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1
Williams, John P. « Oh Britannia : Great Britain’s Exit from the European Union and Its Impact on Globalism and Nationalism ». Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 20, no 1-2 (25 mars 2021) : 186–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341590.
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Abstract Globalization unleashed trends such as the free movement of capital, people, and goods; trickle-down economics, and diminished stature of nation-states. While largely embraced by most countries in the WTO, a growing tension within the European Union to push back went largely ignored until recently. Britain’s exit represents such a push back, a rejection of a single banking system, a single budget, and a single political entity. This article examines the historic 2016 British referendum that saw 52 percent of voters favor England leaving the EU. This research serves four purposes: one, to identify the origins of this important referendum as well as the positions of both its supporters and detractors; two, to analyze the fallout of the vote and its impact on other European nations; three, to correlate the results of this referendum and the rise of populist parties on the left and right in the EU; and four, to discuss briefly what the future holds for globalism.
2
Myazin, Nikolai. « Street right-wing radical groups in Great Britain ». Contemporary Europe, no 2 (9 avril 2014) : 81–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/soveurope220148190.
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Hayter, P. D. G. « The Parliamentary Monitoring of Science and Technology in Britain ». Government and Opposition 26, no 2 (1 avril 1991) : 147–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1991.tb01130.x.
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THROUGHOUT THE TWENTIETH CENTURY THE HOUSE OF Lords has been looking for a role. It lost its original power base with the decline in influence of the landed aristocracy and the growth of the party system. At the same time the composition of the House became increasingly difficult to justify; membership based on the accidents of birth no longer seemed an adequate justification for the right to legislate or to overrule the people's elected representatives.The Parliament Act 1911, which took away the Lords' absolute right to veto legislation, promised reform. But nothing happened. In 1968 the Labour government introduced a reform bill. It failed, the victim of assaults from Left and Right in the House of Commons.
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Frazer, Elizabeth. « Citizenship Education : Anti-Political Culture and Political Education in Britain ». Political Studies 48, no 1 (mars 2000) : 88–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00252.
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The British Government white paper ‘Excellence in Schools' and the subsequent report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship Education for Citizenship recommend that schools educate pupils in citizenship and democracy. This recommendation is considered in the context of reasons why there has traditionally been no formal or well articulated political education in schools. Among these reasons a pervasive antipathy to politics and to government is identified as one of the most powerful. This antipathy is expressed from the left and the right wings of the political spectrum, and the ‘critical’ opposition to both, as well as from interests such as those defending professional and personal autonomy. These arguments imply that ‘politics' is optional, not a set of practices and institutions with which individuals must be familiar. It is argued that this proposition cannot be valid.
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Bolshakov, A. « Regulatory Autonomy of Great Britain : Problems and Perspectives ». World Economy and International Relations 65, no 7 (2021) : 71–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-7-71-79.
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Sovereignty does not imply regulatory autonomy. After Brexit, the UK should align its regulatory policy with European norms, if it is interested in close partnership with the EU. Compromises must be made by both sides in order to ensure stability of the partnership. The EU will have to acknowledge the UK’s right to diverge from European rules. Britain will have to partly accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. The structure of dispute settlement mechanism which will be created under the partnership agreement should be a product of a compromise. The present study shows that optimal structure of dispute settlement mechanism must include two different procedures: one for political issues and the other for commercial issues. The central role for the European Court of Justice must be envisaged as a part of politically oriented procedure. There must be no role for the European Court of Justice or any Union to set the pace of political communication. The latter reflects the interest of Great Britain to simplify economic relations, which means that, firstly, disputes are resolved by independent arbiters; secondly, the EU acknowledges the UK’s right to diverge from European regulations; and thirdly, the UK accepts the EU’s right to impose countervailing duties to compensate for adverse effects of divergence on competition. This article also examines the main problems of future British regulatory policy, especially in the field of state aid. Boris Johnson’s government has decided not to form a full-fledged regulatory regime in the area of state aid. Its stance is politically appropriate since Conservative party manifesto for the 2019 general election promised to support local industries without limitations. But that decision created a great deal of economic risk. Firstly, the absence of a domestic subsidy control regulator can cause chaos within regulation system because workable norms and rules can only be sustained by a tight enforcement mechanism. Secondly, the EU can cite lack of subsidy control as an obstacle for British business to have unrestricted access to the European market.
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Nagel, Jack H., et Christopher Wlezien. « Centre-Party Strength and Major-Party Divergence in Britain, 1945–2005 ». British Journal of Political Science 40, no 2 (24 mars 2010) : 279–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123409990111.
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British elections exhibit two patterns contrary to expectations deriving from Duverger and Downs: centrist third parties (Liberals and their successors) win a large vote share; and the two major parties often espouse highly divergent policies. This article explores relations between the Liberal vote and left–right scores of the Labour and Conservative manifestos in the light of two hypotheses: the vacated centre posits that Liberals receive more votes when major parties diverge; the occupied centre proposes a lagged effect in which major parties diverge farther after Liberals do well in the preceding election. Data from elections since 1945 confirm the vacated-centre hypothesis, with Liberals benefiting about equally when the major parties diverge to the left and right, respectively. The results also support the occupied-centre hypothesis for Conservative party positions, but not for Labour’s. After considering explanations for this asymmetry, we identify historical events associated with turning points that our data reveal in post-war British politics.
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Rouban, Luc. « The uncertainty of French political life : the shift to the right and the crisis of representative democracy ». Urgent Problems of Europe, no 3 (2021) : 188–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ape/2021.03.08.
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This article deals with the evolution of French politics between 2017 and 2020. Using systematic surveys, which are conducted by the Center for the Study of French Political Life and in which the author is directly involved he shows that President Macron’s policies have not succeeded in dissipating a democratic crisis affecting trust in political institution. The sanitary crisis had a great impact on the political situation in the country. In France, the crisis associated with Covid-19 was manifested not in the confrontation of political forces, but in the criticism of the government by civil society and in the growth of populism. In this respect, France is very different from Germany, where there is a general public consensus, and Great Britain, where confidence in the system-forming parties remains. Populism has gained ground in French politics and explains, more than any other factor, both the distrust in the Presidency and in government health policies. The rise of left-wing and rightwing populism has not led to the disappearance of the division between left and right. A shift toward right values and State intervention can be observed in French public opinion, changing the electoral game for the 2022 presidential campaign.
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Steenbergen, Marco R., et Tomasz Siczek. « Better the devil you know ? Risk-taking, globalization and populism in Great Britain ». European Union Politics 18, no 1 (29 janvier 2017) : 119–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116516681858.
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Right-wing populist parties in European democracies appeal to citizens’ feelings of uncertainty related to globalization by promoting tough immigration laws and curbing the power of the European Union. This article adds to our understanding of how individuals’ risk propensity relates to support for right-wing populist parties and their ideas in the context of globalization. In particular, by drawing on survey data from the United Kingdom we investigate how this personality trait relates to support for the United Kingdom Independence Party and the vote for a British exit from the European Union. The article explores the complex interplay between risk propensity and right-wing populist appeals by dissecting the direct, indirect and total effects of this trait.
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James, Malcolm, et Sivamohan Valluvan. « Coronavirus Conjuncture : Nationalism and Pandemic States ». Sociology 54, no 6 (décembre 2020) : 1238–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0038038520969114.
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Writing from Britain in the month of May 2020, this essay draws the multiple and conflicting alignments of the Covid-19 moment into conjunctural relief. It seeks to understand how prominent trends of welfarism, collectivism and capitalism are being reorganised across a Left–Right spectrum and to specifically situate nationalism in this general political flux. Focusing on Britain, the essay will explore how an otherwise unsettled ruling Right is reviving a nationalist political imagination through a pandemic consciousness – with an emphasis on the politics of bordering, the spectre of China, reheated civic patriotism, a poetics of survival and melancholic whiteness. The essay will however also speculate about the limits to nationalism amid the imperatives of global pandemics.
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McALEER, G. J. « Red Tory : How Left and Right Have Broken Britain and How We Can Fix It ». Perspectives on Political Science 40, no 1 (13 janvier 2011) : 58–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2011.536739.
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Husbands, Christopher T. « Extreme right‐wing politics in great Britain : The recent marginalisation of the national front ». West European Politics 11, no 2 (avril 1988) : 65–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402388808424682.
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Gest, Justin, Tyler Reny et Jeremy Mayer. « Roots of the Radical Right : Nostalgic Deprivation in the United States and Britain ». Comparative Political Studies 51, no 13 (20 juillet 2017) : 1694–719. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720705.
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Following trends in Europe over the past decade, support for the Radical Right has recently grown more significant in the United States and the United Kingdom. While the United Kingdom has witnessed the rise of Radical Right fringe groups, the United States’ political spectrum has been altered by the Tea Party and the election of Donald Trump. This article asks what predicts White individuals’ support for such groups. In original, representative surveys of White individuals in Great Britain and the United States, we use an innovative technique to measure subjective social, political, and economic status that captures individuals’ perceptions of increasing or decreasing deprivation over time. We then analyze the impact of these deprivation measures on support for the Radical Right among Republicans (Conservatives), Democrats (Labourites), and Independents. We show that nostalgic deprivation among White respondents drives support for the Radical Right in the United Kingdom and the United States.
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Bartels, Larry M. « Political Effects of the Great Recession ». ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 650, no 1 (25 septembre 2013) : 47–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716213496054.
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America’s political response to the Great Recession was surprising to pundits but mostly consistent with patterns familiar to political scientists. Ordinary citizens assessed politicians and policies primarily on the basis of visible evidence of success or failure. Thus, in 2008, the president’s party was punished at the polls for the dismal state of the election-year economy. The successful challenger, Barack Obama, pushed policy significantly to the Left, as Democratic presidents typically do, provoking a predictable “thermostatic” shift to the Right in the public’s policy mood. In 2010, slow economic recovery and public qualms about ideological overreach exacerbated the losses normally suffered by a president’s party in midterm elections. In 2012, Obama was reelected—as incumbents almost always are when their party has held the White House for just four years—thanks in part to a modest but timely upturn in the income growth rate.
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Hendley, Matthew. « Anti-Alienism and the Primrose League : The Externalization of the Postwar Crisis in Great Britain 1918-32 ». Albion 33, no 02 (2001) : 243–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0095139000067120.
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Anti-alienism has frequently been the dark underside of organized patriotic movements in twentieth-century Britain. Love of nation has all too frequently been accompanied by an abstract fear of foreigners or a concrete dislike of alien immigrants residing in Britain. Numerous patriotic leagues have used xenophobia and the supposed threat posed by aliens to define themselves and their Conservative creed. Aliens symbolized “the other,” which held values antithetical to members of the patriotic leagues. These currents have usually become even more pronounced in times of tension and crisis. From the end of the First World War through the 1920s, Britain suffered an enormous economic, social, and political crisis. British unemployment never fell below one million as traditional industries such as coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding, and textiles declined. Electoral reform in 1918 and 1928 quadrupled the size of the electorate, and the British party system fractured with the Liberals divided and Labour becoming the alternative party of government. Industrial unrest was rampant, culminating in the General Strike of 1926. The example of the Russian Revolution inspired many on the Left and appalled their opponents on the Right, while many British Conservatives felt that fundamental aspects of the existing system of capitalism and parliamentary democracy were under challenge.
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Atapin, Evgenii. « Evolution of British Euroscepticism in the Second Half of the 20th Century ». Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, no 5 (décembre 2022) : 171–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2022.5.13.
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Introduction. The United Kingdom is the most prominent example of a Eurosceptic country in the EU. For many years the United Kingdom did not feel a part of Europe. Great Britain was geographically separated from continental Europe and psychologically distant from the European integration movement established by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The British Eurosceptic tradition rested on these geographic and psychological characteristics. Eurosceptic traditions included political, economic, linguistic, cultural and historical aspects that made it difficult for the United Kingdom to accept European integration. Methods and materials. The research methodology is based on narrative and comparative methods. The materials of the study incorporate statements of certain British politicians about attitudes towards European integration, works devoted to the analysis of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom and manifestos of some far-right political parties. Analysis. A study of the attitude to European integration of the two main political forces of Great Britain, namely the Conservative and the Labour Parties, in the second half of the 20th century is carried out. Results. The study results in the creation of a periodization of British Euroscepticism in the second half of the 20th century. Three stages of evolution of British Euroscepticism in the period under study are distinguished: 1) the stage preceding the entry of Great Britain into the European Communities, conventionally called “Labour”; 2) the stage of the United Kingdom’s participation in the “common market”, conventionally called “Conservative”; 3) the stage of Britain’s participation in the European Union, conventionally called “Right-wing populist”. Their chronological framework is established and their main characteristics are given.
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Andreeva, T. « Great Britain and Processes of the European Integration after Euro Crisis ». World Economy and International Relations, no 11 (2014) : 40–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2014-11-40-47.
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The paper is devoted to the Great Britain's stance on the promoting of European integration towards creation of a federal state, after the euro crisis. It focuses on advantages and losses of the British policy in the EU. There are standpoints and views of four main political parties of Great Britain on the country's secession from the EU as well as the results of both local elections and elections for the European Parliament which reveal the rise of the right secessionist and anti-European moods in British society. The author also considers the European nations' present views and attitudes to the European idea. The following questions are answered in the article: Do the anti-European moods exert the crucial and lasting effect on British European policy? Is it better and more profitable for Britain to stay within the organization taking an active part in the integration process, or to withdraw from it?
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Gomez, Raul, et Luis Ramiro. « Beyond the 2008 Great Recession : Economic factors and electoral support for the radical left in Europe ». Party Politics 25, no 3 (10 juillet 2017) : 358–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068817718949.
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One of the most striking political developments occurring during the Great Recession has been the growth of the radical left in some European countries. Though the literature is far from conclusive, it has generally been argued that the economy is not a main reason driving people’s support for non-mainstream parties (particularly the Greens and the radical right). In this article, we contend that this is not the case for radical left parties (RLPs), which despite pursuing other agendas do still compete very strongly on economic issues. Using individual-level data for 56 elections taking place between 1996 and 2016 in 15 European countries, we find a positive effect of unemployment on support for RLPs, and only very weak evidence that this effect depends on voters’ ideology or whether the mainstream (Social Democrats) left is in office. We conclude that unemployment enables the radical left to increase its support regardless of the political context but does not significantly change by itself the ideological makeup of its electorate.
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Amenta, Edwin, Thomas Alan Elliott et Amber C. Tierney. « POLITICAL REFORM AND NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF U.S. MOVEMENTS IN DEPRESSION, RECESSION, AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE* ». Mobilization : An International Quarterly 21, no 4 (1 décembre 2016) : 393–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.17813/1086-671x-21-4-393.
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The Great Depression and the Great Recession in the United States both saw upsurges of social movement activity and newspaper coverage, but why did movements of both the right and left surge during the leftwing regimes of these periods? Why did the Barack Obama administration not produce the lasting leftwing mobilizations characteristic of the Franklin Roosevelt era? To address these questions and locate these episodes in historical perspective, we elaborate a political reform model, a macro-political theory that explains variance in movement presence. At its core, the political reform model holds that highly partisan political regimes and policy enactments interact to spur the presence of movements. We illustrate the argument and place these episodes in historical perspective with data from the Political Organizations in the News Project on all national movement organizations appearing in four major newspapers across 115 years. Historical analyses indicate that all periods of right or left partisan dominance, including leftwing partisanship under Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s and Republican dominance in the 1920s and 1980s, induced waves of movement coverage, regardless of whether there was an economic crisis. Comparisons across movements in similar periods indicate that those with advances in policy boosted their long-term attention. We find lasting leftwing mobilizations occurred more extensively in the wake of the Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson eras because of their greater policy achievements.
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Lunev, S. M. « The Image of Great Britain in the Soviet Press in the Context of the Spanish Civil War (1936‒1939) ». Moscow University Bulletin of World Politics 13, no 1 (7 avril 2021) : 196–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.48015/2076-7404-2021-13-1-196-222.
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The developments of the Spanish Civil War in 1936–1939, including its international aspects, have been thoroughly studied both in foreign and in Russian historiography. However, the introduction of new research approaches, in this case imagology, allows us to revisit even the well-established views. The paper examines the сreation and subsequent development of the image of Great Britain in the Soviet press in the context of the Spanish Civil War. The research draws on publications in the Soviet ‘Pravda’ and ‘Izvestiya’ newspapers, as well as in the ‘Ogoniok’, ‘Za rubezhom’ and ‘Agitator’s Sputnik’ magazines. The study reveales a rather ambiguous position of the Soviet press in relation to the British policy in Spain. Several topics played a key role in creating the image of the ‘Foggy Albion’ in the Soviet press. The leitmotif of publications of the Soviet journalists was the image of the empire in decline. In this regard, the Soviet press emphasized the acquiescence of the British government faced with aggressive actions from Francoists backed by Germany and Italy, as well as its inability to protect national interests of its own state. Parallel to this, the image of Great Britain as a split society was created. The Soviet journalists stressed that passivity of the government caused mounting criticism from both political left and right. At the same time, they praised the work of the civil society and volunteers in support of the republic. Finally, the Soviet media bashed London for its gradual drift from non-intervention towards appeasement and even direct inducement of aggressors. The author concludes that the image of Great Britain created in the Soviet press was intended to convince the Soviet public opinion in the fallacy of the British policy. In the face of an impending global war, London was portrayed as an unreliable ally, prone to concessions to aggressors.
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Gidron, Noam, et Jonathan J. B. Mijs. « Do Changes in Material Circumstances Drive Support for Populist Radical Parties ? Panel Data Evidence from the Netherlands during the Great Recession, 2007–2015 ». European Sociological Review 35, no 5 (18 mai 2019) : 637–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcz023.
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AbstractPolitical developments since the 2008 financial crisis have sparked renewed interest in the electoral implications of economic downturns. Research describes a correlation between adverse economic conditions and support for radical parties campaigning on the populist promise to retake the country from a corrupt elite. But does the success of radical parties following economic crises rely on people who are directly affected? To answer this question, we examine whether individual-level changes in economic circumstances drive support for radical parties across the ideological divide. Analysing eight waves of panel data collected in the Netherlands, before, during, and after the Great Recession (2007–2015), we demonstrate that people who experienced an income loss became more supportive of the radical left but not of the radical right. Looking at these parties’ core concerns, we find that income loss increased support for income redistribution championed by the radical left, but less so for the anti-immigration policies championed by the radical right. Our study establishes more directly than extant research the micro-foundations of support for radical parties across the ideological divide.
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Adams, James, Catherine E. De Vries et Debra Leiter. « Subconstituency Reactions to Elite Depolarization in the Netherlands : An Analysis of the Dutch Public's Policy Beliefs and Partisan Loyalties, 1986–98 ». British Journal of Political Science 42, no 1 (24 juin 2011) : 81–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123411000214.
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During the 1980s and the 1990s, the elites of the two largest Dutch parties converged dramatically in debates on income redistribution, nuclear power and the overall Left–Right dimension, paving the way for the Dutch party system's polarization on immigration and cultural issues. Did the Dutch mass public depolarize along with party elites, and, if so, was this mass-level depolarization confined to affluent, educated, politically engaged citizens? Analysis of Dutch Parliamentary Election Study respondents’ policy beliefs and partisan loyalties in 1986–98 shows that the mass public depolarized during this period, and that this extended equally throughout the electorate. These conclusions mirror previous findings on Britain, but differ from those on the United States, and have important implications for political representation and for parties’ election strategies.
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Gómez-Reino, Margarita, et Hugo Marcos-Marne. « Between center-periphery and left-right : A comparison of traditional and new regionalist parties’ strategies in Galicia during the Great Recession ». Revista de Estudios Políticos, no 196 (9 juin 2022) : 131–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.18042/cepc/rep.196.05.
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This article explains the rise, success, and subsequent failure of new challenger formations in the Galician party system during the Great Recession. For that, it focuses on the multidimensional electoral strategies developed by Alternativa Galega de Esquerda (AGE) and En Marea, comparing them to that of the traditional Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG). Our analysis shows the different strategies displayed by the BNG and new challengers (AGE, and later En Marea), examining both the electoral supply (framing and party programmatic positions) and demand (voter positions). We find a new subsuming strategy developed by AGE and En Marea, which prioritized left-wing anti-austerity policies over core pro-periphery ones. The paper demonstrates the potential of this new strategy during the Great Recession but also its limitations, linking its demise to the organizational weakness that prevented electoral realignment, and ultimately allowed the BNG to regain its leading role in the territorial dimension of competition.
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Buturlimova, Olha. « Olha Buturlimova. British Labour Party in the 1920s : the electoral competition ». European Historical Studies, no 11 (2018) : 113–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2018.11.113-128.
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The article examines the processes of growth of the British Labour Party in the early XXth century. The reasons of Labour Party’s success on parliamentary and municipal elections in the 1920s have been analyzed. The main attention is paid to the party’s activities in constituencies and analysis of Labour Party General Election Manifestos, General Elections Results and other statistic data. The relations between the Labour Party and churches in Great Britain have also been investigated. The support of the Anglican Church and denominations in Great Britain gave the Labour Party some votes but they lost some votes of believers in the next election in 1924 because of Labour government’s failure to acknowledge Bolshevik persecution of the Christians in the USSR. The Labour attempts to win the countryside were also not so fruitful. It is emphasized that 1918 was the turning point in the formation of the Labour Party as mass, widely represented and influential parliamentary party. The reorganization of the Labour party in 1918, Representation of the People Act (1918), adoption of the “Labour and the New Social Order” party constitution have proved to be favorable for its further evolution. But some difficulties such as conflicts between left and right views in the party, absence of convincing majority, black mass-media technologies from political opponents and problems in economics of the country, seriously influenced on its abilities to win success in 1920-s.
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Clohesy, Anthony M. « Britain's Invisible Dividends ». Politics 23, no 2 (mai 2003) : 89–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00184.
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This article argues that the left is generally right in its claim that Britain is important and should be valued. However, it fails to consider two important arguments. The first is theoretical and draws broadly on discourse theory. It argues that Britain's value lies in the fact that it is an artificial and contingent entity. It is this that allows it to accommodate such a broad range of ethnicities and identities. This is related to my second argument. This proposes that the benefits of English regional authorities – citizenship, democratisation and greater economic prosperity – can only be realised fully in the context of a unified British state committed to the principles of inclusion and tolerance.
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Price, Linda, et Mark Simpson. « The trouble with accessing the countryside in Northern Ireland ». Environmental Law Review 19, no 3 (septembre 2017) : 183–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461452917720632.
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The twenty-first century has seen a shift in emphasis from enabling local authorities to provide opportunities for recreation on private land to the conferment of a general right to access certain types of land in Great Britain. Similar liberalisation has not occurred in Northern Ireland. This article examines features of the Northern Ireland context that might explain why landowners’ rights continue to trump those of recreational users, drawing on stakeholder interviews and a rural geography conceptual framework. Following historic struggles for land in Ireland, any erosion of owner control is perceived to undermine hard-won rights; in a relatively rural society and agrarian economy, farmers are readily accepted as having the ‘right’ to determine the function of rural land; and recent conflict has depressed outdoor leisure and tourism. Consequently, productive uses of land remain central to rural policy and a countryside movement able to overcome objections to liberalisation has not emerged. Conflict and instability have also left a legacy of social problems and ‘legislative lag’ in higher priority areas that must be addressed before countryside access can move up the political agenda. The article reveals how, in stakeholders’ eyes, these factors combine to limit the prospects of reform.
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Malet, Giorgio. « Una nuova frattura in Europa ? » Quaderni dell'Osservatorio elettorale. QOE - IJES 74, no 2 (30 décembre 2015) : 57–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/qoe-9257.
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In the enduring debate regarding the structure of political competition, substantial evidence has been accumulated on the emergence of a new European dimension and on its relevance in some national elections. Yet, there have been few attempts to match the supply side with the demand side of electoral politics through cross-national studies. To fill the gap, this article adopts a two-step procedure. On the one hand, it investigates the political potential of Euroscepticism tracing back the fault lines of a new cleavage to processes of economic competition, cultural diversity and political integration. On the other, it showcases the uneven process of politicization of the EU issues in Italy, France, and United Kingdom. In these countries the growing difficulties of mainstream parties to deal with issues that crosscut the traditional left-right dimension have paved the way to the success of new anti-establishment parties. These challengers have exploited conflicts and issues generated by the integration process thus undermining the conventional dynamics of party competition. Nonetheless, preferences on the integration process affect voting behaviour only in Great Britain and, partially, in France, while in the Italian case there is still little evidence of EU issue voting.
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Georgiadou, Vasiliki, et Jenny Mavropoulou. « Anti-Establishment Parties in Government ». Southeastern Europe 45, no 1 (6 mai 2021) : 19–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/18763332-45010003.
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Abstract Anti-establishment parties with either a left-wing or a right-wing ideological slant have been entering contemporary European Democracies with sizeable vote shares. During the Great Recession, the Greek party system could be perceived as a relevant case-study for the formation and breakthrough of anti-establishment parties. Given the fact that two deeply ideologically diverging anti-establishment parties, the Coalition of the Radical Left – Social Unionist Front (syriza) and the populist radical right-wing Independent Greeks (anel), came to power, forming a coalition government from early 2015 to January 2019, the primary goal of this article is to enquire into ‘supply-side’ parameters, exploring potential associations along a range of programmatic stances and policy dimensions that effectuated the syriza-anel alliance. Using the Comparative Manifesto Project and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey datasets from 2012 to 2017, our findings confirm beyond the expected programmatic differences the existence of a converging policymaking basis between syriza and anel which goes beyond the ‘pro-Memorandum vs. anti-Memorandum’ divide.
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Giuliani, Marco, et Sergio Alberto Massari. « The economic vote at the party level : Electoral behaviour during the Great Recession ». Party Politics 25, no 3 (28 août 2017) : 461–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068817728214.
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The Great Recession is a non-trivial test bed for the theory of economic voting, especially if its predictions are decomposed at the party level, as done in this article by analysing the electoral performances of parties competing in 89 national elections held in the 28 member states of the EU between 2003 and 2015. We acknowledge counterintuitively that prime ministers’ parties are able to exploit the relatively good state of the economy, while sharing the blame with their allies in times of crisis, counting on the lack of clarity in the attribution of responsibilities and deploying their heresthetic capacities. We further recognize that new parties, more than opposition ones, proportionally profited from the recession. Tough times magnify the alternation between left- and right-wing victories, without necessarily favouring the most radical parties, whereas the EU’s supposed responsibility in prolonging the crisis fuelled the success of Eurosceptic parties.
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Noury, Abdul, et Gerard Roland. « Identity Politics and Populism in Europe ». Annual Review of Political Science 23, no 1 (11 mai 2020) : 421–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033542.
Texte intégralRésumé :
We review the literature on the rise of identity politics and populism in Europe. Populist parties have gained large vote shares since the Great Recession of 2008. We observe in many countries, and even in the European Parliament, a transformation of the main dimension of politics from the left–right cleavage to a new cleavage opposing the mainstream parties to populist parties. We examine how this transformation relates to changes in voter attitudes and the adjustment of political parties to these changes. Two main types of causes for the rise of populism have emerged: economic and cultural. In reviewing the evidence, we find a complex interaction between economic and cultural factors. Economic anxiety among large groups of voters related to the Great Recession and austerity policies triggers a heightened receptivity to the messages of cultural backlash from populist parties.
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McConnel, Katie. « The Centrepiece of Colonial Queensland's Celebration and Commemoration of Royalty and Empire : Government House, Brisbane ». Queensland Review 16, no 2 (juillet 2009) : 15–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1321816600005080.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Her Majesty's birthday was right royally celebrated last evening by His Excellency the Governor on the occasion of the annual birthday ball at government house.‘Royalty’ and ‘Empire’ were, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. of supreme significance to all the Australian colonies. While each colony was well integrated within the Imperial framework, they remained largely reliant on the economic and geopolitical management of the British Empire. Though different colonial/national identities developed in Australia, the colonies' economic, military and diplomatic dependence on Britain strongly orientated them towards the Queen and ‘home’. Colonial Governors served as the vital link between the colonies and both the Imperial government and the Queen of the British Empire. Appointed by Britain and entrusted with the same rights, powers and privileges as the Queen, the role of Governor was one of great influence and authority.
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Stevens, Daniel, et Barbara Allen. « When Going to War Is Costly : A Comparative Study of Audiences and the Partisan Press ». International Journal of Press/Politics 22, no 3 (24 mai 2017) : 380–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1940161217708065.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Much of the conventional wisdom about partisan media effects is based on the single case of the United States. Without more comparative research, we know little about whether the findings are generalizable, however, and thus cannot be certain of their causes. But comparative research presents several challenges. This paper takes advantage of the case of the War on Iraq to examine the effects of partisan press coverage on perceptions of leaders and ultimately on voting behavior in two countries, the United States and Britain. We test three competing hypotheses of partisan media effects. We find support for the argument that the reputation of the incumbent party moderates the influence of partisan coverage on perceptions of war but also show that opposition partisan media coverage undermines perceptions of the qualities of incumbent leaders. Media outlets that support the incumbent do not have similar positive effects. We conclude that the war cost a left-wing leader, Blair, more than a right-wing leader, Bush, because of (1) the ambivalence of incumbent-supporting newspapers in Britain, (2) the absence of a parallel to the boost in approval that incumbent-supporting newspapers provided for Bush, and (3) greater damage to perceptions of Blair’s attributes among readers of opposition-supporting newspapers.
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Nekit, Kateryna. « Restrictions of Private Property Right in Terms of the Covid-19 Pandemic : The Experience of the US, UK and Ukraine ». Age of Human Rights Journal, no 16 (14 juin 2021) : 263–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.17561/tahrj.v16.6275.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on human rights. Many rights have been restricted to prevent the spread of infection. The restrictions on private property rights during the pandemic were not so obvious, but no less significant. The massive closure of restaurants, cafes, cinemas and other crowded places has resulted in significant losses for business owners. The question arose about the admissibility of such restrictions on the rights of owners, as well as the need to compensate for the losses caused. The purpose of this article is to study the criteria developed by international practice under which the restriction of property rights is allowed, and approaches to resolving issues of compensation for losses caused to owners when it is necessary to ensure a balance of private and public interests in Ukraine. The article also analyzes approaches to resolving issues of compensation for losses caused to owners as a result of restrictions on their rights, developed in the case law of the United States and Great Britain.
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Eisfeld, Rainer. « Political Science in Great Britain and Germany : The Roles of LSE (The London School of Economics) and DHfP (The German Political Studies Institute) ». Polish Political Science Review 2, no 2 (1 décembre 2014) : 71–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ppsr-2015-0022.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP, German Political Studies Institute) in Berlin both emerged extramurally. LSE was founded in 1895 by Fabian socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb; DHfP was established in 1920 by liberal-national publicists Ernst Jäckh and Theodor Heuss. However, superficial resemblances ended there, as shown in the paper’s first part. The founders’ aims differed markedly; incorporation into London and Berlin universities occurred at different times and in different ways. The chair of political science set up at LSE in 1914 was held, until 1950, by two reform-minded Fabians, Graham Wallas and Harold Laski. DHfP, which did not win academic recognition during the 1920s, split into nationalist, “functionalist”, and democratic “schools”. Against this backdrop, the paper’s second part discusses Harold Laski’s magnum opus (1925) A Grammar of Politics as an attempt at offering a vision of the “good society”, and Theodor Heuss’ 1932 study Hitler’s Course as an example of the divided Hochschule’s inability to provide adequate analytical assessments of the Nazi movement and of the gradual infringement, by established elites, of the Weimar constitution. Laski’s work and intellectual legacy reinforced the tendency towards the predominance, in British political science, of normative political theory. West German political science, initially pursued “from a Weimar perspective”, was also conceived as a highly normative enterprise emphasising classical political theory, the institutions and processes of representative government, and the problematic ideological and institutional predispositions peculiar to German political history. Against this background, the paper’s third part looks, on the one hand, at the contribution to “New Left” thinking (1961 ff.) by Ralph Miliband, who studied under Laski and taught at LSE until 1972, and at Paul Hirst’s 1990s theory of associative democracy, which builds on Laski’s pluralism. On the other hand, the paper considers Karl Dietrich Bracher’s seminal work The Failure of the Weimar Republic (1955) and Ernst Fraenkel’s 1964 collection Germany and the Western Democracies, which originated, respectively, from the (Research) Institute for Political Science – added to Berlin’s Free University in 1950 – and DHfP, re-launched in the same year. In a brief concluding fourth part, the paper touches on the reception, both in Great Britain and West Germany, of the approaches of “modern” American political science since the mid-1960s.
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CAVAILLE, CHARLOTTE, et JOHN MARSHALL. « Education and Anti-Immigration Attitudes : Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Reforms across Western Europe ». American Political Science Review 113, no 1 (15 novembre 2018) : 254–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000588.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Low levels of education are a powerful predictor of anti-immigration sentiment. However, there is little consensus on the interpretation of this correlation: is it causal or is it an artifact of selection bias? We address this question by exploiting six major compulsory schooling reforms in five Western European countries—Denmark, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden—that have recently experienced politically influential anti-immigration movements. On average, we find that compelling students to remain in secondary school for at least an additional year decreases anti-immigration attitudes later in life. Instrumental variable estimates demonstrate that, among such compliers, an additional year of secondary schooling substantially reduces the probability of opposing immigration, believing that immigration erodes a country’s quality of life, and feeling close to far-right anti-immigration parties. These results suggest that rising post-war educational attainment has mitigated the rise of anti-immigration movements. We discuss the mechanisms and implications for future research examining anti-immigration sentiment.
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Riley, Dylan. « Neo-trasformismo : Historical legacies and populist revolt ». International Sociology 35, no 6 (30 octobre 2020) : 710–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0268580920944862.
Texte intégralRésumé :
There have been three main types of political outcome from the Great Recession. The first is an insurgency from the left exemplified by Podemos, now in decline, in Spain. It demands a return to classic European social democracy, but presents itself in a more radical rhetorical garb than its mid twentieth century forbears. The second is an insurgency from the right, best exemplified by Hungary’s Victor Orbán and his Fidesz Party. It demands a return to a national capitalism reminiscent of the 1930s. The third is the uniquely Italian phenomenon of the Five Star Movement-Lega combination combined with the rise of technocratic governments called into existence by an increasingly activist presidency. What explains this third, mixed model?
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Statham, Paul, et Ruud Koopmans. « Political party contestation over Europe in the mass media : who criticizes Europe, how, and why ? » European Political Science Review 1, no 3 (novembre 2009) : 435–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773909990154.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This study examines political party contestation over Europe, its relationship to the left/right cleavage, and the nature and emergence of Euroscepticism. The analysis is based on a large original sample of parties’ claims systematically drawn from political discourses in the mass media in seven countries: Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. It addresses questions concerning parties’ mobilized criticisms of European integration and the European Union (EU), specifically: their degree and form; their location among party families and within party systems; cross-national and diachronic trends; their substantive issue contents; whether their ‘Euro-criticism’ is more tactical or ideological; whether claims construct a cleavage; and their potential for transforming party politics. Findings show that a party’s country of origin has little explanatory power, once differences between compositions of party systems are accounted for. Also governing parties are significantly more likely to be pro-European, regardless of party-type. Regional party representatives, by contrast, are significantly more likely to be ‘Euro-critical’. Overall, we find a lop-sided ‘inverted U’ on the right of the political spectrum, but this is generated entirely by the significant, committed Euroscepticism of the British Conservatives andSchweizerische Volkspartei. There is relatively little evidence for Euroscepticism elsewhere at the core, where pro-Europeanism persists. Finally, parties’ Euro-criticism from the periphery mostly constructs substantive political and economic critiques of European integration and the EU, and is not reducible to strategic anti-systemic challenges.
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Howell, David L. « Hard Times in the Kantō : Economic Change and Village Life in Late Tokugawa Japan ». Modern Asian Studies 23, no 2 (mai 1989) : 349–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x00001098.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Things were not right in the Kantō region during the early nineteenth century. In his memoirs, Mastsudaira Sadanobu, architect of the Kansei Reforms, lamented the sorry state of the villages in Edo's hinterland:Much land throughout the Kantō is going to waste for want of cultivators. All the people of some villages have left for Edo, leaving only the headman behind. … Many Kantō villagers are suffering great hardship. Babies are killed, the population has declined, and land has gone to waste.
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BOSSUAT, Gérard. « L’actualité de la pensée de Pierre Mendès France sur l’unité européenne ». Journal of European Integration History 25, no 2 (2019) : 283–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2019-2-283.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Pierre Mendès France, one of the great figures of the French political left from the 1940s to the 1970s, is mostly perceived as an anti-European or at least as a great sceptical in matters of European Unity à la Jean Monnet. Nonetheless, it would be unfair to taint him with this unsubtle image. All his action was turned to restore an then develop France's economy and society after World War II. Misunderstood as advocate of the monetary austerity and the fight against inflation in 1945, he meant to implement a common planning by the Europeans, with the participation of Great Britain. He didn't seek to build a European federation, but a community to promote a new society and an economy in progress, delivered from the restored plundering of carpetbagger capitalism and nationalism. His European vison was larger than that of the Six, but he didn't achieve the aim. Accused to have derailed the EDC in August 1954, he invented a way to make Germany, of which he always remained suspicious, participate in the Western rearmament. The Treaties of Rome contrived him in a political deadlock: despite their very liberal orientation, he could not do other than admit them because they proved to be quite useful for economic development. In response to Charles de Gaulle, Pierre Mendès France knew how to develop in the 1970s a project uniting the European left, capable, he thought, to correct the abuses of the merchant's Europe by means of a common modern planning in innovative sectors, in full employment, in European research and universities, in social policy an in justice for all citizens. What should be retained of all this? I would choose his ambition to regulate European development by seeking the benefit of the people.
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Nacci, Michela. « Introduction : The long life of characters ». Tocqueville Review 35, no 1 (janvier 2014) : 7–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/ttr.35.1.7.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Ubiquitous and elusive: this is how the theory of national characters appears in nineteenth-century French political thought. One could also add “mysterious”. I arrived at national characters in fact—as you can read in my article featured in this issue—via a mystery that Gustave de Beaumont left unsolved in his L'Irlande.1 Indeed, it was the wish to explain it that propelled me to explore the theory of national characters, firstly as regards Great Britain and then followed by Germany and France. Altogether, the idea was hatched to gather around this theme the voices of certain scholars specialized in this field. Finding them proved hard; although it is indeed the case that the theme of national characters exists in countless works with a focus on nineteenth-century France and Europe and on nationalism, there is not one single work specifically focused on the theme. This monographic issue precisely seeks to deal with this issue in a specific way.
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Sax, Boria. « How Ravens Came to the Tower of London ». Society & ; Animals 15, no 3 (2007) : 269–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853007x217203.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractAccording to popular belief, Charles II of England (reigned 1660-1685) once heard a prophecy that if ravens left the Tower of London it would "fall," so he ordered that the wings of seven ravens in the Tower be trimmed. Until recently, this claim was not challenged even in scholarly literature. There are, however, no allusions to the Tower Ravens before the end of the nineteenth century. The ravens, today meticulously cared for by Yeoman Warders, are largely an invented tradition, designed to give an impression of continuity with the past. This article examines the few known references, both graphic and textual, to the Tower Ravens through 1906. It concludes that the ravens were originally brought in to dramatize the alleged site of executions at the Tower. Although not accorded great significance at first, legends that would eventually make the ravens mascots of Britain began outside of the Tower.
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Smirnova, Irina. « “Athos” Course of Lord Bulwer-Lytton : about the History of British-Russian Diplomatic Relations in the Balkans in the 1860s ». ISTORIYA 13, no 7 (117) (2022) : 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840022289-6.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article discusses the goals and objectives of the British diplomats on the “Athos” track in the context of the diplomatic confrontation between Great Britain and Russia which relied extensively on the Church contacts in their Balkan politics. It explores such a little-studied aspect of the Athos problem as the role of Russian and British diplomats in addressing the issue of the Athos monasteries’ properties sequestrated by Alexandru Cuza, prince of the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, through the lens of the activities of Sir George Bulwer-Lytton, ambassador to Constantinople, in the 1860s. It uses Lord Bulwer's participation in the work of European commissions and conferences, to illustrate the methods and practices of British diplomats aimed at forcing Russia out of the Balkan region (and even out of the Middle East): such as erosion of the credibility of the Russian Empire, defamation of its representatives in Greek communities and their displacement from principle foreign-policy objectives, and indoctrination into endless conflicts in the multinational environment of Orthodox monasticism on the Holy Mount. It shows that from the mid-19th century one of the primary instruments of British politics not only on Mount Athos, but also in the Orthodox East, as a whole, was the right of British subjects (Ionian Greeks in the case of Athos) to official support and protection of British diplomats, while Russian Athonites were deprived of that right due to the lack of official Russian patronage over Russian subjects in the Ottoman Empire. The confrontation between Great Britain and Russia in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean played a prominent role in the development of Russian-Greek relations and the occurrence of such a phenomenon as “Russian Athos”.
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Enders, Adam M., Steven M. Smallpage et Robert N. Lupton. « Are All ‘Birthers’ Conspiracy Theorists ? On the Relationship Between Conspiratorial Thinking and Political Orientations ». British Journal of Political Science 50, no 3 (9 juillet 2018) : 849–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000837.
Texte intégralRésumé :
While research on conspiracy theories and those who believe them has recently undergone a renaissance, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the measurement of conspiratorial beliefs and orientations, and the consequences of a conspiratorial mindset for expressly political attitudes and behaviors. We first demonstrate, using data from the 2012 American National Election Study, that beliefs in a variety of specific conspiracy theories are simultaneously, but differentially, the product of both a general tendency toward conspiratorial thinking and left/right political orientations. Next, we employ unique data including a general measure of conspiratorial thinking to explore the predictors of specific conspiracy beliefs. We find that partisan and ideological self-identifications are more important than any other variable in predicting ‘birther’ beliefs, while conspiratorial thinking is most important in predicting conspiracy beliefs about the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
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Pirro, Andrea LP, Paul Taggart et Stijn van Kessel. « The populist politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis : Comparative conclusions ». Politics 38, no 3 (4 juillet 2018) : 378–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263395718784704.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article offers comparative findings of the nature of populist Euroscepticism in political parties in contemporary Europe in the face of the Great Recession, migrant crisis, and Brexit. Drawing on case studies included in the Special Issue on France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the article presents summary cross-national data on the positions of parties, the relative importance of the crisis, the framing of Euroscepticism, and the impact of Euroscepticism in different country cases. We use this data to conclude that there are important differences between left- and right-wing variants of populist Euroscepticism, and that although there is diversity across the cases, there is an overall picture of resilience against populist Euroscepticism.
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Dingman, Roger. « The Diplomacy of Dependency : The Philippines and Peacemaking with Japan, 1945–52 ». Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 17, no 2 (septembre 1986) : 307–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400001077.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Historians have examined the Japanese peace settlement of 1951 in a variety of ways. A few have treated it as an episode in the ongoing evolution of the structure of international relations in the Pacific and East Asia. Most have focused on the interaction between the principal victor, the United States, and vanquished Japan, weighing the negotiating successes and failures of each and assessing the impact of the settlement on subsequent Japanese-American relations. Recently still other historians have exploited newly available archival materials to analyze the role middle-range powers such as Australia and Britain played in shaping the 1951 peace treaty. While this research has revealed a great deal about the San Francisco peace settlement, it has left unexplored the part small powers played in a major restructuring of the Pacific/East Asian international order.
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Rakel, Eva. « IX. Paradigms of Iranian Policy in Central Eurasia and Beyond ». Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 2, no 3 (2003) : 549–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156915003322986398.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractIran and CEA have historically close links going back as far as the sixth century BC when the Persian Achaemenid Empire conquered the region. For a long time, Persian was the main language of the elite in CEA. Since the disintegration of the USSR, Iran has been determined to re-strengthen its position in CEA, particularly in economic and security terms. Iran is an active player in the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO). It also promotes the construction of southern pipelines from CEA to export the region's oil and gas resources as it hopes to profit from it for its own oil and gas export. However, it has to be noted that Iran in no way is a dominant player in the region. The rivalry between the various political factions of the Iranian political elite - the Conservative Traditional Right (Rast-e Sonati), Traditionalist left (Chap-e Sonati), Revolutionary or New Left or Hizbollah, Conservative Modern Right Rast-e Modern - leads to incoherence in Iran's foreign policy and makes Iran an unreliable actor to cooperate with not only the countries of CEA but also for other countries interested in the region (i.e., the United States, European Union, Turkey, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia). Additionally, the great national economic problems in Iran are an obstacle for Iran to become more active economically in CEA.
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Hloušek, Vít, et Lubomír Kopeček. « Cleavages in the Contemporary Czech and Slovak Politics Between Persistence and Change ». East European Politics and Societies : and Cultures 22, no 3 (16 avril 2008) : 518–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325408315833.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This study describes and compares Czech and Slovak party politics after 1989. The concept of cleavages is used as a theoretical starting point. The authors point out that although the communist period overshadowed the traditional cleavages dating from the second half of the nineteenth century, it is possible to analyze some politically-based cleavages in the respective party arrangements of the two countries. The main conclusion of the article is as follows: that despite differing trajectories of political development during the 1990s, at the present time, both the Czech and Slovak party systems show great similarities in terms of the prevalence of the socioeconomic cleavage. Socioeconomic cleavage emerged quite early after 1989 in the Czech Republic; in Slovakia the socioeconomic cleavage has become dominant only in recent years. This has contributed to the stabilization of the classic left-right model of political competition and the consolidation of the two countries' party systems.
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Mansbridge, Jane, et Stephen Macedo. « Populism and Democratic Theory ». Annual Review of Law and Social Science 15, no 1 (13 octobre 2019) : 59–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-101518-042843.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Commentators routinely describe “populism” as vague. Some argue that the early US populists, who coined the modern usage, were not populists. We disagree and identify this common conceptual core: the “people” in a moral battle against “elites.” The core definition fits all cases of populism: those on the left and right, those in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. In addition to this minimal common core, we identify strongly suggested and frequently correlated non-core characteristics. These include the people's homogeneity and exclusivity, direct rule, and nationalism, as well as a single leader, vilification of vulnerable out-groups, and impatience with deliberation. The US Populist Party and Spain's Podemos Party fit the core definition but have few of the other characteristics. The core can be good for democracy, we argue, while the associated characteristics are often dangerous. Populism in opposition can be good for democracy, while populism in power carries great risks.
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Bishara, Fahad Ahmad. « “No country but the ocean” : Reading International Law from the Deck of an Indian Ocean Dhow, ca. 1900 ». Comparative Studies in Society and History 60, no 2 (27 mars 2018) : 338–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417518000075.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractThis paper engages in a microhistory of international law, grounded in the contests surrounding theMuscat Dhowscase brought by Great Britain against France in 1905. At the heart of the case was the question of whether the French consul had the right to grant flags and navigation passes to dhows from the southern Omani port of Sur that were suspected of transporting slaves. The case became foundational to studies of the law of the sea, and the ruling is still cited in footnotes in law school textbooks. Buried in the case's proceedings, however, are a series of petitions by the dhow captains that give historians a window into the legal imaginaries of Indian Ocean mariners in an age of empire. Through a close reading of the petitions, I explore how captains located themselves within an imperial legal geography, and appropriated legal technologies—passes and flags—to help them shape the legal possibilities of a changing political and economic seascape. I argue that the claims the captains articulated and the practices they engaged in at sea reveal a maritime legal culture at work, one animated by a long history of encountering regional and global empires at sea. Their documentary practices illuminate how they engaged in and domesticated a body of international law, and illustrate how the regime manifested itself in an ocean that ran thick with legal idioms.
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Cox, Michael. « Forum on the American Empire Introduction : A new American Empire ? » Review of International Studies 30, no 4 (29 septembre 2004) : 583. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210504005005.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The words used to describe things sometimes tell us less about the thing itself and more about those telling the story: and in the case of the words ‘American Empire’ one could more or less tell in the past that the story was being told by a critic. Not any longer. Indeed, since 9/11 those who have been at the forefront of promoting the idea have not been radical opponents on the left but defenders of the United States on the neo-conservative right. Under conditions where the US dominates the earth like no other power, Empire they argue not only describes what America has become – even though its own leaders invariably fail to recognise the fact; it also indicates to us what has to be done if we are to tackle the threat posed by catastrophic terrorism. And in this the United States now needs to do what it normally does worst: namely learn from the history of other great powers. As one of the new gurus of Empire has suggested, in a world of failed states and terrorist threats, the US has to abandon the idea that it is unique and see how its predecessors, the British and the Romans, created the conditions of order before.
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O'Brien, Bruce R. « Forgers of Law and Their Readers : The Crafting of English Political Identities between the Norman Conquest and the Magna Carta ». PS : Political Science & ; Politics 43, no 03 (30 juin 2010) : 467–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096510000594.
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A short time after 1206 and before 1215, a Londoner assembled a massive collection of older and near contemporary English laws, called theLeges Anglorumby historians, and inserted long interpolations and spurious codes that enunciated many of the principles that guided the baronial opposition to King John and later became part of the Magna Carta. To those familiar with the struggle leading up to the creation of the Magna Carta, these principles should cause no surprise. These ancient laws were made to proclaim that “in the kingdom right and justice ought to reign more than perverse will” (ECf4, 11.1.A.6; Liebermann 1903, 635). In another part of the collection, King Arthur, making his first appearance in English law, is credited with establishing as law the requirement that all nobles, knights, and freemen of the whole kingdom of Britain swear “to defend the kingdom against foreigners and enemies” (ECf4, 32.A.5–7; Liebermann 1903, 655). More surprising is the attribution of the regularly assembled Hustings court in London to the Trojans (who became the Britons). The seventh-century West Saxon king, Ine, suddenly looms large in the ranks of Britain's lawmakers; he not only reigns for the good of all, but is also given the lordly virtues of twelfth-century chivalric romance: he is “generous, wise, prudent, moderate, strong, just, spirited, and warlike” (as was appropriate for the time and place) (ECf4, 32.C.2, 32.C.8; Liebermann 1903, 658–59). A confection of bits of other law, attributed here to King Alfred, orders an end to vice, national education for freemen, and unity for all “as if sworn brothers for the utility of the kingdom” (Leges Angl, Pseudo-Alfred 1–6; Liebermann 1894, 19–20). Finally, in the grandest statement of English political ambition, Arthur appears again as the great conqueror, whose spirit was not satisfied by Britain alone: “Courageously and speedily he subjugated all Scandinavia, which is now called Norway, and all the islands beyond, namely Iceland and Greenland, which belong to Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Gotland, Denmark, Samland, Vinland, Curland, Runoe, Finland, Wirland, Estland, Karelien,Lapland, and all other lands and islands of the eastern Ocean as far as Russia” (ECf4, 32.E; Liebermann 1903, 659).