Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Social media – Political aspects – European Union countriers »

Today, both Ukraine and European countries are subject to disinformation and foreign intervention in their domestic policies. Each democracy no matter its geography experiences its distinct vulnerabilities and respectively, reactions to foreign interference. It should be stated, the immediate responses to such challenges in most Western countries have been rare and sluggish, hampered by legal constraints and bureaucracy, and furthermore, they lacked a real political awareness of the problem or proof of its further impact. Foreign actors are increasingly using disinformation strategies to influence public debate, stir controversy and interfere in democratic decision-making. Responding to these new challenges, the European Commission has introduced a set of actions and tools to better regulate the digital ecosystem of the media and its participants, in particular, the formation and improvement of the legal framework to combat disinformation in the European information space. The researcher’s focus revolves around the European Union’s comprehensive approach to vigorous combating misinformation. The research data prove that since 2015, the EU has adopted a number of regulations to counter this information threat and the potential effects of foreign interference. In particular, in 2016 the EU adopted a document “Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats, a European Union response”, and “Action Plan against Disinformation”, respectively in 2018. These documents provide a baseline for understanding the diverse types of challenges other countries face and how they are addressing them. Consequently, a number of initiatives and projects of the European institutions, and the first worldwide self-regulatory “EU Code of Practice on Disinformation” issued in 2018 on a voluntary basis, have become main pillars of the EU. The Code identifies issues related to ensuring the transparency of political advertising, strengthening efforts to close active counterfeits. accounts, enabling users to report misinformation and access various news sources, while improving the visibility and reliability of authoritative content; enabling the research community to monitor disinformation on the Internet through access to these platforms, compatible with the confidentiality signed by the largest Internet platforms and social media (Google, Facebook, Twitter and Mozilla) in the framework of WMC self-regulation activities. It should be noted that the implementation of the “European Union Code of Practice on Countering Disinformation” has yielded ambiguous fruits. Self-regulation was the first logical and necessary step, but few stakeholders were fully satisfied with the process or its outcome, significant challenges remain for building trust through industry, governments, academia and civil society engagement.

Summary Fake news is relevant in most countries of the world; nowadays the disinformation and fake news are of great importance as they greatly affect different political and social aspects of public life including healthcare, elections, migration, economy, etc. People are free to express themselves in different forms on the Internet, including publishing any content due to the freedom of expression. In order to understand how to legally frame fake news, it should first be clearly defined. The problem of disinformation and fake news is closely connected to the fact that providing a new law on fake news is likely to not just overlap but even often to conflict with the legislations that guarantee freedom of expression as fundamental freedom in the European Union. After considering existing laws, comparing, and analyzing measures taken to combat fake news, it appears that legislation may lead to over-censoring, violating freedom of expression. For effective fighting with fake news and its negative impact on the EU public, regulation on fake news is not necessary, it brings more legal issues than benefits to combating the dissemination of disinformation. Clearly defining the borderline between fake news and lies in the context of freedom of expression can therefore be more useful, taking a balancing approach. The general public is in many cases lacking media literacy and it can be improved by strengthening the role of media, which should be more consistent and be aimed at educating modern society.

Abstract The present paper has as main objective to examine the literature and show the literature review, debates and discussions related to migration and implication of economic development. Media and academic circles are strongly attracted by the topic of migration and its consequences. Aspects brought into attention, from migration and economic development point of view are: climate change, social, economic, political and legislative. The reality is pushing us to research this phenomenon because migration effects are already visible and important for European communities, both for origin and destination countries. It comes questions that point to the core of economic, social, politic and environmental developments of the 21st century and these are referring to environmental and climate justice, as well as existing and growing of the relationships between the involved parties. This paper presents also the literature review analysis of different framings, points of view and lines of argument, and highlighting debates about securitization of climate change, depending on economic and connections to development studies and adaptation research and their influence on migration decision. Migration decision dependents on many factors, such as: level of life, education, employment opportunities, gender and age, familial needs and financial possibilities, but climate change, too. Also, the present paper will point out scientific papers that address the new challenges influencing labour migration inside European Union such as: COVID-19 pandemic, environmental changes, besides social inequalities and regional conflicts which are now at the borders of the European space.

Integration of the Ukrainian national higher education system into the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) has already been traditionally identified as one of the priorities of the Ukrainian national education policy determined by the XXI century. The priority character as well as the urgency of the task leave the contradiction between the public need for the Ukrainian higher education institutions to join the EHEA and insufficient scientific validity of the ways providing the solution of this task unresolved. There are also certain discrepancies between Ukrainian higher education officials' perceptions concerning the directions and scope of reforms, since a fierce competition at the international education market and the process of national higher education system internationalization might lead to the situation when particular aspects of the system at times contradict the requirements of modern social environment in which Ukrainian universities operate. The current state strategy, increased media attention, and public Q&A sessions on specific issues within the specified context indicate that the Ukrainian higher education system is gradually adapting to the current globalized conditions while diversifying management mechanisms by means of step-by-step implementation of the internationalization process. The Ukrainian context of internationalization of higher education under study is outlined through the prism of East European, where the end of the XXth – the beginning of the XXI century can be named as the period of transformations in socio-political life of the countries and as the period of convergence of national higher education systems. It has been emphasized that with the establishment of the EHEA in the context of the integration of European education systems, the internationalization is one of the priority directions for reforming national higher education systems; it promotes greater access to higher education for representatives of different countries; universalization of diverse knowledge; enhancement of international cooperation at national and institutional levels; enhancement of academic mobility; orientation of education to the realities of the globalized world of the XXI century which involves an active development of public-private partnerships in education, etc. It can be concluded that the analysis of the East European experience of national higher education internationalization aimed at further implementation of its elements into the structure of the Ukrainian higher education will facilitate the development of new ideas and approaches to training specialists and will create opportunities and mechanisms for quality improvement of the national higher education. The research states that the accession of the East European countries (such as the Slovak Republic) to the European Union (EU) has given them new opportunities to develop national higher education and has ensured theire active participation in the EU-funded international research and education programmes, the access to the EU funds for developing educational infrastructure and improving the education quality. As a result, national higher education institutions (HEIs) in Eastern Europe have experienced an influx of foreign students and have shown an increase in student and staff outcoming mobility. This situation, in turn, has created a competition in the field of international student recruitment and involvement of external funding into the fields of research and innovation. As the result of the research, the following perspective levels of the Ukrainian higher education system reforming have been identified – political, management-centred, organizational and institutional. Keywords: Higher Education System, Institution of Higher Education, Internationalization, Institutional Level of Internationalization, International Cooperation Programmes, Eastern Europe, Slovakia, European Union.

The article outlines the relationship between the political process and the development of "new" mass media which mainly means social networks. Electronic media, including social networks, pose a challenge to the current state of international relations. In this regard, a number of states (Belorussia, Russia, Great Britain) and supranational structures (European Commission, UN) are developing a digital legislation envisaging control over the online space. In addition to the negative aspects, the development of "new" media helps political forces in their activities. Many European politicians and political parties actively use Internet resources and micro-targeting to attract voters. The challenge for governments and researchers in this field is to understand the pros and cons of the new digital era and to develop a plan for integrating new technologies into the familiar political process. It is concluded that the European Union and other states are at the stage of development and entry into force of uniform rules regulating the Internet. The trend towards the formation of a single legal field is combined with legislative regulation at the national level, since this area affects issues of security and sovereignty.

This article aims to provide the relevant parameters of the phenomena of antigypsyism, online hate speech, and their connection. The parameters serve as background for finding out about the trends in online hate speech directed at the Roma community, the most important concepts and tropes regarding antigypsyism, and the relevant trends in antigypsyist online hate speech. The article will focus on the European Union context because it provides a comparative political and legal framework and possibilities of joint activities and policies to tackle Roma discrimination. By combining scholarly resources and governmental reports, monitoring and reporting collected through nongovernmental organizations, it is concluded that the phenomenon of online antigypsyism is getting stronger. It mirrors offline hate speech and is relatively poorly monitored. It is spread via all mainstream social media platforms whose record on its removal tends to oscillate. A brief section is dedicated to intersectional aspects of antigypsyist hate speech whose iterations in the digital space are under-researched.

Social innovations are activities aiming at implementation of social objectives, including mainly the improvement of life of individuals and social groups, together with public policy and management objectives. The essay indicates and discusses the most important contemporary problems, solving of which requires social innovations. Social innovations precondition the progress of civilisation. The world needs not only new technologies, but also new solutions of social and institutional nature that would be conducive to achieving social goals. Social innovations are experimental social actions of organisational and institutional nature that aim at improving the quality of life of individuals, communities, nations, companies, circles, or social groups. Their experimental nature stems from the fact of introducing unique and one-time solutions on a large scale, the end results of which are often difficult to be fully predicted. For example, it was difficult to believe that opening new labour markets for foreigners in the countries of the European Union, which can be treated as a social innovation aiming at development of the international labour market, will result in the rapid development of the low-cost airlines, the offer of which will be available to a larger group of recipients. In other words, social innovations differ from economic innovations, as they are not about implementation of new types of production or gaining new markets, but about satisfying new needs, which are not provided by the market. Therefore, the most important distinction consists in that social innovations are concerned with improving the well-being of individuals and communities by additional employment, or increased consumption, as well as participation in solving the problems of individuals and social groups [CSTP, 2011]. In general, social innovations are activities aiming at implementation of social objectives, including mainly the improvement of life of individuals and social groups together with the objectives of public policy and management [Kowalczyk, Sobiecki, 2017]. Their implementation requires global, national, and individual actions. This requires joint operations, both at the scale of the entire globe, as well as in particular interest groups. Why are social innovations a key point for the progress of civilisation? This is the effect of the clear domination of economic aspects and discrimination of social aspects of this progress. Until the 19th century, the economy was a part of a social structure. As described by K. Polanyi, it was submerged in social relations [Polanyi, 2010, p. 56]. In traditional societies, the economic system was in fact derived from the organisation of the society itself. The economy, consisting of small and dispersed craft businesses, was a part of the social, family, and neighbourhood structure. In the 20th century the situation reversed – the economy started to be the force shaping social structures, positions of individual groups, areas of wealth and poverty. The economy and the market mechanism have become independent from the world of politics and society. Today, the corporations control our lives. They decide what we eat, what we watch, what we wear, where we work and what we do [Bakan, 2006, p. 13]. The corporations started this spectacular “march to rule the world” in the late 19th century. After about a hundred years, at the end of the 20th century, the state under the pressure of corporations and globalisation, started a gradual, but systematic withdrawal from the economy, market and many other functions traditionally belonging to it. As a result, at the end of the last century, a corporation has become a dominant institution in the world. A characteristic feature of this condition is that it gives a complete priority to the interests of corporations. They make decisions of often adverse consequences for the entire social groups, regions, or local communities. They lead to social tensions, political breakdowns, and most often to repeated market turbulences. Thus, a substantial minority (corporations) obtain inconceivable benefits at the expense of the vast majority, that is broad professional and social groups. The lack of relative balance between the economy and society is a barrier to the progress of civilisation. A growing global concern is the problem of migration. The present crisis, left unresolved, in the long term will return multiplied. Today, there are about 500 million people living in Europe, 1.5 billion in Africa and the Middle East, but in 2100, the population of Europe will be about 400 million and of the Middle East and Africa approximately 4.5 billion. Solving this problem, mainly through social and political innovations, can take place only by a joint operation of highly developed and developing countries. Is it an easy task? It’s very difficult. Unfortunately, today, the world is going in the opposite direction. Instead of pursuing the community, empathic thinking, it aims towards nationalism and chauvinism. An example might be a part of the inaugural address of President Donald Trump, who said that the right of all nations is to put their own interests first. Of course, the United States of America will think about their own interests. As we go in the opposite direction, those who deal with global issues say – nothing will change, unless there is some great crisis, a major disaster that would cause that the great of this world will come to senses. J.E. Stiglitz [2004], contrary to the current thinking and practice, believes that a different and better world is possible. Globalisation contains the potential of countless benefits from which people both in developing and highly developed countries can benefit. But the practice so far proves that still it is not grown up enough to use its potential in a fair manner. What is needed are new solutions, most of all social and political innovations (political, because they involve a violation of the previous arrangement of interests). Failure to search for breakthrough innovations of social and political nature that would meet the modern challenges, can lead the world to a disaster. Social innovation, and not economic, because the contemporary civilisation problems have their roots in this dimension. A global problem, solution of which requires innovations of social and political nature, is the disruption of the balance between work and capital. In 2010, 400 richest people had assets such as the half of the poorer population of the world. In 2016, such part was in the possession of only 8 people. This shows the dramatic collapse of the balance between work and capital. The world cannot develop creating the technological progress while increasing unjustified inequalities, which inevitably lead to an outbreak of civil disturbances. This outbreak can have various organisation forms. In the days of the Internet and social media, it is easier to communicate with people. Therefore, paradoxically, some modern technologies create the conditions facilitating social protests. There is one more important and dangerous effect of implementing technological innovations without simultaneous creation and implementation of social innovations limiting the sky-rocketing increase of economic (followed by social) diversification. Sooner or later, technological progress will become so widespread that, due to the relatively low prices, it will make it possible for the weapons of mass destruction, especially biological and chemical weapons, to reach small terrorist groups. Then, a total, individualized war of global reach can develop. The individualisation of war will follow, as described by the famous German sociologist Ulrich Beck. To avoid this, it is worth looking at the achievements of the Polish scientist Michał Kalecki, who 75 years ago argued that capitalism alone is not able to develop. It is because it aggressively seeks profit growth, but cannot turn profit into some profitable investments. Therefore, when uncertainty grows, capitalism cannot develop itself, and it must be accompanied by external factors, named by Kalecki – external development factors. These factors include state expenses, finances and, in accordance with the nomenclature of Kalecki – epochal innovations. And what are the current possibilities of activation of the external factors? In short – modest. The countries are indebted, and the basis for the development in the last 20 years were loans, which contributed to the growth of debt of economic entities. What, then, should we do? It is necessary to look for cheaper solutions, but such that are effective, that is breakthrough innovations. These undoubtedly include social and political innovations. Contemporary social innovation is not about investing big money and expensive resources in production, e.g. of a very expensive vaccine, which would be available for a small group of recipients. Today’s social innovation should stimulate the use of lower amounts of resources to produce more products available to larger groups of recipients. The progress of civilisation happens only as a result of a sustainable development in economic, social, and now also ecological terms. Economic (business) innovations, which help accelerate the growth rate of production and services, contribute to economic development. Profits of corporations increase and, at the same time, the economic objectives of the corporations are realised. But are the objectives of the society as a whole and its members individually realised equally, in parallel? In the chain of social reproduction there are four repeated phases: production – distribution – exchange – consumption. The key point from the social point of view is the phase of distribution. But what are the rules of distribution, how much and who gets from this “cake” produced in the social process of production? In the today’s increasingly global economy, the most important mechanism of distribution is the market mechanism. However, in the long run, this mechanism leads to growing income and welfare disparities of various social groups. Although, the income and welfare diversity in itself is nothing wrong, as it is the result of the diversification of effectiveness of factors of production, including work, the growing disparities to a large extent cannot be justified. Economic situation of the society members increasingly depends not on the contribution of work, but on the size of the capital invested, and the market position of the economic entity, and on the “governing power of capital” on the market. It should also be noted that this diversification is also related to speculative activities. Disparities between the implemented economic and social innovations can lead to the collapse of the progress of civilisation. Nowadays, economic crises are often justified by, indeed, social and political considerations, such as marginalisation of nation states, imbalance of power (or imbalance of fear), religious conflicts, nationalism, chauvinism, etc. It is also considered that the first global financial crisis of the 21st century originated from the wrong social policy pursued by the US Government, which led to the creation of a gigantic public debt, which consequently led to an economic breakdown. This resulted in the financial crisis, but also in deepening of the social imbalances and widening of the circles of poverty and social exclusion. It can even be stated that it was a crisis in public confidence. Therefore, the causes of crises are the conflicts between the economic dimension of the development and its social dimension. Contemporary world is filled with various innovations of economic or business nature (including technological, product, marketing, and in part – organisational). The existing solutions can be a source of economic progress, which is a component of the progress of civilisation. However, economic innovations do not complete the entire progress of civilisation moreover, the saturation, and often supersaturation with implementations and economic innovations leads to an excessive use of material factors of production. As a consequence, it results in lowering of the efficiency of their use, unnecessary extra burden to the planet, and passing of the negative effects on the society and future generations (of consumers). On the other hand, it leads to forcing the consumption of durable consumer goods, and gathering them “just in case”, and also to the low degree of their use (e.g. more cars in a household than its members results in the additional load on traffic routes, which results in an increase in the inconvenience of movement of people, thus to the reduction of the quality of life). Introduction of yet another economic innovation will not solve this problem. It can be solved only by social innovations that are in a permanent shortage. A social innovation which fosters solving the issue of excessive accumulation of tangible production goods is a developing phenomenon called sharing economy. It is based on the principle: “the use of a service provided by some welfare does not require being its owner”. This principle allows for an economic use of resources located in households, but which have been “latent” so far. In this way, increasing of the scope of services provided (transport, residential and tourist accommodation) does not require any growth of additional tangible resources of factors of production. So, it contributes to the growth of household incomes, and inhibition of loading the planet with material goods processed by man [see Poniatowska-Jaksch, Sobiecki, 2016]. Another example: we live in times, in which, contrary to the law of T. Malthus, the planet is able to feed all people, that is to guarantee their minimum required nutrients. But still, millions of people die of starvation and malnutrition, but also due to obesity. Can this problem be solved with another economic innovation? Certainly not! Economic innovations will certainly help to partially solve the problem of nutrition, at least by the new methods of storing and preservation of foods, to reduce its waste in the phase of storage and transport. However, a key condition to solve this problem is to create and implement an innovation of a social nature (in many cases also political). We will not be able to speak about the progress of civilisation in a situation, where there are people dying of starvation and malnutrition. A growing global social concern, resulting from implementation of an economic (technological) innovation will be robotisation, and more specifically – the effects arising from its dissemination on a large scale. So far, the issue has been postponed due to globalisation of the labour market, which led to cheapening of the work factor by more than ten times in the countries of Asia or South America. But it ends slowly. Labour becomes more and more expensive, which means that the robots become relatively cheap. The mechanism leading to low prices of the labour factor expires. Wages increase, and this changes the relationship of the prices of capital and labour. Capital becomes relatively cheaper and cheaper, and this leads to reducing of the demand for work, at the same time increasing the demand for capital (in the form of robots). The introduction of robots will be an effect of the phenomenon of substitution of the factors of production. A cheaper factor (in this case capital in the form of robots) will be cheaper than the same activities performed by man. According to W. Szymański [2017], such change is a dysfunction of capitalism. A great challenge, because capitalism is based on the market-driven shaping of income. The market-driven shaping of income means that the income is derived from the sale of the factors of production. Most people have income from employment. Robots change this mechanism. It is estimated that scientific progress allows to create such number of robots that will replace billion people in the world. What will happen to those “superseded”, what will replace the income from human labour? Capitalism will face an institutional challenge, and must replace the market-driven shaping of income with another, new one. The introduction of robots means microeconomic battle with the barrier of demand. To sell more, one needs to cut costs. The costs are lowered by the introduction of robots, but the use of robots reduces the demand for human labour. Lowering the demand for human labour results in the reduction of employment, and lower wages. Lower wages result in the reduction of the demand for goods and services. To increase the demand for goods and services, the companies must lower their costs, so they increase the involvement of robots, etc. A mechanism of the vicious circle appears If such a mass substitution of the factors of production is unfavourable from the point of view of stimulating the development of the economy, then something must be done to improve the adverse price relations for labour. How can the conditions of competition between a robot and a man be made equal, at least partially? Robots should be taxed. Bill Gates, among others, is a supporter of such a solution. However, this is only one of the tools that can be used. The solution of the problem requires a change in the mechanism, so a breakthrough innovation of a social and political nature. We can say that technological and product innovations force the creation of social and political innovations (maybe institutional changes). Product innovations solve some problems (e.g. they contribute to the reduction of production costs), but at the same time, give rise to others. Progress of civilisation for centuries and even millennia was primarily an intellectual progress. It was difficult to discuss economic progress at that time. Then we had to deal with the imbalance between the economic and the social element. The insufficiency of the economic factor (otherwise than it is today) was the reason for the tensions and crises. Estimates of growth indicate that the increase in industrial production from ancient times to the first industrial revolution, that is until about 1700, was 0.1-0.2 per year on average. Only the next centuries brought about systematically increasing pace of economic growth. During 1700- 1820, it was 0.5% on an annual average, and between 1820-1913 – 1.5%, and between 1913-2012 – 3.0% [Piketty, 2015, p. 97]. So, the significant pace of the economic growth is found only at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. Additionally, the growth in this period refers predominantly to Europe and North America. The countries on other continents were either stuck in colonialism, structurally similar to the medieval period, or “lived” on the history of their former glory, as, for example, China and Japan, or to a lesser extent some countries of the Middle East and South America. The growth, having then the signs of the modern growth, that is the growth based on technological progress, was attributed mainly to Europe and the United States. The progress of civilisation requires the creation of new social initiatives. Social innovations are indeed an additional capital to keep the social structure in balance. The social capital is seen as a means and purpose and as a primary source of new values for the members of the society. Social innovations also motivate every citizen to actively participate in this process. It is necessary, because traditional ways of solving social problems, even those known for a long time as unemployment, ageing of the society, or exclusion of considerable social and professional groups from the social and economic development, simply fail. “Old” problems are joined by new ones, such as the increase of social inequalities, climate change, or rapidly growing environmental pollution. New phenomena and problems require new solutions, changes to existing procedures, programmes, and often a completely different approach and instruments [Kowalczyk, Sobiecki, 2017].

This article aims at considering the story of the Belgrade Staro Sajmište Second World War concentration camp, as it unfolded since October 2007. At that point, it captured national and international headlines, as a range of actors rallied to ban the private use of this memory place for a concert by a British pop group. The article concentrates on patterns of construction of memory(ies), space and transfers of knowledge as well as power as the Staro Sajmište story is ‘uncovered’ to the public in mainstream mass media. The focus of inquiry extends beyond the official realm of memory to media representations as central aspects of contemporary manifestations of collective memory. The article intends to explore the construction of narratives, public discourse and identities that directly impact democratic practice and citizenship in the wake of the radical social and political change that Serbia has experienced in the recent past and during the Western Balkans European Union accession process. It demonstrates that the multiple (hi)stories and fractured mnemonic genealogies of Staro Sajmište produce, and are themselves produced by, the narrative of European participation and integration, in an interplay between different discursive layers, such as the national narrative, the international and European narrative and the local Jewish narrative, as well as practices of spatial reconstruction and consumerism. The article is informed by understandings of the Balkans as a space that is inside and outside Europe in many senses, traversed by flows of people, funding and ideas/imaginaries of Europe and European-ness, concretised in specific projects and the relations that constitute them.

This article aims to analyze the role of intellectuals in times of a global pandemic, whereby their discourse is assumed as a counterbalance to the hegemony of experts. It takes as a case study several exemplar speeches by Noam Chomsky, linguist and political activist, which were produced since the beginning of March 2020 regarding Covid-19. We will try to show that what marks Chomsky’s discourse is related to the ethos (Maingueneau 2020) of an “intellectual engagement” (Bourdieu 2003). Within the universe of possibilities for choosing intellectuals’ speeches, who are not necessarily convergent on topics affecting the world, and who, in general, don’t talk about the same things, we chose to circumscribe our research on a specific intellectual: Noam Chomsky. In our view, he is an actual example of “intellectual action”, representing properly “the relations between intellectuals and power” (Bobbio 1997). Therefore, it is necessary to understand the statements of intellectuals like Chomsky in moments of global uncertainty, and as a discourse of a different nature that stands against the experts’ power in major media corporations or in government technocracy. Thus, far from wanting to exhaust the possibilities of interpreting the role of the wider category of intellectuals during the pandemic, our proposal is to outline the main points of how an intellectual like Chomsky has been developing and taking the same political positions since the beginning of his activism, in the 1960s, which refers to a type of intellectual engagement similar to that taken since the Dreyfus Affair. In the Dreyfus Affair we have an “inaugural archetype” of the concept of an “engaged intellectual” (Bourdieu 2003, p. 73–74), from which the one who has social capital as an erudite, a scientist or a writer, comes out publicly criticizing the established powers and denounces crimes committed by “the reasons of State” (Chomsky 1973). Therefore, we understand that Chomsky comes from a lineage whose representatives are inserted into a form of intellectual activism; a lineage that became known as “the century of intellectuals” (Winock 2000), the intellectual conceived as the one who “tells the truth”, as Chomsky (1996, p. 55) himself define the “intellectual's responsibility”: “At one level, the answer is too easy: the intellectual responsibility of the writer, or any decent person, is to tell the truth.” On the one hand, there is a patent argument of authority behind the experts, based on a “scientific discourse”, but, on the other hand, there is a kind of “moral commitment to the truth” behind the intellectuals' discourse that becomes a “deeper criticism”. That is, a holistic view to ponder, in the case of Covid-19, the humanitarian problems created due to the pandemic, but also to think about relating this crisis to previous and further geopolitical reasons, from a freer position, not committed to companies and States. This position of the intellectual engagement is idealized in opposition to the “normal science discourse”: the genre of the scientific discourse is produced under official means; it is plastered, blunted, does not allow the spokespeople of science to speak beyond what their research allows. In other words, the scientific experts are inscribed in discursive structures of “scenes of enunciation” (Maingueneau, 2006) that don’t permit them to surpass the barriers of “objectiveness” and enter the field of moral judgment. Seeking to understand how Chomsky acts as an engaged intellectual during the pandemic, we searched his political network and the media in which he is involved. From that, we chose our corpus of analysis, selected from Noam Chomsky’s innumerous speeches to a left-wing or clearly progressive press during the first months of Covid-19 pandemic in the form of interviews from March to June: an interview to Michael Brooks (2020), at the Jacobin Magazine (Brooks, M. 2020); an interview with his longtime interviewer, David Barsamian (2020), an Armenian-American journalist and political activist, published on the website Literary Hub; an interview with the British socialist newspaper Morning Star (2020); two interviews he gave to Amy Goodman (2020a, 2020b) for the American journal Democracy Now; an interview with the Croatian philosopher Srecko Horvat (2020), from which we will use only the parts of the transcript that we found published by Al Jazeera and not the video; an interview to the writer Chris Brooks to the magazine Labor Notes, channel for the proletarian movement; an interview to Cristina Magdaleno (2020) for the Euroactiv, a non-profit organization for democracy in European Union, as well as an interview Chomsky and Robert Pollin gave to C. J. Polychroniou (2020). We believe that through this corpus it is possible to cover the vast majority of Chomsky's speeches on the Covid-19 pandemic, centered on media where Chomsky usually features and that name themselves as having a more progressive bias. We assume that what gives Chomsky’s speech authority to talk about the pandemic, to be invited multiple times to do so, is not his expertise in the subject; it is not his background in epidemiology studies, which he lacks, neither his linguistics theories, that do not relate to the topic, but his image as a great surviving intellectual. It’s to say, what authorizes Chomsky to speak and, therefore, to make his contribution to the studies of this pandemic situation, is not what interests the State, or what would lead the actions of government officials, as they are in general centered on the discourse of experts. Instead, it is his trajectory as a critic without corporate scruples, engaged in telling another kind of “truth”, as one that can discuss and propose a different future for humanity. So, with this article we intended to produce a discussion about the following problem: the type of discourse raised by Chomsky is not that of government experts, men of science who must anchor themselves in statistical studies on disease proliferation curves, researchers who need to give prevention guidelines or economists who provide “get out of the crisis” scenarios. In other words, differently from a biologist, a disease proliferation specialist or a market administrator, Chomsky conceives the pandemic beyond Covid-19, as a long-term crisis, which will cover economic, social and environmental aspects of much greater proportions. In short, with this article we seek to understand how Chomsky assumes himself as a spokesman for all of humanity and how he constructs this position discursively. He is concerned with “bigger problems”, not diminishing the dangers of the Covid-19 pandemic, but insisting on the fact that global warming and the economic crisis created by the debacle of neoliberalism, as well as nuclear war menaces, are much greater threats to human species survival and the maintenance of the planet. We also bring an overview of three important intellectuals who also acted and contributed their reflections on the Covid-19 pandemic during its inception. They are Judith Butler, Giorgio Agamben, and Byung-Chul Han. The purpose of incorporating these distinct views is, in the first instance, to compare to what extent they may resemble the Chomskyan discourse, but also to show how intellectual discourse is constructed in times of a global pandemic in the face of the discourses of health experts or specialists who occupy the spaces of intellectual speech authority.

The variable “EU identity frame” is used to analyze the content of European identity. An EU frame establishes an understanding of the EU as a certain kind of community (e.g., political community, common market, community with political values). Identity frames are indicated by statements on general objectives, norms and/or historic aspects of the EU. For example, the frame that addresses the EU as a currency union is characterized by the objective to be economically strong and competitive and to uphold the norm of fiscal stability. The variable is usually combined with the coding of the evaluation of an identity frame as support for the EU as a specific kind of community or its rejection. Since one media piece can entail several EU identity frames, addressed by different speakers, EU identity frames have been taken as the coding unit in content analyses. Field of application/theoretical foundation: The variable “EU identity frame” is used in comparative research on the construction of collective European identity in media outlets (Lichtenstein, 2016; Lichtenstein & Eilders, 2015, 2019). Identity is understood as a sense of belonging and togetherness. It is analyzed in the context of conflicts and crises within the EU, when identity should provide a basis for the legitimacy of EU governance and transnational solidarity. Differences in the framing of European identity between countries indicate conflicts that are related to different political and economic objectives or a different understanding of European values and culture. In contrast, a shared understanding of European identity between countries provides orientation for political decisions. In its theoretical foundation, the coding of EU frames has some parallels to the coding of thematic frames on conflict events in research on horizontal transnationalization of the public sphere. References/combination with other methods of data collection: The framing of European identity can also be analyzed with surveys in media effect studies. Example study: Lichtenstein & Eilders (2019) Information on Lichtenstein & Eilders, 2019 Authors: Dennis Lichtenstein, Christiane Eilders Research question/research interest: Conflicts in the framing of European identity between countries during the Euro crisis Object of analysis: Weekly quality papers from Germany, France, and the UK Timeframe of analysis: 2011–2014 Information about variable Variable name/definition: EU Frame „Grundlegend für diese Variable ist die Frage, was Europa ist oder sein soll. Hier wird erhoben, welche Idee von Europa in einer Aussage aktualisiert wird. Diese Idee kann direkt vom Sprecher ausgedrückt werden und zwar entweder durch ein direktes oder indirektes Zitat oder durch die Beschreibung einer aktiven Handlung des Sprechers, die Qualitäten einer Meinungsäußerung aufweist. Außerdem kann eine Europaidee durch das Verhältnis zwischen Europa und einem BZO (Bezugsobjekt) aufgezeigt werden. Hier zeigt sich die Konsistenz des BZO zu der Europaidee: Die Beziehung zwischen dem BZO und der Europaidee kann in einem konformen oder in einem konflikthaften Verhältnis stehen. Z.B. ist die Aussage, „die Türkei passt nicht zum europäischen Wertegefüge“ auf die Idee von Europa als Wertgemeinschaft bezogen und nur in diesem Verständnis wird hier ein konflikthaftes Verhältnis zur Türkei behauptet.“ (Lichtentenstein, 2014) This variable is related to the question of what Europe is or should be according to a speaker’s statement. This idea of Europe can be expressed directly by the speaker, either by a direct or indirect quotation, or by the description of an active action of the speaker that has qualities of an expression of opinion. An idea of Europe can be expressed through the relationship between Europe and a BZO (reference object). Here the consistency of the BZO to the idea of Europe is evident: the relationship between the BZO and the idea of Europe can be either conformist or conflictual. For example, the statement that "Turkey does not fit to the European values" refers to Europe as a community of values, and it is only in this understanding that a conflictual relationship with Turkey is asserted here. EU frames Coded EU sub frames Political integration: EU as a federation Strongly politically integrated community Community with a common constitution Political integration: EU as a confederation Loosely connected community of sovereign nation states Community of states with equal power Market regulations: EU as an authority for market regulations Market intervention by the EU Community with a common economic, finance and tax law Economic solidarity between states with strong and weak economies European social policy European environmental and energy policy Market regulations: EU as a free market EU as a market in competition with other big players EU as a free trade area with competition and labor migration Finance policy: Economic growth Investments for economic growth in the EU and in crisis countries Financial solidarity Finance policy: Finance stability Financial stability in the Euro zone Austerity politics to foster budged discipline in EU countries Common political values Democracy as a European value Peace as a European value Solidarity with other EU countries Rule of law Currency Union Euro zone as an economically strong and competitive currency union Fiscal stability in the Eurozone Cultural community Common European history and mythology EU countries connected by religion Education and arts Diversity of cultures in Europa and encounters with people from different European cultures Community with a common foreign policy Common engagement and interests in foreign policy Common military and defense policy EU as a geographic entity Legitimate EU borders equals the borders of the European continent Level of analysis: EU frame Scale level: Nominal Reliability: Krippendorff’s Alpha = .75 References Lichtenstein, D. & Eilders, C. (2019). Lost in uncertainty. How the Euro crisis affected European identity constructions in national media discourses. International Communication Gazette, 81(6–8), 602–622.

Defence date: 12 June 2019
Examining Board: Prof. Alexander Trechsel, University of Lucerne (Supervisor); Prof. Giovanni Sartor, European University Institute; Prof. Luigi Curini, University of Milan; Prof. Anamaria Dutceac Segesten, Lund University
A Public Sphere and a demos are intrinsic key elements of any democratic society. The literature has pointed out that social media platforms can play an important role in developing direct interactions between users and creating a sense of community. Can Twitter contribute to the emergence of a transnational networked European Public Sphere and European demos? This thesis examines the contribution of the European Political Twittersphere to this question. I divide the question into three articles. In each I use a different theoretical framework and methodological approach to two datasets of two issue publics (the Schengen agreement and the transatlantic trade partnership, TTIP) collected through the public Twitter Streaming API from August 2016 to April 2017. In the first article I explore the actor level of the networks created from the Twitter data. I investigate whether these Twitter networks constitute networked publics where non-elite actors receive attention and play an important role by the number of mentions and retweets. In the second article I explore the question of the constitution of European transnational networks. To do so, I geolocate the accounts involved in the two networks to identify the type of interactions the users establish, whether national or transnational. In the third article I analyse the content of these networks by extracting what sentiments the users express for the topics, and whether they see themselves and the topics as national or European. The three articles capture three features of the European Political Twittersphere. First, the results indicate the presence of transnational European networks. Second, built from the bottom-up where non-elite actors receive most of the attention. And third, composed of a multilingual demoi where the users see themselves and the topics as European. However, although these mapped Twitter networks contribute to some extent to transnational interaction and a sense of community, the deliberative quality of these networks is low.

Defence date: 09 June 2008
Examining Board: Prof. Peter Wagner, University of Trento and EUI Supervisor Prof. Alexander Trechsel, EUI Prof. Jürg Steiner, University of Carolina Prof. Hanspeter Kriesi, University of Zürich
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
In this work we will attempt to evaluate which of these scenarios is most likely to become prominent in the future by focusing essentially on three issues: 1) the usage of the online forum by observing how diffuse the phenomenon is and who the users of the online debates are; 2) The offer of the online political forum, by analyzing which are the political actors (civil society, media, institutional actors) who are more susceptible to host the online political debates; and 3) the quality of the online debates by assessing their deliberativeness. By elaborating a sophisticated method for measuring the deliberativeness of the online debates and by analyzing a great variety of online debates our objective is to provide an appreciation of the deliberative potential of the web-debates that avoids shortcuts and inappropriate generalizations, but that recognizes that this may be determined by a multiplicity of factors. From a theoretical perspective the results obtained through our investigations contribute to evaluate whether the deliberative model of democracy could be fostered by the virtualization of the political debates and, more generally, it should also contribute to the elaboration of a deliberative model of democracy that is grounded not only on theoretical principles and suppositions, as this tends to be the case, but also on empirical studies that test its adaptability to the 'real life politics'.

Thirty years after the end of the Cold War and the division of the continent, are we witnessing a renewed east–west divide in Europe? Fifteen years following the enlargement of the European Union to countries of central and eastern Europe, are we witnessing mere political differences or is there an emerging divergence between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states on issues as fundamental as democracy and the rule of law? The triggering of Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty against Poland and Hungary suggests the latter. This is the interpretation favoured in the media or in declarations of political figures on both sides of a newly restored dividing line. In the west, it tends to be perceived as a challenge to the European project and sometimes even as a justification for reservations regarding the very idea of the EU’s eastward expansion. In the Visegrád Group, there are claims of being treated as second-class members of the EU and resentment of alleged double standards and interference from Brussels, sometimes compared to pre-1989 control from Moscow. How can this triple divide on democracy, migration, and societal issues—three aspects of European liberalism—be accounted for after a quarter-century of unprecedented economic, political, and institutional convergence? One place to start is the misunderstandings concerning the process and meaning given to the post-1989 EU integration process (‘enlargement to the east’ or ‘European unification’). Different security concerns and threat perceptions (east versus south) also remain an obstacle in shaping a Common Foreign and Security Policy. There are deeper historical and cultural differences, the understanding of which is important to avoid recent divisions becoming fault lines. Finally these trends should be understood not as irreconcilable differences, but as a specific and acute version of a transeuropean crisis of democracy.

The recent rise of populism around the world, often accompanied by nationalism and isolationism, is a trend that presents a serious threat not only to liberal democracies but also to global peace and security. Populist forces have already shown their influence through the British referendum on membership withdrawal from the European Union and the election of Donald J. Trump as the U.S. President in 2016. These two events alone had ripple effects and were felt by the international community. The causes of populism are being currently revisited. It appears that socioeconomic and cultural aspects are key contributors. Even though the persistent existence of populist elements within societies comes from the very core of the democratic experiment, the current trend in social media technologies allowed demagogues to utilize viral deception on a considerable scale. The authors argue that social media technologies could be employed through e-participation to inhibit populism by bolstering civic empowerment, transparency, progressive inclusiveness, fact-based analysis, and informed decision making.