Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Religion and state – Turkey »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Religion and state – Turkey"
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Hazza, Thaer Najrs, et Anmar Mahmoud Khalaf. « Religion and state in Erdogan's mind ». Tikrit Journal For Political Science 3, no 12 (22 février 2019) : 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.25130/poltic.v3i12.8.
Texte intégralRésumé :
If there are events that confirm Samuel Huntington's argument about the clash of civilizations and Bernard Lewis's thesis on Islam, such as the establishment of the Islamic state in Iran, and the events of September 11, what all these people condone is that Islamist movements are not always an extension of fundamentalism In countries such as Turkey and Indonesia, social movements helped bring in democracy, after decades of authoritarian rule by secularist regimes backed by the army. Religious groups in these countries have participated in the transition to democracy. In Turkey, Islamist groups have fought the vessels in order to strengthen democracy, and in order to participate in the achievement of freedom of opinion and expression and the promotion of religious and human rights, and this is what he did Erdogan and his colleagues since they receive power in Turkey
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Albayrak, H. « Religious Pluralism and Religion-State Relations in Turkey ». Religions 10, no 1 (18 janvier 2019) : 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10010061.
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In this article, I examine religion-state relations and religious pluralism in Turkey in terms of recent changes in the religious landscape. I propose that there is a growing trend in the religious sphere that has resulted in a proliferation of religions, sects and spiritual approaches in Turkey. I argue that although the religious market model might not be applicable to the Turkish religious sphere during the republican era until the 2000s due to the restrictions applied by the state’s authoritarian secularist policies, it is compatible with today’s changing society. Different religious groups as well as spiritual movements have used the democratization process of the 2000s in Turkey as an opportunity to proselytize various faiths and understandings of Islam, with both traditional and modernist forms. In this period, new religious movements have also appeared. Thus, the Turkish religious landscape has recently become much more complicated than it was two decades earlier. I plan for this descriptive work firstly to provide an insight into the history of religious pluralism and state policies in Turkey. Secondly, I will discuss the religious policies of the republican period and, thirdly, I will evaluate recent developments such as the increasing number of approaches in the religious sphere within the scope of the religious market model.
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Çağatay, Neşet. « The Development of Theological Studies in Turkey ». Belleten 54, no 209 (1 avril 1990) : 355–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.37879/belleten.1990.355.
Texte intégralRésumé :
By establishing firmly-based states in various places and regions the Turkish nation, has continued to exist uninterrupted since the 7th century B.C. up to the present day always looking for a religion befitting its both national and individual character. On the strength of this various Turkish clans and groups in different regions, have embraced religions such as Animism, Shamanism, Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism etc. For example, Khazar (Caspian) Turks, who founded a state on the coast of the Caspian Sea, to which they gave their name, accepted Christianity in 508. Furthermore, Islam began to spread amongst them when the Arabs attacked the Caucasus at the end of the 7th century A.D. This state of which Balanjar was the capital accepted Judaism as the offical religion. The Gagauz Turks who live in Rumania today are Orthodox Chirtians. They conduct services in their church in Turkish. Turkish states of Turkestan, began accepting Islam as their official religion towards the end of the 10th century A.D. The first Turkish Muslim state (Which existed from 840-1212) was that of the Karahanlis. The Turkish people, who set up this state, which was also called Ilek Hanlar, became Muslims collectively at the end of the 10th century. (in 940 A.D.) Turkish states after this date were all Muslim.
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Ukenov, A. « Religion as an Instrument of Soft Power in International Relations ». Al-Farabi 76, no 4 (15 décembre 2021) : 197–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.48010/2021.4/1999-5911.15.
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The article examines the cases of using religion as a “soft power” in the example of Russia and Turkey. Based on foreign policy strategies, each state forms its own discourse in the use of religions as “soft power”. The article substantiates the idea that world religions have the greatest potential in solving interstate issues, as carriers of a unique historical experience of spiritual and political globalization, as institutions of spiritual power that accumulate significant material and other resources, as well as as institutions of civil society that promote the values of freedom and humanism. The use of religion as «soft power» becomes another argument in criticizing the theories of secularism. The analysis of the discourse of religion as a “soft power” was made on the example of the foreign policy strategies of Russia and Turkey, taking into account their political authority in the international arena, as well as their perception as one of the centers of world religions.
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Majıev, G. « Features of Relations between the State and Religion : Principles and Development Trends ». Iasaýı ýnıversıtetіnіń habarshysy 4, no 118 (15 décembre 2020) : 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.47526/2020/2664-0686.034.
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In this article analyzes aspects of religion and state relations in Iran and Turkey. In order to open relations between the state and religion, analyzed the features of the manifestation of religious elements in the power system of these countries, including the country's Constitution and legislation regulating the sphere of religion, the activities of religious parties and religious communities. In addition, special attention was paid to the geographical location of the two countries, ethnic and religious composition, and cultural history. Among Islamic countries, Iran and Turkey have a number of differences in religious and state relations compared to other Muslim countries. Therefore, it is important to focus on the models of these two countries when studying the world experience of relations between religion and the state in a comprehensive way. This is especially important for Kazakhstan, which is moving in a secular direction. In the structure of the state administration of Iran, the influence of the religious corps «Valiyat Faqih» is predominant. In Turkey, on the other hand, the religious administration of Dianet is subordinate to the presidential administration. In Iran, religious parties are politically active, while in Turkey, political parties are not allowed to use any religious elements. However, despite these features, both countries are recognized in the world as States that give priority to the Muslim religion. Since the article is aimed at uncovering the specifics of state-confessional relations in Iran and Turkey, structural and functional and comparative analysis methods have been used in the study.
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Majıev, G. « Features of Relations between the State and Religion : Principles and Development Trends ». Iasaýı ýnıversıtetіnіń habarshysy 4, no 118 (15 décembre 2020) : 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.47526/2020/2664-0686.034.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In this article analyzes aspects of religion and state relations in Iran and Turkey. In order to open relations between the state and religion, analyzed the features of the manifestation of religious elements in the power system of these countries, including the country's Constitution and legislation regulating the sphere of religion, the activities of religious parties and religious communities. In addition, special attention was paid to the geographical location of the two countries, ethnic and religious composition, and cultural history. Among Islamic countries, Iran and Turkey have a number of differences in religious and state relations compared to other Muslim countries. Therefore, it is important to focus on the models of these two countries when studying the world experience of relations between religion and the state in a comprehensive way. This is especially important for Kazakhstan, which is moving in a secular direction. In the structure of the state administration of Iran, the influence of the religious corps «Valiyat Faqih» is predominant. In Turkey, on the other hand, the religious administration of Dianet is subordinate to the presidential administration. In Iran, religious parties are politically active, while in Turkey, political parties are not allowed to use any religious elements. However, despite these features, both countries are recognized in the world as States that give priority to the Muslim religion. Since the article is aimed at uncovering the specifics of state-confessional relations in Iran and Turkey, structural and functional and comparative analysis methods have been used in the study.
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Cesari, Jocelyne. « Unexpected Convergences : Religious Nationalism in Israel and Turkey ». Religions 9, no 11 (30 octobre 2018) : 334. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel9110334.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article compares Israel and Turkey to demonstrate how religious nationalism can be analyzed by a combination of historical institutionalism and conceptual history of religious ideas and doctrines. Both cases exemplify how the building of the nation-state was associated with the exportation of the western concept of religion. The resulting association between national territory, state and religion can explain the existing politicization of religion.
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Yilmaz, Fadime, et András Máté-Tóth. « A Comparison of the state-favored religions in Turkey and Hungary ». Religion and society in Central and Eastern Europe 15, no 1 (29 décembre 2022) : 37–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.20413/rascee.2022.15.1.37-56.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Is it possible to establish a radical separation between religion and politics in constitutionally secular states? Is religion a private or political matter? In many countries, religious people are becoming activists, involving politics, trying to change the policies based on their beliefs or get a share of the state power. Their claims sometimes fall within the democratic structure of the country, and sometimes outside of it. This paper provides insight into the relation between state and religion by focusing on the religious politics of two countries, Turkey and Hungary This study is, in essence, a crossregional and cross-religious comparative study, presenting the very first comparison of the state-religion relationships in the two countries. Ninian Smart’s concept of dimensions of religion will be used as a framework to extract a pattern for each country. These dimensions exist in social systems and reflect the cultural and social milieu in which people socialize and build their own beliefs. Our goal is to present and prove that the religious features of Turkey and Hungary are comparable and show similarities along each dimension of Smart. Exploratory qualitative analysis will be employed to collect and analyze qualitative data in order to generate new concepts and generalizations. The data will be collected from open sources, such as newspapers, statistics, and survey results in Hungary and Turkey, to find the answer to the research questions. The main results of our comparative analysis are, first, evidence for substantial similarities regarding the presence of religion in the public sphere in each Smartian dimension, although in countries that are very different in terms of religion. Second, our systematic and structured analysis provides a strong and impartial invitation for further comparative research from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. This study is going to provide data collected from open sources such as newspapers, statistics, survey results in Hungary and Turkey, in order to find the reply to these questions.
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Çalışkan, Esin. « Review : Alevis in Turkey ». Kurdish Studies 3, no 1 (1 mai 2015) : 82–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/ks.v3i1.393.
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This review analyses the recent contributions of Elise Massicard and Markus Dressler to Alevi studies. While Massicard employs methods of political sociology and transna-tional identity politics, Dressler is concerned with the intrinsic relation between the religious and the secular as well as the place of religion in nation-state building projects. Massicard argues that formulating Alevism is context and actor dependent and shaped simultaneously in its interaction with diverse actors, which she calls identity movement without an identity. The emphasis on the audience in defining Alevism might stem from the inadequacy of the universal language of religion to accommodate Alevi expression. Similarly, Dressler argues that the modern Alevi tradition was constructed at the intersection of Turkish nation building, modern religion discourse and Islamic apologetics and criticises the modernist discourse on religion such as the heterodoxy/orthodoxy binary for its insufficiency to capture the complexities of different contexts.
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Kuru, Ahmet T. « Passive and Assertive Secularism : Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion ». World Politics 59, no 4 (juillet 2007) : 568–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2008.0005.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Why do secular states pursue substantially different policies toward religion? The United States, France, and Turkey are secular states that lack any official religion and have legal systems free from religious control. The French and Turkish states have banned students' headscarves in public schools, whereas the U.S. has allowed students to wear religious symbols and attire. Using the method of process tracing, the author argues that state policies toward religion are the result of ideological struggles. In France and Turkey the dominant ideology is “assertive secularism,” which aims to exclude religion from the public sphere, while in the U.S., it is “passive secularism,” which tolerates public visibility of religion. Whether assertive or passive secularism became dominant in a particular case was the result of the particular historical conditions during the secular state-building period, especially the presence or absence of an ancien regime based on a marriage of monarchy and hegemonic religion.
Thèses sur le sujet "Religion and state – Turkey"
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Kuru, Ahmet T. « Dynamics of secularism : state-religion relations in the United States, France, and Turkey / ». Thesis, Connect to this title online ; UW restricted, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/10720.
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Doganyilmaz, Didem. « How far religious freedom goes in a laic state : alevis of Turkey ». Doctoral thesis, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/403209.
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This study aims to analyze the necessities of Alevism as a belief and the limits of freedom that Alevis have had since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey to maintain and practice their cultural and religious components in between a laic state structure and traditionally Sunni Muslim society. It puts the debate on the limits of religious freedom of a certain group; this is to mention Alevis, in a laic state structure, which should aim to keep its distance to any religious identity with possession none of them on the center. The distinguishments aim to emphasize the place of Alevis in political history of the Republic of Turkey, which has been fulfilled with a concrete competition of two aforementioned identities, and to mention the difficulties that Alevis have faced with as a result of their officially unrecognized religious identity by none of the two identities and its consequent limitations.
Keywords: Alevism, political history of Republic of Turkey, laicism, religion, political IslamEste estudio tiene el objetivo de analizar las necesidades del alevismo como una creencia y los límites de la libertad que los alevís han tenido desde la fundación de la República de Turquía, al mantener y practicar sus componentes culturales y religiosos entre una estructura estatal laica y la sociedad tradicionalmente musulmana sunita. Pone el centro del debate en los límites de la libertad religiosa de un grupo determinado, los alevís, en una estructura del Estado laico, que debe tratar de mantener su distancia hacia cualquier identidad religiosa, sin optar por ninguna de ellas. Por lo tanto, las determinaciones tienen el objetivo de destacar el lugar de los alevís en la historia política de la República de Turquía y hablar de las dificultades a las que se han enfrentado los alevís, como consecuencia de su identidad religiosa no reconocida oficialmente por ninguno de las dos identidades y sus consecuentes limitaciones. Palabras clave: alevismo, la historia política de la República de Turquía, el laicismo, la religión, el Islam político
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Menzies, Sarah R. « The Transformation of an Empire to a Nation-State : From the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey ». Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/443.
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The transformation of the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey involved reforming the government, redefining the relationship between the population and the ruling elite, and navigating ethnic and religious identities and how those identities affected the national identity. Unfortunately, these processes were accompanied by the suppression of religious and ethnic minorities, deportations, violence, and murder.
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Rubin, Aviad. « From marginalization to bounded integration - reassessing the compatibility of religion and democracy : a comparison of the state-religion relationship in Turkey and Israel ». Thesis, McGill University, 2010. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=92304.
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There is an inherent tension in the relationship between religion and democracy. While religion generally adheres to a single ultimate set of values, democracy requires political tolerance and the recognition of the coexistence of several truths.This is why, both intuitively and according to influential theories of modernization, the separation of religion and the state has been seen as a pre-condition for successful democratization. Yet a comparison of Israel and Turkey challenge the validity of such alleged "truths." This is because existing theories cannot adequately account for the dynamic nature of the state-religion relations. Israel, which assigned a formal role to religion in the state, was able to maintain stable democratic rule despite some major internal and external political challenges. Nevertheless, after three decades of constructive collaboration between the state and religious actors, the latter have increased their demands on the state in a manner that challenged the foundations of the regime, although so far the state has been successful in effectively containing them. In contrast, the Turkish state attempted to enforce strict secularization on society by marginalizing religion from public affairs through constitutional measures and military repression. Yet after eight decades trying, Turkish society remained far from being truly secular and the attempts to enforce secularism seriously undermined Turkish democracy.
To understand why this has been the case, the dissertation develops a model for the state-religion relationship, the Bounded Integration Model (BIM), that overcomes the over simplistic, static and deterministic nature of existing theories. The model demonstrates that religious actors should be understood as potential members in civil society, the dynamic interaction of which with the state determines the boundaries of civil society and the prospects for stable democratic governance.
The study concludes that there is a need to re-evaluate the relationship between the state and religion over time, and reconsider deterministic conclusions about the ability of some religions - Islam in particular - to peacefully co-exist with democratically governed states.
Il existe une crispation inhérente de la relation entre la religion et la démocratie. La religion, pour sa part, adhère à un seul et unique code de valeurs, tandis que la démocratie, elle, nécessite une tolérance politique et l'acceptation de la coexistence de plusieurs vérités.
C'est pour ces raisons que non seulement intuitivement, mais également selon les théories influentes de la modernisation, la séparation de la religion et de l'État est regardée comme la pierre angulaire d'une démocratisation réussie. Toutefois, une comparaison entre l'Israël et la Turquie conteste la validité de ces présumées vérités, et ce, parce que les théories actuelles ne peuvent expliquer convenablement la dynamique de la nature des relations entre la religion et l'État. D'une part, l'Israël, consacrant au sein de l'État un rôle officiel à la religion, a été en mesure de maintenir un gouvernement démocratique stable malgré certains enjeux politiques, internes et externes, importants. Néanmoins, après trois décennies de collaboration fructueuse entre l'État et les acteurs religieux, ces derniers ont augmenté leurs demandes envers l'État de sorte qu'elles s'opposaient aux assises du régime; jusqu'à maintenant, l'État a toutefois réussi à les limiter. D'autre part, l'État turque a tenté d'appliquer une sécularisation absolue en marginalisant la religion des affaires publiques par l'entremise de mesures constitutionnelles et de répression militaire. Pourtant, après huit années de persévérance, la Turquie demeure loin d'être un État réellement laïque et les efforts déployés dans le but d'appliquer ce laïcisme ont grandement nui à la démocratie.
Afin de comprendre le pourquoi de tels aboutissements, la présente dissertation propose un modèle intitulé le Modèle d'intégration limitée (MIL) illustrant la relation entre l'État et la religion en palliant la nature simpliste, statique et déterministe des théories actuelles. Ce modèle démontre que les acteurs religieux doivent être considérés comme étant des membres potentiels de la société civile dont l'interaction dynamique avec l'État déterminerait les limites de la société civile et les aspirations à une gouvernance démocratique stable.
Cette étude conclue qu'une réévaluation de la relation entre l'État et la religion au fil du temps est nécessaire et remet en question les conclusions déterministes sur la capacité de certaines religions notamment l'Islam de pouvoir coexister en paix avec des États gouvernés démocratiquement.
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Anshori, Ibnu. « Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno : a comparison of views regarding relations between state and religion ». Thesis, McGill University, 1994. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=26248.
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This work is a comparative study of the process of secularization in Turkey and Indonesia, with reference to the thought and policies of Mustafa Kemal and Sukarno. In their rational approach to religion and the concern to modernize their societies the two leaders were guided by a secularist paradigm of the relationship of state and religion that each formulated. The abolition of the sultanate-caliphate system, the end of Islam as the state religion and the replacement of Shari/'a by Western codes demonstrated the impact of modernization and secularization on Turkey. The "polity-dominance secularization" of Mustafa Kemal along with, among other thing, the abolition of religious education, the banning of the mystical orders, and the mandatory use of Turkish in Islamic ritual, made Turkey a completely secular state. In Indonesia, secularization was meant not only to serve the cause of modernization but also has had a special significance for ensuring the religious minority's support of the political system. Sukarno's decision to establish a quasi-secular Pancasila state was guided by a concern for political unity. However, unlike Mustafa Kemal, Sukarno avoided the strategy of overt opposition to religion, in order not to entail unacceptable political risks. Though the Indonesian Islamic parties have frequently opposed Sukarno's secularism, the Islamic ideological orientation was significantly moderated by Sukarno's pragmatic syncretism, as embodied in his manifesto NASAKOM (nationalism, religion and communism). Unlike in Turkey, Islamic parties were recognized, and Islamic courts and the system of religious education were integrated into the structure of state in Indonesia.
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Arjmand, Reza. « Inscription on Stone : Islam, State and Education in Iran and Turkey ». Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Institute of International Education, Dept. of Education, Stockholm University, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-8165.
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Sabeh, Mada. « Démocratie et religions au Proche-Orient : les cas du Liban, d'Israël, des Territoires palestiniens et de la Turquie ». Thesis, Paris 5, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA05H010/document.
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Existe-t-il un pluralisme démocratique, une démocratie différente de celle des normes « occidentales » ? C’est la question que nous nous sommes posés dans notre recherche, en partant sur une hypothèse affirmative, dans un contexte spécifique qui est celui de l’alliance communément contestée entre démocratie et religion. Nous avons décidé de nous pencher sur les démocraties du Proche-Orient, sur leurs particularismes liés au rapport étroit qui existe dans ces pays entre politique et religion. Les pays de la région qui sembleraient à nos yeux les plus démocratiques à ce jour sont le Liban, Israël (en incluant une étude des Territoires palestiniens également), et la Turquie. En tenant pour principes démocratiques l’égalité et la liberté, présents dans leurs constitutions respectives, nous avons décidé d’étudier les spécificités de chaque pays ; celui d’être un Etat confessionnel pour le Liban, un Etat Juif pour Israël, un Etat sans Etat pour les Territoires palestiniens, un Etat à la fois laïc, turc, et islamique pour la Turquie. Il existe des failles démocratiques dans chacun de ses Etats, que nous avons mises en évidence, tout comme des évolutions positives. Le nationalisme présent dans chacun de ces pays est particulièrement prononcé, selon les différentes communautés d’appartenances, ce qui fait de l’appartenance ethnique principale une appartenance nationale ; d’où notre choix ambitieux d’appeler ces Etats des démocraties ethniques, se basant sur l’ethnos (l’appartenance communautaire du peuple). C’est aussi en raison de cette condition qu’ils connaissent surtout des lacunes vis-à-vis de la reconnaissance d’autres appartenances, leurs minorités respectivesDoes a democratic pluralism exist, implying a democracy different from the "Western" standards? Based on a positive assumption, this is the question that we attempt to answer to in this research within a specific framework, namely the commonly contested alliance between democracy and religion. We have decided to study Middle-Eastern democracies with their specificities related to the narrow link that exists in those countries between politics and religion. The countries of the area that seemed, as of today, the most democratic to us are Lebanon, Israel (including a study of the Palestinian Territories) and Turkey. Based on the democratic principles of Equality and Liberty, also present in their respective constitutions, we have decided to look into the specificities of each country; such as being a confessional state for Lebanon, a Jewish state for Israel, a state without a state for the Palestinian Territories and a state being at the same time secular, Turkish and Islamic for Turkey. In each of these countries there are democratic flaws that we have highlighted, as well as positive evolutions. The Nationalism present in each of these countries is particularly pronounced according to the different communities to which one belongs, which leads the main ethnic to become a national identification, hence our ambitious choice to name these states ethnic democracies based on the ethnos (people's identification to a community). It is also because of this specificity that they encounter weaknesses towards the recognition of other identifications such as their respective minorities
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Paker, Hande. « Social aftershocks : rent seeking, state failure, and state-civil society relations in Turkey ». Thesis, McGill University, 2004. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=85026.
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This research emerged from the belief that merely economic explanations of rent seeking were too narrow and an interdisciplinary approach was needed to understand historical structural factors that contribute to particularistic exchanges. Rent-seeking and particularistic ties are almost always explained from a strictly neoclassical perspective which tend to be reductionist approaches that fail to explain why some states will be rent-seeking while others will not. Moreover, other frameworks that analyze state-civil society interaction do so without taking into account particularistic state-civil society interaction. Thus, there is a need to explain such particularistic ties in a comparative institutional framework. My dissertation research was undertaken on two associations in Turkey, namely the Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay) and AKUT (a search and rescue team), in order to understand the dynamics of the relationship between a particularistic state and civil society associations. The TRC was chosen because it was involved in particularistic exchanges and functioned as an institution of the state, which meant that it partook in the state failure the state in Turkey faced in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake in 1999. The Marmara earthquake was devastating not only physically in terms of the damage it caused, but also socially in terms of the extent of the failure of state institutions it exposed and the extent of criticisms it unleashed. The immediate chaos that ensued in the aftermath of the earthquake was marked by the "absence of the state". The failure of the state provoked an unprecedented civil reaction and mobilization. AKUT, the second case of the research, also became the focus of public attention, albeit for completely the opposite reason. It was revered for the successful rescue work it carried out in the earthquake while the TRC was severely criticized for its failure to deliver services.My dissertation research has shown that in cases of state failure, the state can only establish particularistic ties creating a multilevel chain system of particularized exchanges and fails to deliver public goods and services universally. Thus, the state co-opts a civil society organization into this chain system, demonstrated both by the TRC and AKUT. Furthermore, in cases of state failure, a civil society organization that has developed independently of the state becomes over-missionized with filling the gap created by state failure (AKUT), with public expectations and demands from AKUT far exceeding their self-defined goals and capabilities. Thus, ineffectiveness of the state does not translate into well-working civil society organizations. The absence of a capable state affects the nature of civil society organizations adversely. This finding is a direct contribution to the more general debate on the effectiveness of state institutions and the voluntary sector. More importantly, my research effectively shows that much of the dichotomous discussion of the state on the one hand, and civil society on the other, needs to be discarded. Such dichotomous thinking does not capture the complex interactions between the state and civil society organizations, as I have shown in the case of Turkey.
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Yavuz, Devrim Adam. « Business as usual ? : Turkish industrialists, the state and democratization ». Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=102234.
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There is a debate on the exact relationship between capitalist development and democracy. Some maintain that there is a theoretical and empirical affinity between the two, while others have demonstrated that authoritarian regimes have been as able to accommodate capitalist development. A major part of this debate revolves around the economic elite's political preferences, which in some cases is perceived as championing democracy while in others, especially in cases of late-development, as supporting the rise of authoritarianism or, in the least, benefiting from the deficiencies of limited democracy. The shifting position of this elite therefore begs the following question: Is there an instance under capitalist development that makes democracy more appealing to the business classes?To study this question, I have focused on the case of TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), a voluntary association made up of several hundred members and founded by the owners of the largest Turkish corporations, that has in 1997 published a report on democratization in Turkey which promoted major changes to the Turkish state and its institutions. The topic is of relevance to the above debate by presenting a case where individuals that were previously perceived as benefiting from the deficiencies of Turkish democracy and/or were too shy politically were promoting major changes to political life.
In order to understand the process behind this break and the shifting political attitude of the association's members, I have conducted several expert interviews with key actors from TUSIAD and the business community. I have also included a comparison between the case of TUSIAD and the demands of associations in the similar cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico in order to further test the generalizability of my case study.
My research and the dissertation suggest that changes in the activities of Turkish industry, characterized by economic development and a greater international integration achieved primarily through the European Union, present a new structure of opportunities and constraints for TUSIAD members. The factors that entrepreneurs perceive as being necessary for staying competitive and manage growingly complex enterprises not only make increased democracy more appealing but also create a tension between a segment of business, which is becoming increasingly formal, and a state that has traditionally depended on its informal ties with societies to strengthen its control.
However, my research reveals that these economic changes are not sufficient to constitute a radical break from the state. To understand the case of TUSIAD it should be taken into account that this has been possible because of the economic elite's increasing autonomy (due partly on endogenous changes and the opportunities that internationalization offers) and relationship to the state. Turkish political tradition has enabled the state and governments to isolate themselves from business more than in other cases studied. In fact, states in my comparative cases have tended to grant greater access to business, except for various periods, and as such affected its propensity to mobilize politically. It is therefore the apparent indifference of the Turkish state towards the needs and power of industry that has affected the attitude and ideology of businesspeople, thus leading to a greater break than what the current literature would predict. In outlining this process, the current dissertation therefore contributes to academic debate by outlining the manner in which a positive relationship between the needs of business classes and democracy develops, while maintaining that whether this will lead to a radical break is determined by state tradition.
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Aksu, Kenan. « Turkey-EU relations : beyond membership : army, religion, and energy ». Thesis, Goldsmiths College (University of London), 2015. http://research.gold.ac.uk/16752/.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This thesis examines the impact of Turkey-EU relations on Turkey's domestic political evolution in the 1990s and 2000s, with a focus on the evolution of the religious political parties, the changing position of the military and Turkey’s new energy politics. Although Turkey-EU relations resemble non-progressive affairs to many, in reality, they are as productive as any other relations that have resulted in the expected goal. Both Turkey and the EU made significant gains from this long lasting relationship. However, this thesis focuses more on the impact of these relations on Turkey. While engaging with the EU, Turkish domestic politics underwent a major evolution especially concerning the religiously motivated political parties; they were founded on anti-Western and pro-Islamic principles. However their attempt to come to power was continuously prevented by the secular forces, most importantly the army. In 2000s, realizing the importance of Europeanisation to help avoid the military’s intimidation, they became the real champions of Westernisation, contrary to their founding principles. Under Erdoğan’s leadership they started the accession negotiations with the EU. While Islamic political thinking was evolving, the position of the Turkish Armed Forces, who, directly or indirectly, drove Turkish politics since the 1960s, was also changing in favour of civilian control. Thanks to the EU initiated reform programs which were implemented by the religiously rooted JDP after 2002, the Turkish army’s heavy presence in civilian politics was reduced almost to zero. Again, close relations with the EU encouraged Turkey to become proactive within Eurasian energy politics. As well as the good relations with the West, Turkey also started utilizing its geostrategic positioning by trying to become the energy bridge, and perhaps energy hub, between the energy producers on its eastern borders with energy hungry Europe on its western borders.
Livres sur le sujet "Religion and state – Turkey"
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Kuru, Ahmet T. State policies toward religion : France, Turkey, and the United States. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2008.
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Religion and society : New perspectives from Turkey. Ankara : Presidency of Religious Affairs, 2006.
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Özdemir, Adil. Visible Islam in modern Turkey. New York : St. Martin's Press, 2000.
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Islam and secularism in Turkey : Kemalism, religion and the nation state. London : I.B. Tauris, 2010.
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Hazır, Agah. Religion-state relations in Turkey and Iran : Ideologies, institutions and international influences. Osmanbey, İstanbul : Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., 2018.
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Richard, Tapper, dir. Islam in modern Turkey : Religion, politics, and literature in a secular state. London : I.B. Tauris, 1991.
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Modernisation, religion and politics in Turkey : The case of the İskenderpaşa community. Merter, Istanbul : İnsan Publications, 2008.
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The transformation of Turkey : Redefining state and society from the Ottoman Empire to the modern era. London : I.B. Tauris, 2011.
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Çağdaş din hizmeti ve Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı : Dini otorite ve teşkilatların sosyolojik analizi. 2e éd. Kayseri [Turkey] : Laçin, 2006.
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Secularism and revivalism in Turkey : A hermeneutic reconsideration. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1998.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Religion and state – Turkey"
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Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi, et İştar Gözaydın. « Turkey : Religious Assistance in Prisons – State Monopoly of Religious Service ». Dans Boundaries of Religious Freedom : Regulating Religion in Diverse Societies, 391–400. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36834-0_24.
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Keskin, Tuğrul. « Market Oriented Post-lslamism in Turkey ». Dans Secular State and Religious Society, 121–42. New York : Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137010643_7.
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Demirtaş, Birgül. « State, Religion and Refugees : The Case of Turkey and Diyanet ». Dans Europe in Changes : The Old Continent at a New Crossroads, 139–53. Belgrade : Institute of International Politics ; Economics ; University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18485/iipe_euchanges.2021.ch7.
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Kuru, Ahmet T. « Rethinking Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion : The United States, France, and Turkey ». Dans Secularism in Comparative Perspective, 155–70. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13310-7_9.
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Heper, Metin. « Does Secularism Face a Serious Threat in Turkey ? » Dans Secular State and Religious Society, 79–94. New York : Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137010643_5.
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Rubin, Aviad. « Religious Actors in a Democratic Civil Society : Turkey and Israel Compared ». Dans Secular State and Religious Society, 167–93. New York : Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137010643_9.
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Kaya, Ayhan. « Europeanization and De-Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Migration Policies ». Dans EU-Turkey Relations, 347–72. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70890-0_14.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractThis chapter discusses Turkey’s efforts to align and then de-align its migration and asylum policies and laws with the European Union. It argues that the Europeanization of migration and asylum policies and laws corresponds to the internalization of a rights-based approach by state and societal actors in Turkey up until the beginning of the civil war in Syria. The period of the war corresponds to the ascent of the process of de-Europeanization of Turkey that has resulted in the framing of migration and asylum policies at the national and local levels in cultural and religious terms. The chapter argues that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has successfully accommodated the Syrian refugees on the basis of a religious rhetoric called ‘Ansar spirit’.
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Gürbey, Sinem. « Islam, Nation-State, and the Military : A Discussion of Secularism in Turkey ». Dans Secular State and Religious Society, 39–57. New York : Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137010643_3.
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Denli, Özlem. « Between Laicist State Ideology and Modern Public Religion : The Head-Cover Controversy in Contemporary Turkey ». Dans Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief : A Deskbook, 497–511. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5616-7_20.
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Azak, Umut. « Secularists as the Saviors of Islam : Rearticulation of Secularism and the Freedom of Conscience in Turkey (1950) ». Dans Secular State and Religious Society, 59–78. New York : Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137010643_4.
Texte intégralActes de conférences sur le sujet "Religion and state – Turkey"
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Karaman, Ebru. « Principle of Laicity in Turkish and French Constitutions ». Dans International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c11.02275.
Texte intégralRésumé :
To be assumed as a truly democratic state of law; the state should not make law according to a religion and not have a religion-based structure. Turkey and France are two countries different from others being in the discussions on secularism examining the relationship between religion and state. Because the laicity is one of the foundations of the regime and takes part in the legal system as a constitutional principle.
In the first chapter the provisions on laicity in the Turkish Constitutions before the date 1982 and in the Turkish Constitution dated 1982 are going to be explained then the discussions in Turkey are going to be evaluated according to the Turkish Constitutional Court's approach to the principle of laicity. In the second part the provisions on the principle of laicity in the French Constitution dated 1958 are going to be explained, afterwards the discussions on laicity in France is going to take place.
State and religion relations continue to be relevant a subject. That is why it still gives form to Turkish political life. The freedom of religion and the separation of religious and state relations are the requirements of the laic state. For a state these includes not to have an official religion, be impartial to all the religion and to treat equal to all the believers to different religions, to distinguish the religious institutions and state institutions and not to have an accordance between the rules of and the rules of religion.
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Ugur, Etga. « RELIGION AS A SOURCE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ? THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE ». Dans Muslim World in Transition : Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/clha2866.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper asks: when and under what conditions does religion become a source of coopera- tion rather than conflict? The Gülen movement is an Islamic social movement that bases its philosophy on increasing religious consciousness at the individual level and making Islam an important social force in the public sphere. It is this intellectual and social activism that has made the movement a global phenomenon and the focus of socio-political analysis. The Gülen community brings different sectors of society together to facilitate ‘collective intellectual effort’ and offer ‘civil responses’ to social issues, seeing this as a more subtle and legitimate way of influencing public debate and policy. To this end, the movement initiated a series of symposiums, known as Abant Workshops in Turkey. The scope of these meetings was later expanded to include a wider audience in Europe, the U.S., and the Middle East. This paper looks specifically at the Abant Workshops and the movement’s strategy of bridge building and problem-solving. It uses the press releases, transcripts and audio-visual records of the past 14 meetings to discuss their objectives and outcomes. This material is supplement- ed by interviews with key organisers from the Journalists and Writer Foundation and other participants. The discussion aims to understand how far religiously inspired social groups can contribute to the empowerment of civil society vis-à-vis the state and its officially secular ideology. Beyond that, it aims to explain the role of civil society organisations in democratic governance, and the possibility of creating social capital in societies lacking a clear ‘overlap- ping consensus’ on issues of citizenship, morality and national identity. The hesitancy at the beginning turns into friendship, the distance into understanding, stiff looks and tensions into humorous jokes, and differences into richness. Abant is boldly moving towards an institutionalization. The objective is evident: Talking about some of the problems the country is facing, debating them and offering solutions; on a civil ground, within the framework of knowledge and deliberation. Some labelled the ideas in the concluding declarations as “revolutionary,” “renaissance,” and “first indications of a religious reform.” Some others (in minority) saw them “dangerous” and “non-sense.” In fact, the result is neither a “revolution” nor “non-sense” It is an indication of a quest for opening new horizons or creating a novel vision. When and under what conditions does religion become a source of cooperation rather than conflict in the civil society? The Gülen movement is an Islamic social movement that bases its philosophy on increasing religious consciousness at the individual level and making Islam an important social force in the public sphere. It is this intellectual and social activism that raises the Gülen movement of Turkey as a global phenomenon to the focus of socio-political analysis. The Gülen community brings different sectors of the society together to create and facilitate a ‘common intellect’ to brainstorm and offer ‘civil responses’ to social issues. The move- ment sees this as a more subtle, but more effective, and legitimate way of influencing public debate and policy. Hence, the movement initiated a series of symposiums, known as Abant Workshops in Turkey. The scope of the meetings was later expanded to include a wider audi- ence in Europe, the U.S., and the Middle East. In early 1990s the Gülen Movement launched a silent but persistent public relations cam- paign. Fethullah Gülen openly met with the prominent figures of government and politics, and gave interviews to some popular newspapers and magazines. With a thriving media net- work, private schools, and business associations the movement seemed to have entered a new stage in its relations with the outside world. This new stage was not a simple outreach effort; it was rather a confident step to carve a niche in the increasingly diversified Turkish public sphere. The instigation of a series of workshops known as Abant Platforms was one of the biggest steps in this process. The workshops brought academics, politicians, and intellectu- als together to discuss some of the thorniest issues of, first, Turkey, such as secularism and pluralism, and then the Muslim World, such as war, globalization and modernization. This paper seeks to explain the motives behind this kind of an ambitious project and its possible implications for the movement itself, for Turkey and for the Muslim World in transition.
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Kuru, Ahmet T. « CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMISM AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY : THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT AND THE AK PARTY ». Dans Muslim World in Transition : Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/mmwz7057.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The debate between secularists and Islamic groups, a conspicuous feature of Turkish politics for decades, changed in the late 1990s when the political discourse of mainstream Islamic groups embraced secularism. The establishment elite advocate the existing French model of an ‘assertive secularism’, meaning that, in the public domain, the state supports only the ex- pression of a secular worldview, and formally excludes religion and religious symbols from that domain. The pro-Islamic conservatives, on the other hand, favour the American model of ‘passive secularism’, in which the state permits the expression of religion in the public do- main. In short, what Turkey has witnessed over the last decade is no longer a tussle between secularism and Islamism, but between two brands of secularism. Two actors have played crucial roles in this transformation: the Gülen movement and the Justice and Development (AK) Party. Recently the Gülen movement became an international actor and a defendant of passive secularism. Similarly, although the AK Party was originated from an Islamist Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement, it is now a keen supporter of Turkey’s membership to the European Union and defends (passive) secularist, democratic regime. This paper analyses the transformation of these important social and political actors with regard to certain structural conditions, as well as the interactions between them.In April 2007, the international media covered Turkey for the protest meetings of more than a million people in three major cities, the military intervention to politics, and the abortive presidential election. According to several journalists and columnists, Turkey was experienc- ing another phase of the ongoing tension between the secularists and Islamists. Some major Turkish newspapers, such as Hürriyet, were asserting that the secularists finally achieved to bring together millions of opponents of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma (Justice and Development) (AK) Party. In addition to their dominance in military and judicial bureauc- racy, the secularists appeared to be maintaining the support of the majority of the people. The parliamentary elections that took place few months later, in July, revealed that the main- stream Turkish media’s presentation was misleading and the so-called secularists’ aspira- tions were unrealistic. The AK Party received 47 percent of the national votes, an unusual ratio for a multiparty system where there were 14 contesting parties. The main opposition, Cumhuriyet Halk (Republican People’s) Party (CHP), only received 21 percent of the votes, despite its alliance with the other leftist party. Both the national and international media’s misleading presentation of Turkish politics was not confined by the preferences of the vot- ers. Moreover, the media was primarily misleading with its use of the terms “Islamists” and “secularists.” What Turkey has witnessed for the last decade has not been a struggle between secularism and Islamism; but it has been a conflict between two types of secularism. As I elaborated else- where, the AK Party is not an Islamist party. It defends a particular understanding of secular- ism that differs from that of the CHP. Although several leaders of the AK Party historically belonged to an Islamist -Milli Görüş (National Outlook)- movement, they later experienced an ideational transformation and embraced a certain type of secularism that tolerates public visibility of religion. This transformation was not an isolated event, but part of a larger expe- rience that several other Islamic groups took part in. I argue that the AKP leaders’ interaction with the Gülen movement, in this regard, played an important role in the formation of the party’s new perspective toward secularism. In another article, I analyzed the transformation of the AK Party and Gülen movement with certain external (globalization process) and internal (the February 28 coup) conditions. In this essay, I will focus on the interaction between these two entities to explore their changing perspectives. I will first discuss the two different types of secularism that the Kemalists and conservatives defend in Turkey. Then, I will briefly summarize diverse discourses of the Milli Görüş and Gülen movements. Finally, I will examine the exchanges between the Gülen movement and the AK Party with regard to their rethinking of Islamism and secularism.
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Usta, Emine Ebru. « The Effect of Culture on Economic Development and Turkey-Russia Economic Relations ». Dans International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c04.00647.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Globalization is worldwide integration of economical ,cultural,political,religious and social system.The incremental competitive conditions of nowadays make the firms not only analysis the other countries economic or political system but also cultural,religious and social systems. In this respect for globalization world , it is sure that culture and economy get the crucial role at the inter state relations.At the base of turkey and Russia also lays this dialog.For this reason in this study it is aimed that with current parameters tried to explain after diagnosis in general means the effects of culture on economical developments especially after 2001 economic recession- lives important regulation period in which known power transition world economy -Turkey,takes place in the developing countries, with Russia Federation ,important member of ascending market economy.
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Chukov, Vladimir S. « Socio-economic and spiritual-religious specifics of the Syrian Kurds ». Dans 7th International e-Conference on Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences. Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-conf.07.07065c.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This study aims to present the socio-economic and spiritual-religious specifics of the Syrian Kurds. The dominant agrarian livelihood of the “foreign Kurds” stimulates the preservation of the tribal-clan profile of their social structure. This directly reflects on the stability and strong resistance of the specific conservative political culture in which the political center is differentiated, due to non-social parameters. If religion (in a nuanced degree, ethnicity) plays a major role in the formation of the nation-building and state-building process among neighbors, Arabs and Turks, then in the Kurds, especially the Syrians, a similar function is played by the family cell. The main points in the article are: The Syrian Kurds; Armenians and Christians – Assyrians; The specific religious institutions of the Kurds. In conclusion: The main conclusion that can be drawn is that the Kurds in Syria are failing to create a large urban agglomeration, which pushes them to be constantly associated with the agricultural way of life. Even the small towns that were formed did not get a real urban appearance, as their inhabitants had numerous relatives who remained to live in the countryside.
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Kalyoncu, Mehmet. « BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY IN ETHNO-RELIGIOUSLY FRACTURED COMMUNITIES : “THE CASE OF THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT IN TURKEY AND ABROAD” ». Dans Muslim World in Transition : Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/oixq2070.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Civil society is generally associated with the presence of voluntary, non-governmental civic and social organisations, which are run by informed citizens and assume responsibility for monitoring state bodies and operations and mobilising available resources to maintain order and efficiency in the functioning of both state and society. Early civil society theorists argued the relevance of such voluntary associations to achieving a stable and functioning democracy. But what if the local conditions prevent the formation of such associations – if the social landscape is characterised by communal conflicts stemming from deeply entrenched ethno- religious differences? The reality of such conditions makes it imperative that strategies are re-formulated in ethno-religiously fractured societies, where what divides different segments of the population is more than what unites them. This paper argues that it is possible to develop such strategies. The argument is based on field research in Mardin on the activities of the faith-based Gülen movement. This group has succeeded in forging policies and programmes that bring different ethno-religious communities together as a necessary first step towards civil society: common problems facing the different ethno-religious communities are identified, then solid services to address those problems are provided, requiring collaborative effort by the different ethno-religious communities. In this way the social potential of those communities is mobilised and channelled to achieve shared goals which enrich the society as a whole.
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Ebaugh, Helen Rose, et Dogan Koc. « FUNDING GÜLEN-INSPIRED GOOD WORKS : DEMONSTRATING AND GENERATING COMMITMENT TO THE MOVEMENT ». Dans Muslim World in Transition : Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/mvcf2951.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The projects sponsored by the Gülen-inspired movement are numerous, international and costly in terms of human and financial capital. Critics of the movement often question the fi- nancing of these initiatives – with some convinced of collusion with Middle Eastern govern- ments, others (within Turkey) suspicious that Western governments are financially backing the projects. Aware of these criticisms, in a recent comment to a group of visiting follow- ers, Fethullah Gülen indicated greater financial transparency must become a priority for the movement. This paper addresses the financing of Gülen-inspired projects, based on interviews with busi- ness leaders in Turkey, as well as local businessmen throughout Turkey who constitute the financial infrastructure of the movement. In addition, the paper presents data from one local Gülen movement organisation in Houston, Texas, that collects thousands of dollars annually from local members, mostly students on small educational stipends. The paper is framed sociologically in terms of organisational theories of commitment. Beginning with Kanter (1972;1977) and including subsequent major figures in the organi- sational field (e.g. Reichers 1985; Meyer and Allen 1991; Hall 2002; Scott 2003), scholars have demonstrated a positive correlation between sacrifices asked of members and degree of commitment to the goals of the organisation. Using this perspective, the paper argues that the financial contributions made by members in the Gülen movement both demonstrate commit- ment to the ideals espoused by Fethullah Gülen and generate commitment to the movement. The paper presents empirical evidence, based on interviews with financial supporters both in Turkey and the U.S., of how financial resources are generated, the initiatives being supported and the impact of financial giving on the commitment of supporters. The Gülen movement is a civil society movement that arose in the late 1960s in Turkey, initially composed of a loose network of individuals who were inspired by M. Fethullah Gülen. As a state-approved mosque preacher, Gülen delivered sermons in cities throughout Turkey, beginning with a handful of listeners and gradually drawing tens of thousands of people. His sermons focused not only on religious texts but included a broad array of such topics as religion and science, social justice, human rights, moral values and the importance of education. Gülen repeatedly stressed the importance of educating the youth of society by establishing first-rate schools that expose students to the latest scientific knowledge in an at- mosphere of moral values. The projects sponsored by Gülen-inspired followers today number in the thousands, span international borders and are costly in terms of human and financial capital (Woodhall 2005). These initiatives include over 2000 schools and seven universities in more than ninety countries in five continents (Yavuz and Esposito 2003; Baskan 2004; Tekalan 2005), two modern hospitals, the Zaman newspaper (now in both a Turkish and English edition), a television channel (Samanyolu), a radio channel (Burc FM), CHA (a ma- jor Turkish news agency), Aksiyon (a leading weekly news magazine), national and interna- tional Gülen conferences, Ramadan interfaith dinners, interfaith dialog trips to Turkey from countries around the globe and the many programs sponsored by the Journalists and Writers Foundation. In addition, the Isik insurance company and Bank Asya, an Islamic bank, are af- filiated with the Gülen community. In 1993 the community also established the Business Life Cooperation Association (ISHAD) which has 470 members (Baskan 2004). Questions regarding the financing of these numerous and expensive projects are periodically raised by both critics of the Gülen Movement and newcomers to the movement who are invited to Gülen related events. Because of the large amounts of money involved in these projects, on occasion people have raised the possibility of a collusion between the movement and various governments, especially Saudi Arabia and/or Iran, and including the Turkish government. There has even been suspicion that the American CIA may be a financial partner behind the projects (Kalyoncu, forthcoming). Aware of these criticisms, in a recent comment to a group of visiting followers, Fethullah Gülen indicated that a priority must be proactive financial transparency. In this paper, we address directly the issue of the financing of Gülen inspired projects based on the little that is available in published sources, including an interview with Gülen himself, and supplementing that information with interviews with business leaders in Turkey who constitute the infrastructure of the movement. In addition, we present data from one local Gülen organization in Houston, Texas, that regularly collects over half a million dollars from local members, mostly students on small educational stipends. Our analysis is framed socio- logically in terms of organizational theories of commitment. We argue that the contributions made by rank and file movement members, as well as by wealthier sponsors, both demon- strate commitment to the ideals of the movement and simultaneously generate commitment to the movement. An analysis of Gülen-inspired financial contributions must include the ideological and reli- gious motivations inherent in the concepts of hizmet, himmet, sohbet, istisare, and mutevelli. For an understanding of these concepts, we are most indebted to the superb work of Mehmet Kalyoncu whose study of the Gülen movement in Mardin, a city in southeastern Turkey, was very helpful both in understanding these ideas and in demonstrating their applicability to the financing of local projects in the city.
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Vicini, Fabio. « GÜLEN’S RETHINKING OF ISLAMIC PATTERN AND ITS SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS ». Dans Muslim World in Transition : Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/gbfn9600.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Over recent decades Islamic traditions have emerged in new forms in different parts of the Muslim world, interacting differently with secular and neo-liberal patterns of thought and action. In Turkey Fethullah Gülen’s community has been a powerful player in the national debate about the place of Islam in individual and collective life. Through emphasis on the im- portance of ‘secular education’ and a commitment to the defence of both democratic princi- ples and international human rights, Gülen has diffused a new and appealing version of how a ‘good Muslim’ should act in contemporary society. In particular he has defended the role of Islam in the formation of individuals as ethically-responsible moral subjects, a project that overlaps significantly with the ‘secular’ one of forming responsible citizens. Concomitantly, he has shifted the Sufi emphasis on self-discipline/self-denial towards an active, socially- oriented service of others – a form of religious effort that implies a strongly ‘secular’ faith in the human ability to make this world better. This paper looks at the lives of some members of the community to show how this pattern of conduct has affected them. They say that teaching and learning ‘secular’ scientific subjects, combined with total dedication to the project of the movement, constitute, for them, ways to accomplish Islamic deeds and come closer to God. This leads to a consideration of how such a rethinking of Islamic activism has influenced po- litical and sociological transition in Turkey, and a discussion of the potential contribution of the movement towards the development of a more human society in contemporary Europe. From the 1920s onwards, in the context offered by the decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic thinkers, associations and social movements have proliferated their efforts in order to suggest ways to live a good “Muslim life” under newly emerging conditions. Prior to this period, different generations of Muslim Reformers had already argued the compat- ibility of Islam with reason and “modernity”, claiming for the need to renew Islamic tradition recurring to ijtihad. Yet until the end of the XIX century, traditional educational systems, public forms of Islam and models of government had not been dismissed. Only with the dismantlement of the Empire and the constitution of national governments in its different regions, Islamic intellectuals had to face the problem of arranging new patterns of action for Muslim people. With the establishment of multiple nation-states in the so-called Middle East, Islamic intel- lectuals had to cope with secular conceptions about the subject and its place and space for action in society. They had to come to terms with the definitive affirmation of secularism and the consequent process of reconfiguration of local sensibilities, forms of social organisation, and modes of action. As a consequence of these processes, Islamic thinkers started to place emphasis over believers’ individual choice and responsibility both in maintaining an Islamic conduct daily and in realising the values of Islamic society. While under the Ottoman rule to be part of the Islamic ummah was considered an implicit consequence of being a subject of the empire. Not many scientific works have looked at contemporary forms of Islam from this perspective. Usually Islamic instances are considered the outcome of an enduring and unchanging tradition, which try to reproduce itself in opposition to outer-imposed secular practices. Rarely present-day forms of Islamic reasoning and practice have been considered as the result of a process of adjustment to new styles of governance under the modern state. Instead, I argue that new Islamic patterns of action depend on a history of practical and conceptual revision they undertake under different and locally specific versions of secularism. From this perspective I will deal with the specific case of Fethullah Gülen, the head of one of the most famous and influent “renewalist” Islamic movements of contemporary Turkey. From the 1980s this Islamic leader has been able to weave a powerful network of invisible social ties from which he gets both economic and cultural capital. Yet what interests me most in this paper, is that with his open-minded and moderate arguments, Gülen has inspired many people in Turkey to live Islam in a new way. Recurring to ijtihad and drawing from secular epistemology specific ideas about moral agency, he has proposed to a wide public a very at- tractive path for being “good Muslims” in their daily conduct. After an introductive explanation of the movement’s project and of the ideas on which it is based, my aim will be to focus on such a pattern of action. Particular attention will be dedi- cated to Gülen’s conception of a “good Muslim” as a morally-guided agent, because such a conception reveals underneath secular ideas on both responsibility and moral agency. These considerations will constitute the basis from which we can look at the transformation of Islam – and more generally of “the religion” – in the contemporary world. Then a part will be dedicated to defining the specificity of Gülen’s proposal, which will be compared with that of other Islamic revivalist movements in other contexts. Some common point between them will merge from this comparison. Both indeed use the concept of respon- sibility in order to push subjects to actively engage in reviving Islam. Yet, on the other hand, I will show how Gülen’s followers distinguish themselves by the fact their commitment pos- sesses a socially-oriented and reformist character. Finally I will consider the proximity of Gülen’s conceptualisation of moral agency with that the modern state has organised around the idea of “civic virtues”. I argue Gülen’s recall for taking responsibility of social moral decline is a way of charging his followers with a similar burden the modern state has charged its citizens. Thus I suggest the Islamic leader’s pro- posal can be seen as the tentative of supporting the modernity project by defining a new and specific space to Islam and religion into it. This proposal opens the possibility of new and interesting forms of interconnection between secular ideas of modernity and the so-called “Islamic” ones. At the same time I think it sheds a new light over contemporary “renewalist” movements, which can be considered a concrete proposal about how to realise, in a different background, modern forms of governance by reconsidering their moral basis.
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Koychuev, Turar, et Merim Koichueva. « On the Non-Economic Factors of Impact on the Eurasian Economic Cooperation ». Dans International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c06.01287.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Treat the entire Asia and Europe as a geo-economic space is impossible and counterproductive. In our opinion, Eurasian geo-economic space can be considered as a geographical area, which is the junction between Europe and Asia. Geographically, it is - the Urals, the Volga region, the Caspian Sea region of Russia, post-Soviet Central Asia, the Caucasus and the territory where Turkey and Xinjiang is located. The economic interests of the Eurasian countries for "unity" can be the same, but there are non-economic conditions (state and political system, the mode of government - authoritarian, democratic, way of life of the state - secular, religious, moral and cultural values, ideological differences, and historical features of interethnic relations) that as factors may influence positively or negatively.
Principles of formation of the Eurasian Economic Cooperation shall include economic feasibility and mutual benefit, political loyalty, ideological, philosophical and ethnic tolerance, peer contacts, peace-loving nature and solving conflict with a positive decision.
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Demir, Emre. « THE EMERGENCE OF A NEO-COMMUNITARIAN MOVEMENT IN THE TURKISH DIASPORA IN EUROPE : THE STRATEGIES OF SETTLEMENT AND COMPETITION OF GÜLEN MOVEMENT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY ». Dans Muslim World in Transition : Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/bkir8810.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper examines the organisational and discursive strategies of the Gülen movement in France and Germany and its differentiation in Turkish Islam in Europe, with the primary focus on the movement’s educational activities. The paper describes the characteristics of organisational activity among Turkish Muslims in Europe. Then it analyses two mainstream religious-communitarian movements and the contrasting settlement strategies of the “neo- communitarian” Gülen movement. Despite the large Turkish population in western Europe, the movement has been active there for only about ten years – relatively late compared to other Islamic organisations. Mainly, the associational organisation of Turkish Islam in Europe is based on two axes: the construction/ sponsoring of mosques and Qur’anic schools. By contrast, the Gülen movement’s members in Europe, insisting on ‘the great importance of secular education’, do not found or sponsor mosques and Qur’anic schools. Their principal focus is to address the problems of the immi- grant youth population in Europe, with reintegration of Turkish students into the educational system of the host societies as a first goal. On the one hand, as a neo-communitarian religious grouping, they strive for a larger share of the ‘market’ (i.e. more members from among the Turkish diaspora) by offering a fresh religious discourse and new organisational strategies, much as they have done in Turkey. On the other hand, they seek to gain legitimacy in the public sphere in Germany and France by building an educational network in these countries, just as they have done in Central Asia and the Balkans region. Accordingly, a reinvigorated and reorganised community is taking shape in western Europe. This paper examines the organizational and discursive strategies1 of the Gülen movement in France and Germany and it is differentiation in Turkish Islam in Europe. We seek to analyse particularly the educational activities of this movement which appeared in the Islamic scene in Diaspora of Europe for the last 10 years. We focus on the case of Gülen movement because it represents a prime example amongst Islamic movements which seek to reconcile-or ac- commodate- with the secular system in Turkey. In spite of the exclusionary policy of Turkish secular state towards the religious movements, this faith-based social movement achieved to accommodate to the new socio-political conditions of Turkey. Today, for many searchers, Gülen movement brings Islam back to the public sphere by cross-fertilizing Islamic idioms with global discourses on human rights, democracy, and the market economy.2 Indeed, the activities of Gülen movement in the secular context of France and Germany represent an interesting sociological object. Firstly, we will describe the characteristics of organizational ability of Anatolian Islam in Europe. Then we will analyse the mainstream religious-com- munitarian movements (The National Perspective movement and Suleymanci community) and the settlement strategies of the “neo-communitarian”3 Gülen movement in the Turkish Muslim Diaspora. Based on semi-directive interviews with the directors of the learning centres in Germany and France and a 6 month participative observation of Gülen-inspired- activities in Strasbourg; we will try to answer the following questions: How the movement appropriates the “religious” manner and defines it in a secular context regarding to the host/ global society? How the message of Gülen is perceived among his followers and how does it have effect on acts of the Turkish Muslim community? How the movement realises the transmission of communitarian and `religious’ values and-especially-how they compete with other Islamic associations? In order to answer these questions, we will make an analysis which is based on two axes: Firstly, how the movement position within the Turkish-Islamic associational organisation? Secondly, we will try to describe the contact zones between the followers of Gülen and the global society.
Rapports d'organisations sur le sujet "Religion and state – Turkey"
1
Demir, Mustafa. Creating the Desired Citizen : Ideology, State and Islam in Turkey by Ihsan Yilmaz. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), février 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/br0008.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Ihsan Yılmaz’s new book presents a detailed analysis of Turkey’s political and sociological evolution, from the country’s anxious birth as a “fearful nation,” preoccupied and weighed down by historical traumas to the present. Yılmaz’s study provides a detailed account of the polity’s “never-ending” nation-building process and offers keen insights into why this process is intransient. His book highlights the political nature of defining citizens as either “desired,” “tolerated,” or “undesired” and the way this definitional process functions as a tool in hegemonic rivalries between “political tribes” in polities such as Turkey.
2
Demir, Mustafa. What Went Wrong in Turkey ? European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), avril 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/br0001.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The volume titled Islamism, Populism, and Turkish Foreign Policy, edited by Burak Bilgehan Ozpek and Bill Park (Routledge, 2019), reveals that Islamism and populism have long united forces in Turkey to mobilize the masses from the periphery to the center to capture the state “by” the support of the people, but neither “for” nor “with” them.
3
Bourhrous, Amal, Shivan Fazil et Dylan O’Driscoll. Post-conflict Reconstruction in the Nineveh Plains of Iraq : Agriculture, Cultural Practices and Social Cohesion. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, novembre 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55163/raep9560.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The atrocities committed by the Islamic State (IS) between 2014 and 2017 left deep scars on the Nineveh Plains in northern Iraq. IS deliberately targeted ethnic and religious communities with the aim of erasing the traces of diversity, pluralism and coexistence that have long characterized the region. To prevent people from living as Assyrians, Chaldeans, Kaka’i, Shabaks, Syriacs, Turkmen and Yazidis, IS destroyed sites of cultural and religious significance to these communities and devastated their livelihoods, including their crop and livestock farming activities. Using a people-centered approach, this SIPRI Research Policy Paper stresses the need for a holistic approach to post-conflict reconstruction in the Nineveh Plains that not only focuses on rebuilding the physical environment and economic structures, but also pays adequate attention to restoring the ability of communities to engage in cultural and religious practices, and to mending social and intercommunity relations. The paper highlights the interconnectedness of physical environments, economic structures, cultural practices and social dynamics. It stresses the need to address the impacts of the IS occupation while taking into account other pressing challenges such as climate change and water scarcity.
4
Yilmaz, Ihsan, Raja M. Ali Saleem, Mahmoud Pargoo, Syaza Shukri, Idznursham Ismail et Kainat Shakil. Religious Populism, Cyberspace and Digital Authoritarianism in Asia : India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey. European Center for Populism Studies, janvier 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/5jchdy.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies. The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish. The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa. The key findings of our survey are as follows: The future of (especially) fragile democracies is highly intertwined with digital space. There is an undeniable nexus between faith and populism which offers an insight into how cyberspace and politics offline have become highly intertwined. Religion and politics have merged in these five countries to shape cyber governance. The cyber governance policies of populist rulers mirror their undemocratic, repressive, populist, and authoritarian policies offline. As a result, populist authoritarianism in the non-digital world has increasingly come to colonize cyberspace, and events online are more and more playing a role in shaping politics offline. “Morality” is a common theme used to justify the need for increasingly draconian digital laws and the active monopolization of cyberspace by government actors. Islamist and Hindutva trolls feel an unprecedented sense of cyber empowerment, hurling abuse without physically seeing the consequences or experiencing the emotional and psychological damage inflicted on their victims.
5
Yilmaz, Ihsan, Raja M. Ali Saleem, Mahmoud Pargoo, Syaza Shukri, Idznursham Ismail et Kainat Shakil. Religious Populism, Cyberspace and Digital Authoritarianism in Asia : India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), janvier 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/rp0001.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies. The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish. The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa. The key findings of our survey are as follows: The future of (especially) fragile democracies is highly intertwined with digital space. There is an undeniable nexus between faith and populism which offers an insight into how cyberspace and politics offline have become highly intertwined. Religion and politics have merged in these five countries to shape cyber governance. The cyber governance policies of populist rulers mirror their undemocratic, repressive, populist, and authoritarian policies offline. As a result, populist authoritarianism in the non-digital world has increasingly come to colonize cyberspace, and events online are more and more playing a role in shaping politics offline. “Morality” is a common theme used to justify the need for increasingly draconian digital laws and the active monopolization of cyberspace by government actors. Islamist and Hindutva trolls feel an unprecedented sense of cyber empowerment, hurling abuse without physically seeing the consequences or experiencing the emotional and psychological damage inflicted on their victims.
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Alpaydın, Yusuf. EDUCATION IN THE TURKEY OF THE FUTURE. İLKE İlim Kültür Eğitim Vakfı, décembre 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/gt008.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The first report prepared under the Turkey of the Future project is on education, where our country has long been in a search for stability and methodology. The report aims to realistically study in 2018 what needs to be accomplished when looking forward to 2030 using quantitative and qualitative data. In this context, the study begins by explaining the state of education in the new millennium and the problems experienced from this perspective. The context necessary in resolving the issues and bettering current circumstances has been also emphasized in the purview of the report. Along with these improvements, students’ national and international examination performances are also analyzed. Finally, the developed policies, solution recommendations, and improvements have been presented in 12 points on the vision of the future. In preparing the report, the primary framework has been shaped by the relevant scientific literature, the framework and principal values established by the İLKE Foundation for Science, Culture and Education within the scope of the Turkey of the Future Project, and the educational perspectives of the research team. Besides multidisciplinarity and systems approach, locality and originality have been the two principal values when preparing this report.
7
Yilmaz, Ihsan, Zahid Ahmed, Galib Bashirov, Nicholas Morieson et Kainat Shakil. Islamist Populists in Power : Promises, Compromises and Attacks on Democratic Institutions. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), août 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/pp0013.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper comparatively examines the ruling religious populist governments in Turkey and Pakistan through a theoretical framework that focuses on populists’ promises, their compromises, and their attacks on democratic institutions. Through our three-legged framework, we examine how these religious populists behave in power and how strategic necessities, the realities of governing, and structural constraints shape their policies. Similar to the other populists in other parts of the world, before coming to power, Islamist populists make sweeping promises to the people and quick fixes to major problems of the country—most famously, quick and substantial economic development. While they may want to retain their uncompromising style and lofty goals, the realities of governing force populists to make serious compromises to their designated ‘enemies’ and on their values once they are in power. Finally, like other authoritarian politicians, Islamist populists attack formal institutions of democracy such as the judiciary, the media, and civil society; they politicize them, evacuate them, and eventually capture them from within. Keywords: Religion, populism, Islamism, authoritarianism, populists in power, democratic backsliding, Turkey, Pakistan
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Yilmaz, Ihsan, et Nicholas Morieson. Nationalism, Religion, and Archaeology : The Civilizational Populism of Benjamin Netanyahu and Likud. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), octobre 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/pp0015.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper examines civilizational populism in Israel and focuses on the largest and most powerful party in Israel since the 1980s, National Liberal Movement (Likud), and its most significant leader of the past twenty years, the populist politician Benjamin Netanyahu. We show how Netanyahu incorporates ‘civilizationism’ into his populist discourses by, first, using the notion that Jewish civilization predates all others in the region to establish the legitimacy of the state of Israel, the hegemony of Jewish culture within Israel, and at times his own political decisions. Second, through his portrayal of the Arab-Muslim world as an antisemitic and barbaric bloc that, far from being a civilization, threatens Western civilization through its barbarism. Equally, this paper shows how Netanyahu argues that Israel is akin to protective wall that protects Western Civilization from the Islamist barbarians who wish to destroy it, and therefore on this basis calls for Europeans and North Americans to support Israel in its battle for civilization and against “the forces of barbarism.”
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Ludlow, Scott, Wai-Fah Chen et Philippe Bourdeau. Interim report : Embankment Widening and Grade Raising on Soft Foundation Soils, Example I - Indiana State Route 55 Over Turkey Creek in Lake County, Indiana. West Lafayette, IN : Purdue University, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.5703/1288284313413.
Texte intégral
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Shammo, Turkiya, Diana Amin Saleh et Nassima Khalaf. Displaced Yazidi Women in Iraq : Persecution and Discrimination Based on Gender, Religion, Ethnic Identity and Displacement. Institute of Development Studies, décembre 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/creid.2022.010.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This CREID Policy Briefing provides recommendations to address the marginalisation, discrimination and exclusion faced by displaced Yazidi women in Iraq. Throughout the history of their presence in Iraq, the Yazidis have experienced harassment, persecution, killing and displacement. Most recently, they have been exposed to genocide from the Islamic State (ISIS) group after they took control of Sinjar district and the cities of Bahzani and Bashiqa in the Nineveh Plain in 2014, destroying Yazidi homes, schools, businesses and places of worship. Yazidi people were killed or forced to convert to Islam. Over 6,000 were kidnapped, including over 3,500 women and girls, many of whom were forced into sexual slavery. Men and boys were murdered or forced to become soldiers. Any remaining citizens were displaced. Seven years later, more than 2,000 Yazidi women and children were still missing or in captivity, more than 100,000 Yazidis had migrated abroad, and over 200,000 Yazidi people were still displaced, living in camps.