Bibliographies thématiques / Sidgwick, Henry

Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Sidgwick, Henry »

Auteur : Grafiati
Publié le 27 juillet 2024
Mis à jour le 28 juillet 2024

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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Sidgwick, Henry"

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SKELTON, ANTHONY. « Schultz's Sidgwick ». Utilitas 19, no 1 (mars 2007) : 91–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820806002378.

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Bart Schultz's Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Sidgwick. In this article, I direct my attention for the most part to one aspect of what Schultz says about Sidgwick's masterpiece, The Methods of Ethics, as well as to what he does not say about Sidgwick's illuminating but neglected work Practical Ethics. This article is divided into three sections. In the first, I argue that there is a problem with Schultz's endorsement of the view that Sidgwick's moral epistemology combines elements of both coherentism and foundationalism. In the second, I argue that Schultz has failed to do justice to Sidgwick's mature views in Practical Ethics. In the final section, I briefly say something about Schultz's suggestion that Sidgwick succumbed to both racism and dishonesty.
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Schultz, Bart. « Eye of the Universe : Henry Sidgwick and the Problem Public ». Utilitas 14, no 2 (juillet 2002) : 155–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800003502.

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Henry Sidgwick has gone down in the history of philosophy as both the great, classical utilitarian moral theorist who authored The Methods of Ethics, and an outstanding exemplar of intellectual honesty and integrity, one whose personal virtues were inseparable from his philosophical strengths and method. Yet this construction of Sidgwick the philosopher has been based on a too limited understanding of Sidgwick's casuistry and leading practical ethical concerns. As his friendship with John Addington Symonds reveals, Sidgwick was deeply entangled in an effort to negotiate the proper spheres of the public and private, not only in philosophical and religious matters, but also with respect to explosive questions of sexuality – particularly same sex actions and identities, as celebrated by Symonds and other champions of Oxford Hellenism and Whitmania. His willingness to mislead the public about such issues suggests that Sidgwick's utilitarian casuistry was rather more complex and esoteric than has been recognized.
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Schultz, Bart. « Henry Sidgwick ». Philosophers' Magazine, no 9 (2000) : 58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20009103.

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Lazari–Radek, Katarzyna. « The Methods of Ethics Henry Sidgwicka, czyli poszukiwanie świeckiej moralności ». Etyka 41 (1 décembre 2008) : 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.14394/etyka.655.

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W artykule przedstawiono postać Henry Sidgwicka oraz główne założenia i recepcję jego najważniejszego dzieła The Methods of Ethics. Myśl Sidgwicka, w Polsce znana marginalnie, wpłynęła na współczesną dyskusję filozoficzną w większym stopniu niż teorie Benthama czy Milla i to nie tylko w obrębie utylitaryzmu i konsekwencjalizmu, ale również teorii umowy społecznej czy etyki cnoty. Kwestie moralne, które Sidgwick omawiał w The Methods, w dużym stopniu wynikły z obecnego w historycznych i społecznych realiach wiktoriańskich kryzysu powstałego na tle konfliktu wiary i rozumu. Myśl Sidgwicka zrodziła się z dwu bodaj najbardziej charakterystycznych symptomów owego okresu: zainteresowania nauką i wiary w postęp oraz sceptycyzmu w stosunku do religii. Zarówno w swym wielkim dziele jak i w życiu osobistym Sidgwick dowiódł, iż rzeczą podstawowej wagi było dla niego poszukiwanie prawdy. Świadectwem jego oddania prawdzie było to, że po racjonalnym dojściu do konkluzji sprzecznych z jego utylitarystycznymi „preferencjami”, uznał, iż istnieją dwie ostateczne, nie dające się ze sobą pogodzić zasady moralne — utylitarystyczna zasada życzliwości oraz egoistyczna zasada roztropności.
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Shaver, Robert. « Henry Sidgwick (review) ». Journal of the History of Philosophy 41, no 4 (2003) : 569–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2003.0068.

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Skorupski, John. « Desire and Will in Sidgwick and Green ». Utilitas 12, no 3 (novembre 2000) : 307–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800002910.

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This paper examines T. H. Green's and Henry Sidgwick's differing views of desireand the will, and connectedly, their differing views of an individual's good and freedom. It is argued that Sidgwick makes effective criticisms of Green, but that important elements in Green's idealist view of an individual's good and freedom survive the criticism and remain significant today. It is also suggested that Sidgwick's own account of an individual's good is unclear in an important way.
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Harrison, Ross. « Cambridge Philosophers VI : Henry Sidgwick ». Philosophy 71, no 277 (juillet 1996) : 423–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003181910004167x.

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The philosophy department in Edinburgh is in David Hume tower; the philosophy faculty at Cambridge is in Sidgwick Avenue. In one way, no competition. Everybody (who's anybody) has heard of Hume, whereas even the anybody who's anybody may not have heard of Sidgwick. Yet in another way, Sidgwick wins this arcane contest. For if David Hume, contradicting the Humean theory of personal identity, were to return to Edinburgh, he would not recognize the tower. Whereas, if someone with more success in rearousing spirits than Sidgwick himself had could now produce him, Sidgwick would know the avenue. For he planned it; he partially paid for it; and he pushed it past the local opposition. He was its creator. And creator not just of the avenue: if Sidgwick is not quite the only begetter, it was he more than anyone who was responsible for building the school of philosophy in Cambridge which is being celebrated in this series of articles.
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DEIGH, JOHN. « Sidgwick's Epistemology ». Utilitas 19, no 4 (12 novembre 2007) : 435–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820807002737.

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This article concerns two themes in Bart Schultz's recent biography of Henry Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe. The first is the importance of Sidgwick's conflict over his religious beliefs to the development of his thinking in The Methods of Ethics. I suggest that, in addition to the characteristics of Methods that Schulz highlights, the work's epistemology, specifically, Sidgwick's program of presenting ethics as an axiomatic system on the traditional understanding of such systems, is due to the conflict. The second is the relative neglect into which Methods fell in the first part of the twentieth century, neglect Schultz attributes to changes in philosophical fashions and to the undue influence of the Bloomsbury literati on British intellectual culture. I suggest that there is a deeper explanation, which lies in Sidgwick's program of presenting ethics as an axiomatic system on the traditional understanding of such systems. Such programs, I argue, became obsolete in analytic philosophy owing to changes in how axiomatization in mathematics was understood that resulted initially from the rise of non-Euclidean geometries and ultimately from the collapse of Frege's and Russell's logicism.
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Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna. « Czym jest przyjemność ? – Czy definicja Henry’ego Sidgwicka jest wciąż aktualna ? » Etyka 49 (1 décembre 2014) : 23–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.14394/etyka.477.

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Utylitarysta hedonista twierdzi, że jego moralnym obowiązkiem jest bezstronne maksymalizowanie przyjemności dla możliwie jak największej liczby istot zdolnych do jej odczuwania. Czym jednak jest owa przyjemność? Henry Sidgwick, filozoficznie najbardziej skrupulatny z hedonistów, definiuje przyjemność jako „pożą dany stan świadomości”. W pierwszej częś ci artykułu przyjrzę się szczegółowo temu, co Sidgwick miał do powiedzenia w kwestii przyjemności. W części drugiej przedstawię niektóre najnowsze wnioski badań empirycznych i zastanowię się, jaki wpływ mogą one mieć na definiowanie przyjemności przez Sidgwicka. Czy pragnienie zawsze towarzyszyć musi przyjemności? Czy świadomość jest koniecznym warunkiem do jej zaistnienia? Czy można porównywać ze sobą przyjemności i cierpienia? Wnioski skłonią mnie do postawienia pytania wyjściowego do kolejnych rozważań o możliwość użycia badań naukowych w dyskusjach filozoficznych.
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Mariz, George. « Essays on Henry Sidgwick ». History : Reviews of New Books 21, no 1 (juillet 1992) : 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1992.9950744.

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Thèses sur le sujet "Sidgwick, Henry"

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Geninet, Hortense. « La politique chez Henry Sidgwick ». Thesis, Reims, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012REIML007/document.

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La thèse porte sur la conception de la politique moderne d'Henry Sidgwick fondée sur une étude philosophique et historique de la politique par philosophe lui-même et des travaux que celui-ci a réalisé sur la politique et l'organisation d'un gouvernement moderne
The thesis is about Henry Sidgwick's concept of modern politics based on a philosophical and historical study of politics by the philosopher himself, and the written work he made about politics and the organisation of a modern government
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LEPRONI, CHIARA. « Henry Sidgwick e il dibattito tardo-vittoriano sull'idea di libertà ». Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/107.

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Il presente lavoro mira a collocare il pensiero di Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) sul diritto alla libertà all'interno del background culturale inglese dell'epoca tardo-vittoriana, dedicando una particolare attenzione ad un confronto con la speculazione, il metodo ed i risultati ottenuti di due eminenti filosofi della medesima generazione, Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) e Herbert Spencer (1820-1903).
The study aims to connect the thought of Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) about liberty with British intellectual background of the late-Victorian age, paying a special attention to a comparison of it with the philosophy, the methods and goals of two important philosophers of his generation, Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) e Herbert Spencer (1820-1903).
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LEPRONI, CHIARA. « Henry Sidgwick e il dibattito tardo-vittoriano sull'idea di libertà ». Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/107.

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Il presente lavoro mira a collocare il pensiero di Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) sul diritto alla libertà all'interno del background culturale inglese dell'epoca tardo-vittoriana, dedicando una particolare attenzione ad un confronto con la speculazione, il metodo ed i risultati ottenuti di due eminenti filosofi della medesima generazione, Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) e Herbert Spencer (1820-1903).
The study aims to connect the thought of Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) about liberty with British intellectual background of the late-Victorian age, paying a special attention to a comparison of it with the philosophy, the methods and goals of two important philosophers of his generation, Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) e Herbert Spencer (1820-1903).
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Krishna, Nakul. « The morality of common sense : problems from Sidgwick ». Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f2ac036e-115d-4e02-b5a8-cd6ab40f0800.

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Much modern moral philosophy has conceived of its interpretative and critical aims in relation to an entity it sometimes terms 'common-sense morality'. The term was influentially used in something like its canonical sense by Henry Sidgwick in his classic work The Methods of Ethics (1874). Sidgwick conceived of common-sense morality as a more-or-less determinate body of current moral opinion, and traced his ('doxastic') conception through Kant back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and the practice of Plato's Socrates before him. The Introduction to this thesis traces the influence of Sidgwick's conception both on subsequent (mis)understandings of Socratic practice as well as on the practice of moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The first essay offers a challenge to Sidgwick's understanding of Socratic practice. I argue that Socrates' questioning of his interlocutors, far from revealing some determinate body of pre-existing beliefs, is in fact a demonstration of the dynamic and partially indeterminate quality of common-sense morality. The value for the interlocutor of engaging in such conversation with Socrates consisted primarily in its forcing him to adopt what I term a deliberative stance with respect to his own practice and dispositions, asking himself not 'what is it that I believe?' but rather, 'what am I to believe?' This understanding of Socratic practice gives us a way of reconciling the often puzzling combination of conservative and radical elements in Plato's dialogues. The second essay is a discussion of the reception of Sidgwick's conception of ethics in twentieth-century Oxford, a hegemonic centre of Anglophone philosophy. This recent tradition consists both of figures who accepted Sidgwick's picture of moral philosophy's aims and those who rejected it. Of the critics, I am centrally concerned with Bernard Williams, whose life's work, I argue, can be fruitfully understood as the elaboration of a heterodox understanding of Socratic practice, opposed to Sidgwick's. Ethics, on this conception, is a project directed at the emancipation of our moral experience from the many distortions to which it is vulnerable. Williams's writings in moral philosophy, disparate and not entirely systematic, are unified by these emancipatory aims, aims they share with strains of psychoanalysis except in that they do not scorn philosophical argument as a tool of emancipation: in this respect among others, I claim, they are fundamentally Socratic.
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Bazard, Philippe. « Les fondements de l'économie du bien-être et la révision de l'utilitarisme : l'héritage de Henry Sidgwick ». Paris 1, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997PA010074.

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Cette thèse, centrée sur la pensée de Henry Sidgwick, s'intéresse aux débats qui ont permis à l'économie du bien-être de se constituer en discipline autonome au sein de la théorie économique. Les travaux de Sidgwick en économie et en philosophie morale montrent que l'auteur est un des premiers économistes à proposer une analyse de l'intervention de l'état sur la base du principe utilitariste. Ceci lui permet de prendre en compte l'efficacité économique et la justice distributive. La démarche employée par Sidgwick pour justifier les ingérences étatiques dans le domaine économique consiste en une étude des conséquences de l'adoption de l'hypothèse d'égoïsme éclairé des agents. L'auteur parvient ainsi à montrer que les décisions individuelles égoïstes sont le plus souvent incompatibles avec l'intérêt général, renouant ainsi avec la question des limites adéquates de la sphère d'intervention de l'état déjà abordée par Bentham et par Mill. Toutefois, la démarche de Sidgwick est étayée par une compréhension originale des comportements individuels. En effet, Bentham et Mill pensent que l'individu demeure le meilleur juge de ses propres intérêts. En dehors de ces cas, les interventions autoritaires de l'état ne sont pas justifiées du point de vue utilitariste. Or, pour Sidgwick, même des individus "sains de corps et d'esprit" ne sont pas, dans de nombreux cas, les meilleurs juges de leurs intérêts. L'adoption de l'hypothèse individualiste ne permet donc pas de déboucher sur un résultat socialement désirable. Les apports de Sidgwick à l'utilitarisme permettent de comprendre les travaux de ses contemporains. Il s'avère que les divergences avec Marshall sont dues à l'évolutionnisme spencérien qui constitue la source d'inspiration de ce dernier, en éthique et en économie. Son influence s'étend aussi à G. E. Moore et à J. M. Keynes. Sidgwick a suscité les critiques de Spencer pour qui l'évolution tend à favoriser le développement des sentiments égoïstes raisonnables qui assureront la convergence entre intérêts privés et collectifs. Enfin, l'influence sur Edgeworth est la plus importante car ce dernier admet l'idée que les principes d'action égoïste et utilitariste sont irréductibles l'un à l'autre et montre que la concurrence entre individus égoïstes doit être supplée par l'arbitrage utilitariste
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an explanation of the appearance of welfare economics within economic science. The economical and philosophical works of Henry Sidgwick show that this author brings in his utilitarianism in the analysis of state intervention in a different way than Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill. Sidgwick aims at showing that even if we adopt the hypothesis of an economic agent who still remains the "better judge of his own interest", we cannot demonstrate that the aggregated result will be the maximisation of overall utility. Hence, in numerous cases, even if the individuals are, as is commonly assumed, enlightened self-interest, we can show how individual economic interactions fail to achieve a socially desirable outcome. The study of Sidgwick's reappraisal of utilitarianism allows to understand some of his famous contemporaries. Concerning marshall, the divergences between these two cambridgians are due to the latter's adoption of an evolutionary view of man. This theory propounded by spencer was to be vigorously attacked by Sidgwick. But Sidgwick's influence can be extended to g. E. Moore, J. M. Keynes and Edgeworth who seems to have been his disciple
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Ebenstein, Alan Oliver. « The greatest happiness principle : an examination and critique of the theory of utility ». Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.268170.

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Koci, Sébastien. « De Mill à Kant : l'éthique utilitariste de Henry Sidgwick : étude et traduction de "The Methods of Ethics" ». Thesis, Strasbourg, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020STRAB011.

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Notre travail doctoral comporte deux volets dépendants l’un de l’autre. Un volet sur la traduction du livre de H. Sidgwick, Les Méthodes de l’éthique. Un second volet sur le commentaire de ce livre qui attend une traduction en français depuis 1874. C’est un effort de compréhension à travers le processus de traduction. Notre problématique générale est d’analyser la tentative de Sidgwick de concilier l’inconciliable, c’est-à-dire les intérêts privés de l’égoïste rationnel et la recherche du bonheur général, ce que Sidgwick nomme le « dualisme de la raison pratique ». Cette tentative s’inscrit dans un pluralisme complexe où les trois méthodes induisent une dialectique opératoire. Cela le rapproche de John Rawls, dont nous comparons les méthodologies respectives, et les éthiques sacrificielles. C’est aussi l’occasion de confronter Henry Sidgwick à John Stuart Mill et Emmanuel Kant, de mettre à jour la rationalité de son éthique et de comprendre comment il utilise l’intuitionnisme philosophique dans son système utilitariste
Our doctoral work has two mutually dependent components. One part is on the translation of Henry Sidgwick’s book, The Methods of Ethics. A second part on the commentary of this book who has been waiting for a French translation since 1874. It is an effort of understanding through the process of translation. Our general problematic is to analyze Sidgwick’s attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, that is, the private interests of the rational egoist with the search for general happiness, what Sidgwick calls the “dualism of practical reason”. This attempt is part of a complex pluralism in which the three methods induce an operative dialectic. This brings him closer to John Rawls, whose respective methodologies we compare with sacrificial ethics. It is also an opportunity to confront Henry Sidgwick with John Stuart Mill and Emmanuel Kant, to update the rationality of Sidgwick’s ethics and to understand how he uses philosophical intuitionism in the elaboration of his utilitarian system
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Addison, Rachel Helen. « The problem of moral ambivalence : revisiting Henry Sidgwick's theory of 'Rational Benevolence' as a basis for moral reasoning, with reference to prenatal ethical dilemmas ». Thesis, University of Exeter, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/27454.

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This thesis addresses the conflict traditionally found within moral philosophy between deontological and utilitarian schools of thought. Using the example of the serious moral ambivalence experienced by individuals who are deciding whether to end or continue a difficult pregnancy, it is argued that this ambivalence is the result of both absolute principles (such as the intrinsic value of human life) and outcome based considerations (such as the desire to avoid causing pain and suffering) appearing to be morally reasonable, while also being fundamentally opposed: Each course of action is at once morally defensible on the basis of its own reasonableness, and, conversely, reprehensible due to the reasonableness of the other. This lived experience of moral ambivalence is directly reflected by the tension between deontology and utilitarianism as it occurs at the moral philosophic level, where the deontological emphasis on the unconditional rightness of certain principles is seen to be at irreconcilable odds with the utilitarian emphasis on the attainment of certain ends. The thesis’ central claim is that such ambivalence strongly indicates that human morality is neither exclusively one type or the other, and that both types of moral property are in fact reasonable, and thus have moral value. It is theorised that accounting for this dual reasonableness would lead to the most accurate and helpful representation of the human moral experience – but that the philosophic ‘divide’ between the two types of principle has led to an either/or situation, which has largely prevented this sort of understanding from being developed. The thesis argues that Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick developed a view in which neither deontological nor utilitarian principles can be fully realised without reference to the other, precisely on the basis that both can be found to be ultimately rational. This thesis aims to revitalise that theory – represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’ - to show that Sidgwick reconciled the divide between absolute and end based principles in such a way that the relationship between them becomes a ‘synthesis’. In this synthesis, deontological and utilitarian concepts are both seen as essential components of morality, that combine to form a dynamic whole in which the value of each principle is both indicated and naturally limited by the value of the other, on account of their respective rationalities. It is argued that this provides a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of the human moral experience, and better moral justification for either course of action in situations of complex and sensitive ethical decision making.
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Chiu, Yi-Kai, et 邱奕凱. « Henry Sidgwick\'s Methods of Ethics and The Dualism of Practical Reason ». Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qs8f45.

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碩士
國立政治大學
政治學系
107
This thesis focuses on the ethical thinking and related discussions of Henry Sidgwick’s Method of Ethics (ME). In this book, Sidgwick elucidated and discussed the mutual relations of three kinds of methods that are used in common people’s moral thinking: Egoism, Intuitionalism and Utilitarianism. In terms of the unifying of Egoism and Utilitarianism, Sidgwick discovered that the moral decisions made by common people when they concern about their own interests and about public interest point to two different directions; thereofore, it can not be easily unified as one in theory. Sidgwick called this difficulty as “the Dualism of Practical Reason”. How did he reach this conclusion, and what are the meaning and implication of it? I will start to answer these questions from historical perspective, describing the background of Sidgwick’s early life which has a great influence on his theory and the schools of thought that Sidgwick inherited. The importance of this historical review is to show how Sidgwick created his unique “Intuitional Utilitarianism” by fusing theories which contradict each other. Then I will describe the meaning and related arguments of Reason, Right and Ought in ME as well as how Intutionalism (Common Sense Morality) connects with Utilitarianism. The definition Sidgwick gave to these concepts and the connection between the two methods partly form the Dualism. In addition, the failure of Dualism was a result of his effort to modify Bentham and Mill’s theories by trying to get one ultimate moral criterion from theorical instead of practical point of view. In the final chapter of this thesis, I will elucidate how Sidgwick took Common Sense to justify other two methods and thus restricted the realm of Reason. I regard this as the conservative aspect of Sidgwick’s ME. Besides, I found that the justification of Egoism Sidgwick gave is not complete, which can be a breach leading Egoism to Utilitarianism. However, the conclusion of Dualism of Practical Reason shows that Sidgwick intended to use Egoism to conter Utilitarianism for the purpose of preserving a realm of individual freedom.
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Berthiaume, Maxime. « Le rôle de l'intuition en épistémologie morale ». Thesis, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/25112.

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Ce mémoire porte sur la valeur épistémique des intuitions en éthique. Avoir l’intuition que quelque chose est moralement bon ou mauvais justifie-t-il le fait de croire que cette chose est réellement bonne ou mauvaise? Pour répondre à cette question, je tâcherai d’abord d’expliquer ce qu’est une intuition. Ensuite, j’examinerai les deux grandes familles de théories en épistémologies morale : le fondationnalisme et le cohérentisme. Je me pencherai sur le rôle que l’intuition peut jouer dans ces deux grandes familles et je défendrai que les théories fondationnalistes sont préférables aux théories cohérentistes. Je consacrerai donc la majeure partie de ce mémoire à analyser le rôle que l’intuition peut avoir dans les théories fondationnalistes en épistémologie morale. On nomme « intuitionnistes » les théories fondationnalistes en épistémologie morale qui soutiennent que l’intuition permet de saisir des réalités morales indépendantes de nous. Suivant une distinction d’Henry Sidgwick, j’identifierai trois sortes d’intuitionnisme : l’intuitionnisme perceptuel, dogmatique et philosophique. Je m’attarderai principalement à l’examen de la plausibilité de ces trois théories. Finalement, je présenterai la conclusion à laquelle j’en suis venu à la suite de cet examen, soit que l’intuitionnisme philosophique est la forme d’intuitionnisme la plus plausible et qu’elle peut répondre à plusieurs objections souvent adressées à l’intuitionnisme.
This memoir is about the epistemic value of moral intuitions. Does having an intuition that something is morally right or wrong gives us good reasons to believe that the thing we have the intuition about is right or wrong? To answer this question, I’ll start by explaining what an intuition is. Then, I’ll look into the two biggest theories in moral epistemology: foundationalism and coherentism and how intuition can have a role in both of them. I’ll come to the conclusion that foundationalist theories are preferable to coherentist theories. The rest of the memoir will be a discussion of foundationalist theories in moral epistemology in which moral intuitions are what can justify some foundational beliefs. Those theories are called ‘’intuitionist’’. Following a distinction made by 19th century philosopher Henry Sidgwick, I’ll identify three ways in which intuitionism can be defended: perceptual intuitionism, dogmatic intuitionism and philosophical intuitionism. I’ll explain in details what are those theories and see if they are good theories in moral epistemology. Then, I’ll consider some general objections directed toward intuitionism and see if intuitionism can resist those objections. I come to the conclusion that philosophical intuitionism can resist most of the best objections addressed toward it and that it’s a very plausible theory in moral epistemology.
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Livres sur le sujet "Sidgwick, Henry"

1

Ross, Harrison, et British Academy, dir. Henry Sidgwick. Oxford : Published for The British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2001.

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2

Sidgwick, Henry. Henry Sidgwick : A memoir. Bristol, U.K : Thoemmes Press, 1996.

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3

Bart, Schultz, dir. Essays on Henry Sidgwick. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1992.

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4

Nakano-Okuno, Mariko. Sidgwick and contemporary utilitarianism. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

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5

Congresso Internazionale su Henry Sidgwick (2007 Catania, Italy). Atti del Congresso Internazionale su Henry Sidgwick : Felicità e religione = Proceedings of the world congress on Henry Sidgwick : happiness and religion. Catania : Università degli Studi di Catania, Dipartimento di Scienze Umane, 2007.

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Leproni, Chiara. Metamorfosi della libertà : Henry Sidgwick nel dibattito filosofico tardo-vittoriano. Milano : V&P, 2008.

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Congresso internazionale su Henry Sidgwick (2nd 2009-2010 Catania, Italy). Atti del secondo Congresso internazionale su Henry Sidgwick : Etica, psichica, politica. Catania : Università degli studi di Catania, Dipartimento di scienze umane, 2011.

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8

1838-1900, Sidgwick Henry, Stewart Balfour 1828-1887, Balfour, Arthur James Balfour, Earl of, 1848-1930, James William 1842-1910, Crookes William Sir 1832-1919, Myers, Frederic William Henry, 1843-1901, Lodge Oliver Sir 1851-1940 et al., dir. Presidential addresses to the Society for Psychical Research, 1882-1911. Bristol, U.K : Thoemmes Press, 1996.

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9

Sidgwick, Arthur, et Eleanor Mildred Sidgwick. Henry Sidgwick ;. Arkose Press, 2015.

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Sidgwick, Arthur, et Eleanor Mildred Sidgwick. Henry Sidgwick. Creative Media Partners, LLC, 2018.

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Chapitres de livres sur le sujet "Sidgwick, Henry"

1

Flömer, Lars. « Sidgwick, Henry ». Dans Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL), 1. Stuttgart : J.B. Metzler, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05728-0_20293-1.

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Deane, Phyllis. « Sidgwick, Henry (1838–1900) ». Dans The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–3. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1733-1.

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Schultz, Barton. « Sidgwick, Henry (1838–1900) ». Dans The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–5. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1733-2.

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Schultz, Barton. « Sidgwick, Henry (1838–1900) ». Dans The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 12292–97. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1733.

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Schultz, Bart. « Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) ». Dans The Palgrave Companion to Cambridge Economics, 319–48. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-41233-1_15.

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Csik, Gisela. « Sidgwick, Henry : The Methods of Ethics ». Dans Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL), 1–2. Stuttgart : J.B. Metzler, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05728-0_20294-1.

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Audard, Catherine. « Sidgwick, Henry ». Dans The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, 773–76. Cambridge University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139026741.202.

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« HENRY SIDGWICK ». Dans Ethics and the History of Philosophy, 63–83. Routledge, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315823058-10.

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Schultz, Bart. « Henry Sidgwick ». Dans The Elgar Companion to Alfred Marshall, 561–66. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781035304820.00090.

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Raphael, D. D. « Henry Sidgwick ». Dans Concepts of Justice, 139–49. Oxford University PressOxford, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199245710.003.0013.

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Résumé :
Abstract Sidgwick’s book,The Methods of Ed1ics,first published in 1874, is the most comprehensive and the best-argued version of classical utilitarianism. Its discussion of justice is a little disappointing because it does not face the special difficulty that justice poses for utilitarianism. Nevertheless its admirable analysis of the concept marks a clear advance on earlier treatments. Before proceeding to details of Sidgwick’s account of justice, I shall say something of the general plan of the book. What does Sidgwick mean by themethodsof ethics? He writes of three methods, egoist, intuitionist, and utilitarian. You could say that they are three theories of ethics, three different accounts of moral judgement. Egoism says that actions are properly judged to be right for their contribution to the interest of the agent. Intuitionism says that the judgement of an action as right does not depend on some other consideration; it stands on its own ground as a direct awareness. Utilitarianism says that a proper judgement depends on the contribution of the action to the general interest. Why does Sidgwick not write of them as theories? Because they have a practical as well as a theoretical purpose. They are not simply positive explanations, w1der a w1ifying formula, of what moral judgements have in common; they are also normative justifications that serve to recommend the formula as a guide to resolve practical dilemmas. Each of the theories describes a method of thinking that tends to take place without deliberate design, and also prescribes it for deliberate use when we are uncertain.
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