Articles de revues sur le sujet « Political corruption – France »

This article assesses the roles of anxiety and anger in shaping people’s perceptions of politicians’ integrity. Drawing on recent work on the role of affect in shaping political judgement, the article develops a theoretical model of the anticipated role of anger and anxiety in structuring reactions to allegations of political misconduct. The model is tested on a unique data set that includes results of an experiment fielded as part of a survey carried out in January 2013 among a representative sample of the French adult population. The analysis finds that those in whom politically dubious actions generate anxiety are more sensitive to contextual details than other respondents, although the role of anger in modulating ethical judgements is less clear-cut, dampening attention to information about negatively assessed behaviour but enhancing attention to information about behaviour that is assessed more positively.

The so-called “long 19th century”, from the French Revolution to the First World War, ranks as the crucial phase in the genesis of the modern world. In the Western countries this period was characterized by the differentiation of the public and the private spheres, the birth of the modern bureaucratic state and the delegitimation of early modern practices such as clientelism and patronage. All these fundamental changes are, among other things, usually considered important preconditions for the modern perception of corruption.This paper will concentrate on this crucial phase by means of a comparative analysis of debates in France, Great Britain and the United States, with the aim to elucidate the motives for major anti-corruption movements. The questions are: who fights against corruption and what are the reasons for doing so? I will argue that these concerns were often very different and sometimes accidental. Furthermore, an analysis of political corruption may reveal differences between the political cultures in the countries in question. Thus, the history of corruption serves as a sensor which enables a specific perspective on politics. By taking this question as a starting point the focus is narrowed to political corruption and the debates about corruption, while petty bribery on the part of minor civilservants, as well as the actual practice in the case of extensive political corruption, is left aside.

AbstractThis article shows how one can read political history from evidence on corporate corruption. The study exploits newly discovered archival material from Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, a politically connected investment bank. We contribute to current research by replacing existing conjectures with precise qualitative and quantitative evidence. After reviewing previous works and providing a sketch of information repression and media control in France during the interwar period, we argue that the study of patterns of ‘informational criminality’ provides an original entry to the writing of political history and the history of information.

Corruption is a limp in the walk of human progress. It is not a new phenomenon; it is as old as the history of mankind itself. The corruption made itself visible when the institution of the government was established. According to Glynn, et al. (1997), “…..no region, and hardly any country, has been immune from corruption”. Like a cancer, it strikes almost all parts of the society and destroys the functioning of vital organs, means cultural, political and economic structure of society Amundsen (1999). All this was proved by the major corruption scandals of France, Italy, Japan, Philippine, South Korea, Mexico, United States etc. These scandals bring the corruption problem on the agenda of major international institutions like International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organisation, Transparency International and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

This paper is an empirical analysis to explore the relationships between urban conflict and both rent seeking and corruption. It examines social disturbances in medieval France through a sample of twelve towns examined over the period 1270-1399 in a real context of informational asymmetries, commitment problems, and issues indivisibilities. As regards the economic corruption class, it is found that townspeople rebel more often and more intensely against the extortion of funds carried out by policy makers than against the embezzlement of a part of these funds. As to the political corruption class, the findings highlight that abuse of power against municipalities is identified in more social unrest than influence peddling against these local institutions. Furthermore, it is shown that rent-seeking-related policies (like arbitrary actions limiting property rights, economic rules-based policies, and targeted political measures) have less influence on urban conflict than corrupt policies do. These findings produce insights that apply beyond the historical context and analysis of the paper. Situations presenting over-indebted towns despite overtaxed people disturb also modern democracies.

As part of a larger European Union (EU)-funded project, this paper investigates the coverage of corruption and related topics in three European democracies: France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Based on Freedom House data, these countries are characterized by different levels of press freedom. A large corpus of newspaper articles (107,248 articles) from the period 2004 to 2013 were analyzed using dedicated software. We demonstrate that freedom of press is not the only dimension that affects the ability to and the way in which news media report on corruption. Because of its political partisanship, the Italian press tends to emphasize and dramatize corruption cases involving domestic public administrators and, in particular, politicians. The British coverage is affected mainly by market factors, and the press pays more attention to cases occurring abroad and in sport. The French coverage shares specific features with both the British and the Italian coverage: Newspapers mainly focus on corruption involving business companies and foreign actors, but they also cover cases involving domestic politicians. Media market segmentation, political parallelism, and media instrumentalization determine different representations preventing the establishment of unanimously shared indignation.

ABSTRACTGoogle Books Ngrams data are freely available and contain billions of words used in tens of millions of digitized books, which begin in the 1500s for some languages. We explore the benefits and pitfalls of these data by showing examples from comparative and American politics. Specifically, we show how usage of the phrase “political corruption” in Italian, French, German, and Hebrew books strongly correlates with Transparency International’s well-cited Corruption Index for France, Italy, German, and Israel. We also use Ngrams to show that the explosive growth in usage of the phrases “Asian American,” “Latino,” and “Hispanic” correlates with real-world changes in these populations after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. These applications show that Ngram data correlate strongly with similar data from well-respected sources. This suggests that Ngrams has content validity and can be used as a proxy measure for previously difficult-to-research phenomena and questions.

Much more so than in the recent past, the eyes of Europe and even of the world are on Italy. This attention does not derive from any innovative solutions that Italy may have offered to the grave problems which today face modern states: those of environmental pollution, of unemployment, of racism, of declining political legitimacy. Rather, Italy has attracted intense scrutiny for two principal reasons. First, because certain courageous magistrates, both in Palermo and Milan, have waged an unprecedented and dramatic war against criminal organizations and political corruption, and this in one of the most corrupt democracies in Europe. Their lead has been taken up in France and Spain, and their actions studied by colleagues as far away as Japan and Argentina. Unexpectedly, the Italian state has produced and allowed space for a group of public servants who have earned admiration on a global scale.

This paper describes resource dependency, institutional and stakeholder organizational theories and how each theory might or might not work in the France, Nigeria, and India. Application of the three organizational theories demonstrates several features, including an emphasis on inter-organizational dependence for organizational survival and resolution of issues of conflicts between competing stakeholders as critical to the sustenance of organizations in all three national cultures. In relation to the institutional theory, while France is required to implement all European Union Directives and constantly put organizations under pressure to conform to these expectations, issues of poverty, nepotism, political god-fatherism, and corruption prevalent in India and Nigeria mean that organizations are not always put under as much pressure to conform to expectations.

PurposeThis paper focuses on two examples of constitutional corruption in India where the constitution is used for questionable political reasons by the Bharatiya Janata Party under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.Design/methodology/approachThe paper relies on public documents and media reports to analyse Prime Minister Modi's handling of the purchase of Rafale jet fighters from France and the revocation of Articles 370 and 35A which resulted in the division of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.FindingsConstitutional and democratic norms were violated in both cases, but the Supreme Court did not find any irregularities in the sale of the Rafale jet fighters. The second case is under challenge in the Supreme Court. The analysis reveals how the Modi government has undermined democratic values and used constitutional provisions to pursue its partisan and ideological agenda.Originality/valueThe paper focuses attention on the often neglected topic of constitutional corruption in India.

Abstract In 1955, Paris Police Commissioner Guy Isnard curated the exhibition Le Faux dans l'art et dans l'histoire at the Grand Palais in Paris. Featuring a wide variety of forgeries, most notably counterfeit sculptures and paintings, the exhibition was an occasion to showcase the anti-counterfeiting efforts of the National Police. But in the broader context of the politically and economically weakened Fourth Republic, more was at stake. In the immediate postwar period, French society was steeped in uncertainty and a growing fear of inauthenticity, fueled by rumors of currency manipulation by foreign powers, the perceived corruption of the French language by an increasingly influential English, and anti-Americanism in intellectual and political circles. In this environment, the organizers of the exhibition called upon culture, and art in particular, to reaffirm a strict distinction between truth and falsity while also establishing France as the uncontested guardian of truth. This essay shows that Le Faux dans l'art et dans l'histoire constituted a crucial threshold moment in twentieth-century French history, both as an attempt to preserve a rapidly fading vision of truth and originality and as a prefiguration of aesthetic and philosophical debates to come.

AbstractIn response to corruption and inefficient state institutions in recipient countries, some foreign aid donors outsource the delivery of aid to nonstate development actors. Other donor governments continue to support state management of aid, seeking to strengthen recipient states. These cross-donor differences can be attributed in large measure to different national orientations about the appropriate role of the state in public service delivery. Countries that place a high premium on market efficiency (for example, the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden) will outsource aid delivery in poorly governed recipient countries to improve the likelihood that aid reaches the intended beneficiaries of services. In contrast, states whose political economies emphasize a strong state in service provision (for example, France, Germany, Japan) continue to support state provision. This argument is borne out by a variety of tests, including statistical analysis of dyadic time-series cross-section aid allocation data and individual-level survey data on a cross-national sample of senior foreign aid officials. To understand different aid policies, one needs to understand the political economies of donors.

Abstract Contemporary France is a prolific arena for post-fascist actors, parties, and movements. Self-proclaimed alternative news outlets and publishing houses serve as forums for information and mobilisation, through various strategies, to resist an alleged onslaught by the enemies of the nation and its people: multiculturalism, feminism, political correctness, political corruption, and civilisational decay. In this article, I explore uncivility as a discursive logic within the French post-fascist media-ecology, focusing on the conspicuous use of irony and discursive displacement. More specifically, I discuss how sardonic irony as an uncivil discursive strategy is employed to navigate the legal boundaries of free speech and how discursive displacement, coupled with irony, is used as an affective identificatory technique in post-fascist discourse.

The Panama Papers disclosures in April 2016 revealed information about tax avoidance and fraud among political elites and the wealthy on a global scale. But did the disclosures affect relevant political attitudes and behavior, including perceptions of corruption, redistributive preferences, and voting intentions? We leverage nationally representative surveys that were in the field at the time in two heavily impacted countries, France and Spain, and treat the disclosures as a natural experiment, comparing respondents questioned just before and just after the disclosures. Our design highlights the difficulty, at times, of interpreting natural experiments, given the potentially compounded treatments that arise as events unfold over time, and the common inability to properly determine views prior to the treatment. That said, the analysis indicates that the disclosures had limited effects on the domains most likely affected by such a scandal, consistent with them being interpreted based on existing beliefs and identities. Our results thus contradict prior findings which suggest that the Panama Papers had substantial effects on redistributive attitudes, and shed further light on voters’ learning and updating around uncertain, yet emotionally laden, political facts.

The lobbying activities of private groups had an important redistributive influence on national economic policies in both England and France; however, the different organization of government in the two nations gave a particular shape and structure to the redistributive character of national politics. In England, Parliament's role in the legislative process made gaining economic concessions from the government long and difficult. During the eighteenth century, the English government's role was increasingly limited to adjudicating the claims of influential but conflicting groups. In France, by contrast, the government's economic decisions were neither subject to parliamentary scrutiny nor to open public discussion. Whereas the rules of the redistributional game in eighteenth-century England were increasingly public knowledge, the administrative and political process that allowed the French government to pursue its mercantilist programs was private. Furthermore, the rules changed according to ministerial whim. As one historian put it, public law was a forbidden domain, “a mystery reserved to the king and his ministers,” permitting select members of privileged clans, rather than broadly defined interest groups, to enjoy the benefits of government patronage. Although the creation of sophisticated interests and competitive lobbies allowed the English Parliament to provide special favors to particular industries during the eighteenth century, unlike the French executive, neither Parliament nor the English executive had the discretionary authority to distribute monopoly rents to particular ministerial or royal favorites. In England the government's distribution of spoils followed procedures more open to the English political elite as a whole; still, corruption was more pervasive in English public administration than in France, where executive supervision of central government agents was more comprehensive.

AbstractThis article develops theoretical insights concerning the legitimacy of non-profit Transnational Non-Governmental Organisations (TNGOs) in global governance. The research compares the advocacy initiatives of Transparency International (TI), the leading TNGO in the international regime of anti-corruption, in Germany and France during the 1990s. The main argument is that the legitimacy of TNGOs is a relational concept: it is granted or denied in a relationship between at least two parties, in which actor attributes play a role but are not decisive. Only such a relational conception can explain why a given TNGO is granted legitimacy in one context and denied it in another. In addition, legitimacy matters. Although insufficient on its own, legitimacy is a necessary condition for effective advocacy, which TNGOs can generate endogenously. To the extent that the legitimacy of TNGOs depends on their acceptance by dominant groups and powerful decision-makers, therefore, ‘legitimate’ TNGOs may function to sustain rather than challenge the structures of power which condition global outcomes in ways that are often contrary to the goals of equality, fairness, and justice. Thus to assess the impact of TNGOs in global governance, one must examine which TNGOs have been granted (or denied) legitimacy and influence, and why.

An important proportion of citizens do not manifest confidence in many basic institutions (parliaments, parties, unions, army, public bureaucracies, big business, courts, ecclesiastic hierarchy, police) nor in the political class. Such a deficit of trust is attested by a wealth of empirical data. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of democratic regimes is not challenged: European citizens do not conceive realistically of an alternative system of government. A new counter-power is playing an increasing and crucial role in advanced pluralist democracies – that of magistrates and journalists combined. France and Italy are considered as typical cases, concerning in particular corruption at the highest level of the State and society. What types of citizens are needed in advanced democracies? Ignorant, naive, deferential, credulous, believers in myths or well informed, rationally distrustful citizens? Today, democracy is permanently under the supervision of the public, as attested by surveys conducted periodically.

The 1930s saw an explosion in the publication of crime writing in Italy, but initially readers’ appetite for crime fiction was fed almost entirely by translated imports from the US, Britain and France. Even as publishers began promoting crime writing by Italians, foreign models and settings remained important, and several early Italian writers set their work in foreign countries. This article, which draws on both textual analysis and archival research, examines some foreign-set novels produced by Italian authors during the Fascist years, and seeks to identify the function and appeal of foreign settings in the depiction of criminality in that period. These books, peopled by exotic ‘Others’, comment on corruption, freedom of the press, cultural diversity, racial difference, policing, criminality, as much at home as abroad. The distant settings offered safety and freedom, as well as escapism or distraction, and the opportunity to experiment with genre.

This article explores the stakes of the very intense controversy that has developed in France around the medical treatment of Covid-19 (which finds some parallels in the United States of America). It centres on the therapeutic proposal of a Marseilles doctor, who has become a very divisive ‘star’ in public debates over the efficacy of treatment. The author shows that competition between this doctor’s proposal and the commercial hopes of a major pharmaceutical company plays an important role. This company has managed to create links of interest with many other major doctors, some of whom are at the heart of the decision-making process concerning the management of the health crisis. Finally, the author places this episode within the broader question of the hold the drug industry has on scientific production within the medical field. The interdependence between health authorities and the pharmaceutical industry is anything but healthy. The Covid-19 debate conforms to a well-worn pattern of behaviour: public backlash over the transgressions of wealthy corporate actors, government regulatory responses insisting on greater levels of transparency, corporate circumvention of said regulations, resulting in the continuation of fraud and corruption.

Este trabajo pretende mostrar cómo funcionaban los resortes de la alianza hispano-francesa mediante el estudio de uno de los casos diplomáticos más interesantes: el fallido intento de paz entre Portugal y Francia con la mediación española. Unas negociaciones sujetas a multitud de problemas y cambios políticos, así como a la corrupción, a las luchas de poder, a miedos y al cumplimiento de las respectivas alianzas, en el periodo que va de 1796 a 1800. El artículo se ha estructurado en cuatro grandes bloques que dependen del cambio en las conversaciones.AbstractThis paper aims to show how the threads of the Spanish-French alliance worked by studying one of the most interesting diplomatic cases: the failed attempt at peace between Portugal and France with Spanish mediation. These negotiations subject to a multitude of problems and political changes, as well as to corruption, to power struggle, to fears and to the fulfillment of the respective alliances, in the period from 1796 to 1800. The article has been structured in four large blocks that depend on the change in conversations.

The reform of all branches of government in the Russian Federation is caused by the need to implement the idea of building a rule-of-law state and increase the effectiveness of the fight against corruption and arbitrariness of all branches of government. Improving the mechanism of functioning of the executive power both at the federal and regional levels, increasing the responsibility of officials for the decisions taken should have a legal basis. The article considers the historical aspect of the emergence and formation of the concept of “administrative justice”, “administrative courts”, “administrative proceedings”. The problem has a long history: starting with the emergence of the idea itself in France and Germany, continued by research in the field of administrative and legal science in Russia. The views of scientists on the problems of the formation and functioning of administrative justice in the Russian Federation at different historical stages of the development of society and depending on the political and state structure are given. The necessity of improving legislation in the light of the decisions taken related to the establishment of administrative justice in the Russian Federation, the adoption of the Code of Administrative Procedure of the Russian Federation is emphasized. The dynamics of the processes taking place in Russia related to the formation of administrative justice is investigated. The role of administrative justice and its influence on management processes in the state are considered. The authors noted the importance of administrative justice in the process of solving the problem of combating corruption by the state and society in all spheres of life of society and the state.

Cities have always been sources of inspiration for poetry. However, the modern western cities, which are the origins of secularity, have inspired poets in different ways. Charles Baudelaire captured the poetic dimensions of modernity in Paris in the 19th century. He wrote about the night life of Paris which became possible after street lighting. He wrote about corruption. Baudelaire also wrote about the changing character of commercial places in cities and tried to grasp the feelings of people as a ‘flaneur': an individual stroller at city streets. The philosopher Walter Benjamin got inspired by Baudelaire's poems and formed his philosophy, which relates poetics to modernity during the 20th century. Modern cities take an important role in his philosophy too, because Benjamin was making a collection of political event news in the cities of Germany. Then he had to leave Germany because of the growth of fascism. He left his collection behind. When he went to Paris he wrote about the passages and the poetic dimensions of modern city life. When Nazi army came to France, he had to leave Paris too. The poetry of Baudelaire and the philosophy of Benjamin are evidences for the poetic nature of modern city life. The relationship between the modern city and the free individual can easily be felt in their works. However, when you read heir work, you can easily understand that today's Paris is not the same Paris any more. It is still poetic, but in another way.

The intellectual capital is a catalysator of the country’s economic growth. The developed countries try to develop attractive conditions for highly qualified migrants to diffuse the knowledge and innovations. The authors provided the bibliometric analysis of the papers, which focused on the analysis of the migrant issues was done. For the bibliometric analysis, the metadata of 2 500 papers was selected from Scopus. The results showed that the numbers of Scopus documents on the allocated theme have increased for 2015 year. The most powerful investigations were provided by scientists from the USA, Canada, France, United Kingdom. The bibliometric analysis findings confirmed that the scientists allocated a vast range of the determinants that could stimulate or restrict the migrants in the country. Thus, the governance efficiency had the mediation role between the migration and innovation development of the country. In this case, the paper aims to check the hypothesis that the increasing (decreasing) level of country innovation development and government efficiency from year t − 1 to year t positively (negatively) affects net migration in year t + 1. The panel data for 2011-2018 was generated from IndexMundi, EU Data Portal, WorldBank. The object of the investigation was Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania. The dependent variables – net migration rate, the independent variables – World Government Indicators: Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, Voice and Accountability (for assessment of government efficiency), Innovation Index (for assessment of country's innovation development). In the paper, to check the hypothesis, the authors used the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square for homogeneous and heterogeneous models. The findings confirmed that innovation development and governance efficiency (Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Regulatory Quality, Voice and Accountability) had a statistically significant impact on the migration rate. The findings could be used to identify the strategic goals of innovation development to overcome the demographic issues and support the migration of the high qualified workforces.

The processes of the convergence and divergence of law in the era of globalization as well as the trend for establishing similar court proceedings in different countries determine the necessity of studying legal concepts still unknown in the Russian legislation but widely applied in other countries, and expediency is one of them. The goal of this research is to analyze Russian and foreign legislation from both modern and historical perspectives, to analyze the legal regulation of expediency in criminal proceedings, to determine its contents, to differentiate between expediency as a principle and as grounds for the decision to refuse the initiation of criminal proceedings or to terminate them, which is made by a specially authorized official or a state body, to present well-grounded suggestions for the improvement of Russian legislation and the practice of law enforcement. It is determined that expediency is recognized as a principle of criminal proceedings in a number of European states. It is shown that the principle of expediency does not contradict justice and is based on such characteristics of criminal procedure activities as effectiveness, optimality, promptness, procedural economy. At the same time, legislations of the UK, Germany, France and Switzerland provide for the discretionary powers of the prosecutor and other officials to refuse to initiate criminal proceedings, to refuse to bring charges or support them due to inexpediency. The authors show the advantages and disadvantages of making decisions on such grounds: the disadvantages include wide discretionary powers of the officials which could lead to the abuse of power in the absence of necessary guarantees (corruption-generating factor); the advantages are procedural economy, wide opportunities for officials and state bodies involved in the criminal process to use discretionary powers depending on the circumstances of each specific case. They argue that the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation should provide an opportunity for specially authorized officials and state bodies to refuse to initiate a criminal case or pursue criminal prosecution on the grounds of inexpediency.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from some leading developed countries (the USA, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France) into major four Asian economies (China, Korea, India and Singapore).Design/methodology/approachUsing one basic and four augmented versions of gravity model technique, the authors tried to examine the determinants of bilateral FDI flows in four major Asian economies. The study used World Development Indicators, CEPII, KOF and Heritage Foundation data for period 2001–2012.FindingsThe results revealed that besides the market size for host and source country, other criteria such as distance, common language and common border also influence foreign investors. Other macroeconomic factors such as inflation rate and real interest rate are among the key factors that attract more FDI. In addition to economic factors, institutional and infrastructural factors such as telecommunication, degree of openness, index of globalisation and index of economic freedom also stimulate the international investors from the developed world to the major Asian countries.Research limitations/implicationsIt is altogether possible that only a set of home country specific characteristics or host country specific characteristics does not matter when determining FDI. Most empirical studies using indices such as the index of globalisation and economic freedom are subject to certain methodological limitations such as model selection, parameter heterogeneity, outliers and moral hazard.Practical implicationsMore distance between the host and source country would result in less FDI flows due to more managerial and raw material supply chain cost. Similarly, more gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita income (PCI) are leading to more FDI flows into Asian economics. Therefore, major Asian economies should frame their economic policies in such a manner where these counties can strengthen their GDP as well as PCI. Furthermore, above countries should open its economy more and more for better FDI flows as it seems that economic globalisation and economic freedom are major determinants of bilateral FDI flows. The negative impact of inflation and interest rate should be controlled.Social implicationsFrom policy perspective, higher scores of economic, social and political globalisation also attract high FDI to the host country. On the same line higher scores in economic freedom mean that less restrictions in terms of economic policies and the policy environment are conducive for free trade and resource transfers. Higher scores in trade freedom, investment freedom and freedom from corruptions also show more developed and conducive policy environment. In the same reasoning higher scores in the composite index of economic freedom which takes information from trade freedom, investment freedom and freedom from corruption and others also encourage flow of FDI in to the host country.Originality/valueThis is the first paper which combines the globalisation index, economic freedom index and distance along with some major macroeconomic variables.

In view of the worsening experienced by Spain, in recent years, both globally and in Europe , in relation to levels of corruption, in this paper we try to dismantle the idea, still present in some sectors of society, that corruption is an exclusive phenomenon of democratic systems and political pluralism, highlighting the network of corruption that allowed the Franco dictatorship, during which said blight became a widespread social practice, a structural element protected by power and protected by the lack of freedom of expression and communication. We will dwell especially on the fraud carried out by the company MATESA, as well as on the political background that was implicit and that led to a strong government crisis, analyzing it from an original perspective. We will study both the dimensions of fraud, and the media scandal it provoked, as well as the political crisis that resulted from the perspective of the non-collaborationist Christian Democrats, who used this issue to record, through the pages of the Journal Cuadernos for the Dialogue, of the corruption in which the System was based, of the power struggles that confronted the different families of the Regime at the height of 1969, of their position in this respect, as well as of their proposals and alternatives.

There are over 5 million Muslims representing 25 % of the region's population living on the territory of former Yugoslavia which had roughly 20 million citizens. By comparison, there are also around 5 million Muslims living in France, a country that had several colonies in the Muslim world, but the population ratio is different compared to the 60 million of the French population. Unlike the developed countries of Europe, the economies of the Balkan countries were destroyed by numerous interethnic conflicts. After the war of the '90s, the Balkans were living in a longtime economic and social crisis and a state of organized crime. With the beginnings of party pluralism, the different religions gained their former religious identity back.In Croatia and Slovenia, the Catholicism experienced a renaissance, same as the orthodoxy did in Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro and the Islam did in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Western Macedonia and Sandzak. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the fall of communism in the Balkans, the opportunity for increased foreign religious influence became a reality.Today, the image of a tolerant, open Islam from the communist era is still present, although it too is affected. During the several decades of communist rule, the traditional religious networks that affirmed an Islam shielded from Wahhabist and Salafist influences were disintegrated.108The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina intensified the implantation of the mujahidin in Bosnia in 1995. The traditional Muslim imams gradually lost their authority to the newcomers in a large number of mosques. At the same time, in light of its powerlessness, the state began to lose control in the field. It is estimated that some 67 mosques are controlled by radical Islam today, especially in rural and mountainous regions.109Under the pressure of great financial resourced which flowed in from Gulf countries, the education of Bosnian imams in Egypt and Saudi Arabia began. Step by step, Salafist imams were installed in the region preaching a more radical Islam. In such a situation, it was easier to recruit future Jihadists, especially among the socially vulnerable population.110 For example, one graffiti in Pristina (Republic of Kosovo) states: "Every woman will receive 200 euro a month if she wears a niqab".111 The radicalization spread in Bosnia and Kosovo with the greatest intensity. "Bosnia and Kosovo remain the most dangerous countries in Europe due to their political weakness and the high corruption rate. More than 75.000 weapons circulate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one Kalashnikov can be bought for the price of 200 euro and easily brought into the Schengen region", a former police officer of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina points out

Since the establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) in 1975, the development of the country has been uneven both due to domestic policy deficiencies as well as changing international environment. The aim of the article is to provide an overview of the domestic situation in the Lao PDR in connection with the position of the country at the world arena from the 1970s up to date. The study is based on the country-specific research issued abroad in the 1990s-2000s as well as individual papers provided by Russian authors in the 2000s. The sources used for the study include the World Bank and the UN agencies data as well as information from specialized bodies dealing with development including the USAID and the EEAS. The peculiarities of the political system attributed to the Lao PRD include one-party rule, state dominance on most spheres of life and high level of corruption. The economy of the country used to suffer from the land-locked character but nowadays the country strives to gain advantage from being a transit territory in the Mekong River region. Due to sharp turns in the state economic policy from nationalization and collectivization to market orientation, the economy has been rather weak. The efforts to make tourism one of the drivers of economic development along with mining, hydropower production and agriculture, were devalued by the pandemic. The opportunities for receiving education in the country are especially limited for the poor, representatives of ethnic minorities, and women. Due to the continuing growth of the population, it may become even more difficult to provide education in the country largely. The healthcare system is also understaffed and underfunded. Malnutrition is wide-spread among the poor population. However, the healthcare system has improved a lot during the last 30 years. Many social problems of the country are not duly solved partially due to large state deficit that is somehow balanced by foreign aid. Laos was acknowledged a least developed country (LDC) in 1971. Thus, Laos relied a lot on foreign aid. The volumes of official development aid provided to the Lao PDR by the OECD Development Assistance Committee in 1971-2020 changed a lot due to the changes in the main donors of development aid from France and the US at the beginning of the 1970s, then the Soviet Union and Socialist bloc countries in 1975-1990, then again Western states, Japan, UN agencies gaining the main donor position for the Lao PDR. Countering poverty and other social problems were declared the priorities for both Lao authorities and international aid donors, certain success was achieved: the average poverty rate has decreased, the GDP per capita has been growing, the public debt remained large, though. Since the country is expected to be deprived of the LDC status in 2026 due to achieving relatively good results, it is time for the Lao PDR to reformulate its domestic and foreign policy approaches.

The fight against the misappropriation of public funds for private gain perpetrated by individuals, especially public servants, enjoys different degrees of commitment by different countries. The enactment of laws and establishment of institutional mechanisms towards this end are partly a reflection of the attainment of such mission and can also be the measure by which such a commitment can be assessed. Rated as one of the most corrupt countries in Africa by the global anti-corruption watchdog, Transparency International, the Republic of Cameroon recently enacted a law that created a Special Criminal Court. This comes as one of the most robust and significant legislative developments in the fight against misappropriation of public funds as its mandate is to bring to justice persons who cause loss of at least 50.000.000 CFA Francs [equivalent to about USD 100.000] relating to misappropriation of public funds and other related offences provided for in the Cameroon Penal Code and International Conventions ratified by Cameroon.’ This paper examines the offence of misappropriation of public funds, and looks at aspects of the Special Criminal Court as provided by the Law that established it as well as supplementary legislation enacted to address specific issues related to the Special Criminal Court as well as the offence for which individuals are prosecuted. As a bold step in fighting and defeating the ‘invisible enemy amongst us’ (that is, corruption), this paper argues that with such an institutional mechanism that has docked numerous top-notch politicians and former cabinet members for trial, it becomes an example to emulate and confirms that corruption can be fought if, and only when, the political will to do so is present.

ABSTRACTWhile Restoration historians have traditionally assumed that there was little public interest in foreign affairs, and that English attitudes towards Europe were determined either by religious or domestic concerns, this essay argues that there was a lively and sophisticated English debate about Europe which turned on the proper identification of the universal monarch rather than religion. In the later 1660s the English political nation was deeply divided in its understanding of European politics. Enthusiastic supporters of the restored monarchy thought that the republican United Provinces sought universal dominion, while the monarchy's radical critics identified absolutist France as an aspirant to universal monarchy. French success in the early phases of the third Anglo-Dutch war, the failure of the French navy to support the English fleet at sea, and the overthrow of the Dutch republican regime in favour of William III, Prince of Orange, convinced the vast majority of the English that France represented the greater threat. Ultimately popular pressure compelled Charles II to abandon the French alliance. In addition, the popular conviction that Louis XIV had succeeded in corrupting the English court resulted in a new-found desire for popular accountability in foreign affairs, and a consequent diminution of the royal prerogative in that sphere.

Haiti’s new Dictatorship: The Coup, the Earthquake and the UN Occupation.By JUSTIN PODUR. Pluto Press, 2012. $29.95Reviewed by Natali DownerThe controversial book Haiti’s new Dictatorship: The Coup, the Earthquake and the UN Occupation is a significant contribution to current discussions around globalisation, political economy, development, post-colonialism, and human rights. Podur’s work provides welcome insight and a critical perspective on the struggle for sovereignty in modern day Haiti. The author takes the reader through Haiti’s political history, beginning with the slave revolution of 1804, which established Haiti as the world’s first independent black Republic. The historical account grounds the reader in Haiti’s reality—the ongoing battle for economic and political sovereignty within its borders. Since its independence, Podur argues, the successful slave revolt in Haiti has been an ontological challenge to those who would seek to impose colonialism; it is the challenge they posed in 1804 and today.Podur sections the book into historical eras, including the Duvalier dictatorship followed by Haiti’s popular movement and Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which act as signposts for his study. In Podur’s analysis of the second and pivotal coup against Aristide in 2004, he argues that the new dictatorship was imposed and solidified under the control of the U.S., Canada, France and later, the United Nations. Specifically, under the guise of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (the new iteration of the “White Man’s Burden”,) western countries employed the old colonial pretext in order to “overthrow Haiti’s elected government and replace it with an internationally constructed dictatorship.” Drawing on Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s concept of dictatorship, as the use of violence and centralization of power, Podur adds “impunity” to the description as it characterizes how violations by the regime and its supporters go unpunished. Podur categorises the new international variety of dictatorship as a “laboratory experiment in a new kind of imperialism.”Podur discusses the contradictory role of the domestic and international media as contributing to the success of the coup. He argues that the media misrepresented the details surrounding the kidnapping and replacement of a democratically elected prime minister with the dictatorship of the United Nations. He describes the “media disinformation loop” as part of the coup infrastructure by shaping beliefs and actions. Podur’s work is an attempt to publicize an alternative to corrupt mainstream reporting.The media did not question the legitimacy of the coup regime or the United Nations’ Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Podur argues that the occupation of Haiti by the MINUSTAH occurred under peculiar justifications. He reports that, “in Haiti an internationalized military solution is being offered for what even the UN admitted were problems of poverty and social crime that occur in many places.” He argues that violence and murder rates are higher in other countries, including the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica. The mainstream rationale for UN occupation in Haiti has evaded inquiry.Podur’s analysis of the coup extends to the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the new dictatorship. In Haiti, Podur argues, NGOs perform tasks that belong in the hands of a functioning public service, accountable to the people. Instead, NGOs operate in the interests of their donor countries—“offering wealthy countries a morally responsible way of subcontracting the sovereignty of the nations they exploit.” Making NGOs “less non-governmental and more ‘over governmental’” and revealing the determinant role of external intervention in corrupting sovereignty.NGOs are responsible for the bulk of disaster response in Haiti. Podur’s analysis of the earthquake of 2010 reveals a stunning account of how well-meaning donors are part of a feedback loop that (in part) finances a corrupt system. This system of local elites, international enterprises, and NGOs acts with impunity as they create and reinforce vulnerabilities because funds are controlled by western technocrats and corporations (particularly in times of crisis). Rather than geographic factors, Podur argues that social factors are the major cause of Haiti’s horrific death toll following disasters. The decapitation of Haiti’s government and the subsequent program cuts demobilizes the public service while it enables the rise of the “republic of NGOs” and the UN Dictatorship. As Haiti lacks the sovereignty to orchestrate its own disaster response, the failure to rebuild after the earthquake marks the failure of the new dictatorship and not the people of Haiti.Podur illustrates the character of the new dictatorship allowing readers to understand the truly gruesome nature of the post-coup occupiers. Podur’s report leaves the reader spinning from accounts of murder and corruption; page after page the reader experiences Haiti’s grim reality in the new imperialist regime. While the lists of events in the book become disorienting to read, they serve to demonstrate the brutality of actions performed by western nations, the Haitian elite, and armed factions.In this book Podur argues that Haiti is engaged in a historical struggle for democracy against external control. Podur’s work on Haiti reveals how a multilateral violation of sovereignty is organized and carried out, and exposes the “new face of dictatorship in the twenty-first century global order.” However, the larger project of this book suggests a call to action. Podur recounts the illegitimacy of the occupation and its atrocities so that widespread recognition can be achieved and policies changed. Podur challenges us to consider what it truly means to help Haiti, to face the consequences of our “do-good” attempts at aid and instead aim to assist Haitians to reclaim national sovereignty.Work CitedTrouillot, Michel-Rolph. Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990. Print.~NATALI DOWNER is a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University. Her research explores the contradictions of capitalism as expressed in the twin crisis of peak oil and climate change.

Abstract. Introduction. International migration is an important socio-economic indicator of the development of states and a regulator of socio-economic relations in the international economy. Under the modern conditions of development of the world society migration processes are characterized by dynamic development and scale of distribution. Today, international migration is becoming an important factor influencing the formation of international reality, causing social changes and cultural interaction of countries involved in migration process. Purpose. The modern world is diverse in its development and progress. Existing asymmetries and inequalities in most countries, conflicts, poverty, climate change encourage people from the low-income countries to migrate to the economically developed countries in searching of a safer and better life. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic carries great threats to the lives and health of migrants, negatively affects their spatial mobility, and creates the new societal challenges and dangers. That is why the author of the article aims to explore the main trends in the formation of modern migration flows and changes in international migration; to identify global factors influencing the dynamics of international migration and to identify key issues that need to be corrected in the management system of international migration at the global level. Results. The author has analyzed the current trends in the development of international migration in the global space, assesses the formation of the main migration flows in terms of individual sub-regions and countries. According to the results of the analysis, the growing influence of exogenous factors (interstate conflicts, economic and political instability in the world, climate change, etc.) and endogenous factors (low level of social protection of the low-income countries, limited access to vital public resources), high levels of corruption in some countries that cause poverty, carry threat and danger to the lives and health of their citizens) to increase the dynamics of migration flows in the world. During the studying the author has formed the main group of countries (USA, Canada, Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland, Germany, France, Czech Republic, others), which (according to the long-term UN forecasts) will increase net migration rates and net numbers of migrants; this information is the important indicators for governments of these countries in order to respond in a timely manner and put changes into their existing migration policies. The tools of integration of international migrants into the national societies of the host countries of Europe in terms of employment, education, social inclusion have been considered. The benefits of the host countries from successful integration have been determined. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the change in the dynamics of international migration has been studied and the key problems of international migration development that need to be corrected at the global international level due to the intensification of crisis situations have been identified. Conclusions. Thus, the acceleration of migration processes and the scale of their spread in the world have a great impact on significant changes in foreign economic relations between countries; the macroeconomic dynamics of their development is gaining new momentum. The mechanical movement of the population causes changes in the structure of human capital, affects the quality of its formation and development. Due to the unevenness and the existing asymmetry in the socio-economic development of the world, the migration factor can become a major tool for the destruction of economic stability of many countries, the intensification of crises in the social sphere. Therefore, the existing problems of global cooperation and coordination of international migration, the lack of effective mechanisms for interaction between national and global levels of migration management need to be solved in time. The international regulatory framework for the protection of migrants' rights in the global dimension needs to be improved.

Este artículo presenta, fundamentado en fuentes primarias, una imagen de la forma como se ejerció el poder por parte de los funcionarios reales a fines del siglo XVIII. En este caso, los capitanes a guerra nombrados en poblaciones nuevas, resultado de la política borbónica de organización de territorio y población, o en zonas en franca decadencia en las que habían desaparecido los cabildos. Estos funcionarios, en su mayoría sin preparación y sin salarios, aprovecharon sus cargos para explotar y abusar de la población. El artículo también ilustra cómo los vecinos libres (mestizos, zambos negros y pardos), denunciaron mediante quejas y reclamaciones estas situaciones e incluso, como ejercieron acciones políticas tales como las asonadas, los desordenes y —en casos extremos— el uso de la violencia para protegerse del mal gobierno.Palabras clave: Capitanes a Guerra, plebe, libres, desacato, corrupción, despotismo. Corruption, Power and Abuse: The Capitains of War during the late colonial period in Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada Abstract In this paper it is shown, based on primary sources, an image of how power was exerted by Royal servants at the end of XVIIIth century. In this case, they were the war captains named in new settlements as a result of the Bourbon policy of territory and people organization, or in zones in clear decadence in which councils had disappeared. Most of those Royal servants, having no preparation or salaries, would take advantage of their position to exploit and abuse the people. This paper also illustrates how free residents (mestizo, half-breed and mulatto) denounce these situations with complains, and also how they exert a political experience which uses the riots, disturbance and —in extreme cases— violence to protect themselves from bad government.Keywords: captains of war, free people, rabble, disrepect, corruption, despotism.

Adoption in 1978 of the new Constitution became a watershed between two Spains - old, dictatorial and modern, socially oriented, democratic. As a result of shown by leaders of the main political parties, labor unions and pragmatic part of the armed forces responsibility for the future of the country, the compromise solutions of a number of burning issues have been found that created necessary conditions for stable development of Spain for three next decades. Nevertheless over the years there were new problem knots which were distinctly shown during the financial and economic crisis 2008 which painfully struck across Spain, and the long-term depression which followed it. After the national elections to General Courts which took place on December 20, 2015 it became obvious that actually two-party system existing throughout the most part of the post-Franco period in Spain consigned to the past. It was succeeded by four-party system that excessively complicates process of formation of the stable government. In the practical plane there is a question of need to make changes into the existing Constitution of Spain (country federalization, fixing in the Fundamental law of the new civil and political rights and freedoms, revision of bases of an electoral system, reform of the Senate, etc.). The Catalan nationalism / separatism and corruption in the top echelons of power are distinguished from the burning issues of modern Spain. In article the conclusion is drawn that Spain faces a responsible choice today, on what way to go: or to continue the inertial movement on the route offered by the Spanish conservatives or to decide on changes, to initiate something similar to «the second transit» for what can call the left forces.

It has been famously argued that Tom Paine was not much of an economic thinker. Indeed, in his published work, we see relatively scarce systematic commentary on the subject. But, as befitting his origins in a mercantile family, Paine as a young man had prepared for a career as an excise officer. He later fully participated in a broader Enlightenment conversation about the new world of credit, trade, commercial and monetary policies, among other fiscal issues of early globalization. In particular, Paine formulated a systematic critique of public debt as a compelling way to discuss political sovereignty, the social contract, and the true wealth of nations – among other issues. In 1796, in France, Paine published a critique of wartime funding of the British economy with the publication of The Decline and Fall of the English System of Finance inspired by the title of Gibbon’s The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776). Paine’s denunciation of the economic self-mutilation caused by British wartime expansionism focused on a reform by the Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, who partially privatized the public debt of Britain. The British pound sterling was henceforth sustained by mysterious private loans whose very terms were obscured from public opinion. This article argues that the pamphlet had many parallels to David Hume’s 1752 essay Of Public Debt which Hume revised after the Seven Years War with a radical critique of public debt. The Humean origins of many of Paine’s arguments are manifest in the corrupting nature of public debt tied to military expenditure. To Hume and Paine, gimmicky forms of state borrowing in times of war lead to the bankruptcy of expansionist absolutism and to the eventual “decline and fall” of belligerent empires.

It is substantiated that, depending on the political and legal concept, which is elected by the member state of the European Union to prevent corruption, separate programs of social and anti-corruption activities are modeled. For this purpose, in particular, anti-corruption bodies of various structural purposes are being created. The existence of two levels of formation of state and administrative mechanisms for preventing corruption, used in practice by the countries of the European Union, is proved: constitutional and legal and institutional. The constitutional and legal level of combating corruption is expressed in the creation of specialized legislative acts and regulations designed to prevent the spread of corruption schemes and transformations in the member states of the European Union. It has been determined that the problems of state and administrative mechanisms for preventing corruption in the countries of the European Union are associated with the effectiveness of the practical implementation of certain regulatory and legal prescriptions. For example, in France, for example, the array of legislative regulation in the field of combating and combating corruption is striking in its complexity and ramification, but the result of the perception of corruption from Transparency International shows that the practical aspects of the implementation of such a policy leave much to be desired. It is noted that the level of corruption of officials directly depends on the level of political culture on the territory of a particular state. Consequently, in Finland, since 2001, the “Decision on personnel policy” came into force, which, among other duties of officials, highlighted the need to observe high moral principles of professional and personal ethics in their daily activities. It was noted that in democratic countries, which are all member states of the European Union without exception, the principles of openness, openness and transparency of government activities are applied. Consequently, Denmark has a law “On the openness of government activities”, approved in 1999. In particular, they regulate the transparent and open nature of all state documentation.

As a form of social control, undercover tactics played an important state-building role during the Nineteenth Century, in both the United States and France. Yet undercover policing played this role very differently in France than in the US, which made do with a less developed surveillance capacity at all levels of government. The instability of successive French regimes encouraged French political authorities to expand their use of infiltration and to privilege high policing purposes of undercover tactics over the crime-fighting purposes favored by local elites. And while nineteenth-century France, like the United States, often governed through delegations of authority to local elites, French authorities jealously guarded undercover tactics as their exclusive prerogative. As a result, undercover tactics became a marginal crime-fighting tactic in nineteenth century France, becoming identified primarily with the state's surveillance of its political opponents. In the United States, by contrast, the private sector was able to deploy undercover tactics against suspected criminals, organized labor, political radicals, and purveyors of vice. Though the private sector readily accepted delegations from the public sector, the direction of influence also ran in the opposite direction, from the private sector to the state, as American private sector used undercover tactics to replace, bypass, and harness state institutions in ways that their French counterparts could not. In the United States, the private sector's use of undercover tactics came to shape public policing, as prominent detectives entered government and brought their tactics with them, and as Progressive era reformers took up the undercover tactics pioneered by private detectives, modeled them for the state through public-private partnership, and used them to set the anti-corruption, anti-radical, and anti-vice enforcement agenda of government. If French undercover tactics helped to build the French state from the inside out, by consolidating the state's hold over territory and attempting to control disorder and dissent, American undercover tactics became a vector of private sector influence that helped build the state from the outside in by shaping both investigative means and ends at all levels of government.

Globalization and rapid information processes that are inherent in today's post-pandemic society, contributing to the reorganization of the authorities of many countries and their contacts with regions, local territorial units or civil society. Such changes, first of all, provide for delegation of authority at the level of regional and local authorities. However, many developing and today position their own society as post-modern, continue to be in a state of disunity of the branches of government, with a high level of corruption and abuse of official position, improper distribution of resources, inappropriate tax system and incompetent provision of services by relevant authorities. This affects the relevance of studying foreign experience in building a rational, effective, balanced public administration system, the leading place in which in almost all developed countries is the decentralization of the state and, above all, the executive branch. The foreign experience of the successful implementation of decentralization reforms is investigated. The main characteristics inherent in the decentralization of power in European countries are given, including in the context of the existence of a pandemic. The features of decentralization of power in France, the UK, Germany and other countries are highlighted. It is substantiated that the experience of decentralization reforms in each country is unique and reflects the specifics of the development of a particular country, and therefore it is impractical to introduce foreign experience without taking into account the particular economic and political development of a particular country.

Georgia today stands at crossroads between two alternatives: to continue rapprochement with the European Union (EU) on a basis of the Association Agreement (and to ultimately pursue membership through a lengthy, drawn-out process), or to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a much simpler prospect. Georgia has long made clear that it favors engagement with Europe and Euro Atlantic institutions; however, discussion of Georgia’s rapprochement with Russia is becoming more and more topical as a result of uncertainty in modern Georgia-Russia relations and the establishment of the EEAU. This essay clarifies the main differences between the EU and EAEU in the wider context of Georgia’s future. The EAEU started operations in 2015 and at present includes five member- countries – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Georgia is located between two member states – Armenia and Russia – which creates new challenges for Georgia’s development. Georgia and the EU signed the EU Georgia Association Agreement in June 2014. Despite this agreement, talks on Georgia’s rapprochement with Russia have recently reignited, largely sparked by the establish- ment of the EAEU. When analyzing the suitability of these two organization for Georgia, it is important to consider the essential differences between them: The EU was initially set up as an economic union, with the aim of promoting the economic development of its member states. Although the EAEU contains the term “economic“ in its title, this union is not so much a means of economic development as it is a mechanism through which Moscow seeks to maintain and increase its political influence on the member states. The EU is, with the partial exception of some Eastern European member states, an association of developed economies, while the EAEU is comprised solely of underdeveloped post-Soviet economies deficient in their market institutions and lagging behind global standards in technology. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index demonstrates an essential disparity between the EU and EAEU on the issue of corruption. The most corrupt state in the EU according to this rank- ing is Bulgaria (75th of 175), while the least corrupt in the EAEU is Belarus (79th). For comparison, Georgia ranks 44th. For a country to join the EU, it must meet certain standards set by Brussels in areas such as demo- cratic institutions, human rights, freedom of speech and expression, and market economy. Furthermore, only after an applicant country has met European standards in the above areas is the issue of formal membership placed on the agenda. In order to encourage rapprochement with the EU, Brussels has adopted special formats of cooperation – for instance, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) instrument and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Georgia is a participant in both formats. It is through the application of the EaP framework that Georgia has managed to successfully traverse the rather difficult path towards the entry into force of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and the Association Agreement. Unlike the EU, the EAEU has virtually no complex preconditions for member- ship. On the contrary, Moscow’s aim is to expand the union in order to increase its political influence on member-states via economic leverage, with no concern for economic and political standards such as those emphasized by the EU. When the essential differences between the EU and the EAEU are summed up, it can be concluded that Georgia can more easily attain membership in the latter than in the former. However, this evokes a separate question: why would Georgia, a country with a more or less EU-level standard of corruption, enter into the much more corrupt EAEU, which lags behind the EU in institutional and technological terms, and serves Moscow’s political objective of strengthening Russian control over the member states? The answer, of course, is that it would not be in Georgia’s interest to pursue EAEU membership. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the so- called “commensurability barrier“ for the EAEU is much more significant than for the EU. Ruslan Greenberg, a Russian economist, outlines this issue through the comparison of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the EU Greenberg shows that an alliance of countries is streamlined and possesses a higher chance of success when the commensurables (sizes) of the member countries are more or less comparable. When an alliance of countries is formed, the states concerned should make a decision on the areas where they are ready to relinquish part of their sovereignty in favor of the supranational gov- erning bodies of the association. When the commensurability of the countries is more or less analogous, reaching consensus on this matter is easier than when one country and its economy are several times larger in size than those of all the other constituents of the union put together. In this case, the largest country finds it difficult to imagine how it can be expected to yield a share of its sovereignty equivalent to that of much smaller states. As a result, this large country attempts to relinquish far less of its state sovereignty than it obligates the other smaller member states to surrender, thereby maintaining a dominant position in the association. One of the reasons of the EU’s success is also the fact that it consolidates relatively large and simultaneously commensurably more or less homogeneous countries, such as Germany, Great Britain (before the implementation of Brexit), Italy and France, and relatively small but commensurably comparable countries, such as Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and others. According to Greenberg, the “commensurability barrier“ for the CIS was rather high, since the Russian economy accounted for 67-70 percent of the entire economy of the CIS. This barrier is even larger in the EAEU, as Russia’s constitutes over 82% of the entire economy of the union. The issue of, the “commensurability barrier“ is a further indication that the EAEU does not have a high chance of success and an additional.

Resumen: La transición del régimen absolutista al Estado liberal no acabó con la corrupción pública ni con el fraude fiscal asociado, a pesar de las impecables constituciones y las reformas fiscales. Las prácticas fiscales fraudulentas del Antiguo Régimen persistieron en el sistema tributario del Estado liberal, implantado en la reforma tributaria de 1845 y mantenido hasta la reforma tributaria de 1977. Aquel sistema tributario sufrió cambios, por la incorporación de nuevos tributos y cuerpos inspectores; asimismo, cambió su configuración política de régimen constitucional con sufragio censitario o universal a unas dictaduras personales, que agravaron la corrupción pública y el fraude fiscal. Pues bien, tampoco la instauración de una democracia moderna y del sistema tributario del Estado del Bienestar ha acabado con el fraude fiscal, porque las inercias históricas en el comportamiento de los contribuyentes (reforzadas en la dictadura de Franco) son duraderas, y porque también lo es la corrupción política, difícil de erradicar en España. No obstante, la democracia ha ido cercando las prácticas fraudulentas.Palabras clave: fraude fiscal, elusión fiscal, Estado Liberal, Estado del Bienestar, corrupción políticaAbstract: The transition from the absolutist regime to the liberal state did not end public corruption to tax fraud and tax avoidance, despite legally impeccable constitutions and fiscal reforms. The fraudulent tax practices of the Ancien Regime persisted in the tax system of the liberal state, established by the tax reform of 1845 and maintained until the tax reform of 1977. That tax system underwent legal changes, by the incorporation of new taxes and inspection bodies. It also changed the political configuration o the liberal State from constitutional regimes with census or universal suffrage to personal dictatorships, which aggravated and reinforced public corruption and tax fraud. However, neither the establishment of a modern democracy nor the tax system of the Welfare State has put an end to fiscal fraud in Spain, because the historical inertia in the behaviour of taxpayers is long-lasting, and because political corruption is difficult to eradicate in Spain. This explains why democracy maintains a low penalization of tax fraud, particularly of high incomes taxpayers and self-employed workers. However, democracy has been surrounding fraudulent practices.Keywords: tax fraud, tax avoidance, liberal state, Welfare State, political corruption.

Resumen: El artículo abre un debate acerca de la corrupción ambiental en la historia de España. El estudio se centra en la España franquista, a partir de una perspectiva regional y social. Los estudios sobre transiciones metabólicas han demostrado que los patrones industriales en la economía rusa y en las economías occidentales no dependieron de las condiciones económicas y políticas (Krausmann et al, 2016). La historia ambiental social no dispone todavía de estudios capaces de realizar este tipo de comparaciones. Este artículo pretende pues definir la corrupción ambiental del Franquismo, como paso imprescindible antes de realizar comparaciones que dejamos aquí planteadas a modo de hipótesis. Los resultados demuestran que la corrupción ambiental franquista se ejerció mediante tres estrategias: una compleja laxitud y maleabilidad legislativa en la aplicación y reforma de la ley, la creación de duda por parte de ciertos expertos proclives a la industria y la represión y una justicia arbitraria.Palabras clave: Franquismo, medio ambiente, contaminación industrial, historia ambiental, España.Abstract: This article opens a debate about environmental corruption in the history of Spain. The study focused on Franco’ Spain, from a regional and social history perspective. Studies of metabolic transitions have shown that industrial patterns in the Russian economy and Western economies did not depend on economic and political conditions (Krausmann et al, 2016). Social environmental history does not yet have studies capable of making such comparisons. This article aims to define the environmental corruption of Francoism, as an essential step before making comparisons that we leave here presented as hypotheses. The results show that Francoist environmental corruption was exercised through three strategies: a complex laxity and legislative malleability in law enforcement and reform, the creation of doubt certain by certain experts with industrial interests and arbitrary repression and justice.Keywords: Francoism, environment, industrial pollution, environmental history, Spain.

This article studies whether firm-level and country-level factors affect to the corporation's debt maturity in case of Vietnam or not. The paper adopts the balance panel data of 267 listed companies on two trading board HOSE and HNX in the period from 2008 to 2015, estimated by FEM, REM, 2SLS and GMM method. To intrinsic factors, research results show that financial leverage and default risk control have high positive statistical significance with the debt maturity, but tangible assets are lower than those factors. In addition, growth opportunities and company quality have negative impacts to the debt maturity. To external factors, the results point out that economic growth, stock market development and governmental regulation's efficiency demonstrate the positive relationship to the debt maturity with fairly low correlation levels. 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In the summer of 1999, four ships carrying 599 Fujianese people arrived on the west coast of Canada. They survived a desperate and dangerous journey only for the Canadian Government to put them in prison. After numerous deportations, there are still about 40 of these people in Canadian prisons as of January 2001. They have been in jail for over a year and a half under mere suspicion of flight risk. About 24 people have been granted refugee status. Most people deported to China have been placed in Chinese prisons and fined. It is worth remembering that these migrants may have been undocumented but they are not "illegal" in that they have mobility rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes everyone's right to leave any country and to seek asylum. It can be argued that it is not the migrants who are illegal, but the unjust laws that criminalize their freedom of movement. In considering people's rights, we need to keep in mind not only the civil and political rights that the West tends to privilege, but equally important social and economic rights as well. As a local response to a global phenomenon, Direct Action Against Refugee Exploitation (DAARE) formed in Vancouver to support the rights of the Fujianese women, eleven of whom at the time of writing are still being held in the Burnaby Correctional Centre for Women (BCCW). In DAARE’s view, Immigration Canada's decision to detain all these people is based on a racialized group-profiling policy which violates basic human rights and ignores Canadian responsibility in the creation of the global economic and societal conditions which give rise to widespread migration. In light of the Canadian government's plans to implement even more punitive immigration legislation, DAARE endorses the Coalition for a Just Immigration and Refugee Policy's "Position Paper on Bill C31." They call for humanitarian review and release for the remaining Fujianese people. This review would include a few released refugee claimants who are still in Canada, children, women who were past victims of family planning, people facing religious persecution and, of course, those who are still in prison after 18 months and who have never been charged with any crime. Suspicion of flight risk is not a valid reason to incarcerate people for such a long time. Who Is a Migrant? The lines between "voluntary" and "forced" migration are no longer adequate to explain the complexities of population movements today. Motives for forced displacement include political, economic, social and environmental factors. This spectrum runs from the immediate threats to life, safety and freedom due to war or persecution, to situations where economic conditions make the prospects of survival marginal and non-existent. (Moussa 2000). Terms like "economic migrant" and "bogus refugee" have been used in the media to discredit migrants such as the Fujianese and to foster hostility against them. This scapegoating process oversimplifies the situation, for all refugees and all migrants are entitled to the basic respect due all human beings as enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. There can be multiple reasons for an individual to migrate—ranging from family reunification to economic pressures to personal survival; to fear of government corruption and of political persecution, to name just a few. The reduction of everything to merely the economic does not allow one to understand why migration is occurring and likely to increase in the future. Most immigrants to Canada could also be described as economic migrants. Conrad Black is an economic migrant. The privileging of rich migrants over poor ones romanticizes globalization as corporate progress and ignores the immense human suffering it entails for the majority of the world's population as the gap between the wealthy and the poor rapidly increases. Hundreds of years ago, when migrants came to this aboriginal territory we now call Canada, they came in order to survive—in short, they too were "economic migrants." Many of those migrants who came from Europe would not qualify to enter Canada today under its current immigration admissions guidelines. Indeed, over 50% of Canadians would not be able to independently immigrate to Canada given its current elitist restrictions. One of the major reasons for an increase in migration is the destruction of rural economies in Asia and elsewhere in the world. Millions of people have been displaced by changes in agriculture that separate people from the land. These waves of internal migration also result in the movement of peoples across national borders in order to survive. Chinese provinces such as Fujian and Guangdong, whose people have a long history of overseas travel, are particularly common sources of out-migration. In discussing migration, we need to be wary of how we can inadvertently reinforce the colonization of First Nations people unless we consciously work against that by actively supporting aboriginal self-determination. For example, some First Nations people have been accused of "smuggling" people across borders—this subjects them to the same process of criminalization which the migrants have experienced, and ignores the sovereign rights of First Nations people. We need ways of relating to one another which do not reenact domination, but which work in solidarity with First Nations' struggles. This requires an understanding of the ways in which racism, colonialism, classism, and other tactics through which "dividing and conquering" take place. For those of us who are first, second, third, fourth, fifth generation migrants to this land, our survival and liberation are intimately connected to that of aboriginal people. History Repeating Itself? The arrival of the Fujianese people met with a racist media hysteria reminiscent of earlier episodes of Canadian history. Front page newspaper headlines such as "Go Home" increased hostility against these people. In Victoria, people were offering to adopt the dog on one of the ships at the same time that they were calling to deport the Chinese. From the corporate media accounts of the situation, one would think that most Canadians did not care about the dangerous voyage these people had endured, a voyage during which two people from the second ship died. Accusations that people were trying to enter the country "illegally" overlooked how historically, the Chinese, like other people of colour, have had to find ways to compensate for racist and classist biases in Canada's immigration system. For example, from 1960 to 1973, Canada granted amnesty to over 12,000 "paper sons," that is, people who had immigrated under names other than their own. The granting of "legal" status to the "paper sons" who arrived before 1960 finally recognized that Canada's legislation had unfairly excluded Chinese people for decades. From 1923 to 1947, Canada's Chinese Exclusion Act had basically prevented Chinese people from entering this country. The xenophobic attitudes that gave rise to the Chinese Exclusion Act and the head tax occurred within a colonial context that privileged British migrants. Today, colonialism may no longer be as rhetorically attached to the British empire, but its patterns—particularly the globally inequitable distribution of wealth and resources—continue to accelerate through the mechanism of transnational corporations, for example. As Helene Moussa has pointed out, "the interconnections of globalisation with racist and colonialist ideology are only too clear when all evidence shows that globalisation '¼ legitimise[s] and sustain[s] an international system that tolerates an unbelievable divide not only between the North and the South but also inside them'" (2000). Moreover, according to the United Nations Development Programme, the income gap between people in the world's wealthiest nations and the poorest nations has shifted from 30:1 in 1960 to 60:1 in 1990 and to 74:1 in 1997. (Moussa 2000) As capital or electronic money moves across borders faster than ever before in what some have called the casino economy (Mander and Goldsmith), change and instability are rapidly increasing for the majority of the world's population. People are justifiably anxious about their well-being in the face of growing transnational corporate power; however, "protecting" national borders through enforcement and detention of displaced people is a form of reactive, violent, and often racist, nationalism which scapegoats the vulnerable without truly addressing the root causes of instability and migration. In short, reactive nationalism is ineffective in safe-guarding people's survival. Asserting solidarity with those who are most immediately displaced and impoverished by globalization is strategically a better way to work towards our common survival. Substantive freedom requires equitable economic relations; that is, fairly shared wealth. Canadian Response Abilities The Canadian government should take responsibility for its role in creating the conditions that displace people and force them to migrate within their countries and across borders. As a major sponsor of efforts to privatize economies and undertake environmentally devastating projects such as hydro-electric dams, Canada has played a significant role in the creation of an unemployed "floating population" in China which is estimated to reach 200 million people this year. Punitive tactics will not stop the movement of people, who migrate to survive. According to Peter Kwong, "The well-publicized Chinese government's market reforms have practically eliminated all labor laws, labour benefits and protections. In the "free enterprise zones" workers live virtually on the factory floor, laboring fourteen hours a day for a mere two dollars—that is, about 20 cents an hour" (136). As Sunera Thobani has phrased it, "What makes it alright for us to buy a t-shirt on the streets of Vancouver for $3, which was made in China, then stand up all outraged as Canadian citizens when the woman who made that t-shirt tries to come here and live with us on a basis of equality?" Canada should respond to the urgent situations which cause people to move—not only on the grounds upon which Convention refugees were defined in 1949 (race, religion, nationality, social group, political opinion) which continue to be valid—but also to strengthen Canada's system to include a contemporary understanding that all people have basic economic and environmental survival rights. Some migrants have lives that fit into the narrow definition of a UN Convention refugee and some may not. Those who do not fit this definition have nonetheless urgent needs that deserve attention. The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives has pointed out that there are at least 18 million people working in 124 export zones in China. A living wage in China is estimated to be 87 cents per hour. Canadians benefit from these conditions of cheap labour, yet when the producers of these goods come to our shores, we hypocritically disavow any relationship with them. Responsibility in this context need not refer so much to some stern sense of duty, obligation or altruism as to a full "response"—intellectual, emotional, physical, and spiritual—that such a situation provokes in relations between those who "benefit"—materially at least—from such a system and those who do not. References Anderson, Sarah, et al. Field Guide to the Global Economy. New York: New Press, 2000. Canadian Council of Refugees. "Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons." February 20, 2000. Canadian Woman Studies: Immigrant and Refugee Women. 19.3 (Fall 1999). Chin, Ko-lin. Smuggled Chinese. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. Coalition for a Just Immigration and Refugee Policy. "Position Paper on Bill C31." 2000. Davis, Angela. The Angela Davis Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998. Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, Foundation Against Trafficking in Women, and International Human Rights Law Group. "Human Rights Standards for the Treatment of Trafficked Persons." January 1999. Henry, Frances and Tator, Carol. Racist Discourses in Canada's English Print Media. Toronto: Canadian Foundation for Race Relations, 2000. Jameson, Fredric and Miyoshi, Masao, Eds. The Cultures of Globalization. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Kwong, Peter. Forbidden Workers. New York: New Press, 1997. Mander, Jerry and Goldsmith, Edward, Eds. The Case Against the Global Economy. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996. Moussa, Helene. "The Interconnections of Globalisation and Migration with Racism and Colonialism: Tracing Complicity." 2000. ---. "Violence against Refugee Women: Gender Oppression, Canadian Policy, and the International Struggle for Human Rights." Resources for Feminist Research 26 (3-4). 1998 Migrant Forum statement (from Asia Pacific People's Assembly on APEC) 'Occasional Paper Migration: an economic and social analysis.' Pizarro, Gabriela Rodriguez. "Human Rights of Migrants." United Nations Report. Seabrook, Jeremy. "The Migrant in the Mirror." New Internationalist 327 (September 2000): 34-5. Sharma, Nandita. "The Real Snakeheads: Canadian government and corporations." Kinesis. October/November (1999): 11. Spivak, Gayatri. "Diasporas Old and New: Women in the Transnational World." Class Issues. Ed. Amitava Kumar. New York: New York University Press, 1997. States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization. London: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UN RISD), 1995. Thobani, Sunera. "The Creation of a ‘Crisis’." Kinesis October/November (1999): 12-13. Whores, Maids and Wives: Making Links. Proceedings of the North American Regional Consultative Forum on Trafficking in Women, 1997.

Introduction Since at least the work of van Gennep in the early 1900s, anthropologists have recognised that borders and thresholds are crucial in understanding human behavior and culture. But particularly in the past few decades, the study of borders has moved from the margins of social inquiry to the centre. At the same time, fashion (Entwistle), including clothing and skin (Bille), have emerged as crucial to understanding the human condition. In this article, we draw on and expand this literature on borders and fashion to demonstrate that the way Indonesians fashion and display their body reflects larger changes in attitudes about morality and gender. And in this, borders and thresholds are crucial. In order to make this argument, we consider three case studies from Indonesia. First, we discuss the requirement that policewomen submit to a virginity test, which takes the form of a hymen inspection. Then, we look at the successful campaign by policewomen to be able to wear the Islamic veil. Finally, we consider reports of Makassar policewomen who attempt to turn young people into exemplary citizens and traffic 'ambassadors' by using downtown crosswalks as a catwalk. In each of these three cases, fashioned borders and thresholds play prominent roles in determining the expression of morality, particularly in relation to gender roles. Fashion, Thresholds, and Borders There was once a time when social scientists tended to view clothes and other forms of adornment as "frivolous" or trivial (Entwistle 14; 18). Over the past few decades, however, fashion has emerged as a serious study within the social sciences. Writers have, for example, demonstrated how fashion is closely tied up with identity and capitalism (King and Winarnita). And although fashion used to be envisaged as emerging from London, New York, Paris, Milan, and other Western locations, scholars are increasingly recognising the importance of Asia in fashion studies. Whether the haute couture and cosplay in Tokyo or 'traditional' weaving of materials in Indonesia, studying fashion and clothes provides crucial insight into the cultures and societies of Asia (King and Winarnita). To contribute to this burgeoning area of research in Asian fashion, we draw on the anthropological classics, in particular, the concept of threshold. Every time we walk through a doorway, gate, or cross a line, we cross a threshold. But what classic anthropology shows us is that crossing certain thresholds changes our social status. This changing particularly occurs in the context of ritual. For example, walking onto a stage, a person becomes a performer or actor. Traditionally a groom carries his bride through the door, symbolising the transition to husband and wife (Douglas 115). In this article, we apply this idea that crossing thresholds is associated with transitioning social statuses (Douglas; Turner; van Gennep). To do this, we first establish a connection between national and personal borders. We argue that skin and clothes have a cultural function in addition to their practical functions. Typically, skin is imagined as a kind of social border and clothes provide a buffer zone. But to make this case, we first need to elaborate how we understand national borders. In the traditional kingdoms of Southeast Asia, borders were largely imperceptible or non-existent. Power was thought to radiate out from the ruler, through the capital, and into the surrounding areas. As it emanated from this 'exemplary centre', power was thought to weaken (Geertz 222-229). Rather than an area of land, a kingdom was thought to be a group of people (Tambiah 516). In this context, borders were irrelevant. But as in other parts of the world, in the era of nations, the situation has entirely changed in modern Indonesia. In a simple sense, our current global legal system is created out of international borders. These borders are, first and foremost, imagined lines that separate the area belonging to one nation-state from another. Borders are for the most part simply drawn on maps, explained by reference to latitude, longitude, and other features of the landscape. But, obviously, borders exist outside the imagination and on maps. They have significance in international law, in separating one jurisdiction from another. Usually, national borders can only be legally crossed with appropriate documentation and legal status. In extreme cases, crossing another nation's border can be a cause for war; but the difficulty in determining borders in practice means both sides may debate over whether a border was actually crossed. Where this possibility exists, sometimes the imagined lines are marked on the actual earth by fences, walls, etc. To protect borders, buffer zones are sometimes created. The most famous buffer zone is the Demilitarized Zone or DMZ, which runs along North Korea's border with South Korea. As no peace treaty has been signed between these two nations, they are technically still at war. Hostility is intense, but armed conflict has, for the most part, ceased. The buffer helps both sides maintain this cessation by enabling them to distinguish between an unintentional infringement and a genuine invasion. All this practical significance of borders and buffer zones is obvious. But borders become even more fascinating when we look beyond their 'practical' significance. Borders have ritual as well as practical importance. Like the flag, the nation's borders have meaning. They also have moral implications. Borders have become an issue of almost fanatical or zealous significance. The 2015 footage of a female Hungarian reporter physically attacking asylum seekers who crossed the border into her nation indicates that she was not just upset with their legal status; presumably she does not physically attack people breaking other laws (BBC News). Similarly the border vigilantes, volunteers who 'protect' the southern borders of the USA against what they see as drug cartels, apparently take no action against white-collar criminals in the cities of the USA. For the Hungarian reporter and the border vigilantes, the border is a threshold to be protected at all costs and those who cross it without proper documentation and process are more than just law breakers; they are moral transgressors, possibly even equivalent to filth. So much for border crossing. What about the borders themselves? As mentioned, fences, walls, and other markers are built to make the imagined line tangible. But some borders go well beyond that. Borders are also adorned or fashioned. For instance, the border between North and South Korea serves as a site where national sovereignty and legitimacy are emphasised, defended, and contested. It is at this buffer zone that these two nations look at each other and showcase to the other what is ideally contained within their own respective national borders. But it is not just national states which have buffer zones and borders with deep significance in the modern period; our own clothes and skin possess a similar moral significance. Why are clothes so important? Of course, like national borders, clothes have practical and functional use. Clothes keep us warm, dry, and protected from the sun and other elements. In addition to this practical use, clothes are heavily imbued with significance. Clothes are a way to fashion the body. They define our various identities including gender, class, etc. Clothes also signify morality and modesty (Leach 152). But where does this morality regarding clothing come from? Clothing is a site where state, religious, and familial control is played out. Just like the DMZ, our bodies are aestheticised with adornments, accoutrements, and decorations, and they are imbued with strong symbolic significance in attempts to reveal what constitutes the enclosed. Just like the DMZ, our clothing or lack thereof is considered constitutive of the nation. Because clothes play a role akin to geo-political borders, clothes are our DMZ; they mark us as good citizens. Whether we wear gang colours or a cross on our necklace, they can show us as belonging to something powerful, protective, and worth belonging to. They also show others that they do not belong. In relation to this, perhaps it is necessary to mention one cultural aspect of clothing. This is the importance, in the modern Indonesian nation, of appearing rapih. Rapih typically means clean, tidy, and well-groomed. The ripped and dirty jeans, old T-shirts, unshaven, unkempt hair, which has, at times, been mainstream fashion in other parts of the world, is typically viewed negatively in Indonesia, where wearing 'appropriate' clothing has been tied up with the nationalist project. For instance, as a primary school student in Indonesia, Winarnita was taught Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (Pancasila Moral Education). Named after the Pancasila, the guiding principles of the Indonesian nation, this class is also known as "PMP". It provided instruction in how to be a good national citizen. Crucially, this included deportment. The importance of being well dressed and rapih was stressed. In sum, like national borders, clothes are much more than their practical significance and practical use. This analysis can be extended by looking at skin. The practical significance of skin cannot be overstated; it is crucial to survival. But that does not preclude the possibility that humans—being the prolifically creative and meaning-making animals that we are—can make skin meaningful. Everyday racism, for instance, is primarily enabled by people making skin colour meaningful. And although skin is not optional, we fashion it into borders that define who we are, such as through tattoos, by piercing, accessorising, and through various forms of body modification (from body building to genital modification). Thresholds are also important in understanding skin. In a modern Indonesian context, when a penis crosses a woman's hymen her ritual status changes; she is no longer a virgin maiden (gadis) or virgin (perawan). If we apply the analogy of borders to the hymen, we could think of it as a checkpoint or border crossing. At a national border crossing, only people with correct credentials (for instance, passport holders with visas) can legally cross and only at certain times (not on public holidays or only from 9-5). At a hymen, only people with the correct status, namely one's husband, can morally cross. The checkpoint is a crucial reminder of the nation state and citizen scheme. The hymen is a crucial reminder of heteronormative standards. Crucial to understanding Indonesian notions of skin is the idea of aurat (Bennett 2007; Parker 2008). This term refers to parts of the body that should be covered. Or it could be said that aurat refers to 'intimate parts' of the body, if we understand that different parts of the body are considered intimate in Indonesian cultures. Indonesians tend to describe the aurat as those body parts that arouse feelings of sexual attraction or embarrassment in others. The concept tends to have Arabic and Islamic associations in Indonesia. Accordingly, for many Muslims, it means that women, once they appear sexually mature, should cover their hair, neck, and cleavage, and other areas that might arouse sexual attraction. These need to be covered when they leave their house, when they are viewed by people outside of the immediate nuclear family (muhrim). For men, it means they should be covered from their stomach to their knees. However, different Islamic scholars and preachers give different interpretations about what the aurat includes, with some opining that the entire female body with the exception of hands and face needs to be covered. That said, the general disposition or habitus of using clothes to cover is also found among non-Muslims in Indonesia. Accordingly, Catholics, Protestants, and Hindus also tend to cover their legs and cleavage, and so on, more than would commonly be found in Western countries. Having outlined the literature and cultural context, we now turn to our case studies. The Veil and Indonesian Policewomen Our first case study focusses on Indonesian police. Aside from a practical significance in law enforcement, police also have symbolic importance. There is an ideal that police should set and enforce standards for exemplary behaviour. Despite this, the Indonesia police have an image problem, being seen as highly corrupt (Davies, Stone, & Buttle). This is where policewomen fit in. The female constabulary are thought to be capable of morally improving the police force and the nation. Additionally, Indonesian policewomen are believed to be needed in situations of family violence, for instance, and to bring a sensitive and humane approach. The moral significance of Indonesia's policewomen shows clearly through issues of their clothing, in particular, the veil. In 2005, it became illegal for Indonesian policewomen to wear the veil on duty. Various reasons were given for this ban. These included that police should present a secular image, showcasing a modern and progressive nation. But this was one border contest where policewomen were able to successfully fight back; in 2013, they won the right to wear the veil on duty. The arguments espoused by both sides during this debate were reflective of geo-political border disputes, and protagonists deployed words such as "sovereignty", "human rights", and "religious autonomy". But in the end it was the policewomen's narrative that best convinced the government that they had a right to wear the veil on duty. Possibly this is because by 2013 many politicians and policymakers wanted to present Indonesia as a pious nation and having policewomen able to express their religion – and the veil being imbued with sentiments of honesty and dedication – fitted in with this larger national image. In contrast, policewomen have been unsuccessful in efforts to ban so called virginity testing (discussed below). Indonesian Policewomen Need to Be Attractive But veils are not the only bodily border that can be packed around language used to describe a DMZ. Policewomen's physical appearance, and specifically facial appearance and make-up, are discussed in similar terms. As such another border that policewomen must present in a particular (i.e. beautiful) way is their appearance. As part of the selection process, women police candidates must be judged by a mostly male panel as being pretty. They have to be a certain height and weight, and bust measurements are taken. The image of the policewoman is tall, slim, and beautiful, with a veil or with regulation cut and coiffed hair. Recognising the 'importance' of beauty for policewomen, they are given a monthly allowance precisely to buy make-up. Such is the status of policewomen that entry is highly competitive. And those who make the cut accrue many benefits. One of these benefits can be celebrity status, and it is not unusual for some policewomen to have over 100,000 Instagram followers. This celebrity status has led one police official to publicly state that women should not join the police force thinking it is a shortcut to celebrity status (Davies). So just like a nation trying to present its best self, Indonesia is imagined in the image of its policewomen. Policewomen feel pride in being selected for this position even when feeling vexed about these barriers to getting selected (Davies). Another barrier to selection is discussed in the next case study. Virginity Testing of Policewomen Our second case study relates to the necessity that female police recruits be virgins. Since 1965, policewomen recruits have been required to undergo internal examinations to ensure that their hymen is supposedly intact. Glossed as 'virginity' tests this procedure involves a two-finger examination by a health professional. Protests against the practice have been voiced by Human Rights Watch and others (Human Rights Watch). Pledges have also been made that the practice will be removed. But to date the procedure is still performed, although there are currently moves to have it banned within the armed forces. Hymens are more of a skin border than a clothing border such as that formed by uniforms or veils, but they operate in similar ways. The ‘feelable’ hymen marks an unmarried woman as moral. New women police recruits must be unmarried and therefore virgins. Actually, the hymen is not a taut skin border, but rather a loose connection of overlapping tissue and in this sense a hymen is not something one can lose. But the hymen is used as a proxy to determine a woman’s value. Hymen border control gives one a moral edge. A hymen supposedly measures a woman’s ability to protect herself, like any fortified geo-political border. Protecting one’s own borders gives the suggestion that one is able to protect others. A policewoman who can protect her bodily borders can protect those of others. Outsiders may wonder what being attractive, modest, but not too modest has to do with police work. And some (but by no means all) Indonesian policewomen wondered the same thing too. Indeed, some policewomen Davies interviewed in the 2010s were against this practice, but many staunchly supported it. They had successfully passed this rite of passage and therefore felt a common bond with other new recruits who had also gone through this procedure. Typically rites of passage, and especially the accompanying humiliation and abuse, engender a strong sense of solidarity among those who have passed through them. The virginity test seems to have operated in a similar way. Policewomen and the 'Citayam' Street Fashion Our third case study is an analysis of a short and otherwise unremarkable TV news report about policewomen parading across a crosswalk in a remote regional city. To understand why, we need to turn to "Citayam Fashion Week", a youth social movement which has developed around a road crossing in downtown Jakarta. Social movements like this are difficult to pin down, but it seems that a central aspect has been young fashionistas using a zebra crossing on a busy Jakarta street as an impromptu catwalk to strut across, be seen, and photographed. These youths are referred to in one article as "Jakarta's budget fashionistas" (Saraswati). The movement is understood in social media and traditional media sources as expressing 'street fashion'. Social media has been central to this movement. The youths have posted photos and videos of themselves crossing the road on social media. Some of these young fashionistas posted interviews with each other on TikTok. Some of the interviews went viral in June 2022 (Saraswati). So where does the name "Citayam Fashion Week" come from? Citayam is an outer area of Jakarta, which is a long way from from the wealthy central district where the young fashionistas congregate. But "Citayam" does not mean that the youths are all thought to come from that area. Instead the idea is that they could be from any poorer outer areas around the capital and have bussed or trained into town. The crosswalk they strut across is near the transport hub next to a central train station. The English-language "Fashion Week" is a tongue-in-cheek label mocking the haute couture fashion weeks around the world – events which, due to a wealth and class gap, are closed off to these teens. Strutting on the crosswalk is not limited to a single 'week' but it is an ongoing activity. The movement has spread to other parts of Indonesia, with youth parading across cross walks in other urban centres. Citayam Fashion Week became one of the major Indonesian public issues of 2022. Reaction was mixed. Some pointed to the unique street style and attitude, act, and language of the young fashionistas, some of whom became minor celebrities. The "Citayam Fashion Week" idea was also picked up by mainstream media, attracting celebrities, models, content creators, politicians and other people in the public eye. Some government voices also welcomed the social movement as promoting tourism and the creative industry. Others voiced disapproval at the youth. Their clothes were disparaged as 'tacky', reflecting deep divides in class and income in modern Jakarta. Some officials noted that they are a nuisance because they create traffic jams and loitering. Criticism also had a moral angle, in particular with commentators focused on male teens wearing feminine attire (Saraswati). Social scientists such as Oki Rahadianto (Souisa & Salim) and Saraswati see this as an expression of youth agency. These authors particularly highlight the class origins of the Citayam fashionistas being mostly from poorer outer suburbs. Their fashion displays are seen to be a way of reclaiming space for the youth in the urban landscape. Furthermore, the youths are expressing their own and unique version of youth culture. We can use the idea of threshold to provide unique insight into this phenomenon in the simple sense that the crosswalk connects one side of the road to the other. But the youth use it for something far more significant than this simple practical purpose. What is perceived to be happening is that some of the youth, who after all are in the process of transitioning from childhood to adulthood, use the crosswalk to publicly express their transition to non-normative gender and sexual identities; indeed, some of them have also transitioned to become mini celebrities in the process. Images of 'Citayam' portray young males adorned in makeup and clothes that are not identifiably masculine. They appear to be crossing gender boundaries. Other images show the distinct street fashion of these youth of exposed skin through crop tops (short tops) that show the belly, clothes with cut-out sections on various parts of the body, and ripped jeans. In a way, these youth are transgressing the taboo against exposing too much skin in public. One video is particularly interesting in light of the approach we are taking in this article as it comes from Makassar, the capital of one of Indonesia's outlying regions. "The Citayam Fashion Week phenomenon spreads to Makassar; young people become traffic (lalu lintas) ambassadors" (Kompas TV) is a news report about policewomen getting involved with young people using a crosswalk to parade their fashion. At first glance the Citayam Fashion Week portrayed in Makassar, a small city in an outlying province, is tiny compared to the scale of the movement in Jakarta. The news report shows half a dozen young males in feminine clothing and makeup. Aside from several cars in the background, there is no observable traffic that the process seems to interrupt. The news report portrays several Indonesian policewomen, all veiled, assisting and accompanying the young fashionistas. The reporter explains that the policewomen go 'hand in hand' (menggandeng) with the fashionistas. The police attempt to harness the creative energy of the youth and turn them into traffic ambassadors (duta lalu lintas). Perhaps it is going too far to state, but the term for traffic here, lalu lintas ("lalu" means to pass by or pass through, and "lintas" means "to cross"), implies that the police are assisting them in crossing thresholds. In any case, from the perspective we have adopted in this chapter, Citayam Fashion Week can be analysed in terms of thresholds as a literal road crossing turned into a place where youth can cross over gender norms and class barriers. The policewomen, with their soft, feminine abilities, attempt to transform them into exemplary citizens. Discussion: Morality, Skin, and Borders In this article, we have actually passed over two apparent contradictions in Indonesian society. In the early 2000s, Indonesian policewomen recruits were required to prove their modesty by passing a virginity test in which their hymen was inspected. Yet, at the same time they needed to be attractive. And, moreover, they were not allowed to wear the Muslim veil. They had to be modest and protect themselves from male lust but also good-looking and visible to others. The other contradiction relates to a single crosswalk or zebra crossing in downtown Jakarta, Indonesia's capital city, in 2022. Instead of using this zebra crossing simply as a place to cross the road, some youths turned it to their own ends as an impromptu 'catwalk' and posted images of their fashion on Instagram. A kind of social movement has emerged whereby Indonesian youth are fashioning their identity that contravenes gender expectations. In an inconsequential news report on the Citayam Fashion Week in Makassar, policewomen were portrayed as co-opting and redirecting the movement into an instructional opportunity in orderly road crossing. The youths could thereby transformed into good citizens. Although the two phenomena – attractive modest police virgins and a crosswalk that became a catwalk – might seem distinct, underlying the paradoxes are similar issues which can be teased out by analysing them in terms of morality, gender, and clothing in relation to borders, buffer zones, and thresholds. Veils, hymens, clothes, make-up are all politically positioned as borders worth fighting for, as necessary borders. While some border disputes can be won (such as policewomen winning the right to veil on duty, or disrupting traffic by parading one's gender-bending fashion), others are either not challenged or unsuccessfully challenged (such as ending virginity tests). These borders of moral encounter enable and provoke various responses: the ban on veiling for Indonesian policewomen was something to challenge as it undermined women’s moral position and stopped their expression of piety – things their nation wanted them to be able to do. But fighting to stop virginity testing was not permissible because even suggesting a contestation implies immorality. Only the immoral could want to get rid of virginity tests. The Citayam Fashion Week presented potentially immoral youths who corrupt national values, but with the help of policewomen, literally and figuratively holding their hand, they could be transformed into worthwhile citizens. National values were at stake in clothing and skin. Conclusion Borders and buffer zone are crucial to a nation's image of itself; whether in the geographical shape of one's country, or in clothes and skin. Douglas suggests that the human experience of boundaries can symbolise society. If she is correct, Indonesian nationalist ideas about clothing, skin, and even hymens shape how Indonesians understand their own nation. Through the three case studies we argued firstly for the importance of analysing the fashioning of the body not only as a form of border maintenance, but as truly at the centre of understanding national morality in Indonesia. Secondly, the national border may also be a way to remake the individual. People see themselves in the 'shape' of their country. As Bille stated "like skin, borders are a protective integument as well as a surface of inscription. Like the body, the nation is skin deep" (71). Thresholds are just as they imply. Passing through a threshold, we cross over one side of the border. We can potentially occupy an in-between status in, for instance, demilitarised zones. Or we can continue on to the other side. To go over a threshold such as becoming a policewoman, a teenager, a fashionista, and a mini celebrity, a good citizen can be constituted through re-fashioning the body. Fashioning one's body can be done through adorning skin with makeup or clothes, covering or revealing the skin, including particular parts of the body deemed sacred, such as the aurat, or by maintaining a special type of skin such as the hymen. The skin that is re-fashioned thus becomes a site of border contention that we argue define not only personal but national identity. Acknowledgment This article was first presented by Sharyn Graham Davies as a plenary address on 24 November 2021 as part of the Women in Asia conference. References BBC News. "Hungarian Camerawoman Who Kicked Refugees Charged." 8 Sep. 2016. 3 Oct 2022 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37304489>. Bennett, Linda Rae. 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