Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Procedura legislativa ordinaria europea »

<p> La capacidad de decisión de los parlamentos nacionales se ha debilitado en el ámbito europeo y en el nacional. El objetivo principal que se pretende alcanzar en este estudio, es delimitar en el efecto de la integración europea sobre la distribución horizontal de poderes, para determinar: en primer término, los efectos del derecho europeo sobre la actividad legislativa ordinaria de las Cámaras, en segundo lugar detectar si va de acuerdo a la importancia política europea con el funcionamiento de los instrumentos parlamentarios, de relación entre Gobierno y Cortes Generales. Y por último, establecer el impacto global de la integración sobre los poderes parlamentarios previos, valorando si existe un reforzamiento del Ejecutivo frente al Parlamento.</p>

El proceso europeo de aproximación y/o armonización legislativa en materia penal y procesal penal arrancó en tiempo reciente: de hecho, hasta hace bien poco parecía un ejercicio de voluntarista wishful thinking, en la medida en que impactaba sobre un ámbito preservado a la idea tradicional de soberanía de los Estados. La incorporación de la legislación penal y la cooperación judicial penal al ámbito definitivo de la política europea es ejemplificativa de la construcción europea en espacios históricamente monopolizados por los legisladores nacionales. En efecto, en este ámbito se han superado en poco tiempo las limitaciones de la cooperación intergubernamental en el III Pilar que emergió con la entrada en vigor del TUE de 1992, tras su conversión en Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia en el posterior Tratado de Ámsterdam de 1999. En este marco se adoptaron importantes Decisiones Marco (DM) que dieron pasos significativos en el ámbito de la cooperación judicial, mediante la implementación de medidas específicamente orientadas a la seguridad europea contra la criminalidad grave transfronteriza por la vía de la cooperación judicial en materia penal. La conversión del Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia en una genuina política europea sujeta al procedimiento legislativo ordinario (con especialidades) tras el Tratado de Lisboa de 2009, junto a la proyección de la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la UE (en especial, de los principios de seguridad jurídica, de «proporcionalidad» y de «necesidad» y/o «subsidiariedad» en la articulación y aplicación de la legalidad penal) son ahora en efecto, la expresión más rotunda de la ambición política y de la dimensión constitucional de la UE. En paralelo a la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa, el Programa de Estocolmo, adoptado en diciembre 2009, estableció la conversión del antiguo acervo del III Pilar en una nueva y genuina política europea sujeta, por tanto, en lo sucesivo, al Derecho europeo. Los desarrollos futuros de los principios de primacía, eficacia directa, interpretación uniforme, seguridad jurídica y garantía jurisdiccional de los derechos de la ciudadanía, en el marco de las legislaciones internas en los EEMM de los que siguen siendo competentes los Parlamentos nacionales, requerirán un ejercicio intensivo de clarificación judicial por vía interpretativa, y por tanto, exigirá poner particular énfasis en la formación judicial, y del conjunto de las profesiones jurídicas, en la comprensión y manejo del Derecho europeo.The European approximation and/or harmonization in both criminal matters and criminal procedure legislation got started not so long ago: As a matter of fact, until recently, it all seemed a voluntary exercise of wishful thinking, in as much as it was making on a field so far preserved within the traditional realm of States’ sovereignty. The final incorporation of criminal law and criminal judicial cooperation to the sphere of European policy is an outstanding example of the european construction towards areas and competences that had been historically monopolised by national legislators. Indeed, the limitations in this matter of the intergovernmental cooperation in the Third Pillar that emerged with the entry into force of the TEU in 1992, after its conversion into the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the subsequent Treaty Amsterdam 1999, have been just recently overcome. Accordingly, some most important Framework Decisions (FD) meaning significant steps in the area of judicial cooperation were taken, through the implementation of specific measures on European security against serious cross-border crime by means of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The conversion of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is a genuine European policy subject to the ordinary legislative procedure (with some specialties) after the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, together with the projection of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (i.e., of the principles of legal certainty, of «proportionality» and «necessity» and/or «subsidiarity» in the articulation and application of criminal law) are now, in fact, the most visible expression of the EU’s political ambition and constitutional dimension.

L'introduzione della procedura di dialogo sociale nel Protocollo sulla Politica sociale e nel Trattato dell'Unione europea ha consacrato il ruolo delle parti sociali nella elaborazione e attuazione delle misure normative di politica sociale e del lavoro. Il modello del dialogo sociale eu-ropeo ha costituito fonte di ispirazione per gli ordinamenti nazionali quale riferimento normativo delle pratiche di concertazione sociale. Dopo una prima intensa stagione di accordi-quadro europei cui è stata attribuita efficacia erga omnes tramite atti legislativi, il modello è entrato in crisi a causa della rarefazione della legislazione comunitaria in campo sociale e dell'affermarsi di meccanismi di soft law, come della crescente difficoltà per le parti sociali di stipulare accordi di natura normativa. Di recente la Commissione, dopo aver attivato la fase di consultazione, ha bloccato la richiesta delle parti sociali di presentare una proposta legislativa sulla base dell'accordo da esse sottoscritto, invocando l'esistenza di un potere discrezionale di valutare l'opportunità del recepimento in una misura legislativa. La Corte di giustizia ha confermato tale interpretazione delle disposizioni del Trattato, aprendo una breccia nel modello europeo di concertazione sociale che appare del tutto dissonante rispetto all'attuale fase politica di ricostruzione della dimensione sociale.

This article assesses the political and power dynamics of the Ordinarily Legislative Procedure (OLP) in social Europe and the likely impact of the UK’s departure in the field for future integration. It provides a detailed analysis of the OLP in social Europe during two recent periods of integration in the field—the first Barroso Commission (2004–2009) and the Juncker Commission (2014–2019). It finds the dynamics of the OLP have shifted from intergovernmental deadlock during the Barroso Commission to the characteristics of a new intergovernmental core state power during the Juncker Commission, even though the policy area is not a core state power <em>per se</em>. Despite the use of qualified majority voting policy agreements can only be achieved when there is near unanimity support in the Council, the Commission remains a neutral broker, and the Parliament shifts its position to that of the Council. As a result, continued opposition to integration in social Europe by Northern and Eastern Members means the removal of UK political agency will have only a marginal impact on the slow and piecemeal approach to integration in the field.

Lo Statuto del Regno di Sardegna, concesso nel 1848, non diceva nulla circa la procedura per la sua revisione. Pertanto, fu comunemente ritenuto che per modificare il testo originario fosse sufficiente la procedura legislativa ordinaria. Pur nondimeno, innovazioni del massimo rilievo ebbero piuttosto luogo senza alcun atto formale. In alcuni casi queste andavano ben oltre le previsioni dello Statuto, mentre in altri casi addirittura le contraddicevano, con riguardo a questioni essenziali. Il testo originario divenne così parte di un ordine costituzionale de facto alquanto incerto, cedevole e rimodellabile. Ciò ebbe molte conseguenze rimarchevoli e indesiderabili. Quando il fascismo prese il potere negli anni Venti dello scorso secolo, il sistema politico italiano subì uno shock profondo, che tuttavia fu ritenuto compatibile con la costituzione de facto, come plasmata e applicata in precedenza dagli attori politici rilevanti, anzitutto dalla monarchia. Poi i fascisti al governo puntarono a ulteriori alterazioni, devastanti per i principi liberali e le istituzioni rappresentative, ma fecero attenzione ad introdurle attraverso atti formalmente legislativi. Così facendo, dimostravano un’obbedienza esteriore allo Statuto. Se il fascismo fosse rimasto al potere per più tempo, secondo quelle che erano sue intenzioni dichiarate sarebbe forse riuscito a trasformare il sistema politico italiano in un totalitarismo. Al riguardo rilevano il modo in cui erano stati concepiti lo Statuto e la sua revisione nell’Italia prefascista, nonché il ruolo effettivamente svolto dalla monarchia durante il periodo fascista.

When the Lisbon treaty entered into force in 2009 it marked the peak of a long period of institutional empowerment of the European Parliament (EP). In formal terms, the EP and the Council of the European Union (Council) now have equal power in most policy areas. Despite the remarkable transformation of the EP, its role in EU legislation remains understudied. This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the EP’s role in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP). It assesses whether the EP’s formal power is reflected in its de facto influence based on two criteria; 1) it should not be less influential than the Council, and 2) its influence should not be limited in substantive terms. Empirically, it covers 4,662 amendments proposed in the early negotiation phase of 30 randomly selected legislative acts. First, by conducting a one-sample t-test, it demonstrates that despite formal empowerment the parliament is still significantly less influential than the Council in EU legislation. Second, using binary logistic regression, it shows that EP’s influence is limited in substantive terms. The more extensive amendments the EP is attempting to introduce – the less influence it has. In addition to contributing to empirical research on the parliament’s role in EU legislation this thesis introduces a new way of quantitatively measuring legislative influence at the EU level. By creating a dataset comparing the institutions’ negotiation mandates with legislative outcomes, a more precise measurement of the institutions’ influence is provided.

Les collectivités territoriales ont-elles une influence sur les textes adoptés en procédure législative ordinaire au niveau européen ? S’intéressant aux cas de l’énergie et des déchets et adoptant une définition de l’influence comme prise en compte dans les écrits, la thèse suit la façon dont ce type d’acteurs se mobilise et essaie d’infléchir le processus législatif communautaire tout au long de son déroulement (de sa préparation au sein de la Commission européenne jusqu’aux trilogues et à l’adoption des textes). Elle s’appuie pour cela sur une méthodologie centrée sur les « rédacteurs des textes » et combinant process-tracing, influence attribuée et analyse textuelle.Notre recherche montre que, selon le cas, les collectivités peuvent être plus ou moins influentes, à tous les niveaux du processus législatif, et qu’elles ne sont pas nécessairement soutenues par la Commission ou le Parlement en tant qu’institution. Si certains groupes politiques, segments de la Commission ou États-Membres semblent plus enclins à leur apporter leur appui en fonction des sujets (avec une variabilité y compris au sein de chaque secteur), les collectivités sont en réalité confrontées à deux obstacles : l’interprétation du principe de subsidiarité par les législateurs et l’objectif d’un marché intérieur européen concurrentiel.Dans les situations où l’on constate, en dépit de ces entraves, une forte influence des collectivités, nous identifions certaines formulations dans les textes législatifs qui permettent de contourner ces obstacles, que nous avons dénommées « parades rédactionnelles ». Nous en mettons en évidence deux types dans nos études de cas : les « parades en mélange », qui consistent à intégrer les collectivités à une catégorie privée plus large, et les « parades par invisibilité », qui évitent de mentionner les collectivités et leur rôle. Ces « parades rédactionnelles » dessinent une influence des collectivités dans les textes à petits pas et relativement discrète, mais pour autant bien réelle
Do local and regional authorities have an influence on texts adopted in ordinary legislative procedure at European level? Focusing on energy and waste and adopting a definition of influence as the extent to which authorities are taken into account in the successive drafts, the thesis follows the way in which this type of actors mobilizes and tries to influence the Community legislative process throughout its development (from its preparation within the European Commission to trilogues and the adoption of texts). To do so, it relies on a methodology centered on "text writers" and combining process-tracing, attributed influence and textual analysis.Our research shows that, depending on the case at stake, local and regional authorities can be more or less influential, at all levels of the legislative process, and are not necessarily supported by the Commission or the Parliament as an institution. If certain political groups, segments of the Commission or Member States seem more inclined to give them their support depending on the issues (with variability including within each sector), the authorities are actually faced with two obstacles: the interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity by legislators and the objective of a competitive European internal market.In cases where we find, despite of these obstacles, a strong influence of local and regional authorities, we identify specific formulations in legislative texts that make it possible to circumvent these obstacles, and which we have called "editorial parries". We highlight two types of them in our case studies: “parries by mixing”, which consist in integrating local and regional authorities into a larger private category, and “parries by invisibizing”, which avoid mentioning authorities and their role. These "editorial parries" suggest that local and regional authorities enjoy a step-by-step and relatively low profile influence in the texts, but still real

This chapter examines how the European Union institutions cooperate in the creation of European legislation. Unlike many national legal orders, the EU Treaties expressly distinguish two types of legislative procedures: an ordinary legislative procedure and special legislative procedures. According to the ordinary legislative procedure, the European Parliament and the Council act as co-legislators with symmetric procedural rights. European legislation is here seen as the product of a ‘joint adoption’ by both institutions. Meanwhile, the defining characteristic of the special legislative procedures is that they abandon the institutional equality between the Parliament and the Council. The chapter then looks at the principle of subsidiarity—an EU constitutional principle that was designed to prevent the EU legislator from exercising its competences where the Member States would be able to achieve the desirable social aim themselves. It also considers the procedure for the conclusion of international agreements.

This chapter highlights decision-making in the European Union which leads to the adoption of legislative acts. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a clear distinction between legislative and other acts of the Union with the aim of making decision-making at Union level more democratic and transparent. The Treaties now unambiguously use the term 'legislative act' for acts based on a provision of the Treaties and adopted pursuant to a legislative procedure, i.e. under the 'ordinary legislative procedure' or, in specific cases, under a 'special legislative procedure'. The qualification of acts to be adopted as 'legislative acts' has direct consequences for the operation of the institutions, the scrutiny exercised by national parliaments of respect for the principle of subsidiarity, the possibility of delegating powers to the Commission, and judicial review. The EU Constitution had proposed to go one step further and distinguish between legal instruments to be used for legislative acts and non-legislative acts respectively: legislative acts would take the form of a 'European law', or a 'European framework law'. For non-legislative action, institutions were to use a 'European regulation' or a 'European decision'.

Article 21 EC The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the provisions for the procedures and conditions required for a citizens’ initiative within the meaning of Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, including the minimum number of Member States from which such citizens must come.

The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the Commission. This procedure is defined in Article 294.

This chapter is dedicated to the law-making process, which is predominantly procedural. The first part (subsections B and C) of this chapter reveals the involvement of the European institutions, namely the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council and their respective, distinct roles within the legislative process. The second part (subsection D) analyses the requirement protecting the uniformity of European law, namely the last resort nature of enhanced cooperation. The third part (subsection E) explores ways for non-participating Member States to enter into enhanced cooperation, and ways in which participating Member States may leave the group. The last part (subsections F and G) of this chapter is dedicated to a more general question, the question of legislative power. Since the constitutional framework of enhanced cooperation only sets out the authorisation process for a group of Member States to use both the European institutions and the power of the European Union, the question of which laws can be enacted under the enhanced cooperation procedure, in particular with respect to the scope and content, depends on the ordinary competence framework. This part of the study provides an analysis of both the European internal market competence and the subsidiarity principle, and subsequently reveals what the Member States can accomplish in European taxation.

Article 148 EC The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt implementing regulations relating to the European Social Fund.