Bibliographies thématiques / Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)

Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition) »

Auteur : Grafiati
Publié le 4 juin 2021
Mis à jour le 28 janvier 2023

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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)"

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Dayer, Alex, et Carolyn Dicey Jennings. « Attention in Skilled Behavior : an Argument for Pluralism ». Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12, no 3 (16 mars 2021) : 615–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00529-6.

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AbstractPeak human performance—whether of Olympic athletes, Nobel prize winners, or you cooking the best dish you’ve ever made—depends on skill. Skill is at the heart of what it means to excel. Yet, the fixity of skilled behavior can sometimes make it seem a lower-level activity, more akin to the movements of an invertebrate or a machine. Peak performance in elite athletes is often described, for example, as “automatic” by those athletes: “The most frequent response from participants (eight athletes and one coach) when describing the execution of a peak performance was the automatic execution of performance” (Anderson et al. 2014). While the automaticity of skilled behavior is widely acknowledged, some worry that too much automaticity in skill would challenge its ability to exhibit human excellence. And so two camps have developed: those who focus on the automaticity of skilled behavior, the “habitualists,” and those who focus on the higher-level cognition behind peak performance, the “intellectualists.” We take a different tack. We argue that skilled behavior weaves together automaticity and higher-level cognition, which we call “pluralism.” That is, we argue that automaticity and higher-level cognition are both normal features of skilled behavior that benefit skilled behavior. This view is hinted at in other quotes about automaticity in skill—while expert gamers describe themselves as “playing with” automaticity (Taylor and Elam 2018), expert musicians are said to balance automaticity with creativity through performance cues: “Performance cues allow the musician to attend to some aspects of the performance while allowing others to be executed automatically” (Chaffin and Logan 2006). We describe in this paper three ways that higher-level cognition and automaticity are woven together. The first two, level pluralism and synchronic pluralism, are described in other papers, albeit under different cover. We take our contribution to be both distinguishing the three forms and contributing the third, diachronic pluralism. In fact, we find that diachronic pluralism presents the strongest case against habitualism and intellectualism, especially when considered through the example of strategic automaticity. In each case of pluralism, we use research on the presence or absence of attention (e.g., in mind wandering) to explore the presence or absence of higher-level cognition in skilled behavior.
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Cling, Andrew D. « Mind and Cognition ». Teaching Philosophy 15, no 2 (1992) : 196–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil199215226.

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Levine, J. « Review : Consciousness and Cognition ». Mind 113, no 451 (1 juillet 2004) : 596–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/113.451.596.

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Frings, M., M. Maschke et D. Timmann. « Cerebellum and cognition - viewed from philosophy of mind ». Cerebellum 6, no 4 (2007) : 328–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14734220701200063.

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Chokr, Nader N. « Mind, consciousness, and cognition : Phenomenology vs. cognitive science ». Husserl Studies 9, no 3 (1992) : 179–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00142815.

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Jago, M. « Review : Jonathan A. Waskan : Models and Cognition ». Mind 118, no 469 (1 janvier 2009) : 220–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp012.

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Oberst, Michael. « Kant, Epistemic Phenomenalism, and the Refutation of Idealism ». Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100, no 2 (5 juin 2018) : 172–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-2003.

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Abstract: This paper takes issue with the widespread view that Kant rejects epistemic phenomenalism. According to epistemic phenomenalism, only cognition of states of one’s own mind can be certain, while cognition of outer objects is necessarily uncertain. I argue that Kant does not reject this view, but accepts a modified version of it. For, in contrast to traditional skeptics, he distinguishes between two kinds of outer objects and holds that we have direct access to outer appearances in our mind; but he still considers objects outside our mind unknowable. This sheds new light on Kant’s refutation of idealism.
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Madzia, Roman. « Root-Brains : The Frontiers of Cognition in the Light of John Dewey’s Philosophy of Nature ». Contemporary Pragmatism 14, no 1 (30 mai 2017) : 93–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01401006.

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This article endeavors to interpret certain facets of Dewey’s philosophy in light of an underinvestigated research program in contemporary situated cognition, namely, plant cognition. I argue that Dewey’s views on situated cognition go substantially further than most philosophers of embodied mind are ready to admit. Building on the background of current research in plant cognition, and adding conceptual help of Dewey, I contend that plants can be seen as full-blown cognitive organisms, although they do not have what one would normally call “a body.” Through this line of inquiry, I identify what are among the most pressing problems in current theories of the embodied mind and subsequently try to overcome them by means of Dewey’s metaphysics of the psychical.
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Weiskopf, D. A. « Cognitive Integration : Mind and Cognition Unbounded, by Richard Menary. » Mind 119, no 474 (1 avril 2010) : 515–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzq038.

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Van Eyghen, Hans. « What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey ». Contemporary Pragmatism 15, no 3 (31 août 2018) : 387–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01503007.

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I use three ideas from philosopher John Dewey that are of service for Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). I discuss how Dewey’s ideas on embodied cognition, embedded cognition can be put to work to get a fuller understanding of religious cognition. I also use his ideas to criticize CSR’s reliance on the modularity of mind thesis
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Thèses sur le sujet "Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)"

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De, Villiers Tanya. « Mind and language : evolution in contemporary theories of cognition ». Thesis, Link to the online version, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/1092.

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Van, Wagner Tracy P. « An Integrated Account of Social Cognition in ASD : Bringing Together Situated Cognition and Theory Theory ». University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1505203102196309.

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Walker, Rebecca, et n/a. « The emergence of the representational mind ». University of Otago. Department of Psychology, 2006. http://adt.otago.ac.nz./public/adt-NZDU20061106.161621.

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Theory of mind has been described in philosophical and psychological literature as "folk psychology", and is the tacit understanding that our behaviour is driven by our thoughts, desires and beliefs (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children are widely considered to have attained theory of mind understanding when they are able to pass the test of false belief understanding devised by Wimmer and Perner (1983), at around 4 years of age. There are many theories as to how a child comes to hold a folk psychology, including innate modularism (Leslie, 1987, 1988, 1994), theory change (Gopnik & Wellman 1992), developing representational understanding (Perner, 1991, 1995, 2000), and experiential understanding developed in a socio-linguisitic context (Nelson, 1996). In addition, theory of mind has been linked to the development of symbolic understanding (Deloache & Smith, 1999; Perner, 1991), pretend play (Leslie, 1987; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Youngblade & Dunn, 1993), language (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Nelson, 1996; Olson, 1988) and executive function (e.g. Hughes, 1998a; Kochanska et al., 1996; Reed et al., 1984). The present study sought to bring together these diverse findings and to attempt to provide an integrated account of the emergence of theory of mind understanding during the preschool years. Sixty-four New Zealand children were assessed on their mental state understanding, deceptive abilities, symbolic functioning, language, and executive skills, when they were aged 30, 36, 42 and 48 months of age. There were a number of key findings in the present study. Language was a powerful predictor of false belief performance both within and across time, and was also related to many of the other variables included in the study. Performance on the scale model test of symbolic functioning was related across time to children�s concurrent and later false belief understanding. Scale model performance was also intertwined in a bidirectional relationship with language, and language appeared to play an increasingly important role in mediating the relationship with false belief understanding across time. False belief understanding and scale model performance were also related within and across time to executive function. There was evidence to suggest that the importance of working memory was due to its role in conflict inhibition. Although deception has sometimes been posited to be a precocious manifestation of theory of mind (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989), in the present study deceptive ability lagged false belief understanding. Furthermore, false belief understanding was related to children�s subsequent (but not earlier) responses to a protagonist�s intention. This supports the hypothesis that false belief understanding allows a qualitative change in the execution of deception, whereby children can move from simple physical strategies to more sophisticated mentalist strategies. Overall, the present study provides some evidence to suggest that symbolic functioning, language, and later theory of mind may form part of a single developing skill set of symbolic representation. In dynamic interaction with social understanding, and supported by cognitive abilities such as executive function, and the socio-linguistic context, it is argued that understanding of one�s own and other minds emerges. Children�s ability to solve the false belief problem at 4 years of age is presented as a milestone on a developmental continuum of social understanding.
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Stepanenko, Walter Scott. « Passionate Cognition : A Perceptual Theory of Emotion and the Role of the Emotions inCognition ». University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1396533522.

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Fuller, Timothy. « Science and Mind : How theory change illuminates ordinary thought ». The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1343840173.

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Japola, Justyna Marta. « Fodor and Aquinas the architecture of the mind and the nature of concept acquisition / ». Connect to Electronic Thesis (CONTENTdm), 2009. http://worldcat.org/oclc/642200251/viewonline.

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Jaworski, Michael Dean. « Thought Without Language : an Interpretationist Approach to the Thinking Mind ». The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1276576639.

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SMITH, JOHN-CHRISTIAN. « COMMONSENSE FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY : REIDIAN FOUNDATIONS FOR COMPUTATIONAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE (FUNCTIONALISM, INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY, MIND, REPRESENTATION) ». Diss., The University of Arizona, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/188133.

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This work locates the historical and conceptual foundations of cognitive science in the "commonsense" psychology of the philosopher Thomas Reid. I begin with Reid's attack on his rationalist and empiricist competitors of the 17th and 18th centuries. I then present his positive theory as a sophisticated faculty psychology appealing to innateness of mental structure. Reidian psychological faculties are equally trustworthy, causally independent mental powers, and I argue that they share nine distinct properties. This distinguishes Reidian 'intentionalism' from idealist 'representationalism,' which derive cognitive content either from the inherited structure of faculties of from the occurrent structure of sensory activity. Next, I turn to consciousness and reflection for a contemporary Reidian response to traditional phenomenology. Unlike reflection, faculties of reason and remembrance are not causally mediated by consciousness. My interpretation of Reid is that 'Humean causation' of individual faculty structure accounts only for 'natural intentionality,' while 'efficient causation' of faculty interrelations accounts for cognitive 'personal intentionality.' I then proceed by adopting a form of computational description for reconstructing this view as a computational theory of mind. I contrast functional analyses in explanations of some capacities with computational and componential analyses in explanations of other, intentional capacities, in which some processes must be taken to semantically encode and govern the roles of others. This step reconstructs the Reidian notion of intentional operations as requiring an explanation of component faculties and their representation-governed interactions. I argue that properties of faculties delimiting these interactions under Reid's theory parallel those in Fodor's (1983) essay on the "modularity of mind," although the reasons given for individual criteria are often very different. Fodor also proposes a trichotomous mental structure, but I find that a third level of "central systems" is a myth engendered by causal information theory. Such an analysis cannot capture generalizations over the internal representation of semantic roles that determines the character of faculty relations. This requirement for any computational account of cognition is precisely the motivation for the reconstructed Reidian theory. Thus, it comports more favorably with the explanatory program constitutive of a computational cognitive science.
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BLAHNIK, GARY A. « EXPERIMENTALISM : INTEGRATING MIND & ; BODY, SPIRIT & ; MATTER, THE ONE & ; THE MANY ». University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1185550468.

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Maring, Bayta Louise. « The metaphorical bases of children's developing theories of mind / ». view abstract or download file of text, 2003. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3102179.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 186-192). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Livres sur le sujet "Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)"

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Braddon-Mitchell, David. The philosophy of mind and cognition. Oxford, OX, UK : Blackwell Publishers, 1996.

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Braddon-Mitchell, David. The philosophy of mind and cognition. Cambridge, MA : Blackwell, 1996.

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Braddon-Mitchell, David. The philosophy of mind and cognition. 2e éd. Malden, MA : Blackwell Pub., 2007.

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Maiese, Michelle. Embodiment, emotion, and cognition. Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

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Consciousness and cognition. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002.

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Embodied cognition. New York : Routledge, 2010.

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Anderson, Miranda. The Renaissance extended mind. Edinburgh University, UK : Palgrave Macmillan, in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 2015.

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A, Wilson Robert. Boundaries of the mind : The individual in the fragile sciences : cognition. Cambridge, U.K : Cambridge University Press, 2004.

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Adams, Frederick. The bounds of cognition. Malden, MA : Blackwell Pub., 2008.

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Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Complexity and the function of mind in nature. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996.

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Chapitres de livres sur le sujet "Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)"

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Mariscal, Carlos. « Introduction to Philosophy of Science ». Dans Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience, 84–98. New York : Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003241898-7.

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Vukov, Joseph. « Introduction to Philosophy of Mind ». Dans Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience, 70–83. New York : Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003241898-6.

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Cummins, Robert, et Georg Schwarz. « Connectionism, Computation, and Cognition ». Dans Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, 60–73. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3524-5_3.

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Curd, Patricia. « Presocratic accounts of perception and cognition ». Dans Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity, 44–63. New York : Routledge, 2018. | Series : The history of the philosophy of mind ; Volume 1 : Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429508219-3.

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Pelletier, Francis Jeffry. « Compositionality and Concepts—A Perspective from Formal Semantics and Philosophy of Language ». Dans Language, Cognition, and Mind, 31–94. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45977-6_3.

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Kirsh, David. « Putting a Price on Cognition ». Dans Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, 261–80. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3524-5_12.

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Drayson, Zoe. « The Fragmented Mind ». Dans The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition, 79–89. London : Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003014584-7.

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Adams, Fred, et Ken Aizawa. « Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind ». Dans The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, 193–213. Second edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020. : Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429244629-13.

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Bowin, John. « Aristotle on the perception and cognition of time ». Dans Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity, 175–93. New York : Routledge, 2018. | Series : The history of the philosophy of mind ; Volume 1 : Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429508219-10.

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Betegh, Gábor. « Cosmic and human cognition in the Timaeus 1 ». Dans Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity, 120–40. New York : Routledge, 2018. | Series : The history of the philosophy of mind ; Volume 1 : Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429508219-7.

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