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1
Pacheco-Gómez, Alejandro. « Conscientious objection ». Mexican Bioethics Review ICSA 3, no 5 (5 juillet 2021) : 19–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.29057/mbr.v3i5.7457.
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Conscientious objection is a means of exercising freedom of belief, conscience and ethical convictions in the face of legal orders that could collide with their principles by excessively invading their autonomy. Although this right corresponds to every person, the health field is one of the most frequent to invoke it, generating bioethical dilemmas at the time of its exercise.
2
Lamačková, Adriana. « Conscientious Objection in Reproductive Health Care : Analysis of Pichon and Sajous v. France ». European Journal of Health Law 15, no 1 (2008) : 7–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/092902708x300172.
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AbstractThis article explores the issue of conscientious objection invoked by health professionals in the reproductive and sexual health care context and its impact on women's ability to access health services. The right to exercise conscientious objection has been recognized by many international and European scholars as being derived from the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It is not, however, an absolute right. When the exercise of conscientious objection conflicts with other human rights and fundamental freedoms, a balance must be struck between the right to conscientious objection and other affected rights such as the right to respect for private life, the right to equality and non-discrimination, and the right to receive and impart information. Particularly in the reproductive health care context, states that allow health professionals to exercise conscientious objection must accommodate this in such a way that its exercise does not compromise women's access to health services. This article analyses the European Court of Human Rights' decision on admissibility in Pichon and Sajous v. France (2001) and argues that a balancing approach should be applied in cases of conscientious objection in the sexual and reproductive health care context.
3
Hammer, Leonard. « Selective Conscientious Objection and International Human Rights ». Israel Law Review 36, no 3 (2002) : 145–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700018008.
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AbstractThe development of an international status for military conscientious objection received a strong backing by pronouncements from bodies like the Human Rights Committee that the capacity for objection can derive from the international human right to freedom of religion or belief of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Even with such pronouncements, questions remain in regard to the nature, boundaries and scope of this right. Most importantly, does this pronounced right allow for selective military conscientious objection within the international human rights system? This article will focus on the view that the capacity for military conscientious objection in the international human rights system derives from the right to freedom of religion and conscience. The implication of the international human right of freedom of religion or belief is important for its application to selective conscientious objection. However, even if the Human Rights Committee desires to limit the application of military conscientious objection, a selective objector can arguably still make the case for upholding a claim based on the human right and the manner in which it has been interpreted by the Committee and other international bodies. While on the one hand the focus on the human right to freedom of religion or belief can possibly provide the basis for a selective conscientious objector, it removes the possibility for claims that do not involve a religion or belief. The importance however of freedom of religion or behef should force a reviewing body to properly consider and measure the claim of a selective objector, with a view towards considering whether they are confronted with the manifestation of a belief and whether the state is violating such a seminal human right.
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CIUCA, Aurora. « The Right to Conscientious Objection ». Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty : Law 5, no 1 (30 juin 2017) : 17–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.18662/lumenlaw.2017.0501.02.
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Finegan, Thomas. « Conscientious objection to referrals ». Journal of Medical Ethics 45, no 4 (21 septembre 2018) : 277–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2018-105067.
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Christopher Cowley 1 has recently put forward three arguments against the legal accommodation of a general practitioner’s conscientious objection (CO) to abortion referrals. i He claims that the adoption of these arguments does not undermine a more general right to CO to involvement in abortion. I argue that Cowley is seriously mistaken. His three arguments, especially the second and third, proceed on a path directed towards the outright rejection of a right to CO in healthcare contexts. A common problem with Cowley’s three arguments is that they overlook the peremptory significance for CO analysis of both the internal, deliberating perspective of those with a CO and the good of moral integrity. This paper supports the view that either there are strong prima facie grounds for holding that a right to CO extends in principle to the issue of referrals or the claim of a general right to CO is easily assailable.
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Yildirim, Mine. « Conscientious Objection to Military Service : International Human Rights Law and the Case of Turkey ». Religion & ; Human Rights 5, no 1 (2010) : 65–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187103210x513639.
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AbstractThe assessment of claims of conscientious objection to military service under freedom of religion or belief provisions has been an evolutive process in international human rights law. In Turkey, the right to conscientious objection to military service is not recognized, nor is there a specific punishment due for non-performance of military service on grounds of religious or philosophical beliefs. Military service is compulsory for every Turkish male citizen. The article in hand aims, firstly, to provide a survey on the status of the right to conscientious objection to military service in international human rights law and to propose a harmonizing interpretation that would allow for the evaluation of cases of conscientious objection under relevant provisions protecting freedom of religion or belief and secondly, to evaluate the Turkish legislation in relation to conscientious objection to military service and highlight human rights issues that arise due to a lack of legal regulation on conscientious objection to military service.
7
Greenblum, Jake. « Public reason and the limited right to conscientious objection : a response to Magelssen ». Journal of Medical Ethics 44, no 3 (14 septembre 2017) : 206–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2017-104237.
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In a recent article for this journal, Morten Magelssen argues that the right to conscientious objection in healthcare is grounded in the moral integrity of healthcare professionals, a good for both professionals and society. In this paper, I argue that there is no right to conscientious objection in healthcare, at least as Magelssen conceives of it. Magelssen’s conception of the right to conscientious objection is too expansive in nature. Although I will assume that there is a right to conscientious objection, it does not extend to objections that are purely religious in nature. i Thus, this right is considerably more restricted than Magelssen thinks. In making my case, I draw on John Rawls’s later work in arguing for the claim that conscientious objection based on purely religious considerations fails to benefit society in the appropriate way.
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Ngwena, Charles G. « Conscientious Objection to Abortion and Accommodating Women's Reproductive Health Rights : Reflections on a Decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia from an African Regional Human Rights Perspective ». Journal of African Law 58, no 2 (27 août 2014) : 183–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021855314000114.
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AbstractIf applied in isolation from the fundamental rights of women seeking abortion services, the right to conscientious objection can render any given rights to abortion illusory, including the rights to health, life, equality and dignity that are attendant to abortion. A transformative understanding of human rights requires that the right to conscientious objection to abortion be construed in a manner that is subject to the correlative duties which are imposed on the conscientious objector, as well as the state, in order to accommodate women's reproductive health rights. In recent years, the Colombian Constitutional Court has been giving a judicial lead on the development of a right to conscientious objection that accommodates women's fundamental rights. This article reflects on one of the court's decisions and draws lessons for the African region.
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Triyana, Heribertus Jaka. « Conscientious Objection Before the Indonesian Constitutional Court ». Constitutional Review 8, no 2 (30 décembre 2022) : 323. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/consrev825.
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The issuance of Indonesia’s Law No. 23 of 2019 on the Management of National Resources for State Defense (PSDN Law) sparked a national debate on conscription and conscientious objection. Consequently, a coalition of civic society organizations submitted the PSDN Law before the Constitutional Court for judicial review. They argued that the PSDN Law violates the Indonesian Constitution’s Article 28 on human rights protection. One of the legal submissions is based on the argument that the PSDN Law deliberately ignores human rights in order to provide reserve and backup components to the military. This argument is supported by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ICCPR’s General Comment No. 22 of 1993 paragraph 11, justifying conscientious objection as an inherent human right. The analysis in this paper is mainly uses the legal positivism paradigm and the human rights-based approach. This paradigm provides a framework for analyzing how the PSDN Law generates a distinctive legal feature for Indonesia’s legal system. In line with Article 28 of the Indonesian Constitution, the Constitutional Court should explicitly assess the preservation of civil rights. It may be claimed that conceivable legal gaps (norm versus reality) and legal loopholes add to the Constitutional Court’s obligation to consider the omission of conscientious objection recognition. This article argues the Constitutional Court should adjudicate on the issue of citizens being conscripted as reserve and backup components in situations of military threats, hybrid threats and/or non-military threats. This research further maintains that the Constitutional Court should recognize the existence of conscientious objection as an inherent human right, as a form of judicial activism. In accordance with the doctrine of judicial activism, the Court could resolve and offer solutions to the existence of conscientious objection as a democratic civil right. The Court should also determine the area, scope, application and orientation of conscientious objection as a distinct feature of human rights based on Indonesia’s context and perspective on defense required by international human rights treaties, conventions, or general comments on such instruments.
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Blanc, Sandrine. « Conscientious objection in firms ». Economics and Philosophy 37, no 2 (20 avril 2021) : 222–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026626712000022x.
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AbstractThis article asks whether firms should exempt employees when they object to elements of their work that go against their conscience. Fairness requires that we follow the rules of an organization we have joined voluntarily only if these rules express mutual advantage. In corporations, I argue that subordination and exemption provides for mutual advantage better than subordination plus right of exit. This is because agents want to protect their conscientious convictions, even in hierarchical organizations geared towards efficient preference satisfaction. Thus exemptions should be granted in unforeseeable circumstances, provided the costs are limited.
11
Madjid, Abdul. « Sentencing over Objection to Mobilization as Military Reserve : An analysis of National and International Laws ». Brawijaya Law Journal 9, no 1 (30 avril 2022) : 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.21776/ub.blj.2022.009.01.01.
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Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning National Resource Management for State Defense does not regulate conscientious objection, which refers to the right of a person to refuse to participate in a war or military service on the grounds of religion and morality. Their absence in such services is replaced by other responsibilities such as working in public health services, providing security, and being involved in other social services. Article 77 Paragraph (1) of Law Number 23 of 2019 expressly provides for sentences that should be imposed on those who refuse to serve as a military reserve, where the rule is not in accordance with the principle of conscientious objection which gives a person the right to refuse on the basis of conscience. This research discusses the legal consequences of the enactment of two rules regarding military service and the application of different conscientious objections. This study applied normative juridical methods and approaches to examine the consistency and relevance of various statutes and government regulations that govern conscientious objection. This study also used conceptual and statutory approaches to explore why conscientious objection is considered a ground for refusal to participate in conscription according to International Human Rights Law. The findings revealed that the conception of defense and compulsory military service in Indonesia does not leave any chance to guarantee the rights of citizens to refuse to participate in military service according to the conscience and belief of every individual (conscientious objection). This is in contrast to the regulatory provisions of international human rights ratified by Indonesia under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Additionally, there is a need for clear arrangements regarding conscientious objection and the requirements that must be met by citizens who submit these principles for the rejection of military service in Indonesia.
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Fernando, Emmanuel Q. « The Right to the Free Exercise of Religion in the Philippines ». Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 19, no 2 (18 décembre 2018) : 191–237. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718158-01902004.
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The Philippines Supreme Court’s controversial Reproductive Health (rh) Law case gave occasion for a probing inquiry into legal doctrines and policy issues. The ‘conscientious objection’ provisions incorporated into the Law were probably the most divisive issue in the case. The provisions were intended to protect the religious scruples of health care providers. While the duties to extend contraceptive information and services to a patient were imposed on them, there was an opt-out clause in the event a provider conscientiously objects to these duties, so long as he refers the patient to another health care provider, who does not share his objection, to attend to her needs. The Court found this imposition of a duty to refer to be legally unacceptable relying on the United Kingdom (uk) case of Doogan and Wood v nhs Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board. This resort to uk jurisprudence was misguided in that the decision was overruled on appeal. There were, moreover, methodological differences between the two jurisdictions as to the resolution of conscientious objection cases. This article attempts to learn from and gain some insight into the issue of conscientious objection from a more comprehensive examination of uk jurisprudence, as well as from underlying moral, political, and philosophical principles of the Philippine Constitution.
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Kuře, Josef. « Conscientious objection in health care ». Ethics & ; Bioethics 6, no 3-4 (1 décembre 2016) : 173–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ebce-2016-0018.
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Abstract The paper deals with conscientious objection in health care, addressing the problems of scope, verification and limitation of such refusal, paying attention to ideological agendas hidden behind the right of conscience where the claimed refusal can cause harm or where such a claim is an attempt to impose certain moral values on society or an excuse for not providing health care. The nature of conscientious objection will be investigated and an ethical analysis of conscientious objection will be conducted. Finally some suggestions for health care policy will be proposed.
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Zampas, Christina, et Ximena Andión-Ibañez. « Conscientious Objection to Sexual and Reproductive Health Services : International Human Rights Standards and European Law and Practice ». European Journal of Health Law 19, no 3 (2012) : 231–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180912x639116.
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Abstract The practice of conscientious objection often arises in the area of individuals refusing to fulfil compulsory military service requirements and is based on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as protected by national, international and regional human rights law. The practice of conscientious objection also arises in the field of health care, when individual health care providers or institutions refuse to provide certain health services based on religious, moral or philosophical objections. The use of conscientious objection by health care providers to reproductive health care services, including abortion, contraceptive prescriptions, and prenatal tests, among other services is a growing phenomena throughout Europe. However, despite recent progress from the European Court of Human Rights on this issue (RR v. Poland, 2011), countries and international and regional bodies generally have failed to comprehensively and effectively regulate this practice, denying many women reproductive health care services they are legally entitled to receive. The Italian Ministry of Health reported that in 2008 nearly 70% of gynaecologists in Italy refuse to perform abortions on moral grounds. It found that between 2003 and 2007 the number of gynaecologists invoking conscientious objection in their refusal to perform an abortion rose from 58.7 percent to 69.2 percent. Italy is not alone in Europe, for example, the practice is prevalent in Poland, Slovakia, and is growing in the United Kingdom. This article outlines the international and regional human rights obligations and medical standards on this issue, and highlights some of the main gaps in these standards. It illustrates how European countries regulate or fail to regulate conscientious objection and how these regulations are working in practice, including examples of jurisprudence from national level courts and cases before the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, the article will provide recommendations to national governments as well as to international and regional bodies on how to regulate conscientious objection so as to both respect the practice of conscientious objection while protecting individual’s right to reproductive health care.
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Yang, Chelsey. « The inequity of conscientious objection : Refusal of emergency contraception ». Nursing Ethics 27, no 6 (13 mai 2020) : 1408–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0969733020918926.
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In the medical field, conscientious objection is claimed by providers and pharmacists in an attempt to forgo administering select forms of sexual and reproductive healthcare services because they state it goes against their moral integrity. Such claim of conscientious objection may include refusing to administer emergency contraception to an individual with a medical need that is time-sensitive. Conscientious objection is first defined, and then a historical context is provided on the medical field’s involvement with the issue. An explanation of emergency contraception’s physiological effects is provided along with historical context of the use on emergency contraception in terms of United States Law. A comparison is given between the United States and other developed countries in regard to conscientious objection. Once an understanding of conscientious objection and emergency contraception is presented, arguments supporting and contradicting the claim are described. Opinions supporting conscientious objection include the support of moral integrity, religious diversity, and less regulation on government involvement in state law will be offered. Finally, arguments against the effects of conscientious objection with emergency contraception are explained in terms of financial implications and other repercussions for people in lower socioeconomic status groups, especially people of color. Although every clinician has the right and responsibility to treat according to their sense of responsibility or conscience, the ethical consequences of living by one’s conscience are limiting and negatively impact underprivileged groups of people. It is the aim of this article to advocate against the use of provider’s and pharmacist’s right to claim conscientious objection due to the inequitable impact the practice has on people of color and individuals with lower incomes.
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Gascón Abellán, Marina. « Defensa de la objeción de conciencia como derecho general = In defense of a general right to conscientious objection ». EUNOMÍA. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad, no 15 (1 octobre 2018) : 85. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/eunomia.2018.4342.
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Resumen: Defiendo en este trabajo que la libertad de conciencia otorga protección a la objeción de conciencia con carácter general, por lo que en principio se puede invocar objeción frente a un deber jurídico sin que sea imprescindible que esta goce de expreso reconocimiento legal. Dicha protección es obviamente prima facie o condicionada, y la protección definitiva dependerá de que se cumplan ciertos requisitos. En la segunda parte examino esos requisitos (relativos fundamentalmente a la seriedad y veracidad de las convicciones y creencias, y a que en todo caso queden tutelados los bienes públicos y los derechos de los demás protegidos por el deber objetado) y finalmente sostengo la conveniencia de regular los tipos de objeción más relevantes.Palabras clave: Libertad de conciencia, libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y religión, objeción de conciencia, derechos humanos, orden público.Abstract: I advocate here the thesis that there is a general right to conscientious objection based on the freedom of conscience, which means it is possible for a person to invoke conscientious objection to avoid performing a legal obligation even though there is no legal provision expressly recognizing to do so. A general right to conscientious objection cannot be interpreted in absolute terms. Conscientious objection in a particular case can only be accepted if certain requirements are met. I also examine those requirements: particularly the need to hold genuine convictions or religious beliefs and protect public order and the rights of others. Finally, I claim it would be convenient to regulate the most relevant forms of conscientious objection, and some suggestions on the matter will be proposed.Keywords: Freedom of conscience, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, conscientious objection, human rights, public order.
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Campbell, Mark. « Conscientious objection, health care and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights ». Medical Law International 11, no 4 (décembre 2011) : 284–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0968533211426953.
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Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides protection for freedom of thought, conscience and religion. From one perspective, it may be said that Article 9 guarantees a right to conscientious objection in health care, whereas from another perspective, a Strasbourg case, such as Pichon and Sajous v France, effectively means that Article 9 provides little or no protection in that context. In this article it is argued that the matter is more complex than either of these two positions would suggest. Moreover, given the nature of the subject matter, national authorities should be afforded a significant margin of appreciation in the way that they protect and regulate conscientious objection. By way of illustration, there is a discussion of the ways in which Article 9 might affect conscientious objection in health care under English law. The final part of the article considers the conceptual limitations of Article 9 in thinking about conscientious objection in health care; in particular, the claim that the extent to which Article 9 of the Convention provides protection for a conscientious objection in the health care context is a different question from whether conscientious objection by doctors and other health care practitioners is justified in principle.
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Evans, Emily W. « Conscientious objection : A pharmacist’s right or professional negligence ? » American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy 64, no 2 (15 janvier 2007) : 139–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2146/ajhp060283.
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Simamora, Robby. « Hak Menolak Wajib Militer : Catatan atas RUU Komponen Cadangan Pertahanan Negara ». Jurnal Konstitusi 11, no 1 (20 mai 2016) : 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk1117.
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The military service agenda proposed Components of the National Defense Bill sows controversy. The absence of protection of citizens who exercised their right of conscientious objection to military service could potentially lead to violations of human rights if the military service must be implemented as it happens in other countries. Guarantee the protection of conscientious objection as part of the civil and political rights is a necessity if the government want to impose military service, considering Indonesia had acknowledged the existence of conscientious objector in the history of its military service policy.
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Dobrowolska, Beata, Ian McGonagle, Anna Pilewska-Kozak et Ros Kane. « Conscientious object in nursing : Regulations and practice in two European countries ». Nursing Ethics 27, no 1 (21 mai 2019) : 168–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0969733019845136.
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Background: The concept of conscientious objection is well described; however, because of its nature, little is known about real experiences of nursing professionals who apply objections in their practice. Extended roles in nursing indicate that clinical and value-based dilemmas are becoming increasingly common. In addition, the migration trends of the nursing workforce have increased the need for the mutual understanding of culturally based assumptions on aspects of health care delivery. Aim: To present (a) the arguments for and against conscientious objection in nursing practice, (b) a description of current regulations and practice regarding conscientious objection in nursing in Poland and the United Kingdom, and (c) to offer a balanced view regarding the application of conscientious objection in clinical nursing practice. Design: Discussion paper. Ethical considerations: Ethical guidelines has been followed at each stage of this study. Findings: Strong arguments exist both for and against conscientious objection in nursing which are underpinned by empirical research from across Europe. Arguments against conscientious objection relate less to it as a concept, but rather in regard to organisational aspects of its application and different mechanisms which could be introduced in order to reach the balance between professional and patient’s rights. Discussion and conclusion: Debate regarding conscientious objection is vivid, and there is consensus that the right to objection among nurses is an important, acknowledged part of nursing practice. Regulation in the United Kingdom is limited to reproductive health, while in Poland, there are no specific procedures to which nurses can apply an objection. The same obligations of those who express conscientious objection apply in both countries, including the requirement to share information with a line manager, the patient, documentation of the objection and necessity to indicate the possibility of receiving care from other nurses. Using Poland and the United Kingdom as case study countries, this article offers a balanced view regarding the application of conscientious objection in clinical nursing practice.
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Kaczor, Christopher. « A Defense of Conscientious Objection in Health Care ». Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 92 (2018) : 41–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc202071499.
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In this essay, I defend rights of conscientious objection against various objections raised on deontological grounds of rights and entitlements as well as on consequentialist, utilitarian grounds. Udo Schuklenk and Ricardo Smalling in their article, “Why Medical Professionals Have No Moral Claim to Conscientious Objection Accommodation in Liberal Democracies” raise various objections, including the Objection from the Rights of Patients, the Objection from Monopoly, the Objection from Religion, the Objection from Untestability, and the Objection from Inconsistency. This article also responds to the concern about “unconstrained conscientious objection.” It suggests that we can distinguish legitimate from illegitimate conscientious objection in part by means of distinguishing objection to particular kinds of procedures from objection to treating particular kinds of persons. Perhaps the most promising way of differentiating legitimate from illegitimate conscientious objection in healthcare is by means of the goal of the medical art understood as the promotion of health.
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Kantur, Ruslan. « International legal dimension of the right to conscientious objection : considerations with respect to the ECtHR judgment in Dyagilev v. Russia ». Meždunarodnoe pravosudie 11, no 2 (2021) : 54–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.21128/2226-2059-2021-2-54-71.
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The article delves into international legal aspects of the enjoyment of the right to conscientious objection. It is argued that the collision between the permissive norm of international law providing for sovereign discretion to introduce and enforce domestic rules on matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states, including those relating to compulsory military service, and the mandatory norm of international law ensuring the right to conscientious objection. The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights pivots upon the assumption that the right to conscientious objection is derived from the right to the freedom of thought, religion, and conscience and is covered by the international human rights treaties enshrining the latter (including Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). It is revealed that the standard which has been found in ECtHR jurisprudence means that Article 9 defends the opposition to military service, where such opposition is motivated by a serious and insurmountable conflict between the obligation to serve in the army and a person’s conscience or his deeply and genuinely held religious or other beliefs, with states parties retaining a certain margin of appreciation and being able to establish assessment procedures to examine the seriousness of the individual’s beliefs and to prevent the abuse of the right. However, in Dyagilev v. Russia the Court did not take into account that the circumstances of the case point out the actual unlimited margin of appreciation in this area, which leads to the situation when the conscript had had to provide “evidence” that he was a pacifist (in the absence of legally outlined minimum criteria helping assess the substantiation), but not to substantiate the very request by the fact that he shared pacifist views. Consequently, such a broad margin of appreciation implies that the state abuses its sovereignty, for the procedure of the examination of requests runs counter to the purpose of the right to the freedom of conscience and, consequently, the right to the conscientious objection.
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Triviño Caballero, Rosana. « Objeción de conciencia = Conscientious Objection ». EUNOMÍA. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad, no 15 (1 octobre 2018) : 198. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/eunomia.2018.4348.
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Resumen: La objeción de conciencia constituye un recurso mediante el que se pretende resolver la tensión entre el deber jurídico y el moral. Su caracterización en el seno de las sociedades democráticas está llena de matices y de contenidos no siempre compatibles entre sí, que va desde el reconocimiento explícito de la objeción como derecho a su consideración como una excepción condicionada para el cumplimiento de la norma. En función de la correspondiente noción de partida, será posible establecer las potenciales ventajas e inconvenientes que ofrece su regulación. Estos aspectos son los ejes centrales de los debates sobre la objeción de conciencia, que en la actualidad se vincula fundamentalmente al conflicto entre deberes profesionales y convicciones personales. Palabras clave: Objeción de conciencia, deber jurídico, deber moral, deber profesional, pluralismo, regulación de la objeción.Abstract: Conscientious objection is an instrument to solve the conflict between legal and moral duties. In democratic societies, it is easy to find different features and nuances to define it which are not always compatible among them (i.e. conscientious objection as a legal right vs. objection as a conditioned exemption to the law accomplishment). Depending on the guiding notion, the potential advantages and disadvantages arisen from conscientious objection regulation can be identified. These aspects are the central points which articulate conscientious objection issues, which currently are mainly related to conflicts between professional duties and personal beliefs.Keywords: Conscientious objection, legal duty, moral duty, professional duty, pluralism, conscientious objection regulation.
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Valero, María José. « Freedom of Conscience of Healthcare Professionals and Conscientious Objection in the European Court of Human Rights ». Religions 13, no 6 (16 juin 2022) : 558. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13060558.
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The recent social and legal debate in several European countries on abortion, euthanasia, and assisted suicide has caused a strong resurgence of the concerns of healthcare personnel as to the real possibility of protecting their consciences in their professional sphere. Individual refusal for religious, moral, deontological, or ethical reasons to participate in activities that directly or indirectly could result in the termination of a human life constitutes the most extreme manifestation of the legal phenomenon of conscientious objection. Although the European Convention on Human Rights does not recognize a general right to conscientious objection, since Bayatyan v. Armenia, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has identified a connection between conscience-related claims to compulsory military service and Article 9 of the Convention. However, to this date, this doctrine has not been applied to cases that affect health-sensitive areas like abortion and contraception. This article analyzes the activity of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the right to freedom of conscience and to conscientious objection, particularly in healthcare, and offers several final observations projected to possible future conflicts.
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Upeniece, Vita. « Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Services : International to National Perspective ». SOCRATES. Rīgas Stradiņa universitātes Juridiskās fakultātes elektroniskais juridisko zinātnisko rakstu žurnāls / SOCRATES. Rīga Stradiņš University Faculty of Law Electronic Scientific Journal of Law 1, no 22 (2022) : 100–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.25143/socr.22.2022.1.100-113.
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The international regulation (United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights) stipulates that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and that this right includes freedom to change their religion or belief and freedom to manifest their religion or belief. The U.N. Human Rights Committee concluded that the right to conscientious objections could be derived from Article 18. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights also extends to the cases of the opposition to military service. In Latvia the question of conscientious objection was regulated in the Alternative Service Law which expired in 2007 when the compulsory military service was completely abolished. Since then, the question about the conscientious objection to the military service has not been directly regulated in the national normative acts and has not also been raised in the courts of Latvia. In 2021, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia heard the case about the refusal to be a reserve soldier and to perform service in the National Armed Forces’ reserve on the ground of the pacifist beliefs of the applicant. This case revealed the lack of legal tools in Latvian military service regulations to respect the human rights mentioned therein. The purpose of the article is to propose the possible solutions to the identified gaps in Latvian regulation by analysing the international and national regulation, other countries’ experience and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The historical, analytical, systemic and teleological method has been used in the preparation of article.
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Kubala, Maciej. « Freedom of Conscience as a Human Right and Conscience Clause as a Legal Institution in the International System of Human Rights Protection (Special Focus on European Context) ». Teka Komisji Prawniczej PAN Oddział w Lublinie 14, no 1 (21 juillet 2022) : 219–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.32084/tekapr.2021.14.1-19.
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The United Nations recognized the right to conscientious objection to military service only in 2004, with far-reaching restrictions. At the Council of Europe, interpretation for the purpose of issuing ruling was derived from the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, however it has never been given autonomous treatybased legal regulation. Dispositions such as resolution 1763 (2010) of the Council of Europe or Strasbourg judicial decisions, respecting a recognition margin, could only call for recognition or observance of conscience clause by the states – parties to the Convention. These states, however, already as member states of the European Union – signatories of Treaty of Lisbon – although actually recognising Article 10 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as specification of freedom of conscience, still retained a far-reaching autonomy in its legal configuration. This paper answers the following research questions: is recognition of freedom of conscience as a human right, justifying the right for conscientious objection, requisite for the necessity to adopt conscience clause into the international system of human rights protection, and, consequently, in the state legal orders; if so, is the “universal” mandate of transnationally recognized right for conscientious objection strong enough to overcome the arbitrariness of statutory solutions of state legal orders?
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Begić, Martina s. Ana. « Conscientious Objection – an Act of Faithfulness to Oneself ». Crkva u svijetu 57, no 4 (13 décembre 2022) : 637–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.34075/cs.57.4.8.
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The discourse about conscientious objection is becoming increasingly relevant today. Some dispute it, while others see it as the last defense of their beliefs against the onslaught of ethical relativism and an increasing number of permissive laws. The paper emphasizes that conscientious objection is an act of faithfulness to oneself, that is, to one’s belief. The dignity of man, created in the image of Good and called to discover the truth, dictates that he discovers the truth in his conscience and makes free decisions that are in accordance with the known truth, that is, his belief. In this context, the fundamental right of every person is self-determination and making decisions in accordance with our beliefs because our actions simultaneously determine our personality. Therefore, conscientious objection cannot be seen as a conflict between believers and non-believers because the requirement to live according to one’s conscience, given that it stems from the very dignity of the person and their nature, binds every person regardless of their worldview. In the end, conscientious objection is not disobedience to the law or some anti-juridical position but an aspiration to express the correct spirit of the law that does not contradict the inalienable rights of the human person. In particular, conscientious objection is not a passive position where we jealously guard our safety and our space of personal freedom; that is a kind of escape from responsibility, refraining from taking action or transferring responsibility to another. Conscientious objection is a renunciation of one’s own comfort and an expression of courage to oppose imposed laws. It is a form of civic responsibility and religious courage to actively stand up for Good and, at the same time, an authentic way of witnessing the value of personal freedom.
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Knoetze, Adriaan, et Shaun De Freitas. « The Protection of Conscientious Objection against Euthanasia in Health Care ». Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 22 (20 septembre 2019) : 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2019/v22i0a5590.
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In 2015 the South African judiciary was confronted with the issue of the so-called "right to die", when Robin Stransham-Ford applied to the High Court of South Africa (the North Gauteng Division) for an order to have his life terminated. Although the Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the order (on procedural grounds), the High Court's judgment paved the way towards renewed attention regarding the possible legalisation of euthanasia. A pertinent question arising from this is whether a medical practitioner may be compelled to participate in the administering of euthanasia. Bearing this in mind, this article argues for the protection of the rights of medical practitioners who conscientiously object to participating in the administering of euthanasia, especially where such an objection is based on religious beliefs. From this arises the necessity to investigate the rights applicable both to the medical practitioner and the patient (which focusses on the right to freedom of religion and personal autonomy), the weighing up against one another of the different meanings ascribed to such rights, as well as the postulation of a substantively competitive rationale against the background of the importance and sacredness of human life. This also overlaps with the importance of the endeavour towards higher levels of religious freedoms and consequently of plurality in democratic societies. Applying the proportionality test in the analysis whether a medical practitioner's rights may be reasonably and justifiably limited against the background of administering euthanasia also strengthens the argument for the protection of the medical practitioner's right to object conscientiously to the administering of euthanasia. This, together with the vacuum there is in substantive human rights jurisprudence related to this topic, suggests the importance of this article both for the South African context and beyond.
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Hansen, Flemming S. « The Moscow Patriarchate and the Right to Conscientious Objection ». Religion, State and Society 37, no 4 (décembre 2009) : 403–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637490903315427.
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Emmerich, Nathan. « Conscientious objection should not be equated with moral objection : a response to Ben-Moshe ». Journal of Medical Ethics 45, no 10 (16 juillet 2019) : 673–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2019-105670.
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In his recent article, Ben-Moshe offers an account of conscientious objection (CO) in terms of the truth of the underlying moral objections, as judged by the standards of an impartial spectator. He seems to advocate for the view that having a valid moral objection to X is the sole criteria for the instantiation of a right to conscientiously object to X, and seems indifferent to the moral status of the prevailing moral attitudes. I argue that the moral status of the prevailing moral attitudes is relevant, and that a good faith disagreement between those who condone the relevant act and those who object to it is a criterion for CO. In this light, I suggest that CO is a sociopolitical device for managing differing ethical perspectives, particularly in the context of collective moral change. Thus, it is misguided to equate having a valid moral objection with the recognition of a CO.
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Paço, Sandra, et Sérgio Deodato. « Conscientious objection : reflections for nursing in Portugal ». Revista Gaúcha de Enfermagem 36, no 4 (décembre 2015) : 112–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1983-1447.2015.04.53242.
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Objective: to discuss conscientious objection in nursing, identifying the ethic and legal basis for this decision-making. Methodology: qualitative study in which the methodology used was ethical reflection based on a legal analysis of the laws in question, proceeding to a bibliographical and documentary research Conclusions: Portuguese law and ethical pillars that form the basis of the Code of Ethics of nurses in Portugal defend the freedom of conscience as a professional practice. However, the obligation to protect human life, which imposes the need for coordination between this protection and the exercise of the right to conscientious objection on the part of the nurse, is also clear.
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Mullan, Kenneth, William L. Allen et David B. Brushwood. « Conscientious Objection to Assisted Death : Can Pharmacy Address This in a Systematic Fashion ? » Annals of Pharmacotherapy 30, no 10 (octobre 1996) : 1185–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/106002809603001020.
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OBJECTIVE: To describe a legal structure for the accommodation of pharmacists' rights of conscience in the dispensing of drugs for pharmaceutically assisted death. BACKGROUND: Pharmacists have indicated that there is disagreement in the profession regarding the appropriateness of a practice known as “pharmaceutically assisted death”, in which lethal medications are prescribed for terminally ill patients who want to end their lives. Pharmacists who object to pharmaceutically assisted death may be asserting a conscientious objection that threatens to create a conflict with their employers. In addition, pharmacists who support pharmaceutically assisted death, but whose employers forbid the dispensing of medications for this purpose, may face a similar conflict. Current laws and principles of professional ethics fail to adequately address the resolution of either of these conflicts. DISCUSSION: We propose a system within which the pharmacy profession could accommodate the right to conscientious objection without sacrificing the quality of patient care. At the heart of our proposal is the understanding that employers must respect an employee's right to beliefs that differ from those of the employer and, correspondingly, the understanding that employees must respect the employer's duty to provide products and services to those who seek them from the employer. CONCLUSIONS: Pharmacy associations can adopt policies for conscientious objection and have those policies become law through action of the state legislature or the state board of pharmacy. This approach could lead to the development of a clear policy and procedure for resolving the issue of conscientious objection within the pharmacy community, making it far less likely that institutions outside pharmacy would be required to develop a solution for pharmacy.
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Jakuszewicz, A. « Some reflections on the judge"s right to conscientious objection ». Вісник Національного університету "Львівська політехніка". Серія : Юридичні науки, no 850 (2016) : 321–30.
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V McHale, Jean. « Conscientious objection and the nurse : A right or a privilege ? » British Journal of Nursing 18, no 20 (novembre 2009) : 1262–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.12968/bjon.2009.18.20.45122.
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Arlettaz, Fernando. « Conscientious Objection in the Council of Europe ». International and Comparative Law Review 13, no 2 (1 décembre 2013) : 27–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/iclr-2016-0069.
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Abstract The Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe have been promoting the recognition of conscientious objection, mainly for military service but also in other domains, since the 1960s. However, for more than fifty years the precedents of the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights repeatedly denied that conscientious objection could be found implicit in article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 2011 the Court changed its standpoint and energetically affirmed that conscientious objection, at least for military service, is a derivation of freedom of conscience and religion, and that European states are thus bound to incorporate it to their internal legislations.
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Forster, Melanie. « Ethical position of medical practitioners who refuse to treat unvaccinated children ». Journal of Medical Ethics 45, no 8 (27 juin 2019) : 552–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2019-105379.
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Recent reports in Australia have suggested that some medical practitioners are refusing to treat children who have not been vaccinated, a practice that has been observed in the USA and parts of Europe for some years. This behaviour, if it is indeed occurring in Australia, has not been supported by the Australian Medical Association, although there is broad support for medical practitioners in general having the right to conscientious objection. This paper examines the ethical underpinnings of conscientious objection and whether the right to conscientious objection can be applied to the refusal to treat unvaccinated children. The implications of such a decision will also be discussed, to assess whether refusal to treat unvaccinated children is ethically justifiable. The best interests of both existing and new patients are crucially important in a doctor’s practice, and the tension between these two groups of patients are contemplated in the arguments below. It is argued that on balance, the refusal to treat unvaccinated children constitutes unjustified discrimination.
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JEON, Sang-Hyeon. « Conscientious Objection : Focusing on Subjectivity and Sincerity ». Korean Constitutional Law Association 28, no 3 (30 septembre 2022) : 237–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.35901/kjcl.2022.28.3.237.
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Although conscience is a universal phenomenon that exists in common to all human beings, it is subjective in that the order of conscience differs from person to person. In order to allow conscientious objection, which means exemption from the order of a just law on the ground of subjective order of individual’s conscience, the order of conscience must conform to the principles and values of the Constitution. The reason that the conscientious objection to military service could be recognized in our constitutional law was the order of the conscientious objection was based on absolute pacifism and unconditional respect for human dignity and value. While it is inevitable to employ some method to distinguish genuine from fraudulent claims, the conscientious objector’s fundamental rights such as human dignity and equal protection may be infringed in the process of investigating whether the claims to be conscientious objection is sincere or not. As the conscience that the Constitution protects is the conscience of minority, the sincerity of minority’s conscience should not be denied only because it is unfamiliar to majority of the society.
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Cowley, Christopher. « Conscientious Objection in Social Work and Healthcare : A Philosophical Analysis ». British Journal of Social Work 50, no 7 (22 novembre 2019) : 2083–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcz136.
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Abstract Healthcare and social work would seem to have a lot in common. Both of them involve professional care, even if the methods and the targeted needs are different. However, they differ strikingly in the place accorded to conscientious objection (CO). The right of healthcare professionals to refuse to perform or authorise certain lawful services is well protected by the law of most Western jurisdictions. In addition, these conscience rights have been subject to a good deal of discussion in the medical ethics and medical law literature. In contrast, there seems to be very little scope for CO among social workers and very little discussion about CO in the social work literature. I examine the possible reasons for this difference, and then investigate the sort of things that a social worker might plausibly object to. In the end, I defend the position that social workers should not be permitted to express a CO, although I accept that they have other avenues for expressing legitimate dissent.
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Heydari, Abbas, et Hasan Sharifi. « Conscientious Objection : A neglected legal right of nursing profession in Iran ». Education and Ethics in Nursing 5, no 4 (1 décembre 2016) : 9–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.52547/ethicnurs.5.4.9.
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Saad, Toni C. « Conscientious Objection and Clinical Judgement : The Right to Refuse to Harm ». New Bioethics 25, no 3 (3 juillet 2019) : 248–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2019.1649863.
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Giubilini, Alberto. « Conscientious Objection in Healthcare : Neither a Negative Nor a Positive Right ». Journal of Clinical Ethics 31, no 2 (1 juin 2020) : 146–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/jce2020312146.
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Toro-Flores, Rafael, Pilar Bravo-Agüi, María Victoria Catalán-Gómez, Marisa González-Hernando, María Jesús Guijarro-Cenisergue, Margarita Moreno-Vázquez, Isabel Roch-Hamelin et Tamara Raquel Velasco-Sanz. « Opinions of nurses regarding conscientious objection ». Nursing Ethics 26, no 4 (12 novembre 2017) : 1027–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0969733017731915.
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Background: In the last decades, there have been important developments in the scientific and technological areas of healthcare. On certain occasions this provokes conflict between the patients' rights and the values of healthcare professionals which brings about, within this clinical relationship, the problem of conscientious objection. Aims: To learn the opinions that the Nurses of the Madrid Autonomous Community have regarding conscientious objection. Research design: Cross-cutting descriptive study. Participants and research context: The nurses of 9 hospitals and 12 Health Centers in the Madrid Autonomous Community. The study was done by means of an auto completed anonymous questionnaire. The variables studied were social-demographical and their opinions about conscientious objections. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Ethical Community of Clinical Research of the University Hospital Príncipe de Asturias. Participants were assured of maximum confidentiality and anonymity. Findings: A total of 421 nurses answered the questionnaire. In total, 55.6% of the nurses confirmed they were religious believers, and 64.3% declared having poor knowledge regarding conscientious objection. The matters that caused the greatest objections were voluntary abortions, genetic embryo selection, refusal of blood transfusions, and therapy refusal. Discussion: Different authors state that the most significant cases of conscientious objections for health professionals are those regarding carrying out or assisting in abortions, euthanasia, the practice of assisted reproduction and, finally, the prescription and dispensing of the morning-after pill. In our study, the most significant cases in which the nurses would declare conscientious objections would be the refusal to accept treatment, the selection of embryos after genetic diagnosis preimplantation, the patient’s refusal to receive blood transfusions due to religious reasons and pregnant women’s request for voluntary abortions within the first 14 weeks. Conclusion: Nurses’ religious beliefs influence their opinions regarding conscientious objection. The nurses who declare themselves as religious believers object in a higher percentage than those without religious beliefs.
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ANCELL, AARON, et WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG. « How to Allow Conscientious Objection in Medicine While Protecting Patient Rights ». Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26, no 1 (9 décembre 2016) : 120–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180116000694.
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Abstract:Paradigmatic cases of conscientious objection in medicine are those in which a physician refuses to provide a medical service or good because doing so would conflict with that physician’s personal moral or religious beliefs. Should such refusals be allowed in medicine? We argue that (1) many conscientious objections to providing certain services must be allowed because they fall within the range of freedom that physicians have to determine which services to offer in their practices; (2) at least some conscientious objections to serving particular groups of patients should be allowed because they are not invidiously discriminatory; and (3) even in cases of invidiously discriminatory conscientious objections, legally prohibiting individual physicians from refusing to serve patients on the basis of such objections is not always the best solution.
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Lamb, Christina. « Conscientious Objection : Understanding the Right of Conscience in Health and Healthcare Practice ». New Bioethics 22, no 1 (2 janvier 2016) : 33–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2016.1151252.
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Nawrot, Oktawian. « Conscientious objection versus human rights and their philosophy ». Polish Law Review 1 (1 octobre 2015) : 2–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/24509841.1197117.
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Nawrot, O. « Conscientious objection and European vision of human rights ». Progress in Health Sciences 6, no 1 (30 juin 2016) : 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0009.5136.
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The development of biomedical sciences and techniques, despite the undeniable positives, brings with it new threats, also for human rights and democratic society. The most serious concern is possibility of modification of the biological nature of human beings –which might entail limitations of human freedom. The modification of the human genome, brain and mind control, mechanization of human body, creating digital copies of human beings are now the most widely discussed threats , for human rights and the rule of law. Aside to the mentioned risks directly related to the development of biomedical technologies, the subject of much controversy is the relationships between the beneficiaries of progress in biomedicine (patients), and those who provide defined benefit plans (primarily physicians). The question is whether the physician is obliged to provide every medical service or may refuse to provide those which are opposed to his ethical judgements? The problem of the status of conscientious objection arises in above mentioned context. This paper presents the issue of conscientious objection from the perspective of the Council of Europe regulations.
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Davis, Shoni, Vivian Schrader et Marcia J. Belcheir. « Influencers of ethical beliefs and the impact on moral distress and conscientious objection ». Nursing Ethics 19, no 6 (25 juin 2012) : 738–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0969733011423409.
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Considering a growing nurse shortage and the need for qualified nurses to handle increasingly complex patient care situations, how ethical beliefs are influenced and the consequences that can occur when moral conflicts of right and wrong arise need to be explored. The aim of this study was to explore influencers identified by nurses as having the most impact on the development of their ethical beliefs and whether these influencers might impact levels of moral distress and the potential for conscientious objection. Nurses whose ethical beliefs were most influenced by their religious beliefs scored higher in levels of moral distress and demonstrated greater differences in areas of conscientious objection than did nurses who developed their ethical beliefs from influencers such as family values, life and work experience, political views or the professional code of ethics.
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Mazurkiewicz, Szymon. « Judge as Conscientious Objector – Analysis Based on Cultural Exemptions Theory and U.S. Law ». Polish Review of International and European Law 6, no 1 (4 septembre 2018) : 73. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/priel.2017.6.1.03.
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The aim of this paper is to analyze whether it is possible for a judge to possess the right to conscientious objection. Firstly, the author provides some conceptual remarks along with distinguishing conscientious objection from other situations concerning conflict between law and morality that involve judges. Next, cultural exemptions/religious accommodations theory is introduced as a conceptual basis for further analysis. W. Ciszewski’s multidimensional view on exemption theory is applied here. It distinguishes three levels of discussion: the general legitimatization of accommodations, secondly, the justification of a concrete exemption and thirdly the scope, process of application and exclusions of the specific exemption. This paper involves the second level and some issues from the third. Five premises given by W. Ciszewski are considered: (1) significance of a goal realized by regulation, (2) formal amenability of a duty to exclusion, (3) significance of one’s world view being in conflict with duty, (4) prohibition of the unjustified privileging of a group and (5) size of a group that may obtain an exemption. The last part involves the problem of applying a conscience clause. In the paper the author analyzes whether the regulation of judicial disqualification, especially judicial recusal, can be regarded as a legal basis for taking advantage of conscientious objection. The author also considers the boundaries of the clause of conscience with special emphasize on the individual’s right to a fair trial.
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Hambler, Andrew. « Recognising a Right to ‘Conscientiously Object’ for Registrars whose Religious Beliefs Are Incompatible with their Duty to Conduct Same-Sex Civil Partnerships ». Religion and Human Rights 7, no 3 (2012) : 157–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18710328-12341235.
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Abstract This article will argue that the term ‘conscientious objection’ can be applied beyond its associations with military service and reproductive healthcare, to explain the situation of a registrar of marriages, who, in carrying out his or her employment, has an objection based on religious beliefs to a specific aspect of his or her job requirements—namely the conduct of civil partnerships. It is argued that this objection is worthy of recognition and potential accommodation because of the weight of the burden which conscience imposes on the registrar, a burden that outweighs the case against recognition. The article then turns to examine critically the options for accommodating such a conscientious objection within United Kingdom law to the extent of considering three broad options, each with attendant advantages and disadvantages. Finally the article comes to the conclusion that re-configuring discrimination law might be the most pragmatic solution.
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Finegan, Thomas. « Liberal Relativism’s Challenge to Conscience Rights ». Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 9, no 1 (1 février 2020) : 79–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwaa010.
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Abstract I argue that within contemporary liberal theory and case law is a relativistic conception of conscience, a conception which has the effect of obscuring the significance of conscience and downplaying the importance of conscience rights. The article focuses in particular on the right to conscientious objection. After outlining a representative cohort of cases from within contemporary liberalism concerning conscientious objection I analyse Cardinal Ratzinger’s (Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI) ‘dictatorship of relativism’ critique for its cogency as a response to these cases. I contend that although the ‘dictatorship of relativism’ critique is almost always understood in a univocal manner it is in fact comprised of two logically distinct arguments. One of these is found fundamentally flawed while the other is deemed promising yet in need of supplementation and defence. This I attempt via an analysis of the understanding of conscience present within contemporary liberal case law and theory. I go on to claim that contemporary liberalism, in part due to its problematic understanding of conscience, is often insufficiently respectful of an important principle of conscience rights protection when it dismisses claims of conscientious objection. The final part of the article is an attempt at explaining the paradox of a liberalism which readily justifies significant restrictions on conscience rights. I end by concluding that one version of the ‘dictatorship of relativism’ critique, suitably clarified and supplemented, is basically sound and poses a very serious challenge to contemporary liberalism.