Articles de revues sur le sujet « Political corruption – Lebanon »

The present study aims to examine the indirect effects of social media on political distrust among Lebanese citizens using data based on the Arab Barometer Wave V. The Arab Barometer Wave V was obtained in 2018-2019 via which 2,400 Lebanese citizens were surveyed. Using the Preacher and Hayes Bootstrapping method, the results of the test the hypotheses indicate that, firstly, social media has a positive effect on citizens’ political distrust and causes the increase in their level of distrust in political institutions with the mediator variables corruption perception and poor government performance; and secondly, the results show that although the lack of guaranteed freedoms has a positive effect on increasing political distrust in society, this variable cannot mediate the relationship between social media and political distrust among Lebanese citizens.

In his strongly argued, thoroughly researched, and well written study, Reinoud Leenders tells a fascinating story about elite competition over resources in postwar politics. What is most intriguing in this particular book on Lebanon is not the complexity of the political order agreed to in 1989 but the unforeseen consequences of the initially praised new formula of power sharing as trust building. Counterintuitively, a fairer representation of distinct groups turns out to have harmed the public interest through a series of failures to ensure a transparent process of policymaking. Leenders offers a detailed account of the price Lebanon had to pay for the accommodation of social conflict, that is, institutional gridlocks and widespread misuse of state resources by politicians. The lessons implied in Spoils of Truce gain special importance now, when in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, constitutional engineers and practitioners engage in the building of new political institutions in many Middle Eastern and North African countries.

Lebanon, a unique, poly-confessional Eastern Mediterranean country of Arab origin with a long Phoenician history, has seen yet another wave of unrest in the last two years. Around the same period, widespread protests were aroused in two post-soviet countries in Eastern Europe, expressing their outrage at the falsification of vote tallies, corruption, and the political motivation of their governments in the face of a worsening economic situation. The aim of the study was to find out the common and distinctive elements of these civil rallies and assemblies, as well as to predict their possible impact on interregional relations and geopolitical tendencies. The article may indicate some unique features due to the lack of fundamental research studies on the theme rather than analytics and media reports. A concise comparison is made of Lebanon’s, Moldova’s, and Belarus’s situation with respect to their establishment, political and economic crisis, resulting protest actions. Some peculiarities were discovered following the interests of internal and external political groups and their influence. A cautious prognosis was made in order to forecast some further developments in the situation around these countries, including the attitude of the key actors in the region towards the processes inside and outside, trying to tip the scales in their favor.

Countries in transition face numerous political and economic challenges often exacerbated by persistent corruption and internecine religious conflict. In Lebanon, existing local governments have proven ineffective at providing many public services, especially those with spillover effects and externalities. This article proposes a structural change: the introduction of special-purpose local authorities to provide a single service transcending the boundaries of individual local governments. This proposal promises an innovative and practical solution to some existing problems; moreover, it will disentangle some of the complexities in the social and political milieus of a country typified by intense conflict. Points for practitioners This article proposes a policy recommendation to address one of the many challenges facing decentralization in Lebanon. Existing local governments have proven ineffective at providing many public services, especially those with spillover effects and externalities. Special-purpose local authorities are introduced as an innovative and practical solution to some existing problems; an approach that will disentangle some of the complexities in the social and political milieus of a country typified by intense conflict. The article provides certain decision points that are useful for policy makers and practitioners as they consider possible resolutions to existing challenges, potential implementation obstacles, and mitigating factors.

Lebanon, a multi-confessional state, is undergoing a deep socioeconomic change that could trigger a review of its constitutional arrangement. The tiny republic on the Mediterranean was born in 1920 as a liberal democracy with a market economy, where the Christians had the upper hand in politics and the economy. In 1975, Lebanon witnessed a major war that lasted for fifteen years, and a new political system emerged in 1989, dubbed the Ta’ef Accord. The new constitutional arrangement, also known as the “second republic,” transferred major powers to the Muslims. Under the new republic, illiberal policies were adopted in reconstruction, public finance, and monetary policy, coupled with unprecedented corruption at the highest levels. On 17 October 2019, the country exploded in a social revolution which could precipitate the death of the second republic or the demise of the country as another victim of predator neoliberalism.

Tatiana Kostadinova's critical remarks and questions are spot on. Some of them had been on my mind while researching the book, and they all deserve to be raised. I would argue that the possible ways by which my case study could be viewed as relevant to more generalizing approaches to corruption are twofold.

Nowadays social movements are driven by networks of people who resort to social media platforms to rally, self-organise and coordinate action around a shared cause, which can be referred to as the formation of publics. Due to years of political instability, conflicts, corruption, sectarianism, economic collapse and declining living conditions, in October 2019 Lebanon witnessed uprisings which transcended into a wider social movement. As the movement unfolded, Lebanese diaspora members living across the world formed their own publics in support of the Lebanese revolution that interfaced with the local Lebanon-based publics. As such, a broader transnational public emerged as a result of the coordinated online and offline efforts between diaspora actors and local actors, which had a crucial role in mitigating the aftermath of the compounded crises that hit Lebanon. In this paper, through observation and interviews with Lebanese diaspora members, we contribute a socio-technical understanding of the formation of a transnational public, with a particular focus on the underlying infrastructures that enabled its creation. Furthermore, we surface the challenges in relation to sustaining such a diaspora public and its interfacing with local publics in Lebanon. We contribute empirical insights that highlight how different technological tools and platforms, coupled with social processes built within diaspora groups and with local actors, led to the formation of such a multilayered transnational public.

Based on declassified reports in the Central Zionist Archives, this article brings to light a virtually unknown disinformation project implemented by the Jewish Agency (the governing body of the Yishuv before 1948) in the Arab world during the 1936-39 Palestinian revolt. Operating via a JA front organization—an Arabic-language news agency set up in Cairo—and out of the Jerusalem-based JA Political department’s intelligence services, the project involved inter alia the planting of fabricated articles in the Lebanese and Syrian press with the aim of influencing public opinion. Whatever the project’s impact, the article provides insights into the Zionist leadership’s thinking, internal debates, and operating methods, and shows the degree of corruption that existed in certain segments of the Arab elite.

The Arab Springs is known as “a revolutionary wave of demonstrations, protests, riots, protracted civil wars and other forms of opposition (both violent and non-violent) in the Arab territories” (Elfaith. 2015, 121). Starting in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi a street vendor, set himself on fire after being harassed by municipal police officials. Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation sparked international attention, leading Tunisia into a revolution. After being in power for 23 years as Tunisia’s President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia (Bunton 2013, 16). Tunisia’s revolution led both the Arab and non-Arab world to witness “spontaneous explosions of protests, [revolutions] and popular political upheaval” in countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, Lebanon, Algeria, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania (Ismael and Ismael 2013, 229). The high levels of political corruption, economic hardships and the desire for a free democratic government all inspired the citizens of these countries to take action against their governments.

In this book, Former Wall Street Journal reporter Stephen Glain sets out to answer an extremely broad and difficult question: namely why is it that the Arab world, specifically the Levantine region, has consistently underperformed economically since the beginning of the 20th century. The book provides the reader with a somewhat in-depth analysis of the political, social and economic state of six Arab nations (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Egypt, and Iraq). By breaking down his analysis into country-specific chapters, Glain enables the reader to understand the multi-faceted problems facing the region as a whole. In doing so, Glain shows the reader a common thread of bad governance, corruption, negative external interference, and protectionism; the thread that runs through all these nations, causing economic decay.

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the political economy aspects of state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) governance and privatization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In particular, the paper presents an overview of privatization in the region and examines the extent to which SOEs operate at arm's length from the public sector and the motives for this behavior. Showing empirically the region’s relative reticence on privatizing public assets, the paper highlights the political economy aspects contributing to this impasse, offers Lebanon as a case study, and suggests a policy framework for successful reform of SOEs. Highlighting the lack of sustainable drives for SOEs reform and privatization in the region and the need for better governance systems based on the rule of law, property rights protection, and combating corruption, the paper proposes policy options to deal with privatization and improve the governance of SOEs through advocating a state-owned enterprise governance framework. This framework suggests subjecting SOEs to regulation and supervision of more than one government entity as opposed to only one ministry of custody. This should help to ensure a level-playing field in the industry and reduce the pressure on SOEs to heed to political pressures.

The article examines the Lebanese diaspora, its relations with the Lebanese society and the situation in the world. The data is analyzed and the location of Lebanese diasporas in different parts of the world is considered. Lebanese immigrant communities around the world make up the largest groups of Arab immigrants. As a diaspora, Lebanese communities have historical roots in almost every corner of the world. A more significant fact of the migration of Lebanese society is considered to be the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, the Lebanese immigrated to America, Africa and Northern Europe. Many factors have contributed to the spread of Lebanese society around the world. Lebanon has a free market economy and a strong commercial tradition of non-interference. The government does not restrict foreign investment, but the investment climate suffers from bureaucracy, corruption, arbitrary licensing decisions, complex customs procedures, high taxes, tariffs and fees, archaic legislation, and inadequate protection of intellectual property rights [4. Р. 143]. The idea of a diaspora-a dispersed ethnic group spanning national borders-has been revived by the intensity of global processes over the past few decades towards understanding the immigrant experience. In its Greek origin, the term diaspora means the scattering of seeds and thus means an association with migration and colonization, implying acculturation and assimilation while preserving an ingrained tradition. Also, the diaspora captures much of our analytical and popular imagination and requires explanatory power in describing the presence and conditions of the immigrant population. Understanding their position as a product of global economic, political and cultural dynamics, Lebanese immigrants demonstrate forms of identification, social ties and ways of cultural expression that take into account the global diaspora consciousness [2. Р. 82]. The diaspora, on the other hand, provides an entry into the study of the global situation and the dynamics of the economy. It should be noted that the Lebanese diaspora is an important group for studying the dynamics of immigration and how immigrants are affected by global economic, political and cultural processes.

Lebanon, a country with a confessional political system, fragmented its political power based on the composition of religions. The political system is fragile and become an obstacle in creating national integrity. The fragility of the political system has always been the source of unstable politics and economics, however, the system remains until now. These problems are worsened by the fact that Lebanese community are exclusive in certain areas based on their religion, thus it triggers the imbalance of social and economic. On the other hand, the number of corruptions in the country has increased among the political elites hence social, political, and economical chaos are undeniable.

Abstract This essay was written in the wake of the Beirut port explosion on August 4th, 2020. We explore the extent to which activists, academics, and practitioners can find a way to break the cycle of corruption caused by decades of sectarian power-sharing. Through our own story and experience of breaking our own cycle of hopelessness and transcending disciplinary boundaries, we document and analyze how we can create an evidence-based, community-led, and locally-driven roadmap for Beirut’s recovery. The essay focuses on our experience creating and building Khaddit Beirut (the shake-up) amidst multiple crises and in doing so opening up the university to the grievances of a devasted community. In doing so we review existing literature about what we already know about Lebanon’s political system and explain why breaking the cycle is as much an existential project as it is a political struggle.

Lebanon is in the midst of a rapidly escalating, unprecedented humanitarian crisis that is plunging the country deep into poverty and threatens population well-being, economic development, social welfare and national and regional stability. The dire situation is due to the compounding effects of the August 2020 Beirut blast, massive economic collapse and the COVID-19 pandemic, in a setting of longstanding entrenched political corruption and a dysfunctional, mismanaged crisis response by the state. This current emergency occurs on the background of a turbulent history and complex regional geopolitical context – including the Syrian refugee crisis, the ongoing influence of foreign actors and their local proxies, the United-States-imposed sanctions, endemic corruption, a culture of nepotism and entitlement among the political dynasties, dysfunctional power-sharing and deep-seated sectarian divides. With over half the population now living in poverty, a generation of children are among those at risk. This Perspective provides a brief overview of Lebanon's current complex humanitarian crisis, discusses the impacts of the evolving situation on youth and proposes a suite of recommendations to mitigate the effects.

Abstract A wide range of Arabic language variation in form, code choice and orthographic script was wielded by Lebanese political protestors in their graffiti and political placards in Beirut in 2015. That summer, civil protests spilled out into the streets to critique the government inaction over waste management and overall corruption. I will focus on four tactics that highlight a trend towards linguistic transgression and strategic recontextualization of Arabic discourse in these protests: reworking of state iconography; inscribing irreverent spoken dialect in written form; incorporation of hashtag (#) participant and interpretive frameworks; and the recontextualization of traditional calligraphic forms in new contexts. This paper explores the intertextuality of protest signage and consider the ways in which the transgression of traditional linguistic boundaries might inform understandings of the social dynamics of contemporary politics in Lebanon.

Education research and development initiatives have mostly approached poor or weak practices of governance as consequences of armed conflict. Moreover, education reform strategies have often overlooked the political and historical roots to governance issues that impede education reform and development. Drawing on the case of Lebanon, we observe how governance practices of corruption and authoritarianism emerge as destructive expressions of conflict. I focus on two of many areas that have jeopardized the safety of children and their rights to quality education: the failure of rehabilitating school infrastructure that has led to the death of a student in November 2022 and the stalemate of history curriculum reform since 1970. In this paper, I argue that authoritarianism and corruption should be regarded in education research and development work as expressions of conflict rather than consequences.

In any nation across the world, effective governance involves improving the lives of all, providing value for new generations, consistent allocation of duties and functions, accountable decisions, providing quality of information, transparency and responsibility, good performance, a strong legal system, and above all developing sustainability on all levels. Governance is rooted and established based on the collaboration and coordination among nation’s governments, organizations, and people. The sluggishness in setting such governance goals as well as the incapability of many governments, like the Lebanese one, to develop and execute adequate legislative and institutional initiatives coupled with the absence of corporate governance knowledge, given that organizations remain connected to their elderly conventional method to manage their businesses that are based on nepotism, corruption legislation, and sectarian distribution, represent a crucial challenge for any reform and good governance endeavor. This paper aims to approach the need for Lebanon to reconsider new governance strategy and organizational and institutional reforms, especially, in conjunction with the severe economic crisis facing the country, the explosion of the port of Beirut on August 4, 2020, and the awaiting implementation of CEDRE project. The analysis revealed that moving to a new perspective in a complicated social and political environment, like Lebanon, involves multiple aspects. As a result, an in-depth implementation of a New Lebanese Public Governance in Lebanon along with political stabilization must lead to a progressive structural administrative reform and change which will also contribute to boosting confidence with the international community and speed up the international financial donation and support that will help Lebanon to heal its wounds and rise again. The defiance is to figure out if this could be another lost opportunity.

In October 2019, the worsening political, economic, and perceived corruption in Lebanon led to civil unrest. In anticipation of injuries, a group of healthcare professionals and social activists summoned paramedics, nurses, and physicians through social media, to provide medical assistance in the protest area. These volunteers established a physician-led advanced first-aid tent, whose aim was to reduce the patient load on Emergency Departments in local hospitals. We present the experience of volunteers, lessons learned, and challenges faced during the establishment of the physician-led first aid tent. In this manuscript, we discuss the following aspects of our efforts that can serve as relevant lessons we learned about medical volunteerism: spontaneity in volunteerism, operations, location and storage, supplies, roaming team, coordination with emergency services, safety, documentation, communication, special situations, and transition from acute to primary care.

Abstract Background The COVID-19 pandemic compounded political and financial pressures on the nursing workforce in Lebanon. The government resigned in October 2019 in response to the popular uprising that called for an end to corruption and economic mismanagement 5 months before the first COVID-19 case appeared in the country. The continuing crises and the added stress of COVID-19 has increased the risk of occupational burnout and turnover in the nursing workforce. Therefore, valid and reliable measurement is imperative to determine burnout levels, prioritize intervention, and inform evidence-based workforce policy and practice. The primary aim of the study was to delineate burnout levels and cut-points in a national sample of nurses to inform workforce policies and prioritize interventions. Methods Multidimensional and unidimensional Rasch analyses of burnout data collected from a national convenience sample of 457 hospital nurses 9–12 months after Lebanon’s political and economic collapse began. The data were collected in July–October 2020. Results Multidimensional Rasch analysis confirmed that the Copenhagen Burnout Inventory has three highly correlated unidimensional scales that measure personal burnout, work-related burnout, and client-related burnout. Except for a ceiling effect of ~ 2%, the three scales have excellent measurement properties. For each scale, Rasch rating scale analysis confirmed five statistically different nurse burnout levels. The mean personal burnout scores and work-related burnout scores (50.24, 51.11 respectively) were not higher than those reported in the international literature. However, the mean client-related burnout score of 50.3 was higher than reported for other countries. Compared with a baseline study conducted at the beginning of Lebanon’s political and economic crises, only client-related burnout scores were higher p. <.01. Conclusions The CBI scales are reliable and valid measures for monitoring nurse burnout in crises torn countries. Stakeholders can use the CBI scales to monitor nurse burnout and prioritize burnout interventions. Urgent action is needed to reduce levels of client-related burnout in Lebanon’s nursing workforce.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between suicide rates and institutional quality. Design/methodology/approach This study used autoregressive distributed lag model and error correction model to examine short-run and long-run relationships during 1996–2017 in Lebanon. Findings The study shows that in the long-run, suicide rates are significantly associated to the control of corruption, voice and accountability and rule of law, but not to regulatory quality, political stability and government efficiency. In the short-run, nearly all variables of institutional quality have a negative and significant relationship to suicide rates. Results are discussed in detail. Originality/value This research is the first to inspect the relation between the quality of institutions and suicide rates. Empirical results of this study add new evidence to the literature and provide support to policymakers.

Abstract Background Public acceptance of governmental measures are key to controlling the spread of infectious diseases. The COVID-19 pandemic has placed a significant burden on healthcare systems for high-income countries as well as low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The ability of LMICs to respond to the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic has been limited and may have affected the impact of governmental strategies to control the spread of COVID-19. This study aimed to evaluate and compare public opinion on the governmental COVID-19 response of high and LMICs in the Middle East and benchmark it to international countries. Methods An online, self-administered questionnaire was distributed among different Middle Eastern Arab countries. Participants’ demographics and level of satisfaction with governmental responses to COVID-19 were analyzed and reported. Scores were benchmarked against 19 international values. Results A total of 7395 responses were included. Bahrain scored highest for satisfaction with the governmental response with 38.29 ± 2.93 on a scale of 40, followed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (37.13 ± 3.27), United Arab Emirates (36.56 ± 3.44), Kuwait (35.74 ± 4.85), Jordan (23.08 ± 6.41), and Lebanon (15.39 ± 5.28). Participants’ country of residence was a significant predictor of the satisfaction score (P < 0.001), and participants who suffered income reduction due to the pandemic, had a history of SARS-CoV-2 infection, and held higher educational degrees had significantly lower satisfaction scores (P < 0.001). When benchmarked with other international publics, countries from the Gulf Cooperation Council had the highest satisfaction level, Jordan had an average score, and Lebanon had one of the lowest satisfaction scores. Conclusion The political crisis in Lebanon merged with the existing corruption were associated with the lowest public satisfaction score whereas the economical instability of Jordan placed the country just before the lowest position. On the other hand, the solid economy plus good planning and public trust in the government placed the other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council on top of the scale. Further investigation is necessary to find out how the governments of other low-income countries may have handled the situation wisely and gained the trust of their publics. This may help convey a clearer picture to Arab governments that have suffered during the pandemic.

The Arab world witnessed an influx of satellite channels during the 1990s and in the early years of the first decade of the new century. Many analysts in the Arab world applauded this influx as a potential tool for political change in the Arab countries. Two stations were at the heart of the new optimism: Al-Jazeera and Al Arabiya, the two most prominent 24-hour news channels in the region. Al-Jazeera proved to be more controversial because in its early years of broadcasting it managed to break taboos in the Arab media by tackling issues of human rights and hosting Arab dissidents. Also, its coverage of international conflicts (primarily Afghanistan and Iraq) has marked it as a counter-hegemonic news outlet. For the first time, the flow of news went from South to North. Some scholars who study Arab satellite media, and Al-Jazeera specifically, have gone so far as to suggest that it has created a new Arab public sphere (Lynch, Miladi). However, the political developments in the Arab world, mainly the recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and what is now happening in Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen, have raised questions as to how credible these suggestions are. And are we going to claim the same powers for social media in the Arab world? This article takes the form of a personal reflection on how successful (or not) Arab satellite channels are proving to be as a tool for political change and reform in the Arab world. Are these channels editorially free from Arab governments’ political and economic interests? And could new media (notably social networking sites) achieve what satellite channels have been unable to over the last two decades? 1996 saw the launch of Al-Jazeera, the first 24-hour news channel in the Arab world. However, it didn’t have much of an impact on the media scene in the region until 1998 and gained its controversial reputation through its coverage of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars (see Zayani; Miles; Allan and Zelizer; El-Nawawy and Iskandar). In the Arab world, it gained popularity with its compelling talk shows and open discussions of human rights and democracy (Alterman). But its dominance didn’t last long. In 2003, Al Walid Al Ibrahim, son-in-law of the late King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (1921-2005) established Al Arabiya, the second 24-hour news channel in the Arab world, just before the start of the Iraq war. Many scholars and analysts saw in this a direct response to the popularity that Al-Jazeera was achieving with the Arab audiences. Al Arabiya, however, didn’t achieve the level of popularity that Al-Jazeera enjoyed throughout its years of broadcasting (Shapiro). Al Arabiya and Al-Jazeera Arabic subsequently became rivals representing political and national interests and not just news competitors. Indeed, one of Wikileaks’ latest revelations states that Al-Jazeera changed its coverage to suit Qatari foreign policy. The US ambassador to Qatar, Joseph LeBaron, was reported as saying: The Qatari prime minister, Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, had joked in an interview that Al-Jazeera had caused the Gulf State such headaches that it might be better to sell it. But the ambassador remarked: “Such statements must not be taken at face value.” He went on: “Al-Jazeera’s ability to influence public opinion throughout the region is a substantial source of leverage for Qatar, one which it is unlikely to relinquish. Moreover, the network can also be used as a chip to improve relations. For example, Al-Jazeera’s more favourable coverage of Saudi Arabia's royal family has facilitated Qatari–Saudi reconciliation over the past year.” (Booth). The unspoken political rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar on Lebanese domestic disputes, over Iran, and over the Palestinian internal conflict was played out in the two channels. This brings us to my central question: can Arab satellite channels, and specifically Al-Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya, be regarded as tools for democratic political change? In the recent revolution in Tunisia (spring 2011), satellite channels had to catch up with what social media were reporting: and Al-Jazeera more so than Al Arabiya because of previous encounters between Al-Jazeera and Zein Al Abidine bin Ali’s regime (Greenslade, The Guardian). Bin Ali controlled the country’s media and access to satellite media to suit his interests. Al-Jazeera was banned from Tunisia on several occasions and had their offices closed down. Bin Ali allowed private TV stations to operate but under indirect state control when it came to politics and what Ben Ali’s regime viewed as national and security interests. Should we therefore give social networking credit for facilitating the revolution in Tunisia? Yes, we should. We should give it credit for operating as a mobilising tool. The people were ready, the political moment came, and the people used it. Four out of ten Tunisians are connected to the Internet; almost 20 per cent of the Tunisian population are on Facebook (Mourtada and Salem). We are talking about a newly media-literate population who have access to the new technology and know how to use it. On this point, it is important to note that eight out of ten Facebook users in Tunisia are under the age of 30 (Mourtada and Salem). Public defiance and displays of popular anger were sustained by new media outlets (Miladi). Facebook pages have become sites of networking and spaces for exchanging and disseminating news about the protests (Miladi). Pages such as “The people of Tunisia are burning themselves, Mr President” had around 15,000 members. “Wall-posts” specifying the date and place of upcoming protest became very familiar on social media websites. They even managed to survive government attempts to disable and block these sites. Tunisian and non-Tunisians alike became involved in spreading the message through these sites and Arab transnationalism and support for the revolution came to a head. Many adjacent countries had Facebook pages showing support for the Tunisian revolution. And one of the most prominent of these pages was “Egyptians supporting the Tunisian revolution.” There can be little doubt, therefore, that the success of the Tunisian revolution encouraged the youth of Egypt (estimated at 80 per cent of its Facebook users) to rise up and persist in their call for change and political reform. Little did Wael Ghonim and his friends on the “Kolinah Khaled Said” (“We are all Khaled Said”) Facebook page know where their call for demonstrations on the 25 January 2011 would lead. In the wake of the Tunisian victory, the “We are all Khaled Said” page (Said was a young man who died under torture by Egyptian police) garnered 100,000 hits and most of these virtual supporters then took to the streets on 25 January which was where the Egyptian revolution started. Egyptians were the first Arab youth to have used the Internet as a political platform and tool to mobilise people for change. Egypt has the largest and most active blogosphere in the Arab world. The Egyptian bloggers were the first to reveal corruption and initiated calls for change as early as 2007 (Saleh). A few victories were achieved, such as the firing and sentencing of two police officers condemned for torturing Imad Al Kabeer in 2007 (BBC Arabic). However, these early Egyptian bloggers faced significant jail sentences and prosecution (BBC News). Several movements were orchestrated via Facebook, including the 6 April uprising of 2007, but at this time such resistance invariably ended in persecution and even more oppression. The 25 January revolution therefore took the regime by surprise. In response, former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and his entourage (who controlled the state media and privately owned TV stations such as Dream TV) started making declarations that “Egypt is not Tunisia,” but the youth of Egypt were determined to prove them wrong. Significantly, Mubarak’s first reaction was to block Twitter, then Facebook, as well as disrupting mobile phone text-messaging and Blackberry-messaging services. Then, on Thursday 27 January, the regime attempted to shut down the Internet as a whole. Al-Jazeera Arabic quickly picked up on the events in Egypt and began live coverage from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, which resulted in Mubarak’s block of Al-Jazeera’s transmission in Egypt and the withdrawal of its operational licences. One joke exchanged with Tunisian activists on Facebook was that Egyptians, too, had “Ammar 404” (the nickname of the government censor in Tunisia). It was not long, however, before Arab activists from across the regions started exchanging codes and software that allowed Egyptians to access the Internet, despite the government blockades. Egyptian computer science students also worked on ways to access the Worldwide Web and overcome the government’s blockade (Shouier) and Google launched a special service to allow people in Egypt to send Twitter messages by dialling a phone number and leaving a voice message (Oreskovic, Reuters). Facebook group pages like Akher Khabar’s “Latest News” and Rased’s “RNN” were then used by the Egyptian diaspora to share all the information they could get from friends and family back home, bypassing more traditional modes of communication. This transnational support group was crucial in communicating their fellow citizens’ messages to the rest of the world; through them, news made its way onto Facebook and then through to the other Arab nations and beyond. My own personal observation of these pages during the period 25 January to 12 February revealed that the usage of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter changed markedly, shifting from being merely social in nature to becoming rapidly and primarily political, not only among Arab users in the Arab world, as Mourtada and Salem argue, but also throughout the Arabian diaspora. In the case of Libya’s revolution, also, social media may be seen to be a mobilising tool in the hands of both Libyans at home and across the Libyan diaspora. Libya has around 4 per cent of its population on Facebook (Mourtada and Salem), and with Gaddafi’s regime cracking down on the Internet, the Libyan diaspora has often been the source of information for what is happening inside the country. Factual information, images, and videos were circulated via the February 17th website (in Arabic and in English) to appeal to Arab and international audiences for help. Facebook and Twitter were where the hash tag “#Feb17th” was created. Omar Amer, head of the UK’s Libyan youth movement based in Manchester, told Channel 4: “I can call Benghazi or Tripoli and obtain accurate information from the people on the ground, then report it straight onto Twitter” (Channel 4 News). Websites inspired by #Feb17th were spread online and Facebook pages dedicated to news about the Libyan uprisings quickly had thousands of supporters (Channel 4 News). Social media networks have thus created an international show of solidarity for the pro-democracy protestors in Libya, and Amer was able to report that they have received overwhelming support from all around the globe. I think that it must therefore be concluded that the role Arab satellite channels were playing a few years ago has now been transferred to social media websites which, in turn, have changed from being merely social/cultural to political platforms. Moreover, the nature of the medium has meant that the diasporas of the nations concerned have been instrumental to the success of the uprisings back home. However, it would be wrong to suggest that broadcast media have been totally redundant in the revolutionary process. Throughout the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, Al-Jazeera became a disseminating tool for user-generated content. A call for Arab citizens to send their footage of unfolding events to the Al-Jazeera website for it to re-broadcast on its TV screens was a key factor in the dissemination of what was happening. The role Al-Jazeera played in supporting the Egyptian revolution especially (which caused some Arab analysts to give it the name “channel of revolutions”), was quickly followed by criticism for their lack of coverage of the pro-democracy protests in Bahrain. The killing of peaceful protestors in Bahrain did not get airtime the way that the killing of Egyptian pro-democracy protestors had. Tweets, Facebook posts and comments came pouring in, questioning the lack of coverage from Bahrain. Al Arabiya followed Al-Jazeera’s lead. Bahrain was put last on the running order of the coverage of the “Arab revolutions.” Newspaper articles across the Arab world were questioning the absence of “the opinion and other opinion” (Al-Jazeera’s Arabic motto) when it came to Bahrain (see Al Akhbar). Al Jazeera’s editor-in-chief, Hassan El Shoubaki, told Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar that they were not deliberately absent but had logistical problems with the coverage since Al-Jazeera is banned in Bahrain (Hadad). However, it can be argued that Al-Jazeera was also banned in Egypt and Tunisia and that didn’t stop the channel from reporting or remodelling its screen to host and “rebroadcast” an activist-generated content. This brings us back to the Wikileaks’ revelation mentioned earlier. Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Bahraini protests is influenced by Qatari foreign policy and, in the case of Bahrain, is arguably abiding by Qatar’s commitment to Gulf Cooperation Council security treaties. (This is one of the occasions where Al Arabiya and Al-Jazeera appear to have shared the same editorial guidelines, influenced by Qatari and Saudi Arabian shared policy.) Nevertheless, the Bahraini protests continue to dominate the social networks sites and information has kept flowing from Bahrain and it will continue to do so because of these platforms. The same scenario is also unfolding in Syria, but this time Al-Jazeera Arabic is taking a cautious stance while Al Arabiya has given the protests full coverage. Once again, the politics are obvious: Qatar is a supporter of the Syrian regime, while Saudi Arabia has long been battling politically with Syria on issues related to Lebanon, Palestine, and Iran (this position might change with Syria seeking support on tackling its own domestic unrest from the Saudi regime). All this confirms that there are limits to what satellite channels in the Arab world can do to be part of a process for democratic political reform. The Arab media world is not free of the political and economic influence of its governments, its owners or the various political parties struggling for control. However, this is clearly not a phenomenon unique to the Arab world. Where, or when, has media reporting ever been totally “free”? So is this, then, the age of new media? Could the Internet be a free space for Arab citizens to express their opinion and fulfil their democratic aspirations in bringing about freedom of speech and political freedom generally? Is it able to form the new Arab public sphere? Recent events show that the potential is there. What happened in Tunisia and Egypt was effectively the seizure of power by the people as part of a collective will to overthrow dictators and autocratic regimes and to effect democratic change from within (i.e. not having it imposed by foreign powers). The political moment in Tunisia was right and the people receptive; the army refused to respond violently to the protests and members of bin Ali’s government rose up against him. The political and social scene in Egypt became receptive after the people felt empowered by events in Tunis. Will this transnational empowerment now spread to other Arab countries open to change notwithstanding the tribal and sectarian alliances that characterise their populations? Further, since new media have proven to be “dangerous tools” in the hands of the citizens of Tunisia and Egypt, will other Arab regimes clamp down on them or hijack them for their own interests as they did the satellite channels previously? Maybe, but new media technology is arguably ahead of the game and I am sure that those regimes stand to be taken by surprise by another wave of revolutions facilitated by a new online tool. 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