Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Political corruption – Spain »

Political corruption is a universal phenomenon. Even though it is a cross-country reality, its level of intensity and the manner of its effect vary worldwide. In Spain, the demonstrated political corruption cases that have been echoed by the media in recent years for their economic, judicial and social significance are merely the tip of the iceberg as regards a problem hidden by many interested parties, plus the shortage of the means to fight against it. This study models and quantifies the population at risk of committing political corruption in Spain by identifying and quantifying the drivers that explain political corruption. Having quantified the problem, the model allows changes to be made in parameters, as well as fiscal, economic and legal measures being simulated, to quantify and better understand their impact on Spanish citizenship. Our results suggest increasing women’s leadership positions to mitigate this problem, plus changes in the political Parties’ Law in Spain and increasing the judiciary system’s budget.

Abstract The authors decided to deal with the theme of the influence of corruption on the political processes in contemporary Spain and Catalonia. The investigation of this problem requires the reference to both: a political situation in entire state and in the peripheral region, included in the territorial range of Spain. Therefore, the main objective of the article is the attempt to answer three questions: 1) What is the corruptive phenomenon based on and why a public sphere is endangered with it to such a degree?, 2) How did the Spanish citizens react to corruptive processes after 2008?, 3) Did Catalonia, whose politicians regard this region as definitely separate from Spain, differ considerably from a political centre and other regions of the country within intensity of the occurrence of corruptive phenomena after 2008?

- This article examines the public denunciation of political life in Spain during the second period of the long years of PSOE government, presided over by Felipe González from 1982 to 1996. During those years, with a consolidated democracy in place, the main opposition party, the conservative PP, called on the socialist leaders to deal with the corruption among those holding political office - particularly from the beginning of 1989. Not only did the denunciation of the various cases of corruption and of the "dirty war" against ETA terrorism occupy the political agenda as a means of challeng-ing and discrediting the government, but it also led to a "corrosion" of the political discourse that had characterized the democratic transition in Spain. With regard to these events in recent political life in Spain, the article emphasizes that political scandal is a slightly different phenomenon from corruption, understood as an abuse of the law that undermines the political system.

AbstractEver since the spectacular boom and bust cycle of the Spanish real estate industry, endemic corruption at the local level has become a widely recognized problem in the national public discourse. In an effort to expose an under-explored political determinant, this paper investigates the effect of local and regional alignment in fomenting corruption at the Spanish municipal level. To do so, we construct an ample panel dataset on the prevalence of corrupt practices by local politicians, which is employed to test the possible impact of partisan alignment in three consecutive joint municipal and regional elections. Findings show aligned municipalities to be more corrupt than non-aligned ones, an effect that is further associated with absolute majorities at both levels of government and higher capital transfers. By contrast, we also show that “throwing the rascals out” could be an effective strategy for curbing the corrupt practices of aligned municipalities. This indicates that the democratic political process may be effective in corruption control if agreements can be reached to remove corrupt politicians or parties from power.

Surveys show that citizens in all parts of the world have a strong distaste for corruption. At the same time, and contrary to the predictions of democratic theory, politicians involved in the most glaring abuse of public office often continue to receive electoral support. Using an original survey experiment conducted in Spain, this article explores a previously understudied aspect of this apparent paradox: the importance of viable and clean political alternatives. The results suggest that voters do punish political corruption when a clean alternative exists, even when the corrupt candidate is very appealing in other respects. However, when only given corrupt alternatives, respondents become much more likely to tolerate a candidate accused of corruption—even when given a convenient “no-choice” option. I discuss how these results can help us understand corruption voting and why some societies seem to be stuck in a high-corruption equilibrium.

Empirical studies do not provide a univocal answer about the effects of corruption on political attitudes and behaviour. Focusing on the relationship between corruption and political trust, in this article we explore whether real-world corruption scandals have a negative causal effect on trust in politicians; whether the impact of scandals decays over time; and whether corruption scandals have a weaker impact among the supporters of the party involved in the scandal. We address these questions through a natural experiment generated by the coincidence of the uncovering of a corruption scandal in Spain (the Bárcenas scandal) and the fieldwork of the European Social Survey. Given that the day at which survey interviews were conducted is as-if random, the uncovering of the scandal represents a unique opportunity to assess the causal effect of corruption on individuals’ trust in politicians. The results indicate that: (i) the corruption scandal had a substantial negative effect on trust in politicians; (ii) the effect of the scandal was stronger in the days following its disclosure; (iii) the effect of the scandal was independent from individuals’ partisan preferences.

Este trabajo analiza los Informes de Cumplimiento de 2016 y 2017 del Grupo de Estados contra la Corrupción del Consejo de Europa (GRECO) sobre prevención de la corrupción en España y se centra en el estudio de sus aspectos judiciales. Estos informes alertan sobre los serios peligros, provocados por la injerencia política, que acechan a los Órganos del Poder Judicial y se proyectan en la elección de los Jueces de los Altos Tribunales. Finalmente, estos informes también indican que en España no se cumplen con las recomendaciones que GRECO dirigió al Estado en 2014 a este respecto.This paper analyses the 2016 and 2017 Compliance Reports of Group of States against Corruption of Council of Europe (GRECO) about corruption prevention in Spain and it is focused on the study of its judiciary aspects. These Reports warn about the dangers of corruption in the Organs of Judiciary Government and in the election of Judges for High Courts caused by the political interference and also indicate that in Spain is not accomplished at all with the recommendations that GRECO addressed to the State in 2014.

This thesis is organized in three clearly differentiated chapters. The three of them deal with currently relevant issues: The effect of low-quality of standardized tests on research, the high levels of political corruption in Spain and the collective capacity of tackle climate change. In the first chapter “Straightening PISA: When Students do not Want to answer Standardized Tests”, I study one of the key elements on current education policies: The standardized-tests. Concretely, I analyze how students approach standardized tests in different ways. I use a measure of effort exerted by students belonging to different countries and social groups in order to assess the impact of low effort on the student's final score. The measure links an acknowledged psychological tests (Dot-Counting test) with one PISA-item, in which students had to merely count dots. In this chapter, I measure to which extent different effort levels may distort the score of students. This problem would affect social-science research when standardized-tests are use. At the end of the chapter, I propose a simple solution to design standard tests which would eliminate this problem. Given the importance of standardized-tests on the design of education programs, this paper may be a contribution to implement more accurate education policies. The second chapter focuses on one key issue of Spanish current political crisis: The level of political corruption. Political institutions developed during the Spanish transition to democracy are currently criticized due to their inability to stop political corruption. For instance, Spanish Attorney Generals are appointed by the government and their impartiality is usually criticized. In “Stories on Corruption: How Media and Prosecutors Influence Elections”, I analyze systematically the partiality of the last two Attorney Generals. Concretely, I study whether Attorney Generals try to influence elections by adjusting the tempo of their investigations to the electoral calendar. This possibility is combined with the mass media editorial decisions. I analyze whether mass media have a partisan bias and hide corruption activities of their preferred parties. For doing so, I have created a unique database: I have coded the number of articles containing the word “corruption” of the two main Spanish newspapers “El Pais” and “El Mundo" every week in the last ten years. After the econometric analysis I found significant evidence of the partisan behavior of both the Attorney Generals and mass media. The last chapter is a joint work with Karolina Safarzynska from the Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien. “Responding to the Climate Change Challenge: Experimental Evidence” tackles the problem of climate change and the capacity of societies to overcome it. This chapter has also a different methodology. Precisely, it is based on experimental methods. We consider isolated groups of individuals which must extract resources form a renewable common-pool. The novelty is the study of the impact of resource uncertainty on individual harvests in common-pool resource dilemmas together with the possibility of group collapse. The uncertainty is modeled as a weather shock diminishing the groups' resources, which is drawn from the distribution known in advance to participants. On the other hand, the group collapses if the resources go below a certain threshold. In that case all accumulated resource-extraction get lost. This can be interpreted as the minimum harvests below which a group does not have sufficient nutrition to survive. We find that in the long run, sufficiently severe weather shocks can induce individuals to conserve resources. However, in the short-run uncertainty leads to resources over-exploitation. In addition, our results suggest that resource uncertainty undermines effectiveness of costly sanctioning. In some treatments, individuals can punish others at their own cost. We found that the possibility to punish others induce individuals to harvest significantly more resources in the beginning of the experiment, compared to the situation when sanctioning is not possible. The presence of punishment paradoxically increases the probability of resource exhaustion. We interpret these results in the context of the World climate change. We conclude that the positive impact of environmental pressure on individual behavior and the effect of new institutions are likely to come too late to prevent damage to the environment.
Questa tesi è organizzata in tre capitoli chiaramente differenziati. I tre capitoli riguardano argomenti attualmente rilevanti: l’effetto della bassa qualità dei test standardizzati in ricerca, gli alti livelli di corruzione politica in Spagna e la capacità collettiva di rispondere ai cambiamenti climatici. Nel primo capitolo “Rafforzando PISA: quando gli studenti non vogliono fare i test standardizzati”, studio uno degli elementi chiave nelle attuali politiche per l’educazione: i test standardizzati. Concretamente, analizzo come gli studenti affrontano i test standardizzati in modi differenti. Uso una misura di sforzo fatto degli studenti che appartengono a Paesi diversi e gruppi sociali diversi per stimare l’impatto del basso sforzo nel punteggio finale degli studenti. La misura collega un test psicologico molto affermato (il test di conta dei punti) con una domanda del test PISA, nella quale gli studenti devono semplicemente contare i punti. In questo capitolo, misuro fino a che punto diversi livelli di sforzo fatto degli studenti possono distorcere il punteggio del PISA. Questo problema avrebbe degli effetti sulla ricerca nelle scienze sociali, quando vengono utilizzati i risultati dei test standardizzati. Alla fine del capitolo, propongo una semplice soluzione per il design di test standardizzati che elimini questo problema. Data l’importanza dei test standardizzati nel design dei programmi educativi, questo articolo potrebbe essere un contributo per implementare politiche educative più accurate. Il secondo capitolo si focalizza su uno dei temi chiave della attuale crisi politica spagnola: il livello di corruzione. Le istituzioni politiche sviluppate durante la transizione spagnola verso la democrazia sono attualmente sotto forte critica a causa della loro incapacità nel fermare la corruzione politica. Per esempio, i procuratori generali spagnoli sono nominati dal governo e la loro imparzialità è spesso criticata. Nel capitolo “Storie sulla corruzione: come i media e I procuratori influenzano le elezioni”, analizzo sistematicamente la parzialità degli ultimi due procuratori generali. Concretamente, studio se i procuratori generali tentano di influenzare le elezioni modificando la tempistica delle loro indagini adattandola al calendario elettorale. Questa possibilità è combinata con le decisioni editoriali dei mass media. Analizzo se i mass media hanno un pregiudizio ideologico e nascondono le storie di corruzione dei loro partiti preferiti. Per fare questo, ho creato un database unico: ho codificato il numero di articoli contenenti la parola “corruzione” nei due quotidiani principali spagnoli, “El Pais” e “El Mundo”, ogni settimana negli ultimi dieci anni. Dopo un’analisi econometria ho scoperto una evidenza significativa di un comportamento partigiano sia dei procuratori generali che dei mass media. L’ultimo capitolo è un lavoro congiunto con Karolina Safarzynska della Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien. “Rispondendo alla sfida del cambiamento climatico: evidenze sperimentali” affronta il problema del cambiamento climatico e la capacità delle società di superarlo. Questo capitolo usa una metodologia differente. Precisamente si basa su metodi sperimentali. Noi consideriamo gruppi isolati di individui che devono estrarre risorse da un bacino di risorse rinnovabili. La novità è lo studio dell’impatto dell’incertezza di risorse sui raccolti individuali nei dilemma dei bacini di risorse rinnovabili, unita alla possibilità che il gruppo collassi. L’incertezza è modellata come uno shock atmosferico che diminuisce le risorse dei gruppi, che è estratto da una distribuzione conosciuta in anticipo dai partecipanti. D’altro canto il gruppo collassa se le risorse scendono sotto una certa soglia. In quel caso tutta l’estrazione accumulata di risorse viene persa. Questo potrebbe essere interpretato come il minimo raccolto sotto al quale il gruppo non ha nutrimento sufficiente per sopravvivere. Scopriamo che nel lungo termine, shock atmosferici abbastanza severi possono indurre gli individui a conservare le risorse. Comunque, nel breve termine l’incertezza porta ad un sovrasfruttamento delle risorse. Inoltre, i nostri risultati suggeriscono che l’incertezza nelle risorse danneggia l’effettività del sanzionamento costoso. In alcuni trattamenti, gli individui possono punire altri pagando un costo. Scopriamo che la possibilità di punire altri induce gli individui a raccogliere significativamente più risorse all’inizio dell’esperimento, comparato alla situazione in cui il sanzionamento non è possibile. La presenza della punizione paradossalmente incrementa la probabilità di un esaurimento delle risorse. Interpretiamo questi risultati nel contesto del cambiamento climatico mondiale. Concludiamo che l’impatto positivo della pressione climatica sul comportamento individuale e l’effetto di nuove istituzioni probabilmente arrivano troppo tardi per prevenire un danno all’ambiente.

This work is set around three empirical papers concerned with the political foundations and consequences of trust among people. The first one addresses the question of how trust evolves and whether this is shaped by life-events related to economic shocks vis-à-vis experiences related to the individual engagement in civic life and to the institutional environment. The second paper turns the attention to the characteristics of the partner involved in the interaction investigating how intergroup political conflicts affect social cooperation and trust. This allows assessing whether heuristics about political group membership and identities shape the individual trust radius. The third paper considers, instead, the consequences of trust addressing whether it favors involvement in unconventional political participation, a still understudied relationship. This is done also accounting for other selective and collective incentives. Overall, this thesis offers a novel approach and new evidences on both political origins and implications of trust among people.
Este trabajo de tesis consta de tres artículos empíricos sobre las orígenes y las consecuencias políticas de confianza social. El primer articulo se propone investigar la cuestión esencial de cómo se forma confianza social y si esta es el resultado de shocks económicos, frente a experiencias relacionadas con la participación en la vida cívica o el contexto institucional. El segundo articulo se centra en la interacción de confianza entre individuos investigando cómo los conflictos políticos entre grupos afectan la confianza y la cooperación entre individuos. Esto nos permite evaluar si los individuos emplean heurísticos cognitivos e identidades sociales y políticas y si estos afectan al perímetro de la confianza social. En fin, el tercer articulo estudia las consecuencias políticas de confianza social analizando como esta influye en la participación política en formas no convencionales de protesta, en el marco de una teoría de los incentivos selectivos y colectivos, una discusión que sigue abierta en la literatura científica. En general, este trabajo de tesis se propone ofrecer nuevas evidencias empíricas sobre las orígenes y las implicaciones de la confianza social entre personas a través de soluciones metodológicas innovadoras.

El presente trabajo analiza la práctica de la criminalización de altas autoridades públicas en dos países – España y Brasil – a partir de una regla de alteración de competencia, presente en los dos sistemas procesales, llamada «aforamiento». El aforamiento es aplicado para el enjuiciamiento de determinadas personas que, por la importancia del cargo que ocupan, no son juzgadas criminalmente ante el juez o tribunal que les correspondería por las reglas ordinarias de competencia, sino ante un tribunal distinto, superior. Se indaga, en este trabajo, si este instituto procesal, objeto de críticas y de fuerte debate actual, refuerza la impunidad de los detentores del poder. Para eso análisis, fue desarrollada una investigación empírica en dos órganos judiciales de ambos países – el Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Catalunya, como muestra para España, y el Superior Tribunal de Justicia de Brasil – que examinó los procesos contra aforados allí incoados entre 2008 y 2016. Los datos recogidos fueron observados a partir de los marcos teóricos de la sociología jurídico-penal y de la Criminología Crítica, especialmente los estudios sobre los crímenes de los poderosos, para comprender no sólo el instituto del aforamiento en sí, sino también para verificar si afecta, y en qué medida, la criminalización de los detentores del poder y la selectividad del sistema penal para las altas autoridades públicas. El presente trabajo identifica las similitudes y diferencias de la criminalización de aforados en ambos países y discute si el debate actual para eliminar el aforamiento se justifica en términos de los objetivos que se pretende alcanzar.
Aquest treball analitza la pràctica de la criminalització d’altes autoritats públiques en dos països – Espanya i Brasil – a partir d’una regla d’alteració de competència, present en els dos sistemes processals, anomenada «aforament». El aforament és aplicat en l’enjudiciament de determinades persones que, per la importància del càrrec que ocupen, no són jutjades criminalment davant del jutge o tribunal que li correspondria per les regles ordinàries de competència, sinó davant d’un tribunal diferent, superior. S’indaga, en aquest treball, si aquest institut processal, objecte de crítiques i de fort debat actual, reforça la impunitat dels detentors de poder. Per aquesta anàlisi, va ser desenvolupada una recerca empírica en dos òrgans judicials d’ambdós països - el Tribunal Superior de Justícia de Catalunya, com a mostra per a Espanya, i el Superior Tribunal de Justícia de Brasil – que va examinar els processos contra aforats allí incoats entre 2008 i 2016. Les dades recollides van ser observades a partir dels marcs teòrics de la sociologia jurídic- penal i de la Criminologia Crítica, especialment els estudis sobre els crims dels poderosos, per comprendre no sols l' institut de l’aforament en sí, sinó també per verificar si això afecta, i en quina mesura, la criminalització dels detentors del poder i la selectivitat del sistema penal per a les altes autoritats públiques. El present treball identifica les similituds i diferències de la criminalització d’aforats en ambdós països i discuteix si el debat actual per eliminar l’aforament es justifica en termes dels objectius que es pretén aconseguir.
This work analyses the criminalisation of high public officials in the judicial practice of two countries – Spain and Brazil – following a change of legal jurisdiction in the prosecution system of both countries, called “privilege of court”. This rule applies to people who, due to the importance of the public positions they occupy, are not prosecuted according to ordinary criminal procedures, before a judge or court, but before a higher court. In this work, I question whether this rule, object at the moment of a high criticism and strong debate, reinforces, in the criminal justice system, the impunity of those in power. For this study, empirical research was carried out in the judicial courts of each country – the Superior Court of Justice in Catalonia, as an example for Spain, and the Superior Court of Justice in Brazil – into the criminal procedures filed against high-level government officials between 2008 and 2016. The collected data was analysed from the theoretical frameworks of legal-criminal sociology and critical criminology, in particular the studies on the crimes of the powerful, in order not only to understand the origins and justifications of this law, but also to verify if - and to what degree - it affects the criminalisation of those in power and the selectivity of the criminal system for high public officials. This study identifies similarities and differences in the criminalisation of high- level government officials in both countries and discusses whether the present debate into the elimination of this law can reach its intended aims.
O presente trabalho analisa a prática da criminalização de altas autoridades públicas em dois países – Espanha e Brasil – a partir de uma regra de alteração de competência, presente nos dois sistemas processuais, denominada «prerrogativa de foro». A prerrogativa de foro é aplicada para o processamento de determinadas pessoas que, pela importância do cargo que ocupam, não são julgadas criminalmente ante o juiz ou tribunal que lhes corresponderia pelas regras ordinárias de competência, mas sim ante um tribunal distinto, superior. Indaga-se, neste trabalho, se este instituto procesal, objeto de críticas e de forte debate atual, reforça a impunidade dos detentores de poder. Para essa análise, foi realizada uma pesquisa empírica em dois órgãos judiciais de ambos países – o Tribunal Superior de Justiça de Catalunha, como amostra espanhola, e o Superior Tribunal de Justiça do Brasil – que observou os processos ali iniciados contra autoridades com prerrogativa de foro entre os anos 2008 e 2016. Os dados colhidos foram examinados a partir dos marcos teóricos da sociologia jurídico-penal e da Criminologia Crítica, especialmente os estudos sobre os crimes dos poderosos, para compreender não só o próprio instituto da prerrogativa de foro, mas também para verificar se ele afeta, e em que medida, a criminalização dos detentores de poder e a seletividade do sistema penal para as altas autoridades públicas. O presente trabalho identifica as semelhanças e diferenças da criminalização de autoridades com prerrogativa de foro em ambos países e discute se o debate atual pela eliminação dessa regra de competência se justifica em termo dos objetivos que pretende alcançar.

Urbanisation désordonnée, manque d’équipements urbains, prééminence de la promotion privée dans la production de logements, domination de la propriété d’occupation, telles sont les caractéristiques du développement urbain et immobilier sous le régime franquiste, qui ont perduré jusqu’à aujourd’hui pour certaines d’entre elles. Cette ville « sans qualité » constitue un objet de préoccupation sociale majeur et une voie de contestation du régime dans les dernières années de la dictature franquiste. Le mode de production de la ville qui se met en place durant l’époque franquiste, et la question urbaine sur lequel il débouche, constituent l’objet de cette thèse. Cette recherche repose sur l’analyse conjointe des politiques nationales d’urbanisme et du logement, et du groupe professionnel des architectes. Ce choix a été guidé par un double constat. L’interventionnisme du régime franquiste s’est en effet aussi concrétisé dans les domaines du logement et de l’urbanisme : un ensemble d’organismes centraux, de dispositions et de dispositifs officiels ont ainsi encadré et déterminé le mode de production urbaine. Les architectes, par la position particulièrement privilégiée qu’ils occupent dans le secteur de la construction en Espagne, jouent un rôle clé dans l’élaboration et la mise en œuvre de ces politiques. Des membres du groupe professionnel sont par ailleurs les fers de la critique urbaine à la fin de la dictature. Ce dispositif de recherche permet d’étudier la constitution de l’espace urbain et immobilier en catégorie de l’action publique et les effets de ce processus sur les champs professionnel et scientifique sur l’ensemble de la période franquiste. Il offre les bases d’une histoire sociale des politiques urbaines qui éclaire à la fois l’histoire du régime franquiste, l’histoire des sciences sociales de la ville, ainsi que la sociologie de l’action publique et des groupes professionnels
Francoism and urban production. Housing and urban policies, professionals and urban sciences in Spain from the 1930's to the 1970's.An urban model oriented towards growth, lack of public facilities and infrastructure, high proportion of owner-tenancy, shortage of public housing, or the relevance of real state in the national economy are some of the characteristics of Spain’s urban development during Franco’s dictatorship. It became a main social concern and way to criticize Franco’s regime at the end of the dictatorship. The aim of this PhD thesis is to study the mode of production of Spanish cities during the dictatorship and the social urban movement at the end of the regime. This research is based on the double analysis of national urban planning and housing policies and of the role of one of their principal actors: the architects. During the Franco’s era, State’s intervention was indeed reflected on housing and town-planning through a set of central institutions or bodies, of legal provisions and official measures. Theses decisions determined the mode of urban development. Owing to their privileged position in the building sector in Spain, architects play a key role in the definition and implementation of these policies. Moreover, some architects were years later the leaders of urban criticism and urban social movement. This set-up brings into light the development, if not the constitution, of the urban space as a category of public action during the Franco years, as well as its effects on the professional and scientific fields. This PhD thesis intends to constitute a social history of urban policies during the Franco’s era (1939-1975). Through this approach, it contributes to a better knowledge of the history of this period, of the history of urban social sciences and public action and of the sociology of professions

Defence date: 18 January 1999
Examining board: Prof. Paul Heywood (Université de Nottingham) ; Prof. Yves Mény (Directeur de thèse, IUE, Centre Robert Schuman, Directeur) ; Prof. Jean-Louis Quermonne (Emeritus, IEP, Paris) ; Prof. Philippe C. Schmitter
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

The hybrid nature of Public Owned Enterprises (POEs) presents opportunities, difficulties, and challenges. This paper focuses on the implementation of transparency, anti-corruption and accountability in POE in Spain. Spain is one of the European countries with lower importance of public owned enterprises. However, the privatisation process has been intense in Spain and it is accompanied by a parallel process of development of public enterprises at the regional and local levels. The analysis shows the need to improve the compliance of anti-corruption, transparency, and accountability measures by public enterprises in Spain. The mere existence of laws on this field is not enough to prevent corruption. The main risks and problems identified concern the political influence, the lack of professional management, the contracting procedures, and the confusion between the public and private sphere.

The hybrid nature of Public Owned Enterprises (POEs) presents opportunities, difficulties, and challenges. This paper focuses on the implementation of transparency, anti-corruption and accountability in POE in Spain. Spain is one of the European countries with lower importance of public owned enterprises. However, the privatisation process has been intense in Spain and it is accompanied by a parallel process of development of public enterprises at the regional and local levels. The analysis shows the need to improve the compliance of anti-corruption, transparency, and accountability measures by public enterprises in Spain. The mere existence of laws on this field is not enough to prevent corruption. The main risks and problems identified concern the political influence, the lack of professional management, the contracting procedures, and the confusion between the public and private sphere.

AbstractAround 1800, merchants, scientists and adventurers travelled to Latin America with different purposes. Their multifaceted interests in a world region, experiencing a threshold of independence from Spanish colonial rule, inspired new historical and political works about the continent’s recent past. The Enlightenment provided not only the philosophical armamentarium against corruption, but it also paved the way to a new expression of sentiments and to the loss of fear when addressing injustice. Some examples of these are Hipólito Villaroel’s list of grievances and Humboldt’s Political essay. These two authors provide some thoughts on the political landscape of New Spain (now Mexico), while the two Swiss physicians Rengger and Longchamp describe the ruthless and odd dictator Francia of independent Paraguay as a champion of anti-corruption. Finally, Argentine dictator Rosas—and his robberies as described by Rivera Indarte, Sarmiento and other anonymous authors—represent the embodiment of corruption through pure larceny, for whose crimes the Spanish colonial past apparently no longer served as a comparison.

Chapter 4 examines the inclusion calculations of party elites in the aftermath of a massive corruption scandal. It argues that party elites have an incentive to strategically increase the presence of women candidates in such an environment in order to associate themselves and their party with stereotypical feminine traits, but this incentive is not always enough to trigger inclusion. Case study analyses of Spain, Portugal, and Ireland are presented, with evidence that political parties in Spain and Portugal recruit and run more women candidates in high-profile positions after a massive scandal breaks but, due to the high “costs” of running women in the institutional environment of Ireland, this effect is not found there. Finally, the chapter presents a large-N regression analysis of legislative electoral results over a period of 20 years, with evidence that more women win legislative seats in the aftermath of a corruption scandal.

This chapter focuses on the competition policies of selected countries in Eastern and Southern Africa, specifically Kenya, Namibia, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and the island of Mauritius. The eastern and southern countries’ competition authorities span a range of functionality, from very high to almost inert. Even the highest functioning competition authorities face severe challenges in terms of financial and human capital, corruption, political pressure to favor government cronies and vested interests, and sometimes war and bankruptcy. Other challenges that competition authorities face concern the privileges of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), corruption through government procurement, and a plethora of not always transparent cross-border restraints. Even though their agendas are crowded by mandatory duties of vetting mergers and authorizing agreements, the best of agencies carve out precious time to identify the most harmful market obstructions and develop strategies to solve them.