Sommaire
Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Sistema di vigilanza »
Créez une référence correcte selon les styles APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard et plusieurs autres
Consultez les listes thématiques d’articles de revues, de livres, de thèses, de rapports de conférences et d’autres sources académiques sur le sujet « Sistema di vigilanza ».
À côté de chaque source dans la liste de références il y a un bouton « Ajouter à la bibliographie ». Cliquez sur ce bouton, et nous générerons automatiquement la référence bibliographique pour la source choisie selon votre style de citation préféré : APA, MLA, Harvard, Vancouver, Chicago, etc.
Vous pouvez aussi télécharger le texte intégral de la publication scolaire au format pdf et consulter son résumé en ligne lorsque ces informations sont inclues dans les métadonnées.
Articles de revues sur le sujet "Sistema di vigilanza"
AMOROSINO, SANDRO. « I SISTEMI DI VIGILANZE PUBBLICHE SUI MERCATI FINANZIARI : DAI MODELLI ALL'EFFETTIVITA' ». BANKPEDIA REVIEW 2, no 1 (mars 2012) : 103–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.14612/amorosino_special_issue.
Texte intégralBuscema, Marco. « L'innovazione dei sistemi di vigilanza e le istruzioni per la compilazione delle segnalazioni ». ECONOMIA E DIRITTO DEL TERZIARIO, no 1 (septembre 2014) : 143–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/ed2014-001008.
Texte intégralHadi, Winny Zilkhalida, et Rika Ampuh Hadiguna. « Model Kebijakan Penetapan Institusi Masjid sebagai Shelter dalam Sistem Logistik Bencana di Kota Padang ». Jurnal Optimasi Sistem Industri 14, no 1 (20 avril 2016) : 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.25077/josi.v14.n1.p16-32.2015.
Texte intégralFebrianti, Asterina, Lauditta Irianti et Aldila Hasanah. « Evaluasi Performansi dan Tingkat Kelelahan dalam Upaya Optimisasi Capaian Pembelajaran Sistem Praktikum di Perguruan Tinggi X ». Jurnal Rekayasa Hijau 2, no 1 (9 juillet 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.26760/jrh.v2i1.2042.
Texte intégralMoura, Roudom Ferreira, Ana Paula Miranda Mundim-Pombo, Rosângela Elaine Minéo Biagolini et Janessa de Fátima Morgado de Oliveira. « Epidemia do novo coronavírus (COVID-19) : análise dos indicadores nos três primeiros meses, Estado de São Paulo, Brasil ». ARCHIVES OF HEALTH INVESTIGATION 9, no 4 (6 octobre 2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.21270/archi.v9i4.5102.
Texte intégralThèses sur le sujet "Sistema di vigilanza"
Penzo, Marica. « Le autorità di vigilanza nel sistema penale ». Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3426946.
Texte intégralLa decisa affermazione di un diritto penale improntato al principio di offensività rappresenta il risultato intangibile di un moderno Stato di diritto. S’intende, con ciò, riferirsi all’odierna concezione del diritto penale quale strumento di tutela contro comportamenti concretamente offensivi di beni giuridici ritenuti meritevoli di protezione e promozione da parte dell’ordinamento, espungendo ogni possibile riferimento alla criminalizzazione di mere violazioni di doveri.. Nel nostro ordinamento, il secolare dibattito sul diritto penale dell’offesa non può prescindere da una prospettiva costituzionale: in particolare, lata parte della dottrina sostiene che la Costituzione repubblicana affermi, sia pur non expressis verbis, il principio di necessaria offensività del reato. L’esigenza di un diritto penale dell’offensività, dove il ricorso alla sanzione penale rappresenta effettivamente un’extrema ratio, volta a punire esclusivamente comportamenti concretamente offensivi di ben determinati beni giuridici, si scontra con la proliferazione di interventi legislativi, in particolare nell’ambito del diritto penale dell’impresa e nel diritto penale delle società, orientati alla repressione di comportamenti privi di un concreto orientamento offensivo, che vedono la sanzione penale chiamata a reprimere semplici inosservanze formali. Le conseguenze sul piano delle scelte di penalizzazione dovrebbero essere evidenti: la sanzione penale non dovrebbe scattare solo in presenza di una compiuta aggressione a una situazione individuale, perché l’intrinseca, naturale pericolosità dell’attività d’impresa troverebbe uno spazio troppo ampio sottratto alla disciplina penale, con quasi certe ripercussioni sulla tutela del bene del singolo. Si profila così la necessità di un’anticipazione della risposta sanzionatoria.
Crema, Chiara <1987>. « Il sistema informativo alla luce delle Nuove disposizioni di vigilanza prudenziale per le banche ». Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/4322.
Texte intégralD'Ambrosi, Francesco. « Semplificazione strutturale e razionalizzazione della regolazione ». Doctoral thesis, Universita degli studi di Salerno, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10556/2357.
Texte intégralThis research wants to focalize its attention on the finance world, especially on the financial markets supervision in order to obtain their simplification and rationalisation. After the computer revolution, the world began a “global village” and most part of the economy has suffered a financialisation process; the decrese and the speed up of the economic exchanges in the space and time found its best expression in the speeding up of the financial exchanges. The current interexchanges have made the financial world more complex and in few years it took over politics. Particularly the categories, by which one used to study politics and States life, have no value anymore: the triad territory – state – nation has to be substituted by a sort of local, national, overnational and international interconnected networks. The crisis of the State moved the balance from the executive to the administrative and the legal certanty with the State monopoly has left the place to an interexchangeable sets of rules network. From here the independent authorities are born and they were succesful even thanks tothe process of liberalization-privatization of the economy. Above all in Italy these Authorities were born in a chaotic and no organic way, with a series of overlaps of competences that don’t let understand “who does what”: so it needs simplification and rationalisation. In the financial world, especially all after the crisis in 2007/2008, we understood that the world, as de Larosière report says, was in front of two ways: or to do chacun pour soi or to take again the destiny in its hands, i.e. to try to take back finance under the direction of politics. the UE chose the second hypothesis leaving Lamfalussy care (soft law) and moving to de Larosière care (hard law), as a doctor does towards ills people: he tries to prevent instead of caring. The European regulations in 2010 and the international institutions like G20, FSB, Basel Committee, IOSCO, IFAC, IASB and IAIS, by their standards, tried to put order again in the financial world and to prevent the socalled “systemic risks” (macroprudential supervision), including the microprudential supervision in the most important sectors of finance (banking, insurance, securities) too. So it is necessary to study and know better the international supervision sistems (coordinated inter se) especially the EU Authorities (EBA, ESMA, EIOPA). The UE needed to rationalise the sistem and imposed it by regulations on every member State; in other words the Bank of Italy, CONSOB, IVASS and COVIP (financial indipendent Authorities) began the longa manus of the European Authorities by introducing into the italian system some rules coming directly from Europe, without “passing” through government or parliament way. Considering that the other member States have more less adeguated their “organogram” of Authorities following the UE model, Italy is still late, no because it didn’t adopte the European binding rules, but because it persevered to retain a “set” of inadeguated Authorities for the financial markets challenge. There are a lot of overlaps – interferences of competences between CONSOB and the Bank of Italy, the Bank of Italy and AGCM, whithout considering the “financialisation” of the insurance sector; Germany faced questions like Bankassurance and Allfinanz by BaFin reform, Italy instead persists in a “mixed” model of supervision in which coexists the “pourpose” model (fixed by TUF) and the “sectorial” model (there are specific supervision Authorities in every sector). In the italian system, as Kant says, it is necessery a new criterion of truth that combines empiricism of the American approach (SEC and CFTC) with the organic system and the predictability of the European model. So it is strongly necessary a simplification – reduction of Authorities to two: one in the field of micropudential supervision (Bank of Italy – CONSOB) and one Authority for macroprudential supervision (like UE model); in this way we’ll have a regulation, with overnational legal standards, based on prefixed, general, abstract defined criterions that are possibly “waterproof” for private interests of strong big groups. [edited by Author]
XIV n.s.
Livres sur le sujet "Sistema di vigilanza"
Gualandri, Elisabetta. Sistemi finanziari e normative di vigilanza : Gran Bretagna, Fraancia e Italia. Milano : Giuffrè Editore, 1987.
Trouver le texte intégralGualandri, Elisabetta. Sistemi finanziari e normative di vigilanza : Gran Bretagna, Francia e Italia. Milano : Giuffrè, 1987.
Trouver le texte intégral