Volkwagen diesel scandal) that the ESG scores do not change significantly more for firms in which SWFs have ownership stakes. This potentially suggests that SWFs in general do not actively steer their target firms towards higher levels of ESG.
11
LI, Hong. « Depoliticization and Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds : A Chinese Perspective ». Asian Journal of International Law 1, no 2 (25 octobre 2010) : 403–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s204425131000010x.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractThe China Investment Corporation (CIC) has often been perceived as a threat by Western economies. Such fears, however, are unfounded as the severe losses incurred by CIC during the recent economic crisis reveals that the fund, just like other investment entities, is vulnerable to market conditions. Moreover, given their relative lack of expertise in international investment, the regulation and development of “young and inexperienced” sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) within their home state is more pertinent than the defensive regulation structured by the host states in which SWFs invest. Positive financial returns should always be the fundamental goal of SWFs, rather than non-commercial considerations. This article proposes a three-step approach to regulating SWFs from a Chinese perspective: (1) home states should distinguish between their roles as shareholders and managers of state-owned capital-exporting institutions, and can use the Santiago Principles for that purpose; (2) host countries should not discriminate against SWFs but treat them as private institutional investors; and (3) there should be a clarification of the international investment regime regarding state investment. If these three steps are taken, SWFs would be depoliticized, and biased regulatory agencies and regulations would be a thing of the past. Under a broad regime, concerns between home and host states could then be addressed at bilateral or multilateral forums.
12
DE BELLIS, Maurizia. « Global Standards for Sovereign Wealth Funds : The Quest for Transparency ». Asian Journal of International Law 1, no 2 (11 novembre 2010) : 349–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2044251310000123.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are currently under increased scrutiny. This article aims at identifying the features and likely impact of the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP), using two lenses, both well known to legal scholars, especially within global administrative law (GAL) studies: global standards and transparency. On the one hand, contrasting the GAPP with other types of global financial standards can help identify the most powerful incentives to foster compliance. On the other hand, even though the transparency provisions requesting SWFs to provide public information concerning their legal basis, structure, and financing decisions appear to be a step in the right direction, they need further clarification so that a proper balance between disclosure and the need to avoid unnecessary costs can be struck. Moreover, this article claims that the effectiveness of disclosure provisions in fostering the accountability of the funds depends also on the existence of structural elements.
13
SHANG, SHU, et WEI SHEN. « When the State Sovereign Immunity Rule Meets Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Post Financial Crisis Era : Is There Still a Black Hole in International Law ? » Leiden Journal of International Law 31, no 4 (19 septembre 2018) : 915–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156518000420.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractThis article examines the state sovereign immunity rule in the context of a rising number of sovereign wealth funds and their ever-increasing value of cross-border commercial activities in the aftermath of the latest global financial crisis. The concept of sovereignty and the rule of sovereignty remain in a state of flux while new actors such as sovereign wealth funds are participating in global commercial activities in a nontransparent and politically motivated manner. Accordingly, states may pursue strategic foreign policy objectives through these newer investment arms in an unconventional way, thereby being deeply involved in the political-economic arena and distorting the existing concepts of international law. This article posits that there is an international law black hole in which sovereign wealth funds have come to engage in commercial activities as well as exercise the public functions traditionally associated with states (acts jure imperii). The doctrine of restrictive immunity has come into question and the bulk of local court decisions have offered little clear guidance. Against this backdrop three interconnected perspectives are then discussed with reference to emerging economies like China: the immunity rule, the principle of sovereignty, and the balance of power in globalization.
14
Ghahramani, Salar. « Sovereign Investors as Trustees of Environmental Intergenerational Equity ». European Business Law Review 31, Issue 3 (1 mai 2020) : 345–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2020015.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Do governmental investors such as sovereign wealth funds (‘SWFs’) have a legal duty to protect the natural environment for future generations? After providing a background on SWFs, the paper examines the relevant international law paradigms, with a particular focus on the concept of intergenerational equity – the notion that the state must preserve access to environmental resources for future generations. The article asserts that SWFs, as state actors, have a legal responsibility under international treaties and customary international law, as well as the evolving rules on complicity in international jurisprudence and general principles of international human rights law (which the author posits form the basis for intergenerational equity and environmental rights), to adopt environmental intergenerational equity as an overarching investment policy and implement the principle through shareholder activism and ESG screening. Sovereign Wealth Funds, intergenerational equity, international law, international environmental law, human rights law, shareholder activism, ESG screening
15
Beck, Roland, et Michael Fidora. « Sovereign Wealth Funds — Before and Since the Crisis ». European Business Organization Law Review 10, no 3 (septembre 2009) : 353–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s156675290900353x.
Texte intégral
16
Richardson, Benjamin J. « Sovereign Wealth Funds and Socially Responsible Investing : An Emerging Public Fiduciary ». Global Journal of Comparative Law 1, no 2 (2012) : 125–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2211906x-00102001.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The dramatic growth of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in recent decades has made them a significant phenomenon in global financial markets and raised the prospect of more enlightened investing that respects the environmental underpinnings of economic prosperity. Until the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the movement for socially responsible investing (SRI) had been the only noteworthy dissenting voice to the traditional complacency about the financial economy’s wider impacts. That financial calamity not only unveiled a systemic malaise in the financial alchemy of the global economy but also highlighted its social and environmental sequelae. The rise of SWFs, several of which are legally mandated to practice SRI, gives hope that states may reclaim some public oversight over finance capitalism. The purpose of this article is to investigate the governance of some SWFs with a view to assessing their capacity to contribute to environmental sustainability. As public financial institutions empowered by a broader conception of investment that takes account of social and environmental factors, SWFs have the incipient markings of ‘public fiduciaries’. SWFs could provide a novel way to interpolate the public trust environmental responsibilities of the state into the governance of the financial economy. This article focuses on the French and Norwegian SWFs, which arguably have the most comprehensive SRI practices of all SWFs. Both, however, have struggled to reconcile their ethical and financial mandates into a coherent investment philosophy. But their putative fiduciary responsibilities to society through an increasingly long-term investing perspective suggest a new normative direction to reconcile these tensions and to thereby help institutionalize the principles of intergenerational equity and sustainable development in the context of financial markets.
17
GELPERN, Anna. « Sovereignty, Accountability, and the Wealth Fund Governance Conundrum ». Asian Journal of International Law 1, no 2 (12 mai 2011) : 289–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2044251310000391.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Sovereign wealth funds—state-controlled transnational portfolio investment vehicles—began as an externally imposed category in search of a definition. SWFs from different countries had little in common and no desire to collaborate. This article elaborates the implications of diverse public, private, domestic, and external demands on SWFs, and describes how their apparently artificial grouping became a site for innovation in international law-making.
18
Bassan, Fabio. « Host States and Sovereign Wealth Funds, between National Security and International Law ». European Business Law Review 21, Issue 2 (1 avril 2010) : 165–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2010011.
Texte intégral
19
SORNARAJAH, M. « Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Existing Structure of the Regulation of Investments ». Asian Journal of International Law 1, no 2 (27 janvier 2011) : 267–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2044251310000330.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The strategic investments made by SWFs in vital economic sectors of the developed states have caused national security concerns. The existing law on foreign investment, which was designed by the developed states to permit liberal flows of foreign investment and emphasize protection against government interference, sits uneasily with recent moves to control SWF investments. The developed states may have to dismantle to a significant extent the international law they had created to protect foreign investment and retreat into principles of sovereignty earlier advocated by the developing states. This will result in dramatic changes to customary law as well as treaty norms and significantly undermine the present structure of investment protection: a complete reversal of the neoliberal vision may occur. This phenomenon provides an opportunity for the examination of how events that lead to the quick making of legal rules in line with a legal theory favoured in a particular political context are, equally quickly, replaced by another set of rules to suit rapid changes in the power balances.
20
Bismuth, Régis. « The Santiago Principles for Sovereign Wealth Funds : The Shortcomings and the Futility of Self-Regulation ». European Business Law Review 28, Issue 1 (1 janvier 2017) : 69–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2017006.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The risks associated with sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) transactions are essentially two-fold: political, to the extent that SWFs could be used as the armed wing of States’ foreign policy, and economic, since there is a risk of public subsidization or other types of market distortions through their investments. It is within this framework that the idea of international best practices aimed at a better regulation of SWFs was envisaged. This led to the adoption of the “Generally Accepted Principles and Practices” for SWFs, also labelled as the “Santiago Principles”. While the Santiago Principles may be useful for a better regulation of the relationship between fund managers and owners, they are nevertheless absolutely futile for considering and protecting the interests of the host States of sovereign investments. Thus, the Santiago Principles go against their founding objective. To this extent, the Santiago Principles shall not be regarded as a genuine form of international regulation, but rather as a veneer of respectability to improve the way recipient States perceive sovereign investors.
21
Nakatani, Kazuhiro. « Sovereign Wealth Funds : Problems of international law between possessing and recipient States ». International Review of Law 2015, no 2 (mars 2015) : 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.5339/irl.2015.swf.7.
Texte intégral
22
Schwartz, Herman. « Political Capitalism and the Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds ». Globalizations 9, no 4 (août 2012) : 517–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2012.699924.
Texte intégral
23
Martínek, Stanislav. « Review of the Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law ». International Review of Economics & ; Finance 54 (mars 2018) : 326–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2017.02.003.
Texte intégral
24
PARK, Donghyun, et Gemma Esther ESTRADA. « Developing Asia's Sovereign Wealth Funds : The Santiago Principles and the Case for Self Regulation ». Asian Journal of International Law 1, no 2 (3 mars 2011) : 383–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2044251310000445.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Concerns in host countries about the investment activities of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) arise from their non-commercial motives and lack of transparency. In response to such concerns, investor countries have begun to work together to set up the norms and laws which will define the governance and regulation of SWFs. In particular, the Santiago Principles have given birth to a set of voluntary principles and guidelines designed to guide their investment behaviour. In this article, we point out that the Santiago Principles are fundamentally consistent with the commercial self-interest of SWFs, which bodes well for the prospects of their voluntary adoption. The Santiago Principles serve a highly valuable role as a mechanism which signals and crystallizes the commitment of SWFs to comply with the basic rules and regulations of the countries in which they invest.
25
Heffron, Raphael J. « The application of distributive justice to energy taxation utilising sovereign wealth funds ». Energy Policy 122 (novembre 2018) : 649–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.07.049.
Texte intégral
26
Yin, Wei. « Regulating the State Capitalism : Is There an Optimal Regulatory Model for Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment ? » Journal of World Trade 54, Issue 1 (1 février 2020) : 155–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2020007.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), as the rise of ‘state capitalism’, are shaping the current political arena and global economic order. Questions have been raised with regard to the motivation of these funds and the plausible regulatory responses to this phenomenon. After a brief review of SWF investment in global markets and the literature review on the controversy surrounding SWFs, this article will examine critical points that need to be considered when regulating SWFs. It argues that legal measure should tackle specific issues but not discriminate the nature of state ownership. By considering subjective and objective elements, three general regulatory models and further suggestions for international regulation of SWFs are proposed and examined. The political economy dimension of SWFs may easily mislead the direction of the necessary legal response. Policymakers have to navigate between attracting foreign capital and protecting the legitimate national security. The article suggests that the rights and obligations of SWFs should be guaranteed and balanced. It finds that unilateral actions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and there is no one-size-fits-all approach for every country while there could be a plausible approach via international regulation, i.e. incorporating soft law rules into hard law investment treaties. Sovereign wealth funds, state capitalism, national security, state ownership, market access, international investment treaty, corporate governance, soft law
27
Sahu, Ritankar, Priyadarshi Banerjee et Tanay Kumar Nandi. « Islamic finance and sovereign wealth funds perspectives with focus on Shariah compliant transactions in India ». International Journal of Private Law 2, no 2 (2009) : 185. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijpl.2009.022327.
Texte intégral
28
CLARK, Gordon L., et Eric R. W. KNIGHT. « Temptation and the Virtues of Long-Term Commitment : The Governance of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment ». Asian Journal of International Law 1, no 2 (7 octobre 2010) : 321–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s204425131000007x.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In this article we look at the governance of SWFs from the perspective of the competing political interests embedded in the sponsor—the domestic political claims on funds and the principles and practice of governance used to discipline those interests in favour of a long-term perspective that emphasizes the conservation of wealth and the intergenerational transfer of benefits. Using the case-study of the Australian SWF known as the Future Fund, we argue that SWFs can be used as legal instruments to promote the interests of future generations. In this way, it puts into action the principle of intergenerational equity which has been hereto notoriously difficult to substantively apply in international law. By invoking the intergenerational principle, we argue that the Australian government not only responded to the legal challenges of implementing intergenerational equity but also contributed to its currency as a customary norm.
29
Chaisse, Julien, Jaydeep Mukherjee et Debashis Chakraborty. « Emerging Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Making : Assessing the Economic Feasibility and Regulatory Strategies ». Journal of World Trade 45, Issue 4 (1 août 2011) : 837–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2011029.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The recent emergence of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) as active and important players in international financial markets has raised a host of questions about their likely effect on markets and states. This trend is further reinforced in 2010/2011 by the fact that despite the fears and turbulences that spread all over the world in reason of the global economic and financial crisis, SWFs have blatantly retained their influence. SWFs create a regulatory and theoretical challenge because they serve two masters with very different agendas. This article is the first to explore the challenges governments face when they wish to set up an SWF. It explores determinants and policy options governments have to set up an SWF by analysing the fiscal and monetary parameters while simultaneously focusing on the regulatory determinants funds may and should comply with in order to be better accepted as international investors. The challenges are important since SWF are expected to grow in the future and might emerge as decisive investors throughout a world in crisis.
30
Wurster, Stefan, et Steffen Schlosser. « Sovereign Wealth Funds as Sustainability Instruments ? Disclosure of Sustainability Criteria in Worldwide Comparison ». Sustainability 13, no 10 (17 mai 2021) : 5565. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13105565.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are state-owned investment vehicles intended to pursue national objectives. Their nature as long-term investors combined with their political mandate could make SWFs an instrument suited to promote sustainability. As an essential precondition, it is important for SWFs to commit to sustainability criteria as part of an overarching strategy. In the article, we present the sustainability disclosure index (SDI), an original new dataset for a selection of over 50 SWFs to investigate whether SWFs disclose sustainability criteria covering environmental, social, economic, and governance aspects into their mandate. In addition to an empirical measurement of the disclosure rate, we conduct multiple regressions to analyze what factors help to explain the variance between SWFs. We see that a majority of SWFs disclose at least some of the sustainability criteria. However, until today, only a small minority address a broad selection as a possible basis for a comprehensive sustainability strategy. While a high-state capacity and a young population in a country as well as a commitment to the international Santiago Principles are positively associated with a higher disclosure rate, we find no evidence for strong effects of the economic development level, the resource abundance, and the degree of democratization of a country or of the specific size and structure of a fund. Identifying favorable conditions for a higher commitment of SWFs could help to initiate pathways to become functional sustainability instruments.
31
Gallo, Daniele. « The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and the Protection of Public Interest(s) : The Need for a Greater External and Internal Action of the European Union ». European Business Law Review 27, Issue 4 (1 août 2016) : 459–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2016020.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article focuses on the so-called ‘sovereign investors’ (i.e., sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and state owned enterprises (SOEs)). It is based on the assumption that sovereign investment has become a major – albeit controversial – element in emerging patterns of global governance in this century. At the heart of the paper lies the need that sovereign investors shall be regulated by pursuing a fair balance between protection of general/public interests and attraction of foreign capital. The essay deals with the main concerns related to the rise of SWFs. In this respect, the principal argument implied therein is that the quest for an equilibrium between economic benefits deriving from the entry of SWFs in the EU market and the protection of national as well as European strategic/sensitive sectors must be reached at the EU level rather than solely at the national level and that, in doing so, the EU must be more activist and bolder. The EU should give law a central role, regarding the market as an inherently political, institutional and social construct, rather than a self-referential locus that depends on its internal laws and dynamics. This seems even more urgent when market actors that, at least on paper, should be politically unbiased market-oriented investors, tend to act also as the long arm of State capitalism, that is, of foreign governments wishing to invest abroad in crucial socio-economic sectors and often connected with countries where the rule of law, in its multiple dimensions, is neither sufficiently promoted nor respected.
32
Halim, Justin Alexander. « Indonesia’s New Sovereign Wealth Fund : When Strategic Development Converges with Stabilization ». Lawpreneurship Journal 1, no 1 (3 mars 2021) : 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.21632/tlj.1.1.1-29.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Indonesia’s latest attempt to reintroduce an investment management agency emerged as the government undertook a significant overhaul of its investment strategy in providing a vehicle to accommodate foreign investment. While the agency had been categorically set as a hybrid model of a stabilization fund as well as a strategic development fund, the interplay between these two objectives remains to be seen by virtue of implementing the agency’s mandate stated in the Job Creation law and its implementing regulations. As the fund has been slated to receive large sums to cater to the ambitious government-led initiative, there is a heightened urgency to dissect the investment management policies that the agency will adopt to achieve its goals and sustain its presence. Upon reference to similar entities in other jurisdictions and the commonly adopted governance principles for sovereign wealth funds, this paper has found that the Indonesian government’s reforms should adhere to those that have been internationally embraced, while adjusting them to the relevant circumstances that the Indonesian agency is geared to achieve.
33
Goucha Soares, António. « “National Champions” Rhetoric in European Law — Or the many faces of protectionism ». World Competition 31, Issue 3 (1 septembre 2008) : 353–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2008030.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article aims to debate the issue of national champions regarding merger operations with a Community dimension. It starts with a brief overview of the legal framework for merger review in European Union law, as well as a reference to the division of competences between the Union and the Member States in this field. Then, it analyses the scope of Member State action regarding merger operations with a Community dimension, namely the clause to protect national legitimate interests. After some illustrations of recent cases concerning Member States’ defence of national champions, the article devotes the last part to a reflection of two related issues: the concept of industrial policy and the new challenges raised by sovereign wealth funds.
34
Norton, J. J. « The 'Santiago Principles' for Sovereign Wealth Funds : A Case Study on International Financial Standard-Setting Processes ». Journal of International Economic Law 13, no 3 (1 septembre 2010) : 645–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgq034.
Texte intégral
35
Chaisse, Julien. « Assessing the relevance of multilateral trade law to sovereign investments : Sovereign Wealth Funds as “investors” under the General Agreement on Trade in Services ». International Review of Law 2015, no 2 (mars 2015) : 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5339/irl.2015.swf.9.
Texte intégral
36
Pistor, Katharina. « Sovereign Wealth Funds, Banks and Governments in the Global Crisis : Towards a New Governance of Global Finance ? » European Business Organization Law Review 10, no 3 (septembre 2009) : 333–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1566752909003334.
Texte intégral
37
Kusuma, Muhammad Trianda, Tariq Hidayat Pangestu et Ricky Raytona. « ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND THROUGH INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTION IN REALISING OPTIMISATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ». Indonesia Private Law Review 2, no 2 (31 décembre 2021) : 125–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.25041/iplr.v2i2.2376.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Investment can encourage the acceleration of a country's development. Foreign investment improve country's economy either with partial or complete control by the asset owner or depending on international agreements used in determining the scope of investment. However, several factors hinder the entry of foreign investment in Indonesia. To overcome this, government with parliament through Law Number 11 of 2020 concerning Job Creation emphasise the legal politics of forming a quo law-oriented towards improving the investment climate in Indonesia, one of which is the establishment of the Indonesian Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) under the name Investment Management Institution or Lembaga Pengelola Investasi (LPI). The purpose of this study is to see how the government's political will in attracting foreign investment is through the establishment of Law Number 11 of 2020 concerning Job Creation and the legitimacy of using the SWF model in the Investment Management Institute (LPI). This research uses a combination of juridical-normative and comparative case study methods. The juridical-normative method is carried out by identifying library materials. Through the comparative case study method, the research will analyse the formation and concept of SWF in India and Russia. This study found that, the LPI plays a vital role in infrastructure financing on national strategic projects and can encourage increasing national foreign exchange. Also, the exact source of institutional funds originates from foreign investors as in the Indian and Russian state mechanisms.
38
Drezner, Daniel W. « Bad Debts : Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics ». International Security 34, no 2 (octobre 2009) : 7–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.34.2.7.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Commentators and policymakers have articulated growing concerns about U.S. dependence on China and other authoritarian capitalist states as a source of credit to fund the United States' trade and budget deficits. What are the security implications of China's creditor status? If Beijing or another sovereign creditor were to flex its financial muscles, would Washington buckle? The answer can be drawn from the existing literature on economic statecraft. An appraisal of the ability of creditor states to convert their financial power into political power suggests that the power of credit has been moderately exaggerated in policy circles. To use the argot of security studies, China's financial power increases its deterrent capabilities, but it has little effect on its compellence capabilities. China can use its financial power to resist U.S. entreaties, but it cannot coerce the United States into changing its policies. Financial power works best when a concert of creditors (or debtors) can be maintained. Two case studies—the contestation over regulating sovereign wealth funds and the protection of Chinese financial investments in the United States—demonstrate the constraints on China's financial power.
39
Bungenberg, Marc. « The Scope of Application of EU (Model) Investment Agreements ». Journal of World Investment & ; Trade 15, no 3-4 (28 juillet 2014) : 402–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22119000-01504004.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The contribution examines the personal and material scope of application of future eu International Investment Agreements. Therefore the notions of 'investor' and 'investment' are discussed. The scope of application of iias is one of the most important issues in investment law, as it determines the application of material standards as well as the possibility of investor state dispute settlement. On a comparative basis, the chapter examines the eu approach to this issue. Also the coverage of State owned Enterprises as well as Sovereign Wealth Funds is paid specific attention to. Especially the draft investment chapter of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (ceta) is taken as a first orientation for possible wording and structure as well as intention of the scope of application of future eu iias.
40
De Meester, Bart. « International Legal Aspects of Sovereign Wealth Funds : Reconciling International Economic Law and the Law of State Immunities with a New Role of the State ». European Business Law Review 20, Issue 6 (1 décembre 2009) : 779–817. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2009035.
Texte intégral
41
Nazymko, Ehor, et Olena Nazymko. « OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT DISABLED PERSONS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS ». Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 5, no 4 (29 octobre 2019) : 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.30525/2256-0742/2019-5-4-155-159.
Texte intégralRésumé :
One of the fundamental social, socio-forming institutions, which are strictly protected, including through the relevant rules of the current law, is the longstanding institute of support for persons who are unable to provide for themselves through the special disability or incapacity at all. A very important socio-institutional and socio-regulatory component of such an institution is a social consensus about the support of people with physical disabilities, which is constantly reproduced and permanently required by social communities. Among many components of the mentioned consensus, of great importance was also the indispensable obligation to carry out the full, decent or at least minimally necessary financial and material and other such support, provided by law and moral and ethical tradition, first by the parents of their young and minor children, and then, in turn, by adult, legally capable children of their older persons, including disabled, socially vulnerable parents. In spite of the necessity of careful treatment by society towards the disabled, in each country, this obligation is regulated in different ways. Therefore, it seems appropriate to analyse the obligation to keep disabled persons within the meaning of current international law and other international provisions. Methodology. The goal is solved using the cognitive potential of the system of philosophical, scientific, and special methods. The analysis and synthesis made it possible to identify the signs of incapacity for work and the specifics of the responsibilities for the maintenance of disabled persons. The methods of grammatical consideration and interpretation of legal norms have contributed to the identification of universal legal constructs that can be used in the national legislation of any sovereign country of the world. The comparative-legal method allowed determining the directions of development of national legislation of sovereign countries in order to bring them into conformity with generally accepted international standards. Practical implications. The peculiarities of the social and legal status of disabled persons require scientists to develop consistent measures of the proper legal protection of their rights. This requires establishing a clear contentspectral relationship between the concepts of such vulnerable, helpless social-group categories as “older persons”, “persons with disabilities”, and “mentally retarded persons”, which implies a broad socio-physical contextual concept of “disabled person”. The national legislation of each sovereign country should provide for a mechanism developed at the international level for collecting funds for the benefit of certain socially vulnerable persons, including the disabled.
42
Qamar, Parveen. « Do The Companies Owe Corporate Social Responsibility towards Institutions of Higher Education ? » RESEARCH REVIEW International Journal of Multidisciplinary 7, no 12 (14 décembre 2022) : 76–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.31305/rrijm.2022.v07.i12.013.
Texte intégralRésumé :
With an emphasis on distribution of wealth among the stakeholders and considering environmental sustainability, the companies are required to manage business processes in such a way to provide a positive impact on the society. These companies through their business earn a major profit by operating in the society and various stakeholders are involved and affected from their process directly or indirectly, therefore the companies are expected to spend a part of their profit for the benefits of their stakeholders. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a concept where big companies consciously combine their economic profit with social well-being and environmental sustainability. India has made legislation in the form of section 135 of Companies Act, 2013 for this purpose. According to this Act, education, gender equality, persons with disability (PwD) and environmental sustainability are some of the areas where the companies can use Corporate Social Responsibility funds through their policies.
In response to the law, a large number of companies are performing well and undertaking a large number of projects in areas mentioned under the Schedule VII of the Companies Act, 2013. But the data shows a lot still needs to be done as these large numbers of Companies are spending on education at school level and skill development but higher educational institutions (HEIs) are far away from reaping the benefits of CSR funds. Companies and corporate houses do not consider much about the infrastructural development in HEIs for environmental sustainability, and projects leading to women development.
Government is over burdened in looking and sponsoring even the small projects. CSR funding can share this responsibility thereby accelerating the process of development in the institutions.
43
Fellmeth, Robert C., Bridget Fogarty Gramme et C. Christopher Hayes. « Cartel Control of Attorney Licensure and the Public Interest* ». British Journal of American Legal Studies 8, no 2 (1 décembre 2019) : 193–233. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/bjals-2019-0006.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract The purpose of regulating any profession is to assure competent practitioners, particularly where its absence can cause irreparable harm. Regulatory “licensing” ideally achieves such assurance, while at the same time avoiding unnecessary supply constriction. The latter can mean much higher prices and an inadequate number of practitioners. Regrettably, the universal delegation to attorneys of the power to regulate themselves has led to a lose/lose system lacking protection from incompetent practice while also diminishing needed supply. The problem is manifest in four regulatory flaws: First, state bars—in combination with the American Bar Association—require four years of largely irrelevant higher education for law school entry. Most of this coursework commonly has nothing to do with law. Second, and related, these seven-years of mandatory higher education (that only the United States requires for attorney licensure) impose extraordinary costs. Those costs now reach from $190,000 to $380,000 in tuition and room and board per student—driven by shocking tuition levels lacking competitive check. Third, attorney training focuses almost entirely on a few traditional subjects, with little attention paid to the development of useful skills in most of the 24 disparate areas of actual practice (e.g., administrative, bankruptcy, corporate, criminal, family, taxation, et al.). And schools often pay scant attention to legislation, administrative proceedings, or the distinct areas of law that will be relevant to a student’s future practice. Fourth, state bars rely on supply-constricting bar examinations of questionable connection to competence assurance. In the largest state of California, the bar examination fails about 2/3 of its examinees. This system has fostered an opportunistic cottage industry of increasingly expensive preparatory courses that further raise the cost of becoming an attorney—even after 7 years of higher education. Meanwhile, the bars regulating attorneys in the respective states: a) Do not treat negligent acts as a normal basis for discipline (outside of extreme incapacity); b) Do not require malpractice insurance—effectively denying consumer remedies for negligence; c) Do not allow clients injured by malpractice to recover from “client security funds”; d) Do not require post-licensure “legal education” in the area of an attorney’s practice; e) Do not test attorneys in the area of practice relied upon by consumers—ever; and f) Respond to cost-effective, technology-centric solutions to legal problems not by regulation to assure consumer benefit, but by attempts to categorically foreclose them in favor of total reliance on often unavailable/expensive counsel. No area of state regulation has more openly violated federal antitrust law than has the legal profession. The United States Supreme Court held in 2015 that any state body controlled by “active market participants” in a profession regulated is not a sovereign entity for antitrust purposes without “active state supervision.” Yet four years later, attorneys continue to regulate themselves without such supervision, overlooking the threat of criminal felony and civil treble damage liability.
44
Timoshenko, Nataliia M. « Financial Monitoring in the Securities Market of Ukraine ». Business Inform 10, no 537 (2022) : 175–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-4459-2022-10-175-180.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The purpose of the article is to study the current status of financial monitoring carried out in the securities market of Ukraine. The article analyzes the activities of the entities of the State-based financial monitoring and primary financial monitoring in the stock market of Ukraine. Their main functions and tasks in the financial monitoring system are distinguished. Based on the carried out research, it is concluded that securities are often used in illegal schemes (withdrawal of assets outside Ukraine, minimization of tax liabilities, tax evasion, etc.) that precede the laundering of criminal income. One of the risky instruments of the financial market was also the purchase and sale of domestic government bonds. On the one hand, this type of securities can be considered one of the most reliable financial instruments due to its high liquidity and wide range of applications. At the same time, the high demand and peculiarities of execution of contracts concluded on the stock exchange for the purchase/sale of domestic government bonds make them attractive in schemes of legalization of illegal income, especially for public figures who must declare their wealth. Considering the nature of reports of violations of securities transactions, it can be concluded that there is a high proportion of possible schemes for legalizing dirty funds. Under martial law, there have been significant changes in the process of identification and verification of clients of the primary financial monitoring entities in order to simplify the purchase of government securities. Thus it is worth noting that the largest share of violations of financial legislation falls on government bonds, which have become available to various categories of investors (including individuals). This fact may contribute to the emergence of new schemes for laundering (legalization) of proceeds from crime. Therefore, the entities of the State-based financial monitoring should develop a system of hedging risks regarding the placement of government bonds among different categories of investors. This is especially true of the over-the-counter market. It is worth noting that this segment of the stock market is under the partial control of the national depository of the NBU. Therefore, it is proposed to create an entity in the securities market that would adopt the functions of controlling and preventing fraudulent and manipulative actions with securities.
45
Amineh, Mehdi P., et Wina H. J. Crijns-Graus. « Rethinking eu Energy Security Considering Past Trends and Future Prospects ». Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 13, no 5-6 (8 octobre 2014) : 757–825. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341326.
Texte intégralRésumé :
euenergy policy objectives are directed at three highly interdependent areas: energy supply security, competitiveness and decarbonization to prevent climate change. In this paper, we focus on the issue of energy supply security. Security of energy supply for the immediate and medium-term future is a necessary condition in the current context of the global political economy for the survival of the Union and its component member states. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, energy policy no longer comes onto the agenda of the European Commission through the backdoor of the common market, environment and competitiveness. The Treaty created a new legal basis for the internal energy market. However, securing external supplies as well as deciding the energy mix, remain matters of national prerogative, though within the constraints of other parts of eu’s legislation in force. Without a common defense policy, the highly import dependent Union and its members face external instability in the energy rich Arab Middle East and North Africa.Concern about energy security has been triggered by declining European energy production as well as the strain on global demand exerted by newly industrializing economies such as China and India and the Middle East, as well as the political instability in this reserve-rich part of the world. This paper explores the following two topics [1] the current situation and past trends in production, supply, demand and trade in energy in the eu, against the background of major changes in the last half decade and [2] threats to the security of the supply of oil and natural gas from import regions.Fossil fuel import dependence in the eu is expected to continue to increase in the coming two decades. As global trends show, and despite new fields in the Caspian region and the Eastern Mediterranean, conventional fossil oil and gas resources remain concentrated in fewer geopolitically unstable regions and countries (i.e. the Middle East and North Africa (mena) and the Caspian Region (cr) including Russia), while global demand for fossil energy is expected to substantially increase also within the energy rich Gulf countries. This combination directly impacts eu energy supply security. It should be noted that the trend towards higher levels of import dependence was not interrupted when the era of low energy prices, between 1980 and 2003, came to an end.Within the eu itself, domestic resistance to the development of unconventional resources is an obstacle to investment in unconventional sources in this part of the high-income world. This should therefore not put at risk investments in either renewables or alternative sources at home or conventional resources mainly in the Arab-Middle East.The situation is exacerbated by the spread of instability in the Arab-Middle Eastern countries. There are three domestic and geopolitical concerns to be taken into consideration:(1) In the Arab-Middle East, threats to eu energy supply security originate in the domestic regime of these countries. Almost all Arab resource-rich countries belong to a type ofpatrimonial, rentier-type of state-society relation. These regimes rely on rents from the exploitation of energy resources and the way in which rents are distributed.Regimes of this type are being challenged. Their economies show uneven economic development, centralized power structures, corruption and poverty at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The discrimination of females is a major obstacle to the development of the service sector. At present, even the monarchies fear the spread of violent conflict.Offshoots of these consequences have proven to cause civil unrest, exemplified by what optimists have called the ‘Arab Spring.’(2) The second concern is the domestic and global impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds (swfs) managed by Arab patrimonial rentier states. swfs have proven to be an asset in both developing and developed economies due to their ability to buffer the ‘Dutch Disease,’ and to encourage industrialization, economic diversification and eventually the development of civil society. In patrimonial states, however, swfs are affected by corruption and the diversion of funds away from long-term socioeconomic development to luxury consumption by political elites. In fact, Arab swfs underpin the persistence of the Arab patrimonial rentier state system.(3) Finally, the post-Cold War, me and cea geopolitical landscape is shifting. The emergence of China and other Asian economies has increased their presence in the Middle East due to a growing need for energy and the expansion of Asian markets. The recent discovery of energy resources in the us has led to speculation that there will be less us presence in the region. There would be a serious risk to eu energy security if emerging Asian economies were to increase their presence in the Middle East as us interests recede.
46
Dyson, Maurice R. « Combatting AI’s Protectionism & ; Totalitarian-Coded Hypnosis : The Case for AI Reparations & ; Antitrust Remedies in the Ecology of Collective Self-Determination ». SMU Law Review 75, no 3 (2022) : 625. http://dx.doi.org/10.25172/smulr.75.3.7.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Artificial Intelligence’s (AI) global race for comparative advantage has the world spinning, while leaving people of color and the poor rushing to reinvent AI imagination in less racist, destructive ways. In repurposing AI technology, we can look to close the national racial gaps in academic achievement, healthcare, housing, income, and fairness in the criminal justice system to conceive what AI reparations can fairly look like. AI can create a fantasy world, realizing goods we previously thought impossible. However, if AI does not close these national gaps, it no longer has foreseeable or practical social utility value compared to its foreseeable and actual grave social harm. The hypothetical promises of AI’s beneficial use as an equality machine without the requisite action and commitment to address the inequality it already causes now is fantastic propaganda masquerading as merit for a Silicon Valley that has yet to diversify its own ranks or undo the harm it is already causing. Care must be taken that fanciful imagining yields to practical realities that, in many cases, AI no longer has foreseeable practical social utility when compared to the harm it poses to democracy, privacy, equality, personhood and global warming. Until we can accept as a nation that the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 are not up to the task for breaking up tech companies; until we can acknowledge DOJ and FTC regulators are constrained from using their power because of a framework of permissibility implicit in the “consumer welfare standard” of antitrust law; until a conservative judiciary inclined to defer to that paradigm ceases its enabling of big tech, then workers, students, and all natural persons will continue to be harmed by big tech’s anticompetitive and inhumane activity. Accordingly, AI should be vigorously subject to anti-trust monopolistic protections and corporate, contractual, and tort liability explored herein, such as strict liability or a new AI prima facie tort that can pierce the corporate and technological veil of algorithmic proprietary secrecy in the interest of justice. And when appropriate, AI implementation should be phased out for a later time when we have better command and control of how to eliminate its harmful impacts that will only exacerbate existing inequities. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of a totalitarian tenor—greatly helped by Terry v. Ohio—has opened the door to expansive police power through AI’s air superiority and proliferation of surveillance in communities of color. This development is further exacerbated by AI companies’ protectionist actions. AI rests in a protectionist ecology including, inter alia, the notion of black boxes, deep neural network learning, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, and partnerships with law enforcement that provide cover under the auspices of police immunity. These developments should discourage a “safe harbor” protecting tech companies from liability unless and until there is a concomitant safe harbor for Blacks and people of color to be free of the impact of harmful algorithmic spell casting. As a society, we should endeavor to protect the sovereign soul’s choice to decide which actions it will implicitly endorse with its own biometric property. Because we do not morally consent to give the right to use our biometrics to accuse, harass, or harm another in a line up, arrest, or worse, these concerns should be seen as the lawful exercise of our right to remain a conscientious objector under the First Amendment. Our biometrics should not bear false witness against our neighbors in violation of our First Amendment right to the free exercise of religious belief, sincerely held convictions, and conscientious objections thereto. Accordingly, this Article suggests a number of policy recommendations for legislative interventions that have informed the work of the author as a Commissioner on the Massachusetts Commission on Facial Recognition Technology, which has now become the framework for the recently proposed federal legislation—The Facial Recognition Technology Act of 2022. It further explores what AI reparations might fairly look like, and the collective social movements of resistance that are needed to bring about its fruition. It imagines a collective ecology of self-determination to counteract the expansive scope of AI’s protectionism, surveillance, and discrimination. This movement of self-determination seeks: (1) Black, Brown, and race-justice-conscious progressives to have majority participatory governance over all harmful tech applied disproportionately to those of us already facing both social death and contingent violence in our society by resorting to means of legislation, judicial activism, entrepreneurial influential pressure, algorithmic enforced injunctions, and community organization; (2) a prevailing reparations mindset infused in coding, staffing, governance, and antitrust accountability within all industry sectors of AI product development and services; (3) the establishment of our own counter AI tech, as well as tech, law, and social enrichment educational academies, technological knowledge exchange programs, victim compensation funds, and the establishment of our own ISPs, CDNs, cloud services, domain registrars, and social media platforms provided on our own terms to facilitate positive social change in our communities; and (4) personal daily divestment from AI companies’ ubiquitous technologies, to the extent practicable to avoid their hypnotic and addictive effects and to deny further profits to dehumanizing AI tech practices. AI requires a more just imagination. In this way, we can continue to define ourselves for ourselves and submit to an inside-out, heart-centered mindfulness perspective that informs our coding work and advocacy. Recognizing we are engaged in a battle of the mind and soul of AI, the nation, and ourselves is all the more imperative since we know that algorithms are not just programmed—they program us and the world in which we live. The need for public education, the cornerstone institution for creating an informed civil society, is now greater than ever, but it too is insidiously infected by algorithms as the digital codification of the old Jim Crow laws, promoting the same racial profiling, segregative tracking, and stigma labeling many public school students like myself had to overcome. For those of us who stand successful in defiance of these predictive algorithms, we stand simultaneously as the living embodiment of the promise inherent in all of us and the endemic fallacies of erroneous predictive code. A need thus arises for a counter-disruptive narrative in which our victory as survivors over coded inequity disrupts the false psychological narrative of technological objectivity and promise for equality.
47
الحلو, عقيل حميد, et زينب شاكر جبير. « رؤية استشرافية مقترحة لإنشاء صناديق ثروة سيادية داعمة للموازنة العامة ولتطوير أداء الاقتصاد العراقي ». Journal of Kufa Studies Center 1, no 53 (28 juillet 2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.36322/jksc.v1i53.5037.
Texte intégralRésumé :
تهدف هذه الدراسة لتقديم رؤية مستقبلية لأنشاء صناديق ثروة سيادية داعمة للموازنة العامة ولتطوير اداء الاقتصاد العراقي ، وقد استندت الدراسة الى فرضية مفادها ((تسهم صناديق الثروة السيادية في دعم الموازنة العامة للبلد من خلال امتصاصها للفوائض النفطية عند ارتفاع الأسعار ومنعها لحالة التوسع في الانفاق العام، كما تعمل على دعم الموازنة العامة عند حدوث الصدمات النفطية وانخفاض الاسعار ولاسيما في البلدان الريعية ومنها العراق في حال انشائها فيه))، وقد اعتمدت الدراسة على تحليل النسب المالية لبيانات الموازنة العامة في العراق مع تقديم رؤية استشرافية لأنشاء منظومة متكاملة من الصناديق السيادية تمول الموازنة العامة في المقام الاول ثم تبني مقومات النهوض بالاقتصاد من اعمار البنى التحتية وتوفير حق الاجيال القادمة من هذه الثروة الناضبة، وان اهم ما توصلت اليه الدراسة هو العجز المتفاقم والمستمر الذي تعاني منه الموازنة العامة وعدم الترشيد في استخدام الفوائض النفطية في اوقات الفائض بل تدويرها الى سنوات لاحقة نتج عنها موازنات انفجارية وما تخلف عنها من توسع بالإنفاق العام ، وفي ضوء النتائج اعلاه اوصت الدراسة بضرورة الاسراع في تشريع قانون صندوق بلاد الرافدين المقترح الذي ينبغي ان يحدد صلاحيات ومسؤوليات السلطات المختلفة المسؤولة عن تمويل وادارة وتنفيذ استراتيجيات الصندوق الاستثمارية من خلال تحويل الفوائض المالية المتحققة من الفرق بين السعر التقديري في قانون الموازنة العامة والسعر الفعلي الى حساب الصندوق، لضمان استمرار تمويل نفقات الموازنة العامة في حال هبوط اسعار النفط ولو على المدى القصير. The study was based on the hypothesis that "sovereign wealth funds contribute to support the country's general budget." The study relied on analyzing the financial ratios of the general budget data in Iraq With a forward-looking vision for the establishment of an integrated system of sovereign funds to finance the public budget in the first place and then adopt the fundamentals of the advancement of the economy from the reconstruction of infrastructure and provide the right of future generations of this poor wealth, and the most important findings of the study is the deficit And the lack of rationalization in the use of oil surpluses in times of surplus, but the rotation to subsequent years resulted in explosive budgets and the consequent expansion of public spending, and in the light of the results above recommended the need to accelerate the legislation of the proposed law of Mesopotamia To determine the powers and responsibilities of the various authorities responsible for financing, managing and implementing the Fund's investment strategies by transferring the surplus funds obtained from the difference between the estimated price in the General Budget Law .
48
Grasso, Giorgio. « Constitutionalism and Sovereign Wealth Funds ». Global Jurist 17, no 2 (1 janvier 2017). http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/gj-2016-0018.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractThe aim of this article is to contextualise the study of Sovereign Wealth Funds within constitutionalism, which is construed as a limit to the exercise of power, whatever its source of inspiration. Sovereign Wealth Funds are investment funds that are owned by a sovereign government (this is the main difference from ordinary private investment funds). These funds are today major players on the global financial market and their role has increased since the start of the financial and economic crisis in 2008. This article analyses the influence of Sovereign Wealth Funds on several categories of constitutional law, such as sovereignty or the protection of fundamental rights, and suggests several remedies to improve the weak accountability and the responsibility of these funds. The final aim of this article is to prove that there can be no power without responsibility, which also applies to the power of the most powerful actors within the globalized world, such as Sovereign Wealth Funds.
49
Backer, Larry Catá. « Review Essay : Taking a Step Toward a Law for Sovereign Wealth Funds ». SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2143452.
Texte intégral
50
AUDIT, Mathias. « Is the Erecting of Barriers against Sovereign Wealth Funds Compatible with International Investment Law ? » Journal of World Investment & ; Trade, 2009, 617–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221190009x00330.
Texte intégral