Se connecter

Bibliographies thématiques / Pain and pleasure / Articles de revues

Articles de revues sur le sujet « Pain and pleasure »

Pour voir les autres types de publications sur ce sujet consultez le lien suivant : Pain and pleasure.

Auteur : Grafiati

Publié le 25 juillet 2024

Mis à jour le 26 juillet 2024

Créez une référence correcte selon les styles APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard et plusieurs autres

Choisissez une source :

Consultez les 50 meilleurs articles de revues pour votre recherche sur le sujet « Pain and pleasure ».

À côté de chaque source dans la liste de références il y a un bouton « Ajouter à la bibliographie ». Cliquez sur ce bouton, et nous générerons automatiquement la référence bibliographique pour la source choisie selon votre style de citation préféré : APA, MLA, Harvard, Vancouver, Chicago, etc.

Vous pouvez aussi télécharger le texte intégral de la publication scolaire au format pdf et consulter son résumé en ligne lorsque ces informations sont inclues dans les métadonnées.

Parcourez les articles de revues sur diverses disciplines et organisez correctement votre bibliographie.

1

Jaulin, Annick. « Aristote : le plaisir des differences ». Chôra 17 (2019) : 127–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chora2019178.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Given the necessary connection between pleasure and energeia, the value of an aristotelian pleasure depends on the value of its correlative activity. Since the absolute pleasures the philokalos takes in his virtuous activities might go hand in hand with pains, the definition of absolute pleasure cannot rely on the distinction between mixed pleasure (pleasure with pain) versus pure pleasure (pleasure without pain). So, how can we characterize the pleasures of the temperate man (sophron) ? My thesis is that the right way to define the pleasures of the temperate man is to describe them as pleasures derived from differences. A pleasure derived from differences is involved in the pleasure human beings get from the formal use of their senses. It then belongs to the kind of pleasure they take in knowing. This formal use of the senses helps understanding how the pleasures of the temperate man can be separated from the pleasures enjoyed by children and animals.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

2

Liebersohn, Yosef Z. « Epicurus’ “Kinetic” and “Katastematic” Pleasures. A Reappraisal ». Elenchos 36, n^o 2 (1 juin 2015) : 271–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2015-360204.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Abstract In this paper I shall offer new definitions for what seem to be the most dominant terms in Epicurus’ theory of pleasures - “kinetic” and “katastematic”. While most of the scholarly literature treats these terms as entirely concerned with states of motion and states of stability, I shall argue that the distinction concerns whether pain is or is not removed by this or that pleasure. As the removal of pain is a necessary condition for the Epicurean goal of ataraxia and aponia, “katastematic” pleasure, having to do with the removal of pain, is the necessary pleasure pertaining both to the process of removing pain and to its result, namely the absence of pain, while “kinetic” pleasure is an unnecessary pleasure having nothing to do with the removal of pain, e.g. it starts after pain has been removed. If my analysis and interpretation prove correct, the two conventional classifications - “kinetic-katastematic” and “necessary-unnecessary” - turn out to be referring to the same phenomenon and are aspects of one classification. Moreover, this new interpretation resolves some of the main problems arising from our testimonia concerning “kinetic” and “katastematic” pleasures.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

3

Liebersohn, Yosef Z. « Epicurus’ Varietas and ἡ κινητικὴ ἡδονή ». Mnemosyne 71, n^o 5 (13 septembre 2018) : 777–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568525x-12342428.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

AbstractAccording to Epicurus’ view which locates the summit of pleasure in the absence of all pain, once pain has been removed pleasure cannot be increased, but it can be embellished. This article has two main aims. Firstly I shall deal with this embellishment, namely the pleasure beyond the absence of pain (thevarietas), and discuss its exact place within the Epicurean theory of pleasures; I argue thatvarietaspertains only to pleasures concerning the body. Secondly, and on the basis of my findings concerning the Epicureanvarietas, I shall offer a redefinition of the concept of kinetic pleasures and argue that the pair natural-unnatural is the axis by which the kinetic pleasures are to be divided into pleasures concerning the body and pleasures concerning the soul respectively. I shall end by referring to a well disputed question concerning the Epicurean way of living, namely the question: “was Epicurus an ascetic?”.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

4

FELDMAN, FRED. « Unconscious Pleasures and Pains : A Problem for Attitudinal Theories ? » Utilitas 30, n^o 4 (2 avril 2018) : 472–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820818000109.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Ben Bramble, Dan Haybron and others have endorsed the idea that there are unconscious, or unfelt, pleasures and pains. These would be sensory experiences that are genuine pleasures or pains, but experiences of which the subject is unaware. The idea that there are such things is worthy of attention in its own right; but I am interested in this alleged phenomenon for a further reason. I am attracted to an attitudinal theory of sensory pleasure and pain. Bramble has claimed that the existence of unconscious pleasures and pains reveals that attitudinal theories cannot be true. Chris Heathwood has offered a reply on behalf of attitudinalism. I think a better reply can be provided. In this article I explain why an attitudinal theory of pleasure and pain is consistent with whatever is plausible in the ‘unconscious pleasure and pain’ phenomenon.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

5

Whalley, Katherine. « Pain or pleasure ? » Nature Reviews Neuroscience 16, n^o 6 (20 mai 2015) : 316. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn3975.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

6

Parry, Richard D. « Deceptive Pleasures in Republic ix ». Ancient Philosophy 43, n^o 2 (2023) : 379–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343222.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

In Republic ix, Socrates begins his argument that deceptive pleasure causes insatiable desire by citing the error that cessation of pain is the greatest pleasure. Some interpret this error as an illusion, experiencing pleasure when there is no pleasure; but illusion cannot explain insatiable desire. Our interpretation explains insatiable desire—and Socrates’ restatement of wisdom and justice to include pleasures, which links the knowledge of unchanging reality with these virtues.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

7

Renaut, Olivier. « Le plaisir dans la cite platonicienne ». Chôra 17 (2019) : 17–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chora2019173.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

This article aims at showing that the definition of pleasure in Plato’s dialogues cannot be separated from a political educational program and an anthropology that consider pleasure as the main vehicle towards virtue. The political use of pleasure is as important as its definition, insofar as its manifestation and content are the prerogatives of the legislator. All pleasures are politically meaningful in the Republic and in the Laws, and among them especially the triad hunger, thirst and sex ; in making pleasures a “public” issue, as pleasures are object of surveillance and political control, Plato gives several means in order to shape the way pleasures are felt in the city, and in order to make the community of pleasure and pain a fundamental role in unifying the city under the reason’s commands.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

8

HEATHWOOD, CHRIS. « Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure ». Utilitas 30, n^o 2 (11 août 2017) : 219–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820817000188.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

This article responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains. According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware. In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations in only a weak sense, and this weak sort of unawareness of a sensation does not preclude its being an object of one's attitudes.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

9

McDaniel, Charles‐Gene. « The pain of pleasure ». Medical Journal of Australia 143, n^o 6 (septembre 1985) : 249–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5694/j.1326-5377.1985.tb122965.x.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

10

Oktenberg, Adrian, Aleida Rodriguez et Olga Broumas. « From Pain to Pleasure ». Women's Review of Books 17, n^o 4 (janvier 2000) : 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4023383.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

11

Gromet, Dena M., Geoffrey P. Goodwin et Rebecca A. Goodman. « Pleasure From Another’s Pain ». Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 42, n^o 8 (8 juin 2016) : 1077–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167216651408.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

12

Sampson, Ellen. « Shoes : Pleasure and Pain ». Costume 50, n^o 1 (1 janvier 2016) : 132–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05908876.2016.1134878.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

13

Higgins, E. Tory. « Beyond pleasure and pain. » American Psychologist 52, n^o 12 (1997) : 1280–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.52.12.1280.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

14

Oettingen, Gabriele, Doris Mayer et Sam Portnow. « Pleasure Now, Pain Later ». Psychological Science 27, n^o 3 (29 janvier 2016) : 345–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797615620783.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

15

Cook, Tim. « Spinoffs : pain and pleasure ». Materials Today 7, n^o 9 (septembre 2004) : 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1369-7021(04)00406-7.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

16

Dunn, Joshua C., Brenda Thiru-Chelvam et Charles H. M. Beck. « Bathing : Pleasure or Pain ? » Journal of Gerontological Nursing 28, n^o 11 (1 novembre 2002) : 6–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.3928/0098-9134-20021101-05.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

17

Bain, David, et Michael Brady. « Pain, Pleasure, and Unpleasure ». Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5, n^o 1 (9 février 2014) : 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0176-5.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

18

Pringle, Richard. « Defamiliarizing Heavy-Contact Sports : A Critical Examination of Rugby, Discipline, and Pleasure ». Sociology of Sport Journal 26, n^o 2 (juin 2009) : 211–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/ssj.26.2.211.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Pleasure can be regarded as a productive force in the constitution of the social significance of sport and desiring sport subjects. The organization and use of sport pleasure has been a relatively marginalized topic of examination. To promote and examine sport pleasure, I conducted semistructured interviews with seven passionate rugby players. Transcripts were analyzed via Foucauldian theorizing and revealed the intertwined workings of technologies of dominance and self in the constitution of rugby pleasures. As a strategy to defamiliarize and disrupt habitual and uncritical acceptance of rugby aggression, I argued that rugby pleasures were akin to sadomasochism. Rugby can be understood as a taboo-breaking game associated with transparent relations of power connected with the pleasure induced from physical domination and the fear of pain.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

19

Conolly, Oliver. « Pleasure and Pain in Literature ». Philosophy and Literature 29, n^o 2 (2005) : 305–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/phl.2005.0020.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

20

Civille, Gail Vance. « Food Texture : Pleasure and Pain ». Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry 59, n^o 5 (9 mars 2011) : 1487–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/jf100219h.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

21

Binik, Yitzchak M. « Pain, pleasure, and the mind ». Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20, n^o 3 (septembre 1997) : 440–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x9724149x.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

The target articles by blumberg et al. and berkley reflect some of the recent major theoretical and clinical advances in two areas of pain research. These two articles also represent two very different approaches to which type of variables are considered relevant to the study of pain. These different approaches are contrasted in the context of the different emphases in pain and pleasure research.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

22

Caputi, Linda. « Grading papers : Pleasure or pain ? » Teaching and Learning in Nursing 1, n^o 2 (octobre 2006) : 35–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.teln.2006.06.004.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

23

Das Choudhury, Sangeeta, et Saiyantany Choudhury. « Stiletto : Pain, Pleasure and Style ». JOURNAL OF ASIATIC SOCIETY FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 5, n^o 1 (30 juin 2023) : 66–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.46700/asssr/2023/v5/i1/223401.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

24

Carone, Gabriela Roxana. « Hedonism and the Pleasureless Life in Plato's Philebus ». Phronesis 45, n^o 4 (2000) : 257–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852800510225.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

AbstractThis paper re-evaluates the role that Plato confers to pleasure in the Philebus. According to leading interpretations, Plato there downplays the role of pleasure, or indeed rejects hedonism altogether. Thus, scholars such as D. Frede have taken the "mixed life" of pleasure and intelligence initially submitted in the Philebus to be conceded by Socrates only as a remedial good, second to a life of neutral condition, where one would experience no pleasure and pain. Even more strongly, scholars such as Irwin have seen the Philebus' arguments against false pleasures as an actual attack on hedonism, showing in Irwin's words "why maximization of pleasure cannot be a reasonable policy for the best life." Against these claims, I argue that the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is presented in the Philebus as a rst best and not just as a second best for humans, and that, accordingly, Socrates proposes to incorporate rather than reject pleasure as one of the intrinsically desirable aspects of the happy life. Thus, I offer alternative readings of controversial passages that have given rise to the prevalent interpretation criticized here, and advance positive evidence that at least some pleasures are seen by Plato as inherently good. In addition, I demonstrate that Plato's arguments against false pleasures do not by themselves constitute an attack on hedonism. Rather, they can be seen as a strategy to show the hedonist that, in order to be a maximal, or even a consistent, hedonist, he should go for true, and not fake pleasures, if after all pleasure is the object of his pursuit. But, since this cannot be achieved without intelligence, then the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is to be accepted even by hedonist themselves.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

25

Wolfsdorf, David. « PLEASURE AND TRUTH INREPUBLIC9 ». Classical Quarterly 63, n^o 1 (24 avril 2013) : 110–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838812000882.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

AtRepublic9, 583b1–587a2, Socrates argues that the pleasure of the philosophical life is the truest pleasure. I will call this the ‘true pleasure argument’. The true pleasure argument is divisible into two parts: 583b1–585a7 and 585a8–587a2. Each part contains a sub-argument, which I will call ‘the misperception argument’ and ‘the true filling argument’ respectively. In the misperception argument Socrates argues that it is characteristic of irrational men to misperceive as pleasant what in fact is a condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained. In the true filling argument Socrates argues that in so far as pleasure entails somatic or psychic filling and there are more and less true fillings, there are more and less true pleasures. Philosophical filling is the truest filling and thus the truest pleasure. The misperception argument critically contributes to the true pleasure argument by clarifying what pleasure is not: merely an appearance (φαινόμενον) or merely the absence of pain. The misperception argument thereby clears the ground for the constructive contribution of the true filling argument.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

26

QUINN, MICHAEL. « Bentham on Mensuration : Calculation and Moral Reasoning ». Utilitas 26, n^o 1 (18 décembre 2013) : 61–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820813000241.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

This article argues that Bentham was committed to attempting to measure the outcomes of rules by calculating the values of the pains and pleasures to which they gave rise. That pleasure was preferable to pain, and greater pleasure to less, were, for Bentham, foundational premises of rationality, whilst to abjure calculation was to abjure rationality. However, Bentham knew that the experience of pleasure and pain, the ‘simple’ entities which provided his objective moral standard, was not only subjective, and only indirectly accessible to the legislator, but also typically dependent on a complex of socially mediated beliefs and attitudes. All moral reasoning involved a process of inference from contingent ‘facts’ which was littered with possibilities for error. The Bentham who emerges is a more vulpine hedgehog than is usually allowed, whose core insistence is that, despite its imperfections, consequentialist analysis and decision-making remains the only viable route to a rational morality.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

27

Dahl, Espen, et Theodor Sandal Rolfsen. « The Phenomenology of Pain and Pleasure : Henry and Levinas ». Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 31, n^o 1/2 (12 avril 2024) : 46–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2023.1050.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

While Henry and Levinas are often juxtaposed, little attention has been given to their shared views on pain and pleasure. Both phenomenologists converge on the argument that an adequate account of pain and pleasure requires a critical confrontation with the theory of intentionality. This raises further questions. What roles do interiority and exteriority play in pain and pleasure? Should they be conceived as different tonalities of one essence or as heterogenous phenomena? Despite their shared critique of intentionality, Henry and Levinas respond differently to these questions. We argue that Henry’s account suffers from an imprisonment in immanence, leading to a homogenous account of pain and pleasure as derivatives of one essence. In our view, Levinas points toward a more fruitful phenomenological account, both in so far as he does not divorce pain and pleasure from exteriority, and also in the way his phenomenology preserves the heterogeneity of pleasure and pain.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

28

Diabate, Naminata. « Nudity and Pleasure ». Nka Journal of Contemporary African Art 2020, n^o 46 (1 mai 2020) : 152–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/10757163-8308270.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Cultural products and discourses about erotic pleasure have recently proliferated, leading to what the author calls “the pleasure turn.” In studies of African culture, “the pleasure turn” can be read as decentering the dominant paradigm that has mostly associated black nakedness with negative emotions: sorrow, pain, and humiliation. Illustrative of the turn is the 2009 exhibition Beauty and Pleasure in South African Contemporary Art, which considered pain and suffering as overrated and sought to provide a more accurate picture of life on the continent as a mix of pleasure and pain. This article closely reads the South African multimedia artist Dineo Bopape’s 2008 Silent Performance, alongside Berni Searle’s 2001 politically charged Snow White, to point out their generative potential for the intersection of the visual media, erotic pleasure, and nudity. Traditional views of pleasure have avoided the nexus of erotic pleasure and the visual because of their historical association with nineteenth-century scientific racism. The author argues Bopape’s and Searle’s images exceed a single and stable interpretation. By inserting their (semi-)naked bodies as central images, they invite yet resist unwanted readings of erotic pleasure in their works. Incorporating her analysis of these works into her conceptualization of images of black female nudity in art, the author proposes that a robust attention be given the visual image in the rising conversation on pleasure in African studies.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

29

Resneck-Sannes, Helen. « From Pain and Anxiety to Pleasure ». Clinical Journal of the International Institute for Bioenergetic Analysis 24, n^o 1 (mars 2014) : 133–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.30820/0743-4804-2014-24-133.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Two definitions of chronic pain are presented and their effects on sufferers are described. One definition is of pain that is persistent even after the original insult is gone. How this type of pain affects the brain is discussed and its relationship to anxiety, post traumatic stress and other psychiatric disorders is explicated. Factors that modulate the experience of pain are presented as well as a specific somatic exercise for relieving pain.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

30

Collen, Mark. « Life of Pain, Life of Pleasure ». Journal of Pain & ; Palliative Care Pharmacotherapy 19, n^o 4 (janvier 2005) : 45–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/j354v19n04_08.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

31

Goldstein, Irwin. « Pleasure and Pain : Unconditional, Intrinsic Values ». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, n^o 2 (décembre 1989) : 255. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107959.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

32

Macmillan, Robert. « The Pain, the Pleasure, the Practice ». Management in Education 10, n^o 1 (février 1996) : 29–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/089202069601000113.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

33

Garland, Zelina. « Double the pleasure, double the pain ». Journal of Health Visiting 1, n^o 4 (avril 2013) : 234. http://dx.doi.org/10.12968/johv.2013.1.4.234.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

34

Carey, Kevin. « The pain and pleasure of travel ». British Journal of Visual Impairment 22, n^o 2 (mai 2004) : 74–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0264619604046642.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

35

Kemp, Martin. « A flowering of pleasure and pain ». Nature 465, n^o 7296 (mai 2010) : 295. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/465295a.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

36

Wood, Dan, Angela Cottrell, Simon C. Baker, Jennifer Southgate, Maya Harris, Simon Fulford, Christopher Woodhouse et David Gillatt. « Recreational ketamine : from pleasure to pain ». BJU International 107, n^o 12 (14 février 2011) : 1881–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-410x.2010.10031.x.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

37

Bartoshuk, Linda. « The Measurement of Pleasure and Pain ». Perspectives on Psychological Science 9, n^o 1 (janvier 2014) : 91–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691613512660.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

38

SHIMODA, Shunsuke. « Pleasure and pain in outperforming others ». Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Japanese Psychological Association 75 (15 septembre 2011) : 1EV037. http://dx.doi.org/10.4992/pacjpa.75.0_1ev037.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

39

Tulloch, John. « Soaps and Audiences : Pleasure and Pain ». Media Information Australia 42, n^o 1 (novembre 1986) : 22–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1329878x8604200104.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

40

Collen, Mark. « Life of Pain, Life of Pleasure ». Journal Of Pain & ; Palliative Care Pharmacotherapy 19, n^o 4 (6 janvier 2005) : 45–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j354v19n04_08.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

41

Chisholm, Roderick M. « Brentano's theory of pleasure and pain ». Topoi 6, n^o 1 (mars 1987) : 59–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00141819.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

42

Larson, Janet. « The Pain (and Pleasure) of Learning ». Journal of Forestry 88, n^o 6 (1 juin 1990) : 33–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jof/88.6.33.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

43

Vasiliou, Elena. « Penitentiary pleasures : Queer understandings of prison paradoxes ». Criminology & ; Criminal Justice 20, n^o 5 (6 juillet 2020) : 577–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748895820939147.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Historically, prison researchers have remained disengaged with explorations of pleasure in punishment because of the risk of romanticizing imprisonment. This risk is inherent in any discussion of pleasure experienced by prisoners. In this article, I advocate for the application of queer theory as a means of deconstructing the binary formation through which pain and pleasure in prison is understood. To do that, I explore how ex-prisoners’ narratives might reveal (queer) moments of pleasure and complement existing criminological scholarship that has neglected such an issue. This exploration is framed by Foucault’s theory of pleasure as a productive force that renders it akin to power: it produces an effect. In this article, I draw on Edelman’s concept of “futurity” and Halberstam’s “failure” to bring criminology and queer theory into a productive dialogue for the purpose of analyzing the production of narratives of pleasure by ex-prisoners. In my analysis, I use Jackson and Mazzei’s “plugging in method” centered around the categories of (a) pleasure and pain, (b) pleasure and resistance, and (c) sexuality and pleasure. Drawing upon the findings, I argue that pleasure becomes a nexus of relations that exists and correlates with sexuality, power/resistance, and the feeling of pain. I conclude that a queer understanding of what is unpleasant is possible if we reconsider pleasure and pain in a spectrum as opposed to a binary formation.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

44

Yeates, J. « Breeding for pleasure : the value of pleasure and pain in evolution and animal welfare ». Animal Welfare 19, S1 (mai 2010) : 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0962728600002219.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

AbstractFarming and laboratory industries face questions about whether to breed animals with altered capacities for pleasure and pain. This paper addresses this issue from different approaches to animal welfare based on experiences, fitness and naturalness. This can illuminate both the breeding-related issues and the different approaches themselves. These differences have practical implications for decisions about animal breeding. All three approaches will agree that pleasure that is adaptive in natural environments has positive value and that maladaptive pain has negative value. However, where animals’ environments will not be natural, experiences-based approaches may support breeding animals that experience more pleasure and less pain or insentient animals; whereas, in some cases, fitness-based and naturalness-based approaches might favour the breeding of animals that experience more pain and less pleasure.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

45

Fusaro, M., G. Tieri et S. M. Aglioti. « Seeing pain and pleasure on self and others : behavioral and psychophysiological reactivity in immersive virtual reality ». Journal of Neurophysiology 116, n^o 6 (1 décembre 2016) : 2656–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1152/jn.00489.2016.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Studies have explored behavioral and neural responses to the observation of pain in others. However, much less is known about how taking a physical perspective influences reactivity to the observation of others' pain and pleasure. To explore this issue we devised a novel paradigm in which 24 healthy participants immersed in a virtual reality scenario observed a virtual: needle penetrating (pain), caress (pleasure), or ball touching (neutral) the hand of an avatar seen from a first (1PP)- or a third (3PP)-person perspective. Subjective ratings and physiological responses [skin conductance responses (SCR) and heart rate (HR)] were collected in each trial. All participants reported strong feelings of ownership of the virtual hand only in 1PP. Subjective measures also showed that pain and pleasure were experienced as more salient than neutral. SCR analysis demonstrated higher reactivity in 1PP than in 3PP. Importantly, vicarious pain induced stronger responses with respect to the other conditions in both perspectives. HR analysis revealed equally lower activity during pain and pleasure with respect to neutral. SCR may reflect egocentric perspective, and HR may merely index general arousal. The results suggest that behavioral and physiological indexes of reactivity to seeing others' pain and pleasure were qualitatively similar in 1PP and 3PP. Our paradigm indicates that virtual reality can be used to study vicarious sensation of pain and pleasure without actually delivering any stimulus to participants' real body and to explore behavioral and physiological reactivity when they observe pain and pleasure from ego- and allocentric perspectives.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

46

El far, Georg. « Can a Materialistic Philosophy Produce a Moral System ? "Epicurean Model" ». Jordan Journal of Social Sciences 15, n^o 3 (22 janvier 2023) : 288–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.35516/jjss.v15i3.833.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

The main problem in this research was the answer to the question posed about the possibility of the existence of an ethical system based on a materialistic philosophy and not on an idealistic and metaphysical philosophy as was customary in establishing ethical systems. It has nothing to do with idealism or metaphysics. Rather, Democritus adopts the atomic materialist philosophy as its theoretical basis and does not depend on reason or divine laws as a criterion and judgment in moral issues, but rather nature, the sense of pleasure and the avoidance of pain as a spontaneous judgment of human and animal life alike. Herefore, this philosophy resorts to liberating man from the fear of death and the fear of the gods, so that this fear and anxiety do not spoil human life and deprive him of enjoying life itself. We have revealed in this research that the pleasure that the Epicureans are talking about is mainly the pleasure of the stomach, but it is not a reckless and exaggerated pleasure, but rather a pleasure that seeks simplicity and seeks to establish a calm life that is not disturbed by the pain resulting from the pursuit of more pleasures, the results of which are greater pain. The Greek philosopher Epicurus, who lived in the fourth century BC and a contemporary of both the Greek philosopher Aristotle and the philosopher Zeno, the founder of Stoicism that opposed his philosophical school, had established Epicureanism in Athens, Greece, to respond to the questions of the Greek public about the necessities of the historical stage and the decline of civilization after the death of AlexanderMacedonian in 324 BC.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

47

Prossinger, Hermann, Tomáš Hladký, Silvia Boschetti, Daniel Říha et Jakub Binter. « Determination of “Neutral”–“Pain”, “Neutral”–“Pleasure”, and “Pleasure”–“Pain” Affective State Distances by Using AI Image Analysis of Facial Expressions ». Technologies 10, n^o 4 (22 juin 2022) : 75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/technologies10040075.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

(1) Background: In addition to verbalizations, facial expressions advertise one’s affective state. There is an ongoing debate concerning the communicative value of the facial expressions of pain and of pleasure, and to what extent humans can distinguish between these. We introduce a novel method of analysis by replacing human ratings with outputs from image analysis software. (2) Methods: We use image analysis software to extract feature vectors of the facial expressions neutral, pain, and pleasure displayed by 20 actresses. We dimension-reduced these feature vectors, used singular value decomposition to eliminate noise, and then used hierarchical agglomerative clustering to detect patterns. (3) Results: The vector norms for pain–pleasure were rarely less than the distances pain–neutral and pleasure–neutral. The pain–pleasure distances were Weibull-distributed and noise contributed 10% to the signal. The noise-free distances clustered in four clusters and two isolates. (4) Conclusions: AI methods of image recognition are superior to human abilities in distinguishing between facial expressions of pain and pleasure. Statistical methods and hierarchical clustering offer possible explanations as to why humans fail. The reliability of commercial software, which attempts to identify facial expressions of affective states, can be improved by using the results of our analyses.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

48

Schroeder, Timothy. « Pleasure, Displeasure, and Representation ». Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31, n^o 4 (décembre 2001) : 507–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2001.10717578.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Pleasure and displeasure have been suffering from intellectual neglect in the philosophy of mind. In contemporary work, the mode of experience which effectively dominates discussion is vision—David Marr's work on visual representation and L. Weiskrantz's work on blindsight are familiar to many philosophers of mind, as are the philosophical uses of such work, and no one seems to tire of working out what the frog's eye tells the frog's brain. Who, though, can name a leading theorist of pain? As a source of examples and intuitions, pain is a perennial favorite in ethics and the philosophy of mind, but in both disciplines pain is taken for granted far more often than it is the object of analysis. Equally significantly, forms of displeasure other than pains are very largely neglected. Pleasure, for its part, has been the nigh-exclusive province of moral theorists; few other than Strawson seem to have taken a special interest in it in the philosophy of mind. The object of the present work is to rectify this neglect, and to give an account of pleasure and displeasure which reveals a striking degree of unity and theoretical tractability underlying the diverse phenomena: arepresentationalistaccount.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

49

Warren, James. « Socrates And The Patients : Republic IX, 583c-585a ». Phronesis 56, n^o 2 (2011) : 113–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852811x558447.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

AbstractRepublic IX 583c-585a presents something surprisingly unusual in ancient accounts of pleasure and pain: an argument in favour of the view that there are three relevant hedonic states: pleasure, pain, and an intermediate. The argument turns on the proposal that a person’s evaluation of their current state may be misled by a comparison with a prior or subsequent state. The argument also refers to ‘pure’ and anticipated pleasures. The brief remarks in the Republic may appear cursory or clumsy in comparison with the Philebus, but this appearance is misleading. Rather, they are part of a neat dialectical argument against a potentially troubling set of opponents. Socrates’ use of a topological analogy at 584d3-585a7 rounds off this section by clarifying and illustrating his position, preparing the ground for the final explanation of the pleasantness of the philosophical life at 585a-587c.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

50

Tordo·Rombaut, Karine. « Protagoras 351b3‑358d4 : le plaisir et rien d’autre ». Chôra 17 (2019) : 59–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chora2019175.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

In Protagoras 351b3‑358d4, Socrates apparently admits the use of pleasure and pain as criteria for distinguishing between good and bad. Focusing on this passage, my paper outlines three problems, raising from : (1) the contradiction between Socrates’ objection to pleasure in other platonic dialogues and his assent here to a hypothesis which identifies good with pleasure ; (2) the petitio principii apparently involved in Socrates’ argument to support the thought that knowledge is more powerful than emotions ; (3) the compatibility of his “ hedonist ” hypothesis with his “intellectualist” thought. My paper undertakes to reconstruct Socrates’ argument, in order to answer problem (2). I contend that this argument makes the humans admit they are deprived of the knowledge both of good and evil and of pleasant and painful, a point sufficient to silence them when they speak of “knowledge being defeated by pleasure”. This contention helps answering problem (1), through a distinction between so‑called pleasures (to which Socrates objects) and real ones (which he might accept). My conclusion answers problem (3), by showing that, held together, both the “hedonist” hypothesis and the “intellectualist” thought lead to not take pleasure for granted, as required to secure a philosophical approach.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

Nous offrons des réductions sur tous les plans premium pour les auteurs dont les œuvres sont incluses dans des sélections littéraires thématiques. Contactez-nous pour obtenir un code promo unique!