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1
Krylov, A. V. « The role of the religious factor in political processes in Israel ». Journal of International Analytics, no 1 (28 mars 2016) : 98–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2016-0-1-98-108.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article studies the influence of religion on political and social processes in Israel. Modern Israel is a complicated multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. Israel is home to over 8 million people and approximately a quarter of its citizens are non-Jews (Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs, Druze, Bedouins, Circassians and etc.). In spite of the fact that the Israeli system of law provides “the complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex”, many Arabs and other non-Jews citizens of the State are not really integrated into Israeli society and do not feel themselves full citizens of the State that seeks to position itself exclusively as a «Jewish State».In addition the tension between Israel’s Middle Eastern and European identities is personified in the contradictions between Ashkenazim and Sephardim. There are also religious differences between Jews who identify themselves with the ultra-Orthodox, religious nationalists (so called “Hardelim” - an acronym of two words in Hebrew – “Hared” (ultra-orthodox) and “Leumi” (nationalist)), traditionalists and secular Jews. The article notes that the current «Likud» government supported by the religious parties actually strengthens the tendency to clericalization of Israeli political and social life.The author also makes an attempt to understand and analyze the basic historical, philosophical and religious aspects of the National-Religious trend in Israeli politics. This trend turned into a powerful force after a Jewish religious fanatic Yigal Amir had killed Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.The research reveals the forms and methods, aims and objectives of the Israeli official settlement policy, determines the attitude of the religious parties and groups towards the settlement movement and indicates a negative influence of the settlement factor on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating process and political situation in the Middle East as well.
2
Abu-Saad, Ismael. « Israeli ‘Development’ and Education Policies and their Impact on the Negev Palestinian Bedouin : Historical Experience and Future Prospects ». Holy Land Studies 2, no 1 (septembre 2003) : 5–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/hls.2003.0008.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Throughout the last five decades, successive Israeli governments have attempted to split the minority group of Palestinian Arabs with Israeli citizenship into smaller groups based on religious (Muslim, Christian, Druze) or geographical distinctions (the ‘Galilee’, the northern region; the ‘Triangle’, the central region; and the ‘Negev’, the southern region) for control purposes. The governments' treatment of Negev Palestinian Arab Bedouin, who were traditionally a semi-nomadic population, provides a classic example of its segmentation policy. Although, in line with this policy, Israeli governments have unilaterally created and implemented development plans for the Negev Palestinian Arab Bedouin population, they have not integrated them into the national infrastructure in a viable and meaningful sense. This paper examines the historical experience of the Negev Palestinian Arab Bedouin and their actual development needs.
3
Bahhur, Riad. « SUSAN SLYOMOVICS, The Object of Memory : Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998). Pp. 319. $19.95 paper. » International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no 4 (novembre 2001) : 631–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743801304075.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Susan Slyomovics's Object of Memory explores the ways in which Arabs and Jews (primarily Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews) narrate the Palestinian village, focusing on the pre-1948 Palestinian village of Ein Houd, located in the Carmel Mountains south of the city of Haifa. The Palestinian inhabitants of Ein Houd were displaced during the 1948 war and prevented by the Israeli government from returning to their homes there. Most of them became internal refugees, designated “present absentees” under Israeli law. Others became refugees in surrounding Arab states and in the part of Palestine that became known as the West Bank. Their properties were confiscated by Israel under the Absentee Property Law.
4
Mahamid, Hatim. « History Education for Arab Palestinian Schools in Israel ». Journal of Education and Development 1, no 1 (16 novembre 2017) : 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.20849/jed.v1i1.249.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Since 1948, the Educational system for Palestinian Arabs in Israel was affected by political and ideological considerations of the Jewish state policy. Nurit Peled-Elhanan (2012) argues that the textbooks used in the school system in Israel are laced with a pro-Israel ideology and that they play a part in priming Israeli children for military service. She analyzes the presentation of images, maps, layouts and use of language in History, Geography and Civic Studies textbooks, and reveals how the books might be seen to marginalize Palestinians, legitimize Israeli military action and reinforce Jewish-Israeli territorial identity. Up until 1987 the Department for Arab Education was headed by a Jewish-Israeli director who was appointed by the Ministry of Education and involved in policy making for ensuring control over the Palestinians. Since then Palestinians have been appointed to lead the Department but they have been lacked of power or decision making, which remained under the direct control of the Ministry of Education. Thus the Department for Arab Education has no autonomous decision and authorities, but only meant to supervise the education of Palestinian Arabs and answer to Jewish-Israelis who continue to be in charge. Since the first years Israeli politicians saw in the state education system, an instrument to realize Zionist political objectives, and on the other hand the educational system was used to ensure weakening of Arab and Palestinian identity in the country.
5
Siegal, Gil. « Genomic Databases and Biobanks in Israel ». Journal of Law, Medicine & ; Ethics 43, no 4 (2015) : 766–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jlme.12318.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In addressing the creation and regulation of biobanks in different countries, a short descriptive introduction to the social and cultural backgrounds of each country is mandatory. The State of Israel is relatively young (established in 1948), and can be characterized as a multi-religious (Jewish, Muslim, Christian, Druz, and others), multi-ethnic (more than 14), multi-cultural (Western “Ashkenazi” Jewry, Oriental “Sfaradi” Jewry, Soviet Jewry, Israeli Arabs, Palestinian Arabs) society, somewhat similar to the American melting pot. The current population is 8.3 million, a sharp rise resulting from a 1.2 million influx of immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. Seventyfive percent are Jewish, 20% Arabs (the majority of whom are Muslims), and several other minorities. The birth rate is 3.8 per family, the highest in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
6
Abu-Saad, Ismael. « Palestinian Education in Israel : The Legacy of the Military Government ». Holy Land Studies 5, no 1 (mai 2006) : 21–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/hls.2006.0001.
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This essay analyses the ways in which the military government (1948–1966) and its policies positioned the Palestinian Arab community in Israeli society, with a particular focus on public education. The educational system for the Palestinian Arab community developed within the context of military government, and while the formal administrative structures have changed, the legacy of using education as a tool for political purposes has endured and continues to defi ne the educational experience of indigenous Palestinian Arab students in Israel today. Despite the formal abolition of the military government in the mid-sixties, its ongoing legacy continues to shape educational policy and practice, as well as the broader status of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel.
7
Peled, Yoav, et Gershon Shafir. « The Roots of Peacemaking : The Dynamics of Citizenship in Israel, 1948–93 ». International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no 3 (août 1996) : 391–413. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800063510.
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The Declaration of Prsinciples signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in September 1993 marked a dramatic about-face in Israel's traditional policy toward the PLO and the Palestinian issue in general. This turn of events came as a surprise not only to journalists and commentators following day-to-day political events, but also to scholars engaged in the academic study of Israeli society. The prevailing notion among these scholars had been that the Israeli polity was suffering from what Horowitz and Lissak (1989) called “overburden” due to domestic debates over the disposition of the occupied territories. Thus, it was concluded, Israel was unable to launch bold policy initiatives to try to solve its deadlocked conflict with the Arabs.
8
Kaminker, Sarah. « For Arabs Only : Building Restrictions in East Jerusalem ». Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no 4 (1997) : 5–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2537903.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Government planning policy denies Palestinians the right to use their land in East Jerusalem. Thirty-three percent of this land has been expropriated and used for building homes for more than 40,000 Jewish families. Planning schemes confine Palestinians to 10 percent of the land area of East Jerusalem. Draconian bureaucratic measures imposed on "Arabs only" aggressively prevent construction on the remaining Palestinian lands in East Jerusalem. The result: a shortage of 21,000 homes for Arab families. Using Har Homa to provide for the Arab "homeless" could be the only political and moral justification for developing the lonely mountain Jabal Abu Ghunaym.
9
Zhen, Wang, Alfred Tovias, Peter Bergamin, Menachem Klein, Tally Kritzman-Amir et Pnina Peri. « Book Reviews ». Israel Studies Review 35, no 1 (1 mars 2020) : 109–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/isr.2020.350108.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Aron Shai, China and Israel: Chinese, Jews; Beijing, Jerusalem (1890–2018) (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2019), 270 pp. Hardback, $90.00. Paperback, $29.95.Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Israel under Siege: The Politics of Insecurity and the Rise of the Israeli Neo-Revisionist Right (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 298 pp. Paperback, $26.94.Dan Tamir, Hebrew Fascism in Palestine, 1922–1942 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 210 pp. Hardback, $99.99.Alan Dowty, Arabs and Jews in Ottoman Palestine: Two Worlds Collide (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2019), 312 pp. Hardback, $65.00.Guy Ben-Porat and Fany Yuval, Policing Citizens: Minority Policy in Israel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 250 pp. Hardback, $89.99.Deborah Golden, Lauren Erdreich, and Sveta Roberman, Mothering, Education and Culture: Russian, Palestinian and Jewish Middle-Class Mothers in Israeli Society (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 225 pp. Hardback, $114.25.
10
Omar, Yousef. « The United States Position towards the Battle of Al-Karameh and its Repercussions, March 21, 1968 ». ATHENS JOURNAL OF HISTORY 7, no 2 (18 février 2021) : 163–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajhis.7-2-4.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper explores the United States' position towards the battle for Al-Karameh and its repercussions on the 21 March 1968. It argues that even though American policy has always been completely biased in favor of Israel since Israel's founding on 15 May 1948, its position on the battle of Al-Karameh was at the time considered supportive of Israel, balanced with Jordan, and hostile to Palestinian organizations. The United States position in the research relies mainly on the documents of the US State Department (Foreign Relations of the United States FRUS) and on some of the minutes of the Israeli parliament (Knesset) sessions (Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee meetings). This research dealt with an introduction to the crystallization of the Palestinian resistance after the defeat of the Arabs in the Six-Day War of 1967 as well as the policy of the United States towards the region after this war, its position on the escalation of Palestinian resistance from inside Jordan, and the dialectic of Jordan's control of its territories and borders. It also dealt with the incident of the bombing of the Israeli bus on 18 March 1968, and the escalation of tension, which eventually led to Israel attacking Jordan in the battle for Al-Karameh on 21 March 1968, the initial American reaction to it, and the subsequent issuance of Security Council Resolution 248 and its implications. It further dealt with the official American position after the battle ended, its support for the efforts of the Jarring Peace Mission in the region, and its policy of balancing its positions between Israel and Jordan. In conclusion, reference was made to the most important results of the research.
11
Aulia Marcella, Rina. « The Implementation Of U.S Foreign Policy Towards Gaza Strip ». Aptisi Transactions on Technopreneurship (ATT) 4, no 1 (19 janvier 2022) : 26–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.34306/att.v4i1.220.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper examines how the United States' foreign policy towards the Gaza conflict is being implemented. Furthermore, this paper discusses the United States' performance, attempts, technology use and outcomes in striking an agreement between Israel and Palestine. The goal of this analysis is to look at the United States' attempts in the long and near term to reintegrate the Palestinian authority into the democratic system and stabilize Gaza. According to the findings of this research, the United States has a strong commitment to community development and protection for a secure, free, democratic, and stable Palestinian government using technology in era 4.0. In order to achieve peace, the United States remains committed to a solution in which both Israel and Palestine, specifically Israel and Palestine, are equally entitled to the same level of freedom, security, and prosperity. The United States contributes to the delivery of bilateral assistance both in the economic and military fields.
12
Ida, Yoram, et Gal Talit. « Israeli Government Policy on Non-Israeli Construction Workers ». Migration Letters 20, no 1 (31 janvier 2023) : 101–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/ml.v20i1.2820.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In Israel, there has been a severe shortage of housing units for several decades, due, among other things, to a shortage of skilled construction workers. The industry employs Palestinian labourers (since 1967) and migrant workers, mainly from Eastern Europe and China (since the 1990s). The Israeli government has changed its policy on the employment of non-Israeli workers several times. This article reviews these changes and discusses their successes and failures. The findings show that the shortage of workers in the construction industry in Israel might justify an increase in the quota of non-Israeli workers in the short term. However, in the medium and long term, measures must be taken to ensure implementation of planned reforms to reduce Israel's dependence on non-Israelis and encourage the integration of Israeli workers in the industry. This should be achieved mainly through technological improvements and a transition to industrialized construction.
13
Philippova, Natalya I. « Israel and apartheid : Opinion of human rights NGOs, and Israeli Government denials ». Asia and Africa Today, no 11 (2022) : 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s032150750020143-9.
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Between 2019 and early 2022 more than 15 human rights NGOs have brought accusations against Israel regarding the presence of signs of apartheid both in the territory of the State of Israel and in the occupied territories. Based on documents of international law (the International Convention against the Crime of Apartheid and the Rome Statute), NGOs (national and international) have presented in a number of reports why the reality in which the Palestinian people live should be called apartheid. Although the term ‘apartheid’ has no geographic reference, its use for systems established outside of South Africa is very rare and highly controversial. However, accusations against Israel, which have been going on for a long time, are gaining popularity and are also reflected in the reports of the Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, which are mainly based on data provided by NGOs. Israel contends that these accusations are false and have nothing to do with reality. Thus, the Israeli authorities have repeatedly stated that in this way human rights organizations promote hate, incitement, violence, and terror. Despite the tendentious nature of the information, NGOs have a significant impact on the image of the Jewish state and on public opinion in the context of supporting the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, although they will not make changes to Israel’s policy.
14
Salman Al - Shammari, Mustafa Ibrahim, et Dhari Sarhan Hammadi Al-Hamdani. « British foreign policy towards the Palestinian cause since 2003 ». Tikrit Journal For Political Science 3, no 11 (1 mars 2019) : 150. http://dx.doi.org/10.25130/poltic.v3i11.103.
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The topic area of that’s paper dealing with role of Britain in established of Israel, so the paper argued the historical developments of Palestinian question and Role of Britain Government toward peace process since 1992, and then its insight toward plan of Palestinian State.
That’s paper also argued the British Policy toward Israeli violations toward Palestinians people, and increased with settlement policy by many procedures like demolition of houses, or lands confiscation, the researcher argued the Britain position toward that’s violations beside the political developments which happens in Britain after Theresa May took over the power in Ten Downing Street
15
Schejter, Amit. « ‘The Stranger That Dwelleth with You Shall Be unto You as One Born among You’—Israeli Media Law and the Cultural Rights of the ‘Palestinian-Israeli’ Minority ». Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 1, no 2 (2008) : 156–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187398608x335810.
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AbstractThe media and communication rights of Palestinians in Israel are designed to deny them of collective cultural rights, specifically the right to express their identity through the mass media and to participate equally in the process of national culture building. Through a critical analysis of the documents that shape the media industry in Israel and their historical evolution, this paper lays bare the assumptions underlying Israeli media policies. The policies are designed in a discourse branding ‘Palestinian-Israelis’ a linguistic minority, and portraying them as the ‘enemy within’, thus barring their participation in the development of Israeli culture by limiting their electronic media participation to separate channels targeting both them and Arabs in neighboring states. The paper argues that this policy stems from a narrow interpretation of ‘democracy’ that rejects identification with the Orient and embraces neo-liberalism.
16
Korochkina, Victoria. « THE PALESTINIAN CASE AND ITS PLACE ON RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA ». Political Expertise : POLITEX 17, no 1 (2021) : 52–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu23.2021.105.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The events of the “Arab spring” and its consequences as well as the “Iranian threat”, which became a key security challenge for the Gulf States, not without the efforts of Benjamin Netanyahu and supported by the pro-Israel Trump administration (2016-2020), seemed to have removed the Palestinian case from the priority list of Middle East issues. The role of Russia, the traditional partner of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since Soviet times, also looked more low- key after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, especially amid resolution of the military-political crisis in Syria. Russian diplomacy on the Palestinian track remained unnoticed compared to the activity in the region of Donald Trump’s envoys, who promoted a peace plan for settling the Palestinian-Israeli conflict known as the “deal of the century”. Having failed to achieve the main goal, the White House contributed to the signing of the “The Abraham Accords”, which was a breakthrough given that the Arab states declared the solution of the Palestinian issue as precondition for formal relations with the Jewish state. If Arab-Israeli normalization continues, Israel will have peace treaties with more than half of the Arab and Muslim states despite the deadlock in the peace process with the Palestinians. Based on the analysis of political processes amid the unresolved Palestinian problem, and above all, Russia’s attempts as a mediator to achieve a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the author suggests that the Palestinian issue has not lost its political significance and relevance as much as the Israeli government under Netanyahu tries to sell it.
17
Karolyi, Paul. « Chronology ». Journal of Palestine Studies 46, no 4 (2017) : 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2017.46.4.s3.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This is part 134 of a chronology begun by the Journal of Palestine Studies in Spring 1984, and covers events from 16 February to 15 May 2017 on the ground in the occupied Palestinian territories and in the diplomatic sphere, regionally and internationally. U.S. pres. Donald Trump leads a new, regional effort to restart Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. With the prospect of peace talks on the horizon, the Israeli government announced a new policy to guide settlement growth in the West Bank, and the Ramallah-based Palestinian leadership struggled to consolidate power. Palestinians in the West Bank elected new local leaders, although the elections were compromised by disagreements among the major political parties. Approximately 1,500 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails declared a hunger strike (the Dignity Strike), drawing support from across the political spectrum. Meanwhile, the right-wing Israeli government continued its efforts to undermine and delegitimize its opponents, including the Israeli Left, the Palestinian minority in Israel, and the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. For a more comprehensive overview of regional and international developments related to the Palestine-Israel conflict, see the quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy in JPS 46 (4).
18
Bloch, Ofra. « Hierarchical Inclusion : The Untold History of Israel's Affirmative Action for Arab Citizens (1948–68) ». Law and History Review 39, no 1 (février 2021) : 29–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0738248020000309.
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The history of Israel's relationship with its Palestinian-Arab minority during the founding decades, from 1948 to 1968, is often portrayed as a story of formal citizenship that concealed large-scale, state-sanctioned oppression under military rule. This article excavates an untold history of employment affirmative action for Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel during these two decades which does not fit neatly into this story. Drawing on original archival research, it reveals that, during Israel's founding decades, officials adopted hiring quotas for unskilled Arab workers and for educated Arabs; requirements and incentives for hiring Arabs in government offices, Jewish businesses, and organizations; earmarked jobs and established vocational training courses for the Arab population. It demonstrates that interests in safeguarding Jewish control and economic stability aligned with egalitarian aspirations, and motivated state officials to adopt measures that promoted the inclusion of the Arab population in the workforce, albeit on unequal terms. Furthermore, these measures were part of a transformation of the state's attitude towards Arab citizens, from strict military control to a regime of “hierarchical inclusion” entailing gradual integration into the Israeli economy — mostly though its lower tiers and with a second-class status. Tracing the use of these mechanisms, not then called affirmative action but recognizable as such today, to this period of subjected population management, complicates our understanding of both this chapter in Israel's history and of affirmative action more broadly.
19
Abbasi, Dr Mustafa. « THE WAR ON THE MIXED CITIES : THE DEPOPULATION OF ARAB TIBERIAS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF ITS OLD, ‘SACRED’ CITY (1948–9) ». Holy Land Studies 7, no 1 (mai 2008) : 45–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1474947508000061.
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The Old City of Tiberias was one of the most beautiful and ancient cities in Palestine. With a mixed population of Palestinian Arabs and (largely) Mizrahi 1 1 The Mizrahim are eastern or oriental Jews. and Sephardic Jews until the 1948 Palestinian Nakba, Tiberias – in which Maimonides is buried – is, according to Jewish tradition, among the four ‘sacred’ cities in the country. Shortly after Israel was established, the secular Zionist establishment decided to raze the Old City to its foundations. As a result of this policy, the Old City, with all its historical buildings and nearly all its historical walls, was entirely erased, and in its place today there are parking lots and modern high-rise hotels. This article traces the story of the destruction of Old Tiberias and examines the attitudes of the secular Labour Zionist leadership to a ‘sacred’ Jewish city and the reactions to these attitudes of the local Sephardic and Mizrahi public.
20
David, Steven R. « Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing ». Ethics & ; International Affairs 17, no 1 (mars 2003) : 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2003.tb00422.x.
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Since the beginning of the second intifada in the fall of 2000, Israel has pursued a policy in which alleged Palestinian terrorists have been hunted down and killed by government order. The policy is not one of assassination and is consistent with international law because Israel is engaged in armed conflict with terrorists, those targeted are usually killed by conventional military means, not through deception, and the targets of the attacks are not civilians but combatants or are part of a military chain of command. Targeted killing has also been affirmed by Israel's High Court.Although targeted killing has been pursued by Israel throughout its history, the scale of the present effort and the use of sophisticated military assets such as helicopter gunships and jet fighters set it apart from earlier practices. The effectiveness of the policy is called into doubt because it has not prevented–and may have contributed to–record numbers of Israeli civilians being killed. The policy has also resulted in informers being revealed, intelligence resources diverted, potential negotiating partners eliminated. It has also produced murderous retaliation and international condemnation of Israel. Benefits of the policy include impeding the effectiveness of terrorist operations, keeping terrorists on the run, and deterring some attacks. In addition, it affords the Israeli public a sense of revenge and retribution.Because it targets the actual perpetrators of terrorism, targeted killing provides a proportionate and discriminate response to the threat Israel faces. Improving the policy will require better civilian oversight, greater care to eliminate harm to innocent bystanders, and refraining from killing political leaders. Despite its many shortcomings, Israel is justified in pursuing this policy so long as it faces a terrorist threat that the Palestinian Authority will not or cannot control.
21
Gans, Chaim. « Nationalist Priorities and Restrictions in Immigration : The Case of Israel ». Law & ; Ethics of Human Rights 2, no 1 (1 janvier 2008) : 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1938-2545.1024.
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It may be that the appropriate demographic objective of Israel as a country in which the Jewish people realize their right to self-determination is the existence of a Jewish public in Israel in numbers sufficient to allow its members to live in the framework of their culture. It may also be that the appropriate demographic objective of Israel should be the existence of a Jewish majority within it. While I discussed this issue elsewhere; here I discuss the legitimate means for the realization of these goals. Israels principal means for realizing these objectives thus far has been its Law of Return and its Citizenship Law. These laws afford every Jew anywhere in the world the right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen of the State of Israel. Many liberals and left-wingers consider these laws to be tainted with racism, because they regard any nationally-based preference with regard to immigration to be a form of racism. In the first part of my paper I argue against this position. I offer three justifications for nationality-based preferences in immigration. However, the fact that nationality-based priorities in immigration are not necessarily racist and that there are legitimate human interests justifying such priorities, does not entail that the specific priorities manifested by Israels Law of Return and its other immigration and citizenship policies are just. These policies in effect mean that all Jews and only Jews (or anyone related or married to a Jew) have the right to immigrate to Israel and to become fully integrated in Israeli life. In the second part of the paper, I argue that these two aspects of Israels immigration policies, namely, its almost categorical inclusion of all Jews and its almost categorical exclusion of all non-Jews, are somewhat problematic. In addition to the Law of Return, a number of additional ways to ultimately increase the number of Jews in relation to the number of Arabs have been proposed and even adopted in Israel in recent years. During the incumbency of the fifteenth Knesset, right-wing Member of Knesset Michael Kleiner tabled a draft bill intended to encourage people that do not identify with the Jewish character of the state [i.e., Palestinian citizens of Israel C.G.] to leave. The Israeli Government later tabled a billthat was eventually passedto amend the Israeli Citizenship Law in a manner that would deny Arabs who are Israeli citizens and have married Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories the right to live in Israel with their spouses and children. In the third part of the paper, I clarify why in contrast to granting Jews priority in immigration, both the aforementioned laws, namely, Kleiners law and the law pertaining to family unification are racist and are therefore morally unacceptable.
22
Haklai, Oded, et Adia Mendelson-Maoz. « Editors' Note ». Israel Studies Review 37, no 2 (1 juin 2022) : v. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/isr.2022.370201.
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We are pleased to introduce the second issue of 2022. Several of the articles in this issue are marked by their policy relevance. The article by Arie Krampf, Uri Ansenberg, and Barak Zur examines the role played by the Labor Party government between 1992 and 1996 to guide Israel onto a neoliberal economic path. The authors coin the term “embedded neoliberalism” to explain the interaction between pro-market and anti-market influences, yielding a peculiar type of neoliberal order in Israel. Examining social work education of Palestinian female students in Israel, the article by Haneen Elias and Ronit Reuven Even-Zahav identifies the significance of context-informed education that integrates the intersectional position of Palestinian students. Finally, Erez Cohen’s article identifies incompatibilities between existing public policy pertaining to post-retirement employment and the real-life needs of elderly people, suggesting a need for reform.
23
Saleh, Mohsen. « Islam and Israel ». American Journal of Islam and Society 13, no 3 (1 octobre 1996) : 411–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v13i3.2304.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This book consists of six chapters, endnotes, a glossary, a bibliography,and an index. Although fairly short vis-a-vis the long period that itcovers (from the Ottoman era to 1988), this book is in fact a very valuablereference work on the subject. The author made considerable efforts tocollect, compare, and analyze the data. However, it seems that the maintitle, Islam and Israel, is rather ambiguous and misleading. The subtitle,Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State, reveals the book'scontents adequately. This title may have been coined by the publisher formarketing purposes.The book explores Israeli policy toward Palestinian Muslim religiousendowments (awqtif, sing. waqf) and studies the methods employed toconfiscate and transfer most of them so that they eventually becameexclusively Jewish property. The waqf system played a very significantsocioeconomic, religious, and educational role in the history of Muslimsociety. About 15 percent of the agricultural land in Palestine is waqf (1.2million dunums), as are many buildings, shops, and other structures inurban areas. The revenue derived from these sources finances importantnetworks of welfare and charitable services in Palestine, such as schools,orphanages, and soup kitchens.The first chapter tackles the Palestinian Muslim waqf system duringthe late Ottoman empire and the British Mandate. It indicates the importanceof waqf for the notable families in Palestine and their administrationof it in ways designed to enhance their power and influence. It also studiesthe arrangements made by the Ottomans during the nineteenth centuryto set up a waqf administrative structure and to develop it under their closesupervision. During the British Mandate (1918-48), however, a new structure,known as The Supreme Muslim Council, was created in 1922. It wasdominated by the Palestinian religious elite and notables and took a"national character" under the leadership of Hajj Am1n al ijusayn1. In1937, the British mandatory government suspended the council's centralcommittee and replaced it with a government-appointed commission.These measures undermined the waqf institution and its role in politics andthe national struggle.The second chapter discusses the Muslim waqf system in Israel from1948 to 1965 and explains how the Zionist state managed to control andconfiscate waqf properties and resources. In the parts of Palestine that ...
24
Christison, Kathleen. « Bound by a Frame of Reference, Part III : U.S. Policy and the Palestinians, 1988-98 ». Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no 4 (1998) : 53–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538130.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The policymakers most responsible for shaping policy on the Palestinian-Israeli question in both the Bush and the Clinton administrations, a team led by special mediator Dennis Ross, came of age politically at a time when the Palestinian perspective was virtually excluded from American political discourse. These policymakers, by their own testimony emotionally involved in Arab-Israeli issues because of their Jewish roots, are naturally inclined to view the issue from the traditional Israel-centered vantage point despite their occasionally harsh criticism of Israel's right-wing government and their vaunted understanding of Palestinian sensibilities. Part III of this series examines how the old frame of reference still determines policy even in an era when Palestinians are seen as legitimate participants in the peace process.
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Saragih, Hendra Maujana. « Kebijakan luar Negeri Indonesia Dalam Mendukung Palestina sebagai Negara Merdeka Pada Masa Pemerintahan Jokowi ». FOKUS Jurnal Kajian Keislaman dan Kemasyarakatan 3, no 2 (5 février 2019) : 133. http://dx.doi.org/10.29240/jf.v3i2.601.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The aim of this paper is to explain how serious and sympathy the Government and the people of Indonesia with the Palestinian struggle colonized by Israel and the unilateral claim made by Israel against Jerusalem as the capital. More than that the dominant factor is certainly the humanitarian crisis which is the reason why it needs to continue to support Palestine. Palestine and Egypt became the party that recognized the earliest Indonesian independence in 1945 even though at that time Palestine was not yet a state, it was not yet independent and it was recognized and respected by the Indonesian Government as concrete evidence of Palestinian existence. The Indonesian government's actions for Palestine have at least been announced from Bung Karno administration to President Jokowi today. None of the Indonesian Presidents since the Republic of Indonesia was independent which did not pay more attention to the Palestinian problem and its variants and it all became a concern of the President and his ranks in fighting for independent Palestine during his foreign policy so far
26
Nister Kabir, Shah. « Representing the 2006 Palestinian Election in New Zealand Newspapers ». Culture Unbound 7, no 4 (19 janvier 2015) : 649–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.3384/cu.2000.1525.1573649.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This study investigates the news and editorial representation of the 2006 Palestinian election appearing in three New Zealand newspapers—the Otago Daily Times, the Press and the New Zealand Herald—and finds that the attention of these newspapers is consistent with some elite Western nations’ policy towards the Middle East. These newspapers identify Palestine’s (Hamas-led) government as a threat, an identification that parallels the Western policy line. In addition, Hamas’s attack on Israel was prominently reported but nothing was said about the killings perpetrated by Israelis in the context of coverage of the 2006 Palestinian election.
27
Karolyi, Paul. « Update on Conflict and Diplomacy ». Journal of Palestine Studies 46, no 4 (2017) : 140–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2017.46.4.140.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This update, which summarizes bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting the Palestinians and the future of the peace process, covers the quarter beginning on 16 February 2017 and ending on 15 May 2017. During this period, the administration of U.S. pres. Donald Trump attempted to put its own stamp on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Israeli government announced a new policy on settlement growth in the West Bank, and the Ramallah-based Palestinian leadership struggled to consolidate power. Palestinians in the West Bank elected new local leaders, despite disagreements among the major parties. Some 1,500 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails declared a hunger strike, drawing support from across the political spectrum. Meanwhile, Israel's right-wing government kept up a campaign to undermine and delegitimize its opponents, including the Israeli Left, the Palestinian minority in Israel, and the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement.
28
Yitzhaki, Dafna. « Attitudes to Arabic language policies in Israel ». Language Problems and Language Planning 35, no 2 (12 octobre 2011) : 95–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/lplp.35.2.01yit.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The paper reports the findings of a survey study which examined attitudes towards a range of language policies for the Arabic language in Israel. Arabic is an official language in Israel as a result of a Mandatory Order (1922) which dictates comprehensive Hebrew-Arabic bilingual conduct by state authorities. In practice, Arabic’s public position in Israel is marginal, and Hebrew is the dominant language in Israeli public spheres. Arabic speakers, a national indigenous minority, and Jewish immigrants from the Former Soviet Union, form the two largest language-minority groups in Israel. The study explored attitudes concerning (1) the use of Arabic in three public domains (government services, public television, and teaching of Arabic in Jewish schools), (2) a Hebrew-Arabic bilingual model, and (3) a multilingual model addressing language minorities in Israel in general. Respondents were 466 university and college students, Jews and Arabs, divided into five subgroups along linguistic, ethnic and religious lines. The main findings indicated (1) a clear hierarchy of language policy domains among all five subgroups, with ‘government services’ being the most favored domain; (2) a tendency among Jewish respondents to favor a multilingual policy over a Hebrew-Arabic bilingual one; and (3) a language minority element (non-native Hebrew speakers), overshadowed by the ethnic-religious (Jewish-Arab) element.
29
Usher, Graham. « Unmaking Palestine : On Israel, the Palestinians, and the Wall ». Journal of Palestine Studies 35, no 1 (1 janvier 2005) : 25–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2005.35.1.25.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Placing Israel's separation wall in the continuum of the Zionist project in Palestine since the late nineteenth century, this essay sees the wall as the latest component of long-held policies of exclusion, control, and containment. In particular, it sees the wall as the culmination of Israel's quest to deal with its ““native problem,”” which had been largely solved with the 1948 war, but which returned full force with the 1967 conquests. The author traces the evolution of Israel's approach to this problem, from ““partial integration”” (and direct military rule) to separation (with indirect military rule and limited Palestinian self-government); settlement and land alienation have been constants. After deconstructing Sharon's current policy, the essay ends by examining Palestinian options for confronting a bleak future, focusing in particular on an as-yet inchoate strategy of nonviolence, campaigns for enforcing international law, and nurturing the most important potential alliance in the struggle against occupation: the Israeli peace camp.
30
Fildis, Ayse Tekdal, et Ensar Nisanci. « British Colonial Policy “Divide and Rule” : Fanning Arab Rivalry in Palestine ». UMRAN - International Journal of Islamic and Civilizational Studies 6, no 1 (26 février 2019) : 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.11113/umran2019.6n1.234.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The 2nd November 2017 is the centenary of the Balfour Declaration which is Britain’s public acknowledgement and support of the Zionist movement and the commitment to a Jewish National Home. The Declaration is identified by the Palestinian narrative as the source of their tragedy whilst the British side its motive was the consideration of who would be most useful to the British interest under the given circumstances. The main characteristics of the Palestinian politics and society after the Balfour Declaration and during the Mandate period was the pervasiveness of factionalism. These divisions were based on family, kinship, and clan. As for their politics, they were mainly shaped by the notable families who helped to intensify this fragmentation in the Palestinian society. The notable families pervaded local politics during the Ottoman period and continued to do so in the early part of the British administration. The mandate administration, although denied the effective Palestinian self-government, it toughened the notability stratification by giving it recognition and legitimacy in social and religious affairs. The British administration refused to accept or recognize the Palestinian Arabs as a national entity, because of the lack of a central authority, Palestinians did not have the social resources to organize and unite themselves. Although the British did not recognize the Palestinians as a national entity they accepted its notables as the leaders and representatives of the Palestinians. The British policy of alliance with the notables helped those notable families achieve decisive pre-eminence in the Palestinian politics. The notability was at the forefront of the nationalist sentiment. They suppressed the existence of independent nationalist parties and groups. The same traditional elite helped intensify fragmentation in the society, especially as the external challenges became more severe. They became an impediment to the wider national integration. Following the historical background of the area until the establishment of the Mandate, this paper will focus on the analysis of the British policies feeding the inter-Arab rivalries and animosity between the notable families and conclude with the study of the valuation of the Palestinian Arab leadership until 1936-1939 Arab revolt.
31
Kelley, Robin D. G. « Another Freedom Summer ». Journal of Palestine Studies 44, no 1 (2014) : 29–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2014.44.1.29.
Texte intégralRésumé :
During the summer of 2014, the U.S. government once again offered the State of Israel unwavering support for its aggression against the Palestinian people. Among the U.S. public, however, there was growing disenchantment with Israel. The information explosion on social media has provided the public globally with much greater access to the Palestinian narrative unfiltered by the Israeli lens. In the United States, this has translated into a growing political split on the question of Palestine between a more diverse and engaged younger population and an older generation reared on the long-standing tropes of Israel's discourse. Drawing analogies between this paradigm shift and the turning point in the civil rights movement enshrined in Mississippi's 1964 Freedom Summer, author and scholar Robin Kelley goes on to ask whether the outrage of the summer of 2014 can be galvanized to transform official U.S. policy.
32
Leep, Matthew, et Jeremy Pressman. « Foreign cues and public views on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict ». British Journal of Politics and International Relations 21, no 1 (21 novembre 2018) : 169–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148118809807.
Texte intégralRésumé :
As foreign sources in the news might help the public assess their home country’s foreign policies, scholars have recently turned attention to the effects of foreign source cues on domestic public opinion. Using original survey experiments, we explore the effects of domestic (United States) and foreign (Israeli, British, and Palestinian) criticism of Israel’s military actions and settlements on US attitudes towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. We find that foreign cues by government officials and non-governmental organisations have modest effects, and are generally not more influential than domestic cues. We also show that individuals might discount foreign criticism of Israel in the context of US bipartisan support for Israel. While our experiments reveal some heterogeneous effects related to partisanship, we are sceptical of significant movement in opinion in response to foreign cues. These findings provide insights into foreign source cue effects beyond the context of the use of military force.
33
Scham, Paul. « Israel’s Rightward Pull Versus Regional Rapprochement ». Transatlantic Policy Quarterly 21, no 3 (1 décembre 2022) : 77–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.58867/hwtx7365.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The Abraham Accords of 2020 were Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s proudest foreign policy achievement. They were applauded in Israel and the United States but were met with more skepticism by the Arab public because they lacked any satisfaction of Palestinian demands for statehood. Netanyahu, who won Israel’s recent election and is slated to become prime minister once again as soon as his government is in place, would like to enlarge the Accords signatories to more Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, but may be stymied by his far-right coalition partners, whose agenda is based on expanding settlements, annexing the West Bank with no regard for its Palestinian population, and making Israel more religiously Jewish. This will almost certainly lead to violence, perhaps even a new intifada, as the West Bank is already seething. Western and Arab leaders have expressed their concern about the leaders of Israel’s far right parties, some with histories of violence, becoming government ministers. There is good reason to believe that not only are the Accords unlikely to expand but, rather, may contract if Arab leaders see headlines of violence, with Palestinians being killed by Israeli forces. The government must be formed by mid-December and while Netanyahu will lead it, its policies may destroy the Accords, his pride and joy.
34
Thanon, Anwar Izz al-Din, et Tareq Mohammed Tayeb Thahir Al-Kassar. « The Turkish position on the Palestinian issue after 2002 ». Tikrit Journal For Political Science 3, no 6 (26 février 2019) : 55. http://dx.doi.org/10.25130/poltic.v3i6.58.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The Palestinian cause are one of the most prominent Arab issues being considered the issue of Arab central, very attitudes international and regional issue interest prominently what these attitudes of the consequences of internal and external reality, the Arab and international levels, and has taken the Turkish position on the Palestinian issue forms and visions mixed since the founding of the Zionist entity and the proclamation of the his country was Turkey's positions and visions of the developments of the Arab _ Zionist varied by the effects of internal and external but marked bias to Israel embodies the recognition of Turkey this entity and conventions diverse held between the parties throughout the period that preceded the arrival of the AKP came to power, and after 2002 Turkey began after the arrival of the party Justice and a new development in its foreign policy and attitudes to-wards the issues of the region and tended to make efforts to play the role of political mediator in the Palestinian issue, as the Government of the Justice and Development itself in a difficult test with regard to its policy and its offi-cial position between the Palestinian issue and Developments.
35
Pillar, Paul R. « The Kushner Plan : Keeping Israeli-Palestinian Peace out of Reach ». Journal of Palestine Studies 48, no 4 (2019) : 113–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2019.48.4.113.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The U.S. administration's Israeli-Palestinian “peace plan,” under President Donald Trump, has so far yielded only an inconclusive talkfest about economic development. The underlying rationale of the plan—that economics must come before any addressing of core political issues—is fundamentally flawed for several reasons. The biggest impediments to Palestinian economic development stem from aspects of the Israeli occupation that would continue under the plan, which rejects a two-state solution and is a slightly revised and renamed version of the current arrangement of limited Palestinian autonomy under Israeli domination. The plan flows directly from the Trump administration's policy of acquiescing in the preferences of the right-wing government of Israel. Accordingly, the political portion of the plan is indefinitely delayed and might never be announced. Keeping the full plan under wraps serves the Israeli government's purpose of holding out the promise of—but never delivering—peace with the Palestinians, while more facts are created on the ground.
36
Shafer Raviv, Omri. « Studying an Occupied Society : Social Research, Modernization Theory and the Early Israeli Occupation, 1967–8 ». Journal of Contemporary History 55, no 1 (21 août 2018) : 161–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022009418785688.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Jordan and Egypt, and established a long-lasting military regime over their Palestinian population. In this article, recently declassified sources and published reports were used to demonstrate how the Israeli government initiated and funded academic research on Palestinian society to gain reliable, useful knowledge to inform its policies. The Israeli leadership was most specifically concerned with pacification of the occupied population, the Arab/Jewish demographic balance, and the status of the 1948 Palestinian refugees. By early 1968, the research team had produced a series of policy-oriented reports on Palestinian society, covering such subjects as employment, education, nationalism, migration, and general values. The team used surveys, questionnaires, and observations, with modernization theory providing the theoretical framework for analyzing their empirical findings and formulating policy recommendations. As the Israeli team had studied a population under military occupation, their recommendations differed from those reached by their US peers who studied traditional populations in the context of the Cold War. Israeli civil and military officials had great interest in this new knowledge, rendering social research an ongoing practice for the Israeli occupation regime in the years to come.
37
Korochkina, Viсtoria. « ИЗРАИЛЬСКИЕ ЭКСПЕРТЫ О МЕЖГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЯХ ТУРЦИИ И ИЗРАИЛЯ НА СОВРЕМЕННОМ ЭТАПЕ ». Eastern Analytics, no 4 (2020) : 207–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.31696/2227-5568-2020-04-207-226.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Throughout the seventy-year history of bilateral relations, which are especially sensitive to events in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Turkey and Israel have repeatedly been on the verge of their complete breach. A serious deterioration occurred after the incident with the Turkish «Gaza Freedom Flotilla» in May 2010. The author examines how the Israeli expert community assesses aspects of the relationship between the Israeli government headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as well as his policy on a number of issues on the Israeli and regional agenda.
38
Ben-Shemesh, Yaacov. « Immigration Rights and the Demographic Consideration ». Law & ; Ethics of Human Rights 2, no 1 (1 janvier 2008) : 1–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1938-2545.1027.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Attaining and maintaining a substantial Jewish majority in Israel has been one of the basic goals of the State of Israel since its early years. A substantial Jewish majority within the borders of the state is thought to be necessary in order to preserve its Jewish nature. Many believe that the demographic consideration also stood behind the enactment of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision), 2003, which prohibits granting Israeli citizenship and residency to Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and prevents, inter alia, Israeli Arabs from living in Israel with their Palestinian spouses.I examine the legitimacy of the demographic consideration from the perspective of liberal political theory. I conclude that demography can, in principle, be a legitimate consideration in deciding immigration policy, and its justification can be derived from the liberal justification of the right to national self-determination. However, the demographic consideration must be assigned its proper role and weight relative to other important liberal values such as equality and other human rights. I suggest that the demographic consideration might be legitimate only to the extent that it is not used to justify immigration policies that violate constitutional rights.I then discuss the Supreme Court decision concerning the constitutionality of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law. I demonstrate that, contrary to statements by the judges themselves, the demographic consideration played a key role in the opinions of several judges. It was, however, a hidden consideration. It was not openly acknowledged and discussed. Consequently, a careful examination and balancing of the demographic consideration could not take place. The result was that the actual influence of the demographic consideration on the outcome of the case was much stronger than can be reasonably justified according to liberal principles of justice.
39
Shatat, Saleh Raed, et Ong Argo Victoria. « ILLEGAL LAND GRAB : ISRAEL'S SEIZURE OF LAND IN PALESTINE ». Jurnal Akta 8, no 2 (29 juin 2021) : 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.30659/akta.v8i2.15685.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Since 1967, each Israeli government has invested significant resources in establishing and expanding the settlements in the Occupied Territories, both in terms of the area of land they occupy and in terms of population. As a result of this policy, approximately 380,000 Israeli citizens now live on the settlements on the West Bank, including those established in East Jerusalem (this report does not relate to the settlements in the Gaza Strip). During the first decade following the occupation, the Ma'arach governments operated on the basis of the Alon Plan, which advocated the establishment of settlements in areas perceived as having "security importance," and where the Palestinian population was sparse (the Jordan Valley, parts of the Hebron Mountains and Greater Jerusalem). After the Likud came to power in 1977, the government began to establish settlements throughout the West Bank, particularly in areas close to the main Palestinian population centers along the central mountain ridge and in western Samaria. This policy was based on both security and ideological considerations. The political process between Israel and the Palestinians did not impede settlement activities, which continued under the Labor government of Yitzhak Rabin (1992-1996) and all subsequent governments. These governments built thousands of new housing units, claiming that this was necessary to meet the "natural growth" of the existing population. As a result, between 1993 and 2000 the number of settlers on the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) increased by almost 100 percent.
40
Pe’er, Eyal, Yuval Feldman, Eyal Gamliel, Limor Sahar, Ariel Tikotsky, Nurit Hod et Hilla Schupak. « Do minorities like nudges ? The role of group norms in attitudes towards behavioral policy ». Judgment and Decision Making 14, no 1 (janvier 2019) : 40–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500002898.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractAttitudes of public groups towards behavioral policy interventions (or nudges) can be important for both the policy makers who design and deploy nudges, and to researchers who try to understand when and why some nudges are supported while others are not. Until now, research on public attitudes towards nudges has focused on either state- or country-level comparisons, or on correlations with individual-level traits, and has neglected to study how different social groups (such as minorities) might view nudges. Using a large and representative sample, we tested the attitudes of two distinct minority groups in Israel (Israeli Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews), and discovered that nudges that operated against a minority group’s held social norms, promoting a more general societal goal not aligned with the group’s norms, were often less supported by minorities. Contrary to expectations, these differences could not be explained by differences in trust in the government applying these nudges. We discuss implications for public policy and for the research and applications of behavioral interventions.
41
Timani, Hussam S. « KAIS M. FIRRO, The Druzes in the Jewish State : A Brief History (Leiden, Boston, and Cologne : E. J. Brill, 1999). Pp. 274. » International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, no 3 (août 2000) : 432–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800002646.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This well-researched book is a welcome contribution to the study of the Druzes, one of the most under-studied religious groups in the Middle East. The main objective of this book is to trace the historical development of the Druzes in Israel since the creation of the Jewish state in 1948 to the present, and to show that Druze ethnicity was and still is an instrument in the hands of the Israeli government officials and the Druze elite. This book also attempts to show how the Zionists used Druze ethnicity and ethnic issues to pursue their policy aims of alienating the Druzes from other Arabs. In this work, the author, a professor at the University of Haifa, revisits an area he knows well and has already presented in a previous book, A History of the Druzes.
42
Al-Shunnaq, Abdulmajeed. « Political Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel (1965-1969) ». Dirasat : Human and Social Sciences 49, no 5 (17 octobre 2022) : 132–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.35516/hum.v49i5.2769.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The study dealt with the German Federal Israeli political relations since the political recognition and the exchange of diplomatic representation on May 12, 1965, and the timing of the political recognition on this date is considered a gift to Israel on the seventeenth anniversary of its founding.
The study focused on the development of bilateral political relations from 1965-1969 due to the exchange of power when the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Willy Brandt, formed the government for the first time in contemporary German history. The study addressed the research questions, which are what are the political factors that led to political recognition and the exchange of diplomatic representation and at the highest the level of how the internal German policy affected the bilateral relations between the two countries, and whether the German – Israeli political relations could be considered special and distinct relations on Germany's relations with any other country, especially during the Israeli aggression on the Arabs in 1967, and the study proved that there are many factors affecting the continuity of development in relations for what it presented the successive German government until 1969 provided finaneial, economic and other assistance for the benefit of the Israeli side and without the slightest consideration of its negative impact on German Arab relations, and the study highlighted the support of the Federal Republic of Germany with Israel during its aggression against Egypt, Jordan and Syria in June 1967, noting that it was the expansionist goals of Israel.
43
Soroczyński, Rafał. « Acquisition of Title to Territory in the Aftermath of the Use of Force in the United Nations Era : The case of the State of Israel ». Revue québécoise de droit international 30, no 1 (26 septembre 2018) : 65–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1053758ar.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The territory to which the State of Israel had a title as a newly-created state corresponded to the areas allotted to Jews by the provisions of the resolution 181(II) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 29, 1947, which had recommended the partition of Palestine and creation of the Arab state, the Jewish state and the City of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum. As this territorial regime had been modified during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949 and Israel’s government has recognized the areas seized by it during the war as part of its territorial domain, the problem arose as to Israel’s title to those additional territories situated between the 1947 partition lines and the lines established in accordance with the armistice agreements of 1949. Due to important characteristics of the legal status of former mandatory Palestine and to the fact that considerable parts thereof became occupied territories, the process of consolidation of the title thereto required the consent of the international community as a whole. This consent has in fact been granted, both by the international community and by representatives of Palestinian Arabs, in respect of large parts of territories situated between the 1947 partition lines and the 1949 armistice lines. There are no doubts that the State of Israel has sovereign, uncontested rights to these areas. As it constitutes important departure from the generally accepted principle that the use of force in any form cannot serve as a root of title to territory, this situation is of particular interest, providing support for the view that this principle cannot be analyzed without due regard paid to those exceptional situations where the international community decided to depart from its strict application in order to safeguard stability of territorial solutions.
44
Kryzhko, Lidiya Anatol'evna, Evgeniy Vladimirovich Kryzhko et Petr Igorevich Pashkovsky. « Egypt in U.S. policy in the Middle East in the early 1950s. » Конфликтология / nota bene, no 2 (février 2022) : 40–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0617.2022.2.38065.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The author considers the problem of the role of Egypt in the US policy in the Middle East in the early 1950s. It is shown that a new political circumstances in the regions of the Middle and Near East forced the United States to act as a competitor to Great Britain. The United States understood the importance of gradually ousting Great Britain from the region, trying to prevent the increase of Soviet influence there using various methods. At the same time, the implementation of US's plan to form a controlled military-political bloc of Middle Eastern states in 1950-1953 proved to be untenable for various reasons. The decisive role in this regard was played by the position held by Egypt. A special contribution of the authors to the study of the topic is the focus on the project "Middle East Command", as the first failed plan of the military bloc of Western countries in the region. It was revealed that the US stake on Egypt as a conductor of its interests turned out to be unjustified. The US administration objectively saw in the anti-British movement, which was gaining momentum in Egypt during this period, an opportunity to strengthen its influence. However, with the approval of G. A. Nasser in power in Egypt, a new foreign policy strategy was being developed, which was based on efforts to raise the patriotism of the Arab countries and unite the Arabs in the fight against the colonial past. Also, US's efforts to achieve coexistence of Egypt and Israel in a single policy not brought the desired results. In the context of the unresolved Palestinian issue and the aggravation of the Arab-Israeli confrontation in Egypt's foreign policy, tendencies towards rapprochement with the Arab countries in the form of a number of military-political alliances were gaining momentum.
45
Freij, Hanna Y. « Making Peace with the PLO ». American Journal of Islam and Society 14, no 4 (1 janvier 1997) : 103–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v14i4.2224.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This is a timely and engaging book about the secret peace talks between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It is a detailed case study of Israeli decision making that produced a sea change in Israeli policy in a period of serious challenges to Israel from Islamic militants within and outside Israeli-controlled areas. Mak.ovsky underscores that a significant factor in Israel's dramatic shift toward the PLO was the latter's promise to control and repress Islamist mi1itants, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The book gets its detailed and highly nuanced portrayal of the Israeli and PLO decisions from a number of interviews with Israeli and PLO officials, Israeli academician, and trained and critical observers of Israeli politic . The author presents a highly complex picture of the dynamics between Yitzhak. Rabin and Shimon Peres and the impact of the domestic environment on Rabin's calculations to enter into negotiations with the PLO and Arafat. The sections on Israeli domestic politics and the relationship between Rabin, Peres, and Yossi Beilin are essential for any comprehensive understanding of how Israel is likely to pursue future negotiations with Syria and the PLO in Rabin's absence. The book starts with a quick survey of the historical background of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict Although significantly weakened by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the PLO was not destroyed and Israel failed to reduce its support in the occupied areas (p. 6). The intifada not only saved the PLO from political oblivion, it asserted the importance of the inside, nondiaspora Palestinians in the struggle against Israel, which Arafat i currently trying toundo. The American-sponsored Madrid peace talks allowed Arafat to get afoothold in the negotiations as part of the Jordanian delegation. The Shamir governmentargued that negotiations were limited to "personal autonomy" for thePalestinians, a position the Palestinian delegation flatly rejected.The second chapter focuses on the background that got the Oslo process started.Initially, the PLO asked the Norwegians to get involved in order to start adialogue between them (PLO) and Israel. International academic conferences ...
46
ESEED, RANA. « Social Service Provision by Minority Religious Organizations : A Case Study of the Islamic Movement in Kafr Qassim ». Journal of Social Policy 49, no 3 (29 juillet 2019) : 507–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s004727941900062x.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractThis study examines what motivates an organization representing a religious-national minority to provide social services. The case study for examining this issue is the Islamic Movement in Palestinian society in Israel, and specifically its social activities in the town of Kafr Qassim. The article analyzes the factors leading to the development of the movement’s various services in the town by tracing their historical development and current offerings. This case study analysis is informed by two theoretical bodies of knowledge: the development of NGOs and the development of faith-based organizations. The data is based upon 17 semi-structured in-depth interviews with the heads of all the social services, social activists and municipality representatives in Kafr Qassim, where the movement was established. Some of the interviews also include tours and observations of actual services provision. Additional sources include archival documents, such as the organization’s regulations and work plans. The findings identify three main factors in the development of minority religious organizations: government failure in providing services (necessary factor) and religious ideology and mobilization of political support as secondary factors. All three are grounded in the ongoing conflict between the Palestinian minority group and the state.
47
Salenson, Irene. « Jerusalem and the border, evolutive aspects ». Estudios Fronterizos 6, no 11 (1 janvier 2005) : 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.21670/ref.2005.11.a02.
Texte intégralRésumé :
What meaning does the term border take on referring to a city? The city of Jerusalem is an interesting case study because with it the whole polysemy of the word border shows up, on every geographical scale. Since the start of the Al- Aqsa Intifada in 2000, support for the idea of a physical barrier between Israel and the Palestinian territories has grown tremendously among Israelis. On Jerusalem´s external boundary, this barrier takes the form of an eight-metershigh- wall. The Israeli government does not admit that the barrier’s sole purpose was the prevention of terrorist incursions. A policy of ethnic separation was clearly intended, the argument being that co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians had been a failure. How did the Holy city reach this pessimistic point, considering that the idea of an international city was proposed twice in the first half of the twentieth century, when its inhabitants had already suffered a separation between 1948 and 1967, and when a peace process had been initiated in 1994? Will this barrier become the new border between Israel and Palestine, between West and East Jerusalem? Keywords: Jerusalem, frontier, separation fence, municipal territory, international city.
48
Stein, Yael. « Any Name Illegal and Immoral ». Ethics & ; International Affairs 17, no 1 (mars 2003) : 127–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2003.tb00423.x.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Since November 2000, Israel has been implementing an assassination policy in the occupied territories. The Israeli policy is both illegal and immoral. The legal questions are much more complicated than would appear from David's argument. Although individual killings may be lawful in specific cases, this debate concerns a policy providing systematic justification for such acts. Neither international nor Israeli law ensures any backing for this policy. Armed Palestinians are not combatants according to any known legal definition. They are civilians–which is the only legal alternative–and can only be attacked for as long as they actively participate in hostilities.The argument that this policy affords the public a sense of revenge and retribution could serve to justify acts both illegal and immoral. Clearly, lawbreakers ought to be punished. Yet, no matter how horrific their deeds, as the targeting of Israeli civilians indeed is, they should be punished according to the law. David's arguments could, in principle, justify the abolition of formal legal systems altogether.The Israeli government has not endorsed the minor changes of policy that David suggests, and for a reason. Israel's initial refusal to acknowledge the very existence of this policy and even its later hesitant admission suggest it is aware of the problems the policy entails and of the difficulties of dismissing them. Assassinations have been part of Israel's security policy for many years, and Israel is currently the only democratic country that regards such measures as legitimate. The Palestinian violations of international law, however, cannot be used to grant legal and/or moral legitimation to these violations when perpetrated by others.
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Arar, Khalid Husny. « The challenges involved when Arab women forge a path to educational leadership : Context, personal cost, and coping ». Educational Management Administration & ; Leadership 47, no 5 (février 2018) : 749–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1741143217753191.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper traces challenges faced by six Arab women from three different Arab localities – Palestinian Arab society in Israel, Palestinian Authority territories, and Jordan – on their path to appointment as school principals, investigating how they cope with the challenges involved in women’s leadership in a patriarchal society. Qualitative methodology employed in-depth interviews to elucidate the life stories of six Arab women principals. Findings show that the women’s professional careers were empowered by family support. They report various difficulties and obstacles that they needed to overcome, especially since they are expected to continue to fulfil their homemaker role while complying with the requirements of their demanding profession. It is concluded that Arab women who attain educational leadership posts employ their strong characteristics, their empowered agency, and the values they acquire and represent to improve their social status, transform their personal and professional identity, and improve their resources despite restrictive cultural norms. Enlisting support from their families and other resources, they overcome barriers on the path to principalship. It is recommended that government policy in the studied societies should encourage women to undertake senior roles in education and provide the necessary mentoring and support to ensure their success. Further implications of the findings are discussed.
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Ivanov, S. M. « Joe Biden's visit to the Middle East : losses and gains ». Diplomaticheskaja sluzhba (Diplomatic Service), no 5 (27 septembre 2022) : 398–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.33920/vne-01-2205-05.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article analyzes the US foreign policy in the Middle East in the context of the growing confrontation between the collective West and Russia against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis. Particular attention is paid to the results of the visit of US President Joe Biden to Israel, to the West Bank of the Jordan River to the State of Palestine and to Saudi Arabia, which he made in mid-July 2022. The author comes to the conclusion that another attempt by Washington to draw the countries of the region into its behind-the-scenes foreign policy games has failed. The Middle Eastern allies and partners of the United States represented by Israel, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf and other Arab states took a neutral position in relation to the confl ict in Ukraine, and the oil and gas exporting countries did not go for a sharp increase in hydrocarbon supplies to the EU countries and the UK, as he insistently asked Biden. The White House failed to put together a regional anti-Iranian bloc on the basis of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (GCC), as the leaders of Qatar, Oman and Iraq are determined to maintain their traditional ties and contacts with Tehran. Moreover, these countries are making mediation eff orts to normalize relations between the Saudi Arabia and Iran, and there are prerequisites for success in this matter. In general, the Arabs do not support the US administration's concept of hegemony in the world and building a unipolar world order in the Middle East. Even with some remaining dependence on the United States and the West as a whole in the fi nancial, economic, military-technical and other fi elds, the Arab countries prefer to pursue an independent policy on key issues of our time, develop a multipolar world, and maintain mutually benefi cial and respectful relations with all states, including China and Russia. The Arab capitals are in no hurry to speed up the rapprochement with the State of Israel, which is imposed by Washington, expecting from its leadership to intensify eff orts to justly resolve the Palestinian problem and liberate the illegally occupied Arab lands. Even the bogey exaggerated by the White House of a common threat to the Middle East from the hypothetical appearance of Iran's nuclear weapons and its expansion in the region cannot persuade the Persian Gulf monarchies and other Arab countries to cooperate with Jerusalem in the military or military-technical fields.