Articles de revues sur le sujet « Public debt. Political uncertainty. Sovereign default »

Abstract Lienau’s book on ‘Rethinking Sovereign Debt’ delves into international finance to shed light on its background rules, overarching ideologies and interacting actors, disentangling the social norm of sovereign debt continuity and its institutional foundations. What a formalistic legal reasoning would interpret as a self-contained bilateral contract is then situated in historical time and social space populated by a variety of actors (debtors and creditors), co-existing legal regimes and evolving principles of reference. Her focus on odious debt highlights situations where debt continuity is challenged by major events in the sovereign borrower status (such as major political regime change, corruption and human rights abuse) which challenge debt legitimacy. This comment expands on her thoughtful analysis by linking debt continuity to the borrowing sovereign entity as a going concern. Sovereign borrowing makes lenders involved with this ongoing entity through time and circumstances. Ongoing sovereign debt management is featured by both debt securities market trading and the refinancing mechanism. In turn, refinancing involves public finances with their public benefit missions, central banking and the monetary base management. In this context, socially responsible lending and borrowing may be facilitated by acknowledging the bonding relationship between the borrowing sovereign entity and its creditors, including when default occurs.

The subject matter of this paper are specific causes of sovereign debt default of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1932. In the first part of the paper, time series of public debt, with the subcategories of domestic and foreign public debt, for the period from 1929 to 1939, were constructed on the basis of data from Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the League of Nations. In the second part of the paper, the sustainability of public debt of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia has been measured with help of relevant macroeconomic indicators: public debt-to-GDP ratio and debt service-to-public revenue ratio. In the third part of the paper, decomposition of public debt data has been made with respect to the methodology used in Statistical Yearbook of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This decomposition has shown that public debt accumulation had to do little if anything with the Great Depression and was to a large extent caused by political, economic and financial consequences of the Great War.

This article analyses the factors that seem to play an important role in determining the cost of sovereign debt. Specifically, we evaluate to what extent transparency, the level of corruption, citizens’ trust in politicians and credit ratings affect interest rates. For that purpose, we create a transparency index matching the 2007 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/World Bank Budgeting Database items with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Best Practices for Budget Transparency sections. We also check our assumptions with the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index and with a non-linear transformation of our index. Furthermore, we use several control variables for a sample of 103 countries in the year 2008. Our results show that better fiscal transparency, political trust and credit ratings are connected with a lower cost of sovereign debt. Finally, as expected, higher corruption, budget deficits, current account deficits and unemployment make sovereign interest rates increase. Points for practitioners The key implications for professionals working in public management and administration are twofold. First, despite the criticism raised by credit ratings, it is clear that poorer ratings are connected with higher financing costs for governments. Therefore, governments should enhance those indicators that impact the credit rating of their sovereign debt. Second, governments should seek to be more transparent, since transparency reduces uncertainty about the degree of cheating, improves decision-making and therefore decreases the cost of debt. Transparency reduces information asymmetries between governments and financial markets, which, in turn, diminishes the spread requested by investors.

Much empirical research has been carried out to test the presence of contagion in European sovereign debt crisis since the beginning of 2010. In this paper I will consider contagion as a change in the transmission mechanism of shock, illustrating co-movement among the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) markets of seven European countries and the UK from November 2008 up until June 2013. By examining daily pricing data of the five-year sovereign CDS contracts of these countries, I found a large increase in the volatility in the period of crisis, and hence a correlation test is invalid, but parametric method with GARCH residual time series and quantile regression approach are applicable. The first test modelling time series’ residuals by GARCH formula shows no contagion. In the second method, slope equality tests analyse the stability in linear relationship among markets across quantile and find no evidence of contagion. This final result of no contagion during the debt crisis suggests that the reason of the sovereign risk’s propagation is the conventional interdependence among countries, not the greatness of the shock.

Abstract Many previous studies have documented the procyclicality of fertility to business cycles or labour market indicators in Western countries. However, part of the recent fertility decline witnessed since the Great Recession has been left unexplained by traditional measures. The present study advances the notion that birth postponement might have accelerated in response to rising uncertainty, which fuelled negative expectations and declining levels of confidence about the future. To provide empirical support for the causal effect of perceived uncertainty on birth rates, we focus on Italy’s sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012 as a natural experiment. Perceived uncertainty is measured using Google trends for the term ‘spread’—which acted as somewhat of a barometer for the crisis both in the media and everyday conversations—to capture the general public’s degree of concern about the stability of Italian public finances. A regression discontinuity in time identifies the effect of perceived uncertainty on birth rates in Italy as a drop between 1.5% and 5%, depending on model specification.

Motivation: SCDS contracts, based on treasury bonds, are used to assess credit risk. Observation of changes in these instruments provides information on the current economic situation of individual countries. By correlating them with the economic assessment of individual countries, SCDS indicate the risk level of bankruptcy of a given country and thus play an informative role on the global financial market. Aim: The objective of the study is to investigate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the level of credit risk in Poland. This aim will be achieved by determining the level and the dynamics of changes of SCDS spreads, and by identifying the determinants of changes in the level of SCDS spreads before and after the pandemic. The study hypothesises that as a result of the supply and demand shocks caused by the outbreak of the Covid-19, the level of Polish SCDS spreads increased due to macroeconomic factors. Results: The results of the study confirmed that due to the panic, Poland’s credit risk increased dynamically in the first stage of the Covid-19. However, over time, the level of credit risk in Poland decreased. Nevertheless, the reduction in Poland’s credit risk is accompanied by an increase in public debt, with a simultaneous deterioration in macroeconomic indicators. This evidence suggests that SCDS spreads are not capable of reflecting the foundations of the economy during uncertainty. The results of this study indicate that the fundamental determinants of credit risk changes occurred before and during the pandemic. However, the results showed that the magnitude of their impact on credit risk is different. Multiple linear regression analysis also showed that during the Covid-19, macroeconomic factors showed a significantly higher degree of correlation with credit risk compared to non-economic factors directly related to the effects of the pandemic.

AbstractTo complement the ‘no shared liability’ rule and public deficit limits, the Maastricht Treaty gave the European Central Bank (ECB) a narrow remit to focus on price stability. Crucially, as a ‘non-sovereign’ central bank, it was unclear that the ECB would act as lender of last resort in the event of market panics. The neoliberal orthodoxy at the heart of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) held that moral hazard and inflationary risks militated against anything resembling ‘illegal monetary financing’. Following monetary union, markets under-priced risks and encouraged bubbles, but, with the onset of the crisis, sentiment overshot the other way, starving credit from banks and later sovereigns. With bailout funds limited and austerity failing to improve debt spreads, sovereigns became illiquid. ECB officials reluctantly concluded that an uncontrolled sovereign default would threaten the continuation of monetary union. The ECB was thus forced de facto to expand its mandate, first to help banks and, later, to help sovereigns facing loss of access to bond markets. Ultimately this was successful in restoring confidence, but the ECB remained uncomfortable with its role. It has continued to stress its legal limitations and has pressed for reformed governance to enforce fiscal discipline. The economic case for a lender of last resort in a crisis was always strong, but brings with it a worsening moral hazard problem that may invite leaders to avoid the deeper political changes necessary to rebalance the Eurozone.

Abstract To complement the ‘no shared liability’ rule and public deficit limits, the Maastricht Treaty gave the European Central Bank (ECB) a narrow remit to focus on price stability. Crucially, as a ‘non-sovereign’ central bank, it was unclear that the ECB would act as lender of last resort in the event of market panics. The neoliberal orthodoxy at the heart of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) held that moral hazard and inflationary risks militated against anything resembling ‘illegal monetary financing’. Following monetary union, markets under-priced risks and encouraged bubbles, but, with the onset of the crisis, sentiment overshot the other way, starving credit from banks and later sovereigns. With bailout funds limited and austerity failing to improve debt spreads, sovereigns became illiquid. ECB officials reluctantly concluded that an uncontrolled sovereign default would threaten the continuation of monetary union. The ECB was thus forced de facto to expand its mandate, first to help banks and, later, to help sovereigns facing loss of access to bond markets. Ultimately this was successful in restoring confidence, but the ECB remained uncomfortable with its role. It has continued to stress its legal limitations and has pressed for reformed governance to enforce fiscal discipline. The economic case for a lender of last resort in a crisis was always strong, but brings with it a worsening moral hazard problem that may invite leaders to avoid the deeper political changes necessary to rebalance the Eurozone.

The European economy is just recovering after the crisis and is facing numerous problems that prevent the transition to a sustainable economic growth. Among the most significant problems are massive fiscal deficits and public debt. This imposes the risks of default and can cause a collapse of national economies’ encouragement programs. Large-scale foreign trade imbalances threaten the already shaky stability of the global monetary and financial system. Huge amounts of speculative capital contribute to the formation of price bubbles in the domestic and international stock and commodity markets. It is obvious that these difficulties are systemic by their nature. In order to overcome them the leading European states have to undertake decisive and concerted measures for the restructuring of the existing economic order. An understanding of the respective need is currently declared at the highest political level, including the European Central Bank and G20. In practice, however, the efforts so far are concentrated mainly on the soft and cautious reform of the regulation of financial markets in the countries of the Eurozone. Implementation of the steps to create a more reliable and secure European financial and economic architecture is restrained by dramatic differences in the interests of the leading countries. According to most analysts, efforts to overcome this are likely to fail in the coming years. The failure to address fundamental problems of the financial crisis increases the uncertainty of the development of the European economy and creates the preconditions for new crisis situations.

The current COVID-19 pandemic highlighted something that was already known for decades: modern governments need to master the art of equilibristics – they need to offer public value in all governance arenas while battling increasing levels of uncertainty and change. Looking back at the last decade, unpredictable change has been the norm rather than the exception (whether it is at political level – Arab Spring (2011), 2016 US elections, Brexit (2016) – social – Occupy Wall Street movement (2011), EU migrant-refugee crisis (2016), Black Lives Matter, #Metoo movement – or economic – the economic crisis of 2008, which prompted the sovereign debt crisis in multiple EU countries, China replacing the US as the largest economy) the environment in which governments operate in has never seen such a particular type of dynamic. The COVID-19 pandemic can be seen almost as an organic culmination of this dynamic, a perfect storm, highlighting the essence of the new environment in which governments operate: highly complex, unpredictable, and interdependent – in one word turbulent. The point is not to discuss the nature of these changes or whether they match perfectly the definition of a black swan event, but rather to raise an important question: how should governments (and society as a whole) react and adapt to such challenges? Are the current institutional structures and patterns of governing able to deal with this turbulence? From a governance perspective, two major concepts stand out as a potential framework of dealing with such situations: adaptive governance (Hatfield-Dodds, 2007) and turbulent governance (Ansell, Trondal and Øgård, 2017).

This article analyzes the state–market nexus by examining the role played by sovereign credit default swap (CDS) derivative markets in the southern European debt crisis of 2010–2014. This nexus is conceived of as being part of a larger process of state financialization and, more specifically, of sovereign debt management. This article shows that the southern European debt crisis was triggered by the deterioration of fundamental macroeconomic variables—not self-fulfilling dynamics driven by speculation. Moreover, the financialization of public debt markets may generate opportunities for governments to manage their public financing needs, which illustrates the complex nexus between markets and governments.

Repeated crises have proven credit rating agency (CRA) models/methods erroneous and “business-as-usual” unsustainable. Nevertheless, considerable dubious “default risk” management and technoscientific capitalist expertise remain unchanged. Unpacking sovereign ratings, we appreciate how “debt sustainability analysis” (DSA) distortions underpin expertocratic CRA (default) anomaly. Their neoliberal “politics of limits” performance helps market (shareholder) imperatives trump those of democratic (stakeholder) politics. Given surging inflation and debt (distress) to remedy Covid-19-induced shocks, ratings aid constitute and (re)validate the subjectivities/affinities and organizational conditions advancing a “self-equilibrating,” “self-generative” agencement political economy of creditworthiness (PEC). Antagonizing sustainable budgetary government’s programmatic/expertocratic and operational/democratic asymmetry, econophysics ratings diminish fiscal sovereignty. Universal PEC management through hybrid credit risk/uncertainty qualculation mitigates negative externality contestation shielding CRAs from serious reform. Ratings procyclicality and contagion reinforce this precarious sociotechnical agencement PEC as the status quo.

Global capital markets can react dramatically to elections in developing countries, affecting governments’ access to finance and sometimes setting off broader crises. We argue, contrary to some conventional wisdom, that investors do not systematically react to the election of left-leaning parties and candidates. Government ideology is often an imprecise heuristic, given the diversity in policies among parties, especially those on the left. We therefore expect that neither elections generally, nor elections that produce specific partisan outcomes, are associated with significant changes in sovereign financing costs. Yet we also predict that the election of left-leaning parties will generate volatility in sovereign bond markets, reflecting investors’ uncertainty over future policy outcomes. This volatility is especially pronounced when new governments take office; over time, however, government policy performance enables investors to make increasingly precise estimates of political risk. Volatility has implications for the real economy, as well as for governments’ ability to manage their debt. We test, and find support for, our core expectations using monthly data on sovereign bond spreads and credit default swap prices for 74 developing countries from 1994–2015.

Recent Developments and Outlook. Barbados has continued to make good progress in implementing its Economic Recovery and Transformation (BERT) plan to restore fiscal and debt sustainability, rebuild reserves, and increase growth—but now faces a major challenge owing to the global coronavirus pandemic. Since May 2018, international reserves have recovered, helping rebuild confidence in the country’s macroeconomic framework. This has helped rebuild confidence in the country’s macroeconomic framework, though reserves are expected to be negatively impacted by the crisis in the months ahead. The completion of the external debt restructuring in December 2019 has reduced economic uncertainty, and the agreed terms with creditors have put public debt on a clear downward trajectory. On December 11, 2019, Standard and Poor’s upgraded Barbados’ foreign currency sovereign credit rating from Selective Default to B-. However, prospects for 2020 have deteriorated significantly owing to the global pandemic, and risks to the outlook are now very high and tilted to the downside.

Purpose- Governments and Central Banks are critical actors in avoiding big swings like recessions, destabilizing inflations, or stagflations. On top of that, they might interact with different tools and resources to realize their own macro-financial purposes and interests. They engage in concrete macro-financial processes to reshape monetary regimes. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, major central banks held interest rates at zero or in a negative zone, yet global inflation remained low anyway. Though, as stated by Bernanke, this instrumental flexibility prevented a total meltdown in the world (Bernanke 2013, 87), where the experience of the post-GFC period until the post-COVID era (2021) has shown, how rigid implementation of this “meta-power” solely for the sake of “inflation or not” objective may result in “outside-the-box surprises”. Therefore, we must understand within which the internal actors (central banks) of an econofinancial system and the contours of “outsiders” who influences central bank policies on the non-technocratic political fronts. Now, a moment of awakening is on the way as global inflation has surged out of this box to a 9.8% level pushing the strongest economies in the world to the limits of a deflationary spiral, if not to stagflation. Our paper will argue that great regime changes and policy reversals on the monetary and fiscal policy fronts are on the way at the post-COVID era. In this regard, “Tight Fiscal and Loose Monetary Policies” are replaced with “Loose Fiscal and Tight Monetary Policies” at the new regime. To this end, our paper aims to analyze those regime shift processes within the macro-financial neoclassical and Keynesian synthesis of “regime switching”. Notwithstanding with this primary objective, the paper sheds light on the quasi “tug-of-war” (Economist October 8th, 2022) between the governmental- and central banker actors under the framework of Actor Oriented System Dynamics Theory (ASD), which is used to model socio-economic systems and phenomena. Consequently, we will try to make educated guesses about the possible effects on the financial system resilience, where the financial system will be in need of to redesign their playing rules and strategies within these new meta-power rules. Methodology- The macro-financial analysis of regime change processes will rely on the current trend to combine historical Classical and Keynesian approaches. This synthesis depends on the assumption of stationary equilibrium in the Keynesian approach. The switch from the Keynesian regime to the Classical one would be depicted within the IS-LM models, resulting in Inflation and Stagnation. This result is in line with our predictive findings, as explained below. Didactically, this macro theoretical approach will be strengthened by relying on the Actor Systems Dynamics Theory. It should be stressed from the outset that the Keynesian or Classical framework took certain institutional power dynamics and games for granted. In this regard, part II will explore a new paradigm that is needed to provide an adequate model to understand the “fiscal dominance versus independence” phenomena, whereby governments as “recession fighters” put political pressure on their central banks to keep interest or borrowing costs low and the will of central bankers for institutional independence to exercise their other missions. Understanding the macro-financial problems today requires a transdisciplinary paradigm and the reconceptualization of “independence” (Conti-Brown, 6). The interaction of the new regime of “Stagflation” with the financial system on the “Financial System Resilience” front will be elaborated within the models related to systemic risk modelling approaches such as RAMSI-style structural models of systemic risk and DSGE models for financial stability policy, which are summoned under the heading of “Network Model of Financial System Resilience”. Findings- Within the context and framework of ASD theory, the collision between the Governments and Central Banks will result in the new games that were once characterized by expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, resulting in record low-interest rates and Inflation (Asset Price and Consumer Products) will change to less expansionary monetary policy combined with a still expansionary fiscal policy. This new art of policy collisions will increase interest rates, control inflation, and decline in asset prices. If the interest rate hikes worsen the debt-to-GDP ratios and the central banks would prefer to fight against inflation by selling assets like government bonds, central banks, including private and public banks, would suffer from capital losses on the bond sales and their insolvency combined with the need for extra capital would erode further confidence within a macro-financial system. This would again push for higher rate hikes that would also increase the borrowing costs for the Treasuries and the corporates, no matter how they would enforce repressive measures to push down the borrowing costs. Facing a new fiscal deficit burden on the front as new defence, health care and ESG issues are pressing the governments, “rating weak” countries would face a risk of sovereign downgrades as well. Under the shadow of fundamental trends like zero-emission and decarbonization policies, increasing defense and energy spending, aging populations, and higher healthcare costs, there will be great spending governments, and the world will return to the second version of the 1970s with rampant and persistent patterns of macroeconomic shocks giving possible ways to corporate defaults, credit losses for banks and financial system resilience risks. To stop any market or systemic failure due to the contracting real balances and liquidity within the econo-financial systems, Governments and Central Banks might return to an older kind of financial repression through regulations. This will result in more losses of independence, not just of the Central Banks combined with state-owned banks; the remaining private sector banks will be in a different game context within the borders of ASD Theory. Consequently, all of those actors will find themselves in a zero-sum-game. Conclusion- One of the major macro conclusions is the fact that the FED and the other central banks cannot fight against inflation while massive amounts of cash are burned by the fiscal policy implementors within the macro-financial system. This is the point where monetary policy-based solutions cannot be taken for granted. In infected money and capital markets in the post-COVID era, we observe an “Illusion of Control” and strive for more recognition by the governments. The Central Bank authorities and governmental fiscal agencies would think that everything would be under “control” even though the markets were showing higher volatilities and governments were pressing for more asset values. Contrary to the fundamental macroeconomic theories where central banks would stimulate the markets by exercising macro-prudential instruments, corporates would rest and slow down their investment activities during higher volatility and interest rates hikes; the corporates would further find themselves in a more stochastic investment-financing processes with higher volumes of disinvestment or default processes, whereas the political elite would try to reverse this process by injecting more governmental deficit into the society. Consequently, unfavourable shocks under the new regime can trigger unwinding of the intended credit cycles with dramatic default and sizable scales of new debts, which should be monetised by the central banks at higher inflationary costs. Consequently, the results of the aggregate loss distributions modelled by systemic risk measurement approaches within a financial system may address a forthcoming stagflation on the econofinancial horizon. Keywords: Behavioral finance, financial crisis, criteria for decision-making under risk and uncertainty, regime switching JEL Codes: D52, D81, D83, G11, G01

Abstract Hedging and speculative strategies play a key role in periods of financial market volatility particularly during economic crises. In such contexts, liquidity problems tend to evolve into potential credit risk events that amplifies the volatility of several markets such as the CDS and the government bond markets. The former, however, generally embodies a higher sensitivity to volatility due to the operators’ uncertainty about unstable and countercyclical counterparty risk. The aim of this paper is to analyze the long-lasting dynamic relationship between credit default swap (CDS) premia and government bond yield spreads (GBS), by focusing particularly on sovereign credit risk, in order to evaluate the lead-lag markets in the price discovery process against the backdrop of a deep financial crisis. The focus of this study concerns the country of Italy, one of the major European countries that suffers from both weak GDP growth and high public debt, which subjects it to volatility and speculation during periods of financial stress. JEL classification numbers: G01, G12, G14, G20. Keywords: CDS spreads, Government bond spreads, Credit risk, Cointegration, Vector error correction model, Granger-causality.

Research and economic studies in all their aspects show that uncertainty has significant consequences in all areas of the economy. In recent years, the Iraqi economy has gone through difficult economic conditions as a result of exacerbations of structural imbalances and the global health crisis. The global economy witnessed a significant recovery in 2021 as a result of the improvement in the health situation, the increase in vaccination rates around the world, and the decline in Covid-19 infections. Economic growth in Iraq has begun to gradually recover in the wake of the downturn caused by the Corona pandemic during the past year, partly due to the increase in non-oil economic activity. As for the recovery of the oil sector, it has had the most prominent impact in changing the course of the Iraqi economy, and it is expected that the improvement in the conditions of the global oil market will lead to enhancing economic growth in the medium term and achieving financial surpluses that contribute to reducing the accumulated debts. Although the economic conditions in Iraq have gradually improved with the recovery of international oil markets, this recovery is fraught with major risks posed by structural obstacles, including public investment management restrictions that affected the provision of public services, the slow repayment of overdue debts, especially those related to public wages, and the burden of owned banks. The state and the Central Bank of Iraq’s sovereign debt burden. In addition to the fragility of the political situation, the weakness of the health care system, and the rampant financial, administrative and political corruption in various state institutions. In order to orient ourselves better, we need to look carefully at ways of perceiving the challenges facing the Iraqi economy as a necessary condition for the country’s development. However, despite the improvement in the prospects of the Iraqi economy and the recovery of global oil markets, the repercussions of the Corona virus and the challenges of climate change constitute new risk factors. The economy is expected to recover gradually against the backdrop of high oil prices and an increase in the production quotas of the “OPEC +” alliance, which is scheduled to be phased out in 2022. Oil GDP will be the main engine of growth in the medium term. There is a lot of research on the state of Iraq from international and local organizations and institutions. Everyone has proven that the most serious challenge for development in Iraq is insecurity. In fact, with this material we have to answer the main question: what is the country facing and what problems are there to solve?

On May 18, 2003, the Australian Minister for Education, Brendon Nelson, appeared on the Channel Nine Sunday programme. The Yoda of political journalism, Laurie Oakes, attacked him personally and professionally. He disclosed to viewers that the Minister for Education, Science and Training had suffered a false start in his education, enrolling in one semester of an economics degree that was never completed. The following year, he commenced a medical qualification and went on to become a practicing doctor. He did not pay fees for any of his University courses. When reminded of these events, Dr Nelson became agitated, and revealed information not included in the public presentation of the budget of that year, including a ‘cap’ on HECS-funded places of five years for each student. He justified such a decision with the cliché that Australia’s taxpayers do not want “professional students completing degree after degree.” The Minister confirmed that the primary – and perhaps the only – task for university academics was to ‘train’ young people for the workforce. The fact that nearly 50% of students in some Australian Universities are over the age of twenty five has not entered his vision. He wanted young people to complete a rapid degree and enter the workforce, to commence paying taxes and the debt or loan required to fund a full fee-paying place. Now – nearly two years after this interview and with the Howard government blessed with a new mandate – it is time to ask how this administration will order education and value teaching and learning. The curbing of the time available to complete undergraduate courses during their last term in office makes plain the Australian Liberal Government’s stance on formal, publicly-funded lifelong learning. The notion that a student/worker can attain all required competencies, skills, attributes, motivations and ambitions from a single degree is an assumption of the new funding model. It is also significant to note that while attention is placed on the changing sources of income for universities, there have also been major shifts in the pattern of expenditure within universities, focusing on branding, marketing, recruitment, ‘regional’ campuses and off-shore courses. Similarly, the short-term funding goals of university research agendas encourage projects required by industry, rather than socially inflected concerns. There is little inevitable about teaching, research and education in Australia, except that the Federal Government will not create a fully-funded model for lifelong learning. The task for those of us involved in – and committed to – education in this environment is to probe the form and rationale for a (post) publicly funded University. This short paper for the ‘order’ issue of M/C explores learning and teaching within our current political and economic order. Particularly, I place attention on the synergies to such an order via phrases like the knowledge economy and the creative industries. To move beyond the empty promises of just-in-time learning, on-the-job training, graduate attributes and generic skills, we must reorder our assumptions and ask difficult questions of those who frame the context in which education takes place. For the term of your natural life Learning is a big business. Whether discussing the University of the Third Age, personal development courses, self help bestsellers or hard-edged vocational qualifications, definitions of learning – let alone education – are expanding. Concurrent with this growth, governments are reducing centralized funding and promoting alternative revenue streams. The diversity of student interests – or to use the language of the time, client’s learning goals – is transforming higher education into more than the provision of undergraduate and postgraduate degrees. The expansion of the student body beyond the 18-25 age group and the desire to ‘service industry’ has reordered the form and purpose of formal education. The number of potential students has expanded extraordinarily. As Lee Bash realized Today, some estimates suggest that as many as 47 percent of all students enrolled in higher education are over 25 years old. In the future, as lifelong learning becomes more integrated into the fabric of our culture, the proportion of adult students is expected to increase. And while we may not yet realize it, the academy is already being transformed as a result. (35) Lifelong learning is the major phrase and trope that initiates and justifies these changes. Such expansive economic opportunities trigger the entrepreneurial directives within universities. If lifelong learning is taken seriously, then the goals, entry standards, curriculum, information management policies and assessments need to be challenged and changed. Attention must be placed on words and phrases like ‘access’ and ‘alternative entry.’ Even more consideration must be placed on ‘outcomes’ and ‘accountability.’ Lifelong learning is a catchphrase for a change in purpose and agenda. Courses are developed from a wide range of education providers so that citizens can function in, or at least survive, the agitation of the post-work world. Both neo-liberal and third way models of capitalism require the labeling and development of an aspirational class, a group who desires to move ‘above’ their current context. Such an ambiguous economic and social goal always involves more than the vocational education and training sector or universities, with the aim being to seamlessly slot education into a ‘lifestyle.’ The difficulties with this discourse are two-fold. Firstly, how effectively can these aspirational notions be applied and translated into a real family and a real workplace? Secondly, does this scheme increase the information divide between rich and poor? There are many characteristics of an effective lifelong learner including great personal motivation, self esteem, confidence and intellectual curiosity. In a double shifting, change-fatigued population, the enthusiasm for perpetual learning may be difficult to summon. With the casualization of the post-Fordist workplace, it is no surprise that policy makers and employers are placing the economic and personal responsibility for retraining on individual workers. Instead of funding a training scheme in the workplace, there has been a devolving of skill acquisition and personal development. Through the twentieth century, and particularly after 1945, education was the track to social mobility. The difficulty now – with degree inflation and the loss of stable, secure, long-term employment – is that new modes of exclusion and disempowerment are being perpetuated through the education system. Field recognized that “the new adult education has been embraced most enthusiastically by those who are already relatively well qualified.” (105) This is a significant realization. Motivation, meta-learning skills and curiosity are increasingly being rewarded when found in the already credentialed, empowered workforce. Those already in work undertake lifelong learning. Adult education operates well for members of the middle class who are doing well and wish to do better. If success is individualized, then failure is also cast on the self, not the social system or policy. The disempowered are blamed for their own conditions and ‘failures.’ The concern, through the internationalization of the workforce, technological change and privatization of national assets, is that failure in formal education results in social exclusion and immobility. Besides being forced into classrooms, there are few options for those who do not wish to learn, in a learning society. Those who ‘choose’ not be a part of the national project of individual improvement, increased market share, company competitiveness and international standards are not relevant to the economy. But there is a personal benefit – that may have long term political consequences – from being ‘outside’ society. Perhaps the best theorist of the excluded is not sourced from a University, but from the realm of fictional writing. Irvine Welsh, author of the landmark Trainspotting, has stated that What we really need is freedom from choice … People who are in work have no time for anything else but work. They have no mental space to accommodate anything else but work. Whereas people who are outside the system will always find ways of amusing themselves. Even if they are materially disadvantaged they’ll still find ways of coping, getting by and making their own entertainment. (145-6) A blurring of work and learning, and work and leisure, may seem to create a borderless education, a learning framework uninhibited by curriculum, assessment or power structures. But lifelong learning aims to place as many (national) citizens as possible in ‘the system,’ striving for success or at least a pay increase which will facilitate the purchase of more consumer goods. Through any discussion of work-place training and vocationalism, it is important to remember those who choose not to choose life, who choose something else, who will not follow orders. Everybody wants to work The great imponderable for complex economic systems is how to manage fluctuations in labour and the market. The unstable relationship between need and supply necessitates flexibility in staffing solutions, and short-term supplementary labour options. When productivity and profit are the primary variables through which to judge successful management, then the alignments of education and employment are viewed and skewed through specific ideological imperatives. The library profession is an obvious occupation that has confronted these contradictions. It is ironic that the occupation that orders knowledge is experiencing a volatile and disordered workplace. In the past, it had been assumed that librarians hold a degree while technicians do not, and that technicians would not be asked to perform – unsupervised – the same duties as librarians. Obviously, such distinctions are increasingly redundant. Training packages, structured through competency-based training principles, have ensured technicians and librarians share knowledge systems which are taught through incremental stages. Mary Carroll recognized the primary questions raised through this change. If it is now the case that these distinctions have disappeared do we need to continue to draw them between professional and para-professional education? Does this mean that all sectors of the education community are in fact learning/teaching the same skills but at different levels so that no unique set of skills exist? (122) With education reduced to skills, thereby discrediting generalist degrees, the needs of industry have corroded the professional standards and stature of librarians. Certainly, the abilities of library technicians are finally being valued, but it is too convenient that one of the few professions dominated by women has suffered a demeaning of knowledge into competency. Lifelong learning, in this context, has collapsed high level abilities in information management into bite sized chunks of ‘skills.’ The ideology of lifelong learning – which is rarely discussed – is that it serves to devalue prior abilities and knowledges into an ever-expanding imperative for ‘new’ skills and software competencies. For example, ponder the consequences of Hitendra Pillay and Robert Elliott’s words: The expectations inherent in new roles, confounded by uncertainty of the environment and the explosion of information technology, now challenge us to reconceptualise human cognition and develop education and training in a way that resonates with current knowledge and skills. (95) Neophilliacal urges jut from their prose. The stress on ‘new roles,’ and ‘uncertain environments,’ the ‘explosion of information technology,’ ‘challenges,’ ‘reconceptualisations,’ and ‘current knowledge’ all affirms the present, the contemporary, and the now. Knowledge and expertise that have taken years to develop, nurture and apply are not validated through this educational brief. The demands of family, work, leisure, lifestyle, class and sexuality stretch the skin taut over economic and social contradictions. To ease these paradoxes, lifelong learning should stress pedagogy rather than applications, and context rather than content. Put another way, instead of stressing the link between (gee wizz) technological change and (inevitable) workplace restructuring and redundancies, emphasis needs to be placed on the relationship between professional development and verifiable technological outcomes, rather than spruiks and promises. Short term vocationalism in educational policy speaks to the ordering of our public culture, requiring immediate profits and a tight dialogue between education and work. Furthering this logic, if education ‘creates’ employment, then it also ‘creates’ unemployment. Ironically, in an environment that focuses on the multiple identities and roles of citizens, students are reduced to one label – ‘future workers.’ Obviously education has always been marinated in the political directives of the day. The industrial revolution introduced a range of technical complexities to the workforce. Fordism necessitated that a worker complete a task with precision and speed, requiring a high tolerance of stress and boredom. Now, more skills are ‘assumed’ by employers at the time that workplaces are off-loading their training expectations to the post-compulsory education sector. Therefore ‘lifelong learning’ is a political mask to empower the already empowered and create a low-level skill base for low paid workers, with the promise of competency-based training. Such ideologies never need to be stated overtly. A celebration of ‘the new’ masks this task. Not surprisingly therefore, lifelong learning has a rich new life in ordering creative industries strategies and frameworks. Codifying the creative The last twenty years have witnessed an expanding jurisdiction and justification of the market. As part of Tony Blair’s third way, the creative industries and the knowledge economy became catchwords to demonstrate that cultural concerns are not only economically viable but a necessity in the digital, post-Fordist, information age. Concerns with intellectual property rights, copyright, patents, and ownership of creative productions predominate in such a discourse. Described by Charles Leadbeater as Living on Thin Air, this new economy is “driven by new actors of production and sources of competitive advantage – innovation, design, branding, know-how – which are at work on all industries.” (10) Such market imperatives offer both challenges and opportunity for educationalists and students. Lifelong learning is a necessary accoutrement to the creative industries project. Learning cities and communities are the foundations for design, music, architecture and journalism. In British policy, and increasingly in Queensland, attention is placed on industry-based research funding to address this changing environment. In 2000, Stuart Cunningham and others listed the eight trends that order education, teaching and learning in this new environment. The Changes to the Provision of Education Globalization The arrival of new information and communication technologies The development of a knowledge economy, shortening the time between the development of new ideas and their application. The formation of learning organizations User-pays education The distribution of knowledge through interactive communication technologies (ICT) Increasing demand for education and training Scarcity of an experienced and trained workforce Source: S. Cunningham, Y. Ryan, L. Stedman, S. Tapsall, K. Bagdon, T. Flew and P. Coaldrake. The Business of Borderless Education. Canberra: DETYA Evaluation and Investigations Program [EIP], 2000. This table reverberates with the current challenges confronting education. Mobilizing such changes requires the lubrication of lifelong learning tropes in university mission statements and the promotion of a learning culture, while also acknowledging the limited financial conditions in which the educational sector is placed. For university scholars facilitating the creative industries approach, education is “supplying high value-added inputs to other enterprises,” (Hartley and Cunningham 5) rather than having value or purpose beyond the immediately and applicably economic. The assumption behind this table is that the areas of expansion in the workforce are the creative and service industries. In fact, the creative industries are the new service sector. This new economy makes specific demands of education. Education in the ‘old economy’ and the ‘new economy’ Old Economy New Economy Four-year degree Forty-year degree Training as a cost Training as a source of competitive advantage Learner mobility Content mobility Distance education Distributed learning Correspondence materials with video Multimedia centre Fordist training – one size fits all Tailored programmes Geographically fixed institutions Brand named universities and celebrity professors Just-in-case Just-in-time Isolated learners Virtual learning communities Source: T. Flew. “Educational Media in Transition: Broadcasting, Digital Media and Lifelong Learning in the Knowledge Economy.” International Journal of Instructional Media 29.1 (2002): 20. There are myriad assumptions lurking in Flew’s fascinating table. The imperative is short courses on the web, servicing the needs of industry. He described the product of this system as a “learner-earner.” (50) This ‘forty year degree’ is based on lifelong learning ideologies. However Flew’s ideas are undermined by the current government higher education agenda, through the capping – through time – of courses. The effect on the ‘learner-earner’ in having to earn more to privately fund a continuance of learning – to ensure that they keep on earning – needs to be addressed. There will be consequences to the housing market, family structures and leisure time. The costs of education will impact on other sectors of the economy and private lives. Also, there is little attention to the groups who are outside this taken-for-granted commitment to learning. Flew noted that barriers to greater participation in education and training at all levels, which is a fundamental requirement of lifelong learning in the knowledge economy, arise in part out of the lack of provision of quality technology-mediated learning, and also from inequalities of access to ICTs, or the ‘digital divide.’ (51) In such a statement, there is a misreading of teaching and learning. Such confusion is fuelled by the untheorised gap between ‘student’ and ‘consumer.’ The notion that technology (which in this context too often means computer-mediated platforms) is a barrier to education does not explain why conventional distance education courses, utilizing paper, ink and postage, were also unable to welcome or encourage groups disengaged from formal learning. Flew and others do not confront the issue of motivation, or the reason why citizens choose to add or remove the label of ‘student’ from their bag of identity labels. The stress on technology as both a panacea and problem for lifelong learning may justify theories of convergence and the integration of financial, retail, community, health and education provision into a services sector, but does not explain why students desire to learn, beyond economic necessity and employer expectations. Based on these assumptions of expanding creative industries and lifelong learning, the shape of education is warping. An ageing population requires educational expenditure to be reallocated from primary and secondary schooling and towards post-compulsory learning and training. This cost will also be privatized. When coupled with immigration flows, technological changes and alterations to market and labour structures, lifelong learning presents a profound and personal cost. An instrument for economic and social progress has been individualized, customized and privatized. The consequence of the ageing population in many nations including Australia is that there will be fewer young people in schools or employment. Such a shift will have consequences for the workplace and the taxation system. Similarly, those young workers who remain will be far more entrepreneurial and less loyal to their employers. Public education is now publically-assisted education. Jane Jenson and Denis Saint-Martin realized the impact of this change. The 1980s ideological shift in economic and social policy thinking towards policies and programmes inspired by neo-liberalism provoked serious social strains, especially income polarization and persistent poverty. An increasing reliance on market forces and the family for generating life-chances, a discourse of ‘responsibility,’ an enthusiasm for off-loading to the voluntary sector and other altered visions of the welfare architecture inspired by neo-liberalism have prompted a reaction. There has been a wide-ranging conversation in the 1990s and the first years of the new century in policy communities in Europe as in Canada, among policy makers who fear the high political, social and economic costs of failing to tend to social cohesion. (78) There are dense social reorderings initiated by neo-liberalism and changing the notions of learning, teaching and education. There are yet to be tracked costs to citizenship. The legacy of the 1980s and 1990s is that all organizations must behave like businesses. In such an environment, there are problems establishing social cohesion, let alone social justice. To stress the product – and not the process – of education contradicts the point of lifelong learning. Compliance and complicity replace critique. (Post) learning The Cold War has ended. The great ideological battle between communism and Western liberal democracy is over. Most countries believe both in markets and in a necessary role for Government. There will be thunderous debates inside nations about the balance, but the struggle for world hegemony by political ideology is gone. What preoccupies decision-makers now is a different danger. It is extremism driven by fanaticism, personified either in terrorist groups or rogue states. Tony Blair (http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6535.asp) Tony Blair, summoning his best Francis Fukuyama impersonation, signaled the triumph of liberal democracy over other political and economic systems. His third way is unrecognizable from the Labour party ideals of Clement Attlee. Probably his policies need to be. Yet in his second term, he is not focused on probing the specificities of the market-orientation of education, health and social welfare. Instead, decision makers are preoccupied with a war on terror. Such a conflict seemingly justifies large defense budgets which must be at the expense of social programmes. There is no recognition by Prime Ministers Blair or Howard that ‘high-tech’ armory and warfare is generally impotent to the terrorist’s weaponry of cars, bodies and bombs. This obvious lesson is present for them to see. After the rapid and successful ‘shock and awe’ tactics of Iraq War II, terrorism was neither annihilated nor slowed by the Coalition’s victory. Instead, suicide bombers in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Indonesia and Israel snuck have through defenses, requiring little more than a car and explosives. More Americans have been killed since the war ended than during the conflict. Wars are useful when establishing a political order. They sort out good and evil, the just and the unjust. Education policy will never provide the ‘big win’ or the visible success of toppling Saddam Hussein’s statue. The victories of retraining, literacy, competency and knowledge can never succeed on this scale. As Blair offered, “these are new times. New threats need new measures.” (ht tp://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6535.asp) These new measures include – by default – a user pays education system. In such an environment, lifelong learning cannot succeed. It requires a dense financial commitment in the long term. A learning society requires a new sort of war, using ideas not bullets. References Bash, Lee. “What Serving Adult Learners Can Teach Us: The Entrepreneurial Response.” Change January/February 2003: 32-7. Blair, Tony. “Full Text of the Prime Minister’s Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” November 12, 2002. http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6535.asp. Carroll, Mary. “The Well-Worn Path.” The Australian Library Journal May 2002: 117-22. Field, J. Lifelong Learning and the New Educational Order. Stoke on Trent: Trentham Books, 2000. Flew, Terry. “Educational Media in Transition: Broadcasting, Digital Media and Lifelong Learning in the Knowledge Economy.” International Journal of Instructional Media 29.1 (2002): 47-60. Hartley, John, and Cunningham, Stuart. “Creative Industries – from Blue Poles to Fat Pipes.” Department of Education, Science and Training, Commonwealth of Australia (2002). Jenson, Jane, and Saint-Martin, Denis. “New Routes to Social Cohesion? Citizenship and the Social Investment State.” Canadian Journal of Sociology 28.1 (2003): 77-99. Leadbeater, Charles. Living on Thin Air. London: Viking, 1999. Pillay, Hitendra, and Elliott, Robert. “Distributed Learning: Understanding the Emerging Workplace Knowledge.” Journal of Interactive Learning Research 13.1-2 (2002): 93-107. Welsh, Irvine, from Redhead, Steve. “Post-Punk Junk.” Repetitive Beat Generation. Glasgow: Rebel Inc, 2000: 138-50. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Brabazon, Tara. "Freedom from Choice: Who Pays for Customer Service in the Knowledge Economy?." M/C Journal 7.6 (2005). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0501/02-brabazon.php>. APA Style Brabazon, T. (Jan. 2005) "Freedom from Choice: Who Pays for Customer Service in the Knowledge Economy?," M/C Journal, 7(6). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0501/02-brabazon.php>.