Articles de revues sur le sujet « Romania. Army »
Pour voir les autres types de publications sur ce sujet consultez le lien suivant : Romania. Army.
Créez une référence correcte selon les styles APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard et plusieurs autres
Consultez les 50 meilleurs articles de revues pour votre recherche sur le sujet « Romania. Army ».
À côté de chaque source dans la liste de références il y a un bouton « Ajouter à la bibliographie ». Cliquez sur ce bouton, et nous générerons automatiquement la référence bibliographique pour la source choisie selon votre style de citation préféré : APA, MLA, Harvard, Vancouver, Chicago, etc.
Vous pouvez aussi télécharger le texte intégral de la publication scolaire au format pdf et consulter son résumé en ligne lorsque ces informations sont inclues dans les métadonnées.
Parcourez les articles de revues sur diverses disciplines et organisez correctement votre bibliographie.
1
NICULAE, Daniel Silviu. « The Allies’ Cooperation in the Re-Entry of Romania into the War on 28 October/10 November 1918 ». Romanian Military Thinking 2021, no 4 (novembre 2021) : 304–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2021.4.18.
Texte intégralRésumé :
When he drew up the operations project for the Allied armies in the East, in order to exploit success, after the capitulation of Bulgaria (16/29 September 1918), General Franchet d’Esperey certainly relied on Romania’s support, establishing the Danube Army strength to only three divisions. Indeed, it was the mission of this army to secure both the right flank of the main operation carried out in Belgrade’s direction and the left flank of the secondary operation carried out in the direction of Constantinople, against a possible intervention by the Austro-German armies in Romania. Henri Mathias Berthelot, former head of the French Military Mission in Romania, who had lived both the days of repression and the glory of the Romanian Army, was also a certain proof of the intention of the Allies to cooperate with Romania. The article presents aspects of the cooperation of the Allies with the forces of the Romanian Army that resulted in liberating the Romanian territory from the occupation of the Central Powers and in creating the necessary circumstances for the achievement of Greater Romania.
2
NICULAE, Daniel Silviu. « Cooperarea aliaţilor la reintrarea României în Primul Război Mondial : 28 octombrie/10 noiembrie 1918 ». Gândirea Militară Românească 2021, no 4 (novembre 2021) : 304–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/gmr.2021.4.18.
Texte intégralRésumé :
When he drew up the operations project for the Allied armies in the East, in order to exploit success, after the capitulation of Bulgaria (16/29 September 1918), General Franchet d’Esperey certainly relied on Romania’s support, establishing the Danube Army strength to only three divisions. Indeed, it was the mission of this army to secure both the right flank of the main operation carried out in Belgrade’s direction and the left flank of the secondary operation carried out in the direction of Constantinople, against a possible intervention by the Austro-German armies in Romania. Henri Mathias Berthelot, former head of the French Military Mission in Romania, who had lived both the days of repression and the glory of the Romanian Army, was also a certain proof of the intention of the Allies to cooperate with Romania. The article presents aspects of the cooperation of the Allies with the forces of the Romanian Army that resulted in liberating the Romanian territory from the occupation of the Central Powers and in creating the necessary circumstances for the achievement of Greater Romania.
3
Os'kin, Maksim. « The Romanian Mission of General Berthelot (1916–1917) : Cooperation and Disagreements with the Russian Command of the Romanian Front ». Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no 2 (2022) : 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640016584-0.
Texte intégralRésumé :
When the Kingdom of Romania entered the Great War in 1916, it was supposed to receive aid from the Entente allies While the Russian troops fought alongside the Romanians on the Eastern Front, the Western allies assisted them with arms, financial resources, and experienced officers. Military cooperation in the various European theatres of war was a rather complex task, and its arrangement actualised the issues of cooperation between the allies in arms in pursuit of a common goal. The French Mission of General Berthelot assisted the Romanian army in a number of ways, including leading the fighting in the autumn of 1916, reorganising the defeated Romanian army, and acting as military advisers in the 1917 campaign. In that respect, the French were competing with the Russians for influence over the Romanian top leadership, especially the military command. The formation of the Romanian front, consisting mainly of Russian troops, allowed the Russian Stavka to sideline the French from directly influencing the course of military operations. The work of the French mission was limited to bringing the Romanian units withdrawn to the rear back into order. However, in 1917, the French resumed their leading role in influencing the Romanian generals. The February Revolution marked a turning point in relations between the rival partners, finally consolidating the leading role of the Berthelot Mission in the affairs of the Romanian Army on the Romanian front. The French Mission helped reorganise the Romanian Army, which played a decisive role in the final stage of the Great War. This allowed the Kingdom of Romania to remain among the victorious nations, despite the vicissitudes of 1918 following the withdrawal of Russia from the war. The main sources for this article are documents from the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA) relating primarily to the competence of the central military authorities and administration during the war period, namely the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff Headquarters.
4
Giurgiu, Luminita. « General Constantin Hârjeu – A Close Collaborator of Alexandru Marghiloman ». Dialogica. Revistă de studii culturale și literatură, S(1) (novembre 2023) : 84–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.59295/dia.s.2023.1.09.
Texte intégralRésumé :
General Constantin Hârjeu, a distinguished personality of the military elite, was appointed minister of war in the governments of Titu Maiorescu and Alexandru Marghiloman. As Minister of War, he was involved in the reorganization and modernization of the army, initiated legislative measures, and his entire military career was rewarded with high orders and medals. General Constantin Hârjeu also stood out through his work as a military theorist; compiled the first monograph of the Romanian Army, together with General Constantin Brătianu and Lieutenant-Colonel G. Aronovici, published in French. He was elected a corresponding member of the Romanian Academy on May 27, 1909. He participated at a major event from our history – the union of Basarabia with the Kingdom of Romania, as a first step in the realization of the dream of a Great Romania.
5
BAJORA, ANATOLIE. « THE SOVIETIZATION OF THE ROMANIAN ARMY (1945-1950) ». Sociopolitical Sciences 11, no 6 (6 décembre 2021) : 107–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2223-0092-2021-11-6-107-112.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Traditionally, the Romanian Army had a French military model, and with the beginning of the Second World War, the German, the allied country. Traditionally, the Romanian army used the French and, with the outbreak of World War II, the German allied country as a military model. However, things would change significantly after the defeats on the eastern front and the country’s entry under Soviet influence. The nucleus of the future Romanian Army will be created in the USSR from the Romanian prisoners of war, who enlisted as volunteers in the “Tudor Vladimirescu” and later “the Horea, Cloșca, and Crișan” divisions. After establishing the communist regime in Romania, in the beginning, with the help and under the supervision of the Soviet military, advisers will begin the formation of a new army, strongly politically affiliated but better equipped technically and materially.
6
Gardocki, Sylwester. « Challenges and Changes in Military and Defense Policy of Romania after the Outbreak of War in Ukraine ». Polish Political Science Yearbook 52, no 4 (31 décembre 2023) : 207–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202398.
Texte intégralRésumé :
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Romania faced the imminent threat of an escalation of the armed conflict. The geographical proximity of military operations caused this, as the Black Sea location and the self-proclaimed republic of Transnistria located in neighboring Moldova. For this reason, Romania, like other European countries, faced the consequences of the outbreak of war and met economic, political, and military challenges. After the outbreak of war, the Romanian government had to take appropriate steps to help Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees who crossed the border into Romania. Although Romania adopted a distant attitude towards Ukraine, it did not block any aid projects and acted following NATO’s strategic actions. The outbreak of war in Ukraine contributed to rapid changes in the scope of the Romanian army. Several decisions were made to purchase new equipment and strengthen the armed forces.
7
Mehedinți-Beiean, Mihaela. « From a multi-ethnic empire to a national state : the contribution of Romanian officers in the Habsburg army to the creation of Greater Romania as presented by Transylvanian journalists ». Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies 10, no 1 (15 août 2018) : 53–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.53604/rjbns.v10i1_5.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Greater Romania was created at the end of World War I as a result of both top-down and bottom-up processes that involved all social layers from Transylvania and the Old Kingdom. The present study focuses on a particular category of actors that took part in the Great Union of 1 December 1918, namely Romanian officers from the Austrian army, and on a specific set of sources, i.e. Transylvanian periodicals issued around this date. In order to answer a number of research questions centered on Romanian officers’ contribution to the historical act that took place in Alba Iulia, I used articles that appeared throughout 1918 in four Transylvanian periodicals, namely Biserica și Școala, Drapelul, Transilvania and Unirea. The study’s chief aim is to provide a clear picture of the manner in which Romanian officers from the Austrian army were depicted by the press shortly before and after Transylvania’s union with Romania was proclaimed, as well as of the nature of their participation in the events: as delegates of the National Guards or as agents whose goal was to ensure order during the meeting.
8
Traşcă, Ottmar. « Grupul Etnic German din România și Serviciul Special de Informaţii (1940-1944) ». Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "George Bariţiu". Series Historica 62 (30 décembre 2023) : 267–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.59277/aiigb/2023.62.14.
Texte intégralRésumé :
One can safely state that the «Andreas Schmidt era» (1940-1944) could be considered one of the most difficult periods of the history of the German minority in Romania. From the very beginning, the activity of Nazi controlled organization entitled the German Ethnic Group in Romania and its leader (Andreas Schmidt) was perceived by the Romanian authorities with suspicion and concern. This concern was legitimate since the aggressive policies of the leadership of the German Ethnic Group in Romania let to increasing tensions between the latter, on one side, and the Romanian authorities and the Romanian local population in mixed Romanian-German communities, on the other side. Consequently, the Special Intelligence Service (Serviciul Special de Informaţii, one of the Romanian secret services in the interwar period), the intelligence service of the Romanian army (entitled in Romanian: Secţia a II-a Informaţii a Marelui Stat Major), the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie, and the General Directorate of the Police kept under close surveillance the hostile activities of the German Ethnic Group towards the Romanian state. The reports of these aforementioned intelligence institutions emphasized the totalitarian character of the German Ethnic Group in Romania and illustrates how this Nazi controlled organization turned under the leadership of Andreas Schmidt into an effective tool of the Third Reich in South Eastern Europe.
9
Rendiuk, Teofil. « The Pinnacle in the Activity of the Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in Romania (1921) ». Diplomatic Ukraine, no XXII (2021) : 71–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2021-3.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article deals with the peculiarities in the activity of the Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (EDM of the UPR) in Romania during 1921, when the whole territory of Ukraine was occupied by Bolshevik troops. In those circumstances, the State Centre of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in exile considered Romania as its important military and political partner in the struggle for Ukraine’s independence. For its part, the then Romanian leadership was deeply interested in the existence of independent Ukraine, primarily as a military and political buffer between Romania and expansionist Soviet Russia. The author emphasises the existence at the beginning of and during 1921 of sufficiently favourable political conditions for the activities of the EDM of the UPR in Romania. During 1921, the head of the mission and seasoned diplomat, K. Matsievych, held two important meetings with King Ferdinand I of Romania, had numerous working contacts with the heads of Romanian governments, ministers of foreign affairs, ministers of war, as well as authorised members of parliament and politicians with whom he discussed the cooperation of the Directory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic with Romania, zealously defending the Ukrainian cause. The EDM of the UPR in Bucharest and its consular offices in Iași, Chișinău, and Chernivtsi paid special attention to working with thousands of Ukrainian militaries as well as political and civilian emigrants throughout Romania, uniting the patriotic part of emigration and using its potential to liberate Ukraine. In this context, it is noted that during 1921 a military section was active in the EDM of the UPR in Bucharest, which from June of that year was headed by an experienced Ukrainian general, S. Delvih. The study reveals the details of the formation in the summer of 1921 in Romania, with the assistance of the country’s authorities, of the Bessarabian (Southern) guerrilla group as part of the UPR Insurgent Army with headquarters in Chișinău to participate in the Second Winter Campaign (October–November 1921), aimed at liberating southwestern Ukraine from the Bolshevik occupation. Keywords: Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission, Ukrainian People’s Republic, Directory, Kingdom of Romania, UPR Army, interned soldiers, guerrilla insurgent groups, Second Winter Campaign.
10
Torrey, Glenn E. « The Revolutionary Russian Army and Romania, 1917 ». Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no 1103 (1 janvier 1995) : 98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/cbp.1995.60.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The growth ofthe revolutionary movement in the ranks of the Russian army on the Romanian front in 1917 has attracted the attention of a number of Soviet historians. M.M. Gitsiu, Deiatel 'nost' soldatskikh sovetov i komitetov na rumynskom fronte i v Moldavii v 1917 g. (Kishinev, 1985), concentrates on the soldier's organizations and the growth of Bolshevik influence among them. E.N. Istrati, Demokraticheskoe dvizhenie za mir na rumynskom fronte v. 1917 gody (Kishinev, 1973), has a broader perspective emphasizing the question of war or peace. M.S. Frenkin, Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie na rumynskom fronte 1917 g. - mart 1918 (Moscow, 1965), is the best of this genre but despite the title, covers only one of four Russian armies attached to the Romanian front, and the one which was not on Romanian soil. Frenkin's second book, Russkaia armiia i revoliutsiia 1917-1918 (Munich, 1978), written after his emigration to Israel, is a welcome corrective to all Soviet accounts, including his earlier one. But in covering all four fronts, Frenkin devotes limited attention to the Romanian. By far the best general survey of the impact of the Revolution at the front is Allan Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1980, 1987), which is distinguished by balance and insight. However, neither Wildman nor the others mentioned deal with the Romanian response to Russian revolutionary agitation or with Russo-Romanian relations.
11
Curelea, Daniela, et Dragoș Curelea. « CONSIDERAȚII ȘI APRECIERI ASUPRA CALITĂȚILOR ORGANIZATORICE ȘI DE COMANDĂ ALE GENERALULUI DĂNILĂ PAPP EFECTUATE DE SUPERIORII SĂI IERARHICI ÎN PERIOADA 1919–1933 ». ANUARUL INSTITUTULUI DE CERCETĂRI SOCIO-UMANE „GHEORGHE ŞINCAI” 26 (1 avril 2023) : 255–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.59277/icsugh.sincai.26.16.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In the following article, we would like to bring to your attention the results of the research we undertook on the command and organization activity that General D. Papp undertook, both in the service of the Governing Council, especially in the command and organization structure called the Command General Territorial Sibiu (December 1918-April 1919), as well as in the Army of Great Romania in the period April 1918-April 1930. We note that Dănilă Papp was a senior officer and general with military training at the Teresian Military Academy in Wienner-Neustadt and civilian as a graduate of the Faculty of Engineering specializing in Roads, bridges, constructions, fortifications at the Polytechnic in the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He was coopted into the structure of the General Territorial Command of Sibiu, serving in the Department of the Army and Public Safety under the coordination of the Romanian politician Ștefan Cicio-Pop and under the orders of General Ioan Boeriu. Organizer of the 16th and 18th divisions formed from Transylvanians, and as commander of the 18th Infantry Division from Sibiu, he participated in the Campaign of the Romanian Army on the Tisza and in Hungary in 1919. He participated as commander general of the 18th Sibiu Infantry Division at the Coronation Celebrations of Their Royal Majesties King Ferdinand and Queen Maria of Great Romania in Alba Iulia and Bucharest between October 15-17, 1922, festivities during which he led the Ardelean Division’s parade. From 1923 he was appointed to the command of the 1st Territorial Army Corps from Craiova, and from April 1, 1924 until April 1, 1930, when he was transferred to the reserve, he was in command of the 6th Territorial Army Corps from Cluj.During the period in which he served the Romanian state and the Royal House of Romania as the commanding officer of the Cluj Army Corps, he distinguished himself in the technical-organizational staff that took care of the smooth running of the Avram Iancu Centenary Celebrations, both in the Apuseni Mountains area and in Cluj during August-September 1924. In the following study, we present the assessments that the senior officers in the rank of General D. Papp made, both on his activity of organization and command, as well as in terms of his qualities and the excellent training that he always showed, referring -us, especially the assessments made by generals Artur Văitoianu, Ioan Boeriu, Ștefan Holban, Henri Cihoski, Nicolae Petala, Gheorghe Mărdărescu, Alexandru Hanzu, Ioan Prodan. For his high merits in the service of the state of Romania, he was decorated with the Order of the Coroana României in the rank of Commander, then with the same Order in the rank of Grand Officer, with the Order of the Steaua României in the rank of Grand Officer,The Victory Medal of the Great War for Civilization (1916-1921), and later with the Order of Ferdinand I in the rank of Grand Officer, and then in the rank of Grand Cross, respectively with the Order of Faithful Service in the rank of Grand Officer.
12
Morozov, M. E. « Stages of the Battle of Stalingrad and the participation of Romanian troops ». Вестник Российской академии наук 93, no 4 (1 avril 2023) : 304–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s0869587323040072.
Texte intégralRésumé :
A modern concept of the history of the Battle of Stalingrad and the role assigned by the top military−political leadership of Germany to the troops of one of its satellite countries, Romania, is presented. Romanian dictator I. Antonescu responded to the wishes of the leadership of the Third Reich, significantly increasing the grouping of Romania’s armed forces on the Soviet−German front. Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, this did not become a passport to success for the Axis troops during the battles for Stalingrad, becoming instead one of the main causes of their defeat during Operation Uranus, the Soviet counteroffensive in the vicinity of Stalingrad. As a result of the crushing defeat, which in its scale for Romania exceeded the catastrophe of the 6th Army for Germany, most of the Romanian troops were withdrawn from the Soviet−German front.
13
Vlasenko, V. M. « TO EPISTOLARY BY KOST’ MATSIYEVYCH AND ANDRIY NIKOVSKY IN 1920-1921 ». Sums'ka Starovyna (Ancient Sumy Land), no 60 (2022) : 5–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/starovyna.2022.60.1.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In the published documents (18 letters and 3 telegrams), which are kept in the fund 3696 «The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic, 1918-1924» in the Central state archive of highest authorities and management of Ukraine, the information is provided about the activities of Ukrainian diplomats Kost’ Matsiyevych and Andriy Nikovsky. At that time the first one headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the latter was the head of the UPR extraordinary diplomatic mission in Romania. The documents cover the period from April 7, 1920 to November 21, 1921. The sender of 13 letters and 2 telegrams is Kost’ Matsiyevych while the author of 5 letters and 1 telegram is Andriy Nikovsky. The documents concern a wide range of foreign policy issues on the eve and during the first year of the UPR government’s immigration. The most important problems mentioned there include the following items: financing the activities of the UPR government, the Ukrainian delegation at the Prague Peace Conference, the Ukrainian embassy in Turkey, the UPR extraordinary diplomatic mission in Romania, the UPR military mission in Romania; the return of prisoners of war, World War I disabled persons and refugees; negotiations about the joint actions of the UPR army and Wrangel’s “Russian army” against the Bolsheviks; the imposition of the UPR embassy in Bulgaria governor’s duties on Kost’ Matsiyevych; the development of relations with Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, the review of the political and social-economic situation in those countries; the issue of the UPR’s joining the League of Nations, discussing the Ukrainian issue in the League of Nations; the supply of arms and ammunition to Ukraine; the implementation of the cultural diplomacy; ensuring the tour of the Ukrainian republican choir’s headed by O. Koshits; providing the organizational and financial support for the Bessarabian group during the second winter military campaign of the UPR army; termination of the UPR diplomatic mission in Romania activities and its functions transfer to the Civilian assistance of Ukrainian immigration committee.
14
UNGUREANU, George. « România, Bulgaria și declinul puterii militare germane la Marea Neagră (noiembrie 1942-septembrie 1944 ». Gândirea Militară Românească 2023, no 2 (1 juin 2023) : 260–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/gmr.2023.2.12.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The capture of Sevastopol, on 4 July 1942, and the military developments of the following months marked a genuine peak of German military presence and power at the Black Sea. Until the autumn of 1944, this presence would be history, after a quasi-uninterrupted series of Red Army successes. In this article, the impact of these military and political developments on Romania and Bulgaria and the relations between the two neighbouring states west of the Black Sea is analysed. Thus, from the position of asymmetrical allies of the Third Reich, Romania and Bulgaria would finally almost simultaneously become allies of the Soviet Union, but still find themselves in asymmetrical positions compared to the new regional hegemon. The bibliography of the article includes important Romanian, Bulgarian and Western historiographical contributions, which vary in terms of typology and range, to which many documents from the Romanian military archives, partly original ones, are added.
15
UNGUREANU, George. « Romania, Bulgaria and the Decline of German Military Power at the Black Sea (November 1942-September 1944) ». Romanian Military Thinking 2023, no 2 (1 juin 2023) : 226–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2023.2.12.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The capture of Sevastopol, on 4 July 1942, and the military developments of the following months marked a genuine peak of German military presence and power at the Black Sea. Until the autumn of 1944, this presence would be history, after a quasi-uninterrupted series of Red Army successes. In this article, the impact of these military and political developments on Romania and Bulgaria and the relations between the two neighbouring states west of the Black Sea is analysed. Thus, from the position of asymmetrical allies of the Third Reich, Romania and Bulgaria would finally almost simultaneously become allies of the Soviet Union, but still find themselves in asymmetrical positions compared to the new regional hegemon. The bibliography of the article includes important Romanian, Bulgarian and Western historiographical contributions, which vary in terms of typology and range, to which many documents from the Romanian military archives, partly original ones, are added.
16
Stopchak, Mykola. « The Policy of Poland and Romania Concerning Interned Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (1921–1924s) : Modern Domestic Historiography ». Scientific Papers of the Vinnytsia Mykhailo Kotsyiubynskyi State Pedagogical University. Series : History, no 35 (2021) : 118–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.31652/2411-2143-2021-35-118-129.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article focuses on a comprehensive analysis of the historiographical achievements of modern Ukrainian historians on the policy of the leadership of Poland and Romania regarding the interned in the camps of these countries, the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The methodological basis of the study comprises the principles of historicism, objectivity and systematics. General scientific and special research methods were used in solving the set tasks: historiographical analysis and synthesis of knowledge development, generalization, quantitative, historical-comparative, chronological, retrospective, etc. The scientific novelty of the work lies in a comprehensive analysis of the state of study in modern domestic historiography of the policy of the leadership of Poland and Romania during 1921-1924s concernig interned Army of the UPR. Conclusions. The analysis of the historiographical achievements of modern Ukrainian historians proved they have made significant progress in studying the scientific field. Having gained access to previously closed domestic and foreignarchival materials, scholars of independent Ukraine cooperated with foreign historians and rejected unscientific, ideologically biased approaches and conclusions of Soviet historiography regarding the policy of the Polish and Romanian leadership towards the interned army. The shortcomings of Ukrainian foreign historiography on this problem, which consisted of a number of inaccuracies and a weak source base, were eliminated, which led to the distortion of historical realities. Domestic historians have clearly shown that the policy pursued by the governments of Poland and Romania regarding the internment of the UPR Army in the camps of these countries was aimed at ensuring their own national interests. It varied depending on the state of relations with its aggressive northern neighbor – Bolshevik Russia. The orientation of this policy was significantly influenced by the position of the Entente states, the victors of the First World War/ They viewed the UPR Army as a force capable of counteracting the expansionist aspirations of Bolshevik Russia. At the same time, despite significant progress in the study of this topic, especially in the 1990s – early XXI century, in the last twenty years, domestic historians didn’t pay enough attention to its study. A number of aspects of this problem remain unexplored and require further scientific analysis.
17
Bakó, Rozália Klára. « Global Stars on Local Screens : BTS and Its “Army” ». Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Communicatio 7, no 1 (1 décembre 2020) : 151–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/auscom-2020-0011.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract This research note is aimed at exploring the opportunities and challenges faced by teenagers living in an underprivileged region in Romania as fans of an internationally popular K-pop band. We used desk research and netnography to explore similarities and differences between the local and international BTS (Bangtan Sonyeondan) fandom, also called “Army”. Which are the barriers a Hungarian “Army” from Romania encounters when engaging with their idols? What is the role of K-pop in opening up the language and cultural bubble in which Hungarian youth in rural Romania live?1 The innovative element in our empirical research is the focus on family context: we interviewed both BTS fans and their parents in order to assess to what extent is K-pop in general and BTS in particular part of their daily lives. With its limitations as a small-scale qualitative analysis, such research can give insights into fan studies from a comparative perspective.
18
Ciorbea, Valentin, et Nicoleta STANCA. « Romanian-Russian Documents on the Administration of Dobrogea (June 1877-November 1878) ». Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archaeology 13, no 2 (2021) : 17–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.56082/annalsarscihist.2021.2.17.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The present study presents and analyzes the Russian administration installed in Dobrogea after the occupation of the region by the Tsarist troops at the beginning of June 1877 and until November 1878, when most of the region (Constanța and Tulcea counties) was taken over by Romania following the decision of Berlin Congress (July 13, 1878). Romanian documents, due to the Dobrogea research team, led by Colonel Stefan Fălcoianu before the installation of the Romanian administration and army in the province, have been used. Russian sources from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Empire archive are also highlighted.
19
Sandu, Traian. « Romanian-Serbian relations and the Banat question during the First World War ». Balcanica, no 37 (2006) : 241–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc0637241s.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Relations between Serbia and Romania throughout the war are viewed from the standpoint of the two countries' rivaling claims on the Banat and within the framework of power balance in the Allied camp with an emphasis on the position of the Romanian government and statesmen. Obviously, Romania's position was more favourable during the first two war years as the Allies sought to win her over for the Entente. Thus the Banat was included in compensations for her entering the war on the side of the Allies. Romania's defeat, however, produced a complete shift in the balance of power, with Romania now in an unenviable position, especially following the breach of the Salonica Front in September 1918. From the Romanian perspective, the Banat's destiny also depended on divergent political positions on the domestic scene. The fate of the Banat was eventually decided by the advancing Serbian army which took the whole territory, though under French command. The final decision became a responsibility of the Paris Peace Conference.
20
Stopchak, Mykola. « THE POLICY OF POLAND AND ROMANIA ON THE INTERNED ARMY OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1921–1924) : UKRAINIAN FOREIGN HISTORIOGRAPHY ». Naukovì zapiski Nacìonalʹnogo unìversitetu "Ostrozʹka akademìâ". Serìâ Ìstoričnì nauki 1, no 33 (23 mars 2022) : 76–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.25264/2409-6806-2022-33-76-81.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article analyzes the historiographical achievements of Ukrainian foreign historians on the policy of the leadership of Poland and Romania during 1921–1924 regarding the Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic interned in the camps of these countries. General scientific and special research methods were used in solving the set tasks: historiographical analysis and synthesis, generalization, quantitative, historical-comparative, etc. The conceptual approaches and techniques used by Ukrainian foreign experts to scientifically reconstruct this policy were clarified. It is shown that Ukrainian foreign historians rejected the ideologically biased conclusions of Soviet historiography regarding the policy of the Polish and Romanian leadership towards the interned Army of the UPR, preparing a number of works in which this problem was covered at a higher scientific level. It is noted that not all works covered the research problem to the same extent. A characteristic feature of these works in the interwar period was the simple statement of more or less favorable attitude of the governments of Poland and Romania to interned soldiers, emphasizing that Poles and Romanians helped the interned Army of the UPR, pursuing their own political goals. At the same time, this problem was considered by the authors of the publications not directly, but in the context of a wider palette of camp issues. The analytical component of such publications was low. It is emphasized that Ukrainian foreign historians of the postwar period departed from a simple and concise statement of well-known facts on the researched problem, at a higher analytical level analyzed the policy of Polish leaders regarding the interned Army of the UPR. However, the attitude of the Romanian authorities towards interned Ukrainian soldiers generally fell out of sight of Ukrainian foreign researchers of the postwar period. A general conclusion is made that in the works of Ukrainian foreign historians the policy of Polish and Romanian government circles regarding the interned Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic on their territory was not considered a complete scientific problem. As a rule, the desire of the politicians of these countries to use the military potential of the Ukrainian army to solve their own problems in relations with Soviet Russia was stated, but without a sufficient analysis of the circumstances that determined the direction of such a policy. In addition, the analysis of the research topic showed a clear bias towards the coverage of the policy of the Polish leadership towards Ukrainian soldiers interned on its territory. Romania's position on this issue was covered only in isolated works, which significantly impoverished the historiography of the problem as a whole.
21
Frolova, Marina. « From the background of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 : the Russian-Romanian military Convention and the agreement with the partnership of Greger, Horvitz and Kogan ». Slavic Almanac, no 3-4 (2023) : 70–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2073-5731.2023.3-4.04.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article reveals, based on published and archival documents, the reasons the Russian command of the Danube Army on the eve of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878 concluded an agreement for the supply of food and fodder with the partnership of Greger, Horvitz and Kogan. The path of the Russian army to the theater of military operations on the right bank of the Danube passed through the territory of Romania. The draft of Russian-Romanian military convention was drawn up in November 1876, and the convention was signed on April 4 (16), 1877, just before the declaration of war on April 12 (24), 1877. The low capacity of the railways of the Principality prevented timely delivery of food and fodder from Russia. In the absence of a convention, it was impossible to publicly make purchases in Romania, to prepare warehouses officially and in advance. The Ministry of Finance of Russia allocated only credit rubles to cover expenses, and in Romania only hard money was in use. The Commander-in-chief believed that under such circumstances it was possible to arrange the provision of troops abroad only through the medium of private commission agents. The partnership of Greger, Horwitz and Kogan was chosen, since it had considerable capital, offered to supply the entire list of required products, not only its individual items, as indicated in the calls of other commission agents, and received payment in credit rubles, not gold. In addition, its members had a good business reputation.
22
Keppeler, Tom. « Oastea Domnului : The army of the lord in Romania∗ ». Religion, State and Society 21, no 2 (janvier 1993) : 221–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637499308431592.
Texte intégral
23
Hakman, Serghei. « Particularitățile includerii Basarabiei și a nordului Bucovinei în componența Uniunii Sovietice ». Analele Bucovinei 58, no 2 (1 décembre 2022) : 519–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.56308/ab/2022.2.11.
Texte intégralRésumé :
"The author considers a set of military propaganda measures taken by Soviet troops to seize the territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Regular units of the USSR Armed Forces which were united in a specially created Southern Front, whose troops were concentrated on the border with Romania, were used to achieve this goal. On June 28, 1940, Soviet troops crossed the Dniester and entered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Romanian units were ordered to withdraw in an organized manner. The Red Army exceeded the agreed rate of evacuation of Romanian troops, violated the line of demarcation, which led to local incidents. There were cases of disarmament of Romanian soldiers. There were armed clashes, a result of which were loses of both sides, including killed. In turn, the Red Army also felt hostility, encountering minefields, anti-tank barriers, trenches, mined or dismantled railways and bridges. Both Soviet and Romanian military units took certain military-administrative measures against the civilian population, which had different motives and forms of manifestation. The low level of morale of the retreating Romanian army led to the disintegration of entire military units, whose soldiers dropped their weapons and fled home. At the same time, there were serious violations of military discipline among the Red Army, for which the soldiers were punished, including the death penalty. Immediately after the Red Army entered Bessarabia and the Northern part of Bukovina, a huge Soviet propaganda machine began to operate. A large number of newspapers and special literature were distributed among the population and soldiers; and posters and slogans were hung in the streets and houses. Politicians of the Red Army organized rallies and demonstrations to awaken in the souls of the Bessarabians and Bukovinians “love for the liberators and a sense of confidence in the Soviet authority”. The annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Soviet Union in June-July, 1940 can be considered a well-thought-out and carefully prepared political-diplomatic and military-propaganda campaign. These territories were occupied by the Red Army according to all the rules of military art (all components of the military operation were used: military force, local military pressure, military intelligence, propaganda and propaganda service), thanks to which the USSR achieved its goal. "
24
Bichir, Florian. « THE LEGENDARY HORIA AGARICI BETWEEN MYTH AND PROPAGANDA ». Review of the Air Force Academy 19, no 2 (29 décembre 2021) : 21–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.19062/1842-9238.2021.19.2.3.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Captain Horia Agarici has certainly become a legend. His story has become a myth, and myths must live on. After all, they can't even be touched by time. The notoriety of the famous aviator was also preserved due to Păstorel Teodoreanu’s poem, made into a song by Gherase Dendrino in the summer of 1941: "He went hunting, Agarici / He went to hunt Bolsheviks...”1, a fashionable hit between 1941-1944, a period during which Romania was leading a crusade against communism! Broadly speaking, Horia Agarici's life was accessible to the general public after 1989, and it appeared, in part, even on the ultra-publicized Wikipedia [1]. But most of the details were brought to light, naturally, by post-communist newspapers. Horia Agarici (born April 6, 1911, Lausanne, Switzerland, d. 1982, Constanţa, Romania) was a major aviator in the Romanian Air Force, one of the elite aviators of the Romanian Army during the Second World War, a poet and a Romanian author [2]. For his extraordinary deeds of bravery during the Second World War, he was also nicknamed “The Savior of [the city of] Constanța”
25
Stanciu, Cristian-Octavian, et Răzvan-Ștefan BICHIR. « PARTICULARITIES OF CONTROL IN THE ROMANIAN ARMY ». INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERINCE "STRATEGIESXXI" 18, no 1 (6 décembre 2022) : 245–351. http://dx.doi.org/10.53477/2971-8813-22-41.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The control and inspection corps was established on 20.02.2007 by merging the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of National Defense with the Control Corps, being the successor of the institution "Inspector General in the Romanian Army" established on April 1, 1910, by High Royal Decree no. 1217, signed by King Carol I. According to this document, the first inspector general of the army was appointed FERDINAND I, the heir to the throne of Romania, division general, commander of the Second Army Corps and inspector of the cavalry. Fields of activity, according to the provisions of art. 16 of Law no. 346 of July 21, 2006 with the subsequent amendments and completions regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense, are the following: 1) The control and inspection body elaborates the general regulatory framework of inspection and control activities in the Ministry of National Defense; 2) The control and inspection body investigates / verifies, on order, issues necessary to inform the ministry's management to substantiate decisions; 3) The control and inspection body elaborates policies and regulations specific to the Ministry of National Defense in the field of environmental protection and that of occupational safety and health, coordinates, monitors and controls their integration/application in the army.
26
Hlihor, Constantin, et Dan-Laurențiu Mocanu. « The Romanian Army from the guardian of constitutional order to a political actor for its change in Romania on December 30, 1947 ». Euro-Atlantic Studies, no 4 (2021) : 37–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.31178/eas.2021.4.2.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The study analyzes the role of the Romanian military institution in the process of changing the constitutional regime by removing the Monarchy on December 30, 1947, from two perspectives: its position as guardian of constitutional order, but also that the monarch was the supreme commander of the army. The non-intervention of the army in the event that led to the overthrow of the Monarchy was interpreted in pre-1989 historiography as respecting its status of neutrality to the political struggle in society. It would have been true if there had been a regime of genuine democracy in Romanian society and not a dictatorship in which the army as an institution was subject to transformations that were not in line with traditions or the spirit in which it was formed and educated. All this shaped the military's path from political neutrality to be an instrument in the service of communist leaders.
27
Satsyuk, Olga. « USE OF LATIN ORIGINAL PREFIXES AND SUFFICES IN ROMANIAN LANGUAGE ». Naukovì zapiski Nacìonalʹnogo unìversitetu «Ostrozʹka akademìâ». Serìâ «Fìlologìâ» 1, no 10(78) (27 février 2020) : 215–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.25264/2519-2558-2020-10(78)-215-217.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article deals with productive affixes of Latin origin, with the help of which many words of the Romanian language have been formed since the beginning of its formation from the Latin language of the Danube region. Latin suffixes and prefixes that continue to be used in the word formation process of modern Romanian are also analyzed. Some Romanian words were borrowed through other languages (French, German) The ways of penetration of the Latin language into the territory of modern Romania have been established. The process of Romanization began after the wars near the Oresteier Mountains (101-106), as a result of which Dacia was conquered and annexed to the Empire. It is noted that Dacia (modern-day territory of Romania) inherited a rich ancient heritage with the conquest of new provinces by the Empire and, thus, the spread of Roman cultural heritage. However, Latin was the official language in Dacia. Many new cities with introduced Roman civilization were also founded. Latin was spoken in the army and in state institutions. The vocabulary of the Romanian language, which was created with the help of Latin word-forming elements at the beginning of the Romanian language formation, is distinguished, and it is shown that these affixes are used in the modern Romanian language thus distinguishing productive and unproductive affixes.
28
RÎȘNOVEANU, Ion. « Acțiunile Detașamentului „18 Pază Zona Petroliferă” pentru apărarea zonei Ploiești în perioada 23 august-1 septembrie 1944 ». Gândirea Militară Românească 2023, no 3 (1 septembre 2023) : 236–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/gmr.2023.3.13.
Texte intégralRésumé :
When the Second World War broke out, Romania was undergoing in a rather difficult economic, political, military and especially diplomatic situation. Germany’s territorial expansion triggered the fall of the system of alliances Bucharest was relying on, given that France signed the armistice in April 1940. That is why the pressures exerted by Germany forced Romania’s entry under Berlin’s sphere of influence, an actual example being that the German Military Mission was sent into our country, with the clear purpose, among others, to take over oil resources and processing capacities in the Ploiești area. The act of 23 August 1944, through which Romania turned its weapons against Germany, with the clear intention of joining the United Nations, led to a state of confusion among Romanian and German troops deployed in Valea Prahovei. However, the dynamic orders of the Romanian General Staff were to annihilate any German resistance in the area, even by the force of arms, if needed. This mission was assigned to the 18th Oilfield Guard Detachment, commanded by Brigadier General Grigore Moșteoru. This large unit was subordinated to the 5th Territorial Army Corps, commanded by Major General Constantin Vasiliu-Rășcanu. The conclusion of this study illustrates the effort and heroism of Romanian troops, who annihilated, between 31 August and 1 September 1944, sometimes after heavy battles and human losses, any resistance of the German units who were thus forced to retreat to the North and lose all control over the oil resources in the Ploiești area. These aspects are highlighted from a military, economic and socio-historical perspective, by using the documentation technique.
29
RÎȘNOVEANU, Ion. « Actions of the 18th Oilfield Guard Detachment to Defend the Ploiești Area between 23 August and 1 September 1944 ». Romanian Military Thinking 2023, no 3 (1 septembre 2023) : 226–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2023.3.13.
Texte intégralRésumé :
When the Second World War broke out, Romania was undergoing in a rather difficult economic, political, military and especially diplomatic situation. Germany’s territorial expansion triggered the fall of the system of alliances Bucharest was relying on, given that France signed the armistice in April 1940. That is why the pressures exerted by Germany forced Romania’s entry under Berlin’s sphere of influence, an actual example being that the German Military Mission was sent into our country, with the clear purpose, among others, to take over oil resources and processing capacities in the Ploiești area. The act of 23 August 1944, through which Romania turned its weapons against Germany, with the clear intention of joining the United Nations, led to a state of confusion among Romanian and German troops deployed in Valea Prahovei. However, the dynamic orders of the Romanian General Staff were to annihilate any German resistance in the area, even by the force of arms, if needed. This mission was assigned to the 18th Oilfield Guard Detachment, commanded by Brigadier General Grigore Moșteoru. This large unit was subordinated to the 5th Territorial Army Corps, commanded by Major General Constantin Vasiliu-Rășcanu. The conclusion of this study illustrates the effort and heroism of Romanian troops, who annihilated, between 31 August and 1 September 1944, sometimes after heavy battles and human losses, any resistance of the German units who were thus forced to retreat to the North and lose all control over the oil resources in the Ploiești area. These aspects are highlighted from a military, economic and socio-historical perspective, by using the documentation technique.
30
Vlasenko, V. M., et Е. А. Murashko. « COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE SPECIAL INFORMATION SERVICE (based on Hnat Porokhivsky’s archive-investigative case materials) ». Sums'ka Starovyna (Ancient Sumy Land), no 56 (2020) : 21–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/starovyna.2020.56.2.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The lack of the scientific literature concerning the Intelligence Service of Romania (Special Information Service) is stated. Only some references to the activities of the Intelligence Service of Romania on the territory of Ukraine are mentioned in the isolated publications. The authors used the documents and materials from Hnat Porokhivsky’s archive-investigative case which is kept in the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine. The materials mentioned above are representative and fill the gap in the issue concerning the structure of the Special Information Service of Romania and provide a certain indication about its composition. The fact that Hnat Porokhivsky was a colonel of the UNR Army and the leader of the Ukrainian military emigration in Romania is mentioned. Hnat Porokhivsky’s main biographical milestones, his socio-political and military activities are covered. His organizational skills, professional knowledge in the sphere of secret service, and counterespionage were used by the Intelligence Service of Romania. Not being a citizen of Romania, he made a valuable contribution to the process of the Romanian secret service development. The Special Information Service had a complicated multi-stage structure with the an extensive network of intelligence centers, sub-centers, rezidenturas, agents, and support divisions on the territories of both Romania and the Soviet Union on the eve of World War II. Different intelligence units of the Special Information Service of Romania operated on the occupied territories of Ukraine from 1941 to 1944. The central authorities and regional offices heads’ and staff members’ surnames (sometimes pseudonyms) are specified. From the authors’ point of view, the most promising studies are those ones of the Intelligence Service of Romania espionage, counterespionage and propagandistic activities, Ukrainian and Russian immigrants’ participation in this process, and Special Information Service cooperation with secret services of Germany and Japan. Keywords: intelligence (secret) service, Hnat Porokhivsky, rezidentura, Romania, Special Information Service, Ukrainian emigration, center.
31
Luchkanyn, Serhiy. « The evolution of romanian communism : from Stalin`s totalitarianism to Nicolae`s Ceausescu national-communism ». European Historical Studies, no 3 (2016) : 86–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2016.03.86-100.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In the article that is based only on Romanian references and historiography, had been analyzed stages of development, deployment, ideological evolution of Romanian Communistic Party: being (staying) on the periphery of Romanian`s political life in interwar Romania; coming into power in 1944-1947 with the help of the Soviet army; violent dictatorship of Stalinist model the late 1940s the early 1940s, it marked at the same time with internal party struggle, that finished with victory and establishment of solo dictatorship Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1945- 1965), who didn`t accept Khrushchev`s De-Stalinization; socialism “with a human face” (1962-1974) late Gheorghiu-Dej`s and early Nicolae`s Ceaușescu; Nicolae`s Ceaușescu “communistic monarchy” like gradual stagnation of Romanian communism with “national tendency” (1974-1989), which finished by rejection of Soviet perestroika, the Romanian Revolution in December 1989 by murder of Ceaușescu and his wife.
32
Bîlbîie, Răduţ. « The Professionalization of Public Relations in the Romanian Army ». International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 22, no 2 (1 juin 2016) : 401–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2016-0069.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract The communication structures of the Ministry of National Defense have a considerable seniority and have played an important role both in different historical, critical periods for the country (wars, political crises) or institutional building (the forming of the Romanian army, of the modern command structures, etc.) as well as during the transition period after 1989. The first military publication, Observatorul Militar, (Military Observer), was released in 1859, being followed by a few thousands of magazines, newsletters, specialized directories, or during the war years of information and opinion journals such as Romania, organ of the General Headquarters, in the years of World War I, or Soldatul (The Soldier), Santinela (The Sentry), during the years of World War II. One after another, others followed such as: since 1916 Studioul Cinematografic al Armatei (Army Cinema Studio), originally, a photo-cinema structure, then specialized in the documentary film: history, presentation or training, and, since 1940, on public radio frequencies Ora Ostaşului (Ora Armatei), (Soldier’s Hour, Army’s Hour), then since 1968, a television broadcast on public television station broadcasting frequencies, since 1996 the web products (the first web site of an army in Eastern Europe, the first site of a ministry within the Government of Romania). The force and the role of the structures varied from period to period Studioul cinematografic (The Cinematographic Studio) had in 1989, 217 employed people, military and civilians, today there are less than 15), according to the budgets and the importance of what they were given by the management structures. The revolution of December 1989 marked the depoliticization of the communication act and the switch to the professionalization of the specialized structures, transforming their propaganda tools into products and means of Public Relations. The years 1990-1995 have marked this process through: (a) the establishment of structures, (b), staff training (in France, Switzerland, Germany, but especially in the United States), (c) the completion of the first guides, instructions, procedures for the field, (d) the opening of the first course for specialists, (e) the initiation of a quarterly specialized magazine Panoramic militar, (Military Panorama), (f) a code of ethics for practitioners.
33
M., Zidaru. « Soe documents about Grigore Gafencu ‘s situation in 1944-1945 ». Scientific Bulletin of Naval Academy XXII, no 1 (15 juillet 2019) : 122–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.21279/1454-864x-19-i1-016.
Texte intégralRésumé :
After Grigore Gafencu finished his mission in Moscow in 1941, he decided to go to Switzerland, where he lived during the Second World War. After 23rd August 1944 Romania was occupied by the Soviet Union’s Red Army. The problem of the return of Gafencu in Romania became very complicated. This article presents the story of the contacts of Grigore Gafencu with SOE during the year 1944-1945 and his attempts to return in the country.
34
Padureac, Lidia. « The City of Bălți in 1940 : Occupation, Sovietization, Repressions ». Dialogica. Revistă de studii culturale și literatură, no 2 (septembre 2023) : 107–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.59295/dia.2023.2.03.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The aim of this research is to highlight the situation in the city of Bălți in 1940, presented in archival and oral history documents. The annexation of the territories between the Dniester and the Prut rivers by the Soviet Union in 1940 also implied the forced establishment of Soviet power in this region. The city of Balti, being one of republican subordination, was subjected to the specific practices of the communist regime. The population had to endure the occupation regime – many people who wanted to flee to Romania did not have this possibility. The withdrawal of the Romanian army and the establishment of the Soviet army caused great trauma to the people, who became powerless in the face of weapons. The occupation was followed by sovietization and repression, which mutilated the ordinary life of the city in the interwar period. The testimonies of survivors emphasise the state of fear, insecurity, obedience imposed by the Soviet regime.
35
Bîlbîie, Răduţ. « Military Mail Radio ». Scientific Bulletin 20, no 2 (1 décembre 2015) : 12–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bsaft-2015-0003.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract Cultural and scientific personalities from the army, military experts and creators of the doctrine have collaborated with the radio from the beginnings of radiophony, the educational role of this new, persuasive communication channel being evident not only for Romania or the Romanian army but also for all the countries that had radiophony services. This happens in the context of the end of the crisis and the start of economic and social development, promoting culture, creating a solid class of peasants with a certain social status, in villages, together with the priest, teacher and gendarme, increasing of the number of subscriptions and development of the Romanian radiophony. The radio has been used as a means of persuasion of the population for the war effort through broadcasts intended for pre-military boys, then for the entire population or soldiers. Operational means of connecting military and their families, an effective tool in maintaining a good morale of the troops and a satisfactory state of mind of the population with relatives in theatres of operations, Poșta militară radio has proven effectiveness through millions of letters sent along its four years of existence.
36
Oskin, Maxim. « Romanian refugees of autumn 1916 and the russian military command in Romania : controversial cooperation at the turn of the disaster ». Revista de istorie a Moldovei, no 1-2(129-130) (novembre 2022) : 102–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.58187/rim.129-130.04.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The participation of the Romanian Kingdom in the First World War in the campaign of 1916 resulted in a heavy military defeat and the loss of the capital and most of the country’s territory. Among the humanitarian consequences, a special place is occupied by the refugee movement, which affected hundreds of thousands of civilians. Due to the fact that the refugees retreated to the north together with the army, their fate was closely intertwined with military operations, including the troops of the Russian ally. The Russian command in 1916 also had to solve the problems of regulating the refugee movement in Romania and organizing assistance to refugees.
37
Hakman, Serghei. « Măsurile pregătitoare politico-diplomatice și militar-propagandistice ale U.R.S.S. pentru anexarea Basarabiei și a nordului Bucovinei (II) ». Analele Bucovinei 58, no 1 (1 septembre 2022) : 117–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.56308/ab.2022.1.08.
Texte intégralRésumé :
"A significant turning point in relations between the Soviet Union and Romania was associated with the incorporation of Bessarabia and northern part of Bukovina into the USSR, which took place in the context of Soviet-German rapprochement. To this end, the Soviet leadership developed a set of preparatory political-diplomatic and military-propaganda measures. Soviet political and diplomatic actions were based on fundamental military preparations. In order to prepare and further joining Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina to the USSR, the Southern Front was created on the basis of the Kyiv Special and Odessa military districts. Army General Georgy Zhukov was appointed as a commander. The General Staff of the Red Army developed two variants of actions by Soviet troops. The first one provided for measures in case the Romanian government would not agree to the peaceful transfer of Bessarabia and Bukovina to the USSR. The second variant was an action plan in case of a voluntary retreat of Romanian troops west of the Prut. The first option was taken as the base. As early as June 26, 1940, on the border with Romania, the Soviet command concentrated 32 infantry, 2 motorized infantry, 6 cavalry divisions, 11 tank, 3 airborne brigades, 16 artillery regiments of the commander-in-chief’s reserve, 14 corps artillery regiments and 4 separate artillery divisions. In the main areas of the offensive, more than a triple advantage in manpower and means was provided. At the same time, for the purpose of ideological support, a huge propaganda apparatus was prepared to work with the population. In accordance with the Directive of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army № 0140 (June 21, 1940), a large number of political workers were sent to the disposal of the Southern Front. One month before the start of the military operation, all employees of party and Soviet organizations were considered as mobilized. After appropriate training, they were ready for further activities as editorial staff, propagandists and agitators. Concert brigades and drama theatre groups were organized for the cultural service of the population. There were selected mobile library, gramophone records, and films. Book-mobile was arranged; everything necessary for the publication in Romanian newspaper was completed and provided with everything necessary. Due to the diligence of all these preparatory acts, the territories of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina were occupied by the Red Army according to all the rules of military art (all elements of military operation were used: military force, local military pressure, military intelligence and counterintelligence, agitation and propaganda), thanks to which the USSR could reach its purpose. "
38
DRECIN, Mihai D., et Mircea DULCA. « ANDREI SILVIU AND NICOLAE RAJKOVIČ, DEFENDERS OF THE CITY OF ORADIA, KILLED BY HUNGARIAN HORTYSTS ON 9 OCTOBER 1944 ». Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archaeology 15, no 1-2 (30 décembre 2023) : 62–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.56082/annalsarscihist.2023.1-2.62.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The battles for the liberation of Oradia and Bihor from the Hortyst-German occupation involved a number Romanian Army divisions (the 3rd Mountain Brigade and Tudor Vladimirescu Brigade), as well as divisions of the Red Army and were particularly ferocious and long-lasting (5 September - 12 October 1944). Several offensives and counter-offensives of the Hungarian-German and Romanian-Soviet military divisions took place with the purpose of preserving/liberating the city of Oradea, the administrative centre of Bihor County, a critical land and air communications hub for the entire western region (roads, railways, airport). In the battles for Oradea, the region experienced several days of power vacuum, with the fascist troops retreating from the city in order to prepare for a counter-offensive, while the Romanian-Soviet troops were regrouping outside the city for a decisive offensive (25 September - 28 September). At the same time, three citizens of the city, i.e. Andrei Silviu – a Romanian ethnic, a former civil servant with the City Hall and reserve officer of the Romanian Army, who had a local Israeli wife, Nicolae Rajkovič - a Romanian citizen of Serbian origin who was a local barber, and Papp Tibor – a civil servant with the City Hall, a Romanian citizen of Hungarian origin, established a “civil guard” comprising 45 citizens of Oradea with different nationalities, who were armed with rifles from a City Hall warehouse. The role of the guard was to maintain peace in the city and to defend the life and property of the citizens, primarily the workshops and shops in the city against the lumpenproletariat who were prone to looting. The return of fascist occupiers in the city leads to the arrest of the three guard organisers. They are brought in front of a military court and sentenced to death for organising “partisan troops behind the front”. Andrei and Rajkovič are shot in the Oradia Fortress three days before (9 October) the liberation of the city (12 October), while Papp is saved by his family and sentenced to 15 years in prison, due to the fact that he was a Hungarian ethnic. Although historians and patriotic local councillors proposed (in 2007, 2013, 2015, and 2020) that the two murdered locals should be honoured as heroes of the city, the political parties or coalitions that held the majority in the Oradea City Council (the Democratic Party (PD) + the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), the National Liberal Party (PNL) + the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)) kept rejecting the initiative. This year, several cultural and patriotic organisations will bring up the proposal once again, since the idea behind it still makes a valid point.
39
Petrencu, Anatol. « Bessarabia as Part of Greater Romania ». Trimarium 1, no 1 (22 avril 2023) : 105–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.55159/tri.2023.0101.06.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The focus of the article is Romania during the last part of the World War I (January– November 1918), when, after the demise of the Tsarist Empire, and shortly after the Bolshevik coup, Bessarabia proclaimed independence from Russia (24 January 1918), followed shortly by a union with Romania on 27 March. Based on documents of the time, we describe the circumstances of the Union, the difficulties that arose in the process of the integration of Bessarabia (proclaimed a republic) with the Kingdom of Romania, as well as the various opinions on the constitution of Greater Romania (through the later union of Bukovina and Transylvania). After the end of the World War I and after the establishment of Greater Romania, the state and society faced various challenges, which they overcame (some successfully, others less so). The important figures of the time, some of whom were actively involved both in the Union and in subsequent political life, wrote about the emerging problems. For instance, Dr Petre Cazacu, a member of the Country Council (the Parliament of Bessarabia, 1917–1918), outlined a number of difficulties faced by the Bessarabian population in the first decade after the Union in his book Zece ani de la Unire: Moldova dintre Prut şi Nistru (1918–1928) [Ten years after the Union: Moldova between the Prut and the Dniester (1918–1928)]. The publisher and politician Onisifor Ghibu expressed his views on this issue even more forcefully, and voiced his strong conviction that the Union of Bessarabia with Romania had been hasty. “Things would have turned out very differently in Bessarabia,” stated Ghibu, “if the union had not been forced and if it had occurred naturally, in the autumn of 1918, at the same time as that of Transylvania and Bukovina, in an atmosphere of triumphant Romanianism. Shielded by the Romanian army, Bessarabia, guided by its national culture and by the idea of the union of all Romanians, supported by people imbued with the holy feeling of love for the nation, would have made such progress during the eight months (March–November 1918) [of] favourable development, like in the past, that it could no longer have fallen prey to the ambitions of some, or to the poison of others”. We do not share Ghibu’s views. We believe that by the end of World War II Romanian historians (from both Romania and the Republic of Moldova) had already objectively presented the history of Romanians after World War I.
40
Tomoni, Bianca. « Using money metaphors in banking discourse ». Metaphor and the Social World 2, no 2 (31 décembre 2012) : 201–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/msw.2.2.04tom.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Drawing on the theory of conceptual metaphors and on its socially and discursively oriented developments, this paper investigates the conceptualisation of money (and related notions like income, repayments, fees, interest rates or profit) in Romanian banking discourse. By analysing corpora composed of 74 documents issued by the National Bank of Romania (BNR) and by three other commercial banks, before and during the recent financial crisis, it aims to show how apparently unrelated metaphoric expressions (with source domains such as medicine, army or water) are in fact connected, giving rise to three coherent scenarios: a caring scenario, a physical force scenario and a river scenario. The article also highlights the role of (money) metaphor in persuading customers, creating identities and transferring ideologies.
41
Cazacu, Ioana. « The Second Corps of Romanian volunteers in Russia ». Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies 2, no 1 (15 août 2010) : 111–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.53604/rjbns.v2i1_9.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The situation of Romanian POWs has aggravated with the Bolshevik assuming of power. Following the Kiew occupation by Bolsheviks, the First Romanian Volunteers Corps has been disbanded and a great number of POWs remained on Russian territory with little possibilities to return to their native land. In these circumstances, the Romanians volunteers decided to depart for Moscow from where they hoped to leave for their country with the Romanian consul’s support. However, the German authorities refused to allow their crossing through Ukraine and the volunteers had to cope with their staying in Russia. They set up a body of all officers in order to represent the Romanian cause both in Russia and in France: the Second Corps of Romanian Volunteers in Russia. This occasioned them to encounter other political-military forces acting in the Russian chaotic situation, a Lithuanian army corps included. The Romanians will continue their odyssey in their attempt to be evacuated through Vladivostok, they successfully fighting the Bolsheviks and finally returning to Romania. This paper elaborates over the fate of the Second Corps of Romanian Volunteers in Russia and their encounters with their Lithuanian, other Baltic and Czechoslovak fellows.
42
GIMIGA, Silviu-Iulian, et Cristian-Octavian STANCIU. « TRANSFORMATIONS DETERMINED BY THE EMERGENCE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN THE MILITARY FIELD ». INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERINCE "STRATEGIESXXI" 18, no 1 (6 décembre 2022) : 506–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.53477/2971-8813-22-58.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Rivalries between the great powers of the world have always been the main cause of the outbreak of world wars. Industrial-technological revolutions have constantly influenced the life of society and implicitly the military power of each nation. The emergence of new military technologies determines radical and complex changes in the structure, principles and fighting methods used in the Romanian Army. New technologies have been, are and will be the key to maintaining the Romanian Army in international military structures as well asthe basis for the gradual development of its own military industry. The investments in high technologies, national infrastructure but also in National Defense domain can be the engine of economical growth of our country and by consequence, increasing global credibility upon Romania`s capabilities. The evolution of the informational domain convinced us that always the operational environment is constantly changing, which determines the adaptation of military technologies based on scientific discoveries and everyday realities. Technologicalsuperiority represented by artificial intelligence, quantum physics, 5 G technology, can be used as a Trojan horse to act violently on a military power that does not keep up with the development of technology. Technological progress means life improvement, but it can also bring new challenges or problems. Therefore, political goals must support the country`s national defense strategy to limit and overcome potential enemies.
43
TOPOR, Claudiu-Lucian. « Carsten Nielsen and his “controversial” agreements in Romania (1915). Files re-opened in Nazi Germany ». Analele Ştiinţifice ale Universităţii „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iaşi, s.n., Istorie 69 (2024) : 169–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.47743/asui-2023-0011.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Neutrality-era Romania sometimes behaves like a transit country with the appearance of an oriental bazaar. The ideal place where all sorts of foreigners (some of dubious reputation) come to do noisy business. Eager traders who are eager to make a profit and are eager to get their hands on the most precious commodities in wartime: food and fuel. They were selling, sadly, almost everything. Corruption had touched the moral fibre of a nation in search of its identity. The insiders were well aware of the situation when they wrote: “With the refined senses that usually distinguish thieves, these individuals have noticed that we now have to work with money here and therefore they think that their time has come to fish in troubled waters”. These words belong to Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary Ottokar Czernin. He recorded them in a report of February 1915 to the Foreign Minister. They show the involvement of Central Power diplomats in secret negotiations on trade arrangements that also concealed political desires in Romania at the time. In the economic sphere, these arrangements were aimed at obtaining the coveted export permits for grain and accepting the transit of munitions for the Ottoman Empire. There were, of course, possible political scenarios arising from the conclusion of the contracts. All were aimed at Romania’s entry into the war against Russia. The War Ministry held such discussions and even concluded a controversial trade treaty. Citing the need to ensure supplies of armaments and the import of ammunition on the old German (or Austro-Hungarian, as the case may be route, which had become inaccessible to Romania when neutrality in the war was proclaimed, the Romanian army chiefs sat down at the negotiating table. This is practically how the “grain for arms” exchange system was set up, a model of lucrative business justified by the superior interests of the state. The corrupt middlemen and officials in particular stood to gain. Many foreign traders were registered with the General Security, and at the time they were also known as grain traders. One of them, Carsten Nielsen, managed to rise to the top. He brokered the signing of a trade contract with the War Ministry which, once in force, would probably have secured Germany a benevolent neutrality from Romania. But this contract was never implemented. Carsten Nielsen suffered considerable damage. Always seeking justice in the interwar years, he created a legal dispute over financial compensation for losses resulting from the blocking of Romanian business. This legal dispute did not die out until the years of Nazi Germany. Nielsen drafted numerous petitions, some of which were even addressed to the German Foreign Ministry. The Communication analyses the contents of these documents and identifies information that sheds new light on the ‘alternatives’ to Romanian neutrality.
44
Pacurar, Gheorghe Gelu. « The Making of a Holy Nation : Pastoral Activity, Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and Nationalism in Interwar Romanian Orthodoxy ». Acta Terrae Septemcastrensis 18, no 1 (1 décembre 2019) : 134–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/actatr-2019-0005.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract After the end of World War I and the creation of Greater Romania, various actors tried to influence the official policy of the state by proposing political visions suitable to consolidate the Romanian identity and character of the country. The Orthodox Church, one of the most vocal of these actors, envisioned a variety of activities and programs with the goal of promoting the future development of the country alongside religious principles. In particular, in 1925 the Metropolitan of Ardeal organized the first “mass” pilgrimage to the Holy Land in the history of the Romanian people. Among the participants was Iosif Trifa, a close collaborator of the Metropolitan and the initiator and organizer of a widespread spiritual movement called the Army of the Lord. During the pilgrimage Trifa wrote notes that later constituted the basis of his travelogue Pe urmele Mântuitorului [In the Footsteps of the Savior], a book that, I will suggest, proposes a national – spiritual model for the building of the new political project inspired by the mythical image of the holy places. Trifa vested these pastoral concerns with political preoccupations that ultimately claimed the Holy Land as an ideal pattern for Greater Romania. Through a gradual literary process that morphed Palestine into the Christian Holy Land and reclaimed it for Orthodox Christians only, Trifa established a close connection between the holy sites and Romania by presenting the group of pilgrims and their itinerary as a symbol of the nation walking in the footsteps of Jesus Christ. A close reading of the narrative will show that Trifa aimed at using it as an exhortation to prompt Romanians’ commitment to Orthodoxy as the only successful solution to the national project.
45
MANOLACHI, Cristian, et Florian RĂPAN. « CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE PEOCESS OF OPERATIONALIZATION WITH AERONAUTICAL PERSONNEL OF THE FIRST AVIATION STRUCTURE EQUIPPED WITH MULTIROLE AIRCRAFT ». Review of the Air Force Academy 21, no 2 (26 février 2024) : 70–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.19062/1842-9238.2023.21.2.9.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Romania's membership to the North Atlantic Alliance, the need to ensure interoperability with the aeronautical combat systems of the partners, the reality of equipping the Romanian Air Force with east technology , which could no longer carry out the planned peace service enforcement missions and air defense to crisis and war, imposed on the responsible factors the decision of purchasing the first aviation structure endowed with multirole aircraft. The process was also amplified by the evolutions that took place at the eastern border of NATO, including the borders of Romania, especially after the annexation, in 2014, of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation. Of absolute complexity and novelty, the acquisition, the training of the aeronautical personnel for the operation of new combat equipment and related activities have imposed on the structures and personnel involved in this process responsibility, innovation, devotion, the first and most important and consistent program of endowment of the Romanian Army being a recognized success of the Romanian Air Force and inspirational, for the subsequent acquisition programs of the national defense.
46
Ragsdale, Hugh. « The Munich Crisis and the Issue of Red Army Transit across Romania ». Russian Review 57, no 4 (octobre 1998) : 614–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0036-0341.00048.
Texte intégral
47
M., Zidaru. « Political, diplomatic and military aspects of Romania's participation in the first world war ». Scientific Bulletin of Naval Academy XXI, no 2 (15 décembre 2018) : 202–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.21279/1454-864x-18-i2-026.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Although linked to the Austro-Hungarian Empire by a secret alliance treaty in 1883, Romania chose to declare itself neutral at the outbreak of hostilities in July 1914, relying on the interpretation of the "casus foederis" clauses. The army was in 1914 -1915 completely unprepared for such a war, public opinion, although pro-Entente in most of it, was not ready for this kind of war, and Ion I. C. Bratianu was convinced that he had to obtain a written assurance from the Russian Empire in view of his father's unpleasant experience from 1877-1878. This article analyze the political and military decisions after Romania entry in Great War
48
Defta, Dragoş. « The German Ethnic Group of Romania. The Second Assignment Source for the Waffen-SS ». Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "George Bariţiu". Series Historica 62 (30 décembre 2023) : 287–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.59277/aiigb/2023.62.15.
Texte intégralRésumé :
An outcome of the interplay between methodical ideological indoctrination and applied war-craft schooling, the final product of the GEG training system consisted of the Waffen-SS soldier. Fully motivated, dogmatically and assiduously qualified in war-techniques, the young Volksdeutsche recruit from Romania acted as an exuberant and impetuous fighter, ready to fulfil Hitler’s orders and his Weltanschauung ideals. Considering the numbers hereafter provided by several well-known historians, the GEG in Romania was able to assemble a considerable army of recruits thoroughly prepared to perform as a politized fighting force in consonance with the Waffen-SS ethos, as it had been promoted by its ideologists and military professionals.
49
Anghel, Florin. « Proletkult Diplomacy. What About Romania in the Last Minutes of Tsardom 1 and the First of People’s Republic of Bulgaria (1945-1947) Foreign Affairs ». Acta Marisiensis. Seria Historia 3, no 1 (1 décembre 2021) : 69–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/amsh-2021-0007.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract The Romanian-Bulgarian relations were assigned the role of satellites belonging first to the Axis, and then to U.S.S.R., following the regulation of the territorial statute of South Dobrudja on September 7th 1940, through the Treaty from Craiova. After the Red Army has entered Bulgaria, on September 8th 1944, an unusual fact has intervened between Bucharest and Sofia, from the perspective of Kremlin’s influence, of course: the priority of Bulgarian political, ideological and diplomatic factors over the Romanian ones, unprecedented fact in the history of almost seven decades of the modern bilateral relations. The lack of human and ideological resources of the Romanian Communist Party has become obvious during the not even declared competition with the Bulgarian Communists and their leader, Georgi Dimitrov. The Communist Bulgaria has become a model that Romanian communists do not only seriously took into account, yet, at least the year King Mihai I has abdicated (1947), they zestfully were also studying and copying, as the case may have been. Being a so-called People’s Republic even since September 1946, following a falsified popular referendum, Bulgaria has undertaken during the next months to coordinate plans of internal and external politics of Romania. In order to finalize a “Bulgarian way” in Romania, the government led by Petru Groza and the media of propaganda, and mainly the press official of the Romanian Communist Party, “Scânteia”, have scrupulously assumed the role of protagonists. And Communist Bulgaria, just like U.S.S.R., has become for more than two years (1946- February 1948) an extremely important and valuable topic of the Romanian public speech, of the Romanian Communists’ confirmation, of establishing the project for instituting the totalitarian regime. The similarity of actions and of institutes’ organization is striking for this short period, and the treaty signed in January 1948 is nothing but the final of a stage extremely abundant in models and suggestions for the Romanian communists.
50
Xenofontov, Ion. « Military structures in interwar Chisinau ». Studia Universitatis Moldaviae. Seria Ştiinţe Umanistice, no 10(180) (avril 2024) : 21–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.59295/sum10(180)2023_03.
Texte intégralRésumé :
On the basis of unpublished historical sources, press, iconographic sources, specialized literature, a complex panorama of the situation of the military structures in the capital of Bessarabia, the second largest city in Romania by population, is presented. In the context of the activation of the illegal Bolshevik forces in the region, the activation of the state of siege in Bessarabia, the Romanian Army’s deployment in Chisinau was necessary to provide the city with military security measures. Between the City Hall of Mun. Chisinau and the Ministry of War/National War there were disputes related to the economic and real estate sphere. For the first time in history, the subject of the real estate of the III Army Corps in Chisinau, the military barracks, was addressed. Other lines of subject researched concern: the Chisinau Military Circle, military societies, military press, enlightenment of soldiers.