Articles de revues : « Social Dilemma Games »

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Kas, Judith, David J. Hardisty et Michel J. J. Handgraaf. « Steady steps versus sudden shifts : Cooperation in (a)symmetric linear and step-level social dilemmas ». Judgment and Decision Making 16, n^o 1 (janvier 2021) : 142–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008342.

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AbstractAre groups of people better able to minimize a collective loss if there is a collective target that must be reached or if every small contribution helps? In this paper we investigate whether cooperation in social dilemmas can be increased by structuring the problem as a step-level social dilemma rather than a linear social dilemma and whether cooperation can be increased by manipulating endowment asymmetry between individuals. In two laboratory experiments using ‘Public Bad’ games, we found that that individuals defect less and are better able to minimize collective and personal costs in a step-level social dilemma than in a linear social dilemma. We found that the level of cooperation is not affected by an ambiguous threshold: even when participants cannot be sure about the optimal cooperation level, cooperation remains high in the step-level social dilemmas. We find mixed results for the effect of asymmetry on cooperation. These results imply that presenting social dilemmas as step-level games and reducing asymmetry can help solve environmental dilemmas in the long term.

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Haesevoets, Tessa, Chris Reinders Folmer, Dries H. Bostyn et Alain Van Hiel. « Behavioural Consistency within the Prisoner'S Dilemma Game : The Role of Personality and Situation ». European Journal of Personality 32, n^o 4 (juillet 2018) : 405–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.2158.

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Mixed–motive games represent situations that confront people with a conflict between cooperative and non–cooperative alternatives. Despite this common basis, recent research has shown that the consistency of people's choices across different mixed–motive games is rather low. The present research examined behavioural consistency within the same mixed–motive game, by presenting participants with a series of one–shot Prisoner's Dilemma Games. Across this set of games, payoffs were manipulated in order to intensify or weaken the conflict between self and the other party while maintaining the game's underlying structure. Our findings indicate that significant differences in choice behaviour are observed as a function of both situational (i.e. manipulations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game's payoff structure) and personality differences (i.e. individual differences in personality and motivational traits). Moreover, our included situational variables and personality features did not interact with each other and were about equally impactful in shaping cooperation. Crucially, however, despite the significant behavioural differences across game variants, considerable consistency in choices was found as well, which suggests that the game's motivational basis reliably impacts choice behaviour in spite of situational and personality variations. We discuss implications for theorizing on mixed–motive situations and elaborate on the question how cooperation can be promoted. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

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Jensen, Niels Holm. « Male mating signaling in social dilemma Games ». Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 11, n^o 3 (septembre 2013) : 131–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/jep.11.2013.3.3.

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Drouvelis, Michalis. « Alleviation and Sanctions in Social Dilemma Games ». Games 6, n^o 3 (21 septembre 2015) : 368–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g6030368.

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Stoop, Jan, Daan van Soest et Jana Vyrastekova. « Rewards and cooperation in social dilemma games ». Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 88 (mars 2018) : 300–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.12.007.

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Cox, Caleb A., Arzé Karam et Ryan J. Murphy. « Social preferences and cooperation in simple social dilemma games ». Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 69 (août 2017) : 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2017.05.002.

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Haesevoets, Tessa, Alain Van Hiel, Kim Dierckx et Chris Reinders Folmer. « Do multiple-trial games better reflect prosocial behavior than single-trial games ? » Judgment and Decision Making 15, n^o 3 (mai 2020) : 330–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500007142.

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AbstractMost prior research on the external validity of mixed-motive games has studied only one single game version and/or one specific type of real-life prosocial behavior. The present study employs a different approach. We used multiple game trials — with different payoff structures — to measure participants’ behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Commons Dilemma, and the Public Goods Dilemma. We then examined the associations between these aggregated game behaviors and a wide set of self-reported prosocial behaviors such as donations, commuting, and environmental behaviors. We also related these prosocial behavior measures to a dispositional measure of prosociality, social value orientation. We report evidence that the weak statistical relationships routinely observed in prior studies are at least partially a consequence of failures to aggregate. More specifically, our results show that aggregation over multiple game trials was especially effective for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, whereas it was somewhat effective for the Public Goods Dilemma. Yet, aggregation on the side of the prosocial behaviors was effective for both these games, as well as for social value orientation. The Commons Dilemma, however, turned out to yield invariably poor relationships with prosocial behavior, regardless of the level of aggregation. Based on these findings, we conclude that the use of multiple instances of game behavior and prosocial behavior is preferable to the use of only a single measurement.

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MERLONE, UGO, DAREN R. SANDBANK et FERENC SZIDAROVSZKY. « SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO N-PERSON SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES : CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS ». International Game Theory Review 14, n^o 03 (septembre 2012) : 1250015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500156.

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This paper presents a new systematic review of N-person social dilemma games using a new approach based on dynamic properties of the corresponding system. Traditionally N-person social dilemma games are classified by relative orders of magnitude of payoff parameters. Without border-line cases 24 are identified. The new approach introduced in this paper categorizes the social dilemma games in cases with different number and asymptotic properties of the equilibria. In these cases the solution structure or the trajectory of the percentage of cooperators is readily apparent. These cases also provide the modeler with additional information concerning the impacts of the model parameters on the game outcomes. The example of a simple cartel illustrates this methodology.

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Ito, Hiromu, et Jun Tanimoto. « Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation ». Royal Society Open Science 5, n^o 10 (octobre 2018) : 181085. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.181085.

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Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD–GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules have four different dilemma resolution (relaxation) mechanisms. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.

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Akimov, Vladimir, et Michail Soutchanski. « Automata Simulation of N-Person Social Dilemma Games ». Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, n^o 1 (mars 1994) : 138–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002794038001007.

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Guo, Ting, Yuyu Yuan et Pengqian Zhao. « Admission-Based Reinforcement-Learning Algorithm in Sequential Social Dilemmas ». Applied Sciences 13, n^o 3 (31 janvier 2023) : 1807. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app13031807.

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Recently, the social dilemma problem is no longer limited to unrealistic stateless matrix games but has been extended to temporally and spatially extended Markov games by multi-agent reinforcement learning. Many multi-agent reinforcement-learning algorithms have been proposed to solve sequential social dilemmas. However, most current algorithms focus on cooperation to improve the overall reward while ignoring the equality among agents, which could be improved in terms of practicality. Here, we propose a novel admission-based hierarchical multi-agent reinforcement-learning algorithm to promote cooperation and equality among agents. We extend the give-or-take-some model to Markov games, decompose the fairness of each agent, and propose an Admission reward. For better learning, we design a hierarchy consisting of a high-level policy and multiple low-level policies, where the high-level policy maximizes the Admission reward by choosing different low-level policies to interact with environments. In addition, the learning and execution of policies are realized through a decentralized method. We conduct experiments in multiple sequential social dilemmas environments and show that the Admission algorithm significantly outperforms the baselines, demonstrating that our algorithm can learn cooperation and equality well.

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Martirosyan, E., A. Govaert et M. Cao. « Autocratic strategies for infinitely iterated multiplayer social dilemma games ». IFAC-PapersOnLine 53, n^o 2 (2020) : 2838–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2020.12.2528.

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Chaudhuri, Ananish. « Recent Advances in Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games ». Games 7, n^o 1 (26 février 2016) : 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g7010007.

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Płatkowski, Tadeusz. « On Derivation and Evolutionary Classification of Social Dilemma Games ». Dynamic Games and Applications 7, n^o 1 (4 novembre 2015) : 67–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0174-y.

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Merlone, Ugo, Daren R. Sandbank et Ferenc Szidarovszky. « Equilibria analysis in social dilemma games with Skinnerian agents ». Mind & ; Society 12, n^o 2 (21 février 2013) : 219–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11299-013-0116-6.

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Kieslich, Pascal J., et Benjamin E. Hilbig. « Cognitive conflict in social dilemmas : An analysis of response dynamics ». Judgment and Decision Making 9, n^o 6 (novembre 2014) : 510–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500006392.

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AbstractRecently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study presents a first application of the response dynamics paradigm (i.e., mouse-tracking) to social dilemmas. In a fully incentivized lab experiment, mouse movements were tracked while participants played simple two-person social dilemma games with two options (cooperation and defection). Building on previous research, curvature of mouse movements was taken as an indicator of cognitive conflict. In line with the hypothesis of less cognitive conflict in cooperation, response trajectories were more curved (towards the non-chosen option) when individuals defected than when they cooperated. In other words, the cooperative option exerted more “pull” on mouse movements in case of defection than the non-cooperative option (defection) did in case of cooperation. This effect was robust across different types of social dilemmas and occurred even in the prisoner’s dilemma, where defection was predominant on the choice level. Additionally, the effect was stronger for dispositional cooperators as measured by the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality model. As such, variation in the effect across individuals could be accounted for through cooperativeness.

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Hilbig, Benjamin E., Pascal J. Kieslich, Felix Henninger, Isabel Thielmann et Ingo Zettler. « Lead Us (Not) into Temptation : Testing the Motivational Mechanisms Linking Honesty–Humility to Cooperation ». European Journal of Personality 32, n^o 2 (mars 2018) : 116–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.2149.

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Over the past decades, there has been considerable interest in individual differences in cooperative behaviour and how these can be explained. Whereas the Honesty–Humility dimension from the HEXACO model of personality has been identified as a consistent predictor of cooperation, the underlying motivational mechanisms of this association have remained unclear—especially given the confound between the temptation to exploit others and the fear of being exploited as motivational drivers of defection in social dilemmas. In a reanalysis and a new experiment, we tease apart these mechanisms by manipulating the rank order of pay–offs in a symmetric two–person game paradigm, essentially implementing the classic prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken games. Results revealed that Honesty–Humility predicted cooperation specifically in the games in which temptation was a potential motivator of defection, whereas it did not account for cooperation in those games in which only fear implied defection. Our findings thereby shed light on the underlying motivational mechanisms of the Honesty–Humility–cooperation link and, more generally, demonstrate how economic games can be used to disentangle such mechanisms. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

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Lu, Peng, et Xiaoping Zheng. « Social Stratification and Cooperative Behavior in Spatial Prisoners' Dilemma Games ». PLOS ONE 10, n^o 7 (14 juillet 2015) : e0131005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0131005.

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Zong, Hengshan, Guozhu Jia et Yang Cheng. « Exploring social influence on evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games in networks ». Modern Physics Letters B 29, n^o 30 (4 novembre 2015) : 1550184. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217984915501845.

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Though numerous studies demonstrate the importance of social influence in deciding individual decision-making process in networks, little has been done to explore its impact on players’ behavioral patterns in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games (PDGs). This study investigates how social influenced strategy updating rules may affect the final equilibrium of game dynamics. The results show that weak social influence usually inhibits cooperation, while strong social influence has a mediating effect. The impacts of network structure and the existence of rebels in social influence scenarios are also tested. The paper provides a comprehensive interpretation on social influence effects on evolutionary PDGs in networks.

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Zhang, Qionghan, Yingyuan Chen, Yuan Tao, Tahir Farid et Jianhong Ma. « How Consistent Contributors Inspire Individuals to Cooperate : The Role of Moral Elevation and Social Value Orientation ». Sustainability 11, n^o 7 (28 mars 2019) : 1874. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11071874.

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Achieving cooperation to address social dilemmas has long been a global problem. This study examined, using an environment-focused step-level public-goods-dilemma game, the effect a consistent contributor (CC) has on group cooperation, as well as the mediating role moral elevation and the moderating role social value orientation (SVO) play in this process. A total of 196 students were recruited and classified as “pro-selfs” or “pro-socials” based on their SVOs; individuals with the same SVO characterization were randomly allocated to groups of four, and then randomly assigned to the CC condition or the control condition to play 15 rounds of public-goods-dilemma games. In the CC condition, additional computer-controlled players represented the CCs. The results showed that the CC groups cooperated and earned more than the control groups did. Multi-level mediation analysis confirmed that moral elevation partially mediates the CC effect. Although the CCs had a direct impact on both pro-socials and pro-selfs, multi-level moderated-mediation analysis demonstrated that CCs influenced pro-socials directly, but affected pro-selfs’ decision-making indirectly, through moral elevation. This study contributes to a better understanding of sustainability of cooperation in social dilemmas by showing that consistent cooperative behaviors are contagious, and that their effects differ based on an individuals’ SVO.

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Haesevoets, Tessa, Alain Van Hiel, Jasper Van Assche, Dries H. Bostyn et Chris Reinders Folmer. « An exploration of the motivational basis of take-some and give-some games ». Judgment and Decision Making 14, n^o 5 (septembre 2019) : 535–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500004836.

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AbstractSurprisingly little research has investigated the particular motives that underlie choice behavior in social dilemma situations. The main aim of the present research was to ask whether behavior in take-some games (such as the multiple-person Commons Dilemma Game and the two-person Bandit Game) and give-some games (such as the multiple-person Public Goods Dilemma Game and the two-person Dictator Game) is differently affected by proself and prosocial motives. Two experimental studies were conducted. Our first experiment used a trait-based assessment of the motives, whereas in our second experiment the motives were measured as state variables. The results of both experiments revealed that proself and prosocial motives did not explain much difference between taking and giving when comparing the Commons Dilemma Game and the Public Goods Dilemma Game. Yet, our second experiment revealed that these motives did differentiate choices in the Bandit Game and the Dictator Game. More specifically, prosocial motives are more strongly related to giving behavior in the Dictator Game than to taking behavior in the Bandit Game. As such, it can be concluded that in dyadic games (but not in multiple-person games) prosocial motives (but not proself motives) predict choice behavior in a game-specific way.

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ANTONIONI, ALBERTO, et MARCO TOMASSINI. « COOPERATION ON SOCIAL NETWORKS AND ITS ROBUSTNESS ». Advances in Complex Systems 15, supp01 (juin 2012) : 1250046. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219525912500464.

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In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are at least as much as in scale-free networks but here the population model is more realistic. Cooperation is robust with respect to different strategy update rules, population dynamics, and payoff computation. Only when straight average payoff is used or there is high strategy or network noise does cooperation decrease in all games and disappear in the Prisoner's Dilemma.

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JANKOWSKI, RICHARD. « Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games ». Rationality and Society 2, n^o 4 (octobre 1990) : 449–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463190002004004.

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Wang, Xiaoyang, Lei Zhang et Xiaorong Du. « The Effectiveness of Reward and Punishment in Spatial Social Games ». International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Applications 16, n^o 01 (mars 2017) : 1750007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1469026817500079.

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Punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation especially among multiple participators. However, the performance of these two scenarios in spatial environment needs to be discussed. To figure out this issue, we resort to the [Formula: see text]-player Iterated Snowdrift Dilemma (ISD) game and Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game. More importantly, the evolution of punishment and reward in social network-structured populations has not been formally addressed. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency can be influenced by cost-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text], the punishment-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text] and the reward-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text]. And one intriguing observation is that under the same situation, the punishment is more effective than reward to the population. Then we further probe the effectiveness of neighborhood relationship to the cooperation, which is reflected by the random rewired probability [Formula: see text]. From the distribution of the four roles of the participator we can find that individuals can cooperate easily when they have close relationship. The results of this paper may be helpful to understand the cooperation in complex project or among industry–university–research cooperation project.

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Chiong, Raymond, et Michael Kirley. « Promotion of cooperation in social dilemma games via generalised indirect reciprocity ». Connection Science 27, n^o 4 (11 septembre 2015) : 417–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09540091.2015.1080226.

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Kumar, Medha, et Varun Dutt. « Understanding Decisions in Collective Risk Social Dilemma Games Using Reinforcement Learning ». IEEE Transactions on Cognitive and Developmental Systems 12, n^o 4 (décembre 2020) : 824–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tcds.2020.3008890.

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Sun, Qingzhou, Haozhi Guo, Jiarui Wang, Jing Zhang, Chengming Jiang et Yongfang Liu. « Differences in cooperation between social dilemmas of gain and loss ». Judgment and Decision Making 16, n^o 6 (novembre 2021) : 1506–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500008524.

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AbstractIn social interactions, people frequently encounter gain (i.e., all outcomes are gains from the status-quo) or loss (all outcomes are losses from the status-quo) social dilemmas, where their personal interests conflict with social interests. We ask whether there are any behavioral differences in social interactions when it comes to gains and losses. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma games, in three studies we observed that participants were less cooperative in the loss domain than in the gain domain. This effect was robust, not moderated by payoff amount (Study 1), cooperation index (Study 1), domain comparison (Studies 1 and 2), and personal loss aversion (Study 3). Social motive and belief explained this effect: compared to the gain domain, participants in the loss domain aroused more pro-self motive and less prosocial motive, and showed stronger beliefs that their partner would defect, which led them to cooperate less. These findings suggest that gain and loss domains affect individual motivation and belief, subsequently affecting strategic choices in social dilemmas.

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dos Santos, Miguel. « The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 282, n^o 1798 (7 janvier 2015) : 20141994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.1994.

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Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

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Apt, K. R., et G. Schaefer. « Selfishness Level of Strategic Games ». Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 49 (17 février 2014) : 207–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.4164.

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We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be offered to each player to achieve that a social optimum is realized in a pure Nash equilibrium. The selfishness level is unrelated to the price of stability and the price of anarchy and is invariant under positive linear transformations of the payoff functions. Also, it naturally applies to other solution concepts and other forms of games. We study the selfishness level of several well-known strategic games. This allows us to quantify the implicit tension within a game between players' individual interests and the impact of their decisions on the society as a whole. Our analyses reveal that the selfishness level often provides a deeper understanding of the characteristics of the underlying game that influence the players' willingness to cooperate. In particular, the selfishness level of finite ordinal potential games is finite, while that of weakly acyclic games can be infinite. We derive explicit bounds on the selfishness level of fair cost sharing games and linear congestion games, which depend on specific parameters of the underlying game but are independent of the number of players. Further, we show that the selfishness level of the $n$-players Prisoner's Dilemma is c/(b(n-1)-c), where b and c are the benefit and cost for cooperation, respectively, that of the n-players public goods game is (1-c/n)/(c-1), where c is the public good multiplier, and that of the Traveler's Dilemma game is (b-1)/2, where b is the bonus. Finally, the selfishness level of Cournot competition (an example of an infinite ordinal potential game), Tragedy of the Commons, and Bertrand competition is infinite.

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Birajdar, Ganesh S., Balaraju Battu, Krishnavtar Jaiswal et V. S. Chandrasekhar Pammi. « Modelling Social Dilemmas : A Regret-driven Neural Network Model ». Studies in Microeconomics 4, n^o 2 (16 septembre 2016) : 115–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321022216647261.

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Marchiori and Warglien (2008 , Science, 319(5866), 1111–1113) showed that a simple regret-driven neural network model outperforms almost all competing models when predicting human choice behaviour in games with ‘unique equilibrium in mixed strategies’. Considering its effectiveness in this class of games, we scale up the model to account for strategically more important decision-making scenarios like prisoners’ dilemma (PD). The modification is based on the assumption that the trajectory of behaviour observed in a repeated PD experiment is the result of the bidirectional attraction between pareto-optimal (mutual cooperation) versus self-interested defection (mutual defection) in repeated PD game. The simulation results significantly capture the qualitative trends in behaviour over time.

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DU, WEN-BO, XIAN-BIN CAO, HAO-RAN ZHENG, HONG ZHOU et MAO-BIN HU. « EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS OF WEIGHTED SOCIAL NETWORKS ». International Journal of Modern Physics C 20, n^o 05 (mai 2009) : 701–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183109013923.

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Much empirical evidence has shown realistic networks are weighted. Compared with those on unweighted networks, the dynamics on weighted network often exhibit distinctly different phenomena. In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary game dynamics (prisoner's dilemma game and snowdrift game) on a weighted social network consisted of rational agents and focus on the evolution of cooperation in the system. Simulation results show that the cooperation level is strongly affected by the weighted nature of the network. Moreover, the variation of time series has also been investigated. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior in the social systems.

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De Jong, S., S. Uyttendaele et K. Tuyls. « Learning to Reach Agreement in a Continuous Ultimatum Game ». Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 33 (20 décembre 2008) : 551–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2685.

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It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have much difficulty with social dilemmas, as they are able to balance personal benefit and group benefit. As agents in multi-agent systems are regularly confronted with social dilemmas, for instance in tasks such as resource allocation, these agents may benefit from the inclusion of mechanisms thought to facilitate human fairness. Although many of such mechanisms have already been implemented in a multi-agent systems context, their application is usually limited to rather abstract social dilemmas with a discrete set of available strategies (usually two). Given that many real-world examples of social dilemmas are actually continuous in nature, we extend this previous work to more general dilemmas, in which agents operate in a continuous strategy space. The social dilemma under study here is the well-known Ultimatum Game, in which an optimal solution is achieved if agents agree on a common strategy. We investigate whether a scale-free interaction network facilitates agents to reach agreement, especially in the presence of fixed-strategy agents that represent a desired (e.g. human) outcome. Moreover, we study the influence of rewiring in the interaction network. The agents are equipped with continuous-action learning automata and play a large number of random pairwise games in order to establish a common strategy. From our experiments, we may conclude that results obtained in discrete-strategy games can be generalized to continuous-strategy games to a certain extent: a scale-free interaction network structure allows agents to achieve agreement on a common strategy, and rewiring in the interaction network greatly enhances the agents' ability to reach agreement. However, it also becomes clear that some alternative mechanisms, such as reputation and volunteering, have many subtleties involved and do not have convincing beneficial effects in the continuous case.

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Xu, Bo, Huibin Shi, Jianwei Wang et Yun Huang. « Effective seeding strategy in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on online social networks ». Modern Physics Letters B 29, n^o 09 (10 avril 2015) : 1550027. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021798491550027x.

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This paper explores effective seeding strategies in prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on online social networks, i.e. the optimal strategy to obtain global cooperation with minimum cost. Three distinct seeding strategies are compared by performing computer simulations on real online social network datasets. Our finding suggests that degree centrality seeding outperforms other strategies regardless of the initial payoff setting or network size. Celebrities of online social networks play key roles in preserving cooperation.

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Greitemeyer, Tobias. « The Police Officer’s Dilemma ». Journal of Media Psychology 32, n^o 2 (avril 2020) : 82–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-1105/a000260.

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Abstract. Correll and colleagues ( Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002 ) developed a first-person shooter task that simulates the police officer’s dilemma of whether to shoot or not a target that may present lethal danger. The present study examined the relationship between habitual violent video game play and responses in this shooting paradigm. Habitual violent video game play has been shown to increase the accessibility of aggressive thoughts. Previous research also demonstrated that action video game play has a positive impact on perceptual skills. Hence, it was hypothesized that players of violent video games would be more likely to mistakenly shoot a target and exhibit shorter reaction times in the shooting task. Results revealed that reaction times, but not error rates, were significantly associated with habitual violent video game play. These findings suggest that habitual violent video game play may have a positive impact on overall processing skills without limiting accuracy.

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Bühren, Christoph, et Julija Michailova. « Social Ties and Money Priming in Bargaining Games and the Prisoner‘s Dilemma ». International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics 10, n^o 4 (octobre 2021) : 59–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijabe.2021100105.

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The authors examine the effects of money priming and solidarity on individual behavior in three simple games: dictator, ultimatum, and prisoner's dilemma game. In three consecutive experiments, they use two different money treatments and two neutral (control) treatments. Additionally, they vary the strength of social ties between participants by conducting experiments with students from a military university and a regular university. Although the priming procedure is sufficient to remind people of the concept of money, it is not sufficient to induce systematically different behavior of the treatment groups compared to the control groups. They find significant differences between groups with strong and weak social ties, even without activating the idea of group affiliation. They discuss various explanations of why the results seem to contradict previous research on money priming.

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Moisan, Frédéric, Robert ten Brincke, Ryan O. Murphy et Cleotilde Gonzalez. « Not all Prisoner’s Dilemma games are equal : Incentives, social preferences, and cooperation. » Decision 5, n^o 4 (octobre 2018) : 306–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dec0000079.

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Wang, Zhen, Lin Wang, Zi-Yu Yin et Cheng-Yi Xia. « Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games ». PLoS ONE 7, n^o 7 (9 juillet 2012) : e40218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040218.

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Cubitt, Robin P., Michalis Drouvelis et Simon Gächter. « Framing and free riding : emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games ». Experimental Economics 14, n^o 2 (9 décembre 2010) : 254–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9266-0.

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Duca, Stefano, et Heinrich H. Nax. « Groups and scores : the decline of cooperation ». Journal of The Royal Society Interface 15, n^o 144 (juillet 2018) : 20180158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2018.0158.

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Cooperation among unrelated individuals in social-dilemma-type situations is a key topic in social and biological sciences. It has been shown that, without suitable mechanisms, high levels of cooperation/contributions in repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation, as a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism that leads to cooperation. A simple and prominent reputation dynamic function through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one's score, non-contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that scoring can sustain cooperation in two-player prisoner's dilemmas and donation games. However, these prior studies focused on pairwise interactions, with no experiment studying reputation mechanisms in more general group interactions. In this paper, we focus on groups and scores, proposing and testing several scoring rules that could apply to multi-player prisoners' dilemmas played in groups, which we test in a laboratory experiment. Results are unambiguously negative: we observe a steady decline of cooperation for every tested scoring mechanism. All scoring systems suffer from it in much the same way. We conclude that the positive results obtained by scoring in pairwise interactions do not apply to multi-player prisoner's dilemmas, and that alternative mechanisms are needed.

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Wang, Zhipeng, Miao Li, Dan Wang et Qinghe Chen. « Evolution of extortion in the social-influenced prisoner’s dilemma ». Modern Physics Letters B 30, n^o 04 (10 février 2016) : 1650029. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217984916500299.

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The introduction of extortion strategy has attracted much attention since it dominates any evolutionary opponent in iterated prisoner’s dilemma games. Despite several studies argue that extortion is difficult to survive under strategy imitation and birth–death updating rules in well-mixed populations, it has recently been proven that a myopic best response rule facilitate the evolution of cooperation and extortion. However, such updating rules require a strong assumption of complete knowledge of all players, which is unlikely to hold in social networks in reality. To solve this problem, we introduce the concept of social influence into the model to limit players’ knowledge within their neighborhood. It turns out that this myopia initiated by social influence prevents players from observing superior strategies and therefore enables cooperators and extortioners to be evolutionarily stable. We also suggest that heterogeneous networks contribute to the evolution of cooperation and extortion under such social influence.

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Madeo, Dario, et Chiara Mocenni. « Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks ». Games 12, n^o 3 (29 juillet 2021) : 60. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12030060.

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Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation to defect and the fear to be betrayed by others. Few results are available for analyzing situations where only the temptation to defect (Chicken game) or the fear to be betrayed (Stag-Hunt game) is present. In this paper, we analyze the emergence of full and partial cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we show that the partial one is also globally stable. Furthermore, in the Chicken and Stag-Hunt games, partial cooperation has been found to be more rewarding than the full one of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This result highlights the importance of such games for understanding and sustaining different levels of cooperation in social networks.

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Merlone, Ugo, et Angelo Romano. « Using the Braess Paradox to Teach Tacit Negotiation ». Simulation & ; Gaming 47, n^o 6 (8 novembre 2016) : 780–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1046878116671754.

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Background. Social dilemmas are situations in which following personal interest leads to collective disasters. Pollution, tropical deforestation, and the sustainable use of natural resources, can be characterized as examples of social dilemmas. In the negotiation literature, social dilemmas are known as tacit negotiations as individuals negotiate through moves rather than verbal communication. These negotiations are difficult to manage because of the absence of binding contracts and the interdependent nature of decisions of the parties involved. Therefore, it is important for participants to learn from activities addressing these issues. Although several negotiation exercises are available, it is difficult to find educational games or simulations specifically devised to allow several participants to face social dilemmas. Purpose. In this article, we present a negotiation game based on a well-known social dilemma, the Braess paradox. The Braess paradox has been observed in many real situations and is particularly suited to highlight the core concepts of social dilemmas. Approach. We will review the main negotiation activities focusing on the number ofparticipants they are implemented for. Then we will present an activity which allows to accommodate up to thirty participants and allows them to understand some interesting aspects of social dilemmas. Findings. Through the lessons gained by experiential learning, and the discussions emerging during debriefing, this activity may provide participants with a better understanding of urgent real problems.

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Engel, Christoph, Sebastian Kube et Michael Kurschilgen. « Managing expectations : How selective information affects cooperation and punishment in social dilemma games ». Journal of Economic Behavior & ; Organization 187 (juillet 2021) : 111–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.029.

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He, Jialu, Jianwei Wang, Fengyuan Yu, Wei Chen et Wenshu Xu. « The persistence and transition of multiple public goods games resolves the social dilemma ». Applied Mathematics and Computation 418 (avril 2022) : 126858. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.126858.

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Danku, Zsuzsa, Zhen Wang et Attila Szolnoki. « Imitate or innovate : Competition of strategy updating attitudes in spatial social dilemma games ». EPL (Europhysics Letters) 121, n^o 1 (1 janvier 2018) : 18002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/121/18002.

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ZHANG, LI, et TAD HOGG. « REDUCED ENTANGLEMENT FOR QUANTUM GAMES ». International Journal of Quantum Information 01, n^o 03 (septembre 2003) : 321–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219749903000255.

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Quantum generalizations of conventional games exploit entangled states to improve performance. With many players, quantum games can require entangling many states. Such entanglement is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. To simplify possible implementations, we examine some quantum versions of social dilemma games and show their use of entanglement can be substantially reduced by randomly replacing some of the entangled states by unentangled ones. For the example of public goods games, we identify a unique Nash equilibrium invariant with respect to the amount of this replacement. We also show players obtain no advantage from adding more entanglement to states which they control. With many players, a fairly small number of entangled states can give nearly as good performance as using the full number of such states.

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Kosfeld, Michael, Akira Okada et Arno Riedl. « Institution Formation in Public Goods Games ». American Economic Review 99, n^o 4 (1 août 2009) : 1335–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1335.

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Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)

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Esmaeili, Parinaz, Ahmad Makui, Seyed Mohammad Seyedhosseini et Rouzbeh Ghousi. « The effect of probabilistic incentives to promote cooperation during the pandemics using simulation of multi-agent evolutionary game ». International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations 13, n^o 3 (2022) : 319–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.5267/j.ijiec.2022.3.001.

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Social dilemmas describe conflict situations between immediate self-interest and longer-term collective interests. In these situations, it is better that all players work together to attain a common goal, but individuals may threaten the best payoff of the group by free-riding. Human behavior in a pandemic is one example of a social dilemma but wait-and-see games and relying on herd immunity to get a free ride generates a threat of continuing the pandemic. This study aims to use probabilistic incentives given by a third party as a mechanism to inhibit free-riding behavior by promoting cooperation in the volunteer dilemma game. For more realistic human behavior simulation, we use an agent-based model of network topology. When the parameters of the problem change gradually, an abrupt jump in the cooperation rate may happen and lead to a significant shift in the outcome. Catastrophe theory is a valuable approach to survey these nonlinear changes. This study tries to give some managerial insights to the decision-makers to find the minimum level of necessary effort in which the cooperation dominates the defection.

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Patra, Sudip, et Partha Ghose. « Quantum-like modelling in game theory : Quo Vadis ? A brief review ». Asian Journal of Economics and Banking 4, n^o 3 (7 décembre 2020) : 49–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ajeb-08-2020-0054.

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Purpose The current paper is a brief review of the emerging field of quantum-like modelling in game theory. This paper aims to explore several quantum games, which are superior compared to their classical counterparts, which means either they give rise to superior Nash equilibria or they make the game fairer. For example, quantum Prisoners Dilemma generates Pareto superior outcomes as compared to defection outcome in the famous classical case. Again, a quantum-like version of cards game can make the game fairer, increasing the chance of winning of players who are disadvantaged in the classical case. This paper explores all the virtues of simple quantum games, also highlighting some findings of the authors as regards Prisoners Dilemma game. Design/methodology/approach As this is a general review paper, the authors have not demonstrated any specific mathematical method, rather explored the well-known quantum probability framework, used for designing quantum games. They have a short appendix which explores basic structure of Hilbert space representation of human decision-making. Findings Along with the review of the extant literature, the authors have also highlighted some new findings for quantum Prisoners Dilemma game. Specifically, they have shown in the earlier studies (which are referred to here) that a pure quantum entanglement set up is not needed for designing better games, even a weaker condition, which is classical entanglement is sufficient for producing Pareto improved outcomes. Research limitations/implications Theoretical research, with findings and implications for future game designs, it has been argued that it is not always needed to have true quantum entanglement for superior Nash Equilibria. Originality/value The main purpose here is to raise awareness mainly in the social science community about the possible applications of quantum-like game theory paradigm. The findings related to Prisoners Dilemma game are, however, original.

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Deb, Joyee, et Julio González-Díaz. « Enforcing social norms : Trust‐building and community enforcement ». Theoretical Economics 14, n^o 4 (2019) : 1387–433. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te2404.

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We study impersonal exchange and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's dilemma. We show that cooperation can be sustained quite generally, using community enforcement and “trust‐building.” The latter refers to an initial phase in which one community builds trust by not deviating despite a short‐run incentive to cheat; the other community reciprocates trust by not punishing deviations during this phase. Trust‐building is followed by cooperative play, sustained through community enforcement.

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