Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Naturalised Epistemology »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Naturalised Epistemology"
Beed, C. « Naturalised epistemology and economics ». Cambridge Journal of Economics 29, no 1 (1 janvier 2005) : 99–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bei013.
Texte intégralMoraes de Assis, Saulo. « Por um naturalismo moderado ? ; For a moderate naturalism ? » Sofia 11, no 2 (1 août 2022) : e11231861. http://dx.doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v11i2.31861.
Texte intégralH, Jales Ribeiro. « The Roots of the Concept of Naturalised Epistemology : Russell and Quine ». Philosophy International Journal 5, no 4 (10 octobre 2022) : 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.23880/phij-16000272.
Texte intégralOmoge, Michael. « Naturalised modal epistemology and quasi-realism ». South African Journal of Philosophy 40, no 3 (3 juillet 2021) : 229–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2021.1949556.
Texte intégralHaack, Susan. « Il buono, il brutto e il cattivo. Disambiguare il naturalismo di Quine ». RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA, no 1 (mars 2009) : 75–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sf2009-001006.
Texte intégralZanet, Giancarlo. « Naturalizzazione, mente e conoscenza ». RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA, no 1 (mars 2009) : 151–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sf2009-001009.
Texte intégralKARUVELIL, Benny. « Naturalised Epistemology and the Quinean-Chomskyan Debate Revisited ». Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 71, no 4 (31 décembre 2009) : 751–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/tvf.71.4.2045822.
Texte intégralCampbell, Jennifer. « Irreducible Freedom in Nature ». Philosophy 89, no 2 (25 octobre 2013) : 301–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819113000752.
Texte intégralLemos, John. « A Defense of Naturalistic Naturalized Epistemology ». Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 35, no 105 (8 janvier 2003) : 49–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2003.1052.
Texte intégralSans Pinillos, Alger, et Anna Estany. « Concerning the Epistemology of Design : The Role of the Eco-Cognitive Model of Abduction in Pragmatism ». Philosophies 8, no 2 (29 mars 2023) : 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8020033.
Texte intégralThèses sur le sujet "Naturalised Epistemology"
Inglis, S. « The form and scope of naturalised epistemology ». Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.604930.
Texte intégralKrieger, Gordon S. F. « Connectionism, naturalized epistemology, and eliminative materialism ». Thesis, McGill University, 1993. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=68112.
Texte intégralI present a review of the connectionist approach to psychological models that contrasts it with the classical symbolic approach, focusing on the nature of their respective representations. While defending the legitimacy of the connectionist approach, I find that its most useful application is as a basis for neuroscientific investigation.
Discussing connectionist psychology, I find it inconsistent with folk psychology and therefore consistent with eliminative materialism. I argue also for the naturalization of epistemology and thus for the relevance of psychology for epistemology. The conclusion of the essay is an outline of connectionist epistemology, which centres around two mathematical analyses of the global activity of connectionist networks; I argue that connectionist psychology leads to a version of epistemic pragmatism.
Freedman, Karyn L. « Naturalized epistemology and the construction of normativity ». Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/NQ59045.pdf.
Texte intégralChristiansen, Jesse G. « Apriority in naturalized epistemology investigation into a modern defense / ». unrestricted, 2007. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-11272007-193136/.
Texte intégralTitle from file title page. George W. Rainbolt, committee chair; Jessica Berry, Steve Jacobson, committee members. Electronic text (43 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Jan 18, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 43).
Christiansen, Jesse Giles. « Apriority in Naturalized Epistemology : Investigation into a Modern Defense ». Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/31.
Texte intégralHundleby, Catherine. « Feminist standpoint theory as a form of naturalist epistemology ». Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/NQ58217.pdf.
Texte intégralRoberts, Brenda. « Connectionism and the integration of error, applications in naturalized epistemology and minimal rationality ». Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ47880.pdf.
Texte intégralPenna-Forte, Marcelo do Amaral. « Iconografia cientifica : um estudo sobre as representações visuais na ciencia ». [s.n.], 2006. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280453.
Texte intégralTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-07T02:48:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Penna-Forte_MarcelodoAmaral_D.pdf: 33078007 bytes, checksum: d5814e0c2de9c5cefde73b485db17b1e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006
Resumo: A presente tese elabora um quadro geral para o estudo das representações visuais, tal como são utilizadas na atividade científica, na perspectiva de uma filosofia naturalista da ciência. Para tanto, é encaminhado um questionamento acerca das funções das representações visuais que passa pela consideração, orientada para este fim, da pertinência das análises funcionais, de uma noção adequada de representação e da caracterização da ciência como um sistema de representações. Conclui-se, finalmente, que as funções das representações visuais concernem à elaboração, ao desenvolvimento e, por vezes, à modificação da rede de similaridades que constitui a ciência
Abstract: This dissertation is concerned with the exposition of a naturalistic general framework for the study of visual representations as they are used in the scientific activity. It raises the question ci the role played by the visual representations in science. In order to do so, it argues for a functional analysis as a philosophical approach, suggests a suitable notion of representation, and describes science as a representational system. Finally, it concludes that visual representations can contribUte to the establishment, to the improvement, and to the revision of the network of similarities that constitutes science
Doutorado
Doutor em Filosofia
Guzman, Dahlia. « The Strategic Naturalism of Sandra Harding's Feminist Standpoint Epistemology : A Path Toward Epistemic Progress ». Scholar Commons, 2018. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7626.
Texte intégralLopes, Arthur Viana. « Três defesas do externalismo epistêmico ». Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2010. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/5689.
Texte intégralCoordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
The purpose of this dissertation is to defend the position known in epistemic literature as epistemic externalism. This position essentially consists in the thesis that some of the features which determine when a belief is a case of knowledge or a case of justified belief are external to the epistemic agent, i.e., they are not internal states of the agent, nor need to be consciously accessed by him. We neither criticize any particular internalist theory, nor advocate a particular externalist theory. Instead, we discuss three different topics that work as a general motivation for adopting externalism. The option for these topics is guided by an interest in naturalistic epistemology and in recent discussions of epistemology. First, we discuss the use of cases the description of imaginary cases with the intent to emphasize the intuition of a particular proposition or to show the counterintuitive consequence of a theory in the debate between internalists and externalists. We try to provide a sort of psychological diagnosis of the use of this intuitive tool and argue that the literature on concepts psychology suggests an advantage for externalist theories. Second, we discuss the contextualist approach about the skeptical paradox and its relation to conceptual analysis. We argue that a semantic approach fails to solve the paradox and that the proper understanding of its origin, and also an invariantist rejection of the contextualist approach, provide a motivation to accept the externalist solution of the problem. At last, we deal with John Pollock s criticism against externalism the idea that a proper naturalistic theory of justification has to be internalist. We analyze whether his refutation really affects all form of externalism, particularly, process reliabilism. We present Pollock s procedural theory of epistemic norms, and discuss if the reasons he presents can actually refute process reliabilism. We claim that the reasons presented do not really put Pollock s project in an advantage.
A proposta deste trabalho é defender a posição conhecida na literatura epistemológica como externalismo epistêmico. O externalismo epistêmico consiste essencialmente na tese de que alguns dos fatores que determinam quando uma crença constitui um caso de conhecimento ou um caso de crença justificada são externos ao agente epistêmico, i.e., não são estados internos ao sujeito, nem precisam ser acessados conscientemente por ele. Nós não atacamos nenhuma teoria particular do internalismo, ou mesmo defendemos uma teoria externalista particular. Em lugar disto, discutimos três tópicos distintos que servem de motivação geral para a adoção do externalismo. A escolha destes tópicos é guiada pelo interesse em uma epistemologia naturalizada e em discussões recentes da epistemologia. Primeiro, nós discutimos a utilização da análise de casos a descrição de casos imaginários com a intenção de salientar a intuição de uma proposição particular ou mostrar a consequência antiintuitiva de uma teoria no debate entre internalistas e externalistas. Nós tentamos fornecer uma espécie de diagnóstico psicológico sobre o uso desta ferramenta intuitiva e argumentamos que a literatura em psicologia de conceitos sugere um favorecimento a teorias externalistas. Segundo, nós discutimos a abordagem contextualista sobre o paradoxo cético e sua relação com a análise conceitual. Nós argumentamos que uma abordagem semântica falha em resolver o paradoxo e que a compreensão adequada de sua origem, assim como uma rejeição invariantista da posição contextualista, fornece uma motivação para aceitarmos a solução externalista do problema. Por último, nós tratamos da crítica de John Pollock ao externalismo, que consiste justamente na ideia de que uma teoria de justificação naturalista adequada deve ser internalista. Nós analisamos se sua refutação realmente atinge toda forma de externalismo e, em particular, o confiabilismo de processo. Nós apresentamos a teoria procedimental de normas epistêmicas de Pollock e discutimos se as razões que ele apresenta podem realmente refutar o confiabilismo de processo. Nós defendemos que as razões que são apresentadas não colocam realmente o projeto de Pollock em vantagem.
Livres sur le sujet "Naturalised Epistemology"
Moral epistemology naturalized. Calgary, Alta : University of Calgary Press, 2000.
Trouver le texte intégralFairweather, Abrol, dir. Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3.
Texte intégralRichmond, Campbell, et Hunter Bruce 1949-, dir. Moral epistemology naturalized. Calgary, Alta : University of Calgary Press, 2000.
Trouver le texte intégralKnowles, Jonathan. Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230511262.
Texte intégralHilary, Kornblith, dir. Naturalizing epistemology. Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press, 1985.
Trouver le texte intégral1962-, Mi Chienkuo, et Chen Ruey-lin, dir. Naturalized epistemology and philosophy of science. Amsterdam : Rodopi, 2007.
Trouver le texte intégralHilary, Kornblith, dir. Naturalizing epistemology. 2e éd. Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press, 1994.
Trouver le texte intégralIllusions of paradox : A feminist epistemology naturalized. Lanham, Md : Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.
Trouver le texte intégralJane, Duran. Knowledge in context : Naturalized epistemology and sociolinguistics. Lanham, Md : Rowman & Littlefield, 1994.
Trouver le texte intégralMeeker, Kevin. Hume’s Radical Scepticism and the Fate of Naturalized Epistemology. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137025555.
Texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Naturalised Epistemology"
Knowles, Jonathan. « Naturalised Epistemology ». Dans Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology, 34–47. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230511262_3.
Texte intégralNolan, Daniel. « Naturalised Modal Epistemology ». Dans Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, 7–27. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_2.
Texte intégralKnowles, Jonathan. « Psychologistic Naturalised Epistemology ». Dans Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology, 114–42. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230511262_6.
Texte intégralGjelsvik, Olav. « The Epistemology of Decision-Making “Naturalised” ». Dans Knowledge, Language and Logic : Questions for Quine, 109–29. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3933-5_9.
Texte intégralSinclair, Robert. « Quine's Epistemology Naturalized ». Dans Just the Arguments, 183–87. Oxford, UK : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444344431.ch47.
Texte intégralKvandal, Halvor. « A Virtue Epistemology for the ». Dans God Naturalized, 145–62. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83178-3_6.
Texte intégralFairweather, Abrol. « Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science ». Dans Virtue Epistemology Naturalized, 1–9. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_1.
Texte intégralFallis, Don. « Epistemic Values and Disinformation ». Dans Virtue Epistemology Naturalized, 159–79. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_10.
Texte intégralComesaña, Juan. « Defeasibility Without Inductivism ». Dans Virtue Epistemology Naturalized, 181–92. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_11.
Texte intégralMorton, Adam. « Acting to Know : A Virtue of Experimentation ». Dans Virtue Epistemology Naturalized, 195–205. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_12.
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