Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Neurosciences – Aspect moral »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Neurosciences – Aspect moral"
GRAF, FRIEDRICH WILHELM. « God's Brain. Some Critical Remarks on Modern Neurotheology ». European Review 15, no 2 (4 avril 2007) : 257–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1062798707000257.
Texte intégralÁRNASON, GARDAR. « Neuroimaging, Uncertainty, and the Problem of Dispositions ». Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19, no 2 (12 mars 2010) : 188–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180109990454.
Texte intégralBULLER, TOM. « The New Ethics of Neuroethics ». Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 27, no 4 (10 septembre 2018) : 558–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180118000087.
Texte intégralMusto, Lynn C., Patricia A. Rodney et Rebecca Vanderheide. « Toward interventions to address moral distress ». Nursing Ethics 22, no 1 (10 juin 2014) : 91–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0969733014534879.
Texte intégralHÄYRY, MATTI. « Neuroethical Theories ». Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19, no 2 (12 mars 2010) : 165–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180109990430.
Texte intégralLOVELESS, SHERRY E., et JAMES GIORDANO. « Neuroethics, Painience, and Neurocentric Criteria for the Moral Treatment of Animals ». Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 23, no 2 (4 février 2014) : 163–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180113000698.
Texte intégralRappaport, Jack M., Stephen B. Richter et Dennis T. Kennedy. « An Innovative Information Technology Educational Framework Based on Embodied Cognition and Sensory Marketing ». International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences 9, no 2 (avril 2018) : 85–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijsds.2018040106.
Texte intégralZULLO, SILVIA. « Naturalizing Responsibility ». Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25, no 4 (16 septembre 2016) : 700–711. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180116000426.
Texte intégralRueda, Jon. « Socrates in the fMRI Scanner : The Neurofoundations of Morality and the Challenge to Ethics ». Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30, no 4 (octobre 2021) : 604–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180121000074.
Texte intégralDašić, Dejan, Gruja Kostadinović et Milan Stanković. « Ethical Aspects of Science and Technological Innovations ». International Journal of Cognitive Research in Science, Engineering and Education (IJCRSEE) 11, no 2 (31 août 2023) : 343–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.23947/2334-8496-2023-11-2-343-350.
Texte intégralThèses sur le sujet "Neurosciences – Aspect moral"
Thomasset, Laure. « La neuroéthique saisie par le droit : contribution à l'élaboration d'un droit des neurotechnologies ». Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 1, 2021. https://buadistant.univ-angers.fr/login?url=https://bibliotheque.lefebvre-dalloz.fr/secure/isbn/9782247226603.
Texte intégralBorn in the 2000s with the aim of addressing a growing ethical concern over the neuroscientist advances, neuroethics shall be understood as an ethical reflection related to neurosciences. Seized by law since the law on bioethics dated July, 7th 2011, it was embedded in the legal sphere by means of a special regime, namely neurotechnology law. Since the latter undeniably fails within bioethics law, the health risk arising from these technologies was self-evidently considered. After scrutiny though, the rationale behind creating rules peculiar to neuroscientist technologies mainly lies in the presence of a different risk : the behavioural risk. Surprisingly, such risk was given cursory consideration only in its various aspects by the legislature. Based on this observation, the purpose of this thesis is to make a contribution to the development of the aforementioned special regime, by seeking to integrate further the behavioural risk issues without detriment to the consideration already given to the health risk. Towards that end, measures are proposed for each family of neurotechnologics. As regards cerebral imaging technologies, this includes restricting their permissible purposes as well as correcting the conditions for prior consent. With respect, to neuromodulation technologies, it is a question, of limiting their purpose for use and to overhaul the liability rules
FeldmanHall, Oriel. « A neuro-cognitive investigation of human moral decision-making in real and hypothetical contexts ». Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2012. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.610657.
Texte intégralGauthier, Élaine. « Les fondements naturels du jugement moral : rationalisme et sentimentalisme à l'ère des neurosciences ». Mémoire, 2011. http://www.archipel.uqam.ca/4621/1/M12313.pdf.
Texte intégralCOPPOLA, Federica. « The moral brain and the guilty mind : toward an emotion-oriented general theory of culpability informed by the neuroscience of moral decision-making and antisocial behavior ». Doctoral thesis, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/46848.
Texte intégralExamining Board: Prof. Dennis Patterson, European University Institute (EUI Supervisor); Prof. Lisa Claydon, The Open University Law School; Prof. David Roef, Maastricht University; Prof. Stephen Morse, University of Pennsylvania Law School
Criminal culpability relies upon a rationalist conception of criminal decision-making. According to this rationalist view, criminal decisions are nothing more nor less than the result of intellect-governed instrumental reasoning, aimed at maximizing one’s pleasure to the detriment of the interests of other individuals. Therefore, culpability is grounded solely in offenders’ cognitive intelligential faculties, by virtue of which offenders know the meaning of their criminal actions, and thus willfully choose to act upon their antisocial impulses. While cognitive intellect is thought to be the only mental source of criminal decision-making, emotions are presumed to have no bearing on the deliberative processes leading to rational criminal choices. Criminal law thus excludes emotions from the essential mental components of culpability, as well as of culpability doctrines. The criminal law’s rationalist model of the culpable agent quo calculating, emotionallycold actor collides with the huge body of neuroscientific literature about the influential role of emotions on (im)moral decision-making processes. For emotions appear to be critical in either informing, or hindering, moral decisions - and behavior–, neuroscientific disciplines vigorously hypothesize that antisocial behavior is also, and significantly, emotion-influenced rather than solely cognition-driven. Drawing upon these scientific insights, this dissertation reforms the rationalist tenets of culpability by including emotions in its relevant psychological set. It therefore provides a broader paradigm of the “legally relevant mind”, one in which emotional, cognitive, and volitional spheres play an equally important role in determining criminal choices. It then offers a normative argument for reconsidering the overall meaning of culpability in light of the real mental processes that undergird and guide moral decision-making and antisocial behavior. The argument emphasizes that an emotion-oriented understanding of culpability better reflects the meaning of blameworthiness, and exhibits greater compliance with the principle of personal guilt. The investigation then tests the newly developed emotion-oriented conception of culpability, informed by moral neuroscience, on culpability doctrines – notably, the mens rea state of criminal intent, insanity, and diminished capacity. After integrating the new paradigm of legally relevant mind in the respective psychological sets of said doctrines, the study reconsiders their conceptual substance, and provides revised formulations of their standards. The dissertation concludes with an analysis of the potential implications of this neuroscientifically informed theory of culpability for forensic and correctional contexts.
Livres sur le sujet "Neurosciences – Aspect moral"
Benno, Hess, et Plogg Detlev, dir. Neurosciences and ethics : Federal Republic of Germany, Klostergut Jakobsberg, 20-25 April, 1986. Berlin : Springer-Verlag, 1988.
Trouver le texte intégralA, Rees David, et Rose, Steven P. R. 1938-, dir. The new brain sciences : Perils and prospects. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Trouver le texte intégralThe ethical brain. New York, NY : Dana Press, 2004.
Trouver le texte intégralMarcus, Steven. Neuroethics : Mapping the field : conference proceedings, May 13-14, 2002, San Francisco, California. New York : Dana Press, 2002.
Trouver le texte intégralFoundation, Charles A. Dana, dir. Neuroethics : Mapping the field : conference proceedings, May 13-14, 2002, San Francisco, California. New York : Dana Press, 2002.
Trouver le texte intégralL'éthique à l'écoute des neurosciences. Paris : Les Belles lettres, 2013.
Trouver le texte intégralEthics and the neurosciences : Ethical and social consequences of neuroscientific progress. Paderborn : Mentis, 2010.
Trouver le texte intégralA, Van Slyke James, dir. Theology and the science of moral action : Virtue ethics, exemplarity, and cognitive neuroscience. New York : Routledge, 2012.
Trouver le texte intégralThe Oxford handbook of neuroethics. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011.
Trouver le texte intégralOrts, Adela Cortina. Neuroética y neuropolítica : Sugerencias para la educación moral. Madrid : Tecnos, 2011.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Neurosciences – Aspect moral"
« Introduction ». Dans Sensory Individuals, sous la direction de Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz et Rick Grush, 1–16. Oxford University PressOxford, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866305.003.0001.
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