Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Populism – Poland »

Populism is on the rise: but to understand this phenomenon, we should first clearly conceptualize it and recognize that populism takes on different forms in various historical and political contexts. These “populisms” pose a threat to modern liberal democracy. As Poland and Hungary show, populists exclude entire swathes of society from the polity, and undermine the formal institutions and the informal norms of democracy.

This article tests the salience of the concept of “civilizational populism” in the European and North American contexts. Right-wing populism is increasingly successful across a range of countries in Europe and North America. While right-wing populism is oriented toward nationalism and nativism, many right-wing populist parties increasingly perceive, as Brubaker puts it, the “opposition between self and other” and “the boundaries of belonging” not in narrow “national but in broader civilizational terms”. Yilmaz and Morieson describe this phenomenon as “civilizational populism”. Using Cas Mudde’s ideological/ideational definition of populism, Yilmaz and Morieson describe civilizational populism as “a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ who collaborate with the dangerous others belonging to other civilizations that are hostile and present a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people”. Civilizational populism appears to be widespread across Europe, and it is also present in the United States, although there is curiously little research on this phenomenon, and Yilmaz and Morieson’s conception of civilizational populism has not been extensively tested. To test the salience of this concept, this article examines three distinct manifestations of civilizational rhetoric in three different countries: the Trump administration in the United States, National Rally in France, and PiS in Poland. The article asks the following two questions. What role does civilizationalism play in populist discourses? How do the civilizational populists in France, Poland, and the United States define “the people”, “elites”, and “others”, and what are the similarities and differences between the parties/movements examined? The article finds that all three parties/movements may be termed “civilizational populists” under the definition given by Yilmaz and Morieson. It finds that the civilizational populists examined in the article posit that “elites” are immoral insofar as they have both turned away from the “good” religion-derived cultural values of “the people” and permitted or desired the immigration of people who do not share the culture and values as “the people”, instead belonging to a foreign civilization—Islam—with different and even antithetical values. However, the article finds that “the people”, “elites”, and “others” are described by Trump, Le Pen, and Kaczyński in significantly different ways.

Mainstream parties, like PiS in Poland, have to cater to broad segments of society to sustain broad support. Cultivation of populist radical right ideologies of authoritarianism, traditionalism, religiosity, and nativism—all interlaced with gender as a nemesis and the nation as a deity—takes highly motivated, confrontational politicians who prepare the ground for radical populist ideas to take root in the electorate’s minds, who mobilize voters through radicalization. This article introduces the concept of “populist skirmishers” to the literature on populism, adding this to Cas Mudde’s basket of major mobilizing forces of populism, that is, a populist leader, a social movement, and a political party. Though it might be considered an unnecessary elevation of a profession that perverts the rules of civility in the public sphere, polarizes electorates, and does whatever it takes to derail the project of European integration, I argue that understanding the modus operandi and functions of populist skirmishers is indispensable to furthering our understanding of populism.

Abstract The article offers an analysis of the particular type of populism that has evolved in Eastern and Central Europe, most notably in Hungary and Poland. The new populism in ECE differs from other populisms because it combines the elements of populism, ethnonationalism, and authoritarianism. Adhering to a similar script, which consists of sustained attacks on rule of law institutions, civil rights and freedoms, the media, and electoral rules, both populist governments in a relatively short period of time dismantled almost all the key cornerstones of democracy in Hungary and Poland. The current surge of populism in ECE demonstrates that constitutional democracy is in great danger when its core principles no longer enjoy wide democratic support. Paradoxically, constitutional democracy can play its “counter-majoritarian” role only when a majority of the people believe that it is the only game in town. Ultimately, democratic political parties and social movements with credible political ideas and programs offer the best hope for the survival of constitutional democracy. The role of law and constitutional checks and balances is less of an essential bulwark against democratic backsliding than is traditionally presumed in the legal literature.

This paper examines two speeches made by Janusz Lewandowski and Ryszard Antoni Legutko in the European Parliamentary debate entitled “The situationof the rule of law and democracy in Poland” on 15/11/2017. In particular, it analyses their representations of Poland and the EU, and aims to determine whether they can be considered as “populist” according to J.-W. Müller’s criteria of populism. It is suggested that Legutko’s speech can be labelled populist according to Müller’s criteria, whilst Lewandowski does not face this charge to the same extent, even though his speech uses similar linguistic methods.

The article examines the features of manifestations of populism in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine. The origins of right and left populism in these countries are investigated. The activities of populist leaders and political parties, their influence on the political development of each country are analyzed. It is shown that the triumph of populism in most countries is associated with the crisis of traditional politics and the disappointment of citizens in the systemic political forces. The author substantiates the conclusion that the formation of a developed political culture of an activist type can become effective in countering the spread of populism.

The rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe as a broader democratic crisis – Developments in Hungary, Poland and Romania indicate failure of representative politics post-1989 – Reorienting politics towards a deliberative democratic culture can help answer the bottom-up critique exploited by populists – Citizen-centric deliberative approaches take seriously long-standing discontent with liberal democracy and can provide an alternative to populism

Counter-revolution by law in Hungary and Poland – Populism as a distinctive political project that mobilises anti-liberal conservative forces in society – Populist attempt to dismantle liberal-constitutional institutions in the name of a conservative, illiberal project – Populist critique of legal fundamentalism, understood as an excess of liberal legal norms, as a key dimension in the conservative, populist project

The enduring electoral success of populist parties across Europe and the increasing opportunities they have gained to access government in recent years bring once more into relief the question of whether populism and democracy are fully compatible. In this article we show how, despite playing different roles in government within very different political systems, and despite the numerous constraints placed upon them (for instance, EU membership, international law and domestic checks and balances), populist parties consistently pursued policies that clashed with fundamental tenets of liberal democracy. In particular, the idea that the power of the majority must be limited and restrained, the sanctity of individual rights and the principle of the division of powers have all come under threat in contemporary Europe. This has contributed to the continuing erosion of the liberal consensus, which has provided one of the fundamental foundations of the European project from its start.

This study examines the rise of populism in Hungary and Poland through the Fidesz and Law and Justice (PiS) parties. As a relatively new terminology, the study begins by dissecting the various definitions of populism to establish a universal set of criteria to define the ideology. The majority of experts suggest that populist leaders campaign using a rhetoric of “us versus them” that encourages the population to feel that its general will is not being accurately represented. This strategy is particularly effective in Eastern European nations whose USSR roots makes them skeptical of globalization and paranoid of any loss of sovereignty. The study outlines three major underlying themes that led to the rise of populist parties in Poland and Hungary. First, the neoliberal reforms enacted during a post-communism shock therapy era created a level of poverty and wealth disparity that made citizens eager to return to the leftist economic platforms of Fidesz and PiS. Second, the newness of Poland and Hungary’s political system and continued communist elite system led to a level of corruption in the new government that left citizens with a growing distrust towards more traditional parties. Finally, both PiS and Fidesz capitalized off of the European migration crisis to stoke socially conservative fears and rally nativism. This study finds that these populist parties are successful due to their ability to capitalize off of the frustrations and fears of the common citizen who feels forgotten in a globalized society.

Le thème que nous nous proposons d’aborder dans la présente thèse est celui du populisme comme idéologie avec ses manifestations dans le monde, en Europe et surtout en Roumanie, où ses amples développements ont été à notre avis insuffisamment explorés jusqu’ici. L’hypothèse que nous avançons et que nous essaierons de valider par notre étude est celle que le populisme roumain n’est pas récent ou de fraiche importation, mais qu’il est solidement enraciné dans l’histoire et que ses évolutions ont un intérêt académique certain. L’interrogation méthodique, approfondie de la bibliographie spécialisée nous a révélé l’existence d’un intérêt minimum pour les variantes roumaines du populisme. La bibliographie internationale sur le populisme roumain est restreinte (Ghiţă Ionescu, Aurel Braun, Vladimir Tismăneanu, tous d’origine roumaine, sont actuellement les références citables). En Roumanie, quelques recherches isolées, surtout des dix dernières années, ont abordé des aspects ponctuels.Notre démarche tient sur trois piliers. Un premier chapitre théorique vise à interroger et clarifier la notion de populisme. Nous sommes partis à la recherche du populisme en utilisant la méthodologie de Margaret Canovan et Guy Hermet. Nous avons donc entrepris de refaire l’histoire du concept (narodniki russes, populistes américains, agrariens est-européens de l’entre-deux guerres, populismes latino-américains et d’Europe occidentale d’après guerre. L’étude taxonomique s’est accompagnée d’un passage en revue des conditions locales ayant généré les avatars du populisme sur quatre continents. Nous avons par la suite procédé à un état de la recherche sur la notion de populisme pour aboutir à une définition propre qui intègre des éléments dus à Jaguaribe, Hermet, Albertazzi et Mc Donnel, Laclau.Forts de la définition, nous avons passé en revue les rapports entre populisme et les diverses variantes du nationalisme, en insistant sur le national-populisme théorisé en première par Gino Germani, fort présent en Europe centrale et orientale et sans doute en Roumanie. Nous avons insisté sur les spécificités et les variables (temps, existence d’un leader charismatique) du populisme dans cette région, en retraçant, à la manière de Hermet, l’histoire politique de ces pays (Bulgarie, Hongrie, Pologne, République Tchèque, Roumanie, Slovaquie) avec un accent sur les mouvements considérés (à raison ou à tort) comme populistes.Le premier chapitre constitue la trame de fond du second, qui fait un panorama des avatars du populisme roumain des origines et jusqu’au début de la seconde guerre mondiale. Nous y avons surtout utilisé des sources roumaines (monographies de courants idéologiques, biographies, études et synthèses historiques, collections de revues et journaux, documents d’archives). En Roumanie, le populisme s’est manifesté depuis les débuts de la modernité politique, au XIXe. Le problème paysan a représenté la matrice du populisme roumain et l’examen des solutions pour y répondre constitue le fil conducteur de ce chapitre. Nous en avons dressé l’inventaire :populisme d’État modernisateur à la Peron (prince Cuza), socialisme de Gherea avec la paysannerie en arrière-garde du prolétariat, radicalisme bourgeois de gauche (le poporanism de Stere), populisme romantique et passéiste (le semeurisme de Iorga), boulangisme tardif (général Averescu), paysannisme avec sa doctrine coopératiste (PNP de Maniu et Mihalache), mais aussi le fascisme déviant de la Garde de Fer, qui a ciblé elle aussi les campagnes. Tous ces projets politiques ont illustré l’échec du populisme face aux problèmes de la société roumaine en voie de modernisation.Le troisième chapitre est consacré à la récrudescence populiste après la longue parenthèse communiste. Une analyse du national-communisme de Ceauşescu nous permet d’identifier bien des facteurs ayant façonné la société roumaine de 1989. Le national-populisme a connu un important essor en Roumanie post-communiste. Nous avons mis à profit des recherches internationales (De Waele, Tismăneanu), mais aussi locales comme des discours, articles de presse, sondages, archives électroniques. Nous avons accordé une attention particulière au Parti de la Grande Roumanie de Corneliu Vadim Tudor, le cas typique auquel nous avons consacré une étude. D’autres formations (PUNR, PNG de George Becali, Parti du Peuple – Dan Diaconescu, les anémiques héritiers du Mouvement Légionnaire) ont été passées en revue, pour constater leur inconsistance doctrinaire et leur faible impact électoral. De même, nous avons conclu que le national-populisme roumain post-communiste s’inscrit dans la continuité du national-communisme et très marginalement dans celle de ‘entre-deux-guerres. S’adressant aux perdants de la transition, ces partis ont failli à laisser leur marque. Deux leaders ayant fini en prison, un autre mort, la voie populiste semble momentanément fermée, bien qu’elle ait réussi une percée récente dans le discours des partis mainstream. Notre thèse retient une fin qui saurait aussi bien s’avérer un nouveau commencement.
The theme we intend to investigate in this dissertation is populism as an ideology with its embodiments throughout the world, in Europe and most of all in Romania, where its vast developments have been in our view insufficiently explored until now. The hypothesis we submit and which we shall try to validate by our research is that Romanian populism is not recent or freshly imported, but it is deeply rooted in history and its evolutions are of undoubted academic interest. The deep, thorough examination of specialized bibliography revealed us a limited interest for the Romanian variants of populism. The international bibliography on Romanian populism is far from extensive (Ghiţă Ionescu, Aurel Braun, Vladimir Tismăneanu, all of Romanian origin, are now the quotable references). In Romania, the research is not abundant either, but over the ten last years some individual aspects of the topic have been investigated. Our approach is threefold. A first theoretical chapter aims to questioning and clarifying the notion of populism itself. We set off in search of populism making use of Margaret Canovan and Guy Hermet’s methodology. We have thus ventured to trace back the concept’s history (Russian narodniki, American populists, East-European agrarianisms in-between the world wars, Latin-American and Western European populisms after WWII. The taxonomic study was accompanied by a review of local contexts having generated the avatars of populism on four continents. We have subsequently drawn a state-of-play of the research on populism as a concept in order to come up with our own definition which integrates elements owed to Jaguaribe, Hermet, Albertazzi & Mc Donnel, Laclau.On the solid ground of the definition, we have reviewed the relationships between populism and the diverse variants of nationalism, focusing on the national-populism first theorized by Gino Germani. National-populism is to be widely encountered in Central and Eastern Europe and undoubtedly in Romania. We have insisted on the specificities and variables (time, existence of a charismatic leader) of populism in this region, by recounting in the manner of Hermet the political history of these countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) with special regard to movements rightly or wrongly considered as populist. The first chapter sets the framework of the second one, which brings about a panorama of the Romanian populist avatars from its origins to the start of WWIII. We have mostly made use of Romanian sources (monographs of ideological trends, biographies, historical studies, collections of magazines and newspapers, documents from the archives).Populism has been a constant presence in Romania, since the beginnings of the country’s political modernity in the 19th century. The peasant problem represents the matrix of Romanian populism and the review of the foreseen solutions to solve it represents the unifying thread of this chapter. We have proceeded to an inventory :modernizing state populism à la Peron (prince Cuza), Gherea’s socialism with the peasantry seen as the rearguard of the proletariat, left bourgeois radicalism (Stere and his poporanism), Romanticist & revivalist populism (Iorga and his sămănătorism), late boulangisme (General Averescu), agrarianism with the underlying cooperatist doctrine (National Peasant Party of Maniu and Mihalache), but also the Iron Guard’s deviant fascism, which targeted rural areas as well. All these political projects illustrated the failure of populism to address the problems of Romanian society on its way to modernity. The third chapter deals with the populist revival in Romania after the fall of communism in 1989. An analysis of Nicolae Ceauşescu’s national-communism enables us to identify many factors having shaped the Romanian society of 1989. National-populism enjoyed massive success in post-communist Romania. We took advantage of international (De Waele, Tismăneanu), but also local research and explored speeches, press items, polls, electronic archives.Particular attention was paid to Corneliu Vadim Tudor’s Greater Romania, the typical case which we studied. Other parties (PNUR, George Becali’s NGP, Dan Diaconescu’s People’s Party, the feeble heirs to the Legionary Movement) were reviewed, only to conclude to their doctrinal shallowness and weak electoral impact. We have come to the conclusion that Romania’s post-communist national-populism is based on the legacy of national-communism and only marginally on the heritage of Romania’s interwar populisms. Targeting the losers of transition, these parties failed to achieve major success. Two of their leaders ended up in prison, a third one is dead, so the populist path seems momentarily shut, though it has managed a recent breakthrough into the discourse of mainstream parties. Our dissertation closes on an end note which may well prove a new beginning.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Although the world has experienced great progress in the area of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR), the contemporary transnational turn towards nationalist, right-wing and populist politics has generated a backlash, primarily affecting women and members of the LGBTQ-community (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer/questioning). Yet, opposition to gender and sexual equality, particularly in the European context, is undertheorized. Hence, this thesis sets out to explore and understand the dynamics of political homophobia as a conscious political strategy in Poland and how the homophobic rhetoric pursued by the governing party PiS and their allies has achieved resonance. That is, how anti-LGBTQ ideas have gained support as they echo the ideas, beliefs and values central to potential adherents. The advancements of political homophobia in today’s Poland is rather puzzling since there has not been an upswing in homophobic values among the population. Although the Polish society is not intrinsically homophobic, the dominating values, norms, rules and practices are generally patriarchal and heteronormative. Due to the heteropatriarchal bias of the institutional context, this thesis suggests that both informal and formal institutions may enhance the resonance of the ideas embedded in the anti-LGBTQ ideas framing. Drawing on framing theory and new institutionalism, this thesis develops a framework to analyze this dynamic and reciprocal relationship between framing strategies and the institutional context. The first section of the two-stepped analysis describes how LGBTQ has been framed by identifying the core framing tasks and various framing strategies while the second part outlines various formal rules and informal norms that have facilitated the campaign and identifies how these institutions are heteronormative. The main findings suggest that conservative elites have managed to enhance resonance for their anti-LGBTQ ideas by framing the issue in congruence with heteronormative informal norms, which are perceived to be fundamental for Polish national identity and by exploiting pre-existing formal regulations, which are seemingly neutral but produce heteronormative effects.

Defence date: 04 June 2010
Examining Board: László Bruszt (EUI); Cas Mudde (Univ. Antwerp); Peter Mair (EUI) (Supervisor); Alex Szcezerbiak (Univ. Sussex)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
This thesis inquires into the nature of populism in Poland after 1989. This broad research problem is translated into a number of specific questions: how can we characterize the particularities of the Polish case? What is the relationship between populism and democracy in Poland? Can the growing strength of the populists be seen as a sign of a serious crisis of Polish democracy or does it simply reflect something that might be defined as populist democracy? This thesis attempts to answer these research questions through case studies of selected politicians (Lech Walesa and Stanislaw Tyminski), parties (Self-Defence, League of Polish Families and Law and Justice) and a movement (Radio Maryja). The cases chosen meet two conditions: they were identified as populist in the public discourse and they played a major role in Polish political life. The empirical part of the research was based on qualitative analysis of primary party literature, interviews, secondary literature and a limited use of questionnaires. The thesis confirms that populism can be identified in all the cases studied. At the same time the thesis shows that the form of populism varies between populism as a strategy and populism as an ideology (thin-centred ideology or ideology in a strict sense). Irrespective of its form, the main tool of populism is its discourse. The thesis also distinguishes three waves of populism: two in opposition (1989-2005) followed by a third wave in power (2005-2007). Each wave had its own characteristic features ranging from social, anti-EU to anti-liberal elements. In all cases populism was an expression of conservative and Christian values, which seem to be a specific Polish feature. Yet another important element in the Polish case is the anti-establishment emphasis, an emphasis that derives from dissatisfaction with the settlement of accounts with communism. From this emerges the concept of a ‘network’, a categorization linking post-communist bureaucrats and compromised opposition forces. The thesis concludes that populists in Poland were not opposed to democracy as such, but rather to constitutionalism and procedural democracy. Populism was, above all, a warning sign of social tensions in liberal democracy. Polish populists opposed populist democracy to its liberal version. The case of Poland has also demonstrated the ways in which democracy can resist populism.

The subject of this diploma thesis is to examine and compare the ideological and programmatic definition of Fidesz and PiS, their development in time and their current actions and policy-making since forming their single-party governments in 2010 in Hungary and 2015 in Poland, respectively. This work also focuses on the development in both countries during the transformation from communism towards democracy, and sets out to answer what preconditions have formed the demand for populist radical right ideology both in Hungary and Poland. Based on the theory of populist radical right framework, this thesis concludes that, in addition to the negative aspects of political and economic transformation, historical narratives and prejudices against minorities by a significant part of the Hungarian and Polish societies have also played a crucial role in creating a climate for demand for the populist radical right. In the third chapter, this thesis finds a high volatility in the ideological development of both parties, especially in regards to Fidesz, and attributes these considerable ideological and programmatic changes in part to reaction of Fidesz and PiS towards changes in the party system in both Hungary and Poland. However, since 2006 the ideology of both parties has become increasingly consistent with...

Key Words Polabian Slavs, Polabian area, Obodrite, Populus, Gens, Nacio, State, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Obotritic confederation tribes Abstract The thesis analyses and interprets the key events in the state-forming process of so-called Obotritic confederation tribes in 789 - 1178. It focuses on the analysis of written sources, which serve as a basis for three models of inter-tribal units in Polabian area. The thesis argues against the traditional evolutionistic point of view, which considers the confederation tribes to be the predecessors of early medieval states. The main focus of the analysis is put on the starting point form which the Obotritic state-forming process originated. The main question is whether the Obodrite, upon their first appearance in written history, were more federation of tribes or one large tribe, whose break-up at the turn of 9th and 10th century started a new phase of the process. For the next period, the thesis introduces unique model of so-called tribal state, created by the combined effects of various factors, such as location, political situation, social changes in 11th and 12th century etc. The inner and outer factors that lead to the break-up of the Obotritic tribe state in 1270s are discussed in the same manner. The last part of the thesis is an analysis of later...

Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menganalisis tren perkembangan populasi dan produksi berbagai komoditas ternak di Indonesia sehingga dapat menggambarkan peluang dan tantangan serta strategi efisiensi produksi nasional. Metode penelitian ini adalah analisis deskriptif kuantitatif dan peramalan menggunakan time series expert modeler data tahun 2010-2020. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa produtivitas selama 10 tahun terakhir masih tergolong rendah dan belum dapat memenuhi kebutuhan nasional. Prediksi populasi ternak cenderung meningkat kecuali sapi perah dan kerbau. Produksi daging total (ruminansia dan unggas) dan telur selama 10 tahun kedepan diperkirakan meningkat, namun produksi susu cenderung stagnan. Sistem usaha peternakan secara umum masih perlu ditingkatkan. Strategi peningkatan melalui optimalisasi integrasi pakan lokal, penyediaan bibit unggul, aplikasi teknologi adaptif, implementasi pola kemitraan dan optimalisasi wilayah strategis sesuai komoditas ternak. Perbaikan tersebut diharapkan dapat menyumbang peningkatan populasi ternak ruminansia dan ungags serta produksi nasional.

Pendapatan yang layak sangat diharapkan oleh semua pelaku agribisnis tebu, dikarenakan sangat berkaitan dengan eksistensi budidaya dan kesejahteraannya, apa lagi pada era pandemic covid-19 ini. Namun dalam lima tahun terakhir, pendapatan petani tebu secara nasional menurun, sehingga diperlukan upaya agar pendapatannya meningkat. Penelitian ini bertujuan menyusun model kebijakan pemerintah untuk meningkatkan pendapatan agribisnis tebu di Kecamatan Karangsuwung Kabupaten Cirebon. Waktu penelitian pada bulan September–November 2020. Desain penelitian ini adalah kuantitatif dengan metode survey. Populasi penelitian adalah petani tebu di Wilayah Kerja Pabrik Gula Sindang Laut Rayon Pabrik Gula Karangsuwung yang berjumlah 129 orang dan besar sampel ditentukan sebesar 57 orang. Analisis data menggunakan analisis jalur (path analysis) dan untuk menguji hipotesis menggunakan sobel test. Hasil penelitian menyimpulkan terdapat pengaruh langsung dari variabel perbaikan pola pembiayaan (kredit) budidaya tebu (X1) dan perbaikan pola harga pokok produksi/harga patokan petani (HPP) dan tata niaga gula nasional (X4) terhadap peningkatan pendapatan agribisnis tebu (Y) dan terdapat pengaruh tidak langsung dari variabel perbaikan pola pembiayaan (kredit) budidaya tebu (X1) dan perbaikan produktivitas (X2) terhadap peningkatan pendapatan agribisnis tebu (Y) melalui perbaikan pola harga pokok produksi/harga patokan petani (HPP) dan tata niaga gula nasional (X4). Melalui penelitian ini diharapkan dapat menjadi referensi lokal dan nasional tentang model peningkatan pendapatan agribisnis tebu rakyat.

This report is based on the first panel of ECPS’s monthly panel series called “Mapping European Populism” which was held online in Brussels on February 24, 2022. The panel brought together top-notch populism scholars who are experts on populist politics in CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) countries, namely Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia. As a by-product of this fruitful panel the report consists of brief summaries of the speeches delivered by the speakers.

This report is based on the first panel of ECPS’s monthly panel series called “Mapping European Populism” which was held online in Brussels on February 24, 2022. The panel brought together top-notch populism scholars who are experts on populist politics in CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) countries, namely Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia. As a by-product of this fruitful panel the report consists of brief summaries of the speeches delivered by the speakers.

On 4 February 2022, the Polish Journal of Laws published a new ordinance of the Minister of Education and Science, implementing cuts in the funding of education of German as a minority language. Consequently, the hourly length of such lessons will be significantly reduced. This regulation applies exclusively to the German minority, and the official motive for introducing discriminatory measures is to improve the situation of Polish diaspora in Germany. This is the first time after 1989 when the Polish state authorities introduce a law limiting the rights of Poland’s citizens belonging to a national minority (in this situation children), as a retaliation for the alleged situation of a kin-community elsewhere. Importantly, the adopted regulations are not only discriminatory towards one of the minorities; their implementation may in fact contribute to the dysfunctionality of the entire minority education system in Poland. This is also an obvious violation of the constitutional principle of equality before the law, the right of minorities to ‘maintain and develop their own language’, international standards of minority rights protection, as well as a threat to the very functioning of human rights protection mechanisms in the country.