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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Right and left (Political science) – Netherlands"
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Otjes, Simon, et Tom Louwerse. « Populists in Parliament : Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism in the Netherlands ». Political Studies 63, no 1 (20 novembre 2013) : 60–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12089.
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Pennings, Paul, et Christine Arnold. « Is Constitutional Politics Like Politics ‘at Home’ ? The Case of the EU Constitution ». Political Studies 56, no 4 (décembre 2008) : 789–806. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00697.x.
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A large number of delegates from different institutional levels within the EU have achieved a remarkable consensus on a draft constitution. Has this consensus been made possible because the nationally predominant left–right divide was only weakly present during the deliberations of the delegates? Left–right differences have been analysed by means of a content analysis on submitted documents during the European Convention. The data analysis confirms our assumption that the left–right distinction was relevant, although not very dominant. The draft constitution did not take a mean position on left and right issues, but in fact puts more emphasis on substantial goals related to both left and right, giving an equal weight to both anti-poles. However, if we exclude the Charter of Human Rights, the draft constitution appears to be strongly tilted to the right. The analysis also shows that party family differences did affect the process of coalition building during the Convention, since more than half of all documents have been submitted together with at least one member of the same party family and/or with one family member close by. Our analysis also indicates that the process of consensus building was enhanced by the absence of many extremist and new parties during the Convention. This may have enhanced agreement on the Constitution, but later it became problematic for the domestic democratic process and for the acceptance of the Constitution in some countries, such as France and the Netherlands, especially since some of the excluded parties have actively and successfully mobilised voters to vote against the Constitution.
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Hoefte, Rosemarijn. « The Difficulty of Getting it Right : Dutch Policy in the Caribbeans ». Itinerario 25, no 2 (juillet 2001) : 59–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0165115300008822.
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Dutch colonialism has traditionally focused on the East Indies, rather than the West Indies. Thus when Queen Wilhelmina, while in exile in London, declared in 1942 that the colonies should become autonomous with the words ‘relying on one's own strength, with the will to support each other,’ she was thinking of the East and not so much about Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. Yet as it turned out, all constitutional plans, culminating into the Statuut or Charter of the Kingdom of 1954, even though conceived and drafted with the East in mind, was ultimately only applied to the West. The Netherlands East Indies, occupied by Japan during World War II, opted for independence after the War. The Hague did not accept this step and waged both hot and cold wars to fight against Indonesia's independence. This, for the Netherlands traumatic, experience left its traces in Dutch policy regarding its Caribbean territories.
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Bruff, Ian. « The Netherlands, the Challenge of Lijst Pim Fortuyn, and the Third Way ». Politics 23, no 3 (septembre 2003) : 156–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00192.
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The shock 2002 general election result in the Netherlands has provided a wake-up call to those who believed it would withstand the Europe-wide rise of the far right more successfully than others. This article firstly investigates why Lijst Pim Fortuyn performed so well, and suggests that its popularity owes more to its anti-establishment stance than its xenophobic outlook. The second half of the article links the upheavals to normative deficiencies in the ‘third way’ framework, and concludes that a more distinctive left-of-centre agenda needs to be formulated, both in itself and in relation to containing the far right.
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van der Waal, Jeroen, et Willem de Koster. « Populism and Support for Protectionism : The Relevance of Opposition to Trade Openness for Leftist and Rightist Populist Voting in The Netherlands ». Political Studies 66, no 3 (10 novembre 2017) : 560–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032321717723505.
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Leftist and rightist populist parties in Western Europe both oppose trade openness. Is support for economic protectionism also relevant for their electorates? We assess this in the Netherlands, where both types of populist parties have seats in parliament. Analyses of representative survey data ( n = 1,296) demonstrate that support for protectionism drives voting for such parties, as do the well-established determinants of political distrust (both populist constituencies), economic egalitarianism (leftist populist constituency) and ethnocentrism (rightist populist constituency). Surprisingly, support for protectionism does not mediate the relationship between economic egalitarianism and voting for left-wing populists, or the link between political distrust and voting for either left-wing or right-wing populist parties. In contrast, support for protectionism partly mediates the association between ethnocentrism and voting for right-wing populists. We discuss the largely independent role of protectionism in populist voting in relation to the cultural cleavage in politics and electoral competition, and also provide suggestions for future research.
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Adams, James, Catherine E. De Vries et Debra Leiter. « Subconstituency Reactions to Elite Depolarization in the Netherlands : An Analysis of the Dutch Public's Policy Beliefs and Partisan Loyalties, 1986–98 ». British Journal of Political Science 42, no 1 (24 juin 2011) : 81–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123411000214.
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During the 1980s and the 1990s, the elites of the two largest Dutch parties converged dramatically in debates on income redistribution, nuclear power and the overall Left–Right dimension, paving the way for the Dutch party system's polarization on immigration and cultural issues. Did the Dutch mass public depolarize along with party elites, and, if so, was this mass-level depolarization confined to affluent, educated, politically engaged citizens? Analysis of Dutch Parliamentary Election Study respondents’ policy beliefs and partisan loyalties in 1986–98 shows that the mass public depolarized during this period, and that this extended equally throughout the electorate. These conclusions mirror previous findings on Britain, but differ from those on the United States, and have important implications for political representation and for parties’ election strategies.
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Gidron, Noam, et Jonathan J. B. Mijs. « Do Changes in Material Circumstances Drive Support for Populist Radical Parties ? Panel Data Evidence from the Netherlands during the Great Recession, 2007–2015 ». European Sociological Review 35, no 5 (18 mai 2019) : 637–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcz023.
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AbstractPolitical developments since the 2008 financial crisis have sparked renewed interest in the electoral implications of economic downturns. Research describes a correlation between adverse economic conditions and support for radical parties campaigning on the populist promise to retake the country from a corrupt elite. But does the success of radical parties following economic crises rely on people who are directly affected? To answer this question, we examine whether individual-level changes in economic circumstances drive support for radical parties across the ideological divide. Analysing eight waves of panel data collected in the Netherlands, before, during, and after the Great Recession (2007–2015), we demonstrate that people who experienced an income loss became more supportive of the radical left but not of the radical right. Looking at these parties’ core concerns, we find that income loss increased support for income redistribution championed by the radical left, but less so for the anti-immigration policies championed by the radical right. Our study establishes more directly than extant research the micro-foundations of support for radical parties across the ideological divide.
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Ruisch, Benjamin C., Mariana Von Mohr, Marnix Naber, Manos Tsakiris, Russell H. Fazio et Daan T. Scheepers. « Sensitive liberals and unfeeling conservatives ? Interoceptive sensitivity predicts political liberalism ». Politics and the Life Sciences 41, no 2 (2022) : 256–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/pls.2022.18.
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AbstractThe stark divide between the political right and left is rooted in conflicting beliefs, values, and personality—and, recent research suggests, perhaps even lower-level physiological differences between individuals. In this registered report, we investigated a novel domain of ideological differences in physiological processes: interoceptive sensitivity—that is, a person’s attunement to their own internal bodily states and signals (e.g., physiological arousal, pain, and respiration). We conducted two studies testing the hypothesis that greater interoceptive sensitivity would be associated with greater conservatism: one laboratory study in the Netherlands using a physiological heartbeat detection task and one large-scale online study in the United States employing an innovative webcam-based measure of interoceptive sensitivity. Contrary to our predictions, we found evidence that interoceptive sensitivity may instead predict greater political liberalism (versus conservatism), although this association was primarily limited to the American sample. We discuss implications for our understanding of the physiological underpinnings of political ideology.
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Afonso, Alexandre. « Choosing whom to betray : populist right-wing parties, welfare state reforms and the trade-off between office and votes ». European Political Science Review 7, no 2 (17 avril 2014) : 271–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773914000125.
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This article analyses the impact of populist right-wing parties (PRWPs) on welfare state reforms in Western Europe in the light of the trade-off that they face between office and votes. On the one hand, PRWPs appeal to traditionally left-leaning blue-collar ‘insiders’ supportive of social insurance schemes. On the other hand, they have only been able to take part in government as junior coalition partners with liberal or conservative parties who are more likely to retrench these very same welfare programmes. In this context, the article argues that these parties have to choose between betraying their electorate (and losing votes), and betraying their coalition partners (and losing office). When they choose office, it enables welfare state retrenchment by allowing their coalition partners to curtail left-wing opposition, but entails high electoral costs for PRWPs. When they choose votes, it generates deadlock and potentially jeopardizes their participation in government. The paper draws on a comparative analysis of pension reforms during three periods of government participation of PRWPs: the Schüssel I and II cabinets in Austria (2000–06), the Rutte I cabinet in the Netherlands (2010–12) and three pension reforms in Switzerland between 1995 and 2010. The analysis draws on original primary material and interviews.
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Rekker, Roderik, Loes Keijsers, Susan Branje et Wim Meeus. « The Formation of Party Preference in Adolescence and Early Adulthood : How and When Does It Occur in the Multiparty Context of the Netherlands ? » YOUNG 27, no 1 (25 mars 2018) : 48–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1103308818757037.
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This cohort-sequential panel study on Dutch youths ( N = 3394) and their parents examined the formation of party preference between age 12 and 25. Specifically, it aimed to pinpoint the most formative component and age in a multiparty context. Opinionation, stability and correlates were examined for three components of party preference: party identification, voting intention and left-right identification. Results revealed that most youths formed a preference at some point during their early life. The 6-year stability of party preference was already substantial during early adolescence and increased until early adulthood. Party preference became increasingly related to youths’ social characteristics and issue attitudes with age, but parents remained important. Whereas studies from two-party systems emphasized the importance of party identification, this study suggested that left-right identification may instead predominate the early formation, intergenerational transmission and life-course stability of party preference in the Netherlands. The most formative period was around age 18.
Thèses sur le sujet "Right and left (Political science) – Netherlands"
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Karlsson, Anton. « The Left-Right Scale : An analysis of its connection to preferences on economic issues ». Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Statsvetenskap, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-165611.
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This thesis deals with the nature of the Left-Right scale. Theories and ideas about the Left-Right scale have been tested by a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. The research questions are, in short, firstly if voters’ preferences on political issues, where economic issues are tested in this specific thesis, can consistently explain voters’ Left-Right self-placement, secondly if this level of explanation can vary depending on changes in national political discourse, and finally if a high level of correlation between issue and Left-Right self-placement facilitates the matching process of parties and voters of similar ideological conviction. A regression is run on data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, data which consists of survey questions about attitudes towards economic preferences and self-placement on the Left-Right scale. The selection is restricted to old democracies, as there is some discrepancy between new and old democracies with regards to the capacity of the electorate to relate to the Left-Right scale. The independent variable in this regression is attitudes toward different economic issues, while the dependent variable is self-placement on the Left-Right scale. The first question is answered by the regression, which is if preferences regarding issues can explain self-placement on the Left-Right scale. The answer that is given is that there is indeed a consistent relationship between preferences on economic issues and self-placement on the Left-Right scale, over time. Albeit it is higher for some countries, like Scandinavia, and lower for other countries, like Japan and Ireland. The two remaining questions are answered by case studies, selected through the method of least likely and most likely cases. These are Netherlands, Sweden, Japan and France. In essence, these cases show that the Left-Right scale is indeed flexible, and can adapt to the current political discourse, and that a high relationship between preferences on political issues and self-placement on the Left-Right scale facilitates the matching of voters and parties of similar ideological conviction.
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Kaufman, Daniel A. « The Right in Chile after Pinochet : institutions and ideology in comparative-historical perspective / ». Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3031942.
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Smith, Steven Roy. « The centre-left and new right divide ? : political philosophy and aspects of post-1945 UK social policy ». Thesis, University of Warwick, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.336786.
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Fraser, Duncan. « Long-wave economics and the changing fortunes of the political and social movements of the left and right ». Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2001. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1664/.
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A number of writers working in the fields of history and industrial relations have claimed a correlation between long-wave economics and the changing fortunes of political and social movements of the left and right. They have suggested both particular patterns of development and causations but often on the basis of piecemeal evidence, lacking a comprehensive theoretical and empirical basis. This thesis tests the validity of such a correlation through a comparative historical analysis of the domestic political histories of Britain, France, Germany and the USA over the four long-waves that have occurred in modern times; those of 1803-1848, 1848-1896, 1896-1948 and 1948-1998. It finds, that since industrialization, there has been a distinct and repeating pattern of political and social development that can be correlated with long-wave economics. Common ground is found with existing theoretical patterns, though also notable areas of difference, and this thesis provides a more comprehensive pattern of development. The thesis proceeds to explore possible causations for the pattern found. It does so by using existing political science theories explaining political change; those concerning voting behaviour, class struggle and party competition. It finds that aspects of these theories can be used to explain the pattern of development found. Above all, populations experiencing the different economic phases of the long-wave undergo significant motivational changes that are reflected in the shifting fortunes of the left and right. The thesis concludes by analyzing these findings and highlighting advances made on existing accounts. It also discusses those events within modern history that could be regarded as anomalous, with the intention of further understanding this process. Finally, it discusses the implications of the findings of this thesis for long-wave and political science theory.
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Torges, Gwendolyn B. « The right to be left alone v. the crime against nature : An analysis of Bowers v. Hardwick ». Diss., The University of Arizona, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/298801.
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This qualitative case study analyzed the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and the historical and legal background leading up to the case. Often characterized as a decision representing an emotional rejection of homosexuality rather than a reasoned application of constitutional privacy precedent, this inquiry sought to identify and document the determinants of the outcome in Bowers, in which a slim majority of the Court ruled that the constitutional right of privacy did not prohibit states from regulating homosexual sodomy. The study demonstrated that although homophobia certainly played a part in the Bowers decision, that the opinion was not necessarily inconsistent with previous privacy decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The author concluded that the dominant insight gleaned from Bowers is that there is no such thing as a constitutionally protected right of privacy, at least not in the way that privacy is conventionally understood. The Bowers opinion illuminates that the Court's privacy jurisprudence has been more about the privileging of certain relationships (such as that between husband and wife or doctor and patient) than it has been about personal privacy. Such relationships serve an important limiting principle. The author concluded that the outcome in Bowers was not the insufficiency of the claim of a right to privacy, but the insufficiency of any limiting principle. The research documented and analyzed history of the two bodies of law most relevant to the Bowers opinion: state law which criminalized sodomy; and constitutional protection of individual privacy.
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Kang, Kathryn M. « Agnostic democracy the decentred "I" of the 1990s / ». Connect to full text, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/667.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2005.Title from title screen (viewed 22 May 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Economics and Business. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.
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Hyde, Sarah Jane. « From old socialists to new democrats : the realignment of the Japanese left ». Thesis, University of Oxford, 2005. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7acd9f90-0e06-41a2-83c5-76d8d8de7f82.
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In 1996, a new left of centre party emerged in Japan called the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and effectively replaced the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) as the main opposition party. This thesis asks what conditions caused this realignment and how the DPJ differs from the JSP. An increasing distrust and disinterest of politics and politicians has meant that the non-aligned voter in Japan forms the largest group of the electorate. Every party has lost support, but the left faced the worst drop of support. With the end of the Cold War, and the intensifying call for Japan to reassess its role on the World stage, the traditional ideology of the Japanese left, which has become synonymous with peace and preservation of the Peace Constitution, has lost its stabilising effect on the party and on its supporters. The labour unions, which were once the key mobilisational force for the left-wing parties at election time, began to question their relationship with the JSP and found new links to government. Simultaneously, they were also losing members so mobilisation of voters for the left also declined. Finally, a new electoral system did not reward the opposition as much as the LDP. Overall, the mobilisation of the electorate has become increasingly difficult for the Japanese left as a result of these factors. The DPJ has had to find ways of dealing with them and also has had to create its own identity. The way in which the party has dealt with this is by 'widening out' its types of candidate and using new methods to attract support. Furthermore, the DPJ has become more aware of its party coherence and has ensured that party unity is maintained even when ideological disputes occur.
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Saleam, Jim. « The other radicalism an inquiry into contemporary Australian extreme right ideology, politics and organization, 1975-1995 / ». Connect to full text, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/807.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2001.Title from title screen (viewed Apr. 22, 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Dept. of Government and Public Administration, Faculty of Economics & Business. Degree awarded 2001; thesis submitted 1999. Includes bibliography. Also available in print form.
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Griffiths, Simon. « Responses to the new right : the engagement of the British left with the work of Friedrich Hayek, 1989-1997 ». Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2006. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/325/.
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This is an examination of the context, content and significance of the surprising engagement of the British left with the arguments of Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992), one of the most influential theorists of the new right and an important influence on leading figures in the Conservative Government elected in the UK in 1979. The thesis examines in detail the engagement by four thinkers on the British left with Hayek's work: David Miller, Raymond Plant, Andrew Gamble and Hilary Wainwright. Its chronological parameters are the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the election of ‘New Labour’ in the UK in 1997. Important contextual factors behind this engagement include the rise and fall of the British Conservative Party, the difficulties of statist forms of socialism and Hayek's own death. The engagement with Hayek's work provides a case study that demonstrates changes in political themes, in particular, the decline of statist forms of socialism with the left's embrace of the market and individual freedom, the decline in support for the paternalistic state and the search for more ‘feasible’ alternatives. I argue that the British left's engagement with Hayek is part of a wider intellectual break that constitutes the end of a ‘short twentieth century’ in political thought, and that the political landscape is now dominated by two strands of the liberal tradition. As such, the research will be of importance to anyone seeking a clearer understanding of recent changes in political thought and to the shape of the contemporary political landscape.
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Henderson, Peter Charles. « A history of the Australian extreme right since 1950 / ». View thesis, 2002. http://library.uws.edu.au/adt-NUWS/public/adt-NUWS20030924.134813/index.html.
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Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Western Sydney, 2002."A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, December 2002, School of Humanities, University of Western Sydney" Bibliography : p. [419]-451.
Livres sur le sujet "Right and left (Political science) – Netherlands"
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G, Thobaben Robert, dir. Political ideologies : Left, center, right. New York : Harper & Row, 1989.
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Funderburk, Charles. Political ideologies : Left, center, right. 2e éd. New York : HarperCollinsCollegePublishers, 1994.
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Funderburk, Charles. Political ideologies : Left, center, right. 2e éd. New York : Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994.
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Roth, Joseph. Right and left. London : Chatto & Windus, 1991.
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Left and right : The great dichotomy revisited. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013.
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David, Miliband, dir. Reinventing the left. Cambridge : Polity Press, 1994.
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Jean-Philippe, Thérien, dir. Left and right in global politics. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2008.
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Brooks, Neil. Left vs right : Why the left is right and the right is wrong. [Ottawa?] : Canadian Teachers' Federation, 1995.
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Wright, Anthony, et Roger Eatwell. Contemporary political ideologies. Boulder, Colorado, United States of America : Westview Press, 1993.
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Bobbio, Norberto. Left and right : The significance of a political distinction. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Right and left (Political science) – Netherlands"
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Agathangelou, Pantelis, Ioannis Katakis, Lamprini Rori, Dimitrios Gunopulos et Barry Richards. « Understanding Online Political Networks : The Case of the Far-Right and Far-Left in Greece ». Dans Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 162–77. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67217-5_11.
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Donohue, Christopher. « “A Mountain of Nonsense” ? Czech and Slovenian Receptions of Materialism and Vitalism from c. 1860s to the First World War ». Dans History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, 67–84. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12604-8_5.
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AbstractIn general, historians of science and historians of ideas do not focus on critical appraisals of scientific ideas such as vitalism and materialism from Catholic intellectuals in eastern and southeastern Europe, nor is there much comparative work available on how significant European ideas in the life sciences such as materialism and vitalism were understood and received outside of France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Insofar as such treatments are available, they focus on the contributions of nineteenth century vitalism and materialism to later twentieth ideologies, as well as trace the interactions of vitalism and various intersections with the development of genetics and evolutionary biology see Mosse (The culture of Western Europe: the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Westview Press, Boulder, 1988, Toward the final solution: a history of European racism. Howard Fertig Publisher, New York, 1978; Turda et al., Crafting humans: from genesis to eugenics and beyond. V&R Unipress, Goettingen, 2013). English and American eugenicists (such as William Caleb Saleeby), and scores of others underscored the importance of vitalism to the future science of “eugenics” (Saleeby, The progress of eugenics. Cassell, New York, 1914). Little has been written on materialism qua materialism or vitalism qua vitalism in eastern Europe.The Czech and Slovene cases are interesting for comparison insofar as both had national awakenings in the middle of the nineteenth century which were linguistic and scientific, while also being religious in nature (on the Czech case see David, Realism, tolerance, and liberalism in the Czech National awakening: legacies of the Bohemian reformation. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2010; on the Slovene case see Kann and David, Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918. University of Washington Press, Washington, 2010). In the case of many Catholic writers writing in Moravia, there are not only slight noticeable differences in word-choice and construction but a greater influence of scholastic Latin, all the more so in the works of nineteenth century Czech priests and bishops.In this case, German, Latin and literary Czech coexisted in the same texts. Thus, the presence of these three languages throws caution on the work on the work of Michael Gordin, who argues that scientific language went from Latin to German to vernacular. In Czech, Slovenian and Croatian cases, all three coexisted quite happily until the First World War, with the decades from the 1840s to the 1880s being particularly suited to linguistic flexibility, where oftentimes writers would put in parentheses a Latin or German word to make the meaning clear to the audience. Note however that these multiple paraphrases were often polemical in the case of discussions of materialism and vitalism.In Slovenia Čas (Time or The Times) ran from 1907 to 1942, running under the muscular editorship of Fr. Aleš Ušeničnik (1868–1952) devoted hundreds of pages often penned by Ušeničnik himself or his close collaborators to wide-ranging discussions of vitalism, materialism and its implied social and societal consequences. Like their Czech counterparts Fr. Matěj Procházka (1811–1889) and Fr. Antonín LenzMaterialismMechanismDynamism (1829–1901), materialism was often conjoined with "pantheism" and immorality. In both the Czech and the Slovene cases, materialism was viewed as a deep theological problem, as it made the Catholic account of the transformation of the Eucharistic sacrifice into the real presence untenable. In the Czech case, materialism was often conjoined with “bestiality” (bestialnost) and radical politics, especially agrarianism, while in the case of Ušeničnik and Slovene writers, materialism was conjoined with “parliamentarianism” and “democracy.” There is too an unexamined dialogue on vitalism, materialism and pan-Slavism which needs to be explored.Writing in 1914 in a review of O bistvu življenja (Concerning the essence of life) by the controversial Croatian biologist Boris Zarnik) Ušeničnik underscored that vitalism was an speculative outlook because it left the field of positive science and entered the speculative realm of philosophy. Ušeničnik writes that it was “Too bad” that Zarnik “tackles” the question of vitalism, as his zoological opinions are interesting but his philosophy was not “successful”. Ušeničnik concluded that vitalism was a rather old idea, which belonged more to the realm of philosophy and Thomistic theology then biology. It nonetheless seemed to provide a solution for the particular characteristics of life, especially its individuality. It was certainly preferable to all the dangers that materialism presented. Likewise in the Czech case, Emmanuel Radl (1873–1942) spent much of his life extolling the virtues of vitalism, up until his death in home confinement during the Nazi Protectorate. Vitalism too became bound up in the late nineteenth century rediscovery of early modern philosophy, which became an essential part of the development of new scientific consciousness and linguistic awareness right before the First World War in the Czech lands. Thus, by comparing the reception of these ideas together in two countries separated by ‘nationality’ but bounded by religion and active engagement with French and German ideas (especially Driesch), we can reconstruct not only receptions of vitalism and materialism, but articulate their political and theological valances.
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« Two. Moscas Political Science : Democratic Elitism and Balanced Pluralism ». Dans Beyond Right and Left, 22–61. Yale University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.12987/9780300144185-004.
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Uberoi, J. P. S. « Right, Left and Centre in the Sciences of Nature ». Dans Mind and Society, sous la direction de Khalid Tyabji, 11–17. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199495986.003.0003.
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This chapter continues with the author’s critique of modern Western science. It traces the inherent dualisms of the modernist approach to spheres of thought, nature and society whether they be of the right, left or centre in the political spectrum. The question of dualism and non-dualism is discussed in relation to Marx, Engels, Hegel, Lenin, Goethe, Christianity, Soviet Marxism and Chinese Maoism, and the Renaissance and Reformation in Europe. The final section of the chapter deals with the relation between science and politics outlining the alliance between the science of the expert with the military industrial complex that makes impossible a praxis of Gandhian non-violence, a centrist position that has its reflection in the non-dualist streams of the European underground.
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Butler, Lise. « ‘We Were All Very Sick and Very Stupid’ ». Dans Michael Young, Social Science, and the British Left, 1945-1970, 20–47. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862895.003.0002.
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This chapter discusses the Conference on the Psychological and Sociological Problems of Modern Socialism held at University College Oxford in 1945. This event featured prominent left-wing policy makers, intellectuals, and social scientists, including the MP Evan Durbin, the political theorist G. D. H. Cole, the writer and politician Margaret Cole, the child psychologist John Bowlby, the historian R. H. Tawney, and Michael Young, who was then the Secretary of the Labour Party Research Department. The conference reflected multiple strands of inter-war and mid-twentieth century political thought and social science which emphasized the political and social importance of small groups, notably through guild socialist arguments for pluralistic forms of political organization, and theories about human attachment drawn from child psychology. The views expressed at the conference reflected a sense that active and participatory democracy was not just morally right but psychologically necessary to prevent popular political radicalization, limit the appeal of totalitarianism, and promote peaceful civil society. The chapter concludes by noting that the events of the conference, and the intellectual influences that it represented, would subsequently shape Michael Young’s project to promote social science within the Labour Party during the later years of the Attlee government.
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Rogers, Richard, et Sal Hagen. « Epilogue ». Dans The Politics of Social Media Manipulation. Nieuwe Prinsengracht 89 1018 VR Amsterdam Nederland : Amsterdam University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/9789463724838_ch09.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The publication of the study elicited reactions, especially on Twitter, where questions arose about the use of the notion of junk news, rather than ‘pulp news’, among other points. The analogy to junk food is emphasised. There was also the question of symmetry, and the treatment of both ends of the political spectrum. Why is the new populist right identified as the purveyors of extreme content? We found a polarised Dutch media landscape where hyperpartisan (and to a lesser extent conspiracy) content from new populist right (rather than the left or other orientations) circulates well on social media. Unlike in the US during the initial Trump insurgency, mainstream news in the Netherlands still outperforms what was hitherto known as ‘fake news’, across all platforms.
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Molendijk, Arie L. « Conclusion ». Dans Protestant Theology and Modernity in the Nineteenth-Century Netherlands, 179–90. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898029.003.0011.
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In West European history the nineteenth century has been termed the ‘second confessional age’ (after the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries) because of the revival of religion and the strengthening of confessional divisions, which penetrated politics, society, and everyday culture. The Netherlands was no exception to these trends. Abraham Kuyper provided here the theoretical underpinnings of the process of pillarization (the politico-denominational segregation of a society). The old liberal ideal of an inclusive People’s Church that tolerated a broad range of Christian believers was not achieved. The rise of the critical study of the Bible and science of religion were the most conspicuous scholarly developments in Dutch theology in the second half of the nineteenth century. Methodologically speaking, a historical way of thinking was taking hold of the field. This does not imply that positivism and Darwinism played no role in theological debates, but doubtless the emerging historical-critical approach did much more damage to the credibility of traditional Christian dogma than naturalistic theories. The theologians who have figured in this book all formulated their position with a view to the changing world around them. Some were fundamentally affirmative about new cultural and political developments (Protestant modernist theologians), others were downright critical (Isaac da Costa), while Abraham Kuyper developed a new, modern, and competing worldview vis-à-vis the dominant liberal stance. Nevertheless, in a variety of ways, all protagonists addressed the challenges of the slowly modernizing Dutch society in the nineteenth century and can be called modern thinkers in their own right.
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Barker, Rodney. « : Pluralism, Revenant or Recessive ? » Dans The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century. British Academy, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197262948.003.0005.
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This chapter deals with pluralism, while tackling Ernest Barker, British pluralism, original pluralism, postmodernism, multiculturalism, and feminism. The fact that British political science, particularly through the English language, is part of a far wider intellectual community, does not dilute its distinctiveness. It is one of the conditions enabling its different peoples to develop their own religious, political, and cultural identities. The chapter also describes three familiar metaphors used to explain intellectual change. Pluralism is neither socialist, nor conservative, nor liberal, although it has affinities at different points with all three. It even sits uneasily on a scale of left to right. Its reappearance indicates how far the old morphology of political thinking has been transcended.
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Layman, Daniel. « Spooner ». Dans Locke Among the Radicals, 99–129. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190939076.003.0004.
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More than any other thinker, Lysander Spooner has a plausible claim to the title of founder of libertarianism. In his mature works, he developed the conception of Lockean rights that began to emerge in Hodgskin into a nearly anarcho-capitalist vision that would later reemerge in the philosophy of twentieth-century libertarians like Robert Nozick. But Spooner did not begin his scholarly life in quite this vein. In his early works, Spooner defends a version of liberal republicanism that has room for collective rights and is by no means anarchistic. As his career wore on, however, he began to argue that political morality is a kind of a priori natural science—or, perhaps, mathematics—of individual rights, complete and determinate in all its details and innately knowable by all who reflect on it. This conception of justice left little room for legitimate political legislation (since there is no facet of human life it does not govern on its own), let alone collective political rights. So, in the end, Spooner, more clearly than his philosophical forbear Hodgskin, developed a right-libertarian solution to Locke’s property problem. According to this solution, there is no positive common right to the world, so there is no tension between a natural common right to the world and natural private property rights.
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Chiles, Robert M. « Introduction : From Sustainability to Surveillance ». Dans Controversies in Science and Technology. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199383771.003.0003.
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At Stanford University, a long-standing tradition is for undergraduate students to identify themselves as “techies” or “fuzzies.” Techie students study math, engineering, physics, biology, and related fields in the natural sciences, and most of their coursework revolves around solving problem sets. Fuzzy students study art, history, communications, and other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, and most of their coursework involves writing term papers. When asked to explain the difference between the two, one student offered a very simple, quotidian explanation: Techies study questions that have right or wrong answers, while fuzzies study questions where acceptable answers can be multiple and ambiguous. While the techie/fuzzy distinction is largely intended to be humorous, there is nonetheless something to it; it reflects multiple historical cleavages: fact versus opinion, natural versus social world, and science versus non-science. The existence of scientific and technological controversies illustrates the woeful inadequacy of these dualistic categories for two reasons. First, the acquisition of scientific knowledge is not a simple matter of factfinding, whereby scientists go out and discover The Truth, straight-forwardly reading off of nature. Scientific knowledge reflects the historical, political, economic, cultural, and institutional environments in which it is embedded (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Pinch and Bijker 1984). Favored methods of investigation, what levels of uncertainty are acceptable, and error type preferences (false positive versus false negative), among other factors that shape how science is done, reflect human history and values. In this context, science and technology are neither above nor immune from controversy. Second, social problems that are intrinsically related to certain technologies (for instance, the environmental consequences of fossil-based energy production) are arguably becoming increasingly acute. In the face of these kinds of challenges, it is no longer sufficient for scientific and technological controversies to be left solely in the hands of scientists and other experts. Scientific claims are becoming increasingly politicized by citizen groups, public officials, and others, many of whom are actively challenging traditional notions of what constitutes valid and acceptable knowledge. The “black box” of scientific expertise has been cracked open, and it is only likely to open wider.
Rapports d'organisations sur le sujet "Right and left (Political science) – Netherlands"
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Brummel, Lars. Referendums, for Populists Only ? Why Populist Parties Favour Referendums and How Other Parties Respond. Association Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik, décembre 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.53099/ntkd4302.
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Populists are generally known as supporters of referendums and several populist parties have promoted direct democracy in recent years. To deepen our understanding of the populism referendum link, this study analyses how populist parties in Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands defend a greater use of referendums and how their non-populist counterparts respond to this populist call for referendums. An analysis of election manifestos shows that populist parties justify their referendum support by characterizing referendums as a purely democratic ideal, by presenting it as an alternative to decision-making by ‘bad’ political elites or by promoting referendums as a tool to realise their preferred policy decisions. Populist referendum support is thus related to people-centrism and ant-elitism, as elements of a populist ideology, but also to strategic considerations. These lines of argument are used by both populists on the right and the left, but anti-elitism is particularly prominent in manifestos of radical rightwing populist parties. Populists are not the only supporters of direct democracy – however, there is no evidence that non-populist parties did become more favourable towards referendums to adapt to the populist call for a greater referendum use.