Articles de revues : « Populism – Italy »

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Couperus, Stefan, et Pier Domenico Tortola. « Right-wing populism’s (ab)use of the past in Italy and the Netherlands ». Debats. Revista de cultura, poder i societat 4 (25 décembre 2019) : 105–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.28939/iam.debats-en.2019-9.

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Historical analysis is increasingly used as a tool in the study of present-day populism in Europe. The past is often explored as a source of analogies through which to examine today’s populism, and at other times in search of causal mechanisms to explain the current populist wave. In this paper we focus on a third kind of link between populism and the past, namely the ways populist movements and leaders use and abuse history and historical memory in their quest for mass support. This angle on the populism/history nexus can yield deep insight into the ideological make-up of these movements and their voters, and populism’s discursive dynamics and strategies.Focusing on contemporary right-wing populism and its approach to the dark past of European countries, the paper conducts an exploratory analysis that posits three ways in which the past is (ab)used by populists: (a) the positive reassessment of dark history; (b) the recourse to fake history; (c) the evocation and subsequent denial of links with the dark past. In examining each, we use examples taken from the cases of Italy and The Netherlands to check the plausibility of our categories across different national cases.

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Piccone, P. « Federal Populism in Italy ». Telos 1991, n^o 90 (1 janvier 1991) : 3–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.3817/1291090003.

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Alekseenkova, E. S. « Transformation of Right-Wing Populism in Italy in 2018−2022 : From Sovereignism to Patriotism ». Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 92, S7 (décembre 2022) : S667—S674. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s1019331622130123.

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Abstract The transformation of the discourse of right-wing populist parties in Italy from 2018 to 2022 is considered. Based on analysis of the discourse of the programs and electoral rhetoric of the parties the Brothers of Italy, the League, and Forward Italy, the author concludes that Italian right-wing populism is becoming more moderate, replacing the concepts of sovereignism with “patriotism and conservatism” and rejecting Euroscepticism. Although nationalism is still characteristic of the right-wing parties in Italy, it is changing: a legalist approach to migrants is gradually replacing the ethnocultural and socioeconomic approaches. Populism remains the basic strategy of the right-wing parties, but the role of the main “enemy” of the Italian people is shifting from the European bureaucracy to the domestic mainstream Center–Left (i.e., the Democratic Party). The authoritarianism of the right-wing populists has undergone the least change in terms of ideological content between 2018 and 2022, but its importance has increased with the growing public demand for political stability and the increasing personalization of politics. This article contributes to the study of the phenomenon of right-wing populism.

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Polli, Chiara, et Carlo Berti. « Framing right-wing populist satire : The case-study of Ghisberto’s cartoons in Italy ». Punctum. International Journal of Semiotics 06, n^o 02 (1 mars 2021) : 29–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.18680/hss.2020.0020.

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Abstract Over the last few years, right-wing populism has increased its popularity and political weight, successfully merging with Euro-scepticism, nationalism, xenophobia, religious symbolism, and aggressive forms of conservatism (e.g., anti-feminism, homophobia, and, in general, patriarchal politics). Several studies have focused on the communication strategies of contemporary populism, examining the latter’s use of traditional and new media. So far, however, little attention has been paid to the role and language of right-wing populist satire. Our study draws on the ideational approach to populism to explore how right-wing populism is expressed in satirical cartoons. This approach perceives populism as a thin-centered ideology, based on a Manichean division between ‘good people’ and ‘evil elites,’ which regularly combines with other ideological components (e.g., nationalism, Euroscepticism, xenophobia). Our analysis focuses on the Italian cartoonist Ghisberto, known for his provocative and frequently controversial work. We examine a sample of Ghisberto’s vignettes using multimodal analysis tools and Greimas’s notion of isotopy. The aim is to investigate how right-wing populist satire constructs its different targets (the EU, left-wingers, migrants, NGOs, women, etc.) and how populist ideology exploits cartoons’ communicative resources and power.

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Maccaferri, Marzia. « Populism and Italy : a theoretical and epistemological conundrum ». Modern Italy 27, n^o 1 (24 janvier 2022) : 5–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mit.2021.66.

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AbstractConsidered by many scholars to be principally a catch-all or a useless concept, populism has rarely gone hand-in-hand with historical reflection. Building upon ‘the need to return populism to history’, this article offers an overview of the reasons why populism as a concept and as a potential sequence of historical events seems to fit well in post-Second World War Italy, and aims to suggest areas for further research. At the intersection between conceptual history, democratic theory and discourse-historical analysis, the article explores the continuities and discontinuities of Italian populisms, focusing on the resemioticisation of the concept of civil society and its legacy within historical Italian Fascism, especially during the transition to the so-called Second Republic.

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Tarchi, Marco. « Italy : the promised land of populism ? » Contemporary Italian Politics 7, n^o 3 (2 septembre 2015) : 273–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2015.1094224.

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Verbeek, Bertjan, et Andrej Zaslove. « Italy : a case of mutating populism ? » Democratization 23, n^o 2 (17 septembre 2015) : 304–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1076213.

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Martinico, Giuseppe. « Between Mimetism and Parasitism : Italian Populism in a Comparative Perspective ». European Public Law 26, Issue 4 (1 décembre 2020) : 921–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2020071.

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This article explores the relationship between constitutionalism and populism with particular attention paid to the Italian case. This piece is divided into two parts. In Part I it will be argued that the relationship between populism and constitutionalism should not be seen in terms of mutual exclusion and perfect opposition. Indeed, it is possible to say that populism frequently relies on concepts and categories belonging to the language of constitutionalism (majority, democracy, people), trying to reshape them and offering in this way a sort of constitutional counter-narrative. In this sense, the populist approach to constitutional categories can be described in light of two concepts: mimetism and parasitism. In Part II, I shall focus on the referendum, which is an instrument frequently used by populists and currently object of a problematic constitutional reform proposal advanced by the MoVimento 5 Stelle. As we will see this reform risks affecting the constitutional balance between powers in Italy. Populism, mimetism, parasitism, post – WWII constitutionalism, referendum

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Fijał, Małgorzata. « Od populizmu regionalistycznego do nacjonalistycznego ». Politeja 17, n^o 3(66) (25 juin 2020) : 233–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.17.2020.66.16.

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From Regionalistic to Nationalistic Populism. Reflection on Italian Populism on the Example of the (Northern) League The (Northern) League has been playing a key role on the Italian political scene for almost three decades. The article approaches the issue of the elements of rhetoric of the populist narrative proclaimed by the party with particular emphasis on the two types of populism: regionalistic and nationalistic populism. The purpose of the article is above all an attempt to reconstruct the most important populist characteristics and activities contributing to the League’s significant electoral success and verification of the research hypothesis that the phenomenon of populism in Italy is associated with the long‑standing regional character of the Italian state and the resulting attitude of putting their (often regional) interests above those of others.

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Betz, Hans-Georg. « Exclusionary Populism in Austria, Italy, and Switzerland ». International Journal : Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 56, n^o 3 (septembre 2001) : 393–420. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002070200105600302.

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Betz, Hans-Georg. « Exclusionary Populism in Austria, Italy, and Switzerland ». International Journal 56, n^o 3 (2001) : 393. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40203575.

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Castaldo, Antonino, et Luca Verzichelli. « Technocratic Populism in Italy after Berlusconi : The Trendsetter and his Disciples ». Politics and Governance 8, n^o 4 (17 décembre 2020) : 485–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i4.3348.

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Notwithstanding the speculations from the literature, the empirical analyses still neglect the convergence between populism and technocracy. The Italian case can be of some interest in this perspective, given the rise of technocratic populism since Silvio Berlusconi’s rise to power in 1994. By analyzing the style of leadership and the processes of ministerial appointment and delegation, we argue that Berlusconi has been a trendsetter, more than a coherent example of technocratic populist leader. On the one hand, he played the role of the entrepreneur in politics, promising to run the state as a firm. Moreover, he adopted an anti-establishment appeal, delegitimizing political opponents and stressing the divide between ‘us’ (hardworking ordinary people) and ‘them’ (incompetent politicians). On the other hand, however, his anti-elite approach was mainly directed towards the ‘post-communist elite.’ Extending the analysis to the following two decades, we introduce a diachronic comparison involving three examples of leadership somehow influenced by Berlusconi. Mario Monti represents the paradox of the impossible hero: A pure technocrat unable to take a genuinely populist semblance. Matteo Renzi represents the attempt to mix a populist party leadership with a technocratic chief executive style. Finally, Salvini represents the pure nativist heir of Berlusconi, as the new leader of the right-wing camp. The latest developments of executive leadership in Italy, and the re-emergence of other residual hints of technocratic populism, will be discussed in the final section of the article, also in the light of the evident impact of the 2020 pandemic outbreak on the practices of government.

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Albertazzi, Daniele, et Sean Mueller. « Populism and Liberal Democracy : Populists in Government in Austria, Italy, Poland and Switzerland ». Government and Opposition 48, n^o 3 (5 juin 2013) : 343–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.12.

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The enduring electoral success of populist parties across Europe and the increasing opportunities they have gained to access government in recent years bring once more into relief the question of whether populism and democracy are fully compatible. In this article we show how, despite playing different roles in government within very different political systems, and despite the numerous constraints placed upon them (for instance, EU membership, international law and domestic checks and balances), populist parties consistently pursued policies that clashed with fundamental tenets of liberal democracy. In particular, the idea that the power of the majority must be limited and restrained, the sanctity of individual rights and the principle of the division of powers have all come under threat in contemporary Europe. This has contributed to the continuing erosion of the liberal consensus, which has provided one of the fundamental foundations of the European project from its start.

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Celiksu, Sinan. « Populism and the Conundrums of Democracy in Italy ». Anthropology News 59, n^o 1 (janvier 2018) : e176-e179. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/an.785.

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Biorcio, R. « The Rebirth of Populism in Italy and France ». Telos 1991, n^o 90 (1 janvier 1991) : 43–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.3817/1291090043.

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Fazzi, Luca. « Social work, exclusionary populism and xenophobia in Italy ». International Social Work 58, n^o 4 (26 novembre 2013) : 595–605. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020872813503855.

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Maccaferri, Marzia, et Andrea Mammone. « Global populism and Italy. An interview with Federico Finchelstein ». Modern Italy 27, n^o 1 (février 2022) : 61–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mit.2021.69.

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Federico Finchelstein is Professor of History at the New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College, New York. He is one of the leading scholars on fascism and populism. Professor Finchelstein is the author of many books that have been translated into several languages, including the successful From Fascism to Populism in History (University of California Press, 2017). His new monograph, Fascist Mythologies. The History and Politics of Unreason in Borges, Freud, and Schmitt, is forthcoming in June 2022 from Columbia University Press. Given this, he is a natural starting point to discuss the global dimension of populism and its historical experiences from Latin America to Italy. Andrea Mammone, co-editor of Modern Italy, interviewed him in December 2021.

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Biryukov, Sergey, et Alexander Barsukov. « Italy-2018 : The Triumph of Populism and Prospects of Exit from the Political Crisis ». Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, n^o 3 (juillet 2019) : 191–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2019.3.17.

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Introduction. The article is devoted to the origins, grounds and possible consequences of the political crisis in modern Italy. The paper shows that the Italian crisis has acquired a scale that challenges the interests of political establishment of the country and the very principles of the EU existence. Methods and materials. The authors seek a combination of General theoretical and special methods, focusing on the historical, socio-cultural and political analysis. They are based on the analysis of periodicals, as well as using articles and materials of researchers on the problems of political development in Italy. Analysis. The source of the crisis is the protest of citizens against the state authority and strategies of the political class of Italy, which is accompanied by the requirement of institutional reforms and socio-economic policy for benefit of the majority, in order to establish new political rules and form a truly legitimate political mechanism. These demands came from various social groups and led to a number of political and legal transformations, culminating in the “populist government”, which came to power as a result of the parliamentary elections of 2018. The “Populist government” intended to revise many previous approaches in domestic and foreign policy. It is the Alliance of the right-wing and left-wing populists that was entrusted by Italian society with necessary reforms. Results. According to the authors, it is political populism as a possible platform for social and political transformations, along with a number of possible risks, that contains a positive potential associated with the possibility of overcoming ideological divisions, corporate selfishness of Italian politicians and parties, as well as alienation in the relations of the power and society. This approach to resolving issues by the “populist government” will contribute to the gradual resolution of the problems that have caused the long-term political crisis in Italy.

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Berezin, Mabel. « Fascism and Populism : Are They Useful Categories for Comparative Sociological Analysis ? » Annual Review of Sociology 45, n^o 1 (30 juillet 2019) : 345–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-073018-022351.

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Political developments in the United States and Europe have generated a resurgence in the use of the terms fascism and populism across multiple media. Fascism is a historically specific term that Benito Mussolini coined in Italy to define his regime. Over time, political analysts erased the historical specificity of fascism and deployed it as an analytic category. In contrast, populism is an analytic category that, depending on context, includes varying aggregates of popular preferences that often lack a coherent and unifying ideology. This review draws upon interdisciplinary scholarship and empirical cases to revisit the terms fascism and populism, focusing on institutionalized politics. Contemporary fascist and populist politics are increasingly global. This review argues that comparative political and historical sociologists need to develop an analytically cogent approach to researching this encroaching political phenomenon. The review suggests a research agenda that treats fascism and populism as more than conceptual categories.

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Leonardi, Salvo, et Mimmo Carrieri. « Populism and trade union internationalism : the case of Italy ». Transfer : European Review of Labour and Research 26, n^o 3 (10 juillet 2020) : 273–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1024258920934329.

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Voting analyses have documented how, behind worldwide successes of populist parties, lies growing support from manual workers, even those who are unionised. This reflects changes in political supply and demand, with manual workers frustrated by high costs they have paid in past years and disenchanted by the political vacuum left by traditionally pro-labour parties that had long given voice to their needs. What role do unions play? Can they still influence the voting of their declining but still more or less substantial membership? What are their narratives and organisational strategies on epochal challenges like immigration and EU integration? How can their sense of solidarity, universalism and labour internationalism cope with the growing fears, chauvinism and nationalism of a significant proportion of the working class? This article examines these questions from the perspective of Italy, using empirical data and qualitative insights on the partial success of union action. We conclude that there remains substantial potential for unions, through appropriate political choices, discursive strategies and socialisation with their members, to stem xenophobic and nationalistic inclinations in the world of work.

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Agnew, John, et Michael Shin. « Spatializing Populism : Taking Politics to the People in Italy ». Annals of the American Association of Geographers 107, n^o 4 (13 mars 2017) : 915–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2016.1270194.

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Öner, Selcen. « Growing Fusion of Populism and Euroscepticism in Italy : A Comparative Analysis of the League and The Five Star Movement ». Tripodos, n^o 49 (20 décembre 2020) : 13–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.51698/tripodos.2020.49p13-28.

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There has been a growing fusion of populism and Euroscepticism in European politics, especially after recent economic and migration crises. Despite being a founding EU member and one of the most Europhile countries, Italy has seen the simultaneous rise of populism and Euroscepticism, especially after the last national elections in 2018. After introducing its conceptual and analytical framework, based on the growing fusion of populism and Euroscepticism, this article compares the League and the Five Star Movement (M5S) in terms of populism and Euroscepticism and their policies before the last European Parliament elections in 2019. The qualitative analysis is based on semi-structured, face-to-face, indepth interviews with elite and expert participants conducted by the author in Italy in 2018.

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Sandri, Giulia, Antonella Seddone et Fulvio Venturino. « When Charisma is no Longer Enough. Insights on Populist Parties’ Leadership from the (Northern) League ». Polish Political Science Review 7, n^o 1 (1 novembre 2019) : 80–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ppsr-2019-0005.

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AbstractSeveral scholars of populism have pointed out that populist parties rely very oft en on so-called charismatic leadership (Canovan, 1981; McDonnell, 2015). While the rise of populist parties in Europe in the last decade is quite evident and well-studied, what remains understudied is how this phenomenon interacts with other transformations that are currently shaping parties and party systems in European democracies. In particular, what is the interplay between the rise of populism, political leadership and personalization of politics? This link between populism and leadership could be understood in the light of the change occurring within party organizations, and internal party democratization in particular (Musella, 2015; Pogunkte and Webb, 2007; Karvonen, 2010; Scarrow et al. 2017). Following these studies underlining a close relationship between populism, leadership and inclusive leadership selection methods, in this paper we aim at empirically exploring how the personalization and democratization of organizational patterns affect the role of the leader in populist parties. To what extent does the use of inclusive selection methods of party leaders within populist parties affect the scope of their organizational power and strengthens the party’s personalization patterns? To explore this research question, we focus on a case study, the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy as an empirical illustration and we rely on original survey data, on aggregated electoral data as well as on primary and secondary data on party organizational rules.

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Sigachev, Maxim I., Ernest S. Sleptsov et Eduard V. Fadeev. « New Right-Wing Populism : Tendencies and Prospects on the Example of Some European States (Italy, France, Germany, Austria) ». RUDN Journal of Political Science 22, n^o 3 (15 décembre 2020) : 458–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-1438-2020-22-3-458-474.

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The article reveals the relationship between the political crises that affected the European Union from 2015 to 2020, and the growing sympathy of voters for populist-Eurosceptic parties. Particular attention is paid to the political situation in Austria, where in 2017-2019. The government included right-wing populists, as well as the results of the European Parliament elections in May 2019, which testify to the strengthening of the position of a new populism, especially the right-wing one, represented by the Eurosceptics group Identity and Democracy. The purpose of the article is to analyze the current state of the right-wing populist parties and to describe the current patterns of their development in terms of political prospects and the impact on the internal politics of the EU member states. The following research questions are formulated: 1. Has the influence of right-wing populist parties intensified or waned during the migration crisis? 2. Do right-wing populists constitute a coherent pan-European political force? 3. What is the specificity of Italian, Austrian and German right-wing populists?. To answer these questions, a quantitative (first of all, thematic literature and publications in the media) and quantitative analysis (dynamics of relevant statistical information was evaluated). As a result of the study, the authors come to the following conclusions: 1. The entry of the Austrian right-wing populists (APS) into a coalition with S. Kurtz in 2017-2019. - This is part of the regular fluctuations in the balance of power between the three political camps inside Austria, and not a sharp turnaround in established political models (right turn). 2. The German right-wing populists, on the contrary, despite local and really sudden successes (AdG), are in systemic isolation. 3. In Italy, right-wing populists have made significant progress, but the prospects for their unity with other European new right-wingers remain controversial. 4. With some caution, it can be stated that the period 2017-2019, was successful for right-wing populists. The recognition of the right-wing populist parties, their media coverage and presence in government has increased markedly. The perception of the importance of migration themes and cultural identity has increased in comparison with the first half of the 2010s. Moreover, in 2020. this trend is beginning to decline, the themes of culture and migration are gradually giving way to topics of safety, health and the environment.

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Miglietta, Anna, et Barbara Loera. « Modern Forms of Populism and Social Policies : Personal Values, Populist Attitudes, and Ingroup Definitions in Support of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Welfare Policies in Italy ». Genealogy 5, n^o 3 (23 juin 2021) : 60. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/genealogy5030060.

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We analyzed the relationship between modern forms of populism and citizen support for exclusive welfare policies and proposals, and we focused on support for left-wing- and right-wing-oriented welfare policies enacted or proposed during the Lega Nord (LN)–Five Star Movement (FSM) government in Italy (2018–2019). In light of the theoretical perspective of political ideology as motivated by social cognition, we examined citizens’ support for the two policies considering adherence to populist attitudes, agreement on the criteria useful to define ingroup membership, and personal values. We also took into account the role of cognitive sophistication in populism avoidance. A total of 785 Italian adults (F = 56.6; mean age = 35.8) completed an online survey in the summer of 2019 based on the following: support for populist policies and proposals, political ideologies and positioning, personal values, and ingroup boundaries. We used correlation and regression analyses. The results highlight the relationships between populism and political conservatism. Populism was related to the vertical and horizontal borders defining the “people”; cognitive sophistication was not a relevant driver. We identified some facilitating factors that could promote adherence to and support for public policies inspired by the values of the right or of the left, without a true ideological connotation.

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Cervi, Laura. « Exclusionary Populism and Islamophobia : A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Spain ». Religions 11, n^o 10 (10 octobre 2020) : 516. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel11100516.

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Exclusionary populism is well known for twisting real grievances of the citizens, by problematizing the gap between “us” and “them”, capitalizing on identity lines, calling out as “others” those who do not share “pure people’s” identity and culture. Especially after 9/11, Muslims have become the ideal-type of “other”, making Islamophobia the primary populist anti-paradigm. This article contributes to the burgeoning literature on Islamophobic populism analyzing the presence of Islamophobia in the electoral discourse of Vox party in Spain and Lega in Italy. In addition, it makes a novel contribution by discussing and testing the existence of different models of Islamophobia, distinguishing between “banal Islamophobia” and “ontological Islamophobia”. Applying clause-based semantic text analysis—including qualitative and quantitative variables—to thirty speeches by the two party leaders, Santiago Abascal and Matteo Salvini, during the last three elections (General, Regional and European), the paper concludes that, despite the similarities, the two politician display two different models of Islamophobia. Whereas Abascal displays a clear “ontological Islamophobia”, depicting Muslims ontologically incompatible with Spanish civilization (defined precisely by its anti-Muslim history), the latter presents a mix of arguments that oscillate between “ontological” and “banal” Islamophobia.

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Bobba, Giuliano, Cristina Cremonesi, Moreno Mancosu et Antonella Seddone. « Populism and the Gender Gap : Comparing Digital Engagement with Populist and Non-populist Facebook Pages in France, Italy, and Spain ». International Journal of Press/Politics 23, n^o 4 (2 août 2018) : 458–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1940161218787046.

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This paper clarifies whether and to what extent populist communication could drive different gender-oriented reactions. We adopted an original research design intending Facebook as a natural environment where investigating the interaction between social media users and populist and non-populist parties. Our case selection considers three countries falling into the pluralist polarized media system: France, Italy, and Spain. A human content analysis was carried out on a sample of 2,235 Facebook posts published during thirty days in 2016 by the four main parties/leaders in each country. An original algorithm allowed to identify the gender of users liking each message. We tested whether men tend more to provide likes to messages posted by populist parties, messages published by radical populists, messages containing populist contents, and different components of populist messages. Findings confirm the existence of a gender-oriented reaction to populism: Men tend to support populist actors and parties on Facebook more than women do, by providing likes to their content. Yet the difference in gender gap between radical and moderate parties is not significant. We also found that the antielite component of populist discourse obtains more likes by male Facebook users. This pattern is common for both populist and non-populist parties.

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Font, Nuria, Paolo Graziano et Myrto Tsakatika. « Varieties of Inclusionary Populism ? SYRIZA, Podemos and the Five Star Movement ». Government and Opposition 56, n^o 1 (8 mai 2019) : 163–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2019.17.

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AbstractOver the past years, parties often described as populist, such as SYRIZA in Greece, the Five Star Movement (FSM) in Italy and Podemos in Spain have made significant electoral breakthroughs, unsettling well-established party systems. In the literature, inclusionary populism has primarily been applied to Latin America whereas the three Southern European parties have been examined individually, but not in comparative perspective. The purpose of this article is to provide a comparative analysis, based on an original electoral manifestos content analysis, aimed at unveiling the ‘inclusionary populism’ features of the ‘new’ political parties that have emerged in Southern Europe. By focusing on the 2012–16 period, the article shows that the inclusionary category can be fruitfully applied also to European political parties; it finds different degrees of inclusionary populism (namely between SYRIZA and Podemos); and it proves that the FSM falls between the two exclusionary vs. inclusionary poles.

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González-González, Pablo, Hugo Marcos-Marné, Iván Llamazares et Homero Gil de Zúñiga. « The Informational Consequences of Populism : Social Media News Use and “News Finds Me” Perception ». Politics and Governance 10, n^o 1 (17 février 2022) : 197–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i1.4772.

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Prior studies have theorized a positive association between people’s populist attitudes and an increased use of social media to consume news, which will be mainly driven by individuals’ engagement with news that reflects their people-centered, anti-elitist, and Manichean understanding of politics. However, such general connection remains elusive. This research seeks to further clarify this strand of the literature by incorporating people’s belief that important political information will find them without actively seeking news—"News Finds Me” perception (NFM). For that, we use online survey data from two European countries that differ regarding the ideological political supply side of populism (Italy and Portugal). The main results suggest that citizens who hold stronger populist attitudes will also develop stronger NFM. Furthermore, findings reveal a mediating effect of social media news use on the effects of populist attitudes over NFM. That is, those who hold stronger populist attitudes tend to use social media to get exposed to public affairs news more often, which in turn explains the development of the NFM. These results emphasize the importance of systematically exploring citizens populists’ attitudes within today’s social media, social networks, and complex information systems.

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Giurlando, Philip. « Populism and international affairs : a comparison of Spain and Italy ». Política. Revista de Ciencia Política 60, n^o 2 (3 janvier 2023) : 109–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5354/0719-5338.2022.68358.

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Este artículo sostiene que, en el ámbito de la política internacional, el populismo en el sur de Europa contiene elementos ideológicos densos, y que la identificación de estos elementos puede ayudarnos a dar sentido a algunas de sus preferencias en materia de política exterior. Se pretende apoyar este argumento centrándose en los populistas de España e Italia, a saber, Podemos, Vox, el 5SM y la Liga. También destaca cómo los populistas de ambos países se ven limitados a la hora de poner en práctica su visión debido al estatus de potencia media de sus respectivos países y a la dependencia económica de sus naciones respecto a los socios de la UE. El artículo concluye con sugerencias sobre futuras investigaciones.

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Schmidtke, Oliver. « ‘We the People’ : Demarcating the Demos in Populist Mobilization—The Case of the Italian Lega ». Social Sciences 10, n^o 10 (23 septembre 2021) : 351. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci10100351.

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This article is a theoretically guided and empirically based analysis of how populist movements invoke the notion of the ‘people’ as a cornerstone of their political mobilization. While the confrontation between the virtuous ‘people’ and the unresponsive elites speaks to how populism challenges established political actors and institutions, the actual meaning of who the ‘people’ are and what they represent is shifting and often driven by strategic considerations. Analytically the article investigates the distinct ways in which nationalism and populism conceptualize and politically mobilize the notion of the ‘people’. Empirically it focuses on the Italian League and engages in a discourse analysis of its political campaigns over the past 30 years. Based on this textual analysis of political campaigns, the article sheds light on how the reference to the ‘people’ has been employed as this political actor has transformed from a regionalist party advocating for autonomy in Northern Italy to one taking up the role of a populist-nationalist party at the national level. This case study allows the author to make a generalizable hypothesis about the nature of identity politics promoted by populist actors and the way in which the invocation of the ‘people’ and their alleged enemies is a pivotal political narrative that opens and restricts opportunities for political mobilization. This interpretative approach also allows for a more concise conceptual understanding of the affinity that right-wing populists demonstrate toward nativist ideologies.

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Rooduijn, Matthijs. « The Nucleus of Populism : In Search of the Lowest Common Denominator ». Government and Opposition 49, n^o 4 (11 septembre 2013) : 573–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.30.

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There are different area-based bodies of literature on populism, which generally define the concept in slightly different ways. As a result, the term ‘populism’ has been attached to a wide variety of political actors, from Perot in the US to Berlusconi in Italy, and from Perón in Argentina to Le Pen in France. Is it an unfortunate coincidence that the same word has been used for completely different parties and politicians, or is it possible to discern the lowest common denominator that these actors share? By means of a comparison of six cases, based on a most-different systems design, I demonstrate that populists in different times and places have four characteristics in common: (1) they emphasize the central position of the people; (2) they criticize the elite; (3) they perceive the people as a homogeneous entity; and (4) they proclaim a serious crisis. These four characteristics constitute the core elements of populism.

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Lanzone, Liza, et Dwayne Woods. « Riding the Populist Web : Contextualizing the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy ». Politics and Governance 3, n^o 2 (11 août 2015) : 54–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v3i2.246.

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This article focuses on three mechanisms to explain the rise of populist movements across Europe. They are politicization of resentment, exploitation of social cleavages, and polarization of resentment and feelings of non-representation. We conceptualize populism as a strategic power game aiming to transform potential majorities into real ones by creating or reframing social cleavages. Our theoretical model is used to explain the rise of the Five Star Movement (M5S). Beppe Grillo’s M5S gained notoriety on the national political scene in Italy just before the 2013 elections and succeeded in get-ting nearly 25 percent of the overall vote. Moreover, it was the only political force that was able to attract votes across the different regions in Italy, making it the country’s only truly national party.

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Alekseenkova, Elena. « Country of the Winning Populism : Italy in the Post-election Period ». Contemporary Europe 2, n^o 88 (1 mars 2019) : 106–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/soveurope22019106117.

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Maslova, E. A. « EUROSCEPTISM AND POPULISM IN ITALY : THE EXAMPLE OF “FIVE STARS” MOVEMENT ». Outlines of global transformations : politics, economics, law 10, n^o 1 (1 janvier 2017) : 141–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-1-141-157.

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Caiani, Manuela, et Patricia Kröll. « Nationalism and Populism in Radical Right Discourses in Italy and Germany ». Javnost - The Public 24, n^o 4 (5 juillet 2017) : 336–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2017.1330084.

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Shavlay, E. P., M. I. Sigachev et E. S. Sleptsov. « Anti-immigration Agenda of Populist Parties in Switzerland ». MGIMO Review of International Relations 14, n^o 5 (1 novembre 2021) : 130–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2021-5-80-130-148.

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The article analyzes the problem of right-wing populism in Switzerland. The study of the features of the country's political and electoral system highlights the issues of its immigration policy and relations with the European Union. The authors argue that the phenomenon of Swiss populism should be considered in a broader context, in connection with which attention is paid not only to the Swiss people's party, the Ticino League and the Geneva citizens ' Movement, but also to the populist parties of countries belonging to the Alpine macroregion – the Austrian freedom party (Austria) and the League (Italy). A discursive analysis of the programs shows that the anti-immigrant program is an essential part of the identity of right-wing populists. All of them are opposed to European integration and globalization, linking them to increased ethnic and religious tensions, unemployment and increased crime. At the same time, a special feature of Swiss parties is the fact that they position migration as a phenomenon mainly associated with cross-border movement of European citizens. Already complex, during the COVID-19 pandemic, this issue has become even more acute, and has become an integral part of their agenda. Meanwhile, the 2015-2018 migration crisis that preceded the pandemic allowed the Swiss people's party to strengthen its identity as a right-wing populist neoliberal party with a strong localist and conservative program aimed at cultural dominance over migrants. The authors also note that the Germanic focus on environmental protection is part of the populist agenda of right-wing regional parties, although it is usually characteristic of the left parties.

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Bernini, Lorenzo. « “Merde Alors!” ». Critical Times 3, n^o 3 (1 décembre 2020) : 358–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/26410478-8662280.

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AbstractIn recent history, Italy has repeatedly emerged as a successful laboratory for political experiments. After WWI, Fascism was invented there by Mussolini, and it quickly spread across Europe. In the 1990s, Berlusconi anticipated Trump's entrepreneurial populism. Today, there is a risk that Italy will once again perform the role of a political avant-garde: that it will export to Europe a sovereign populism of a new kind that is nonetheless in continuity with disquieting features of the worst past. The essay performs a close reading of the programmatic speech that Minister of Home Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Italy Matteo Salvini delivered in July 2018 at the thirty-second annual gathering of the Lega party. Its aim is to detect the presence in it of the politics of abjection (Judith Butler), a “Fascist archetype” (Umberto Eco) that affects both racialized and non-heterosexual people.

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Crulli, Mirko. « CORONAVIRUS AND SCIENCE-RELATED COMMUNICATION BY POPULIST PARTIES ». Srpska politička misao 78, n^o 4/2022 (8 novembre 2022) : 43–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.22182/spm.7842022.3.

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The relation between science and populism has already been investigated by relevant sociopolitical literature. However, the Covid-19 pandemic has produced remarkable changes in how politics, science, and society relate to each other. Therefore, there is a need to explore further what science is to populists and how populist parties have dealt with science in times of pandemic. How much has science-related communication by populist parties changed after the outbreak of Coronavirus? What topics have populist science-related messages been about? Are there differences in the science-related communication of ideologically different populist parties, and between populist parties in government and in opposition? The research tries to answer these questions through a thematic analysis of populist communication on Twitter. The empirical investigation is carried out through topic modelling on a dataset of 1.133 science-related populist tweets. The focus is on a pertinent single case study, Italy. Here there are three different populist parties in terms of ideology, which have been both in government and in opposition during the pandemic. Findings highlight that different populist parties have resorted to different science-related rhetoric and that the two Italian populist parties on the radical right, the League and FdI, have engaged in “counter-science” and “anti-science” communication.

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Avram, Răzvan-Samir. « Populism or the Broken Promises of Democracy. Concepts, Causes and Solutions ». Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Studia Europaea 65, n^o 2 (30 décembre 2020) : 303–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbeuropaea.2020.2.14.

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"Europe's response to the consequences of the Two World Wars was the need for joint association in a European project. Later on, the communist revolutions have sparked hopes on the European continent in creating a much-dreamed prosperity. One by one, the Eastern European Countries have joined the European project, the last country being Croatia in 2013. Time has passed, but not all problems seem to be resolved, on the contrary, we could say, extremism is on the rise, intolerance of migrants and foreigners it’s a topic on any internal debate. And s as if it weren't enough, Brexit, in conjunction with the rise in the voting intentions for the populist leaders like Marine Le Pen with The National Front in France, Matteo Salvini with Lega Nord in Italy and Nigel Farage with UKIP and later on with Reform Part. This Article aims to provide some clarifications in relation with the conceptual nature of populism, in order to define the concept and identifying and analyzing the main key messages within the populist speech, and also to identify why such messages have success, using as a starting point the idea that populism is only the result of stagnation of the current political class, as well as of the shortcomings of the democratic system. Keywords: democracy, populism, unemployment, civic-unrest, crisis, elitism, fake-news. "

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Hopkin, Jonathan. « Can Italy's Monti Save the Euro ? » Current History 111, n^o 743 (1 mars 2012) : 94–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2012.111.743.94.

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Varriale, Amedeo. « Neo-Populism : Applying Paul Taggart’s Heartland to the Italian Five Star Movement and League parties ». Journal of Dialogue Studies 8 (2020) : 235–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/mdjy1562.

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In the early 2000s the British academic and expert in the field of populism, Paul Taggart, conceptualised the heartland – which he defined as ‘a version of the past that celebrates a hypothetical, uncomplicated and non-political territory of imagination.’ The idea is that populists envision this return to an almost utopic, laborious, morally pure, and culturally homogenous ‘place’ where professional political administration is not completely rejected but certainly kept at a minimum. Applying Taggart’s heartland to leaders and parties allows us to build on an efficient comprehension of specific uses of populist dialogue, as well as their general discursive styles and political narratives. Those who have capitalised on the current populist zeitgeist (a term Cas Mudde often uses), such as the American President Donald J. Trump, have mobilised masses by implicitly calling for a return to the heartland with slogans such as ‘Make America Great Again’. However, Trump is not the only politician who has discursively framed the concept of heartland in the twenty-first century. Interestingly, the heartland can also be applied to ‘right-wing’ national- populists and ‘left-wing’ techno-populists in Italy. The League, believes that with their involvement, their country can return to be a safer, more stable, hard-working, producerist society. Similarly, the Five Star Movement pressures the elites for a more virtuous, honest, and transparent way of doing politics through the digital web and direct democracy practices. Those values are the ones that shape their idea of heartland. This piece untangles the two distinct versions of heartland that exist within the forma mentis of the two Italian populist parties, compares them, and contrasts them in the hope of contributing to the already existing literature that has presented little evidence so far on how Taggart’s relevant concept can be identified in populist discourse, monologue, and ideology. Also, some advice is given on how to deal with the new populists worldwide in a way that involves dialogue that is both constructive and inclusive.

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Diani, Mario. « Linking Mobilization Frames and Political Opportunities : Insights from Regional Populism in Italy ». American Sociological Review 61, n^o 6 (décembre 1996) : 1053. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2096308.

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Ida Dominijanni et Translated by Cesare Casarino. « THE CRICKET'S LEAP : POST-OEDIPAL POPULISM AND NEOLIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY ITALY ». Cultural Critique 87 (2014) : 167. http://dx.doi.org/10.5749/culturalcritique.87.2014.0167.

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De Luca, Marino, et Antonio Ciaglia. « The role of the people in the characterization of populism. Evidence from the press coverage of the 2014 European Parliament election campaign in Italy ». Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 47, n^o 1 (21 novembre 2016) : 63–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2016.23.

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Populism is being increasingly studied by political and social scientists. This article pays particular attention to the way in which ‘people’ can be approached and appealed to by their leaders. In particular, by undertaking a content analysis of the two most read daily newspapers in Italy, and by relying on the technique of correspondence analysis, this article shows that to fully understand the phenomenon of populism, the way in which ‘the people’ are approached by their leaders cannot be left aside. In doing so, this article empirically analyses and discusses three dimension of populism and contributes to a more granular understanding of this phenomenon in established democracies.

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Rosta, Miklós, et László Tóth. « Is there a demand for autocracies in Europe ? Comparing the attitudes of Hungarian and Italian university students toward liberal democratic values inspired by János Kornai ». Public Choice 187, n^o 1-2 (15 février 2021) : 217–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00877-y.

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AbstractIn the European Union right-wing and left-wing populist parties are increasingly becoming stronger. Meanwhile in Central and Eastern Europe autocracies are emerging and becoming stabilized. Italy and Hungary are two notable examples of these processes. Italy is the only country in Western Europe where a coalition of purely populist parties won an election, while Hungary has the most mature autocracy in the European Union. By using survey methodology, we examined the preferences of Hungarian and Italian students regarding the values of liberal democracy. We seek answers to the questions whether there are any significant differences between the proportion of Hungarian students and Italian students who identify themselves with the values of liberal democracy and which of these values of liberal democracy they consider to be protected values. Based on our results, we claim that students from both countries are more likely to support liberal democratic values than to support either right-wing or left-wing populist values, even if the distributions of the two groups differ significantly. We found that Italian students adhere more strongly to liberal democratic values, while Hungarians are more open to left-wing and right-wing populism. Our results confirm that in Hungary, because of the values that many people hold, conditions are conducive for establishing a sustainable autocracy, while in Italy, the demand for such a system is much weaker.

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Житко, А. О. « ФЕНОМЕН «СУЧАСНИЙ ПОПУЛІЗМ» У КОНТЕКСТІ РИЗИКІВ І ВИКЛИКІВ ЛІБЕРАЛЬНИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЙ ХХІ СТОЛІТТЯ ». Сучасне суспільство : політичні науки, соціологічні науки, культурологічні науки 2, n^o 2-19 (2019) : 17–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.34142/24130060.2019.19.2.02.

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In the article attempts of description and analyze of research studies are undertaken, which are recognized in the modern scientific world as «strong points» in the study of the phenomenon of populism, in particular - G. Ionesk, E. Gellner, D. Bell, M. Kenovan, P. Tagart, E. Laclau, I. Me, I. Sorel et other, and the latest Western and domestic theoretical constructs, which lead to the knowledge and the nature and essence of the phenomenon of «modern populism», namely - Z. Bauman, W. Beck, F. Venturi, A. Grimimal-Buss, K. Davyst, J. Judis, R. Itwell, J.-V. Muller, T. Snyder, etc.; T. Andrushchenko, V. Bebyk, S. Datsyuk, I. Kiananka, G. Kuts, O. Lisnichuk, L. Matlai, I. Pobochi, T. Pryadko, T. Rad, O. Yarosha and others. It is determined that the overwhelming majority of modern researchers express a consolidated position on the complexity of definition («populism is the phenomenon dispersed, i.e. it is a component of many political phenomena, embodied in various ideological forms and political strategies») and a huge variety of manifestation of modern populism D. Trump (USA), Brexit (UK), Yellow Vest Movement (France), Five Star Movement (Italy), Podemos (Spain), G. Wilders (Netherlands), V. Orban (Hungary), R. Erdogan (Turkey), etc. Attention is drawn to the fact that the «global success of populists» in the 21st century creates a real threat to liberal-democratic values - individual freedom, pluralism, free speech, free elections, etc. The key factors that provoked «the outburst of populism» are characterized, in particular, the dominance of the contemporary voter in the socio-political moods of feelings of «disappointment», «confusion», «uncertainty» and others. The author attempts to find effective strategies for counteracting «aggressive populism» in the context of the mediation of contemporary political processes, in particular, the formation of critical thinking and media literacy of the modern voter. It is stated that the «wave» of populism also seized the political space of modern Ukraine, in which the mediation of political processes created a new format of communication between voters and politicians, which, in fact, attested to the results of recent presidential and parliamentary election campaigns.

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Minetti, Marta. « The Facilitators Package, penal populism and the Rule of Law : Lessons from Italy ». New Journal of European Criminal Law 11, n^o 3 (10 août 2020) : 335–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2032284420946837.

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The past 20 years have witnessed an increase in the attention that the international, national and European policy responses have devoted to irregular immigration and transnational organised crime, with the Facilitators Package being among the protagonists of the criminalising approach adopted by the European legislator. More specifically, provision was drafted and ratified with the aim to tackle irregular migration by strengthening the penal framework on the facilitation of unauthorised entry within the European Union (EU) external borders in ‘the strict sense, and for the purpose of sustaining networks which exploit human beings’. Nevertheless, although its effectiveness in achieving the stated goals has been confirmed in the EU regulatory fitness performance programme (REFIT) assessment by the EU commission released in 2017, the academic judgment has taken a completely different direction, labelling the provision as exemplary of the preventive role taken by EU criminal law. The aim of the article is to analyse the transposition of the Facilitators Package by the Italian legislators and to examine its application within the national legal framework, in order to scrutinise the consequences that the symbolic application of the criminal law provision is having on the Italian jurisdiction in terms of Rule of Law (particularly on the principle of legal certainty).

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Hamerli, Petra. « Common Points in the Policy of Italy and Central Europe ». Politics in Central Europe 16, s1 (1 février 2020) : 47–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pce-2020-0003.

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AbstractRecent news often compares current Italian policy to that of Central Europe – especially Hungary. The latest elections brought victory to right-wing populism in Italy and the Visegrad countries – especially in Hungary and Poland – with the key points of their discourse concentrated on similar topics such as Euroscepticism, migration and security, which are tightly connected to the refugee question. Right-wing theories have historical traditions both in Italy (Fascism) and Central Europe (rightist and extreme rightist parties) that I think important to summarise, as some of their elements can also be found in the political thinking of nowadays. The paper presents the main parties of Italy and those of the Visegrad countries and compares their common elements to see whether Italy can politically belong to Central Europe.

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Paerregaard, Karsten. « VIEWPOINT Grasping the Fear : How Xenophobia Intersects with Climatephobia and Robotphobia and how their Co-production Creates Feelings of Abandonment, Self-pity and Destruction ». Migration Letters 16, n^o 4 (30 septembre 2019) : 647–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/ml.v16i4.848.

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The aim of this article is to discuss an issue that has been on my mind for several years: the fear that fuels the rightist populist movements in Europe and America. As we all know, xenophobia is at the heart of the political rhetoric of Lega in Italy, Vox in Spain, Rassemplement National in France, UKIP in UK, Die Freiheitspartei in Austria, Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Partij voor de Vrijheid in Holland, the nationalist parties of Eastern Europe and the Nordic countries, and, of course, the Republican Party led by President Trump in the US. In Europe, anti-Muslim sentiments have become a driver of rightist populism in many countries, and in America, Mexicans and other Latino groups are recurring targets of Trump’s many tweets. But even though I agree that xenophobia is crucial to the surge of populism in the Western world, I believe other equally important sentiments of fear co-produce the image of foreigners as a threat. Two such elements are the threats that a future climate disaster and the introduction of AI (artificial intelligence) represent to our lives and livelihoods.

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