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1
Maslova, Elena. « PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ITALY 2022 : LEADERS AND IDEAS ». Scientific and Analytical Herald of IE RAS 29, no 5 (31 octobre 2022) : 55–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran520225562.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The paper attempts to give an idea of the Italian political scene on the eve and after the extraordinary parliamentary elections in September 2022. The causes of the political crisis are analyzed and it is pointed out that by the level of political tension and intensity the elections in 2022 can be compared with the first parliamentary elections in the country in 1948. In the course of the election campaign political opponents of the centre-right coalition used the tools of labeling, the main of which were «friends of Putin», «populist», «neofascist». The article analyses these discursive techniques, and concludes that the left-wing forces in modern Italy, first of all the Democratic Party, are in a crisis, both in terms of ideology and leadership. The programme of the centre-right coalition and its ideas are considered separately; it is pointed out that the document contains a lot of «left» proposals related to the social support of citizens. The author analyses the reasons for the victory of the centre-right coalition and, in particular, of G. Meloni, highlighting the high social demand for change as the main factor behind the victory of the «Brothers of Italy».
2
Maslova, Elena. « PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ITALY 2022 : LEADERS AND IDEAS ». Scientific and Analytical Herald of IE RAS 29, no 5 (31 octobre 2022) : 55–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran520225563.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The paper attempts to give an idea of the Italian political scene on the eve and after the extraordinary parliamentary elections in September 2022. The causes of the political crisis are analyzed and it is pointed out that by the level of political tension and intensity the elections in 2022 can be compared with the first parliamentary elections in the country in 1948. In the course of the election campaign political opponents of the centre-right coalition used the tools of labeling, the main of which were «friends of Putin», «populist», «neofascist». The article analyses these discursive techniques, and concludes that the left-wing forces in modern Italy, first of all the Democratic Party, are in a crisis, both in terms of ideology and leadership. The programme of the centre-right coalition and its ideas are considered separately; it is pointed out that the document contains a lot of «left» proposals related to the social support of citizens. The author analyses the reasons for the victory of the centre-right coalition and, in particular, of G. Meloni, highlighting the high social demand for change as the main factor behind the victory of the «Brothers of Italy».
3
Gianfreda, Stella. « Politicization of the refugee crisis ? : a content analysis of parliamentary debates in Italy, the UK, and the EU ». Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 48, no 1 (17 octobre 2017) : 85–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2017.20.
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This paper draws on the literature on party competition and issue ownership to assess whether political membership on the right-left dimension explains party stances on migration. While some scholars argue that on this issue a clear distinction between left and right exists, some more recent quantitative and fine-grained analyses show a more nuanced picture. According to them, a clear difference in narratives exists only when the salience of the issue is high, under pressure of the electoral success of a far-right party or about specific policy issues. This paper further investigates this aspect in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis. It looks at the positions held by the main centre-left, centre-right, Radical Right, and Populist Parties in the Italian, British, and European Parliaments. The content analysis shows that centre-left parties frame the refugee crisis mainly as a humanitarian emergency and held pro-European Union (EU) positions, while centre-right parties differ substantially between Italy and the United Kingdom. Both radical right and Populist Parties exploit the political-opportunity offered by the refugee crisis to foster their anti-establishment claims. Moreover, Radical Right Populist Parties stress the need to secure external borders and restore national sovereignty, against further integration. At the EU level, left- and right-wing groups (Socialist and Democrats Party, European Conservatives and Reformists Party, and European People’s Party) are cohesive, while the populist group (European Freedom and Direct Democracy Party) is not. This paper adds on the academic debate on the refugee crisis, showing how the immigration issue can impact on domestic and European party politics, challenging party identities and alliances.
4
Fossati, Fabio. « Italy and European Union enlargement : A comparative analysis of left and right governments ». Modern Italy 13, no 2 (mai 2008) : 187–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13532940801962140.
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This article explores the attitudes of Italy's ruling and opposition parties towards the European Union (EU) enlargement process in Central and Eastern Europe. It shows that during both left (1996–2001) and right (2001–2006) governments there was a convergence between conservative and constructivist political platforms. In the first case, support for the Balkan countries (i.e., Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) and Turkey was based on their economic (penetration of Italian firms) and political (stabilisation of a difficult area) potential. In the second case, support was justified for both economic (i.e., redistributive policy towards Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) and cultural (i.e., pursuing a ‘plural’ Europe by including Turkey) reasons. Some liberal criticism based on Turkey's partial compliance with the political requirements for accession were raised by individual politicians of moderate right and left parties, and cultural biases against Islamic Turkey were stressed by the Lega Nord. Neither view, however, had a significant impact on the decision-making process.
5
Alekseenkova, E. S. « Transformation of Right-Wing Populism in Italy in 2018−2022 : From Sovereignism to Patriotism ». Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 92, S7 (décembre 2022) : S667—S674. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s1019331622130123.
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Abstract The transformation of the discourse of right-wing populist parties in Italy from 2018 to 2022 is considered. Based on analysis of the discourse of the programs and electoral rhetoric of the parties the Brothers of Italy, the League, and Forward Italy, the author concludes that Italian right-wing populism is becoming more moderate, replacing the concepts of sovereignism with “patriotism and conservatism” and rejecting Euroscepticism. Although nationalism is still characteristic of the right-wing parties in Italy, it is changing: a legalist approach to migrants is gradually replacing the ethnocultural and socioeconomic approaches. Populism remains the basic strategy of the right-wing parties, but the role of the main “enemy” of the Italian people is shifting from the European bureaucracy to the domestic mainstream Center–Left (i.e., the Democratic Party). The authoritarianism of the right-wing populists has undergone the least change in terms of ideological content between 2018 and 2022, but its importance has increased with the growing public demand for political stability and the increasing personalization of politics. This article contributes to the study of the phenomenon of right-wing populism.
6
Ridolfi, Maurizio. « "Al di lŕ della destra e della sinistra" ? Tradizioni e culture politiche nell'Italia repubblicana ». MEMORIA E RICERCA, no 41 (février 2013) : 37–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/mer2012-041004.
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A sharp contrast between left and right arose in Italy especially after World War Two, as a legacy of the conflict between fascism and anti-fascism, which had developed between the two wars. However, at this cleavage was added the majority and hegemonic centre pole represented by Christian Democracy (both anti-fascist than anti-communist), which would make more mobile the identity boundaries and more marked the dissonances between the reality of political-administrative life and the self-representation of left and right widespread cultures. A history of politics truly attentive to the social and cultural factors, contribute to overcome the dissociations between a limited political representation of an ungraspable right and the wider circulation of languages and images of identity (in the moderate and populist press, in the youth field, in the silent majority).
7
Urso, Ornella. « The politicization of immigration in Italy. Who frames the issue, when and how ». Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 48, no 3 (10 août 2018) : 365–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2018.16.
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AbstractItaly is one of the most representative ‘new immigration countries.’ Between the 1980s and the 1990s, it became a major country of destination for immigrants coming from Asia, Middle East, and North Africa. As a result, since the mid-90s, immigration has gained salience within the Italian political debate. Building on the existing literature on agenda-setting and framing studies, this article studies the evolution of the immigration issue in Italy over the last two decades. It focuses on the framing and, more specifically, the position political actors tend to adopt when debating on immigration. In particular, the main research questions are: to what extent is the framing of immigration associated with the traditional left vs. right spectrum? Do incumbent political parties tend to adopt a different position toward immigration than opposition parties? This article analyses party competition dynamics over the immigration issue in Italy from 1995 to 2011. The author carried out a political-claim analysis of articles from two Italian national daily newspapers. Findings show that immigration is more a positional issue than a valence one. Political actors’ positions towards migration appear to be anchored to the old left vs. right dimension of the political conflict. This demonstrates that parties’ engagement within the political conflict goes beyond electoral campaigns. Finally, being in government seems to play a crucial role in ‘softening’ the way party actors frame immigration, in terms of both the arguments used and the pro- or anti-immigration positions adopted.
8
Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. « International Aid to Southern Europe in the Early Postwar Period ». ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 656, no 1 (9 octobre 2014) : 22–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716214543897.
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After World War II, Greece and Italy experienced a Left-Right political polarization and a repetition of earlier patterns of political patronage. Both countries received international aid, including emergency relief, interim loans, and Marshall Plan funds. By the beginning of the 1950s, Italy had progressed from stabilization to reconstruction and then to development, while Greece progressed belatedly with reconstruction and did not achieve stabilization until after the end of the Marshall Plan. The different outcomes are explained by institutional legacies and historical conjunctures, such as the disastrous Greek Civil War; the tradition of developmental Italian state agencies, such as prewar Italy’s Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), a state-controlled conglomerate, which Greece lacked; government instability, which prior to 1950 had tormented Greece more than Italy; distrust from the Greek middle and upper classes of the political and administrative elites; and the prevalence of an economic culture fostering industrialization in Italy, which emerged only belatedly in Greece.
9
Alekseenkova, Elena. « COVID-19 AND POLITICAL PROCESS IN ITALY IN 2021 ». Scientific and Analytical Herald of IE RAS 24, no 6 (31 décembre 2021) : 112–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran62021112121.
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The paper examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the political process in Italy in 2021. The author analyzes the change of government in February 2021 and the country’s economic recovery and resilience plan, as well as changes in the party-political landscape that occurred in the second year of the pandemic. The study showed that there is an increase in the factors of personalization of power and the strengthening of the executive branch and stagnation of the party landscape in the absence of a clear leader among political forces. The center-right and center-left coalitions are comparable in terms of citizens’ support, but at the same time the level of frustration is growing, reflecting the dissatisfaction of citizens with any of the parties. We can say that there is a certain feeling of the lack of alternative to the proposed development model and the absence of the very request for an alternative. Against this background, the ideas of sovranism so popular recently, it seems, no longer have any prospects.
10
Pasieka, Agnieszka. « Theft of Gramsci ? On the radical right, radical left, and common sense ». Dialectical Anthropology 46, no 4 (décembre 2022) : 417–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10624-022-09681-6.
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AbstractDrawing on ethnographic research with radical right-wing activists in Italy and Poland, my article reflects on the ways in which the Gramscian framework may enhance our understanding of the present-day political landscape. Gramsci’s role in the article is threefold. First, since he was a keen observer of fascist developments, I relate his observations on fascism and inquire into their relevance for understanding the rise of the far right today. Second, I explore the agendas of the movements I studied through the Gramscian lens. Inspired by the special issue’s editors, I examine the extent to which Gramsci’s concept of “common sense” is helpful for analyzing contemporary far-right activism. Third, I relate my own ethnographic observation to analyses of a broader terrain of far-right politics to shed light on the phenomenon of “far-right Gramscianism.” Bringing together all these observations on the radical right, “common sense” and Gramsci’s legacy, I reflect on the complex interrelationship between the radical right and the radical left.
11
Rosta, Miklós, et László Tóth. « Is there a demand for autocracies in Europe ? Comparing the attitudes of Hungarian and Italian university students toward liberal democratic values inspired by János Kornai ». Public Choice 187, no 1-2 (15 février 2021) : 217–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00877-y.
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AbstractIn the European Union right-wing and left-wing populist parties are increasingly becoming stronger. Meanwhile in Central and Eastern Europe autocracies are emerging and becoming stabilized. Italy and Hungary are two notable examples of these processes. Italy is the only country in Western Europe where a coalition of purely populist parties won an election, while Hungary has the most mature autocracy in the European Union. By using survey methodology, we examined the preferences of Hungarian and Italian students regarding the values of liberal democracy. We seek answers to the questions whether there are any significant differences between the proportion of Hungarian students and Italian students who identify themselves with the values of liberal democracy and which of these values of liberal democracy they consider to be protected values. Based on our results, we claim that students from both countries are more likely to support liberal democratic values than to support either right-wing or left-wing populist values, even if the distributions of the two groups differ significantly. We found that Italian students adhere more strongly to liberal democratic values, while Hungarians are more open to left-wing and right-wing populism. Our results confirm that in Hungary, because of the values that many people hold, conditions are conducive for establishing a sustainable autocracy, while in Italy, the demand for such a system is much weaker.
12
Bellucci, Paolo. « Changing Models of Electoral Choice in Italy ». Modern Italy 12, no 1 (février 2007) : 55–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13532940601134841.
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Scholars argue that the realignment of the electorate which took place with the transition to the so-called Italian Second Republic followed mainly a traditional partisan pattern, with electors of the former centre ruling parties (the Christian Democrats and the Socialists) turning to vote for the new centre and right parties (Forza Italia and the National Alliance), while left-wing voters continued to hold their traditional allegiance. Behind this apparent electoral turmoil there would appear to be little in the way of voter mobility. Such a reading implies continuity in the motivations of voters who behaved according to their previous ‘personal electoral history’ and in accordance with their sub-cultural political identification. Here an alternative interpretation is proposed in which it is argued that as a result of the 1994 realignment elections voters who deserted the centre (the heirs of the Christian Democrats) did so also according to their class interest and in response to the policy proposal of the centre-right. Since that time a ‘valence model’ of electoral behaviour has begun to emerge where ‘reasoning voters’ react to the performance of the incumbent, and voting also depends on an assessment of leadership, policy performance and issues.
13
Arbatova, N. « The Evolution of the Phenomenon of Terrorism in Italy ». World Economy and International Relations 66, no 9 (2022) : 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2022-66-9-29-38.
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European security today faces new challenges that are not directly related to military force. Among them, first of all, is the threat of terrorism, which has both internal and external dimensions. The article is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of terrorism in the European Union on the example of Italy. The author analyses four types of this threat posed by terrorists according to their political motivation: separatism, left- and right-wing domestic political terrorism, and Islamist terrorism. Italian law distinguishes between the concepts of terrorism, radicalism and subversion. According to the 2015 law, terrorism is defined as conduct that, by its nature or context, may cause serious harm to a country or an international organization. It is aimed at intimidating the population or forcing the State or international organizations to commit or refuse to commit any action. The evolution of the phenomenon of terrorism in Italy is of particular interest because it reflects both general and specific features of the terrorist threat in Europe. From the late 1960s to the 1970s and until the beginning of the 1980s, Italian society had been facing the most brutal manifestations of terrorism. During this period, terrorism evolved from ideological far-right extremism to ultra-left revolutionary extremism, which turns to violence against the State and its servants, calling for a communist transformation of society. By the end of the 1980s, the terrorist threat in Italy had been significantly reduced. The decline in terrorist activity in the 1980s is explained, in addition to the increased effectiveness of the intelligence services and the police, by the decline in political activity in Italy after the upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s. The author draws attention to one of the paradoxes of Islamist terrorism in Italy. Despite the fact that Italy bears the main flow of migration waves that can carry the threat of terrorism to Europe, the country has so far been spared from the large-scale threat of such kind. The example of Italy is also important because today the country’s leadership is the most effective in counterterrorism in comparison with other EU states.
14
Drake, Richard. « Terrorism and the Decline of Italian Communism : Domestic and International Dimensions ». Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no 2 (avril 2010) : 110–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2010.12.2.110.
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This essay looks at two recent Italian books about the evolution of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Drawing on archival materials, the books trace the conflict between the radicals and the reformers within the PCI's ranks, a conflict that gave way to violent splinter groups that regarded the PCI as too staid and conciliatory. As the far left took a violent turn in Italy in the late 1960s, it paved the way for the spasm of grisly far-left and far-right terrorism in Italy in the 1970s and early 1980s. The books lend weight to the view that the PCI, through its exaltation of Communist revolution and its demonization of the Christian Democratic establishment, facilitated the emergence of extremist groups that perpetrated more than 8,400 terrorist attacks in the latter half of the 1970s.
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Mete, Vittorio. « New wine in old bottles ? Italy's divided political culture ». Modern Italy 13, no 4 (novembre 2008) : 481–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13532940802300274.
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Italians and politics, edited by Marco MaraffiBologna, Il Mulino, 2007332 pp., €26.00 (paperback), ISBN-978-88-15-11491-4Where is the victory? Voting in 2006, described by Italians, edited by ITANESBologna, Il Mulino, 2006241 pp., €13.00 (paperback), ISBN-88-15-11486-6Left and right: Psychological roots of political differences, edited by ITANESBologna, Il Mulino, 2006182 pp., €12.00 (paperback), ISBN-88-15-10911-0‘Incomplete’ is the adjective usually used to qualify the Italian political transition that started in the early 1990s. Fifteen years is a long time in politics: as has been noted (Calise 2006, 3), political episodes that have left an indelible mark on history, such as the Nazi regime or the Napoleonic campaigns, had a similar duration. The political elections held in Spring 2006, however, showed that Italy was still not out of the woods, with a centre-left coalition prevailing over the centre-right by less than 30,000 votes in the Chamber of Deputies, while the centre-right won the larger number of Senate votes, but gained fewer seats because of the bizarre electoral system, which was forcibly introduced three months before the election. The division of seats faithfully echoed the division of the electorate into two equal parts – a division that had existed since 2001, but had been obscured by the electoral system and the mechanics of coalition formation (D'Alimonte and Vassallo 2006, p. 28). The election gave rise to two broad coalitions, both very diverse internally, and a government paralysed by the narrowness of its majority in the Senate. If it is true that Italy can now consider itself a solidly bipolar system – in fact more so than the United Kingdom, which is frequently quoted as an ideal model – it is also true that the best description of our party system is that of “fragmented bipolarism” (D'Alimonte & Vassallo 2006, 19). This is eloquently illustrated by the fall of the Prodi Government in January 2008 and the resulting record brevity of the XVth legislature, which lasted less than two years. Some 15 years on from restructuring the party system, Italian politics has not moved from the starting line, condemned to highly fragmented politics and party systems that result in instability, ungovernability and inability to reach decisions.
16
Wolff, Elisabetta Cassina. « The meaning and role of the concepts of democracy and corporatism in Italian neo-fascist ideology (1945–1953) ». Modern Italy 16, no 3 (août 2011) : 295–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13532944.2010.524887.
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While caution, tactics and compromise characterised the political practice of the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement in post-war Italy, a section of the Italian press took a less guarded approach to the 20-year regime (Fascism) and to fascism as a political idea (fascism). A lively debate began immediately after the death of Mussolini; Italians sympathetic to fascism opposed the new Italian republican settlement and their opinions were freely expressed in newspapers and magazines. Neo-fascism in Italy was represented by three main ideological currents (left-wing, moderate and right-wing), and this article gives an account of the different views of the issues of democracy and corporatism that were held by fascist loyalists. An extensive number of articles published in the period 1945–1953 are used as primary sources.
17
Bosi, Lorenzo, Anna Lavizzari et Stefania Voli. « Representation of Youth in the Public Debate in Greece, Italy, and Spain : Does the Political Leaning of Newspapers Have Any Effect ? » American Behavioral Scientist 64, no 5 (8 novembre 2019) : 620–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764219885437.
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Recent scientific studies have reached the near-unanimous conclusion that the media produce a stereotypical representation of young people. However, research in this area has not often scrutinized whether there are any significant differences in the coverage of the subject matter. Notably, this article examines whether the political leaning of newspapers has any impact on the levels of plurality in the news coverage of youth. On the basis of political claim analyses of six newspapers from three countries (Greece, Italy, and Spain), we find that the coverage of youth in the public debate is very similar if we compare center-right to center-left newspapers. This suggests that the social construction of the concept of youth dominates in the adult world, regardless of any political differences. Nonetheless, differences emerge when young people are given the opportunity to speak for themselves; center-left newspapers are more likely to recognize the agency of, and give a voice to, young people.
18
Fabbrini, Sergio. « Political and institutional constraints on structural reforms : interpreting the Italian experience ». Modern Italy 18, no 4 (novembre 2013) : 423–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13532944.2013.801665.
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During 2011 Italy reached the verge of a financial default because of its huge public debt. Neither the centre-right nor the centre-left governments that alternated in power in the 2000s were able to introduce the reforms necessary for reducing the debt and promoting growth. The impotence of the government became incompatible with the requirements of the country's continued presence in the eurozone. In November 2011, under the pressure of financial markets and eurozone institutions and leaders, the incumbent centre-right government was obliged to resign, and was substituted by a government composed of technocrats and experts, the Monti government. This lasted until December 2012 and was supported in parliament by a cross-partisan coalition; it was able to introduce some of the structural reforms required, because of the threat of default but also because it did not need to seek the electoral support of powerful constituencies. This article advances an interpretation of the Italian crisis of November 2011, identifying the political and institutional structures and the specific political conditions that fostered a policy stalemate in the country in the 2000s and whose persistence makes the continuation of reforms after the February 2013 elections uncertain.
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Agosti, Aldo. « Eric Hobsbawm, un maestro e un amico ». PASSATO E PRESENTE, no 88 (février 2013) : 5–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/pass2013-088001.
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There are many reasons why Eric Hobsbawm has become arguably the most respected historian in the world, recognised if not endorsed on the political right as well as on the left, and one of the few historians of any era to enjoy genuine national and world renown. He was unrivalled both in his knowledge of historic detail and in his extraordinary powers of synthesis, and endowed with an uncommon facility of expression, a lively style and an ability to synthesize complex events, that made his works known in wide circles of non-specialists. At the same time, his widening fame as a historian was accompanied by a growing reputation as a sharp commentator of his times. Till the end he has been remained loyal to a critical but uncompromising interpretation of Marxism, which he used to read the developments of the current economic crisis. One of the first to have discovered Gramsci outside Italy, from the 1970s onward Hobsbawm, who never refused his imprint as an antifascist turned into a Communist, claimed to have become a "spiritual member" of the Italian Communist Party. His influence on the renewal of historical studies in Italy has been remarkable, and left an important mark also in «Passato e presente».
20
Camerin, Federico. « Regenerating Former Military Sites in Italy. The Dichotomy between ‘Profit-Driven Spaces’ and ‘Urban Commons’ ». Global Jurist 21, no 3 (1 octobre 2021) : 497–523. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/gj-2021-0075.
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Abstract Within the last decades, the reorganisation of the Armed Force left many voids in the territories. Being located in highly lucrative and desirable locations, former military sites can be redeveloped into either profit-driven spaces or proper urban commons. This paper focuses the attention on the Italian case and scrutinises former military barracks in the dichotomies between the generation of profit-driven spaces and urban commons. Also, the analysis questions the actual role of these voids in guaranteeing the right to the city, especially in times of severe shortage of public resources to undertake urban regeneration processes.
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Pirro, Andrea LP, Paul Taggart et Stijn van Kessel. « The populist politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis : Comparative conclusions ». Politics 38, no 3 (4 juillet 2018) : 378–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263395718784704.
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This article offers comparative findings of the nature of populist Euroscepticism in political parties in contemporary Europe in the face of the Great Recession, migrant crisis, and Brexit. Drawing on case studies included in the Special Issue on France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the article presents summary cross-national data on the positions of parties, the relative importance of the crisis, the framing of Euroscepticism, and the impact of Euroscepticism in different country cases. We use this data to conclude that there are important differences between left- and right-wing variants of populist Euroscepticism, and that although there is diversity across the cases, there is an overall picture of resilience against populist Euroscepticism.
22
Ceron, Andrea. « Changing politics, changing language ». Journal of Language and Politics 14, no 4 (7 décembre 2015) : 528–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlp.14.4.03cer.
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This paper examines the changes in political language that occurred after 1989 in Italy and focuses on textual documents drafted by intra-party subgroups between 1946 and 2010 that were related to the internal debates of Italian political parties. These documents, which are addressed to party members and activists rather than the wider public, have been analyzed through quantitative text analysis of word frequencies. The results confirm that a few relevant changes occurred that involve the lexicon, tone, and content of messages. However, concepts such as left and right are still relevant, and we observed neither a strong decline in the use of ideological terms nor a wider usage of populist words. Despite the growing personalization of politics, the main political leaders are not frequently mentioned, with two exceptions: Prodi and Berlusconi. Overall, there is a distance between intra-party politics and the logic of entertainment.
23
Statham, Paul, et Ruud Koopmans. « Political party contestation over Europe in the mass media : who criticizes Europe, how, and why ? » European Political Science Review 1, no 3 (novembre 2009) : 435–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773909990154.
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This study examines political party contestation over Europe, its relationship to the left/right cleavage, and the nature and emergence of Euroscepticism. The analysis is based on a large original sample of parties’ claims systematically drawn from political discourses in the mass media in seven countries: Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. It addresses questions concerning parties’ mobilized criticisms of European integration and the European Union (EU), specifically: their degree and form; their location among party families and within party systems; cross-national and diachronic trends; their substantive issue contents; whether their ‘Euro-criticism’ is more tactical or ideological; whether claims construct a cleavage; and their potential for transforming party politics. Findings show that a party’s country of origin has little explanatory power, once differences between compositions of party systems are accounted for. Also governing parties are significantly more likely to be pro-European, regardless of party-type. Regional party representatives, by contrast, are significantly more likely to be ‘Euro-critical’. Overall, we find a lop-sided ‘inverted U’ on the right of the political spectrum, but this is generated entirely by the significant, committed Euroscepticism of the British Conservatives andSchweizerische Volkspartei. There is relatively little evidence for Euroscepticism elsewhere at the core, where pro-Europeanism persists. Finally, parties’ Euro-criticism from the periphery mostly constructs substantive political and economic critiques of European integration and the EU, and is not reducible to strategic anti-systemic challenges.
24
della Porta, Donatella. « On Violence and Repression : A Relational Approach (TheGovernment and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Memorial Lecture, 2013) ». Government and Opposition 49, no 2 (13 février 2014) : 159–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.47.
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Oppositional violence and repression are closely related. In fact, repression often produces an escalation of violence rather than controlling it. Bridging social movement studies and research on violence, the article uses a small-N, most-different research design to analyse the working of a specific mechanism at the onset of different types of political violence: escalating policing. In particular, it indicates specific causal mechanisms, related to interactions between social movements and the state, which create the conditions for some splinter groups to move underground. In order to compare left-wing, right-wing, ethno-national and religious violence, the article presents empirical references to the author's own empirical research on Italy and the Basque Country as well as a secondary analysis of the conflicts that preceded the rise of al-Qaeda.
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Lyons, Ben, Vittorio Mérola, Jason Reifler et Florian Stoeckel. « How Politics Shape Views Toward Fact-Checking : Evidence from Six European Countries ». International Journal of Press/Politics 25, no 3 (juillet 2020) : 469–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1940161220921732.
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Fact-checking has spread internationally, in part to confront the rise of digital disinformation campaigns. American studies suggests ideological asymmetry in attitudes toward fact-checking, as well as greater acceptance of the practice among those more interested in and knowledgeable about politics. We examine attitudes toward fact-checking across six European counties to put these findings in a broader context ( N = 6,067). We find greater familiarity with and acceptance of fact-checking in Northern Europe (Sweden and Germany) than elsewhere (Italy, Spain, France, and Poland). We further find two dimensions of political antipathy: a left–right dimension and an “anti-elite” dimension (including dissatisfaction with democracy and negative feelings toward the European Union), the latter of which more consistently predicts negative feelings toward fact-checkers in the countries examined. Our findings demonstrate that despite general acceptance of the movement, significant political divides remain. Those less likely to trust fact-checkers could be more vulnerable to disinformation targeting these divides, leading to a spiral of cynicism.
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Ceron, Andrea, Sergio Splendore, Thomas Hanitzsch et Neil Thurman. « Journalists and Editors : Political Proximity as Determinant of Career and Autonomy ». International Journal of Press/Politics 24, no 4 (17 juillet 2019) : 487–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1940161219862489.
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Political economy suggests that media owners try to influence the process of media production by providing career incentives to like-minded journalists and adjusting the level of professional autonomy granted to them. Accordingly, we analyze whether the political distance between editors and journalists (i.e., reporters) affects the careers of journalists in terms of rank and salary, as well as their perceived professional autonomy. We hypothesize that editors reward and allow freedom to journalists whose political viewpoints coincide more precisely with their own. Political proximity to editors should lead to a better salary and rank for reporters and to a stronger perception of editorial autonomy among reporters. We tested our hypotheses through statistical analysis using data from the Worlds of Journalism Study. We analyzed the answers of 3,087 journalists interviewed between 2012 and 2016 in six European countries: Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The results support our hypotheses. The analysis reveals a polarization of media outlet editors, and robust results were achieved via a measure of political proximity that takes into account the particular influence of left-leaning and right-leaning editors. Such partisan leaning, however, seems less relevant in countries belonging to Hallin and Mancini’s Atlantic model.
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Terentiev, Kirill. « Issue of Anti-Semitism in the Relationship between Italy and the Holy See During the Pontificate of Pius XI ». Contemporary Europe 105, no 5 (31 octobre 2021) : 182–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/soveurope52021182189.
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In the first half of the 20thcentury, with the growth of anti-semitic sentiments, the ItaloVatican agenda was supplemented by the so-called Jewish question, which affected the position of the community of this ancient race in Europe, in particular Italy. The fascist leadership and the Catholic clergy perceived the situation around Italian Jews each in its own way: they had different perceptions of the representatives of this ethnic minority and, therefore, different approaches to a dialogue with them. However, Italy and the Vatican were allied at least by the geographic space and the citizens living within it. The Church, far more alarmed by political extremism on the left than on the right, made friendly overtures toward Mussolini’s regime. In spite of this in 1938, Mussolini, without regard to the aspirations of the Holy See, approved openly discriminatory laws against Jews, which looked more and more like a copy of Hitler's policy. The article attempts to explore Jewish issues in the context of a cooperation between the fascist regime and the clerical elite of the Roman Catholic Church in order to determine the place and role of this topic in the relationship of the secular and ecclesiastical authorities of that period.
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Olmastroni, Francesco. « The alleged consensus : Italian elites and publics on foreign policy ». Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 47, no 2 (juillet 2017) : 149–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2017.8.
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The article compares the way Italian (governmental and political) elites and (organized and general) publics perceive the international system and conceive of the role of Italy in it by using anad hocsurvey conducted specifically for this study. In order to establish whether a horizontal (left-right) and vertical (top-down) consensus exists on foreign policy, special attention has been paid to divergence and convergence patterns in terms of threat perception, feelings towards the (American and European) allies, support for the main institutional mechanisms of coordination and cooperation, and willingness to use military power to defend the constituted order and the national interest, while controlling for the position and level of action of each actor within the foreign policy-making process as well as her or his ideological orientation. While tracing elites’ and publics’ attitudes towards a wide range of foreign policy and security issues, the article reveals the effect of ideological and situational factors on the strategic preferences of national policy-makers and public opinion. In doing this, it contributes to define both the substance and boundaries of the alleged consensus, based on shared norms and historical legacies, supposedly overcoming socio-economic and political cleavages in matters of foreign policy.
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Hahm, S. D. « The Political Economy of Deficit Spending : A Cross Comparison of Industrialized Democracies, 1955–90 ». Environment and Planning C : Government and Policy 14, no 2 (juin 1996) : 227–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c140227.
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The postwar deficit experiences of nine industrialized democracies are analyzed. The relative importance of three of the primary influences on a country's deficit which have been suggested in the literature: (1) the state of the country's economy, (2) the ‘left – right’ ideology of the party in power, and (3) the strength of the party in power (as advanced by Roubini and Sachs) are examined. The author also introduces and tests the importance of an additional potential influence based on institutional structure in which presidential, ‘stable’ parliamentary, and ‘unstable’ parliamentary systems are seen to provide different incentives regarding the deficit for key political actors. The arguments are tested on a pooled time-series cross-sectional data set involving two presidential systems (France and the United States), four relatively stable parliamentary systems (Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom), and three relatively unstable parliamentary systems (Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands). The findings include: (a) strong effects of the state of a nation's economy on its deficit; (b) little systematic relationship between the ideology of the party in power and its deficit; and (c) the observation that increased control of the government leads to lower deficits in unstable parliamentary systems but larger deficits in presidential systems, with stable parliamentary systems serving as an intermediate case. The findings are compared both with the author's theoretical refinement and with recent theoretical and empirical work by Roubini and Sachs.
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Mammone, Andrea. « A discussion on Nel cantiere della memoria. Fascismo, Resistenza, Shoah, Foibe, by Filippo Focardi, Rome, Viella, 2020. With Valeria Galimi, Philip Cooke and Filippo Focardi ». Modern Italy 28, no 1 (4 janvier 2023) : 66–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mit.2022.59.
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The centenary of the March on Rome has prompted Modern Italy's Contexts and Debates section to focus on the public uses of history in reference to interwar Fascism. We are looking into the ‘Past, Present, and Future of the Italian Memory of Fascism’, to borrow the title of Guido Bartolini's interviews that were published in our issue 27 (4), 2022. While commemorations and anniversaries shouldn't inherently influence academic research agendas, a broader understanding of public memory can help us to understand the current political mood in Italy. For example, it can explain why the centennial and other comparable ‘fascist’ anniversaries now have little meaning for most of the Italian public and are scarcely addressed by politicians. Indeed, most Italians seems to suffer from political amnesia. The condition is so serious that not even a dramatic occurrence such as the victory of the proudly post-fascist Fratelli d'Italia party at the election of September 2022 has proved able to cure it. Happening just a few days before the centenary of the March on Rome, the electoral results were surely expected to elicit a strong reaction by left-wing politicians and intellectuals – perhaps a mass demonstration, like the one that took place in Milan on 25 April 1994, in the aftermath of the first victory of Silvio Berlusconi's right-wing coalition, when another post-fascist party, Alleanza Nazionale, took power. Yet nothing of that sort has happened in 2022. Why?
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Pedersen, Mogens N., Peter Mair et Francis G. Castles. « Left-right political scales ». European Journal of Political Research 31, no 1 (janvier 1997) : 147–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00310.
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Castles, Francis G., Peter Mair et MOGENS N. PEDERSEN. « Left-right political scales ». European Journal of Political Research 31, no 1-2 (février 1997) : 147–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1997.tb00770.x.
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Aydogan, Abdullah, et Jonathan B. Slapin. « Left–right reversed ». Party Politics 21, no 4 (7 juin 2013) : 615–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068813487280.
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Hájek, Lukáš. « Left, Right, Left, Right… Centre : Ideological Position of Andrej Babiš’s ANO ». Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science 24, no 3 (2017) : 275–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/pc2017-3-275.
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Pasquino, Gianfranco. « What Is Right in Italy ? » South European Society and Politics 10, no 2 (juillet 2005) : 177–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608740500134853.
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Milesi, Patrizia. « Moral foundations and voting intention in Italy ». Europe’s Journal of Psychology 13, no 4 (30 novembre 2017) : 667–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v13i4.1391.
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Based on the view of morality proposed by the Moral Foundations Theory, this paper investigates whether voting intention is associated with moral foundation endorsement in not perfectly bipolar electoral contexts. Three studies carried out in Italy from 2010 to 2013, showed that controlling for ideological orientation, moral foundation endorsement is associated with voting intention. In Study 1 and 3, in fictitious and real national elections, intention to vote for right-wing political groups rather than for left-wing rivals was associated with Sanctity, confirming previous results obtained in the U.S. Furthermore, as a function of the specific competing political groups in each of the examined contexts other moral foundations predicted voting intention. In Study 1, Care and Authority predicted voting intention for the major political groups rather than for an autonomist party that aimed at decreasing central government’s fiscal power in favor of fiscal regional autonomy. In Study 3, Loyalty predicted the intention to vote for the major parliamentarian parties rather than for a movement that aimed at capturing disaffection towards traditional politics. In Study 2, at real regional elections, Loyalty predicted voting intention for the incumbent right-wing governor rather than for the challengers and Fairness predicted voting intention for left-wing extra-parliamentarian political groups rather than for the major left-wing party. Thus multiple moral concerns can be associated with voting intention. In fragmented and unstable electoral contexts, at each election the context of the competing political groups may elicit specific moral concerns that can contribute to affect voting intention beyond ideological orientation.
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Trifiletti, Elena, Rossella Falvo, Carla Dazzi et Dora Capozza. « Political orientation and images of the United States in Italy ». Social Behavior and Personality : an international journal 40, no 1 (1 février 2012) : 85–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2012.40.1.85.
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Image theory was used in this study to assess the images that Italian adults with different political ideologies have of the United States. In addition to the ally, barbarian, enemy, and imperialist images, a new image, that of the father, was introduced. It was found that right-wing respondents endorsed the father and ally images of Americans, while left-wing respondents perceived Americans as barbarians. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.
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Kruk, Aleksandra. « German reactions to political changes in Italy after 2016 ». Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej, no 16 (22 février 2023) : 139–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/rie.2022.16.8.
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The article presents the view of German politicians and journalists on the political processes taking place in Italy, mainly concerning electoral rivalry after 2016. Opinions are analyzed on the causes of instability in the Italian political system, which led to early election in 2022, instead of holding it in 2023. After the government crisis, Italy opts for reforms that will reduce the effects of the energy crisis and tensions caused by the migration crisis and the war in Ukraine. Political rivalry in Italy takes place between the political parties that form an extreme right-wing or left-wing coalition. The main opponent of Enrico Letta, Giorgia Meloni from the Brothers of Italy party, calls for the strengthening of the position of the Italian nation and the position of Italy in the European Union.
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Huang, Haifeng. « Signal Left, Turn Right ». Political Research Quarterly 66, no 2 (9 mai 2012) : 292–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912912443874.
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Di Battista, Silvia, Monica Pivetti, Annukka Vainio et Chiara Berti. « Omission and compromise : The sacredness of moral foundations in political groups in Italy ». Europe’s Journal of Psychology 16, no 1 (3 mars 2020) : 128–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v16i1.1887.
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Sacred values are moral foundations that may make public and political debates among groups hard to resolve. A taboo trade-off framework offers the opportunity of measuring the inviolability and the “sacralization” of moral foundations. In this study, moral foundations in a taboo trade-off framework were assessed in a convenience sample of Italians (N = 224) using a new measure to assess sacred values, the Omission as a Compromise on Moral Foundations scale (OC-MF). The OC-MF measures the willingness of individuals to omit moral foundations in exchange for money. It was predicted that Italian center and left-wing participants would be less willing to compromise individualizing moral foundations as opposed to binding ones, and that center and right-wing participants would be less willing to compromise on binding moral foundations than left-wing participants. Confirmatory Factor Analyses demonstrated the two-factor structure of the OC-MF: individualizing and binding. As predicted, Repeated Measures Anova showed that political orientation was related with differential adoptions of moral foundations as sacred values, with center and left-wing participants refusing to compromise more on individualizing than on binding moral foundations. Moreover, left-wing participants were more willing to compromise on binding moral foundations than center and right-wing participants. The OC-MF shows the hypothesized differences between Italian political groups and offers a new understanding of moral reasoning. These findings provide opportunities for improving ideological debates concerning sacred values.
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White, Jonathan. « Left and Right as political resources ». Journal of Political Ideologies 16, no 2 (juin 2011) : 123–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2011.575681.
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Di Battista, Silvia, Monica Pivetti et Chiara Berti. « Moral Foundations, Political Orientation and Religiosity In Italy ». Open Psychology Journal 11, no 1 (24 avril 2018) : 46–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.2174/1874350101811010046.
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Background:This study investigates the role of political orientation and religiosity in Italy for moral foundations endorsement, in light of Haidt and Graham’sMoral Foundations Theory. This theory hypothesizes that moral systems are based on five dimensions (i.e.,Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity) that, in turn, can be grouped into two broader dimensions (BindingandIndividualizing).Objective:We aim to explore and extend the moral foundation assumptions to the Italian context predicting greater endorsement of binding values among Italian Right-wingers as compared with Left-wingers. Given that the relations between politics and Catholic Church have always been intertwined in modern Italy, we also extend this line of inquiry by examining the role of religiosity.Method:Two hundred and forty-eight Italian participants filled out a self-report measure including theMoral Foundations Questionnaires.Results: Individuals attach considerable relevance to individualizing moral foundations rather than to binding moral foundations; conservatives and regular religious attenders attach more relevance to binding moral foundations as compared with individuals with a Left-wing political orientation and less religious people.Conclusions:Our results show that the Italians’ political orientation emerges as a significant element in the differential adoption of moral foundations. Furthermore, considering the historical and fundamental role of the Catholic religion in the Italian society and political life, our results confirm that binding values are particularly valued in groups such as practicing Catholic, where institutions, families, and authorities are valued.
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Picot, Georg, et Irene Menéndez. « Political parties and non-standard employment : an analysis of France, Germany, Italy and Spain ». Socio-Economic Review 17, no 4 (4 mai 2017) : 899–919. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwx016.
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Abstract Recent research has shown that new labour market divides resulting from the rise of non-standard employment (NSE) are reflected in the political preferences of the workers affected. Yet, our knowledge of the stance of political parties on the issue is extremely limited, even descriptively. Do they address NSE in the context of election campaigns—if so, which parties do? How do they frame non-standard work and what policies do they propose? The article tackles these questions by analysing party programmes in four large Continental and Southern Europe states where NSE is widespread and poorly integrated into the systems of social protection. We find that attention to and criticism of non-standard work follows a left–right distribution, but we also find differences within the left: left-libertarian parties address the issue more specifically, while more traditional left-wing parties often link it to other labour concerns.
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Bull, M. J. « Italy : The Crisis of the Left ». Parliamentary Affairs 56, no 1 (1 janvier 2003) : 58–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsg005.
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Ferraresi, Franco. « The Radical Right in Postwar Italy ». Politics & ; Society 16, no 1 (mars 1988) : 71–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/003232928801600103.
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Calingaert, Michael. « Italy's Choice : Reform or Stagnation ». Current History 107, no 707 (1 mars 2008) : 105–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2008.107.707.105.
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Probably the best hope for Italy is … a reorientation of the political landscape, in which the center-right and center-left coalitions shed some of their more troublesome supporters and move toward the center, whether together or not.
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Azzarà, Stefano G. « Left-Wing Nietzscheanism in Italy : Gianni Vattimo ». Rethinking Marxism 30, no 2 (3 avril 2018) : 275–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2018.1502311.
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Lignier, Wilfried, et Julie Pagis. « “Left” vs. “Right” ». American Behavioral Scientist 61, no 2 (février 2017) : 167–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764216689120.
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Mariani, Giorgio. « The Red and the Black : Images of American Indians in the Italian Political Landscape ». Studia Anglica Posnaniensia 53, s1 (1 décembre 2018) : 327–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/stap-2018-0016.
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Abstract In Italy, over the last decades, both the Left and the Right have repeatedly employed American Indians as political icons. The Left and the Right, that is, both adopted and adapted certain real or often outright invented features of American Indian culture and history to promote their own ideas, values, and political campaigns. The essay explores how well-established stereotypes such as those of the ecological Indian, the Indian as victim, and the Indian as fearless warrior, have often surfaced in Italian political discourse. The “Indiani Metropolitani” student movement resorted to “Indian” imagery and concepts to rejuvenate the languages of the old socialist and communist left, whereas the Right has for the most part preferred to brandish the Indian as an image of a bygone past, threatened by modernization and, especially, by immigration. Indians are thus compared to contemporary Europeans, struggling to resist being invaded by “foreign” peoples. While both the Left and the Right reinvent American Indians for their own purposes, and could be said to practice a form of cultural imperialism, the essay argues that the Leftist appropriations of the image of the Indian were always marked by irony. Moreover, while the Right’s Indians can be seen as instances of what Walter Benjamin (1969) described as Fascism’s aestheticization of politics, groups like the Indiani Metropolitani tried to politicize the aesthetics.
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Vinopal, Jiří. « The Empirical Accessibility of Left-Right Political Orientations ». Czech Sociological Review 42, no 1 (1 février 2006) : 129–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.13060/00380288.2006.42.1.08.
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