Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Oligopolistic models selection »

This paper compares two types of models from the aspects of function selection, hypothesis parameters and modeling basis, and further constructs two composite comparative yield game models to further analyze the cooperation and competition of node enterprises in the supply chain. Based on the output game model of the three-level supply chain, a kind of control system which makes the decision of distributors and retailers chaotic is constructed, and the simulation analysis and supply chain application interpretation are given.

The global economic environment is becoming increasingly complex with the variable change in the competition regulation and the merging of technological innovation. A single equipment manufacturing enterprise cannot achieve the realization of an intelligent strategy. With the help of open innovation, the enterprise can build an intelligent manufacturing innovation ecosystem based on promoting internal re-engineering of enterprises and mutual opening of internal innovation resource processes among enterprises to strengthen cooperation. However, since open innovation is a complex collaborative innovation of multiorganizational cooperation, this paper analyzes and discusses the green open innovation cooperation strategy among oligopolistic enterprises in the equipment manufacturing industry under the influence of environmental regulation by using relevant models and theories of evolutionary game theory. In addition, the optimal combination under the existing situation is selected by using the model to simulate and analyze the selection trends and results of oligopolistic enterprises several times. The study shows that the probability of choosing an open green innovation strategy among oligopolistic equipment manufacturing firms is positively proportional to the excess benefit of open green innovation and government subsidies and inversely proportional to the excess benefit of knowledge spillover, government penalties, and the cost of open collaborative innovation and knowledge spillover between two firms.

In its brief history, the relation between game theory and economics has been characterized by phases of feverish elaboration of new contributions followed by periods in which an open skepticism concerning its usefulness prevailed. Moreover, this vaguely cyclical pattern of evolution has affected various research areas. After an initial period in which game theorists focused their attention on competitive market models, in the 1970s and 1980s they turned to the problems of oligopolistic markets and bargaining. Today the latter research areas are going through a phase of sedimentation and selection while other fields of study receive a strong impulse from the application of game theory.

Game theory has become an important tool to study the competition between oligopolistic enterprises. After combing the existing literature, it is found that there is no research combining two-stage game and nonlinear dynamics to analyze the competition between enterprises for advertising. Therefore, this paper establishes a two-stage game model to discuss the effect of the degree of firms’ advertising input on their profits. And the complexity of the system is analyzed using nonlinear dynamics. This paper analyzes and studies the dynamic game for two types of application network models: data transmission model and transportation network model. Under the time-gap ALOHA protocol, the noncooperative behavior of the insiders in the dynamic data transmission stochastic game is examined as well as the cooperative behavior. In this paper, the existence of Nash equilibrium and its solution algorithm are proved in the noncooperative case, and the “subgame consistency” of the cooperative solution (Shapley value) is discussed in the cooperative case, and the cooperative solution satisfying the subgame consistency is obtained by constructing the “allocation compensation procedure.” The cooperative solution is obtained by constructing the “allocation compensation procedure” to satisfy the subgame consistency. In this paper, we propose to classify the packets transmitted by the source nodes, and by changing the strategy of the source nodes at the states with different kinds of packets, we find that the equilibrium payment of the insider increases in the noncooperative game with the addition of the “wait” strategy. In the transportation dynamic network model, the problem of passenger flow distribution and the selection of service parameters of transportation companies are also studied, and a two-stage game theoretical model is proposed to solve the equilibrium price and optimal parameters under Wardrop’s criterion.

We assess the impact of the European reform in the electricity market focusing on the effects of the First (96/92/EC) and the Second Directive (2003/54/EC). The contribution of the thesis is threefold. Firstly, we study the progress towards a single integrated EU market examining wholesale electricity price convergence in the main EU power exchanges. The key idea is if the underlying national markets are integrated, then there is evidence of a real integrated market. Thus, over the long run wholesale electricity prices should follow the same pattern. To establish wholesale price convergence we apply a fractional cointegration analysis developed by Granger. We find evidence of perfect cointegration between the German and the Austrian wholesale electricity markets. Secondly, we analyse the impact of the reform at retail level focusing on the effect on industrial consumer welfare. Specifically, we study the price-cost margins in the EU15 countries over the period 1980-2006. Our analysis examines the long-run equilibrium of achieving a single internal electricity market allowing Member States to converge freely to the steady state as established by the harmonization principle of the EU reform. Differently from previous studies, we apply the pooled mean group estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999), which constraints the long run parameters to be same, representing therefore the EU mandated goal of market integration, and allows different rates of adjustment to the equilibrium, representing harmonization. Empirical evidence shows that wholesale market opening, privatization and regulation result in an increase of industrial consumer welfare. However, as the degree of vertical integration decreases, price-cost margins increase shrinking industrial-consumer welfare. In addition, the analysis of national rates of adjustment to long-run equilibrium shows that Italy and Germany are the countries with the highest and lowest profit persistence respectively. Finally, we focus on the Italian wholesale market, specifically the Italian day-ahead market, to establish the progress towards competition after wholesale market opening, linking theoretical predictions and empirical findings to identify its underlying oligopolistic structure and to examine potential improvements in consumer welfare after market liberalization. Accounting for the zone organization of the Italian wholesale market, we study the two main macrozones North and South in the summer and winter months of 2005 and 2006. In each market, we define the set of the strategic players and price-taker firms according to both generation capacity and production. We then define two oligopolistic models to describe the underlying oligopolistic structure. In particular, in the North market, we compare the Stackelberg and the Cournot model, whereas, in the South, the Stackelberg and the Dominant firm model. To determine the coefficients of the strategic player’s residual demand, we first estimate the competitive fringe supply. We evaluate the oligopolistic market outcome according to optimization techniques. Applying a variation of the traditional coefficient of determination we find that the North market has recorded a change in the oligopolistic structure from the Stackelberg model (2005) to the Cournot model (2006). However, as stated by microeconomic theory this change implies a loss of efficiency. Concerning the South market results show that during weekdays, in both years, the market follows a Stackelberg model. Instead, during weekends the market has recorded a change from the Dominant firm model to the Stackelberg model.