Articles de revues sur le sujet « Saving and investment – Law and legislation – European Union countries »

In the era of globalization, the attraction of foreign investments has become an important factor in promoting the economic growth of countries. Investors are constantly looking for favorable conditions for investing their capital, which involves a combination of several important factors. The investor, who is focused on getting the maximum profit with the minimum cost, before making an investment decision, will study the investment environment of the host country, the proximity to large key markets, the barriers to entry from the host country to international markets, the availability of production and energy resources, the level of political and economic stability, the number of labor force, qualifications, etc. .sh. In terms of investments in the modern world, two types of trends have been identified: 1. High-tech investments, which are mainly located in developed countries, due to the developed country's intellectual resources, key market and good opportunities for business development, and 2. Investment, which is focused on obtaining maximum profit at the expense of cheap resources and labor force, and there is no or minimal technical innovation in it. It is important for the state to attract such direct foreign investments, which will not only be focused on making profits, but will also ensure the raising of the qualifications of local staff, the introduction of technological innovations, and the social protection of employees. Thanks to the economic reforms implemented after the post-Soviet upheavals, Georgia has become an attractive place for foreign investment, however, due to the shortage of labor force and low qualifications, investments focused on cheap resources and labor force are entering the country more than high-tech ones. The entry of relatively large, high-tech investments is hindered, in addition to the scarcity of the country's workforce and relatively low qualifications, the low level of energy independence, the territories occupied by the Russian Federation of Georgia, the generally politically and economically unstable region (Tskhinvali, Abkhazia, Karabakh regions), the aggressive state - the Russian Federation. Neighborhood and high probability of potential armed conflicts. The positive factors that make Georgia attractive for foreign investors are a favorable geopolitical location with land access, moderate natural and climatic conditions, low level of corruption, less bureaucratic and simple legislation compared to other countries, high level of harmonization of national legislation with international legislation, with the European Union in 2014 and in 2017 Free trade agreements signed with China, which allow a foreign investor to export products produced on behalf of Georgia to two of the world's largest markets without any problems. Due to the fact that one of the most important factors of production - "capital" - is needed to develop the economy, and the country does not have it at this stage, attracting foreign investments is a vitally important task for the economic growth of Georgia. In developing countries like Georgia, the level of domestic savings is relatively low. In addition to this, apart from the banking system, there is no stock market. In the period 1996-2021, a total of about 23.12 billion dollars of investment came into Georgia. The first and only investor country in 1996 was Ukraine with 3753.45 thousand US dollars. In the following years, significant investments were made in Georgia from the USA (1.81 billion USD), the European Union, CIS countries and Great Britain. According to the latest data, foreign investment has entered Georgia from 74 countries, which is almost 2 times less than the number of countries with which Georgia has trade relations (export-import). Since 2003, the growth of investments had an irreversible character, however, the 2008 world economic crisis and Russia's military attack on Georgia sharply reduced this figure, and it took 6 years to restore the pre-war figure. In addition, since 2017, foreign investments in Georgia have been characterized by a decreasing trend. Pandemic year 2020 was particularly notable in terms of investment decline. Despite the fact that after the signing of the Georgia-EU association in 2014, foreign investments should have increased due to the desire to access the EU market, until 2017, their volume was decreasing. In 2017, in the history of independent Georgia, the largest level of foreign investments - 1.98 billion USD was recorded. In the same year, the agreement on free trade between Georgia and China was signed, which should also increase foreign investments due to the desire to access the Chinese market, although the country has not returned to the level of foreign investments made in 2017. On December 31, 2013, the Organic Law of Georgia "On Economic Freedom" adopted in 2011 entered into force. The law, on the one hand, regulates the limit of the amount acceptable from taxpayers - in case of the desire to increase the tax rates of income, profit, VAT and import taxes, citizens' consent is required through a referendum, and on the other hand, the amount of spending of collected taxes is controlled by the limits of the established macroeconomic parameters. After the implementation of this law, the tax burden of taxpayers was not supposed to increase, but the government took advantage of the loophole in the law and in 2017 the excise duty rate was sharply increased on cars (the excise duty on right-hand drive cars was doubled), fuel and tobacco products. The property tax has also been increased, since it does not belong to the general state tax. Since January 1, 2017, when the Estonian model of profit tax came into force, the state budget received about 500 million GEL less. To make up the deficit, either government spending had to be cut, or debt had to be incurred, or taxes had to be raised. In 2017, the government's expenses increased by 800 million GEL, we took on a debt of 400 million GEL, and the excise and property tax rates were also increased, according to which if the family had an annual income of more than 40,000 GEL, they would have already paid property tax on the car. As of May 2021, the foreign debt has increased to 24.8 billion GEL and has already violated the macroeconomic parameter written in the Law on Economic Freedom, according to which the government's debt cannot exceed 60% of GDP. From 2011, when the law was adopted, until 2013, when the law entered into force, the volume of direct foreign investments did not increase, on the contrary - it even decreased, although this can be blamed on the caution caused by the change of government in 2012. - Investors are likely to observe the possibility of a change in the country's political vector. When the law came into force in December 2013, that is, in fact from 2014, the volume of investments increased by leaps and bounds, and this dynamic continued until 2017, when taxes were increased. Since 2018, the volume of direct foreign investments has dropped almost to the level of 2011. Based on all of the above, we believe that in order to attract foreign investments, Georgia should make maximum use of those competitive advantages that will attract the attention of foreign investors. The country, which has historically been a corridor of regional and world importance, has yet to fully utilize its transport function.

This paper aims to present the level of harmonization of investment services in relation to the European investment funds’ market. The author, in an attempt to systematize different types of investment services in Europe, refers to the European Freedoms and presents the key reasons for the harmonization of investment services. An important part of the study is to present the role of investment funds in the financial sector, as well as the crucial benefits of participation in the funds. By using the method of analysis of the sources, the author makes a review of the European regulations on investment funds, both the law and the recommendations of regulators. From the perspective of recent legislation changes the study highlights their possible implications, especially for less developed countries of the European Union. Complementing the current picture of harmonization the author, by referring to the substantial transformation of the common market of the European Union in 2004, makes review of dynamics of this sector, based on basic statistics. What is worth paying attention in this context is that there is still a slight share of the newly acceding countries. Verification of accuracy of the author’s observations may become the subject of wider discussion on the harmonization of financial services in this area, taking into account time necessary to assess the impact of European regulations currently being implemented.

Since 11 October 2020, Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investment into the EU has been applied in the Member States of the European Union. Although the Regulation is automatically and uniformly applicable in all EU countries upon its entry into force – thus, no transposition into national law is required –, Romania is preparing to adopt legislation to regulate FDI due diligence at national level in line with Regulation (EU) 2019/452, in the absence of an adequate legal framework and for the purpose of implementing the Regulation. In this study, we intend to examine the current legal framework in Romania on FDI and the draft legislation mentioned above, which aims to establish a workable screening mechanism for FDI into Romania.

A European Union (EU)-wide screening regime entered into force in October 2020, marking the turning point in the Member States’ investment relations with third countries, most notably, the emerging economies of the Far East. Most Central and Eastern European (CEE) states have recently embraced novel screening solutions; some legislative proposals are still pending in a few states. These regulatory changes are the result of the socio-economic turmoil caused by the COVID-19 epidemic, which threatens a major fire sale of resources that are deemed critical for the Member States’ national security and public order. In this paper, the authors examine the existing screening mechanisms regarding foreign direct investment (FDI) in five EU countries: Austria, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, and Poland. Given the apparent lack of comprehensive FDI screening mechanisms in Croatia, the authors consider that the findings of this comparative analysis could help Croatian legislator establish a comprehensive legal regime for FDI pouring into Croatian strategic industries. This paper argues that Croatia should introduce novel screening mechanisms along the lines of the Germanic legal tradition, most notably, the CEE and the German foreign trade and payments law. The authors suggest potential solutions de lege ferenda that would fit the scope and objectives of the screening regulation. Following the introduction, the second section of the paper glances through FDI screening mechanisms in four CEE countries. In the third section, the paper revisits the existing Croatian legislation on FDI control. The fourth section considers possible amendments thereof within the context of the German foreign trade and payments law. The fifth section summarises and concludes the paper.

Problem setting. The development of social relations, the economic well-being of the population and the stable social structure of any state in the present circumstances are conditioned by a series of factors, one of which is the development of innovative infrastructure. One of the most important directions of development of the economic sector of our country was the formation of an innovative model of the economy, which puts to law the new tasks of clarifying the purpose and social value of law as a regulator of social relations. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The current state of the study of the selected issues indicates that the sources from which public-law organizations are investing innovative activities of small and medium-sized innovative entrepreneurship in the EU are insufficient. At the same time, the state policy of the EU countries in the scientific and technical sphere is realized through the use of various instruments, which include: legislation, tax policy, size and nature of the allocation of budget funds, including for the implementation of works in priority areas, the formation and maintenance of infrastructure, personnel, etc. Target of research is to identify the public and legal means of investing small and medium innovative entrepreneurship in the EU. Article’s main body. In the EU, the innovative component of public policy encompasses the scope of national scientific institutions (institutes, research centers, university laboratories, etc.). There are government programs that receive partial funding from the state budget. The state is guided by different criterias when deciding on the financing of specific works. First, the prospect of each specific direction is evaluated from the point of view of preserving the country’s achieved position on the world market in the future. Second, the recognition at the governmental level of innovation as a vital factor of economic development, the conduct of a broad government company on the problems of innovation. The current state of regulatory support suggests that structural funds such as the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund should be considered as the main public sources of investment for innovative enterprises. In particular, such funds are implementing EIC Pathfinder Pilot, FET Innovation Launchpad, EIC Transition to Innovation Activity, EIC Accelerator, Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME) etc. Conclusions and prospects for the development. In the EU, the investment of small and medium enterprises is not homogeneous, but a large part of them, despite the large number of investment support tools for such companies, face significant challenges in accessing investment resources. Developing a successful pan-European policy requires an indepth understanding of the problems and specifics of financing the innovation activities of small and medium innovative enterprises in EU Member States.

The article examines the European experience of considering disputes in the field of social security, the ways of their prevention, the essence and methods of resolution, the possibility of borrowing positive assets of foreign states in the law enforcement practice of Ukraine is considered. Having analyzed the European experience of resolving disputes in the field of social security, three ways of their possible settlement are distinguished: 1) with the help of special courts on social security issues (sectoral justice); 2) through a civil process in general courts; 3) by means of conciliation and arbitration procedures. It was determined that a social model has developed in European countries, which is based on such values ​​common to all EU member states, such as: a close connection between the level of economic development and social progress; high level of social security, which is universal in nature; developed legislation; equal opportunities and fight against discrimination; production democracy; dialogue of social partners within the framework of contractual relations; availability of developed social infrastructure; the key role of the state in solving social problems; the struggle for employment and eradication of the phenomenon of social rejection and poverty; decent salary; social justice and solidarity in society. These basic values ​​also formed the basis of consideration and resolution of disputes in the field of social security. The listed values ​​should form the foundation of the Ukrainian theory and practice of social disputes. It was determined that the national specifics and practice of each European state provide for the use of various methods of resolving social disputes with recourse to social courts, reconciliation services, mediation, arbitration and mediation. The activity of social courts is based on the principles of tripartite cooperation (tripartism). Court cases are considered by a panel consisting of a professional judge and two non-professional judges. In addition, state mediation and mediation are effective measures for the pre-trial resolution of social disputes in the EU countries. They contribute to the relief of the judicial system, saving time and financial resources of the parties to the dispute. These institutions are little known for Ukraine and, at the same time, promising.

Nowadays, the law is being transformed as a regulator of relations. The idea of strengthe-ning the regulatory role of technologies in the field of streamlining public relations is making much headway in the world. This trend is most pronounced in the area of regulation of private relations. The way of such access to the market as crowdfunding is becoming increasingly widespread. The issuing of the so-called secured tokens is becoming popular for both small businesses and private investors. The trust in new ways of attracting investments is condi-tioned by the applied technology - the use of blockchain as a decentralized transparent data-base management system. Under these conditions, there is such a phenomenon as the democ-ratization of property relations. Every individual receives unlimited opportunities to invest via technologies. Thus, legal scholars all over the world face the question about the role of the law and law in these relations? We believe that we are dealing with such a worldwide trend of regulating public relations as the socialization of the law. Specific examples of issuing tokens in Russia and abroad show the main global trends in the transformation of private law. The platformization of economics leads to the tokenization and democratization of property relations. In this aspect, the aim of lawyers should be to create a comfortable legal environment for the implementation of projects aimed at democratizing property relations in Russia. The socialization of private law is aimed at achieving social jus-tice and is manifested in the creation of mechanisms to protect the rights of the weak party and rules to protect private investors. Globalization requires the study of both Russian and foreign law. To confirm their hypothesis, the authors conducted a detailed analysis of the legislation of Russia, Europe and the United States to identify the norms allowing to see the process of socialization of law in the above field. The generalization of Russian and foreign experience showed that when searching for proper legal regulation, the states elect one of the policies. In some countries, direct regulation of ICOs and related emission relations are being created, in others, it is about the extension of the existing legislation to a new changing tokenization relationship. The European Union countries are seeking to develop common rules to create a regulatory environment to attract investors to the crypto industry and protect them. Asian countries are predominantly developing national legislation in isolation from one another, but most of them are following a unified course to encourage investment in crypto assets while introducing strict rules against fraud on financial markets. The emphasis on the protection of the rights of investors or shareholders, token holders by setting a framework, including private law mechanisms, can be called common to all approaches. This is the aim of private law on the way to social justice.

Global financial crisis in 2008 posted numerous questions about the reasons and triggers. In past three years world’s economic literature has been full of academic articles analysing each reason or trigger and scientific explanations of possible connections. Majority outcome was, that key factor was excessive use of derivatives and synthetic financial products, which were under regulated or not regulated at all. The outcome was that countries with developed financial markets introduced new regulations and controls in the field of derivatives and synthetic financial products. Term “systemic risk” was introduced in global financial market. But will this approach really prevent such global crisis? Submission is divided in three parts. First part deals with the theory of principle based regulation. Principle based regulation was firstly introduced in UK and latter accepted by European Union in the field of capital markets. It was a way, together with the Lamfalussy process, to make EU regulation acceptable for all member states. Instead of detailed prescribed behaviour, legislation texts prescribe only desirable goals. Implementation is left to each state or, even worse, to each supervised subject. So the implementation should depend on the capital market’s development, capital product’s structure, tradition, investment companies’ size etc. From a distant view, principle based legislation could be seen as a great legislation writing’s technique. It could be seen as an effective solution to regulate a fast developing field without need to change the regulation. But is it true? Second part of the submission addresses the legal questions and problems, connected to the principle based regulation starting with the validity of regulations. Broad definitions in Market in financial instruments Directive (MiFID), introduced for fast adaptation to new financial products and instruments, are now turning into dinosaurs. Contrary to US’s fast action, European Union is still discussing whether spot forex trade is financial instrument or not. On the other hand, broad and unclear definitions, represents a friendly environment for new casino’s financial products. Even recognised financial instruments (like derivatives and synthetic financial instruments) are recognised as gambling contracts by national courts within European Union. Problems with legal enforcement of financial contracts are mentioned also in common law’s literature. There are numerous pages describing the economic and financial essence of each derivative or synthetic financial instrument. But the chapters, dealing with the legal aspects, are short and end with a similar advice: “due to small number of case law and the danger, that courts could interpret such contracts as a gambling contract, we strongly advise to settle all disputes outside the court.” In case of numerous defaults unenforceability of contracts could be the poison pill for the trust in capital markets. Accepted solutions could also be a problem for administrative or criminal sanctions. Broad and unclear definitions could violate the basic principle “nullum crimen sine lege praevia.” And least but not last, in modern financial world sins are made in interpretations of details and not of principles. Third part of submission deals with the necessary assumptions for a workable principle based legislation. It starts with basic legal culture and generally accepted rule of law. It deals with the corporate culture, consumer’s organizations, financial markets and capable supervisors. Only when all the actors perform their expected roles, the principle based legislation could work properly.

In Brazil, efforts towards the regulatory acceptance and implementation of innovative methods to replace experimental animal use in various fields began to gather force in 2008, with the approval of Law No. 11,794/2008 (the Arouca Law). This law represented a milestone, as it created the National Council for the Control of Animal Experimentation (CONCEA) to deal with the ethical and legal issues related to the use of laboratory animals. In 2014, CONCEA put together a framework for expanding the implementation of non-animal methodologies for use in research and education. It also promoted the regulatory acceptance in Brazil of 24 test guidelines, including 15 in vitro approaches. It should be emphasised that, in Brazilian legislation, replacement is generally based on the toxicological endpoint and not on the category of product, as tends to be the case in other countries (e.g. cosmetics in the European Union). The resolution-dependent deadlines for the obligatory replacement of in vivo methods with the CONCEA-approved tests are 2019 and 2021. Brazil has advanced considerably towards the replacement of animal experimentation, and in certain aspects, this has been in a highly progressive manner. However, there is still a lot of work to be done, especially considering the current political scenario with reduced investment in research, development and innovation. The chronology of significant events following the approval of the Arouca Law, which have contributed to the promotion of the Three Rs alternatives in Brazil, will be examined.

The purpose of the paper is to substantiate the strategic mechanisms for regulating the European integration development of air transport in Ukraine. Methodology. The study is based on the imperatives of European integration development of air transport of Ukraine, defined in the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their member states, on the one part, and Ukraine, on the other part. Quantitative research is based on the analysis of the volume and structure of Ukraine’s foreign trade in air transport services, calculation of the export-import coverage ratio, determination of the share of transport and air transport services in aggregate services in total foreign trade, including with the EU. Results of the paper consist in assessing the impact of the external environment on the European integration development of the Ukrainian aviation transport. The conclusion was reached on its turbulence, complexity and contradiction, while the advantageous geographical location and strategic positions of Ukraine in the region were determined as the main favorable factors. The research also singles out the following negative signs of the external environment: declining competitiveness of the Russian-Asian lanes for domestic air carriers, localization of air services in connection with hostilities in the East of Ukraine; restriction of air traffic in the context of preventive measures to combat the spread of coronavirus infection; insufficient material and technical base: lack of funding, outdated technologies, low level of innovation, environmental friendliness, safety, insufficient quality of transport services, limited social benefits; aimed at ratification of the CAA Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, as well as the draft Aviation Transport Strategy of Ukraine. The present research also identified such negative effects of COVID-19 on the development of air transport, as: a significant decrease in air passenger transport services and airlines’ revenues, a decrease in the rating of world aviation, termination and bankruptcy of a number of airlines and airports due to air traffic restrictions. It determined the place of air transport services in the system of foreign economic trade in services with the EU countries, and developed measures to increase them. Practical implications consist in the elaboration of the main strategic guidelines for the development of aviation: introduction of a simplified procedure for implementing the provisions of EU legislation into the legislation of Ukraine; ensuring environmental safety and energy saving of civil aviation facilities; innovative renewal of aircraft fleet and reduction of their harmful impact on the environment through the introduction of the latest technologies; settlement of issues relating to the establishment of airport charges for the servicing of aircraft and passengers at Ukrainian airports; development of airport infrastructure; creation of multimodal cargo complexes; approximation of SAAU and European Commission requirements to certification systems in the areas of primary airworthiness, airworthiness maintenance and maintenance of aircraft and its components; expansion of Ukraine’s voluntary participation in the program of compensation and reduction of carbon dioxide emissions from international aviation within the CORSIA program, introduction of administrative procedures for monitoring emissions by operators of civil aircraft on international flights under the MRV standards. Value/originality. The present research substantiates strategic foundations of the institutional transformations of the development of aviation transport in the context of the European integration choice of Ukraine and the transition to monovectorality, elimination of defects of dependence on the trajectory of the preceding traffic and polyvectorality. It also proposes legal, policy, investment and infrastructure integration mechanisms.

Problem setting. The article examines the problems of the legislative definition of business angels, and also summarizes the terminology of this subject of innovation infrastructure. Also, in the article we try to find out the legislative consolidation of the term of “business angel” in the countries of the European Union, which further development and functioning is investigated. The importance of them is determined at the national level to consolidate in a special law the definition and procedure for the provision of investments by business angels. Analysis of resent researches and publications. Business angels are relevant, because for many Ukrainian entrepreneurs and companies there is a problem of financing. Thus, the study of this topic in their scientific works engaged in such outstanding scientists A.M. Lieutenant and LL Antonyuk, S. Valdaytsev, K. Pinyugin, O. Kashirin, O. Semenov, A. Karzhauv, O. Folomentyev, Benjamin J., Margulis J., Ammosov YP, Brian Hill, Dn. Power, N. Fonstein, A. Halytsky and other scientists. The target of research. There is a study of the essence and legal definition of the term business angels. Research of national and foreign private investors (business angels), as well as, outlining of reality of regulation in national legislation of the procedure for providing business angels to invest. Article’s main body. A business angel is a person who invests money in projects that often exist only as an idea. At this stage, a young campaign or entrepreneur funds of the development and implementation plan often have nothing to begin a startup, because there is nothing to interest serious investment funds. In this case, angels come to the aid of investors. It should be emphasized that investors, when they see a prospect in the idea, and believe in the future this idea will appeal to society and will find further improvement and development, business angels, usually, invest in this business the necessary and sufficient amount of their own funds. This is what distinguishes business angels from venture investors, who manages other people’s capital. So, it should be noted that they receive not only a share in the campaign, but sometimes even a blocking stake, what allows them to influence decisions made by the owner. In the research, Shevchenko O.M gives the following definition that business angels are private venture investors who invest their financial resources, as well as, personal time and abilities in little-known young innovative companies with the expectation of commercial profit. In addition, by providing start-up capital, private investors bring to the company the most valuable thing — professional and managerial experience (which is, usually, lacking in companies in the early stages of development), as well as, the necessary connections and reputational support. Conclusions and prospects of the development. Therefore, analyzing all of the above, the following conclusions should be next: firstly, the functioning of such a new institution in innovation law as business angels is an effective source of stimulating innovation by providing financial and information and communication support to entrepreneurs; secondly, it should be emphasized that further development and implementation in Ukraine requires its own legislation in a special Law of Ukraine.

The purpose of the article is to present effective anti-crisis management measures to bring enterprises out of the crisis situation and improve their financial and economic security. The subject of this study is the financial and economic security of an enterprise during a crisis. Methodology. Using the historical and comparative methods, the author analyzes the events of recent years and analyzes the impact of external factors on the formation of the crisis state of an enterprise. The economic and statistical method made it possible to analyze the scale of damage caused by the Russian Federation to the state of Ukraine during almost nine years of active hostilities in violation of such principles of international law as the principle of non-use of force or threat of force; the principle of sovereign equality of states; the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples; the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states; the principle of peaceful cooperation; the principle of fulfilling international obligations in good faith; the principle of inviolability of borders; the principle of territorial integrity of states; the principle of universal respect and protection of human rights; and to see what level of crisis the terrorist state of the Russian Federation has spread in the largest country of the European Union, namely Ukraine. Using the philosophical dialectical method, the author analyzes the very phenomenon of crisis in the broad sense of the word and finds a way to respond to the challenges of the crisis. Results. This study assesses the benefits that have contributed to the development of economic relations with countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe. The losses suffered by the Ukrainian economic system due to the destructive processes of the crisis are analyzed. The author examines the peace formula approved by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which provides for the implementation of measures aimed at shaping peace in the European space and correcting the mistakes made by officials of the terrorist state of the Russian Federation, which led to terrible consequences; the author analyzes the achievements of this peace formula and determines how much benefit and lives it has already brought. The practical significance lies in the definition of reorganization as one of the best anti-crisis management measures that can bring an enterprise out of a crisis. In particular, attention is drawn to the effectiveness of rehabilitation measures that can restore the solvency of an enterprise. In turn, taking into account the established practice of attracting investment capital as a means of improving the economic activity of an enterprise, the author analyzes the risks of losing property and non-property assets in the event of adverse conditions and proposes to create a mechanism for investment guarantees, which consist in preserving assets by the investor in the event of adverse market fluctuations. The scientific novelty lies in the proposal to amend the current legislation to guarantee the safety of the rehabilitation procedure to the investor by mitigating the risk of loss of invested assets in restoring the enterprise's solvency.

Problem setting. The development of information and communication technologies, digitalization of society, the transition of consumers to the sphere of electronic interaction with the seller of goods, services, works causes the need for legal support for the effective development of innovative sectors of the economy. At the same time, first of all, it is necessary to take into account the needs of innovative newly created business entities - startups, the legal nature and specifics of which do not have a common understanding in Ukraine and abroad. At the same time, startups are the main "consumers" of grant proposals and contribute to attracting additional investment, including foreign, in the economies of individual countries. That is why the European Union (hereinafter - the EU) in its policy in 2021 has set a course to maximize the incentive to establish startups in the EU as people already living in Member States and immigrants from third countries, because it is from the level of innovative entrepreneurship depends on the economic stability and potential of the future of the state. Analysis of resent researches and publications. Recent research and publications on the subject. Scientists such as S. Blank, J. Guzman., S. Stern., S. Glibko, K. A. Karbovska, TV Kotyai, L. Gulyaeva, L. Zhuk and others. The target of research is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of legal trends in the development of startups in the EU and compliance with these trends in regulations and law enforcement practices of Ukraine. Article’s main body. Today in the EU the signing of the Declaration "Startup Nations Standard" is in the final stage. By analyzing the content of this Declaration, at an early stage of development of startups it is possible to identify the following vectors of development of legal regulation of EU countries: 1) fast state registration of the startup (as a general rule - 1 day, however, in exceptional cases related to the need for additional checks - no more than a week); 2) the cost of administrative services related to registration may not exceed 100 EUR. 3) availability of effective support services for startup founders; 4) the existence of a single web portal, which has all the relevant legal information on the registration procedure, administrative fees and funding opportunities; 5) availability of electronic support system, including from other EU countries; 6) recognition of legal documents of other EU countries as confirmation of startup registration. The same Declaration provides for cooperation with non-EU countries, which includes, on the one hand, an accelerated procedure, visa issuance for persons planning to register a startup in an EU member state, which can be achieved by having a startup partner from the state. EU, or the presence of such a founder of relevant experience in conducting innovative business, and on the other - to encourage the return to the EU of startups whose founders emigrated to other countries. In addition, it is declared to reduce the tax burden and simplify administrative procedures, in order to implement the guiding principle of supporting EU business - "Think Small First". As of March 2021, the Declaration of Startup Nations Standard has been signed by 24 EU member states and only 3 countries are refraining from signing: Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia. Conclusions and prospects of the development. The leading trends in the development of EU legislation are to simplify the procedure and "reduce" the cost of state registration of startups, digitalization of communication between their founders and government agencies, promoting a single web portal that takes into account all relevant information necessary for registration and operation of startups. about available administrative services, their cost, term of granting, actual grant offers and means of state support, etc.). Compared to the analyzed EU member states, Ukraine generally meets the requirements of the Declaration "Startup Nations Standard" on the speed and cost of state registration of startups, as well as the publication of relevant information for founders on the list of required documents and details of services. At the same time, information support for startups needs to be improved in terms of the functioning of a single web portal with up-to-date data on the opportunities for startups to receive support and other legal information necessary for their activities.

Problem setting. The development of information and communication technologies, digitalization of society, the transition of consumers to the sphere of electronic interaction with the seller of goods, services, works causes the need for legal support for the effective development of innovative sectors of the economy. At the same time, first of all, it is necessary to take into account the needs of innovative newly created business entities - startups, the legal nature and specifics of which do not have a common understanding in Ukraine and abroad. At the same time, startups are the main "consumers" of grant proposals and contribute to attracting additional investment, including foreign, in the economies of individual countries. That is why the European Union (hereinafter - the EU) in its policy in 2021 has set a course to maximize the incentive to establish startups in the EU as people already living in Member States and immigrants from third countries, because it is from the level of innovative entrepreneurship depends on the economic stability and potential of the future of the state. Analysis of resent researches and publications. Recent research and publications on the subject. Scientists such as S. Blank, J. Guzman., S. Stern., S. Glibko, K. A. Karbovska, TV Kotyai, L. Gulyaeva, L. Zhuk and others. The target of research is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of legal trends in the development of startups in the EU and compliance with these trends in regulations and law enforcement practices of Ukraine. Article’s main body. Today in the EU the signing of the Declaration "Startup Nations Standard" is in the final stage. By analyzing the content of this Declaration, at an early stage of development of startups it is possible to identify the following vectors of development of legal regulation of EU countries: 1) fast state registration of the startup (as a general rule - 1 day, however, in exceptional cases related to the need for additional checks - no more than a week); 2) the cost of administrative services related to registration may not exceed 100 EUR. 3) availability of effective support services for startup founders; 4) the existence of a single web portal, which has all the relevant legal information on the registration procedure, administrative fees and funding opportunities; 5) availability of electronic support system, including from other EU countries; 6) recognition of legal documents of other EU countries as confirmation of startup registration. The same Declaration provides for cooperation with non-EU countries, which includes, on the one hand, an accelerated procedure, visa issuance for persons planning to register a startup in an EU member state, which can be achieved by having a startup partner from the state. EU, or the presence of such a founder of relevant experience in conducting innovative business, and on the other - to encourage the return to the EU of startups whose founders emigrated to other countries. In addition, it is declared to reduce the tax burden and simplify administrative procedures, in order to implement the guiding principle of supporting EU business - "Think Small First". As of March 2021, the Declaration of Startup Nations Standard has been signed by 24 EU member states and only 3 countries are refraining from signing: Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia. Conclusions and prospects of the development. The leading trends in the development of EU legislation are to simplify the procedure and "reduce" the cost of state registration of startups, digitalization of communication between their founders and government agencies, promoting a single web portal that takes into account all relevant information necessary for registration and operation of startups. about available administrative services, their cost, term of granting, actual grant offers and means of state support, etc.). Compared to the analyzed EU member states, Ukraine generally meets the requirements of the Declaration "Startup Nations Standard" on the speed and cost of state registration of startups, as well as the publication of relevant information for founders on the list of required documents and details of services. At the same time, information support for startups needs to be improved in terms of the functioning of a single web portal with up-to-date data on the opportunities for startups to receive support and other legal information necessary for their activities.

Across Europe, the labour market participation of persons with disabilities remains lower than that of persons without a disability. Our research examines this disability employment gap, looking specifically at its variation by country and gender. Additionally, we test the influence of labour market policies – testing both the social investment perspective and the welfare scepticism perspective – on the size of the gap, in an effort to determine whether a more generous welfare state raises or lowers the employment rate of people with disabilities. Using the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), we show that Southern European countries have the smallest disability employment gap. Whereas stricter employment protection legislation is found to be beneficial for people with disabilities on the labour market, other labour market policies specifically intended to benefit this group do not strongly affect their chances on the labour market. These findings support the social investment perspective and show that social policies can have a positive effect on the employment of people with disabilities.

AbstractMining gold with the use of cyanide has always been an inherently dangerous activity requiring strict regulatory oversight and the application of appropriate technology to prevent environmental harm. The cyanide spill from the Aurul S.A. gold-mining operation in Baia Mare, Romania, was a warning to the international community that legal and institutional regimes that should prevent and respond to such accidents may as yet not be fully developed, especially in countries in transition. In particular, the international legal regimes for industrial-accident prevention, liability, and foreign direct investment must be considered as a whole in order to identify gaps and weaknesses in the system that should be addressed in the effort to protect human health and the environment from such accidents. In addition, the gap between legal requirements and commitment to, and capacity for, implementation—especially in transition countries—must be addressed.This article addresses the need to bring attention to the international legal implications of the Baia Mare accident. First, the article sets the stage by briefly identifying the positive responses that the accident has evoked from Romanian and international stakeholders, indicating that steps have already been taken to strengthen the institutional and legal framework governing mining operations. Then, the international legal obligations of Romania at the time of the accident are examined, followed by the identification of international conventions to which Romania was not party at the time of the accident and that could have helped prevent the accident. Gaps in the international legal regimes relevant to the accident are also identified and recommendations are made for filling them, including principles of environmental governance for foreign investors in countries in transition. Recommendations are also made for addressing the issue of implementation.The accident at Baia Mare has resulted in a number of positive responses—both domestically in Romania, as well as regionally and at a broader European level—and it is incumbent upon stakeholders to continue to expand the scope of social learning that the accident has made available. Actions taken in Romania after the spill include closer cooperation between local/regional officials and environmental nongovernmental organizations and a generally increased sensitivity among NGOs to the dangers inherent in mining activities. NGOs have now assumed watchdog and public-education roles. Responses at the European level include greater transboundary cooperation in river management and a strong push by the European Union to amend the Seveso II Directive on industrial-accident prevention to cover mining operations.Romania was not party to several key international conventions that could conceivably, if implemented, have prevented or minimized the effects of the accident at Baia Mare or provided for a more effective long-term response. These include the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents and the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. In addition to international legal instruments to which Romania was not party, there are also European Union directives that Romania has not yet transposed into domestic law. As a country seeking to join the European Union, transposition of EU legislation is a high priority for Romania. Priority should be given to the Seveso II Directive, which seeks to prevent industrial accidents, and the directive on integrated pollution prevention and control, which requires the use of the best available technology to prevent discharges.Gaps and weaknesses in international law fall into three main categories: industrial-accident prevention, liability for environmental harm, and foreign direct investment.

On 24 June 2022, the Contracting Parties of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) finalized discussions on the modernization of the treaty. After fifteen rounds of negotiations, an agreement in principle was reached to be adopted by the Energy Charter Conference on 22 November 2022 in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.1 The ECT, adopted in 1994, establishes a legal framework that aims to promote international cooperation in the energy sector.2 It has a membership of 53 countries primarily from Europe and Central Asia, as well as the European Union (EU) and the European Atomic Energy Community. In recent years, the ECT attracted widespread public attention due to its impact on states’ environmental and climate policies. Particularly, the treaty’s provisions on investment protection, with investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) at the centre, allow foreign investors in the energy sector to challenge adverse state action before international arbitration and claim compensation for measures affecting their business activities. Fossil fuel investors have increasingly used the ECT to challenge environmental and climate measures, such as phasing out coal-fired power generation, banning offshore oil drilling in coastal areas, and prohibiting gas fracking projects. Such cases have fuelled concerns regarding the abilities of governments to roll-out large-scale climate action. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that international investment agreements (IIAs) like the ECT could ‘be used by fossil-fuel companies to block national legislation aimed at phasing out the use of their assets’.3 With some of these damage claims running into billions of euros, the ECT enables fossil fuel investors to offload the costs and risks associated with their affected assets onto society at large in the face of necessary climate action. This would go, in the words of the editorial board of the Financial Times, against the ‘heart of the capitalist social contract’ and the ‘ability of markets to deal adequately with the challenge of climate change’.4

Connecting I’ve moved house on the weekend, closer to the centre of an Australian capital city. I had recently signed up for broadband, with a major Australian Internet company (my first contact, cf. Turner). Now I am the proud owner of a larger modem than I have ever owned: a white cable modem. I gaze out into our new street: two thick black cables cosseted in silver wire. I am relieved. My new home is located in one of those streets, double-cabled by Telstra and Optus in the data-rush of the mid-1990s. Otherwise, I’d be moth-balling the cable modem, and the thrill of my data percolating down coaxial cable. And it would be off to the computer supermarket to buy an ASDL modem, then to pick a provider, to squeeze some twenty-first century connectivity out of old copper (the phone network our grandparents and great-grandparents built). If I still lived in the country, or the outskirts of the city, or anywhere else more than four kilometres from the phone exchange, and somewhere that cable pay TV will never reach, it would be a dish for me — satellite. Our digital lives are premised upon infrastructure, the networks through which we shape what we do, fashion the meanings of our customs and practices, and exchange signs with others. Infrastructure is not simply the material or the technical (Lamberton), but it is the dense, fibrous knotting together of social visions, cultural resources, individual desires, and connections. No more can one easily discern between ‘society’ and ‘technology’, ‘carriage’ and ‘content’, ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’, or ‘infrastructure’ and ‘applications’ (or ‘services’ or ‘content’). To understand telecommunications in action, or the vectors of fibre, we need to consider the long and heterogeneous list of links among different human and non-human actors — the long networks, to take Bruno Latour’s evocative concept, that confect our broadband networks (Latour). The co-ordinates of our infrastructure still build on a century-long history of telecommunications networks, on the nineteenth-century centrality of telegraphy preceding this, and on the histories of the public and private so inscribed. Yet we are in the midst of a long, slow dismantling of the posts-telegraph-telephone (PTT) model of the monopoly carrier for each nation that dominated the twentieth century, with its deep colonial foundations. Instead our New World Information and Communication Order is not the decolonising UNESCO vision of the late 1970s and early 1980s (MacBride, Maitland). Rather it is the neoliberal, free trade, market access model, its symbol the 1984 US judicial decision to require the break-up of AT&T and the UK legislation in the same year that underpinned the Thatcherite twin move to privatize British Telecom and introduce telecommunications competition. Between 1984 and 1999, 110 telecommunications companies were privatized, and the ‘acquisition of privatized PTOs [public telecommunications operators] by European and American operators does follow colonial lines’ (Winseck 396; see also Mody, Bauer & Straubhaar). The competitive market has now been uneasily installed as the paradigm for convergent communications networks, not least with the World Trade Organisation’s 1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annex on Telecommunications. As the citizen is recast as consumer and customer (Goggin, ‘Citizens and Beyond’), we rethink our cultural and political axioms as well as the axes that orient our understandings in this area. Information might travel close to the speed of light, and we might fantasise about optical fibre to the home (or pillow), but our terrain, our band where the struggle lies today, is narrower than we wish. Begging for broadband, it seems, is a long way from warchalking for WiFi. Policy Circuits The dreary everyday business of getting connected plugs the individual netizen into a tangled mess of policy circuits, as much as tricky network negotiations. Broadband in mid-2003 in Australia is a curious chimera, welded together from a patchwork of technologies, old and newer communications industries, emerging economies and patterns of use. Broadband conjures up grander visions, however, of communication and cultural cornucopia. Broadband is high-speed, high-bandwidth, ‘always-on’, networked communications. People can send and receive video, engage in multimedia exchanges of all sorts, make the most of online education, realise the vision of home-based work and trading, have access to telemedicine, and entertainment. Broadband really entered the lexicon with the mass takeup of the Internet in the early to mid-1990s, and with the debates about something called the ‘information superhighway’. The rise of the Internet, the deregulation of telecommunications, and the involuted convergence of communications and media technologies saw broadband positioned at the centre of policy debates nearly a decade ago. In 1993-1994, Australia had its Broadband Services Expert Group (BSEG), established by the then Labor government. The BSEG was charged with inquiring into ‘issues relating to the delivery of broadband services to homes, schools and businesses’. Stung by criticisms of elite composition (a narrow membership, with only one woman among its twelve members, and no consumer or citizen group representation), the BSEG was prompted into wider public discussion and consultation (Goggin & Newell). The then Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics (BTCE), since transmogrified into the Communications Research Unit of the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA), conducted its large-scale Communications Futures Project (BTCE and Luck). The BSEG Final report posed the question starkly: As a society we have choices to make. If we ignore the opportunities we run the risk of being left behind as other countries introduce new services and make themselves more competitive: we will become consumers of other countries’ content, culture and technologies rather than our own. Or we could adopt new technologies at any cost…This report puts forward a different approach, one based on developing a new, user-oriented strategy for communications. The emphasis will be on communication among people... (BSEG v) The BSEG proposed a ‘National Strategy for New Communications Networks’ based on three aspects: education and community access, industry development, and the role of government (BSEG x). Ironically, while the nation, or at least its policy elites, pondered the weighty question of broadband, Australia’s two largest telcos were doing it. The commercial decision of Telstra/Foxtel and Optus Vision, and their various television partners, was to nail their colours (black) to the mast, or rather telegraph pole, and to lay cable in the major capital cities. In fact, they duplicated the infrastructure in cities such as Sydney and Melbourne, then deciding it would not be profitable to cable up even regional centres, let alone small country towns or settlements. As Terry Flew and Christina Spurgeon observe: This wasteful duplication contrasted with many other parts of the country that would never have access to this infrastructure, or to the social and economic benefits that it was perceived to deliver. (Flew & Spurgeon 72) The implications of this decision for Australia’s telecommunications and television were profound, but there was little, if any, public input into this. Then Minister Michael Lee was very proud of his anti-siphoning list of programs, such as national sporting events, that would remain on free-to-air television rather than screen on pay, but was unwilling, or unable, to develop policy on broadband and pay TV cable infrastructure (on the ironies of Australia’s television history, see Given’s masterly account). During this period also, it may be remembered, Australia’s Internet was being passed into private hands, with the tendering out of AARNET (see Spurgeon for discussion). No such national strategy on broadband really emerged in the intervening years, nor has the market provided integrated, accessible broadband services. In 1997, landmark telecommunications legislation was enacted that provided a comprehensive framework for competition in telecommunications, as well as consolidating and extending consumer protection, universal service, customer service standards, and other reforms (CLC). Carrier and reseller competition had commenced in 1991, and the 1997 legislation gave it further impetus. Effective competition is now well established in long distance telephone markets, and in mobiles. Rivalrous competition exists in the market for local-call services, though viable alternatives to Telstra’s dominance are still few (Fels). Broadband too is an area where there is symbolic rivalry rather than effective competition. This is most visible in advertised ADSL offerings in large cities, yet most of the infrastructure for these services is comprised by Telstra’s copper, fixed-line network. Facilities-based duopoly competition exists principally where Telstra/Foxtel and Optus cable networks have been laid, though there are quite a number of ventures underway by regional telcos, power companies, and, most substantial perhaps, the ACT government’s TransACT broadband network. Policymakers and industry have been greatly concerned about what they see as slow takeup of broadband, compared to other countries, and by barriers to broadband competition and access to ‘bottleneck’ facilities (such as Telstra or Optus’s networks) by potential competitors. The government has alternated between trying to talk up broadband benefits and rates of take up and recognising the real difficulties Australia faces as a large country with a relative small and dispersed population. In March 2003, Minister Alston directed the ACCC to implement new monitoring and reporting arrangements on competition in the broadband industry. A key site for discussion of these matters has been the competition policy institution, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, and its various inquiries, reports, and considerations (consult ACCC’s telecommunications homepage at http://www.accc.gov.au/telco/fs-telecom.htm). Another key site has been the Productivity Commission (http://www.pc.gov.au), while a third is the National Office on the Information Economy (NOIE - http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/access/access/broadband1.htm). Others have questioned whether even the most perfectly competitive market in broadband will actually provide access to citizens and consumers. A great deal of work on this issue has been undertaken by DCITA, NOIE, the regulators, and industry bodies, not to mention consumer and public interest groups. Since 1997, there have been a number of governmental inquiries undertaken or in progress concerning the takeup of broadband and networked new media (for example, a House of Representatives Wireless Broadband Inquiry), as well as important inquiries into the still most strategically important of Australia’s companies in this area, Telstra. Much of this effort on an ersatz broadband policy has been piecemeal and fragmented. There are fundamental difficulties with the large size of the Australian continent and its harsh terrain, the small size of the Australian market, the number of providers, and the dominant position effectively still held by Telstra, as well as Singtel Optus (Optus’s previous overseas investors included Cable & Wireless and Bell South), and the larger telecommunications and Internet companies (such as Ozemail). Many consumers living in metropolitan Australia still face real difficulties in realising the slogan ‘bandwidth for all’, but the situation in parts of rural Australia is far worse. Satellite ‘broadband’ solutions are available, through Telstra Countrywide or other providers, but these offer limited two-way interactivity. Data can be received at reasonable speeds (though at far lower data rates than how ‘broadband’ used to be defined), but can only be sent at far slower rates (Goggin, Rural Communities Online). The cultural implications of these digital constraints may well be considerable. Computer gamers, for instance, are frustrated by slow return paths. In this light, the final report of the January 2003 Broadband Advisory Group (BAG) is very timely. The BAG report opens with a broadband rhapsody: Broadband communications technologies can deliver substantial economic and social benefits to Australia…As well as producing productivity gains in traditional and new industries, advanced connectivity can enrich community life, particularly in rural and regional areas. It provides the basis for integration of remote communities into national economic, cultural and social life. (BAG 1, 7) Its prescriptions include: Australia will be a world leader in the availability and effective use of broadband...and to capture the economic and social benefits of broadband connectivity...Broadband should be available to all Australians at fair and reasonable prices…Market arrangements should be pro-competitive and encourage investment...The Government should adopt a National Broadband Strategy (BAG 1) And, like its predecessor nine years earlier, the BAG report does make reference to a national broadband strategy aiming to maximise “choice in work and recreation activities available to all Australians independent of location, background, age or interests” (17). However, the idea of a national broadband strategy is not something the BAG really comes to grips with. The final report is keen on encouraging broadband adoption, but not explicit on how barriers to broadband can be addressed. Perhaps this is not surprising given that the membership of the BAG, dominated by representatives of large corporations and senior bureaucrats was even less representative than its BSEG predecessor. Some months after the BAG report, the Federal government did declare a broadband strategy. It did so, intriguingly enough, under the rubric of its response to the Regional Telecommunications Inquiry report (Estens), the second inquiry responsible for reassuring citizens nervous about the full-privatisation of Telstra (the first inquiry being Besley). The government’s grand $142.8 million National Broadband Strategy focusses on the ‘broadband needs of regional Australians, in partnership with all levels of government’ (Alston, ‘National Broadband Strategy’). Among other things, the government claims that the Strategy will result in “improved outcomes in terms of services and prices for regional broadband access; [and] the development of national broadband infrastructure assets.” (Alston, ‘National Broadband Strategy’) At the same time, the government announced an overall response to the Estens Inquiry, with specific safeguards for Telstra’s role in regional communications — a preliminary to the full Telstra sale (Alston, ‘Future Proofing’). Less publicised was the government’s further initiative in indigenous telecommunications, complementing its Telecommunications Action Plan for Remote Indigenous Communities (DCITA). Indigenous people, it can be argued, were never really contemplated as citizens with the ken of the universal service policy taken to underpin the twentieth-century government monopoly PTT project. In Australia during the deregulatory and re-regulatory 1990s, there was a great reluctance on the part of Labor and Coalition Federal governments, Telstra and other industry participants, even to research issues of access to and use of telecommunications by indigenous communicators. Telstra, and to a lesser extent Optus (who had purchased AUSSAT as part of their licence arrangements), shrouded the issue of indigenous communications in mystery that policymakers were very reluctant to uncover, let alone systematically address. Then regulator, the Australian Telecommunications Authority (AUSTEL), had raised grave concerns about indigenous telecommunications access in its 1991 Rural Communications inquiry. However, there was no government consideration of, nor research upon, these issues until Alston commissioned a study in 2001 — the basis for the TAPRIC strategy (DCITA). The elision of indigenous telecommunications from mainstream industry and government policy is all the more puzzling, if one considers the extraordinarily varied and significant experiments by indigenous Australians in telecommunications and Internet (not least in the early work of the Tanami community, made famous in media and cultural studies by the writings of anthropologist Eric Michaels). While the government’s mid-2003 moves on a ‘National Broadband Strategy’ attend to some details of the broadband predicament, they fall well short of an integrated framework that grasps the shortcomings of the neoliberal communications model. The funding offered is a token amount. The view from the seat of government is a glance from the rear-view mirror: taking a snapshot of rural communications in the years 2000-2002 and projecting this tableau into a safety-net ‘future proofing’ for the inevitable turning away of a fully-privately-owned Telstra from its previously universal, ‘carrier of last resort’ responsibilities. In this aetiolated, residualist policy gaze, citizens remain constructed as consumers in a very narrow sense in this incremental, quietist version of state securing of market arrangements. What is missing is any more expansive notion of citizens, their varied needs, expectations, uses, and cultural imaginings of ‘always on’ broadband networks. Hybrid Networks “Most people on earth will eventually have access to networks that are all switched, interactive, and broadband”, wrote Frances Cairncross in 1998. ‘Eventually’ is a very appropriate word to describe the parlous state of broadband technology implementation. Broadband is in a slow state of evolution and invention. The story of broadband so far underscores the predicament for Australian access to bandwidth, when we lack any comprehensive, integrated, effective, and fair policy in communications and information technology. We have only begun to experiment with broadband technologies and understand their evolving uses, cultural forms, and the sense in which they rework us as subjects. Our communications networks are not superhighways, to invoke an enduring artefact from an older technology. Nor any longer are they a single ‘public’ switched telecommunications network, like those presided over by the post-telegraph-telephone monopolies of old. Like roads themselves, or the nascent postal system of the sixteenth century, broadband is a patchwork quilt. The ‘fibre’ of our communications networks is hybrid. To be sure, powerful corporations dominate, like the Tassis or Taxis who served as postmasters to the Habsburg emperors (Briggs & Burke 25). Activating broadband today provides a perspective on the path dependency of technology history, and how we can open up new threads of a communications fabric. Our options for transforming our multitudinous networked lives emerge as much from everyday tactics and strategies as they do from grander schemes and unifying policies. We may care to reflect on the waning potential for nation-building technology, in the wake of globalisation. We no longer gather our imagined community around a Community Telephone Plan as it was called in 1960 (Barr, Moyal, and PMG). Yet we do require national and international strategies to get and stay connected (Barr), ideas and funding that concretely address the wider dimensions of access and use. We do need to debate the respective roles of Telstra, the state, community initiatives, and industry competition in fair telecommunications futures. Networks have global reach and require global and national integration. Here vision, co-ordination, and resources are urgently required for our commonweal and moral fibre. To feel the width of the band we desire, we need to plug into and activate the policy circuits. Thanks to Grayson Cooke, Patrick Lichty, Ned Rossiter, John Pace, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments. Works Cited Alston, Richard. ‘ “Future Proofing” Regional Communications.’ Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, Canberra, 2003. 17 July 2003 <http://www.dcita.gov.au/Article/0,,0_1-2_3-4_115485,00.php> —. ‘A National Broadband Strategy.’ Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, Canberra, 2003. 17 July 2003 <http://www.dcita.gov.au/Article/0,,0_1-2_3-4_115486,00.php>. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Broadband Services Report March 2003. Canberra: ACCC, 2003. 17 July 2003 <http://www.accc.gov.au/telco/fs-telecom.htm>. —. Emerging Market Structures in the Communications Sector. 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MLA Style Goggin, Gerard. "Broadband" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture< http://www.media-culture.org.au/0308/02-featurebroadband.php>. APA Style Goggin, G. (2003, Aug 26). Broadband. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture, 6,< http://www.media-culture.org.au/0308/02-featurebroadband.php>