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1
Grzymala-Busse, Anna. « Global Populisms and Their Impact ». Slavic Review 76, S1 (août 2017) : S3—S8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/slr.2017.152.
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Populism is on the rise: but to understand this phenomenon, we should first clearly conceptualize it and recognize that populism takes on different forms in various historical and political contexts. These “populisms” pose a threat to modern liberal democracy. As Poland and Hungary show, populists exclude entire swathes of society from the polity, and undermine the formal institutions and the informal norms of democracy.
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Morieson, Nicholas. « Understanding Civilizational Populism in Europe and North America : The United States, France, and Poland ». Religions 14, no 2 (28 janvier 2023) : 154. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14020154.
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This article tests the salience of the concept of “civilizational populism” in the European and North American contexts. Right-wing populism is increasingly successful across a range of countries in Europe and North America. While right-wing populism is oriented toward nationalism and nativism, many right-wing populist parties increasingly perceive, as Brubaker puts it, the “opposition between self and other” and “the boundaries of belonging” not in narrow “national but in broader civilizational terms”. Yilmaz and Morieson describe this phenomenon as “civilizational populism”. Using Cas Mudde’s ideological/ideational definition of populism, Yilmaz and Morieson describe civilizational populism as “a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ who collaborate with the dangerous others belonging to other civilizations that are hostile and present a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people”. Civilizational populism appears to be widespread across Europe, and it is also present in the United States, although there is curiously little research on this phenomenon, and Yilmaz and Morieson’s conception of civilizational populism has not been extensively tested. To test the salience of this concept, this article examines three distinct manifestations of civilizational rhetoric in three different countries: the Trump administration in the United States, National Rally in France, and PiS in Poland. The article asks the following two questions. What role does civilizationalism play in populist discourses? How do the civilizational populists in France, Poland, and the United States define “the people”, “elites”, and “others”, and what are the similarities and differences between the parties/movements examined? The article finds that all three parties/movements may be termed “civilizational populists” under the definition given by Yilmaz and Morieson. It finds that the civilizational populists examined in the article posit that “elites” are immoral insofar as they have both turned away from the “good” religion-derived cultural values of “the people” and permitted or desired the immigration of people who do not share the culture and values as “the people”, instead belonging to a foreign civilization—Islam—with different and even antithetical values. However, the article finds that “the people”, “elites”, and “others” are described by Trump, Le Pen, and Kaczyński in significantly different ways.
3
Fomina, Joanna, et Jacek Kucharczyk. « Populism and Protest in Poland ». Journal of Democracy 27, no 4 (2016) : 58–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0062.
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Zbytniewska, Karolina. « Populist Skirmishers : Frontrunners of Populist Radical Right in Poland ». Politics and Governance 10, no 4 (31 octobre 2022) : 72–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i4.5585.
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Mainstream parties, like PiS in Poland, have to cater to broad segments of society to sustain broad support. Cultivation of populist radical right ideologies of authoritarianism, traditionalism, religiosity, and nativism—all interlaced with gender as a nemesis and the nation as a deity—takes highly motivated, confrontational politicians who prepare the ground for radical populist ideas to take root in the electorate’s minds, who mobilize voters through radicalization. This article introduces the concept of “populist skirmishers” to the literature on populism, adding this to Cas Mudde’s basket of major mobilizing forces of populism, that is, a populist leader, a social movement, and a political party. Though it might be considered an unnecessary elevation of a profession that perverts the rules of civility in the public sphere, polarizes electorates, and does whatever it takes to derail the project of European integration, I argue that understanding the modus operandi and functions of populist skirmishers is indispensable to furthering our understanding of populism.
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Bugarič, Bojan. « Central Europe’s descent into autocracy : A constitutional analysis of authoritarian populism ». International Journal of Constitutional Law 17, no 2 (avril 2019) : 597–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz032.
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Abstract The article offers an analysis of the particular type of populism that has evolved in Eastern and Central Europe, most notably in Hungary and Poland. The new populism in ECE differs from other populisms because it combines the elements of populism, ethnonationalism, and authoritarianism. Adhering to a similar script, which consists of sustained attacks on rule of law institutions, civil rights and freedoms, the media, and electoral rules, both populist governments in a relatively short period of time dismantled almost all the key cornerstones of democracy in Hungary and Poland. The current surge of populism in ECE demonstrates that constitutional democracy is in great danger when its core principles no longer enjoy wide democratic support. Paradoxically, constitutional democracy can play its “counter-majoritarian” role only when a majority of the people believe that it is the only game in town. Ultimately, democratic political parties and social movements with credible political ideas and programs offer the best hope for the survival of constitutional democracy. The role of law and constitutional checks and balances is less of an essential bulwark against democratic backsliding than is traditionally presumed in the legal literature.
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Sofizade, Jessica. « The “Debate” about Poland ». Politeja 16, no 6(63) (31 décembre 2019) : 215–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.16.2019.63.14.
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This paper examines two speeches made by Janusz Lewandowski and Ryszard Antoni Legutko in the European Parliamentary debate entitled “The situationof the rule of law and democracy in Poland” on 15/11/2017. In particular, it analyses their representations of Poland and the EU, and aims to determine whether they can be considered as “populist” according to J.-W. Müller’s criteria of populism. It is suggested that Legutko’s speech can be labelled populist according to Müller’s criteria, whilst Lewandowski does not face this charge to the same extent, even though his speech uses similar linguistic methods.
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Bulbeniuk, Svitlana. « Особенности проявлений популизма в странах Восточной Европы ». Studia Politologiczne, no 62/2021 (18 décembre 2021) : 30–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.33896/spolit.2021.62.2.
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The article examines the features of manifestations of populism in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine. The origins of right and left populism in these countries are investigated. The activities of populist leaders and political parties, their influence on the political development of each country are analyzed. It is shown that the triumph of populism in most countries is associated with the crisis of traditional politics and the disappointment of citizens in the systemic political forces. The author substantiates the conclusion that the formation of a developed political culture of an activist type can become effective in countering the spread of populism.
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Suteu, Silvia. « The Populist Turn in Central and Eastern Europe : Is Deliberative Democracy Part of the Solution ? » European Constitutional Law Review 15, no 3 (septembre 2019) : 488–518. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019619000348.
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The rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe as a broader democratic crisis – Developments in Hungary, Poland and Romania indicate failure of representative politics post-1989 – Reorienting politics towards a deliberative democratic culture can help answer the bottom-up critique exploited by populists – Citizen-centric deliberative approaches take seriously long-standing discontent with liberal democracy and can provide an alternative to populism
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Blokker, Paul. « Populist Counter-Constitutionalism, Conservatism, and Legal Fundamentalism ». European Constitutional Law Review 15, no 3 (septembre 2019) : 519–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s157401961900035x.
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Counter-revolution by law in Hungary and Poland – Populism as a distinctive political project that mobilises anti-liberal conservative forces in society – Populist attempt to dismantle liberal-constitutional institutions in the name of a conservative, illiberal project – Populist critique of legal fundamentalism, understood as an excess of liberal legal norms, as a key dimension in the conservative, populist project
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Albertazzi, Daniele, et Sean Mueller. « Populism and Liberal Democracy : Populists in Government in Austria, Italy, Poland and Switzerland ». Government and Opposition 48, no 3 (5 juin 2013) : 343–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.12.
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The enduring electoral success of populist parties across Europe and the increasing opportunities they have gained to access government in recent years bring once more into relief the question of whether populism and democracy are fully compatible. In this article we show how, despite playing different roles in government within very different political systems, and despite the numerous constraints placed upon them (for instance, EU membership, international law and domestic checks and balances), populist parties consistently pursued policies that clashed with fundamental tenets of liberal democracy. In particular, the idea that the power of the majority must be limited and restrained, the sanctity of individual rights and the principle of the division of powers have all come under threat in contemporary Europe. This has contributed to the continuing erosion of the liberal consensus, which has provided one of the fundamental foundations of the European project from its start.
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Jasiewicz, Krzysztof. « The New Populism in Poland : The Usual Suspects ? » Problems of Post-Communism 55, no 3 (mai 2008) : 7–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/ppc1075-8216550302.
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Yatsyk, Alexandra. « Biopolitical Populism in Poland : The Case of PiS ». Populism 3, no 2 (23 octobre 2020) : 148–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25888072-bja10015.
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Abstract This paper examines the discourse of PiS party in Poland as a form of biopolitical populism. I view this phenomenon as a specific style of political discourse rather than an ideology, that, first, focuses on bodily issues, including family and gender policy, sexual behavior, etc., second—it is inherently performative and as such it appeals to emotions, and, third—it directly communicates with “people” while circumventing the existing institutional framework of the state. Based on the cases of PiS rhetoric on the Smolensk catastrophe, and its narratives on gender and anti-LGBTQ issues, I demonstrate how the latter could be used for political othering and for subverting the core democratic principles. My data includes publications in Polish media and on social platforms (Twitter and Facebook), mostly before and after elections to European and national parliaments in May and October 2019, as well as during the presidential election in spring 2020.
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Kotwas, Marta, et Jan Kubik. « Symbolic Thickening of Public Culture and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Poland ». East European Politics and Societies : and Cultures 33, no 2 (16 avril 2019) : 435–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325419826691.
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A key feature of thin populist ideology is a sharp division of the social world into “good people” and “bad elites.” Populist ideology “thickens” when it is combined with another ideology, for instance, when this basic distinction is formulated in terms of a nativist or religious discourse with the aim of defining “aliens” or “enemies.” Ideological thickening of populism is boosted by and contributes to the cultural process we call symbolic thickening. Thin symbolic systems, congruent with some forms of populism, have relatively few symbols with rather simple connotations, are amenable to many interpretations, and are thus potentially attractive to a large group of people. They can be “thickened” by adding new symbols and suggesting tight interrelations between them. The resulting “thick” symbolic system offers a narrower definition of collective identity and thus attracts a narrower group of people. Our central argument is that a powerful cultural-political feedback loop has emerged in Poland. A gradual symbolic thickening of the Polish public culture through the intensification of Catholic and nationalist discourses resulted in the expansion of the discursive opportunity structure. This produced conditions conducive to the thickening of populist ideologies and helped to increase the legitimacy of populist movements and parties. The rising legitimacy and popularity of the increasingly vigorous “thick” populism, in turn, contributed to the further symbolic thickening of public culture. The argument is based on detailed descriptions and interpretations of four performances and visual displays.
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Diec, Joachim A., et Roman V. Savenkov. « Two Trends of Conservative Nationalism in Contemporary Poland : Foreign Policy Aspect ». RUDN Journal of Political Science 24, no 2 (30 mai 2022) : 279–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-1438-2022-24-2-279-290.
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Modern Polish political scene is characterized by both the divisions within the ruling rightwing and, what is more important, with the alt-right, which stick to populism in terms of the determination to defend the country’s sovereignty. On the other hand, the “Confederation”, the alternative right wing, with an even greater emphasis on sovereignty, is moving towards less conflicts with the country’s most important foreign partners. This article presents the foreign policy positions of the largest right-wing national populism movements in contemporary Poland. The authors analyzed the program documents of the leading right-wing populist groups, mainly of the United Right camp, over the past twenty years. The article highlights the main ideas and problematic points, including those regarding the relations with the European Union and the Russian Federation.
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Guisan, Catherine. « Right-Wing Populism and the European Parliament’s Agonistic Politics ». Populism 5, no 1 (15 février 2022) : 48–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25888072-bja10032.
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Abstract How is it that the European Parliament (EP), the only directly elected institution of the European Union (EU), has both empowered right-wing populist politicians in the UK and France, and helped challenge the right-wing populist governments of Hungary and Poland? Part of the response lies in institutional rules shaping the EP’s elections and its authority, which this article discusses critically. The paradoxical impact of the EP on European right-wing populism leads to another question: Should the EP privilege the rights of right-wing populist and anti-system actors; or, to the contrary, should it “protect democracy against democracy”? This article draws from political theorist Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic politics to assess comparatively the measures the EP majority has taken to limit the influence of right-wing populists within the chamber and beyond in EU member states. It critiques the exclusionary cordon sanitaire within, and conditionality and the “judicialization of conflicts” without, which the EP discusses passionately also.
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Kozłowski, Artur Roland. « Populism as a Factor of Destabilisation in Consolidated Democracies ». NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 12, no 2 (1 décembre 2019) : 81–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2019-0015.
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AbstractThis study offers a discussion of the dangers to the stability of political systems in consolidated democracies posed by contemporary populism, with a particular focus on the dynamic development of extreme right-wing populism. The author considers the consequences of efficient populist campaigns, such as Brexit in Great Britain, lowered trust towards the United States under Trump’s administration and practices followed by the Law and Justice party (PiS) under the leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland, which seem especially destructive for liberal democracy. Further examples are those of Hungary and Turkey, where the political systems have eroded into semi-consolidated democracy in the case of the former and an authoritarian system in the latter case. A comparative analysis of freedom indices indicates some dangers related to de-consolidation of the democratic system in Poland. Furthermore, the study points out dangers arising from the transformation of soft populism, understood as communication rhetoric oriented towards the concentration of power in the hands of populist leaders, which clearly paves the way for the dismantling of consolidated democracy in favour of an authoritarian system. The conclusions of the study outlines a variety of actions which can be undertaken to protect the achievements of liberal democracy.
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Meurs, Wim van. « Peasant Parties in Eastern Europe and Their Populist Moment ». Connexe : les espaces postcommunistes en question(s) 4 (30 avril 2020) : 11–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5077/journals/connexe.2018.e157.
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This article examines the actions and discourses of the main peasant parties and movements in Romania, Poland and Bulgaria during the inter-war period. Ideologically and discursively, peasant parties were a heterogeneous amalgamate of anarchist, Marxist, socialist and liberal (and sometimes even conservative or nationalist) ideas. In defining the populism as a repertoire of actions and/or discourses, rather than the unchanging essence of a party, it shows that the three agrarian parties have known a “populist moment”, i.e. temporarily taking recourse to claims of representing “the people” and extra-parliamentary action. While the Bulgarian peasant party never resorted to populist actions, the Romanian agrarian party had its moment of populism without a significant shift in rhetoric and the Polish peasant party never resorted to populism neither in either rhetoric or actions.
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Chrostowski, Mariusz. « The effects of religious education on prodemocratic positions in the face of the right-wing populism in Poland : Theoretical analysis and clues for educational practices ». Journal of Religious Education 70, no 1 (10 février 2022) : 43–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40839-022-00161-1.
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AbstractThe Right-wing populism in Poland faces multiple challenges with respect to Religious Education. This is a complex issue, given it is not only about school education supporting pro-democratic positions in the modern generation of students, but also the fact that today’s populists have participated in long-term and complex educational processes of a similar nature. In this sense, the aim of this article is to seek an answer to the question of how Religious Education in Poland—with all of its theoretical and cognitive background rooted in the Christian vision of God and human and the world—can contribute to the elimination of the alliance of the right-wing populist perspectives from the dominant religion of the nation. The article will explain how practical educational opportunities will help students to understand the political strategy of populists, decipher their presentations and approaches, and so shape a positive attitude towards democracy as a desired ideological system within government and social life.
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Nyzio, Arkadiusz. « Populizm penalny w Polsce w latach 2007-2015 z perspektywy socjotechniki władzy ». Politeja 19, no 1(76) (10 mai 2022) : 365–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.19.2022.76.18.
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PENAL POPULISM IN POLAND IN 2007-2015 FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES Penal populism is a phenomenon that receives a lot of attention in the literature. Most often, however, it is being studied from a legal perspective, whereas political motivations and consequences of its application are frequently disregarded. In the article, I analyse in what way, to what extent, and for what purpose penal populism was utilised in Poland in 2007-2015. I argue that it has proven to be an effective tool for conflict management, agenda-setting, and burying bad news.
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Cardoso, João Casqueira, Akos Cserny, Beatrix Borbas et Lukasz Urbaniak. « Le droit public face aux populismes en Europe : les cas de la Pologne et de la Hongrie ». População e Sociedade 35 (30 juin 2021) : 84–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.52224/21845263/rev35a5.
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Populism is by no means a legal term, and its conceptual matrix is unclear. Nevertheless, it remains a challenge for Public law, as populist trends challenge the notion of the rule of law and the formal mechanisms for the protection of fundamental rights. The European context illustrates this challenge. In this context, this contribution addresses three points: first, in general terms, the concept of populism is considered in its potential contacts with Public law issues; second, the cases of Poland and Hungary over the last decade are developed, highlighting their contexts and the way in which political and legal institutions, and more specifically constitutional courts, have been able to respond to populist trends. Finally, a concluding point discusses the lessons that can be drawn from these European cases, not only with regard to Poland and Hungary, but more broadly at the European and international levels. The article permits to identify the shortcomings of the instruments for the protection of fundamental rights, which are also the shortcomings of a still incomplete European Public law.
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Kurylo, Bohdana. « Counter-populist performances of (in)security : Feminist resistance in the face of right-wing populism in Poland ». Review of International Studies 48, no 2 (2 décembre 2021) : 262–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210521000620.
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AbstractIR scholarship has recently seen a burgeoning interest in the right-wing populist politics of security, showing that it tends to align with the international ultraconservative mobilisation against ‘gender ideology’. In contrast, this article investigates how local feminist actors can resist right-wing populist constructions of (in)security by introducing counter-populist discourses and aesthetics of security. I analyse the case of Poland, which presents two competing populist performances of (in)security: the Independence March organised by right-wing groups on Poland's Independence Day and the Women's Strike protests against the near-total ban on abortion. The article draws on Judith Butler's theory of the performative politics of public assembly, which elucidates how the political subject of ‘the people’ can emerge as bodies come together to make security demands through both verbal and non-verbal acts. I argue that the feminist movement used the vehicle of populist performance to subvert the exclusionary constructions of (in)security by right-wing populists. In the process, it introduced a different conception of security in the struggle for a ‘livable life’. The study expands the understanding of the relationship between populism, security and feminism in IR by exploring how the populist politics of security is differently enacted by everyday agents in local contexts.
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Arteev, S. P., D. S. Bunevich et M. I. Sigachev. « The New Populism in New Europe : Hungarian and Polish Examples in the Scientific Discourse ». Post-Soviet Issues 9, no 1 (2 juin 2022) : 92–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.24975/2313-8920-2022-9-1-92-110.
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The article analyzes the phenomenon of new populism in Central and Eastern Europe, taking as an example such countries as Hungary and Poland. The object of research is scientific discourse, and the subject is its segment, directly or indirectly related to populism in CEE. The main problems, aspects and positions that exist in the scientific community on the topic of populism are identified. This article explores the questions of whether populists in CEE countries are bearers of the potential for alternativeism.The piece also raises the problem of the model of the world order and the possibility of projecting an Eastern European alternative development-Most attention is paid to the answers to these research questions. In addition, the article outlines possible prospects for the development of the scientific discourse of populism, including in a comparative political key.
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Krygier, Martin. « The Challenge of Institutionalisation : Post-Communist ‘Transitions’, Populism, and the Rule of Law ». European Constitutional Law Review 15, no 3 (septembre 2019) : 544–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019619000294.
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Institutionalisation – Populism – Rule of law – Poland – Hungary – Post-communist reformers more given to emulation, adoption and installation, than institutionalisation – Institutionalised traditions as resources and sources of recalcitrance – New populists as institutionalisers of anti-rule of law values, de-institutionalisers of independent institutions – ‘Abusive constitutionalists’, who erode and subvert the kinds of institutionalisation necessary to temper power
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Bartoszewicz, Monika Gabriela. « Celebrity populism : a look at Poland and the Czech Republic ». European Politics and Society 20, no 4 (18 janvier 2019) : 470–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2019.1569342.
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Herbert, David. « Religion and right wing populism in Poland : impacts, causes, prospects ». Religion and society in Central and Eastern Europe 12, no 1 (décembre 2019) : 23–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.20413/rascee.2019.12.1.23-37.
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Rogalewski. « Right wing populism in Poland : a challenge for trade unions ». International Union Rights 27, no 1-2 (2020) : 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.14213/inteuniorigh.27.1-2.0008.
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Rakusa-Suszczewsk, Mikołaj. « Children as an Object of the Right-Wing Populist Politics and Discourse in Poland ». Studia Europejskie - Studies in European Affairs 25, no 2 (5 juillet 2021) : 67–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.33067/se.2.2021.4.
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In Central and Eastern Europe populist regimes are attracting attention as a result of the traumatic legacy of communism, the subsequent overburdening reforms and exhausting systemic transformation, resurgence of ever-lurking nationalism, regional conservatism, parochialism and cultural chauvinism, and/or as an example of the structural shortcomings of young democracies at the borders of civilization. The subject literature also indicates numerous and universal elements of populist governments, present as well in this part of Europe. Without prejudging the aptness and strength of these various concepts and arguments, this article is an attempt to include in these wideranging themes a particular issue that absorbs conservative populists, namely “childhood” and “children”. While the problem of children in politics has already received numerous interpretations, the importance of childhood in the right-wing populist discourse and politics has so far remained an issue discussed only occasionally. We put forward the thesis that children play an important and specifi c role in the right-wing populist superstructure – they constitute an illusory picture of the nation, an allegory of its renewal, as well as a convenient, though inconsistently used, instrument for achieving political, ideological and propaganda goals. Attitudes towards children can be an important characteristic of populism as such, and should be taken into account in research on the subject. We will illustrate these problems using the example of Poland and the populist Law and Justice (PiS) Party that is in power there now.
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Fitzgibbon, John, et Simona Guerra. « Not Just Europeanization, Not Necessarily Populism : Potential Factors Underlying the Mobilization of Populism in Ireland and Poland ». Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11, no 3 (septembre 2010) : 273–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15705854.2010.503033.
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Stryjek, Tomasz. « Populizm historyczny i kryzys demokracji. Węgry i Polska na tle Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej ». Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne 31 (14 décembre 2022) : 81–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/2543733xssb.22.004.16706.
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The Politics of Memory, Historical Populism and the Crisis of Democracy. Hungary and Poland Against the Backdrop of Central and Eastern Europe Firstly, the author analyzes those resources of historical memory that distinguish Hungary and Poland from the other states of Central and Eastern Europe. On the one hand, these resources most strongly associate them with the West, and on the other, they allow them to oppose it to justify their alternative development path. Secondly, he analyzes the cases of populists of various types across the region since 1989, highlighting those who campaigned with interpretations of the past to delegitimize political opponents, mainly from the left. Finally, and thirdly, he presents policies of memory of the right-wing governments of Hungary and Poland. In his opinion only they meet the criteria for the definition of historical populism. This term is what he calls a consistent governmental policy aimed at liberal elites and globalization as embodied by the West. It is conducted by changing the sense given to the entire past following the ideology of ethnocentrism and neo-traditionalism. This ideology is addressed to people-nation (lat. populus) to whom it assigns the role of an heir of a unique history and national tradition.
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Szelewa, Dorota. « Populism, Religion and Catholic Civil Society in Poland : The Case of Primary Education ». Social Policy and Society 20, no 2 (29 janvier 2021) : 310–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474746420000718.
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This article analyses two cases of populist mobilisation – namely, one against a primary school entry-age reform and another against WHO sexuality education and the concept of gender – that took place in Poland between 2008 and 2019. Both campaigns had a populist character and were oriented towards restoring social justice taken away from ‘the people’ by a morally corrupted ‘elite’. There are differences between the cases that can be analytically delineated by assessing whether a religious mobilisation has an overt or a covert character. While the series of protests against the school-age reform represents a case of mobilisation with covert religious symbolism, the campaigns against sexuality education and the use of the concept of gender are characterised by overt religious populism. To characterise the dynamics of the two campaigns, the study uses the concept of a moral panic, emphasising the importance of moral entrepreneurs waging ideological war against the government and/or liberal experts conceived of as ‘folk devils’.
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Gulczyński, Michał. « Support for a Populist Government in Poland ». International Journal of Social Quality 10, no 2 (1 décembre 2020) : 20–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/ijsq.2020.100204.
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In the recent years, one of the most popular subjects of research in political science has been the rise of populism. In Poland, an anti-establishment government has won a second electoral cycle in a row. However, unlike in Hungary, the opposition received a comparable share of the vote. In this article, I try to show how a country with a seemingly homogeneous population could have become so divided. I argue that the current polarization is based on the lack of social recognition of the less well-off citizens and areas, and on the lack of social cohesion: deeply rooted cultural and moral divisions in society overlapping with differences in economic situation. Those underlying causes explain why civil society in Poland is still able to mobilize, but they also let us predict that the divisions will not disappear soon. Although the political preferences of the youth suggest a strong demand for more pluralism, the new gender cleavage may deepen with time, based on a similar logic: diverging life courses and a lack of social cohesion and recognition exploited by polarizing parties. The explanations offered here contribute to the understanding of not only the success of antiestablishment parties in Poland but also of the differences between the Western and Central and Eastern European political mainstream.
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Grzeszczak, Robert, et Stephen Terrett. « The EU’s role in policing the rule of law : reflections on recent Polish experience ». Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 69, no 3 (10 septembre 2018) : 347–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v69i3.172.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Although Brexit has understandably been the primary focus of much recent EU-related discussion, it is not the only threat to the EU’s long-term stability. The growing impact of populism has already influenced the Brexit referendum result and an anti-liberal resurgence within the EU. Events in Poland have led to criticism of the EU’s apparent impotence in counteracting governments determined to implement an antiliberal, national-populist legislative agenda that threatens the rule of law. This article offers a critical analysis of the mechanism contained in Article 7 TEU and the tools created by the European Commission within its New Framework, viewed through the prism of escalating violations of the rule of law in Poland, with particular focus on the destabilisation of the Constitutional Tribunal. It analyses whether such criticisms are justified and, if so, whether a more robust framework for addressing anti-liberal populism is required. We compare the EU’s evolution into an organisation that protects individual human rights with its fledgling evolution into an organisation that seeks to police the rule of law. We argue that, in contrast to its successful human rights evolution, the EU’s current efforts towards enforcing the rule of law give little cause for optimism.
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Grzeszczak, Robert, et Stephen Terrett. « The EU’s role in policing the rule of law : reflections on recent Polish experience ». Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 69, no 3 (6 septembre 2018) : 347–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v69i3.167.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Although Brexit has understandably been the primary focus of much recent EU-related discussion, it is not the only threat to the EU’s long-term stability. The growing impact of populism has already influenced the Brexit referendum result and an anti-liberal resurgence within the EU. Events in Poland have led to criticism of the EU’s apparent impotence in counteracting governments determined to implement an antiliberal, national-populist legislative agenda that threatens the rule of law. This article offers a critical analysis of the mechanism contained in Article 7 TEU and the tools created by the European Commission within its New Framework, viewed through the prism of escalating violations of the rule of law in Poland, with particular focus on the destabilisation of the Constitutional Tribunal. It analyses whether such criticisms are justified and, if so, whether a more robust framework for addressing anti-liberal populism is required. We compare the EU’s evolution into an organisation that protects individual human rights with its fledgling evolution into an organisation that seeks to police the rule of law. We argue that, in contrast to its successful human rights evolution, the EU’s current efforts towards enforcing the rule of law give little cause for optimism.
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Ehrke, Franziska, Gloria Grommisch, Emma Penelope Busch et Magdalena C. Kaczmarek. « Populist Attitudes Predict Compliance-Related Attitudes and Behaviors During the COVID-19 Pandemic Via Trust in Institutions ». Social Psychology 54, no 1-2 (janvier 2023) : 78–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000500.
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Abstract. While previous research discussed populism as a phenomenon of declining trust, we investigated the predictive value of populist attitudes for citizens’ trust, attitudes, and behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, we tested the role of trust in several institutions simultaneously. As preregistered, the cross-sectional ( N = 1,090) and longitudinal ( n = 216) data collected (April to June, 2020) in Germany ( n = 617) and Poland ( n = 473) showed that stronger populist attitudes predicted higher trust in (a) alternative news media but less trust in (b) mainstream news media, (c) political institutions, and (d) scientific institutions. Moreover, we found negative effects of populist attitudes on acceptance and compliance, mediated via trust in political and scientific institutions (but not news media).
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Kaminski, Antoni Z., et Joanna Kurczewska. « Letter From Poland ». Government and Opposition 26, no 2 (1 avril 1991) : 215–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1991.tb01134.x.
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WE STARTED WRITING THIS LETTER ON 22 DECEMBER 1990, the day that Lech Walesa was sworn in before the Polish Sejm as the first President of Poland ever elected in national elections. Even during this memorable ceremony, some MPs could not hide their deep dissatisfaction. They shared with a large portion of intellectuals of the world the conviction that Mazowiecki, a journalist, would be a far better president for Poland than Walesa the shipyard - worker.Having followed with some curiosity the Western coverage of the Polish elections, and of the political struggles that preceded it, we have the impression that the coverage was biased, and often misleading. Commentators repeated misleading stereotypes, identifying themselves with one side in the political conflict in Poland. They presented a black-and-white picture of the conflict. Tadeusz Mazoweicki symbolized stability, democracy, tolerance, open-mindedness, ‘true’ pluralism, etc.; while the ‘terrible Lech Walesa’ represented dictatorship, obscurantism, anti-Semitism, populism, and chaos. Subtle references were made to Walesa's working-class background, to his lack of poise and education. We find such journalistic bad manners outrageous.
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Kováts, Eszter. « Questioning Consensuses : Right-Wing Populism, Anti-Populism, and the Threat of ‘Gender Ideology’ ». Sociological Research Online 23, no 2 (28 mars 2018) : 528–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1360780418764735.
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Since 2012, several European countries (among others Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia or Slovakia) have seen the rise of conservative and, in part, fundamentalist social movements against the perceived threat of what they call (depending on the context) ‘gender ideology’, ‘gender theory’, or ‘genderism’. The movements mobilizing against ‘gender ideology’ are frequently understood as a conservative backlash against achieved levels of equality between women and men and/or LGBTQ rights. This perspective of ‘the patriarchy/heteronormativity fighting back’ seems as tempting as it is simplifying. I discuss the transnational movements against ‘gender ideology’ in the context of the rise of right-wing populism and on the basis of considerations seeking to explain their demand side. On one hand, I argue that the study of this phenomenon provides important clues for understanding the reasons behind the rise of populist forces in Europe and beyond. On the other hand, I propose that ‘gender’ is not the final target for these movements and that they should not be understood primarily as mobilizations against equality. Rather, I see the emergence of these movements as a symptom of a larger systemic crisis. ‘Gender ideology’ in this sense embodies numerous deficits of the so-called progressive actors, and the movements or parties that mobilize against the perceived threat of ‘gender ideology’ react to these deficits by re-politicizing certain issues in a polarized language. Based on Chantal Mouffe’s critique of the established hegemonic idea of consensus in liberal democracy, I discuss two consensuses that are characteristic of the so-called progressive actors (including the feminist and LGBTQ actors), namely, the neoliberal consensus and the human rights consensus, and their contribution to the rise of the movements against ‘gender ideology’.
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Dzięgielewska, Aleksandra. « Exclusive vs. Inclusive Social Populism ? A Comparative Legal Analysis of Welfare Policies in Hungary and Poland Under Populist Regimes ». Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 64, no 6 (31 décembre 2021) : 237–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2021.06.19.
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Ost, David. « REN PILL Politics in Poland ». Current History 121, no 833 (1 mars 2022) : 108–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2022.121.833.108.
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Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party has drawn international attention with its hard-line right-wing rhetoric and policies on a range of issues, from immigration to LGBT rights to attempts to gain control over formerly independent institutions such as the judiciary and the media. Some critical voices in Poland and elsewhere have drawn comparisons with fascism. The party denounces such parallels, pointing out that Poland suffered Nazi occupation, even though it venerates Polish politicians of the World War II era who espoused positions such as eliminationist anti-Semitism. To avoid such impasses created by raising fascism in analyses of contemporary politics, this essay proposes using Poland as a case study for a new category of analysis: Right-wing Exclusionary Nationalist Popular Illiberalism, encompassing both classic fascism and today’s right-wing populism.
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Norkus, Zenonas. « Political Development of Lithuania : A Comparative Analysis of Second Post-communist Decade ». World Political Science 8, no 1 (27 septembre 2012) : 217–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/wpsr-2012-0012.
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AbstractThe goal of this paper is to put into focus and explain distinctive features of the political developments in Lithuania during second post-communist decade, comparing them with other Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) and those Central European countries with political systems which resembled most closely Lithuania (Poland and Hungary) by the end of the first post-communist decade. In all these countries, second post-communist decade witnessed the rise of the new successful populist parties. The author argues that this populist rise is the proper context for understanding of Rolandas Paksas’ impeachment in Lithuania in 2003–2004. His Order and Justice Party has to be classified together with the Kaczynski twins Law and Justice Party and its even more radical allies in Poland, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and Gábor Vona’s Jobbik in Hungary, Juhan Part’s Res Publica in Estonia and Einars Repše’s New Era in Latvia. They all were right-wing populist parties, proclaiming in their anti-establishment rhetoric the war on corruption of the (ex-communist) elite and the coming of new politics. While the rise of right-wing populism did not change the political system in Estonia and Latvia, its outcome in Hungary and Poland was the breakup of the ex-communist and anti-communist elites pact which was the foundation of the political stability during first post-communist decade. The Kaczynski twins founded Rzecz Pospolita IV (4th Republic of Poland), grounded in the thorough and comprehensive lustration of the ex-communist cadres. Fidesz leader Orban used the two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament to promulgate a new constitution. Lithuania is unique in that the ex-communist and anti-communist elites pact was not abolished, but preserved and consolidated thanks to the collaboration of all, by this time, established and left-of-center populist parties during the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment of Paksas can be considered as the stress test of the young Lithuanian liberal democracy just on the eve of the accession of Lithuania to the European Union and NATO. An unhappy peculiarity of the stress tests is that they sometimes break or damage the items tested. Preventing the transformation of liberal post-communism into populist post-communism in Lithuania, the impeachment as stress test was a success. However, against the expectation of many observers, it did not enhance the quality of democracy of Lithuania. The legacy of impeachment are disequilibrium of the balance of power between government branches in favor of the Constitutional Court, strengthening of the left-of-centre populist political forces and the interference of secret services into Lithuanian politics with the self-assumed mission to safeguard Lithuanian democracy from the perils of populism.
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Rogenhofer, Julius M. « Antidemocratic Populism in Turkey after the July 2016 Coup Attempt ». Populism 1, no 2 (4 décembre 2018) : 116–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25888072-00001010.
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AbstractPresident Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) fundamentally transformed the Turkish political realm: The AKP was elected in 2002 on promises of economic liberalisation and accession to the European Union (EU). Over sixteen years it steered Turkey from being perceived as a “model” western-style democracy to autocracy. Instrumental for this transformation was Erdogan’s use of a new form of right-wing, religiously legitimated populism that systematically undermined the institutions of democracy by polarising society, capturing the public discourse and disregarding constitutional principles. This article examines the emergence of the AKP’s right-wing, religiously legitimated populism through three analytical lenses: First, the historical development of democracy in Turkey and its shortcomings; second, the antidemocratic effect of Erdogan’s post-coup attempt policies; third, a comparison between the AKP’s brand of populism with political strategies employed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland and Putin’s Russia.
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Shields, Stuart. « The paradoxes of necessity : Fail forwards neoliberalism, social reproduction, recombinant populism and Poland’s 500Plus policy ». Capital & ; Class 43, no 4 (29 octobre 2019) : 653–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0309816819880798.
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This article asks why Poland’s populist Prawo i Sprawiedliwości [Law and Justice] government promotes progressive forms of social reproduction in the context of the supposed crisis of neoliberalism. It illustrates how populism is a response to the ongoing social ambiguity of post-communist transition that redefines and recombines existing and novel political and social resources that are built both on and with existing social arrangements in Poland. It achieves this by analysing the current government’s flagship child benefit programme: 500Plus. The article claims that certain gender norms construct hegemonic neoliberal and populist discourses that legitimise particular policies, illustrating this by bringing into dialogue Janine Brodie’s neoliberal ‘paradox of necessity’, with the notion of ‘fail forwards’ neoliberalisation. The 500Plus policy remains ridden with contradiction, on one hand a potentially progressive intervention in social reproduction that deals with the crisis mode of society but that simultaneously helps ensure the continuation of neoliberalisation.
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Hall, Bogumila. « Gendering Resistance to Right-Wing Populism : Black Protest and a New Wave of Feminist Activism in Poland ? » American Behavioral Scientist 63, no 10 (mars 2019) : 1497–515. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764219831731.
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The rise to power of the populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) in 2015, and its growing authoritarianism, has politicized thousands of Poles and brought large-scale protests back to Polish streets. Women have been at the forefront of these struggles, aligning the previously unpopular quest for reproductive rights and bodily autonomy with the larger resistance to the ruling party. In particular, the proposal to restrict the abortion law sparked mass mobilization in 2016, with Black Protests turning into a formative experience for many of the previously nonactive participants. This article sheds light on this most recent wave of feminist activism in Poland and its forms of action, from a generational perspective. It scrutinizes in detail the narrative of a “new generation of activists,” who claim to change the contours of Polish feminism, making it more inclusive, more creative and bolder. It reports on the shift, unfolding slowly since the 2000s, from the institutionalized feminism of nongovernmental organizations to less formal, grassroots forms of engagement that combine online activism with organizing on the ground. However, while the latter is often assumed to be skeptical toward the European Union’s “gender equality” framework, the article reveals how, within the context of growing authoritarianism, the youngest cohorts in particular return to the liberal strand of feminism, characterized by the language of human rights and an uncritical gaze toward the European Union. The article ends with a reflection on the proclaimed ‘newness’ of feminism in Poland, as articulated by the new generation of activists. The absence of intergenerational dialogue and transmission of knowledge, it is argued, render past feminist struggles in Poland invisible and forgotten and strikingly leaves unquestioned the legacy of previous neoliberal and patriarchal governments that led to the erosion of women’s rights in postsocialist Poland.
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Ágh, Attila. « The EU polycrisis and hard populism in East -Central Europe : From the Copenhagen dilemma to the Juncker paradox ». Politics in Central Europe 13, no 2-3 (20 décembre 2017) : 7–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pce-2017-0001.
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AbstractAnalyses of populism in East -Central Europe (ECE) necessarily depart from the general crisis of representative democracy in the EU and describe the ECE as a specifi c regional case reflecting the failure of the catch -up process. The first part of this article adopts this “classical” approach and considers the backsliding of ECE democracy alongside the rise of populist identity politics in the global context. In the second part, I turn to the historical trajectory of ECE populism as a “nested” or two -level game in the EU context of ECE developments. The third part of this article outlines the main contradictions in this process that has led to what I call the Juncker paradox. To understand this paradox, we need to return to what the Commission noted in the early 2010s as the Copenhagen dilemma: aft er the EU accession of ECE states, the EU had no means to control rule -of -law violations and, in fact, supported autocratic populist ECE regimes through European transfers. This article explains the worsening of this situation in the late 2010s as the EU polycrisis caused Juncker’s Commission to focus on Core -based priorities and marginalise rule -of -law violations in ECE. This inaction and neglect have produced a special case of negative externalities - the Juncker paradox - that has largely been counterproductive and further strengthened anti -EU populism in all ECE countries, especially Hungary and Poland. Despite this situation, I conclude that Juncker’s 2017 State of the Union address should be a turning point in the EU’s policy towards ECE; in particular, it should promote a better understanding of the regional situation and more effective enforcement of the rule of law.
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Hryhoriev, O. V. « THE CHALLENGES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN THE GROWTH OF POPULISM : CASE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC ». PRECARPATHIAN BULLETIN OF THE SHEVCHENKO SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY Idea, no 6(50) (28 décembre 2018) : 42–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.31471/2304-7410-2018-6(50)-42-48.
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The features of democratic transit in the Czech Republic are analyzed. The defects of Czech democracy are investigated. Compared to the trajectories of the non-liberal turn of the Czech Republic and Hungary and Poland. The main manifestations of deformation of liberal democracy are analyzed. The main threats to liberal democracy in the Czech Republic have been identified.
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Khorishko, Liliia, et Natalia Horlo. « National identity in the discourse of political elites of Poland and Hungary ». Revista Amazonia Investiga 10, no 40 (31 mai 2021) : 9–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.34069/ai/2021.40.04.1.
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The article analyses the position of the political elites of Poland and Hungary, who see the strengthening of European integration processes as a threat to national sovereignty and national identity. The authors link the emergence of interest to the problem of the crisis of national identity with the intensification of the activities of right-wing political parties and movements in these countries, which are trying to introduce the idea of right-wing populism into the public consciousness. The beliefs about the unity of society and the revival of traditional values form the basis of right-wing populist ideas. The methodological basis of the study was the comparative method and framing analysis. The comparative method allowed comparing the political rhetoric of the elites of Poland and Hungary, and with the help of framing analysis, the essence of the problem of the crisis of national identity was specified by highlighting its basic parameters. It is proved that the socio-political discourse around the problem of national identity has some differences in these countries. This is due to the historical and cultural background of these countries. It is emphasized that right-wing populist parties and movements offer certain ways to respond to the problem of loss of national sovereignty and national identity, namely the consolidation of society based on cultural and religious values, strong advocacy of state interests in the EU structures, pressure on the EU within the Visegrád Group, and others. The authors believe that the broad socio-political discourse on the problem of national identity is a manifestation of "identity politics". It aims to introduce desirable assessments of the political situation and to implement traditional collective values and vision into the public consciousness by right-wing populist political parties and movements.
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Vadhanavisala, Onvara. « Democracy Towards Authoritarianism Under Illiberal Populist Leaders in Hungary and Poland ». Central and Eastern European Review 13, no 1 (1 décembre 2019) : 31–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/caeer-2020-0002.
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Abstract A quarter of a century ago, the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War ended. Now the current political era involves a broad challenge to liberal democracy in the European Union. Central European countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Poland, and the Slovak Republic (‘the Visegrád Group’) joined the EU in 2004 with the hope that the post-Cold War era would be one of peace and stability in Europe, including (most importantly) the expansion of Europe’s democracy. A turning point came in 2014, however, when the Syrian refugee crisis hit the EU and caused a political ‘about face’. The European refugee and migrant crisis have strengthened right-wing populism among the European countries, including the Visegrád group. Obviously there are certainly similarities between the populist rhetoric of Hungary’s ruling party, Fidesz, and the Law and Justice party (known as PiS) which is governing the Republic of Poland. The two countries appear to be following the same path of becoming ‘illiberal democratic’ states. The templates of authoritarianism which both countries have adopted involve the following: the restriction of civil society and the independence of the media, control of the judiciary and the court system, together with the transformation of the constitutional framework and electoral law in order to consolidate power. This paper analyses two examples of authoritarian populist leaders: first, Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary of the Fidesz Party and, second, Jarosław Kaczyński, a leader of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland. A brief description of each is provided as a background for the discussion which follows.
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Guasti, Petra. « The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Central and Eastern Europe ». Democratic Theory 7, no 2 (1 décembre 2020) : 47–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/dt.2020.070207.
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The COVID-19 pandemic represents a new and unparalleled stress-test for the already disrupted liberal-representative, democracies. The challenges cluster around three democratic disfigurations: technocracy, populism, and plebiscitarianism—each have the potential to contribute to democratic decay. Still, they can also trigger pushback against illiberalism mobilizing citizens in defense of democracy, toward democratic resilience. This article looks at how the COVID-19 pandemic affects democratic decay and democratic resilience in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It finds varied responses to the COVID-19 crisis by the CEE populist leaders and identifies two patterns: the rise of autocracy and democratic resilience. First, in Hungary and Poland, the populist leaders instrumentalized the state of emergency to increase executive aggrandizement. Second, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, democracy proved resilient. The COVID-19 pandemic alone is not fostering the rise of authoritarianism. However, it does accentuate existing democratic disfigurations.
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Kosař, David, Jiří Baroš et Pavel Dufek. « The Twin Challenges to Separation of Powers in Central Europe : Technocratic Governance and Populism ». European Constitutional Law Review 15, no 3 (septembre 2019) : 427–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019619000336.
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Separation of institutions, functions and personnel – Checks and balances – Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia – Short tradition of separation of powers in Central Europe – Fragile interwar systems of separation of powers – Communist principle of centralisation of power – Technocratic challenge to separation of powers during the EU accession – One-sided checks on the elected branches and empowering technocratic elitist institutions – Populist challenge to separation of powers in the 2010s – Re-politicising of the public sphere, removing most checks on the elected branches, and curtailing and packing the unelected institutions – Technocratic and populist challenges to separation of powers interrelated more than we thought
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Bangstad, Sindre, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen et Heiko Henkel. « The politics of affect ». Focaal 2019, no 83 (1 mars 2019) : 98–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2019.830110.
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This article is based on the transcript of a roundtable on the rise of the far-right and right-wing populism held at the AAA Annual Meeting in 2017. The contributors explore this rise in the context of the role of affect in politics, rising socio-economic inequalities, racism and neoliberalism, and with reference to their own ethnographic research on these phenomena in Germany, Poland, Italy, France, the UK and Hungary.
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Koc, Krzysztof. « Edukacja polonistyczna w czasach populistycznej zarazy ». Paidia i Literatura, no 2 (25 juin 2020) : 13–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.31261/pil.2020.02.02.
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The article encourages reflection on the role of Polish language education in the face of contemporary challenges. One of them is the expansion of populism (e.g. in politics, in the media, in the way of thinking about education) and the accompanying disinformation campaigns, propaganda or replacing information analysis with emotional opinions. We are also in Poland witnessing this disturbing process, which threatens the foundations of democracy. That is why teaching a critical attitude towards theses expressed in public discourse is so important. The article shows how access to reliable information can contribute to forming such an attitude. The author also suggests that the interpretation of modern children’s literature may be used to expose populist lies, harmful simplifications, and manipulation of facts; it can also successfully support the development of mature civic awareness even among very young students. The point of reference in this case is the problem of attitude towards refugees.