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De, Silva Hannelore, Christoph Hauert, Arne Traulsen et Karl Sigmund. « Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism ». Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8.
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Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result - cooperation can be enforced if participation is voluntary - holds even in the case of 'strong altruism', when the benefits of a player's contribution are reaped by the other participants only. (authors' abstract)
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Galbraith, Todd William. « Examining Friendship Dynamics in Social Anxiety with Iterated Games of the Prisoner’s Dilemma ». Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/409829.
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PsychologyPh.D.
Individuals with social anxiety have been shown to have higher levels of friendship impairment and greater difficulty establishing close relationships than persons without social anxiety. However, the mechanisms associated with such impairment have not been widely examined. Previous research suggests that deficiencies in prosocial behaviors (e.g., low warmth, limited self-disclosure, and constrained cooperation) during interpersonal exchanges may partially explain their difficulties developing close relationships. The present study aimed to examine the effect that rejection may have on prosocial behaviors, as well as other factors associated with developing and maintaining friendships, including trust, perceived likeability, closeness/connectedness, using an iterated, computerized version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Participants with high (n = 56) and low (n = 35) social anxiety were asked to play the PD game with another participant (actually an experimental confederate) whom they met at the start of the study. Participants were led to believe that they were playing the PD game against the other participant but were actually playing against a computer that was programmed with a strategy meant to initially facilitate cooperation. Cooperation, or giving, in the PD game was measured primarily by the number of tokens that the participant shared with his/her partner. Additionally, participants were randomized to either rejection or non-rejection conditions. Partway through the study, those in the rejection condition were exposed to a programmed decrease in giving by their partner as well as an ambiguous in-person rejection (administered by the experimenter). Participants in the non-rejection condition were not exposed to either the programmed or in-person manipulations. Outcomes of interest included total giving during the PD game, constriction of giving, and the use of particular strategies following rejection in the PD game, as well as various measures of relationship quality collected at the end of each round of play. It was hypothesized that individuals with high social anxiety in the rejection condition would exhibit less total giving and a constricted response to low partner giving and also be less likely to use prosocial strategies to encourage cooperation (i.e., a coaxing strategy) following rejection by the partner compared to those with low social anxiety in the rejection condition. Additionally, we anticipated that those with high social anxiety in the rejection condition would provide lower ratings of the following relationship quality domains following the rejection condition: trust, closeness/connectedness, and perceived likeability than those with low social anxiety in the rejection condition. Overall, results provided little support for these hypotheses. However, there were several significant main effects that highlighted differences among those with high and low social anxiety. For example, individuals with high social anxiety had greater ratings of the expectancy of future rejection and of the importance of their next turn for maintaining the quality of their relationship with their partner. Additionally, there was a trend level (p = .08) social anxiety group by rejection condition interaction on the participant’s trust of his/her partner, such that those with high social anxiety exhibited reductions in relationship trust following rejection whereas those with low social anxiety did not. Implications of these findings as well as limitations and future directions of study are also explored.
Temple University--Theses
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Hanley, James E. « The role of non-cooperative games in the evolution of cooperation / ». view abstract or download file of text, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9986740.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-123). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Sandbank, Daren. « ANALYTICAL SOLUTION, AGENT BEHAVIORAL TRANSITIONS AND CLASSIFICATION STRUCTURES IN N-PERSON SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES ». Diss., The University of Arizona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194612.
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This dissertation presents the analytical solution, agent behavioral transitions and classification structures in N-person social dilemma games. The specific model in this research uses Pavlovian agents making decisions in a cellular automaton environment with linear payoff functions. This effort culminated in four papers being submitted to journals that publish in this field of study. The first paper demonstrates that the analytical solution to the N-person Prisoners' Dilemma game discussed in previous literature fails when the learning factors are unequal. The paper then derives a more general analytical solution that corrects this issue. The second paper analyzes agent behavior and transitions extending over all social games. Three plateaus are identified. It is found that the agents in each plateau have a significantly different behavior. The transitions between these plateaus are analyzed. Previous literature indicates that there are indeed transitions, but offers no explanations. The third paper presents under what conditions the analytical solution is applicable. The previous literature implies the analytical solution is always applicable in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. This paper thoroughly analyzes for which games the analytical solution actually works and concludes that it applies in the Chicken game with the parameter S slightly negative. The fourth paper views the N-Person Social Dilemma model from a new perspective based on dynamic system theory. Thirteen cases or games are identified. These cases plot the state transition formula, which is a quadratic curve with linear payoff functions, versus the 45 degree line. From case diagrams the solution structures are readily apparent without the use of simulation. Also, additional information concerning proper selection of parameter values is provided above the traditional approach. The case diagrams can be used by modelers to easily develop and validate models for specific applications. There is no previous literature viewing N-person social dilemma games from this system theoretical perspective.
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Levati, Maria Vittoria. « Individuals behaviour in social dilemma games and the role played by persuasion : theory and experiments ». Thesis, University of York, 2000. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/14042/.
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Antinyan, Armenak <1987>. « Three essays on social preferences, social dilemmas and taxation ». Doctoral thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/4669.
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The dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 studies other-regarding preferences of decision makers in the domain of losses. The framework of the Dictator Game is modified by introduction of a bi-directional monetary loss. Chapter 2 studies the interaction of individuals with heterogeneous characteristics in a social dilemma. The framework of the Public Goods Game is modified, by manipulating the endowment sources of the individuals included in the same group. Chapter 3 studies whether providing information on the national public expenditure to the taxpayers and whether involving taxpayers in the process of allocating tax revenues over public goods influence the level of the adequate tax rate- the fraction of income that individuals consider adequate to pay as taxes.
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Izquierdo, Luis R. « Advancing learning and evolutionary game theory with an application to social dilemmas ». Thesis, Manchester Metropolitan University, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.444030.
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Papadomichelakis, Giorgos. « Essays on the Economics of Social Dilemmas ». Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/670052.
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The purpose of this dissertation is to study specific cases of all those aforementioned questions in a number of different settings, all of which share one common characteristic of particular economic relevance. The settings that will be studied all involve a two-ways interaction of an individual with the group of his peers. More specifically, the essays in this thesis are concerned with a problem classified in the literature under the umbrella term of, “Social Dilemma” (Olson 1965, Kollock, 1998). A social dilemma is any strategic situation (in the game-theoric sense of the term) in which there is a conflict between individual and collective interest. To be more precise, the defining characteristics of a social dilemma situation is that everyone collectively is better off if everyone cooperates towards a specific action, but each one individually is better off defecting, regardless of the actions of others. The famous “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (Rappoport and Chammah, 1965) is a classical example showcasing the conflict of interest.
The reason why social dilemmas are interesting from an economist’s perspective, is because this conflict of interest is at the heart of many issues of economic importance, such as labor productivity, public finance, crime and environmental policy among others. Understanding the drivers of individual behavior, as well as the interaction of individuals within a group, and identifying problematic points to these interactions is the key to the design of the appropriate policies, and this thesis aims to contribute towards that goal.
Two distinct cases of social dilemma, represented mathematically as two seminal games, are studied. These two cases are a standard public good game augmented by the presence of a mechanism for the enforcement of cooperation, and a social learning game, where information can only be communicated among the individuals of the group through their actions. As explained before, what connects these two games, is the interdependence of actions and payoffs of their players, as well as the misalignment between individual, and collective best, creating a classical problem of externalities.
These two cases are formally defined, their respective equilibria and other features are identified, and potential welfare-improving mechanism are discussed. An additional common element of these two studies, that constitutes another point of contribution of this body of work, is that I study the role of mechanisms that do not solely rely on the provision of extrinsic (monetary) incentives, as it is the standard approach of the economic literature. In the public good game case, I model the role of endogenous norms that reinforce cooperation among agents and how it interacts with the presence of a punishment mechanism for defectors. In the case of the social learning game, the mechanism to address the inefficiencies that I shall demonstrate, is one that relies on the strategic disclosure of available information, instead of a provision of payoff-relevant incentives to implement the socially optimal behavior. Finally, this thesis which is primarily involved with theoretical analysis of social dilemma problems, is supplemented with a laboratory experiment on social learning, aimed at both testing empirically the propositions of the theoretical work, and other hypotheses that remain ambiguous in the literature.
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Lindahl, Therese. « Strategic and environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas ». Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (EFI), 2005. http://web.hhs.se/efi/summary/674.htm.
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Lemoine, Ida, et Peter Fredin. « How Does Ego Depletion Affect Moral Judgments and Pro-social Decisions ? » Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Nationalekonomi, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-111858.
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BACKGROUND: Today’s societal changes, including high rate of change and increasing information flows, are increasing the demand on the individual mental capacity. It becomes increasingly difficult to analytically process all the different dilemmas and everyday decisions as individuals have a limited mental capacity available to make these decisions. Thus, it has been suggested that ego-depleted relies more heavily on intuition, which is less burdensome, when making decision. However little is known about to what extent intuitive decisions differ from analytic. Are ego-depleted individuals more or less likely to maximize outcome in moral dilemmas involving conflicting values? Do ego depleted individuals become more or less willing to cooperate? Do ego depleted individuals become more or less altruistic? Is our intuition more or less in accordance with Homo Economicus?AIM: Starting from a Dual Process perspective on decision-making the aim of this study is to examine how ego depletion affects moral judgment and pro-social decisions.METHOD: A laboratory experiment involving 115 subjects, using real monetary incentives, was conducted among students at Linköping University. Subjects were randomized into one of two treatments. Everything was identical across treatments except for the initial ego-depletion manipulation. Using a standard paradigm for ego-depletion subjects in treatment 1 were put under high cognitive load while subjects in treatment two were put under low cognitive load. Subjects faced 16 questions divided into four different decision tasks: Moral dilemmas, Public Goods game, two types of Dictator Game where the type of sacrifice subjects could make in order to contribute money to charity was varied.RESULTS: Subjects in the high cognitive load treatment made fewer consequentialists moral judgments compared to other subjects (p = 0.075). The effect is especially strong when looking only at high-conflict dilemmas such as Crying Baby. No difference between treatments was found for the public goods games. In the dictator game involving monetary sacrifice subjects donated less money to charity when put under high cognitive load. However the finding was not significant (p = 0.292). No difference was found in the dictator game involving effort as personal sacrifice since almost everyone chooses to donate to charity.CONCLUSION: According to The Dual Process perspective this essay shows that intuitive thinking does not evidently lead to that they makes decision that more or less is in accordance with Homo Economicus. The connection between ego depletion and pro-social decisions is more complex. Further research needs to investigate which different mental shortcuts that individuals uses in various types of pro-social decisions and why intuitive and analytical decision-making differ between different decisions. Further research within the area can identify potential mechanisms and policies that can support individuals’ capacity to make decisions in accordance with their own and society’s preferences.
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Jourdheuil, Romain. « Le rôle des émotions morales dans l'analyse des dilemmes sociaux : la gratitude au coeur des relations entre agents économiques ». Thesis, Bordeaux, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016BORD0296/document.
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Cette thèse étudie le rôle des émotions morales dans le choix des agents lorsqu’ils font face à undilemme social. Lors des deux premiers chapitres, nous présentons une revue de littérature étendue, quimobilise des recherches en économie expérimentale, psychologie sociale et gestion des organisations, afin decerner comment les émotions morales, et en particulier la gratitude, influent sur la prise de décision des agentséconomiques. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous nous intéressons, à travers une revue des travaux en économiecomportementale, à l’intégration progressive du rôle des émotions dans les modèles économiques. Nousmontrons ainsi en quoi cette intégration, concomitante à l’apparition des modèles dits de « préférencessociales », permet de représenter de manière plus réaliste le processus de décision des agents, dans dessituations où les comportements économiques observés expérimentalement remettent en cause une visionégoïste et matérialiste des êtres humains. Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous présentons en détail le jeu du bienpublic, ainsi que les principaux résultats expérimentaux qui lui sont associés, pour mieux saisir en quoi ilconstitue un cadre propice à l’analyse formelle de l’influence des émotions morales. Enfin, notre travailaboutit, dans les cinquième et sixième chapitres, à l’élaboration d’un modèle original en économiecomportementale, qui vise à analyser comment l’émergence des émotions morales peut influencer, à la fois enstatique et en dynamique, le choix stratégique des individus dans le jeu du bien public et comment l’ajoutd’une phase de récompense peut renforcer la coopération entre les partenairesThis thesis studies the role of moral emotions in the decision making of agents when they face asocial dilemma. The first two chapters present a large literature review, which gathers research inexperimental economics, in social psychology and in the management of organizations, in order to delineatethe way moral emotions, and specifically gratitude, are able to influence the economical decision process. Inthe third chapter, through a review of works in the field of behavioral economics, we take an interest in theprogressive integration of moral emotions into economic modeling. We thus show how this integration, whichis concurrent with the emergence of social preferences models, allows agents' decision-making processes to berepresented in a more realistic way, in situations where the behaviors that are observed empirically challengean egoistic and materialistic vision of people. In chapter four, the public good game is presented in detail,along with the main experimental results associated with it, in order to understand why this game suits theformal analysis of moral emotions' influence. Finally, our work culminates in the development of an originalmodel in behavioral economics, during chapters five and six, which aims at assessing how the emergence ofmoral emotions can influence, both statically and dynamically, the strategic choice of individuals in the publicgood game, and how the introduction of a reward phase can promote cooperation and help individuals todevelop good interpersonal relationships
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Wu, Marcio Jolhben. « Análise do efeito do investimento inicial no dilema do prisioneiro contínuo iterado simultâneo e alternado na presença e ausência de ruído em diferentes cenários de incerteza : contrapondo as estratégias RTS e LRS por meio da simulação bas ». Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/47/47132/tde-02032016-153429/.
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O dilema do prisioneiro é geralmente visto como o ponto de partida para entender o problema da cooperação. Em comparação com o dilema do prisioneiro discreto e iterado, poucos estudos existem sobre o dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado. A maioria dos trabalhos que investigaram o dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado concentrou-se no período de 1990 a 2000, não obtendo resultados conclusivos sobre a melhor estratégia a ser adotada neste tipo de jogo. Duas estratégias diferentes se destacam neste tipo de dilema. A primeira é a estratégia RTS (Raise-the-Stakes) de Roberts e Sherrat (1998) que testa o terreno antes de aumentar os investimentos na relação. A segunda deriva do modelo LRS (Linear Reactive Strategies) de Wahl e Nowak (1999a). Esta última estratégia estando em equilíbrio de Nash cooperativo apresenta três características: (i) generosidade, i.e., investir o máximo possível no início da relação de cooperação; (ii) otimismo, i.e., contar com o melhor cenário para as próximas rodadas, e (iii) intransigência. Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo principal contrapor as estratégias RTS e LRS num dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado, na presença e ausência de ruído, com jogadas simultâneas e alternadas e para diferentes valores do parâmetro w (probabilidade de interagir novamente). Restringimos a nossa análise a um conjunto de seis estratégias: ALLC, ALLD, TFT, RTS, LRS e RTSM. O método utilizado foi o da simulação baseada em agente (ABM) no formato de torneios, semelhante ao de Axelrod (2006), Roberts & Sherratt (1998), Nowak & Sigmund (1992) e Nowak & Sigmund (1993). Utilizamos o software Netlogo e documentamos todo o processo da concepção e construção do modelo por meio da ferramenta TRACE (TRAnsparent and Comprehensive model Evaludation). Os resultados mostram que as estratégias mais cooperativas são mais favorecidas quando o jogo consiste em jogadas alternadas ao invés de simultâneas. A estratégia RTS teve melhor desempenho em jogos simultâneos para valores intermediários de w, na presença ou ausência de ruído. Por sua vez, a estratégia LRS teve melhor desempenho nos jogos simultâneos, na presença ou ausência de ruído, ou alternados e na presença de ruído, em ambos os casos para valores grandes de wThe prisoner\'s dilemma is generally seen as the starting point for understanding the problem of cooperation. In comparison with the discreet and iterated prisoner\'s dilemma, few studies exist on the continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma. Most of the works that have investigated the continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma has concentrated in the period from 1990 to 2000, not getting conclusive results on the best strategy to be adopted in this type of game. Two different strategies stand out in this kind of dilemma. The first is the RTS strategy (Raise-the-Stakes) of Roberts and Sherrat (1998) that tests the ground before increasing investment in the relationship. The second is the model deriva LRS (Linear Reactive Strategies) de Wahl and Nowak (1999a). This last strategy being in Nash equilibrium cooperative presents three characteristics: (i) generosity, i.e., investing as much as possible at the beginning of the cooperation relationship; (ii) optimism, i.e., rely on the best scenario for the next rounds, and (iii) intransigence. This research has as main goal to reconcile opposing RTS strategies and LRS in a continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma, in the presence and absence of noise, with simultaneous moves and alternate and for different values of the parameter w (probability of interacting again). We restrict our analysis to a set of six strategies: ALLC, ALLD, TFT, RTS, LRS and RTSM (halfway between RTS and LRS). The method used was the agent-based simulation (ABM) in tournament format, similar to that of Axelrod (2006), Roberts (1998), Sherratt & Nowak & Sigmund (1992) and Nowak & Sigmund (1993). We use the NetLogo software and document the whole process of design and construction of the tool model TRACE (TRAnsparent and Comprehensive model Evaludation). The results show that most strategies are more favoured unions when the game consists of alternating plays rather than simultaneous. The RTS strategy had better performance in simultaneous games for intermediate values of w, in the presence or absence of noise. In turn, the IRS strategy had better performance when simultaneous games, in the presence or absence of noise, or switched, and in the presence of noise, in both cases, for large values of w
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Tavoni, Alessandro <1977>. « Essays on fairness heuristics and environmental dilemmas ». Doctoral thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/1036.
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The issues explored in this work concern individual behaviour and its departure from the rationality paradigm. While different in terms of underlying methodology, the chapters share the unifying theme of
fairness as a guiding principle for human behaviour, as well as a focus on its relevance for environmental dilemmas.Le questioni affrontate nella tesi riguardano i comportamenti individuali e i relativi scostamenti dal paradigma di razionalità. Nonostante l'utilizzo di metodologie diverse nei tre capitoli, essi hanno in comune il tema unificante di equità come principio guida del comportamento umano, così come una particolare attenzione alla sua rilevanza nei dilemmi ambientali.
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Mienaltowski, Andrew S. « Age Differences in Interpersonal Problem Solving : Examining Interpersonal Conflict in an Iterated Prisoner s Dilemma Game ». Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/24709.
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Studies of life span development in everyday problem solving suggest two trajectories of change in adulthood: individuals become less effective at solving well-defined instrumental problems but more effective at managing ill-defined interpersonal problems. Two experiments were conducted to examine the ability of young and older adults to effectively manage an interpersonal problem that has a well-defined measure of instrumental success. Participants played an iterated Prisoner s Dilemma game with same-age, computer-simulated strangers (Experiment 1) and friends (Experiment 2). Success was dependent upon one s ability to put aside self-interest and cooperate with a partner. Computer-simulated partners reciprocated the participants decisions 100% of the time or behaved in a more self-interested manner. Young and older adults tendencies to create conflict with the reciprocating partner and their defensive reactions to the selfish partner were examined. Although young adults outperformed older adults when playing the game on their own, they did not carry this performance advantage into the interactive rounds. In fact, despite their success when playing alone, young adults were no more successful than older adults when interacting with others. Young and older adults both cooperated more with friends than with strangers and more with the reciprocating partner than the selfish partner. However, when the participants first interaction was with a selfish stranger, older adults were more cooperative than young adults and consequently accrued more reward. This is consistent with previous research demonstrating that older adults use more passive interpersonal problem solving strategies than young adults, and it also partially supports the prediction that advancing age leads to more effective strategy implementation when solving interpersonal problems.
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Mischkowski, Dorothee [Verfasser], Andreas [Akademischer Betreuer] Glöckner, Andreas [Gutachter] Glöckner, Stefan [Gutachter] Schulz-Hardt et Peter [Gutachter] Lewisch. « Decision Time in Social Dilemmas – Personality and Situational Factors Moderating Spontaneous Behavior in First and Second Order Public Good Games / Dorothee Mischkowski ; Gutachter : Andreas Glöckner ; Stefan, Schulz-Hardt ; Peter Lewisch ; Betreuer : Andreas Glöckner ». Göttingen : Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen, 2020. http://d-nb.info/120554464X/34.
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Kaltwasser, Laura. « Influence of interpersonal abilities on social decisions and their physiological correlates ». Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Lebenswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17435.
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Das Konzept der interpersonellen Fähigkeiten bezieht sich auf Leistungsaufgaben der sozialen Kognition. Diese Aufgaben messen die Fähigkeiten Gesichter zu erkennen und sich diese zu merken sowie Emotionen zu erkennen und diese auszudrücken. Ziel dieser Dissertation war die Untersuchung des Einflusses von interpersonellen Fähigkeiten auf soziale Entscheidungen. Ein besonderer Fokus lag auf der Quantifizierung von individuellen Unterschieden in zugrundeliegenden neuronalen Mechanismen. Studie 1 erweiterte bestehende Evidenz zu Beziehungen zwischen psychometrischen Konstrukten der Gesichterkognition und Ereigniskorrelierten Potentialen, welche mit den verschiedenen Stadien der Gesichterverarbeitung (Enkodierung, Wahrnehmung, Gedächtnis) während einer Bekanntheitsentscheidung assoziiert sind. Unsere Ergebnisse bestätigen eine substantielle Beziehung zwischen der N170 Latenz und der Amplitude des frühen Wiederholungseffektes (ERE) mit drei Faktoren der Gesichterkognition. Je kürzer die N170 Latenz und je ausgeprägter die ERE Amplitude, umso genauer und schneller ist die Gesichterkognition. Studie 2 ergab, dass die Fähigkeit ängstliche Gesichter zu erkennen sowie die generelle spontane Expressivität während der sozialen Interaktion mit prosozialen Entscheidungen korreliert. Sensitivität für das Leid anderer sowie emotionale Expressivität scheinen reziproke Interaktionen mit Gleichgesinnten zu fördern. Studie 3 bestätigte das Modell der starken Reziprozität, da Prosozialität die negative Reziprozität im Ultimatum Spiel beeinflusste. Unter der Verwendung von Strukturgleichungsmodellen entdeckten wir, dass Menschen mit ausgeprägter Reziprozität eine größere Amplitude der relativen feedback-negativity auf das Gesicht von Spielpartnern zeigen. Insgesamt sprechen die Ergebnisse dafür, dass die etablierten individuellen Unterschiede in den Verhaltensmaßen der interpersonellen Fähigkeiten zum Teil auf individuelle Unterschiede in neuronalen Mechanismen zurückzuführen sind.The concept of interpersonal abilities refers to performance measures of social cognition such as the abilities to perceive and remember faces and the abilities to recognize and express emotions. The aim of this dissertation was to examine the influence of interpersonal abilities on social decisions. A particular focus lay on the quantification of individual differences in brain-behavior relationships associated with processing interpersonally relevant stimuli. Study 1 added to existing evidence on brain-behavior relationships, specifically between psychometric constructs of face cognition and event-related potentials associated with different stages of face processing (encoding, perception, and memory) in a familiarity decision. Our findings confirm a substantial relationship between the N170 latency and the early-repetition effect (ERE) amplitude with three established face cognition ability factors. The shorter the N170 latency and the more pronounced the ERE amplitude, the better is the performance in face perception and memory and the faster is the speed of face cognition. Study 2 found that the ability to recognize fearful faces as well as the general spontaneous expressiveness during social interaction are linked to prosocial choices in several socio-economic games. Sensitivity to the distress of others and spontaneous expressiveness foster reciprocal interactions with prosocial others. Study 3 confirmed the model of strong reciprocity in that prosociality drives negative reciprocity in the ultimatum game. Using multilevel structural equation modeling in order to estimate brain-behavior relationships of fairness preferences, we found strong reciprocators to show more pronounced relative feedback-negativity amplitude in response to the faces of bargaining partners. Thus, the results of this dissertation suggest that established individual differences in behavioral measures of interpersonal ability are partly due to individual differences in brain mechanisms.
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Furlong, Ellen Elizabeth. « Number Cognition and Cooperation ». Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1216999104.
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Graminho, Juliana de Moura Jorge. « Contribuições da teoria dos jogos à gestão de desempenho : estudo de múltiplos casos com líderes da indústria ». Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2013. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/1088.
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Juliana de Moura Jorge Graminho.pdf: 1170913 bytes, checksum: 91d83f81518d7f11fdbf377bebc29853 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2013-10-24Ties and cooperation between employer and employee has been hurt by the current environment that emphasizes short term predominantly. Thus, to influence coopera-tion and, therefore, to get engagement and high performance from employees has been a major challenge for employers and leaders in companies. In this sense, this dissertation aims to investigate cooperatives and/or deserters (non-cooperative) de-cisions regarding to the binomial reward-performance between employee and em-ployer, within the organizational context, through Game Theory applied to a study of multiple cases, in an adapted version of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The survey, con-ducted with ten employees of an industry, showed that over the last seven years there was no complete congruence and reciprocity between performance delivered by the employee to the employer and the reward given by the employer to the em-ployee. These results reinforce the premise that not all decisions regarding the re-ward and performance take into account past decisions and no seek to maximize results. Consequently, high performance is not reinforced and perpetuated, and in the same way the poor performance finds conditions for spreading. Finally, these re-search findings allowed reflect on what policies and practices can be adopted to achieve cooperation, engagement, high performance and a best collective result
Vínculo e cooperação entre empregador e empregado têm sido afetados pelo ambi-ente organizacional que enfatiza resultados de curto prazo. Estimular cooperação para obter engajamento e alto desempenho dos empregados é um grande desafio para empregadores e líderes nas empresas. Considerando as tensões entre compe-tição e cooperação, esta dissertação objetiva investigar as decisões cooperativas e/ou desertoras (não cooperativas) relativamente ao binômio recompensa-desempenho entre empregado e empregador no âmbito organizacional, à luz da Teoria dos jogos. Trata-se de um estudo de múltiplos casos em uma versão adapta-da do Dilema do Prisioneiro. A pesquisa, realizada com dez empregados de uma indústria, demonstrou que, no decorrer dos últimos sete anos, não houve plena con-gruência e reciprocidade entre desempenho entregue pelo empregado ao emprega-dor e a recompensa oferecida pelo empregador ao empregado. Os resultados mos-tram, não é sempre que todas as decisões quanto à recompensa e desempenho consideraram decisões passadas e que também não é sempre que todas buscam maximizar resultados. Consequentemente, o alto desempenho não é reforçado e perpetuado, da mesma forma que o baixo desempenho encontra condições para se propagar. A pesquisa permitiu ainda a reflexão sobre quais políticas e práticas po-dem ser adotadas para alcançar a cooperação, o engajamento, alto desempenho e um melhor resultado coletivo
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Tseng, Ting-han, et 曾亭翰. « A Study of Multi-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma and Social Structure in Online Games ». Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/17243579137455079504.
Texte intégralRésumé :
碩士國立中山大學
高階經營碩士班
104
In recent years, the development of computer games have moved toward mobile devices, but the life cycle of a game is significantly decreasesing. Because of lowering the threshold for game development, many new entrants would join the competition and change the market with less cost. On the other hand, because of the different environment and characteristics of smartphone and personal computer, the player''s gaming habits has also been changed. Faced with such fierce competition, some game designers try to adopt a series of mechanisms to improve product profitability, enable these players to compete with each other, and guide the players to an iterative multiplayer prisoner''s dilemma. The Prisoners’ Dilemma is usually viewed as a Game Theory and emphasize on the ratioanl interaction among players. However, investigations require a multi-person model of the game to understand what the problem that people have had. Much has writton about the two-agent iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma game. Some studies claim the simulation of multi-agent games are based on mutualinteractions among the agents. A stochastic learning model that Macy created has asserted that threshold effects would shift the relation ships of agents from a defective equilibrium to cooperation. This study attempts to use Agent-based model to examine the effect of various user-based parameters (payoff curve, participant personality, neighbor rang, iteration numbers) in an iterative multiplayer prisoner''s dilemma game. This tool is suitable for an unlimited number of participants with various personalities, and can be used to try to figure out the critical point of the participants'' strategy transferred from Nash equilibrium to cooperation. The critical point represents the final ratio of cooperators in the game, and also represents the end of the product life, so the iteration number required to reach the critical point can be considered as the product life cycle. When the gap between the traitor’s payoff curve and the cooperator’s payoff curve is greater, the critical point is lower, and the product life is shorter. In addition, when the neighbor range is smaller, the product life is longer; the participant personality and the initial distribution have significant effect on the product life, and it will significantly affect the final distribution of participants. The product life of a game has a clear relevance with the design of these parameters. A game designer would extend the product life by adjusting these parameters. In addition, this study asserts that social behaviors are the catalsts to the social system cooperation.
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Duradoni, Mirko. « Modelling of reputational dynamics - Applications with telematic environments ». Doctoral thesis, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2158/1188666.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) can facilitate the achievement of both EU Societal Challenges objectives and UN Sustainable Development Goals. However, to fully exploit ICT's potential and thus effectively solve global-scale problems, it is fundamental to understand how human beings relate to ICT and which dynamics exist within the environments made available by new technologies (e.g., virtual environments).
The present work is structured as follows. The first part is focused on collective problem-solving and decision-making within ICT. Numerical simulations (i.e., agent-based modeling) have been performed to highlight which interaction/environmental characteristics (such as group size, task complexity, the ratio of cooperators within the group) are important to reaching large scale cooperation and thus overcome well-known psychological phenomena that usually hinder human cooperation (e.g., free-riding, Ringelmann effect, sucker effect).
The second part concerns reputation effects in virtual environments. Indeed, reputation has been often used in web-based systems to enhance people's cooperation levels. Several empirical experiments based on game theory (e.g., ultimatum game) have been carried out online. Through these experiments, it was possible to estimate how much people rely on reputation in their decision making, how much their fairness is affected by reputational score, and whether online reputation can induce biases. Moreover, how reputation is built in online interactions (i.e., which factors contribute to define an individual's reputation) has been investigated.
Finally, in the third part, a particular human-ICT interaction behavior (i.e., phubbing) has been studied. Phubbing has been often defined in terms of psychopathology. However, phubbing can be reasonably linked also to the increased availability of virtual social environments. Data were collected through online questionnaires and surveys and a multidimensional model for phubbing was produced. On the one hand, the obtained model clarify which are the phubbing's antecedents and thus make possible to assess users’ phubbing potential risk. On the other, the model provides useful insights for dedicated mobile device settings to help reduce ICTs’ pervasivity for potential phubbers.
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Tremayne, Kell. « Social value orientation and contextual cues influence cooperation and trustworthiness ». Thesis, 2009. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/487763.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The higher than predicted levels of cooperation in social dilemmas have motivated others to develop social preference models of behaviour (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2001; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). However, norm-based models of behaviour in social dilemmas (Bicchieri, 2006) may complement social preference models. Six experiments examined the impact of situational cues on cooperative and trustworthy behaviour of proself and prosocial introductory psychology students within a single-play Prisoner’s dilemma or modified Trust game. Using 195 participants, the first study supported the hypotheses that prosocial participants subjectively transformed the Prisoner’s dilemma into a coordination problem and made choices based on these subjective transformations, while proself participants preferred and made choices that reflected the incentive structure of the Prisoner’s dilemma. Findings suggested that the sequential nature of the Prisoner’s dilemma promoted cooperative behaviour in prosocial participants and non-cooperative behaviour in proself participants. The finding that situational cues moderated the predictive value of social value orientation was explored in later studies. In Study 2, using 222 participants, the stimuli for selfish, cooperative, and altruistic expectations were developed for a modified Trust game in Study 3. Using 228 participants in Study 3, proselfs displayed significantly less trustworthiness, compared to prosocials, in the selfish and altruistic trust conditions. However, the difference between the two social value orientations was attenuated in the cooperative trust expectation. Study 4 removed the possibility that participants were acting differently because they did not believe they were playing against a real person. Using 218 participants, proselfs in the high immediacy condition (face-to-face) compared to the low immediacy condition (anonymous) displayed significantly more trustworthiness in response to selfish expectations. This finding suggested that expectations associated with trust and the immediacy of social influence moderated individual differences based on social value orientation. Study 5 proposed and tested a model by which expectations associated with trust activated or deactivated social norms that mediated trustworthy behaviour. Using 265 participants, this study replicated the findings of the selfish and cooperative trust condition in Study 3, although it found no significant difference in the reaction times that underlie the proposed psychological mechanisms mediating trustworthy behaviour. In the altruistic trust condition, proselfs did not significantly keep more money than prosocials, yet displayed significantly faster reaction times for the compliance construct. In the previous studies of this thesis, situational cues had impacted prosocial participants, compared to proself participants, to a lesser extent. One possible reason for this was that prosocials, when playing with an interactive other, were guided by shared expectations of equality, irrespective of the situational cues within the experiment. In Study 6, prosocial participants played against a computer, in which the computer randomised choices between the decision to cooperate and defect. With shared expectations of behaviour absent in this design, prosocial participants cooperated significantly less in a sequential Prisoner’s dilemma when their interactive partner was a computer, compared to another participant. Overall, these findings suggested that situational cues influenced proselfs and prosocials differently. Proselfs were more likely to resist the temptation to take advantage of trust if cooperative expectations were either made salient or in response to a selfish expectation from an immediately-present partner. Furthermore, the findings proposed a social norm perspective of decision making which complemented social preference models of behaviour in interdependent situations.
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Chita-Tegmark, Mihaela. « Social interactions and the prisoner's dilemma game : new measures of cognitive and behavioral phenotypes ». Thesis, 2018. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/33085.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Healthy social interactions are critical for children’s development and academic and life success. Relevant research is found in two key disciplines with different emphases: Developmental psychology focuses on individual thoughts, motivations and traits; and behavioral economics and game theory focuses on behavioral tasks. This project integrated these approaches by validating a game-theoretic task for children, the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD), and demonstrated how it can be used to elucidate the mechanisms underlying children’s social interactions.
I developed a novel RPD with fixed-strategy partners in order to test specific hypotheses based on developmental theories of social interaction. Children between 9 and 11 years of age (N = 167) were tested on the RPD followed by questions about how they played and interpreted the task. Parents completed a questionnaire assessing their child’s reactive and proactive aggressive traits, a basis for predicting decisions in the RPD. Children also completed a Social Information Processing (SIP) task with novel positive scenarios in addition to standard negative ones.
I hypothesized that: 1) children would interpret the RPD as a real social interaction and engage in strategic forms of play according to game theory; 2) children with different levels of reactive and proactive aggression would show different patterns of RPD play based on theories of aggression; 3) the SIP responses would predict different levels of cooperation in the RPD, and the positive scenarios would generate responses consistent with the general SIP theory.
Results showed support for the first hypothesis with classes of motivations (interpersonal and strategic self-interest) predicting RPD behavior. The second hypothesis was partially confirmed: Children rated high on reactive aggression showed reactive responses in the RPD. This analysis also revealed an important novel finding that high-reactive children followed a game-theoretic strategy known as “Grim” – they did not return to cooperation after partner defection. The third hypothesis was partially confirmed: Responses for the positive scenarios were consistent with the SIP model but did not predict RPD play.
These findings demonstrate the value of integrating theoretical and methodological approaches from developmental psychology and game theory in order to study the mechanisms of social interaction.
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Silva, Rui Miguel Constantino da. « The investor behavior on extreme situations of speculation and crash : a game theory approach based on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma ». Master's thesis, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/12422.
Texte intégralRésumé :
JEL Classification System: C73; G01The present dissertation aims to develop an analysis to the investor behavior on situations of speculation and crash on stock markets. An approach to the main investor behavioral features is made, mainly the ones related with cognitive and decision-making questions in order to obtain an individual and the aggregate behavioral profile of the investor on situations of extreme events. Thus, the present work is structured on two main parts. The first one is related to the literature review about the definition of the investor, mainly considering questions linked to rationality, information processing, motivations and needs and properties which define the decision making process; contextualized the main problem of the study. In this part the events that leaded to the stock crashes of 1929 and 2000 were selected. On the second part (from Chapter 4) a concrete analysis to the behavior of the investor is made for these events through game theory, particularly, making use of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma model to a sub-game that possesses as the main problem the existence, between players, of cooperation attitudes, aiming the maintenance of their positions or even their investments on overvalued assets, which are the main cause of the speculative bubble, and defection, which implies the opposite posture. The possibility of cooperation among the agents is inferred for a brief period of time, being demonstrated also that the equilibria were unstable for these situations.
A presente dissertação visa proceder a um estudo do comportamento do investidor em situações de especulação e crash nos mercados bolsistas. É efectuada uma abordagem às características comportamentais do investidor, sobretudo as que se relacionam com questões do foro cognitivo e de escolha, de modo a obter um perfil tanto individual como agregado do comportamento do investidor em eventos extremos. Deste modo o presente trabalho encontra-se estruturado em duas partes. A primeira relaciona-se com uma abordagem à literatura existente relativamente à definição do investidor, particularmente nas questões vocacionadas com a racionalidade, processamento de informação, motivações e necessidades e propriedades que influenciam a tomada de escolha, com uma definição do problema subjacente ao presente estudo, seleccionando para tal os eventos que implicaram os crashes bolsistas de 1929 e 2000. Numa segunda parte (a partir do Capitulo 4) é efectuada uma análise concreta ao comportamento do investidor nesses mesmos eventos via modelação pela teoria dos jogos, em particular, através da aplicação do Dilema do Prisioneiro Iterativo a um sub-jogo que possui como problema-base a existência entre jogadores de atitudes de cooperação, para manutenção das posições ou mesmo investimento em activos sobreavaliados e que são o foco da bolha especulativa, e não cooperação, que implica a atitude contrária. Acabou por ser inferida a possibilidade de existência de cooperação entre os agentes por um curto espaço de tempo, tendo os equilíbrios obtidos demonstrado instabilidade.