Articles de revues sur le sujet « Romania – Politics and government – 1914-1944 »

Abstract The Romanian-Bulgarian relations were assigned the role of satellites belonging first to the Axis, and then to U.S.S.R., following the regulation of the territorial statute of South Dobrudja on September 7th 1940, through the Treaty from Craiova. After the Red Army has entered Bulgaria, on September 8th 1944, an unusual fact has intervened between Bucharest and Sofia, from the perspective of Kremlin’s influence, of course: the priority of Bulgarian political, ideological and diplomatic factors over the Romanian ones, unprecedented fact in the history of almost seven decades of the modern bilateral relations. The lack of human and ideological resources of the Romanian Communist Party has become obvious during the not even declared competition with the Bulgarian Communists and their leader, Georgi Dimitrov. The Communist Bulgaria has become a model that Romanian communists do not only seriously took into account, yet, at least the year King Mihai I has abdicated (1947), they zestfully were also studying and copying, as the case may have been. Being a so-called People’s Republic even since September 1946, following a falsified popular referendum, Bulgaria has undertaken during the next months to coordinate plans of internal and external politics of Romania. In order to finalize a “Bulgarian way” in Romania, the government led by Petru Groza and the media of propaganda, and mainly the press official of the Romanian Communist Party, “Scânteia”, have scrupulously assumed the role of protagonists. And Communist Bulgaria, just like U.S.S.R., has become for more than two years (1946- February 1948) an extremely important and valuable topic of the Romanian public speech, of the Romanian Communists’ confirmation, of establishing the project for instituting the totalitarian regime. The similarity of actions and of institutes’ organization is striking for this short period, and the treaty signed in January 1948 is nothing but the final of a stage extremely abundant in models and suggestions for the Romanian communists.

The main tendencies of the development of the Kingdom of Romania during the First World War were analysed in this article. The stages of the diplomatic negotiations of the Romanian government with the countries of the Central Bloc and the Entente during 1914–1918 years are considered. Bucharest managed to take advantage of its own diplomatic balancing during the war, which was squeezed between the two military-political blocs. Thanks to its foreign policy strategy, the Romanian government had retained its sovereign right to the development and the acceptance of the most important decisions, and those which were touched of the upholding of the national interests of the state. Moreover, Romania managed to significantly expand its borders, which was possible due to the crisis and the destruction that was passed through Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire during 1917-1918 years. In the context of the foreign policy strategy of the kingdom during the World War, the «Bessarabian question» is partially covered and which role it played in the realization of the project of the creation of «Great Romania» by Bucharest. In addition, the certain reasons of the signing, the content and the consequences of the Bucharest peace treaty of 1918 year for the alignment of the forces in the Central European region at the final stage of the war were characterized. Ultimately, the authors state that the diplomatic balancing of the Romanian political leadership during the World War gave it the opportunity to gradually but steadily realize the project of the expansion of the state borders at the expense of the contiguous territories.

Abstract The main objective of the paper is to highlight the changes in the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania and the Romanian minority in Hungary living in the divided Transylvania from the Second Vienna Arbitration from 30 August 1940 to the end of WWII. The author analyses the Hungarian and Romanian governments’ attitude regarding the new borders and their intentions with the minorities remaining on their territories. The paper offers a synthesis of the system of reciprocity, which determined the relations between the two states on the minority issue until 1944. Finally, the negative influence of the politics of reciprocity is shown on the interethnic relations in Transylvania.

Abstract The main S.O.E aim seems to have been the utilization of political circles in an endeavour to overthrow the government and get Romania out of the war or at least to bring about the removal of its array from the Russians front, and to deny the national resources to Germany. The USSR has been constant in its disinclination to play with Maniu or associates itself with British planes until they are convinced that some concrete contribution at their war aim would results. They would however be ready to discuss unconditional surrender with the emissary of the Romanian government, capable of putting it into effect. The evolution of these SOE plans will be presented in this article.

Romanian war-time policy towards Jews presents a paradox. In the summer and fall of 1941 Romanian military and police were killing the Jews of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina indiscriminately. In late fall of the same year, those Jews who survived the first wave of killings were forcibly deported further to the east—this time not only from Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina but from the whole of the latter's province. In the late fall of 1941, Jews from Odessa were once again murdered en masse and any survivors deported from the city. At this time, i.e. in the summer and fall of 1941, Romanian policy was at least as radical and brutal as the Germans', perhaps surpassing it in its brutality, a fact that elicited Hitler's delight and commendation. But then Romanian policy underwent a gradual but more and more pronounced change. Though Romanian authorities took part in the preparations for the deportation of Romanian Jews to the Nazi concentration camps in the summer and early fall 1942, in October of that year the Romanians abruptly terminated their participation in all preparations. In 1943 and 1944 the Romanian government even took measures to protect Romanian Jewish citizens residing in the German-ruled territories by demanding that those Jews were exempt from deportation to concentration camps and facilitated Jewish emigration to Palestine from Romania. Inside Romania, Jews were still heavily discriminated against, exposed to various vexations and harsh confiscatory taxation, but the majority of them survived the war.

At the 1914 Crown Council, which decided to keep Romania neutral in 1914, former Conservative prime minister Petre Carp offered his succinct and direct opinion about the direction of Romanian foreign policy in the opening days of the Great War. He admonished the Council that, if Romania wanted to remain among the ‘civilized states’ ( statele civilizate) it had to follow Germany and Austria-Hungary into war immediately. The idea of ‘civilized states’ that dominated the remainder of the Crown Council was not merely an intersubjective social construction. It was a legal term of art in fin de siècle international law that could be applied in the real world. It was only the legally-civilized states that enjoyed the full panoply of rights, privileges, and protections under international law. This is a study of how Romania’s policy-making elite, and Ion I. C. Brătianu’s government, in particular, confronted the challenges of ‘situational sovereignty’. It asserts that, during Romania’s two-year Period of Neutrality (3 August 1914–17 August 1916), Brătianu initially used bilateral conventions as both a method to establish recognition of Romania’s status (or at least a guarantee of territorial integrity) and as a litmus test to determine which (if any) foreign powers recognized Romania as a legal equal. Although he was able to achieve a short-term victory of having an equality clause inserted into the August 1916 political convention with the Entente, it is unclear if that clause could have been durable. Ultimately, Brătianu was trapped between a desire to secure Romania’s recognition through international agreement, but confronted with the reality that Romania’s lack of recognition as a legally-civilized equal meant those very conventions could be unenforceable.

In the summer of 1915, concerned about Italy’s entry into the war in alliance with the Entente powers yet encouraged by the victories of its armies on the Eastern Front, the German diplomacy attempted to encourage Sweden and Romania to abandon their neutrality in order to give a decisive blow to Russia. In several reports dispatched from Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, the envoy to Germany who was also Romania’s representative in the Scandinavian countries, raised the possibility of Sweden’s entry into the war on the German side. After he had identified Russia as the common historical enemy of the two countries, the Romanian diplomat suggested forging an alliance under the leadership of Germany. A strong alliance was thought to ensure Sweden’s ascendancy in Finland and the Baltic states, and Romania’s supremacy in the East at the Black Sea. Although this plan was rejected by the liberal government, Beldiman’s initiative in a period of neutrality remains an alternative in the Romanian political circles to Entente supremacy.

This article analyzes the communist takeover in Romania as the successful outcome of a long-term policy aiming to make the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) a national force. Such an attempt deserves a new analytical explanation of the highly controversial notions of institutional continuity and of “nationalization” of its membership. While mainstream explanations still focus on factors of change motivated by external (Soviet) pressure and stress that violence, coercion, and intimidation have been main instruments used by the Communist Party to implement its goals, the author argues that a reevaluation of the real extent of popular support is needed. PCR became a national mass party immediately after the coup d’état of 23 August 1944. At that time a marginal political force, traditionally ruled by non-Romanian elements and devoted to the strictest internationalism, turned national without falling into discrimination against minority groups, with the exception of the Germans. In multiethnic Transylvania the ethnic power balance consciously created by PCR with Soviet assistance helped the party to strengthen its political legitimacy among different national and social groups. Unlike the Romanian historical parties and the Hungarian nationalists, the PCR and the Petru Groza—led coalition government behaved as a transnational body and pursued integrative policies. In the troubled context of postwar reconstruction, this call for cooperation and peaceful ethnic coexistence distinguished the PCR and its allies from the opposition parties and significantly contributed to make early communist rule more acceptable to large masses of Romanians and non-Romanians, as well.

Using the little-known BBC Monitoring Service (BBCM) archives, this article shows how Romanian governments in the period 1938–1948 chose to represent themselves via the medium of radio to the rest of the world. After introducing the BBCM and discussing the problems of using such Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) material, the article shows how four key aspects of Romanian history were presented by the Romanian authorities at this time: the wartime expropriation of Jews prior to their planned deportation; Romania’s changing of sides in the war as of 23 August 1944; the return of Jewish deportees after the war; and the communist governments’ changing attitudes towards Palestine/Israel and Jewish emigration. The article suggests that these sources are highly revealing but that they need to be used with considerable caution when trying to understand the tumultuous events of wartime Romanian history.

According to the Munich based scholar the history of Moldovan Csangos was much more influenced by major European events, then it was earlier thought. One has to mention here their (i.e. Csangos) strictly defined frames by the two known totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. One key event of matter to Csangos from the Hungarian side was the resettlment project on the summer of 1944 that eventually failed. This clearly shows the ideological positions of both the Hungarian and Rumanian government of that time, as well as the role of Nazi Germany on the Csango issue

Abstract Many Jewish and non-Jewish Romanians seriously considered and debated the reversal of Romanian seizures of Jewish property (Romanianization) during the Antonescu regime. While the former hoped for full restitution, the majority of the latter opposed the return of Romanianized property. In particular, beneficiaries of Romanianization feared losing their recent acquisitions. Nonetheless, some Jews managed to recover property during the Antonescu regime after petitioning the courts and administrative offices. As a radical antisemite, Antonescu was not motivated by a desire to help the Jews, but rather by concerns about budgetary losses, economic collapse, growing distrust in the security of property rights, and the prospect of postwar peace negotiations. Wartime debates by Jews, non-Jews, and government officials reveal that from 1940 to 1944, the restitution of “illegally” seized property became, in some circumstances, an accepted practice.

This article explores how the U.S. and British governments' wartime strategy against Germany affected their policies toward Hungary, a country that had allied itself with Germany when World War II began. U.S. and British leaders wanted to facilitate an Allied landing on the French coast by diverting German troops to other theaters, thinning them out as much as possible. To this end, the United States and Britain were cool toward Hungary's peace overtures in 1943 and were willing to brook Germany's military incursions into Hungary and Romania in 1944 because German troops operating there could not be quickly redeployed to the west. Germany's occupation of those two countries led to the destruction of what remained of the once-large Jewish communities there, a tragic price that Allied leaders were ultimately willing to risk. The failure of Hungary's secret peace overtures also contributed to the later Soviet occupation of Hungary and the grim fate that befell the country after the war.

The article deals with the views of the largest Russian Slavist Vladimir Ivanovich Lamansky (1833–1914) on the Eastern Question. Both his published works and manuscripts are used as sources. It is noted that Lamansky, on the base of the ideas of Slavophiles, formulated an original civilizational and political-geographical doctrine, which was developed in the concept of Eurasians. It is pointed out that the specific feature of Lamansky’s approach was a broad philosophical-historical and global-historical view at the Eastern Question. He showed that the significance of the Oriental Question was not limited to the rivalry with Turkey, liberation of the Southern Slavs, capture of Constantinople, and control over the Straits. According to Lamansky, the Eastern Question is an issue of civilizational rifts in Eastern Europe and Asia Minor that lead to the confrontation of two civilizational worlds: the Germanic-Romanic and the Greco-Slavic or the Middle World. The main boundaries of Greco-Slavic civilisation coincide with the borders of the Russian Empire, but the western boundary of this distinctive world remains unstable. Its definition constitutes the main content of the Eastern Question. The political configuration of the Greco-Slavic civilisation corresponds best to the idea of a unified Christian Empire, allowing for different forms of government on different territories. However, the Russian state, as the largest representative of the Middle World, realized a different type of empire - a Europeanizing state, which does not correspond to its global-historical task. The Eastern Question, therefore, was aquestion issue of mutual relations between the Germanic-Romanic and the Middle Worlds. Lamansky argued that its solution could not be purely military. A favourable resolution of the Eastern Question for the Middle World would be a consequence of its successful internal development.

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, officially named Yugoslavia after 1929, came into being on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918 after the immense war efforts and sacrifices endured by Serbia. The experience of anti-Habsburg struggle both before and after 1914 and the memory of some of the most difficult moments in the Great War left a deep imprint on the minds of policy-makers in Belgrade. As they believed that many dangers faced in the war were likely to be revived in the future, the impact of these experiences was instrumental to their post-war foreign policy and military planning. This paper looks at the specific ways in which the legacy of the Great War affected and shaped the (planned) responses of the Yugoslav government to certain crises and challenges posed to Yugoslavia and the newly-established order in the region. These concern the reaction to the two attempts of Habsburg restoration in Hungary in 1921, the importance of the Greek port of Salonica (Thessaloniki) for Yugoslavia?s strategic and defence requirements, and military planning within the framework of the Little Entente (the defensive alliance between Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania) in the early 1930s. In addition, it is ar?gued here that the legacy of Serbo-Croat differences during the war relating to the manner of their unification was apparent in the political struggle between Serbs and Croats during the two decades of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia?s existence.

The exile years of Janusz Jędrzejewicz (1939-1951), a prominent and reputed educator of the inter-war Poland, deserve much of our attention. After the outbreak of the war, Jędrzejewicz initially took some effort to return to active military duty but these attempts failed to be successful. Along with the evacuation of the government, the Jędrzejewiczs had to leave Poland for Romania and had to remain there as exiles. Dull, everyday routine in exile in Romania was interspersed with Jędrzejewicz’s involvement in teaching maths and in meetings with fellow exiles, the followers of Józef Piłsudzki. The years from July 1940 until the end of the year, Jędrzejewicz and his family spent in Turkey. In the dire straits he was in at the time, to minimize stress and inconvenience in housing, he managed to find some balance and relief in his political and social activity. Jędrzejewicz managed to establish contacts with other exiles, notably Tatar, Caucasian and Ukrainian exiles. As a result of the meetings with the non-Polish émigrés, the concept of the so-called “Międzymorze – Intermarum”, a proposed federation of countries stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, emerged. The years between 1940 and 1942 Jędzerzejowicz and his family spent in Tel-Aviv in Palestine. The local Polish political and military circles were closely associated with former “colonels” and Gen. Sławoj-Składkowski’s supporters and were labelled as “steadfast” or “unyielding”. In a straightforward way, the leadership of this group fell to Jędrzejewicz as the one who was the highest ranking Pilsudski-ite among them. The group became the core of the political movement founded upon a concept that underlined the ideas of the late marshal and represented their supporters in the Near East. Jędrzejewicz was very active in writing articles on social and political subjects and in giving lectures, including notably the one delivered on March 19, 1941 and entitled “On the occasion of the anniversary of the name day of First Marshal of Poland” He was also involved in talks with leaders of local Jewish and Arabic population. The presented concept of “Intermarum” was received with interest by politicians in exile from the Baltics, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. It also formed an alternative to the realpolitik exercised by the government in exile.An important initiative of the group of the Pilsudski-ites was to publish Biuletyn Informacyjny (News Bulletin), and then to transform it into the official monthly Na Straży (On guard). The editor-in-chief of the periodical was Jędrzejewicz himself (from issue 18th onwards). In the course of time, still in Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem, the Piłsudski-ite groups grew more and more members. These circles, physically far from the government in exile in London and its influence, were thus more independent and formed a sort of a mutation and an alternative to the London-based Związek Pracy Państwowej (State Labour Union). Under the leadership of Janusz Jędrzejewicz, the Piłsudzki-ites in Palestine organized themselves in Związek Pracy dla Państwa (Union of Work for the State). The Polish political scene in exile was going through many dramatic changes and transformations. Political tension was aggravated further by Prof. Kot’s action who had returned from the Soviet Union in mid-1942. He perceived the activity of some of Polish exiles in the Near East as politically detrimental and anti-government. As for Prof Kot’s intense dislike for Jędrzejewicz, it was guided by the two following reasons: the latter’s influence in circles overtly reluctant to accept the stance adopted by the government represented by Gen. Sikorski, and, secondly, his personal grudge and resentment towards the former minister of religious affairs and education (Polish: MriOP). The political situation of the years 1944-1946 was decisive in creating the atmosphere less negative and more cooperative, and ultimately led to the emergence of the idea of a common platform for reconciliation and understanding for all splinter groups of Piłsudski followers. The common denominator for all was to be the Independence League, a political party in exile, of which, until 1947, Jędrzejewicz knew very little about. From 1942 the Jędrzejewiczs lived in Jerusalem, where they enjoyed good rapport and relations with local Arab leaders. Despite some health problems, Jędrzejewicz engaged himself in a series of lectures and continued to edit the periodical Na Straży. Soon, however, he was forced to step down this post due to aggravating health problems. Towards the end of 1946, the former prime minister was transferred to the reserve. This helped Jędrzejewicz to obtain a decision to be moved to Great Britain. Before he left Jerusalem, however, he spent half a year with his family in harsh conditions of El Kantara field hospital, which was also a transit camp for war refugees. The circles of the London-based Pilsudski-ites were very much counting on Jędrzejewicz’s Związek Pracy dla Państwa. The promoters of the Independence League also viewed the former prime minister, who was a one-time trustworthy aide to Marshal Piłsudski, as their potential leader. Jędrzejewicz himself was quite aware of his assets and the position he enjoyed within the hierarchy of values as a Piłsudski-ite and, despite bad health, was ready to support the League. In the first half of 1948, with the help of Jędrzejewicz, the fundamentals of the political program of the Poland’s Independence League were established. However, the following infightings and quarrels as to who was to head the League made Jędrzejewicz step down from the position of the leader of the League. From that time on, his activity was limited to writing articles and the participation in the work for the board of trustees of the London Piłsudski Institute. Jędrzejewicz’s last years of his life were undoubtedly influenced by his poor health (1948-1951). He was repeatedly hospitalized, which was taken advantage of by his political opponents in 1948. His physical state was very much influenced by his mental condition, which was a result the victimization and persecution he experienced between 1939-1943. An emotional shock for him was undoubtedly the news about his son who had been shot by the Germans in 1943, and the death of his former wife, Maria Stattler, in 1944. Eventually, all his energy was directed at administrative and research work. With his participation, or at his initiative, four research institutes were established at the time. The intention was to conduct historical or political science research there. Janusz Jędrzejewicz died on March 16th 1951. In exile, he was unfortunate enough to experience ostracism from fellow Poles, both as a politician and as a man. Still, he was far from shunning the world and, with dignity, he carried out his mission of executing the tasks once set by his Commander. As an exile, he was just as well a good representative of a Piłsudski-ite with a characteristic appropriate system of values that determined his life style. The ongoing internalization of the imponderables of his beloved Commander was though respected in the multi-faceted realities of Polish exile life.

e Romanian Convention of Armistice, signed in Moscow on 12 – 13 September 1944, provided to the Soviet Union the right to represent all interests of the United Nations by ruling the Allied Control Commission on Romania, to which the United States and the United Kingdom represensatives were attached. British documents on microches, studied at the Romanian National Archives, provided a clear insight on the Romanian a$airs approached by the Big ree Powers in the autumn of 1944.One could easily notice the fact that not only did the Soviets interfere in Romanian a$airs from the beginning but they also a$ected the rights, mainly economic, in Romania of all other states of the United Nations, the Great Britain and the United States especially. After Churchill-Stalin’s “Percentages Agreement”, the Soviets, using false arguments, increased their purely unilateral activities, in disregard even of the 10% percent British, by removing British and American-owned oil concerns’ equipment although His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government made serious unsuccessful protests.e United Kingdom succeeded in having the Oce of Political Representatives, through which the Foreign Oce was made known about the political developments with Romanian Government and Romanian patriots’ help, who sincerely believed in the generous principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations.

Romania was considered a defeated country in the World War II and was ocuppied by the Red Army, under Armistice, supervised by the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.On the 6th of March 1945 the Soviets imposed to King Mihai the loyal Groza Government, found unacceptable by the USA and the UK. Encouraged by those two powers, Mihai dismissed the Government but Groza stayed in power as the King and the opposition could not match the Red Army. Mihai addressed the three powers in the matter and refused any collaboration with the Government, including the signing of Royal Decrees for approving laws made only by the Government, after the 21st of August 1945 marking the beginning of the so-called RoyalStrike, The Government used all sorts of pressure in order that the King should resume his duties and warned him he would be deposed. In September the Government approached the Soviets in order to assume the Royal Prerogative but the Groza Cabinet continued to rule Romania as the only political power neglecting the King.In December, the Soviets and the Romanian Communists that dominated the Cabinet thought about a Regency Council under their control but the Allies’s Moscow Conference proposed Mihai to add two ministers of the opposition. Provided only with the opposition’s help, the King had to accept in January 1946 and ended unsuccessfully the Royal Strike.

The commerce was also afected of different problems: the control of the state in this domain; maintaining the private property; changing the taxe system; refuse of the romanian government to participate to Marshall Plan, proposed by U.S.A.; high prices to all merchendises; low quality of products; laws were changed (organisation of Professional Rooms).In this agitated period (1944–1948) there were necessary a series of measures that would stabilise the industry and trades. For the urban traders, an important action was the reopering of the industrial railways Oraviţa-IeşenovaVârşeţ-Timişoara, belonging to the U.D.R. Society.Between 1944–1947 took place some legislative changes, for example, the law for organizing the Professional Chambers, establishing prices for different trades, even banning some of them to get on the markets.The Severin district had to deal with some negative effects too, because the state started to controll everything and everyone from the trading domain. Its commerce was affected by the sovietic robberies and abuses from 1944–1945.The instability of the internal market, and the lack of products because of the soviet army have encouraged the traders to form societies of their own, professional organisations of traders, such as: The Society of Traders specialised in: wood, cereals, iron, meat and lambs, textiles, glass, food, skin and shoes, but all of them had to respect the government’s rules.In conclusion, the commerce in Severin between 1944–1948 was limited by the political factor and the state’s control over it.

e year 1946 was economically marked by the continuation of the etatization measures, culminating in taking over the state control over the National Bank of Romania at the end of December. Politically, 1946 was dominated by the prolonged electoral campaign, shaken by violence and abuses, and by the parliamentary elections in November, forged by the Communist Party-controlled government coalition.In 1946, the pages of the Communist daily «Fighter of Banat» in Timişoara (which appeared in the autumn of 1944) re#ect, subjectively, the economic situation of Banat and the attitude of the Banat workers towards the main political events. After November 19, 1946, articles about drought, sabotage, grain collection, illiteracy, economics, economic laws, and so on.On a political level, all articles „traditional proletarians” plot the traditional parties and praise the work of the Communist Party, its „satellites” and „comrades of the road”. After the elections of November 19, 1946, the political articles of the Communist daily focus on two key themes: women’s rights (including religious a$airs – Christmas with ample connections with the situation in Moldova) and the establishment of popular tribunals (advanced proposal by the workers in Arad).In conclusion, Communist propaganda made through the «Fighter of Banat» newspaper tried to be at least as e$ective as the one launched through other Communist Party publications and its political allies in other parts of the country.