Articles de revues sur le sujet « Sex discrimination in employment – Law and legislation – Italy »

Is there a sound model for the United Kingdom (UK) to adopt should it decide to legislate against age discrimination in employment? In this article the writer attempts to answer this question first, by outlining existing UK sex and race discrimination laws and then progressing to an examination of long-standing American legislation and caselaw in this area. Finally, it explores the Irish Employment Equality Act, 1998, a composite and comprehensive act which prohibits discrimination in employment based on ‘age’ and eight other grounds. The strengths and weaknesses of each of these laws are examined in turn and measured against each other. The final analysis would suggest that each of these models can usefully inform any future law-making process to a greater or lesser degree and that good practice and legislation can co-exist in harmony. Moreover, the present lack of legislation in the UK against age discrimination in any area but especially employment, is remarkable when compared with British laws on sex and race discrimination and is ultimately unwise in the face of the real need for remedies and, the present and growing expansion in numbers of that portion of the population and the working population which British and European society call ‘old.’

Anti-discrimination legislation and case law dealing with employment discrimination are among the most topical labour law issues in Europe. As a result, The International Journal for Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations has received so many manuscripts on questions related to employment discrimination that we have decided to dedicate a complete issue to this matter. One reason why employment discrimination is such a hot topic is the fact that in recent years extensive EC legislation proscribing employment discrimination has been passed: Directive 2000/43/EC prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin, Directive 2000/78/EC banning discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, and finally Directive 2002/73/EC amending Directive 76/207/EEC barring sex discrimination in employment and occupation. And a correction in the paper by Kees J. Vos (Vol 21.3)

This Article analyzes the application of employment discrimination law to sexual minorities-lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender and intersex individuals. It evaluates Title VII and state anti-discrimination laws' treatment of these individuals, and is the first article to use masculinities research, theoretical and empirical, to explain employment discrimination against sexual minorities. While the Article concludes that new legislation would further the interests of sexual minorities, it posits that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to solving the employment discrimination problems of sexual minorities. A major problem lies in the courts' binary view of sex and gender, a view that identifies men and women as polar opposites, and that sees gender as naturally flowing from biological sex. Without courts' understanding that our current binary concept of gender may be socially constructed and artificially rigid rather than a natural result of biology, even new legislation may fail to protect the workers it seeks to protect. The Article demonstrates that research on masculinities can help courts better understand sexual minorities and the motivations of those who discriminate against them in the workplace. It concludes that even in the absence of new legislation, a proper interpretation of Title VII's sex discrimination provision would protect sexual minorities from discrimination and would provide reasonable accommodation to allow sexual minorities to live and work with dignity and security. With an understanding of sexual minorities and the reasons why discrimination occurs, Title VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of sex" should be sufficient to grant sexual minorities workplace rights.

The article analyses the process of legal mobilization for migrants’ rights and investigates how and with what effects, measured in terms of obtaining general policy response and ensuring implementation, legal actors and in particular civil society organizations have mobilized EU, international and domestic legislation on discrimination to promote migrants’ rights in Italy. It focuses in particular on two issues: access to employment in the public sector and access to welfare. Both issues have generated significant levels of litigation in domestic courts, with increasing involvement of civil society organizations. In relation to both, national legislation has been amended, in accordance with EU law, allowing access to employment in the public sector and extending the area of those that have the right to access to social welfare under equal conditions to categories of migrants protected under EU law. The article outlines the EU, International and domestic legislation on non-discrimination and equality for migrants, provides an overview of how litigation has been used to challenge in court the exclusion of migrants from employment in the public sector and welfare, tracks the process that brought to the reform and litigation in the aftermath highlighting the effects of litigation as a means for policy response and implementation. Discrimination, multilevel protection, migrants, welfare, employment, legal mobilization, policy response, implementation, civil society, courts.

English law lacks a general principle of equality of the kind found in constitutional texts in some other European countries. Legislation embodies a principle of non-discrimination in employment on grounds of sex, race and disability. This body of law stresses formal rather than substantive equality, and defines discrimination in terms of the asymmetrical treatment of individuals rather than by reference to the structural sources of group disadvantage. These conceptual weaknesses are part of the explanation for the relatively limited impact of the legislation on the UK labour market, which continues to be characterized by occupational segregation and persistent pay inequality.

In 2000 the European Community adopted the General Framework Directive aimed at combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation. This important measure followed closely on the heels of the Race Discrimination Directive adopted earlier in the year. The adoption of these measures was made possible after the Treaty of Amsterdam inserted a new Article 13 into the EC Treaty which empowered the Community to adopt measures to combat discrimination on the above grounds, as well as in the fields of sex, race and ethnicity. While Article 13 was greeted with much acclaim, doubts were expressed as to whether or not binding measures would be forthcoming. As it has turned out, such pessimism was unwarranted and the Community has now adopted measures aimed at eliminating discrimination on all the grounds specified in Article 13. The adoption of these directives is, therefore, a highly significant expansion of the Community’s competence and ensures the continued development of the Community beyond its original purely economic focus.

In recent years, the clash between supporters of religious liberty and sexual orientation equality legislation has led to repeated battles both in Parliament and the courts. First came the clashes over the scope of exemptions in employment discrimination legislation for religious groups. The UK Regulations dealing with employment discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation give a limited exception for ‘employment for purposes of an organised religion’, which allows an employer to apply a requirement related to sexual orientation to comply with the doctrines of the religion, or to avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion's followers. A legal challenge brought to the scope of this exception was unsuccessful but, despite that, the exemption has not averted damaging findings of discrimination against the Church of England. The Bishop of Hereford was held to have discriminated unlawfully in blocking the appointment of a practising homosexual to a youth-officer post within the Church of England. The partial success of religious groups in achieving exemption was followed by defeat in the equivalent regulations dealing with discrimination in goods and services, made under the Equality Act 2006, despite the claims of Catholic adoption agencies that they would rather close than place children with same-sex couples.

International ratings confirm that Kazakhstan is a leader in Central Asia in addressing the causes of gender inequality; however, there are still significant gender differences in key areas. In particular, gender discrimination in the labor market is complex: when hiring or dismissing, while restricting access to certain professions and positions, in matters of promotion and career growth, when remuneration is paid for performing the same work, not related to differences in labor efficiency. Discrimination is especially sensitive in relation to pregnant women and women with young children. Discrimination continues with access to social measures for avoiding poverty and in the pension system. Further progress requires more strategically significant and focused actions to identify and bridge the remaining factors of systemic discrimination and gender gaps. In the article, we show the insufficient attention of the legal science of Kazakhstan to the problems of regulation of equality. We present the author’s methodology for analyzing labor and social legislation from the perspective of regulating gender equality, consisting of several assessments: Kazakhstan’s fulfillment of international obligations; implementation of the principle of nondiscrimination in labor and social legislation; administrative and judicial mechanisms to protect against discrimination based on sex; and opportunities for implementing best foreign and international practices for the regulation of equality.

Although only addressed by EU law from 2000, age discrimination has been the theme of quite a few cases before the Court of Justice, with a high proportion decided by the Grand Chamber recently. This is due to the conceptual and theoretical challenges that a prohibition to use age as differentiating factor poses. After all, age has been an important stratifier used to synchronize life courses through welfare State regimes in Europe. Partly due to these traditions, there are stereotypes associated with old age, and young age, that in turn lead to disadvantage in employment. For the same reason, age discrimination frequently intersects with discrimination on other grounds, such as sex, race or disability. EU legislation on age discrimination has sought to accommodate the traditional role of age in employment policy by allowing wider justifications than for other forms of discrimination. This leads to contradictions within the larger field of discrimination law, which may even threaten to dilute its efficiency. This article analyses how recent case law of the Court of Justice, and in particular its Grand Chamber, deals with the theoretical challenges posed by these conflicting demands on age discrimination and on discrimination law at large.

In 1996–97 there were a number of significant decisions which extended the scope of employers' liability for sexual and racial harassment at work, based upon the provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 1976. This article seeks to analyse the impact of these recent cases. It began by considering the relationship between the concepts of ‘harassment’ and ‘discrimination’ and the problems inherent in using the anti-discrimination legislation to deal with harassment and bullying at work; we then focus on the recently demonstrated ‘purposive’ approach of the Employment Appeal Tribunal and Court of Appeal in interpreting the statutes and consider how this combats the weaknesses identified. Alternative forms of relief will be briefly considered, in particular the recently enacted Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The authors, while welcoming the recent decisions, argue that there are some victims of bullying who remain outside the protection of the existing anti-discrimination legislation (as they do not fall within any of the groups identified for protection), notwithstanding the robust advances of the EAT. We suggest that the Protection from Harassment Act may not completely fill this gap.

The article is devoted to the study of foreign experience in legal regulation of fixed-term employment contracts. Fixed-termemployment contracts should be considered as one of the earliest and, accordingly, the oldest forms of non-standard employment. Tur -ning to the concept of the application of fixed-term employment contracts in Ukraine in the near future, it seems appropriate to consider the possibility of their further development through the prism of studying European experience. Indeed, in many European countriesthe fixed-term contracts are quite common and therefore analysis of both positive and negative examples of their legal regulation willbe useful for the future development of labour legislation in Ukraine.The article features an analysis of the relevant legislation of the United Kingdom, Estonia, Italy, Poland and France. It is concludedthat the membership of these states in the European Union has had a significant impact on the evolution of national labour le -gislation. This also applies to the United Kingdom, which had been part of this economic and political union for a long time.The transposition of EU legislation into national law by these countries predetermines the existence of common features betweenthem in the legal regulation of fixed-term employment contracts. This common features include: clear time limits of the employmentcontract, maximum allowable number of renewals enshrined in law, compliance with the principle of non-discrimination, etc.In turn, the implementation of fixed-term employment relationships in each country differs in its uniqueness, which is due to thedomestic tradition of their implementation. For example, in the United Kingdom, the dismissal of an employee due to the expiration ofthe employment contract is considered through the lens of fairness of the employer’s actions, while in Italy the number of fixed-termemployment contracts with a particular employer cannot exceed 30 %.The above circumstances should be taken into account by Ukraine when reforming labour legislation. Indeed, the need to implementCouncil Directive 1999/70/EC is clearly provided for in clauses 1139 and 1140 of the Action Plan for the implementation of theAssociation Agreement between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and theirmember states, on the other hand, approved by Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1106, of 25.10.2017.

The focus of this article is an evaluation of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which imposes duties on public authorities, and the Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002, which gives opportunities to political parties over the selection of candidates. Both of these Acts help to move anti-discrimination law in the United Kingdom away from a concentration on remedies for inconsistent treatment towards the acceptance of the need for positive measures aimed at both protecting and also advancing the position of an under-represented group. The article suggests that the positive measures these Acts exemplify may lead to conflict with the background principle that individuals should be treated with equal concern and respect. The article suggests that this principle underlies the limits to positive action in employment schemes under European Union law (the article includes a consideration of whether such limits apply to election candidacy); it goes on to consider the principle in respect of the limits to positive action authorised by these two Acts that may follow from the Human Rights Act 1998. The article concludes by considering whether the new legislation provides acceptable models for the future.

This article defends the classical liberal view of human interactions that gives strong protection to associational freedom except in cases that involve the use of force or fraud or the exercise of monopoly power. That conception is at war with the modern antidiscrimination or human rights laws that operate in competitive markets in such vital areas as employment and housing, with respect to matters of race, sex, age, and increasingly, disability. The article further argues that using the “human rights” label to boost the moral case for antidiscrimination laws gets matters exactly backwards, given that any program of forced association on one side of a status relationship (employer, not employee; landlord, not tenant) is inconsistent with any universal norm governing all individuals regardless of role in all associative arrangements. The articled also discusses the tensions that arise under current Supreme Court law, which protects associational freedom arising out of expressive activities (as in cases involving the NAACP or the Boy Scouts), but refuses to extend that protection to other forms of association, such as those involving persons with disabilities. The great vice of all these arrangements is that they cannot guarantee the stability of mandated win/lose relationships. The article further argues that a strong social consensus against discrimination is insufficient reason to coerce dissenters, given that holders of the dominant position can run their operations as they see fit even if others do otherwise. It closes with a short model human rights statute drafted in the classical liberal tradition that avoids the awkward line drawing and balancing that give rise to modern bureaucracies to enforce modern antidiscrimination laws.

The article examines the progress towards equality in the practice of the ECtHR and its significant impact on the partnership agreement in de facto alliances. It has been established that over the last thirty-five years, the approaches of the European Court of Human Rights to the issue of the right of same-sex partners to family life and its formal recognition have undergone significant changes. It was found that the issue of discrimination was the subject of a number of cases concerning various rights of homosexual unions. It is substantiated that in the aspect of the right to formal recognition of same-sex partnerships by the state, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case “Oliari and others v. Italy ». It was found that despite many years of case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the provisions of Council Regulation № 2016/1104, not all EU countries have provided legal certainty for same-sex couples, even in the form of civil partnerships (namely, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania). The French experience of regulating the procedure for concluding, essential conditions of a partnership agreement, as well as the procedure for its termination is studied. It is substantiated that taking into account the European integration processes in Ukraine, reforming its private law according to European standards, our state, given the principle of equality and positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms should guarantee partners in de facto unions sex legal certainty. In our opinion, it is optimal to amend the Central Committee of Ukraine and grant the right to conclude civil partnership agreements to persons regardless of the article. At the same time, the IC of Ukraine must maintain a heteronomous approach, ie guarantee the right to marry persons of the opposite sex, which fully complies with Art. 12 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Given that a partnership agreement can be an effective legal regulator of relations between individuals in de facto unions, it is worth borrowing the positive experience of France in improving Ukrainian legislation.

AbstractEquality is a pillar for every democratic society that has the goal of achieving social justice and human rights. The fact is that in every community and activity environment, women are subjected to different treatment in law and reality. This situation is both caused and exacerbated by discrimination in the family, community, and workplace.In general, granting rights to women is the same as granting rights to men, this also applied to the right to employment. Women may work in various fields, inside or outside their homes, either independently or with other people, with government or private institutions, as long as the work is carried out in an atmosphere of respect and courtesy. Women can maintain their religion and avoid the negative impacts of the job on themselves and their environment. The Reformation Order was the most progressive period in the protection of human rights in Indonesia. Various laws and regulations were issued during this period, including legislation on the right to employment for women. This is an effort by the government to eliminate discrimination based on sex which is included in various laws and regulations. The law is required to be fair and gender-responsive to ensure the fulfillment of women’s rights, as well as the right to work for women in the online taxi sector. Based on the principle of equality and the principle of non-discrimination, men and women have equal rights or opportunities to participate in every aspect of social and state life, so that if there is discrimination against women, it is a form of violation of women’s rights.Keywords: Equality; Non-Discrimination; Women’s Right. AbstrakKesetaraan merupakan pilar bagi setiap masyarakat demokratis yang mempunyai cita-cita mencapai keadilan sosial dan hak asasi manusia. Kenyataannya dalam setiap lingkungan masyarakat dan lingkungan kegiatan, perempuan menjadi sasaran dari perlakuan yang berbeda dalam hukum maupun dalam kenyataan yang sesungguhnya. Keadaan ini disebabkan dan juga diperburuk oleh adanya diskriminasi di dalam keluarga, masyarakat dan tempat kerja. Pada umumnya pemberian hak bagi perempuan sama dengan pemberian hak kepada laki-laki, demikian halnya dengan hak atas pekerjaan. Perempuan boleh bekerja dalam berbagai bidang, di dalam ataupun di luar rumahnya, baik secara mandiri maupun bersama orang lain, dengan lembaga pemerintah ataupun swasta, selama pekerjaan tersebut dilakukannya dalam suasana terhormat dan sopan, selama mereka dapat memelihara agamanya, serta dapat menghindari dampak-dampak negatif dari pekerjaan tersebut terhadap diri dan lingkungannya. Orde Reformasi merupakan periode paling progresif dalam perlindungan hak asasi manusia. Berbagai peraturan perundangan-undangan keluar pada periode tersebut, termasuk peraturan perundangan-undangan tentang hak bekerja bagi perempuan. Hal ini merupakan upaya pemerintah untuk menghilangkan diskriminasi berdasarkan jenis kelamin yang dicantumkan dalam berbagai peraturan perundang-undangan. Hukum dituntut untuk berkeadilan dan responsif gender untuk menjamin terpenuhinya hak asasi perempuan, demikian halnya terhadap hak atas pekerjaan bagi perempuan di sektor ojek online. Berdasarkan Prinsip Kesetaraan dan Prinsip Non-Diskriminasi antara laki-laki dan perempuan mempunyai hak atau kesempatan yang sama untuk berpartisipasi dalam setiap aspek kehidupan bermasyarakat dan bernegara, sehingga apabila terjadi diskriminasi terhadap perempuan, hal itu merupakan bentuk pelanggaran terhadap hak asasi perempuan.Kata Kunci: Kesetaraan; Non-Diskriminasi; Hak Perempuan.

This paper addresses the bylaw on prostitution issued by the Bantul authority in May 2007. It specifically examines the relation between the involvement of religious symbolism, the call for public participation and political interests in the legislation process. The paper argues that, on the one hand, the law relates prostitution to issues of immorality, social illness, and the degradation of women due to economic discrimination or sexual exploitation. The subject of prostitution has been extended, covering not only sex workers and pimps, but everyone committing indecent acts, such as showing a ‘sexy’ performance. On the other hand, this regulation is considered to be ambiguous in determining the standard of public morality and, therefore, puts women in a marginalised position. That the implementation of this law contributes to institutionalising the criminalisation against women is another fact which is believed to diminish the meaning of democracy. The government is blamed as taking too much care with procedural democracy but giving less attention to education and employment opportunities.[Artikel merupakan hasil studi peraturan daerah tentang larangan pelacuran yang dikeluarkan oleh Pemerintah Kabupaten Bantul pada Mei 2007. Studi ini menguji keterkaitan antara simbol-simbol keagamaan, partisipasi publik, dan kepentingan politik yang muncul dan menyertai proses legislasi. Penulis berpendapat bahwa pada satu sisi, dalam peraturan tersebut, pelacuran dikaitkan dengan perusakan terhadap nilai agama dan sosial serta penurunan martabat perempuan, terlepas akibat diskriminasi ekonomi atau eksploitasi seksual. Subjek pelacuran ternyata juga diperluas, tidak hanya pekerja seks dan mucikari, tetapi setiap orang yang melakukan perbuatan cabul, seperti berpenampilan seksi. Pada sisi yang lain, ukuran moralitas publik dalam peraturan ini dianggap kurang jelas dan menempatkan perempuan pada posisi yang terpinggirkan. Bahwa penerapan peraturan berimplikasi pada kriminalisasi terhadap perempuan merupakan bukti lain yang dinilai bertentangan dengan substansi demokrasi. Pemerintah dinilai terlalu perhatian pada demokrasi prosedural, tetapi mengabaikan masalah pendidikan dan kesempatan kerja.]

Resumen: Este trabajo muestra cómo el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea aplica de manera transversal la normativa comunitaria sobre discriminación entre hombres y mujeres en el empleo y la ocupación en relación con la tutela preventiva de las trabajadoras en situación de lactancia natural y con la prestación de seguridad social que cubre dicha contingencia. El Tribunal europeo ha ocasionado un significativo cambio en la doctrina judicial española al considerar que la incorrecta evaluación de ries­gos de puestos desempeñados por trabajadoras en situación de lactancia natural es una discriminación directa por razón de sexo. Tal entendimiento conlleva la inversión de la carga de la prueba tanto en el derecho europeo como en el interno, reforzando las garantías procesales de la trabajadora en situación de lactancia. Basta que ésta aporte indicios razonables de riesgos para su seguridad y salud y/o su hijo para que el empleador asuma la carga de demostrar la ausencia del riesgo alegado y la carencia de mó­vil discriminatorio. Se suaviza o elimina con ello la exigencia de los tribunales internos de acreditar la existencia de un riesgo específico para la lactante y/o su hijo, aplicándose la nueva doctrina tanto a la evaluación del riesgo en el puesto de trabajo desempeñado por la lactante como a las diferentes medidas adoptadas por el empleador para evitar el mismo.Palabras clave: evaluación de riesgos laborales, lactancia natural, inversión de la carga de la prue­ba, discriminación por razón de sexo.Abstract: This paper shows how the Court of Justice of the European Union applies Community legislation on discrimination between men and women in employment and occupation in a cross-cutting manner in relation to the preventive guardianship of breastfeeding workers and also to the social security benefit which covers this contingency. The European Court has caused a significant change in Spanish judicial doctrine by considering that the incorrect risk assessment of positions held by breastfeeding workers is discrimination on the basis of sex. Such an understanding implies a reversal of the burden of proof in both European and domestic law, thereby reinforcing the procedural guarantees of the worker. It is sufficient for the latter to provide prima facie evidence of risks to her safety and health and/or her child for the employer to assume the burden of proving otherwise and the absence of discriminatory motive. The requirement of the domestic courts to accredit the existence of a specific risk for the breastfeeding worker and/or her child is thus softened or eliminated, applying the new doctrine both to the evaluation of the risk in the job performed by the breastfeeding worker and in the different measures adopted by the employer to avoid itKeywords: occupational risk assessment, breastfeeding, reversal of burden of proof, sex discrimi­nation

The text shows impact of the EU law on the internal legal order in question sat the edge of competences of the Members States, as matters of civil status stay beyond the exclusive competences of the EU. The ECJ develops previous case-law concerning relation between the non-discrimination rule and sex-orientation in the labor matters. In the light of the Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, the CJEU treated the French PACS concluded by a homosexual couple at the same way as a marriage in spite of the fact that the French legislation had highly differentiated both statuses at the moment when the facts of the case took place. The provisions of “the bank collective agreement, […] under which an employee who concludes a civil solidarity pact with a person of the same sex is not allowed to obtain the same benefits, such as days of special leave and a salary bonus, as those granted to employees on the occasion of their marriage, where the national rules of the Member State concerned do not allow persons of the same sex to marry” create a direct discrimination in the light of the Art.2(2)(a) of Directive2000/78/EC.

Focused on the United Nations since its inception women's rights without any discrimination between men and women, Vchrist right to education, through resistance to discrimination in education Treaty, and their right to enjoy political rights through three international documents is the Political Rights of Women, the Convention on Elimination of All Forms discrimination against women, on civil and political rights, which asked the Member States to abide by securing equality between spouses in the rights and responsibilities of the marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution and the international Covenant. ILO also focused on women's work, issued a number of international conventions in this regard, including the Maternity Protection Convention, and the Convention on the prohibition of night work for women, the Convention on equal pay between male and female workers at the equal value of work, and the Convention on discrimination in employment and occupation. On the basis of the principles of equality and equal opportunities between men and women and a commitment to the principles and international resolutions to abolish all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex, it made Algeria efforts to guarantee women's rights and the equality between men and women in rights and duties, and this was confirmed by the constitutions of the Algerian successive constitutional amendment for the year 2016 and the various legislation the most important of the national Labour and social security and the family Law Act and order No. 76-35 on the organization of education and training modified and complemented.

Abstract The extent to which members of the clergy are considered ‘employees’ for the purposes of secular employment and equality legislation has been the subject of much discussion, but essentially remains a fact sensitive question. The Equality Act 2010 (‘the 2010 Act’) seeks to prevent discrimination on the basis of nine ‘protected characteristics’. While recognizing that the application of the 2010 Act to the variety of clergy offices is ‘not straightforward’, the Church of England (‘the Church’) has opined that an equitable approach to clergy appointments is to proceed as if they were subject to the provisions of the 2010 Act. What follows is in`tended to be a thorough review of the eligibility criteria for clergy appointment in the Church to assess their compatibility with the requirements of the 2010 Act. In addition, particular consideration will be given to Schedule 9(2) to the 2010 Act which makes specific provision relating to religious requirements concerning the protected characteristics of sex, sexual orientation, and marriage and civil partnership. In short, where the employment is for the purposes of an organized religion, such as the Church, requirements which relate to these protected characteristics will not constitute discrimination where they engage the ‘compliance or non-conflict principle’. What these principles mean and how they might operate in practice is discussed below, taking into account the likely canonical and theological justifications for discriminating against certain individuals. Whether the law strikes the right balance between, on the one hand protecting clergy and, on the other, providing the Church with the autonomy to act in accordance with its established doctrine, will be explored in the final analysis.

In Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld (C-205/20) , the Court of Justice was asked to clarify whether a provision under Directive 2014/67 on the proportionality of penalties in the context of posting of workers has direct effect. In CJ v TGSS (C-389/20), the Spanish social security legislation excluding domestic workers from unemployment benefits was under scrutiny in light of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex enshrined in Directive 79/7. In HR Rail (C-485/20), the Court of Justice interpreted the obligation for employers to provide for ‘reasonable accommodation’ for workers with disabilities, including trainees, under Article 5 of Directive 2000/78. In Koch Personaldienstleistungen GmbH (C-514/20), the Court determined whether for the purposes of calculating working time and overtime pay, account should be taken only of the hours actually worked or also of the hours from annual paid leave. Continuing on the importance of the right to annual leave, the Court ruled, in Staatssecretaris van Financiën (C-217/20), on the remuneration of annual leave in situations of permanent incapacity of a worker due to illness. In VB (C-262/20), the Court considered the compatibility of Bulgarian law on the duration of night work for civil servants such as firefighters with Directive 2003/88 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, in MIUR et Ufficio Scolastico Regionale per la Campania (C-282/19), the Court assessed whether the systematic use of successive fixed-term contracts for Catholic education teachers in Italy could be justified by ‘objective reasons’ within the meaning of Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement.

In Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld (C-205/20) , the Court of Justice was asked to clarify whether a provision under Directive 2014/67 on the proportionality of penalties in the context of posting of workers has direct effect. In CJ v TGSS (C-389/20), the Spanish social security legislation excluding domestic workers from unemployment benefits was under scrutiny in light of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex enshrined in Directive 79/7. In HR Rail (C-485/20), the Court of Justice interpreted the obligation for employers to provide for ‘reasonable accommodation’ for workers with disabilities, including trainees, under Article 5 of Directive 2000/78. In Koch Personaldienstleistungen GmbH (C-514/20), the Court determined whether for the purposes of calculating working time and overtime pay, account should be taken only of the hours actually worked or also of the hours from annual paid leave. Continuing on the importance of the right to annual leave, the Court ruled, in Staatssecretaris van Financiën (C-217/20), on the remuneration of annual leave in situations of permanent incapacity of a worker due to illness. In VB (C-262/20), the Court considered the compatibility of Bulgarian law on the duration of night work for civil servants such as firefighters with Directive 2003/88 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, in MIUR et Ufficio Scolastico Regionale per la Campania (C-282/19), the Court assessed whether the systematic use of successive fixed-term contracts for Catholic education teachers in Italy could be justified by ‘objective reasons’ within the meaning of Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement.

In Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld (C-205/20) , the Court of Justice was asked to clarify whether a provision under Directive 2014/67 on the proportionality of penalties in the context of posting of workers has direct effect. In CJ v TGSS (C-389/20), the Spanish social security legislation excluding domestic workers from unemployment benefits was under scrutiny in light of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex enshrined in Directive 79/7. In HR Rail (C-485/20), the Court of Justice interpreted the obligation for employers to provide for ‘reasonable accommodation’ for workers with disabilities, including trainees, under Article 5 of Directive 2000/78. In Koch Personaldienstleistungen GmbH (C-514/20), the Court determined whether for the purposes of calculating working time and overtime pay, account should be taken only of the hours actually worked or also of the hours from annual paid leave. Continuing on the importance of the right to annual leave, the Court ruled, in Staatssecretaris van Financiën (C-217/20), on the remuneration of annual leave in situations of permanent incapacity of a worker due to illness. In VB (C-262/20), the Court considered the compatibility of Bulgarian law on the duration of night work for civil servants such as firefighters with Directive 2003/88 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, in MIUR et Ufficio Scolastico Regionale per la Campania (C-282/19), the Court assessed whether the systematic use of successive fixed-term contracts for Catholic education teachers in Italy could be justified by ‘objective reasons’ within the meaning of Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement.

In recent decades, the international community and the European Union have paid increasing attention to ensuring a sufficiently good level of protection of women’s rights. To achieve this level, international and European bodies and institutions should draw up and adopt various acts and instruments aimed at ensuring the fundamental principle of gender equality. For example, in European Union law, the principle of equality between men and women is reflected in Articles 2 and 3 (3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). These provisions explicitly state that the EU is based on certain values, including equality, and specifically promote equality between men and women. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) also provides for a separate provision which entrusts the Community with the task, in all its activities, of striving to eliminate inequalities and to promote equality between men and women (Article 8 of the TFEU). Next, Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits all forms of discrimination, including on the grounds of sex. In addition to the provisions of primary law, the EU seeks to ensure the principle under analysis by adopting strategies and programs of different scope and content. The Member States of the European Union, including the Republic of Bulgaria, also actively promote respect for the principle of gender equality. Explicit guarantees for its provision are contained in the legislation of the Member States, including at the constitutional level. Despite the measures taken on a global, European and national scale, the unequal treatment of women around the world persists. Most often, differences in the treatment of men and women are observed in the social sphere, employment and pay, healthcare, access to education, political, economic and social activities. The existence of these differences leads to the conclusion that it is necessary for the international community, the European Union and its Member States to adopt and implement even more targeted actions, policies and measures to ensure adequate protection of women’s rights.

Women in Universities Women have been fighting for the right to participate in universities since 1873, when Sophia Jex Blake went to court with her fight to enrol at Edinburgh University. In rejecting her application, one of the judges stated: It is a belief, widely entertained, that there is a great difference in the mental constitution of the two sexes, just as there is in their physical conformation. The powers and susceptibilities of women are as noble as those of men; but they are thought to be different, and, in particular, it is considered that they have not the same power of intense labour as men .... (Scutt 224) In Australia, from the 1850s to the 1880s, both the University of Sydney and The University of Melbourne refused to admit women as students. In 1879, the Chancellor of the University of Sydney suggested that: The best course to be taken by advocates of advanced education for women, would be to found some sort of affiliated college for them in the vicinity of the University ... if there really be a widespread wish on the part of young women for a higher education ..." (Scutt 228). Having finally won the right to study at university in 1881, and to enter the academic workforce, women are still finding many of the old prejudices remain. Numerous studies have demonstrated that women's experiences in academe are qualitatively different from men's and that women are systematically paid lower salaries than men of equivalent academic achievement, age and length of service (Bagilhole 431-47; Loder 713-4; McElrath 269-81;). Studies have shown that differences in the experiences of male and female faculty are largely explained by gender (Booth & Burton 312-33; Everett 159-75; Over & Lancaster 309-18; Ready 7) and sex discrimination is highlighted as an ongoing contributor to the inequity (Allport 5-8; Hall & Swadener 1; Tuohy 8). A recent UNESCO-Commonwealth (http://www.unesco.org/) report states that: ... in spite of advances which women have made in many areas of public life in the past two decades, in the area of higher education management they are still a long way from participating on the same footing as men. With hardly an exception, the global picture is one of men outnumbering women at about five to one at middle management level and at about twenty to one at senior management level (Singh 4). The introduction in Australia of Sex Discrimination legislation (http://www.hreoc.gov.au/sex_discrimination/) in 1984 and more recently, Affirmative Action policies ( http://www.austlii.edu.au/) in employment and promotion rounds in some universities has not improved women's situation to the extent expected. In 1978, women held 16% of full time academic posts while gaining 25% of all higher degrees and 30% of undergraduate degrees (Commonwealth Government statistics cited by Over and McKenzie 61-71). In 1999, 54% of students were women yet women's participation in academe had only increased to 35% (DETYA) (http://www.deet.gov.au/). Women are mainly employed at the lowest academic levels. In 1999, 72% of women were employed at Levels A and B (Associate Lecturer/Lecturer) compared to 46% of men, with only 8% of women reaching Levels D and E (Associate Professor/Professor) compared to 26% of men. Women continue to be clustered in the traditionally female areas of Health, Education and Arts while few seem to have successfully broken through the barriers in the traditionally male areas of Engineering, Architecture or Agriculture (DETYA) (http://www.deet.gov.au/). Business has traditionally been viewed as a male preserve but enrolments have increased to the point where women almost equal men. However, the staff ratio of men to women remains very low at 70/30 (DETYA) (http://www.deet.gov.au/). The slow growth rate for women in academe belies the fact that more women than men are now completing university degrees. The purpose of this study was to determine how well the experiences of academic women in the male-dominated faculties of business and commerce, reflect the literature on women in universities, in general. Previous empirical studies have found inequitable treatment of women without necessarily exploring the processes of discrimination. The Study This study involved interviews with academic women who had been employed in faculties of business and commerce for at least five years. The research used the 'snowballing' technique: participants initially comprised women known to me but as these women told female colleagues of my study I was given the names of other women who were willing to participate. Participants comprised twenty-one women from three universities in Western Australia, two universities in New South Wales and one Victorian university. One woman had recently left academe and started her own business because of discriminatory practices she had encountered and another was contemplating leaving. In each university, women comprised a minority of the faculty and felt disadvantaged in some way. A semi-structured interview was used to explore with the women the issues that had been identified from previous studies of sex discrimination in the academic profession. Open-ended questions were used and the interviews conducted face to face, or, in the case of those interstate, via telephone or email. The women spoke frankly about their experiences. Findings and Discussion Promotion Each of the women in this study said that their university had established an internal promotion policy based on merit. However, they felt the greatest problem they had encountered in gaining promotion was in determining the criteria upon which they would be judged each year, and in meeting those criteria. "I have been chasing promotion for over five years. At first I was told that I would not be promoted until I got my masters degree so I worked really hard to complete it but then a male colleague was promoted without a masters. Once I got the masters I was told I needed to publish to be promoted but in the next year someone else was promoted without any publications. You go all out to meet the criteria each year but in the next year the promotions committee changes and so do the criteria for that year"(Lecturer applying for Senior Lecturer position). The promotion procedure at one university was explained by a Senior Lecturer who had served on promotion committees on two occasions. "There are about ten criteria upon which promotion can be based. When the applications are received we all get together to determine which are the criteria to be applied. In the last promotion round only four of the ten criteria were used so only people satisfying those criteria were selected." When asked whether the criteria were the same as the previous year she replied: "Last year there was more emphasis on qualifications and publications. This year community involvement and involvement in university affairs were judged as more important ... it varies from year to year". On questioning about the promotion procedures at their universities, women stated they were largely dissatisfied with the process, that they were presumed to be satisfied with their lot while the men were actively encouraged to apply. "I was told not to bother to apply (for a senior lecturer position) as I would not get it ... that there was a queue of people to be promoted before me - (named males) - and until they were promoted, I would not be considered" (Lecturer). "The position was advertised with a specific male applicant in mind and specifically excluded me by stating that the appointee must have supervisory experience. Women in my department are not given the opportunity to supervise students so I didn't even bother applying."(Lecturer aspiring to a Senior Lecturer position). One woman, upon inquiring why she was not promoted, was told that she should be grateful to have tenure and asked why she wanted to be promoted, anyway. "They would never have said that to a male, they would have expected a male to be working towards promotion" (Associate Lecturer). All women interviewed stated that they had problems keeping up with the 'goal posts' which moved from year to year. The 'moving of the goal posts' is one means by which universities are able to maintain the position of women at lower levels. Unsurprisingly, some women said they felt that promotion at their university was based on politics rather than merit. However, defining merit in universities is problematic. According to Burton (430), definitions of what is meritorious depend upon the power of particular groups to define it and, as a result, can change. The narrow view of merit is 'the best person for the job' which Burton (113) describes as an "overwhelming tendency to select in your own image". Burton (430) and Allport (5) claim universities define merit along male cultural lines with current selection, remuneration and career progression practices strongly influenced by an underlying gender bias. Burton (430) argues that there is still a tendency for work to be ranked as 'men's' or women's work with lower status attributed to the latter and an assumption that different skills and abilities are needed for each. Over and McKenzie (61-71) claim that women are disadvantaged by the fact that invalid merit criteria are applied to them which men as a group are more likely to satisfy. They state that the academic careers of most women do not fit the stereotypic male experience and it is mainly men who decide whether women should be promoted. At one university in the study, the merit criteria for senior lecturer include the requirement that aspirants have a number of overseas conference presentations. "Some of us are single working mothers and overseas conference attendance is out of the question because who's going to mind our children while we are away? The senior males were astonished when I mentioned that this was a problem for me. It had never occurred to them" (Associate Lecturer on why women at her university do not apply for promotion). Family Responsibilities The women commented on the numerous difficulties they had encountered in combining an academic career with responsibility for children. They felt that certain male faculty members perceived married women with children as lacking in career commitment, whereas married men with families were viewed as being more stable and committed to their careers. One married woman claimed that when she needed to go home to tend a sick child, her male Head of Department told her she should "get her priorities right". In 1992, Family Responsibility provisions were added to the Sex Discrimination Act (http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/171/top.htm). However, it would appear that individual practice doesn't always follow as a result of changes in policy. Equal Pay On the subject of equal pay for equal work, the women said that they were often paid lower wages than their male colleagues despite having higher qualifications and equivalent teaching and research experience. Some women felt that the barriers between academic levels were used to artificially maintain the wage gap between men and women, regardless of qualifications and ability. This was felt to be particularly the case between the levels of Associate Lecturer (Level A) and Lecturer (Level B). "They find excuses to keep you at Associate Lecturer so that they can pay you less to do the same work that you would be doing as a lecturer ... lecturing, coordinating units and so on"(Associate Lecturer). "There are no men below Lecturer in my Department, either lecturing or with Masters degrees. As soon as they get their Masters they are promoted to Lecturer.... I'm coordinating units as an Associate Lecturer while some male lecturers have less responsibility' (Associate Lecturer with Masters degree and publications) Two women said that they had been performing higher level duties (Level B) for up to five years while working on their Masters but their university refused to pay them at the higher level until they had completed their degree. Even when they satisfied all the requirements for the Masters degree and had a letter from their supervisor saying they had satisfied all the requirements, the university refused to pay them until they had actually graduated, which was some time later. Shortly afterwards their university took on two men to perform the same duties, paying these at the higher level even though they had not completed a masters degree. One former lecturer claimed that she was employed at a time when there was a large turnover of staff in her department. A number of new staff were appointed of whom she was the only female. Although she and the other new staff were all employed at Lecturer Level B, it wasn't until later on that she discovered that the men were appointed at the top of the Lecturer salary scale while she was appointed at the bottom, with a salary differential of about10 000pa. This was despite the fact that both she and the men had similar qualifications and work experience at commencement. Teaching Loads Another complaint by women concerned inequitable teaching loads. An analysis in one Business School showed that women had higher teaching loads while men were given more time off for research. The women complained that the supervision of post-graduate students was divided up between the men, and women were excluded. Since research publication and student supervision are usually the most highly ranked criteria in academic promotion rounds, women who are not given the opportunity to participate in these areas are disadvantaged when applying for promotion. This problem is compounded since women are overwhelmingly employed at the lower levels where responsibility for the majority of teaching takes place. This leaves them with little time left to devote to research even if given the opportunity. The women also said they were often pressured into taking on higher duties than those prescribed in the Position Classification Standards for their level. They tended to acquiesce because of their need to prove they were better than men to gain promotion. One woman said that the extra administrative duties she had been given meant that she had less time for research which actually reduced her prospects for tenure and promotion. She said she didn't dare complain as the men in her department would use it as an excuse to question her commitment to her job. Conclusion An examination of women's perceptions and experiences in the workplace can help us understand the informal processes that work against women. The experiences of the women discussed in this paper provide an insight into the subtle processes that continue to operate in some higher education institutions to prevent women from reaching their full potential. Although equal opportunity legislation (http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about_the_commission/legislation/index.html) has been enacted to prevent discrimination and disadvantage to women, the implementation of policy does not always filter through to the operational levels. It is still possible to circumvent legislation in subtle ways, perhaps without even being aware that these practices are discriminative. The women in this study spoke frankly about their experiences and the difficulties they had encountered in gaining equal recognition to men, with very few satisfied that they were receiving equitable treatment. The women felt that their work was not valued as highly as that of the men they worked with and they were given less opportunities for advancement. Overall, the interviews with the women revealed interesting insights into their experiences in pursuing academic careers and in trying to gain recognition for their achievements. The collective experiences of the women provide an insight into the subtle ways in which disadvantage can be engendered. The findings of this study have serious implications for university administrators, particularly deans and heads of schools. There are many well-qualified women academics and universities cannot afford to overlook the valuable contribution these women can make to teaching, research and university governance. References Allport, Caroline. "Improving Gender Equity: Using Industrial Bargaining". NTEU Frontline4.1 (1996): 5-8. Bacchi, Carol. "The Brick Wall: Why So Few Women Become Senior Academics". Australian Universities Review36.1 (1993): 36-41. Bagilhole, Barbara. "Survivors in a Male Preserve: A Study of British Women Academics' Experiences and Perceptions of Discrimination in a UK University". Higher Education26 (1993): 431-47. Booth, Alison, and Jonathon Burton. "The Position of Women in UK Academic Economics". The Economic Journal110.464 (2000): 312-33. Burton, Clare. "Merit and Gender: Organisations and the Mobilisation of Masculine Bias." Australian Journal of Social Issues22 (1987): 424-35. Burton, Clare. An Equity Review of Staffing Policies and Associated Decision-making at Edith Cowan University. Report commissioned by ECU. 1994. DETYA. Selected Higher Education Statistics. 1999. Everett, James. "Sex, Rank and Qualifications at Australian Universities". Australian Journal of Management19.2 (1994): 159-75. Hall, Elaine, and Beth Blue Swadener. "Chilly Climate: A Study of Subtle Sex Discrimination at a State University". Initiatives (Online)59.3 (2000): 1. Loder, Natasha. "US Science Shocked by Revelations of Sexual Discrimination". Nature405.6787 (2000): 713-4. McElrath, Karen. "Gender, Career Disruption and Academic Rewards". Journal of Higher Education63.3 (1992): 269-81. Over, Ray, and Sandra Lancaster. "The Early Career Patterns of Men and Women in Australian Universities". The Australian Journal of Education28.3 (1984): 309-18. Over, Ray, and Beryl Mckenzie. "Career Prospects for Women in Australian Universities". Journal of Tertiary Educational Administration7.1 (1985): 61-71. Ready, Tinker. "West Coast US Recognizes Academic Gender Bias". Nature Medicine 7.1 (2000): 1. Scutt, Jocelyn. The Sexual Gerrymander.The Law Printer, 1994. Singh, Jasbir. "Women and Management in Higher Education: A Commonwealth Project." A.C.U. Bulletin of Current Documentation. 133 (1998): 2-8. Tuohy, John. "Sex Discrimination Infects Med Schools: Women Say Bias Blocks Chances for Advancement". USA Today2000. 8. Links http://www.unesco.org/ http://www.deet.gov.au/ http://www.hreoc.gov.au/sex_discrimination/ http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about_the_commission/legislation/index.html http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/disp.pl/au/legis/cth/consol%5fact/aaeofwa 1986634/?query=title+%28+%22affirmative+action%22+%29 http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/171/top.htm Citation reference for this article MLA Style Ellis-Newman, Jennifer. "Women and Work" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 4.5 (2001). [your date of access] < http://www.media-culture.org.au/0111/Ellis-Newman.xml >. Chicago Style Ellis-Newman, Jennifer, "Women and Work" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 4, no. 5 (2001), < http://www.media-culture.org.au/0111/Ellis-Newman.xml > ([your date of access]). APA Style Ellis-Newman, Jennifer. (2001) Women and Work. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 4(5). < http://www.media-culture.org.au/0111/Ellis-Newman.xml > ([your date of access]).

The advent of the #MeToo movement and the scale of participation in 85 countries (Gill and Orgad; see Google Trends) has greatly expanded debate about the revival of feminism (Winch Littler and Keeler) and the contribution of digital media to a “reconfiguration” of feminism (Jouet). Insofar as these campaigns are concerned with sexual harassment and related forms of sexual abuse, the longer history of sexual harassment in which this practice was named by women’s movement activists in the 1970s has gone largely unremarked except in the broad sense of the recharging or “techno-echo[es]” (Jouet) of earlier “waves” of feminism. However, #MeToo and its companion movement #TimesUp, and its fighting fund timesupnow.org, stemmed directly from the allegations in 2017 against the media mogul Harvey Weinstein by Hollywood professionals and celebrities. The naming of prominent, powerful men as harassers and the celebrity sphere of activism have become features of #MeToo that warrant comparison with the naming of sexual harassment in the earlier era of feminism.While the practices it named were not new, the term “sexual harassment” was new, and it became a defining issue in second wave feminism that was conceptualised within the continuum of sexual violence. I outline this history, and how it transformed the private, individual experiences of many women into a shared public consciousness about sexual coercion in the workplace, and some of the debate that this generated within the women’s movement at the time. It offers scope to compare the threshold politics of naming names in the 21st century, and its celebrity vanguard which has led to some ambivalence about the lasting impact. For Kathy Davis (in Zarkov and Davis), for instance, it is atypical of the collective goals of second wave feminism.In comparing the two eras, Anita Hill’s claims against Clarence Thomas in the early 1990s is a bridging incident. It dates from closer to the time in which sexual harassment was named, and Hill’s testimony is now recognised as a prototype of the kinds of claims made against powerful men in the #MeToo era. Lauren Berlant’s account of “Diva Citizenship”, formulated in response to Hill’s testimony to the US Senate, now seems prescient of the unfolding spectacle of feminist subjectivities in the digital public sphere and speaks directly to the relation between individual and collective action in making lasting change. The possibility of change, however, descends from the intervention of the women’s movement in naming sexual harassment.The Name Is AllI found my boss in a room ... . He was alone ... . He greeted me ... touched my hair and ... said ... “Come, Ruth, sit down here.” He motioned to his knee. I felt my face flush. I backed away towards the door ... . Then he rose ... and ... put his hand into his pocket, took out a roll of bills, counted off three dollars, and brought it over to me at the door. “Tell your father,” he said, “to find you a new shop for tomorrow morning.” (Cohen 129)Sexual coercion in the workplace, such as referred to in this workplace novel published in 1918, was spoken about among women in subcultures and gossip long before it was named as sexual harassment. But it had no place in public discourse. Women’s knowledge of sexual harassment coalesced in an act of naming that is reputed to have occurred in a consciousness raising group in New York at the height of the second wave women’s movement. Lin Farley lays claim to it in her book, Sexual Shakedown, first published in 1978, in describing the coinage of the term from a workshop on women and work in 1974 at Cornell University. The group of participants was made up, she says, of near equal numbers of black and white women with “economic backgrounds ranging from very affluent to poor” (11). She describes how, “when we had finished, there was an unmistakable pattern to our employment ... . Each one of us had already quit or been fired from a job at least once because we had been made too uncomfortable by the behaviour of men” (11–12). She claims to have later devised the term “sexual harassment” in collaboration with others from this group (12).The naming of sexual harassment has been described as a kind of “discovery” (Leeds TUCRIC 1) and possibly “the only concept of sexual violence to be labelled by women themselves” (Hearn et al. 20). Not everyone agrees that Farley’s group first coined the term (see Herbert 1989) and there is some evidence that it was in use from the early 1970s. Catherine Mackinnon accredits its first use to the Working Women United Institute in New York in connection with the case of Carmita Wood in 1975 (25). Yet Farley’s account gained authority and is cited in several other contemporary radical feminist works (for instance, see Storrie and Dykstra 26; Wise and Stanley 48), and Sexual Shakedown can now be listed among the iconic feminist manifestoes of the second wave era.The key insight of Farley’s book was that sexual coercion in the workplace was more than aberrant behaviour by individual men but was systemic and organised. She suggests how the phrase sexual harassment “is the first verbal description of women’s feelings about this behaviour and it unstintingly conveys a negative perception of male aggression in the workplace” (32). Others followed in seeing it as organised expression of male power that functions “to keep women out of non-traditional occupations and to reinforce their secondary status in the workplace” (Pringle 93), a wisdom that is now widely accepted but seemed radical at the time.A theoretical literature on sexual harassment grew rapidly from the 1970s in which the definition of sexual harassment was a key element. In Sexual Shakedown, Farley defines it with specific connection to the workplace and a woman’s “function as worker” (33). Some definitions attempted to cover a range of practices that “might threaten a woman’s job security or create a stressful or intimidating working environment” ranging from touching to rape (Sedley and Benn 6). In the wider radical feminist discussion, sexual harassment was located within the “continuum of sexual violence”, a paradigm that highlighted the links between “every day abuses” and “less common experiences labelled as crimes” (Kelly 59). Accordingly, it was seen as a diminished category of rape, termed “little rape” (Bularzik 26), or a means whereby women are “reminded” of the “ever present threat of rape” (Rubinstein 165).The upsurge of research and writing served to document the prevalence and history of sexual harassment. Radical feminist accounts situated the origins in the long-standing patriarchal assumption that economic responsibility for women is ultimately held by men, and how “women forced to earn their own living in the past were believed to be defenceless and possibly immoral” (Rubinstein 166). Various accounts highlighted the intersecting effects of racism and sexism in the experience of black women, and women of colour, in a way that would be now termed intersectional. Jo Dixon discussed black women’s “least advantaged position in the economy coupled with the legacy of slavery” (164), while, in Australia, Linda Rubinstein describes the “sexual exploitation of aboriginal women employed as domestic servants on outback stations” which was “as common as the better documented abuse of slaves in the American South” (166).In The Sexual Harassment of Working Women, Catherine Mackinnon provided a pioneering legal argument that sexual harassment was a form of sex discrimination. She defined two types: the quid pro quo, when “sexual compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment opportunity” (32); and sexual harassment as a “persistent condition of work” that “simply makes the work environment unbearable” (40). Thus the feminist histories of sexual harassment became detailed and strategic. The naming of sexual harassment was a moment of relinquishing women’s experience to the gaze of feminism and the bureaucratic gaze of the state, and, in the legal interventions that followed, it ceased to be exclusively a feminist issue.In Australia, a period of bureaucratisation and state intervention commenced in the late 1970s that corresponded with similar legislative responses abroad. The federal Sex Discrimination Act was amended in 1984 to include a definition of sexual harassment, and State and Territory jurisdictions also framed legislation pertaining to sexual harassment (see Law Council of Australia). The regimes of redress were linked with Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action frameworks and were of a civil order. Under the law, there was potential for employers to be found vicariously liable for sexual harassment.In the women’s movement, legislative strategies were deemed reformist. Radical and socialist feminists perceived the de-gendering effects of these policies in the workplace that risked collusion with the state. Some argued that naming and defining sexual harassment denies that women constantly deal with a range of harassment anywhere, not only in the workplace (Wise and Stanley 10); while others argued that reformist approaches effectively legitimate other forms of sex discrimination not covered by legislation (Game and Pringle 290). However, in feminism and in the policy realm, the debate concerned sexual harassment in the general workplace. In contrast to #MeToo, it was not led by celebrity voices, nor galvanised by incidents in the sphere of entertainment, nor, by and large, among figures of public office, except for a couple of notable exceptions, including Anita Hill.The “Spectacle of Subjectivity” in the “Scene of Public Life”Through the early 1990s as an MA candidate at the University of Queensland, I studied media coverage of sexual harassment cases, clipping newspapers and noting electronic media reports on a daily basis. These mainly concerned incidents in government sector workplaces or small commercial enterprises. While the public prominence of the parties involved was not generally a factor in reportage, occasionally, prominent individuals were affected, such as the harassment of the athlete Michelle Baumgartner at the Commonwealth Games in 1990 which received extensive coverage but the offenders were never publicly named or disciplined. Two other incidents stand out: the Ormond College case at the University of Melbourne, about which much has been written; and Anita Hill’s claims against Clarence Thomas during his nomination to the US Supreme Court in 1991.The spectacle of Hill’s testimony to the US Senate is now an archetype of claims against powerful men, although, at the time, her credibility was attacked and her dignified presentation was criticised as “too composed. Too cool. Too censorious” (Legge 31). Hill was also seen to counterpose the struggles of race and gender, and Thomas himself famously described it as “a hi-tech lynching of an uppity black” (qtd in Stephens 1). By “hi-tech”, Thomas alluded to the occasion of the first-ever live national broadcast of the United States Senate hearings in which Hill’s claims were aired directly to the national public, and re-broadcast internationally in news coverage. Thus, it was not only the claims but the scale and medium of delivery to a global audience that set it apart from other sexual harassment stories.Recent events have since prompted revisiting of the inequity of Hill’s treatment at the Senate hearings. But well before this, in an epic and polemical study of American public culture, Berlant reflected at length on the heroism of Hill’s “witnessing” as paradigmatic of citizenship in post-Reaganite America’s “shrinking” public sphere. It forms part of her much wider thesis regarding the “intimate public sphere” and the form of citizenship “produced by personal acts and values” (5) in the absence of a context that “makes ordinary citizens feel they have a common public culture, or influence on a state” (3), and in which the fundamental inequality of minority cultures is assumed. For Berlant, Hill’s testimony becomes the model of “Diva Citizenship”; the “strange intimacy” in which the Citizen Diva, “the subordinated person”, believes in the capacity of the privileged ones “to learn and to change” and “trust[s] ... their innocence of ... their obliviousness” of the system that has supported her subjugation (222–223). While Berlant’s thesis pertains to profound social inequalities, there is no mistaking the comparison to the digital feminist in the #MeToo era in the call to identify with her suffering and courage.Of Hill’s testimony, Berlant describes how: “a member of a stigmatised population testifies reluctantly to a hostile public the muted and anxious history of her imperiled citizenship” (222). It is an “act of heroic pedagogy” (223) which occurs when “a person stages a dramatic coup in a public sphere in which she does not have privilege” (223). In such settings, “acts of language can feel like explosives” and put “the dominant story into suspended animation” (223). The Diva Citizen cannot “change the world” but “challenges her audience” to identify with her “suffering” and the “courage she has had to produce” in “calling on people to change the practices of citizenship into which they currently consent” (223). But Berlant cautions that the strongest of Divas cannot alone achieve change because “remaking the scene of public life into a spectacle of subjectivity” can lead to “a confusion of ... memorable rhetorical performance with sustained social change itself” (223). Instead, she argues that the Diva’s act is a call; the political obligation for the action of change lies with the collective, the greater body politic.The EchoIf Acts of Diva Citizenship abound in the #MeToo movement, relations between the individual and the collective are in question in a number of ways. This suggests a basis of comparison between past and present feminisms which have come full circle in the renewed recognition of sexual harassment in the continuum of sexual violence. Compared with the past, the voices of #MeToo are arguably empowered by a genuine, if gradual, change in the symbolic status of women, and a corresponding destabilization of the images of male power since the second wave era of feminism. The one who names an abuser on Twitter symbolises a power of individual courage, backed by a responding collective voice of supporters. Yet there are concerns about who can “speak out” without access to social media or with the constraint that “the sanctions would be too great” (Zarkov and Davis). Conversely, the “spreadability” — as Jenkins, Ford and Green term the travelling properties of digital media — and the apparent relative ease of online activism might belie the challenge and courage of those who make the claims and those who respond.The collective voice is also allied with other grassroots movements like SlutWalk (Jouet), the women’s marches in the US against the Trump presidency, and the several national campaigns — in India and Egypt, for instance (Zarkov and Davis) — that contest sexual violence and gender inequality. The “sheer numbers” of participation in #MeToo testify to “the collectivity of it all” and the diversity of the movement (Gill and Orgad). If the #MeToo hashtag gained traction with the “experiences of white heterosexual women in the US”, it “quickly expanded” due to “broad and inclusive appeal” with stories of queer women and men and people of colour well beyond the Global North. Even so, Tarana Burke, who founded the #MeToo hashtag in 2006 in her campaign of social justice for working class women and girls of colour, and endorsed its adoption by Hollywood, highlights the many “untold stories”.More strikingly, #MeToo participants name the names of the alleged harassers. The naming of names, famous names, is threshold-crossing and as much the public-startling power of the disclosures as the allegations and stimulates newsworthiness in conventional media. The resonance is amplified in the context of the American crisis over the Trump presidency in the sense that the powerful men called out become echoes or avatars of Trump’s monstrous manhood and the urgency of denouncing it. In the case of Harvey Weinstein, the name is all. A figure of immense power who symbolised an industry, naming Weinstein blew away the defensive old Hollywood myths of “casting couches” and promised, perhaps idealistically, the possibility for changing a culture and an industrial system.The Hollywood setting for activism is the most striking comparison with second wave feminism. A sense of contradiction emerges in this new “visibility” of sexual harassment in a culture that remains predominantly “voyeuristic” and “sexist” (Karkov and Davis), and not least in the realm of Hollywood where the sexualisation of women workers has long been a notorious open secret. A barrage of Hollywood feminism has accompanied #MeToo and #TimesUp in the campaign for diversity at the Oscars, and the stream of film remakes of formerly all-male narrative films that star all-female casts (Ghostbusters; Oceans 11; Dirty, Rotten Scoundrels). Cynically, this trend to make popular cinema a public sphere for gender equality in the film industry seems more glorifying than subversive of Hollywood masculinities. Uneasily, it does not overcome those lingering questions about why these conditions were uncontested openly for so long, and why it took so long for someone to go public, as Rose McGowan did, with claims about Harvey Weinstein.However, a reading of She Said, by Jodie Kantor and Megan Tuohey, the journalists who broke the Weinstein story in the New York Times — following their three year efforts to produce a legally water-tight report — makes clear that it was not for want of stories, but firm evidence and, more importantly, on-the-record testimony. If not for their (and others’) fastidious journalism and trust-building and the Citizen Divas prepared to disclose their experiences publicly, Weinstein might not be convicted today. Yet without the naming of the problem of sexual harassment in the women’s movement all those years ago, none of this may have come to pass. Lin Farley can now be found on YouTube retelling the story (see “New Mexico in Focus”).It places the debate about digital activism and Hollywood feminism in some perspective and, like the work of journalists, it is testament to the symbiosis of individual and collective effort in the action of change. The tweeting activism of #MeToo supplements the plenum of knowledge and action about sexual harassment across time: the workplace novels, the consciousness raising, the legislation and the poster campaigns. In different ways, in both eras, this literature demonstrates that names matter in calling for change on sexual harassment. But, if #MeToo is to become the last long take on sexual harassment, then, as Berlant advocates, the responsibility lies with the body politic who must act collectively for change in ways that will last well beyond the courage of the Citizen Divas who so bravely call it on.ReferencesBerlant, Lauren. The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship. 1997. Durham: Duke UP, 2002.Bularzik, Mary. “Sexual Harassment at the Workplace: Historical Notes.” Radical America 12.4 (1978): 25-43.Cohen, Rose. Out of the Shadow. NY: Doran, 1918.Dixon, Jo. “Feminist Reforms of Sexual Coercion Laws.” Sexual Coercion: A Sourcebook on Its Nature, Causes and Prevention. Eds. Elizabeth Grauerholz and Mary A. Karlewski. Massachusetts: Lexington, 1991. 161-171.Farley, Lin. Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women in the Working World. 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