Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Politiche interstatali »

Richard Gordon's work helps us understand that globalization of innovation does not diminish competition among states, but it does make it more difficult for states to influence the distribution of innovation rents. Yet, that doesn't keep states from trying. Gordon argued that they could be more successful if they cooperated rather than competed. This article claims that, whether they intend to or not, states do cooperate even as they are competing to expand their individual economic space. The cooperation occurs through the pervasive movement of science and engineering students and graduates from less innovative economies to more innovative economies and back, generally financed directly or indirectly by public funds. Public money in countries competing to get innovative rents mainly finances students to get their first degrees at home. But it also helps finance many to go to innovation centers for advanced degrees. Public money in the innovation centers finances university research and, in turn, graduate students to be trained doing the research. An increasing number of such students are from the hopeful competitors among the NICs. When foreign students stay in the innovation centers, states are implicitly “cooperating” to finance continued innovation in countries that can provide the most advanced training; when these graduates return to the less advanced innovating countries, states are implicitly “cooperating” to finance those countries' attempts to gain larger shares of innovation rents. The graduates, trained by developed country universities largely at developed states' expense and sometimes trained further as employees in developed country high-tech firms, are the most important resource in efforts to begin innovation efforts in the NICs. They also form a political force for promoting national innovation cores. So interstitial competition begets cooperation and interstatial cooperation can also beget competition.

La tesi si propone di mettere in luce gli aspetti più caratteristici e rilevanti dei trattati di aderenza nella loro declinazione visconteo-sforzesca, con l’obiettivo di evidenziare lo sviluppo e, soprattutto, i caratteri innovativi di un legame che, destinato a perdurare nell’età moderna, offre una rinnovata chiave interpretativa dei processi genetici di una “nuova” statualità alla fine dell’età di mezzo. Vincoli elastici, flessibili e ritagliati direttamente sulle base delle contingenze in cui venivano stipulati, i trattati di aderenza (o colleganza, accomandigia, raccomandazione, …) conobbero una vasta diffusione nell’Italia bassomedievale e rinascimentale, in particolar modo dalla metà del XIV secolo, e avevano lo scopo di coordinare i principali poteri degli scacchieri italiani e le realtà minori che allignavano dentro o al di fuori degli stessi, in particolar modo i signori rurali o, in qualche caso, le comunità: riassumendo ai minimi termini, il principalis si vedeva infatti garantito sostegno militare, mentre l’adherens riceveva protezione e legittimazioni di vario tipo. L’utilizzo che i signori – e poi i duchi – di Milano fecero di tale strumento risulta di grande interesse, in quanto Visconti prima e Sforza poi ricorsero con particolare costanza al legame sia per consolidare i processi di state-building interni allo stato, sia i processi di espansione esterni ai confini del principato. Sin dalla metà del Trecento, infatti, i signori di Milano utilizzarono frequentemente i trattati di aderenza per individuare alleati direttamente a ridosso – se non addirittura all’interno – dei territori nemici. Tale meccanismo fu particolarmente sfruttato durante l’età di Gian Galeazzo Visconti, che rese la pressione dei suoi aderenti quantomai efficace contro le potenze avversarie (in particolare Firenze) innervando di sostenitori aree strategiche come la Romagna e la Lunigiana. Con la morte del primo duca di Milano nel 1402 il vincolo attraversò un lungo periodo di crisi, dovuto alla debolezza di Giovanni Maria Visconti, e fu solo in seguito alla sua violenta scomparsa (1412) che Filippo Maria Visconti poté ricostruire, al pari dello stato, anche la rete di aderenti, declinata dal terzo duca in senso difensivo piuttosto che offensivo. Nel momento in cui la dinastia si estinse e il ducato cadde nelle mani degli Sforza, il legame si ritrovò inserito all’interno dei delicati equilibri della Lega italica: l’aderenza divenne così un modo non più per aggredire i nemici o per difendersi, per definire e profilare la propria sfera di influenza, ormai in qualche modo “stabilizzata” e non più sottoposta a eccessivi scossoni. Dal punto di vista nei processi di state-building, invece, il legame mantenne caratteristiche costanti nel corso del tempo: tramite le accomandigie i signori e i duchi di Milano riuscirono infatti a meglio vincolare a sé le animate famiglie signorili che punteggiavano gli spazi dello stato, in particolare in aree come il Piemonte e l’Emilia. Lì i trattati, che pure non persero le loro caratteristiche militari, rivelarono tutto il loro potenziale come elementi di coordinazione e di disciplinamento: la loro fortuna risiede proprio nelle loro caratteristiche elastiche, che se da una parte rendevano il vincolo così costruito instabile, dall’altra ne sostanziano l’effettiva modernità, e che ne garantirono la lunga durata (seppur con alterne fortune) ancora per tutto il ‘500 e oltre.
The research proposes to investigate the most characteristic and relevant aspects of the treatises of adherentia under the Visconti and Sforza, with the aim of highlighting the development and, above all, the innovative characteristics of a bond which, destined to last in the modern age, offers a new interpretative key to the genetic processes of a "new" statehood at the end of the Middle Age. Those treaties were elastic, flexible and tailored directly on the basis of the contingencies in which they were stipulated, and the bonds of adherentia (or collegatio, accomandatio, recomendisia, and so on) knew a wide diffusion in medieval and renaissance Italy, especially from the middle of the 14th century: they had the aim of coordinating the main powers of the Italian chessboards and the minor realities inside or outside them, especially the rural lords or, in some cases, the communities; summing up, the principalis was guaranteed military support, while the adherens received protection and legitimations of various kinds. The use that the lords – and then the dukes – of Milan made of this instrument is of great interest, as Visconti and Sforza resorted with particular constancy to the link both to consolidate the state-building processes inside the state and the expansion processes outside the principality's borders. Since the middle of the fourteenth century, in fact, the lords of Milan frequently used treaties of adherentia to identify allies close to – or even inside – enemy territories. This mechanism was particularly exploited during the age of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, who made the pressure of his adherentes as effective as possible against the opposing powers (in particular Florence) and made strategic areas such as Romagna and Lunigiana a source of supporters. With the death of the first duke of Milan in 1402 the bond went through a long period of crisis, due to the weakness of Giovanni Maria Visconti, and it was only after his violent death (1412) that Filippo Maria Visconti was able to rebuild, like the state, the network of adherentes, which the third duke declined in a defensive rather than offensive way. When the dynasty became extinct and the Duchy fell into the hands of the Sforza, the bond found itself inserted within the delicate equilibrium of the Italic League, thus becoming a way no longer to wage war, but was rather used to define and profile the spheres of influence, now somehow "stabilised" and no longer subject to excessive shocks. From the point of view of the state-building processes, on the other hand, the bond maintained constant characteristics over time: through the accomandigie, the lords and dukes of Milan managed to better bind the restless noble families that dotted the spaces of the state, particularly in areas such as Piedmont and Emilia. There the bonds, which did not lose their military characteristics, revealed all their potential as elements of coordination and discipline: their fortune resides precisely in their elastic characteristics, which, if on the one hand made the bond so constructed unstable, on the other, substantiated its effective modernity, which guaranteed its long duration (albeit with alternating fortunes) throughout the fifteenth century and beyond.

Questa tesi contribuisce alla letteratura sull'impatto economico dei conflitti tra stati. La tesi contribuisce concentrandosi sull'analisi empirica dell'effetto dei conflitti "soft" sui flussi commerciali e sugli IDE bilaterali. I conflitti "soft" tra stati derivanti dal fallimento della diplomazia, quando un'operazione militare sembra troppo radicale, possono agire come uno strumento politico e avere un impatto negativo sulle relazioni bilaterali. E poiché oggigiorno i paesi tendono a evitare la violenza e l'intervento militarizzato, i conflitti “soft” interstatali diventano esplicitamente interessanti da studiare. L'approccio empirico si basa sull'uso di dati panel bilanciati con osservazioni annuali e sull'adozione del modello gravitazionale coerente con la teoria, aumentato da una nuova misura del conflitto "soft" interstatale. I risultati ottenuti per mezzo di stimatori standard del modello gravitazionale mostrano che i conflitti “soft” hanno un impatto negativo statisticamente significativo e prolungato sia sul commercio bilaterale che sugli stock di IDE, indipendentemente dal controllo per le variabili omesse (presenza di accordi commerciali regionali, diversi tipi di sanzioni e controversie interstatali militarizzate) e diverse specificazioni del modello. I nostri risultati dimostrano che l'impatto di diversi tipi (indiretto: contro il paese in generale e diretto: contro una specifica organizzazione) dei conflitti “soft" interstatali è abbastanza eterogeneo tra commercio e IDE. Entrambi i tipi di conflitti “soft” hanno un significato impatto negativo sul commercio, mentre nel caso degli IDE, abbiamo trovato rilevanza solo per i casi diretti. I risultati dimostrano che l'impatto dei diversi tipi di conflitti “soft" interstatali - indiretto, ossia contro il paese in generale e diretti, contro una specifica organizzazione o impresa - è abbastanza eterogeneo tra commercio e IDE. Entrambi i tipi di conflitti “soft” hanno un significativo impatto negativo sul commercio, mentre nel caso degli IDE, l'evidenza riguarda solo i conflitti diretti. ​
This thesis contributes to the literature on the economic impact of interstate conflicts. The thesis contributes by focusing on the empirical analysis of effect of soft conflicts on bilateral trade and FDI. Interstate soft conflicts arising from the failure of diplomacy, when a military operation seems too radical, can act as a policy tool and have a negative impact on bilateral relations. And since nowadays countries tend to avoid violence and militarized intervention, interstate soft conflicts become explicitly interesting to study. The empirical approach is based on the use of balanced panel data with annual observations and on a theory-consistent structural gravity framework augmented by a new measure of interstate soft conflict. The results from standard gravity estimators show that interstate soft conflicts have a statistically significant and sustained negative impact on both bilateral trade and FDI stocks, regardless of the control for omitted variables (presence of regional trade agreements, different types of sanctions and militarized interstate disputes) and different model specifications. The results demonstrate that the impact of different types of interstate soft conflicts – indirect, against the country in general and direct, against a specific organization or firm - is quite heterogeneous between trade and FDI. Both types of soft conflicts have a significant negative impact on trade, while in case of FDI, we found significance only for direct cases.

This essay analyzes the ways in which rural lordship was legitimized, maintained and sometimes contested in the late Middle Ages. The focus is not on the local societies and the political competition within the regional state, but rather on the position of seigneurial power in the interstices of international relations. Specifically, the dynamics of the frontier allowed the lords to enforce their power, but produced situations that put their authority in risk, providing opportunities for their subjects to contrast it. Political brokerage is the key to exploring the competition and the relationship between a variety of local actors and the state authorities. The source I selected is the Carteggio sforzesco, consisting of the written correspondence between these protagonists. From this viewpoint and thanks to records rich in narrative and descriptive contents, I will try to reconstruct economic tensions, military instability, the need for diplomatic agreements and for individual protection, that define the relationship between the Duchy of Milan, Valais, Switzerland and Grisons. Finally I will go into depth in the case-study of Val Formazza, where the domination of the lords family was in decline during the 15th Century, while local protagonists of this diversified local world – highlanders of lower social conditions settled in a peripheral valley forming an ethno-cultural minority of German speakers – were capable.