Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Nationalism – Europe, Eastern »

In a world of presumed nation-states nation has been, and still is, an intrinsic part of political legitimization. The claim of nationality has played an important role in such legitimization for the last two centuries. More than this, it has also constituted a fundamental collective entity for an individual's understanding of who they are in relation to those who are perceived as not sharing the nationality. This is nothing new, but in an era of globalization we are witnessing the rebirth of nationalism and nationality (Castells, 1997), where the power struggle over the political agenda will increasingly be about the struggle for the right to identity and the risks of exclusion from the national community. Even if this is the case it stands clear that everyday nationalism and nationalist struggles take different forms in different parts of the world.

The article highlights the international historical context in which the relationships between nationalists and conservatives were formed during the interwar period in Europe. There was made a comparative analysis of similar and distinct attitudes towards religion in the ideology of nationalist movements in interwar Europe and Ukrainian nationalism. For the broader historical context, the example of nationalist movements in Central and Eastern Europe is crucial for understanding Ukrainian nationalism's ideology, including its attitude towards religion. It describes the complex relationships of modern nationalist movements with traditional Christianity, which was a distinct feature of the intellectual and political life of that time in Europe. The study analyzed the ideological foundations of nationalist movements in Central and Eastern Europe, where church and religion occupied a prominent place. Similar and distinctive features of the religion in the nationalist movement in Galicia were analyzed compared to the similar processes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The author states that the representatives of the Polish integrated nationalism and the fascist parties that came to power, namely the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) led by A. Hitler, the Croatian Ustasha, the Iron Guard in Romania, had a fairly large proportion of mythical foundations in their political programs and resembled political religion in their ideology. The ultimate instrument by which the nation could believe in their ideas was the Church. However, the modern political religion that was created could not completely deny the previous one. Therefore, most of the nationalist movements analyzed here had built their relationship with the Church, mainly for two purposes: first, to receive its support, hence the commitment of the believers; second, they used the authority of the Church and religion in their political activities. Keywords: nationalism, fascism, Nazism, Poland, Croatia, Romania, Codreanu, Pavelic, OUN, Onatsky.

The intractable war in Yugoslavia, the breakup of Czechslovakia, the nationalist rumblings in Hungary and Romania, and manifestations of imperial and nationalist longings in Russian politics signify nationalism's enduring potency in Central and Eastern Europe. While some foreign observers worried about this potency, the new elites largely believed that liberalism in power could overcome those forces. Liberal democracy's triumph supposedly meant the end of History,inter alia,aggressive nationalism in Eastern Europe. They believed that these national liberation movements had cooperative, mutually supportive relationships that would flower after Communism ended. Nationalist discords were due to Eastern Europe's previous historical post-1914 nightmares, but the new post-1989 states would have amicable relations with their neighbors. Ostensibly, nationalism, once freed from Soviet repression, would bring an end to Soviet rule and usher in a new ‘springtime of nations.'

The article restates the theory of Nationalism, which it links to the transition from agrarian to industrial or industrializing society. In an agrarian society, culture is used to underscore a complex and fairly stable system of statuses. Political units themselves are complicated and overlapping and ill-defined, and culture does not demarcate their boundaries. In an industrial society, work ceases to be physical and becomes semantic, and society itself is highly mobile. Under these circumstances, a shared and standardized, codified culture, inculcated by formal education, becomes a precondition of social participation and employability. When shared, literacy-linked culture is very important, people identify with it and thus become ‘nationalists’. The article also traces the five stages which Europe has passed in the course of this transition: the perpetuation of the old dynastic/religious political system in 1815, the century of nationalist irredentism, the setting up of a political system in 1918 based on nationalities which was weak and self-defeating, the most intensive period of ‘ ethnic cleansing’ in the 1940s under the cover of war-time secrecy and post-war retaliation, and finally a certain demolition of the intensity of ethnic feeling during advanced industrialism, thanks to the partial convergence of industrial cultures and the softening impact of affluence.

Abstract Author searches for the scientific origins of nationalisms in the region of Eastern Europe. The evaluation starts with an intellectual experiment by trying to understand certain complex aspects of mental mapping concerning the regional concepts of Eastern and Central Europe. Author examines certain historical definitions on nationalisms as extreme forms of patriotism re-emerged after the turnaround of 1989/1990 in the region of Eastern or Central Europe, in the Balkans. However, it is fact, that nationalism as such is still present today even in the Western part of Europe, thus it is in the middle of modern civilisations, despite intricate internationalisation processes. According to the author, it is necessary to understand the impact of communism on the development of nationalisms in Central and Eastern Europe, because this could be a connection link by evaluating different prevalent forms of nationalism in today's Europe.

The prevalence of a culture of ‘tolerance’ towards ethnic minorities in the West in the face of the practices of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Eastern Europe and of other more general practices of intolerance and extermination in parts of the Third World has led to a popular as well as a sometimes academic conception of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ nationalisms essentialised into two radically different kinds of nationalism. In this paper I offer a critique of such a differentiation based on an examination of various practices of dealing with otherness in the process of nation building, particularly in Lebanon and Australia. I argue that practices of nation building, ranging from the promotion of ethnic cultures to mass ethnic killings, are guided by national imaginaries which, despite their empirical variety, are basically structured in the same way. This means, first, that such differences are better understood as the historical or contextual privileging of specific nationalist problematics grounded in this common national imaginary. Second, it means that within the nationalist imaginary that guides them there is a space in which, in given circumstances, the practitioners of valorisation and tolerance can turn into practitioners of mass killings and vice versa without them turning into a radically different kind of nationalists. Far from being specific to an ‘Eastern’ nationalism, the logic of extermination is inherent to any form of nation building today.

Despite the euphoria surrounding the 1989 revolutions, over the past 15 years voices have warned that resurgent nationalism may bring “democracy in dark times” (Isaacs, 1998; Tismaneanu, 1998; Ramet, 1997). Reflecting this fear, a stream of articles has asserted that nationalism in the East is different from the more civic nationalism of the West (Vujacic, 1996; Bunce, 2001; Schöpflin, 2003). If true, these sentiments should be reflected in the constitutions, documents that define the polity and the foundational values of the state in addition to creating the basic institutional order. Debates over religious references in the European Union constitution and the focus on constitutional change by Albanian forces in Macedonia in 2000 serve as reminders of the centrality of constitutions in contention over identity. However, as all constitutions in East Central Europe and the Balkans set out a democratic structure informed by a tangle of national and liberal ideas, they cannot be neatly divided between those which are nationalist and those which are civic, between those which respect minority rights and those which do not. In fact, what is striking about the constitutions is how they combine ideas of liberal individualism, strong democracy, and pluralism.

The article builds on Ishiyama’s (1998) seminal study of Communist successor parties [Ishiyama, J.T., 1998. Strange bedfellows: explaining political cooperation between communist successor parties and nationalists in Eastern Europe. Nations and Nationalism 4(1), 61e85] by providing the first comparative study of the fate of Communist successor parties in Eurasia and Central-Eastern Europe. The article outlines four paths undertaken by Communist parties in former Communist states: those countries that rapidly transformed Communist parties into center-left parties; countries that were slower at achieving this; countries with imperial legacies; and Eurasian autocracies. The fate of successor Communist parties is discussed within the parameters of previous regime type, political opposition in the Communist era and the nationality question.

From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe supported the development of musical theater in Yiddish. Given the difficulties of life in the shtetl, comprising isolation from non-Jewish neighbors, limited educational opportunities, poverty and political oppression, Yiddish opera functioned as a statement of Jewish nationalism. In this paper, I will discuss the historical conditions under which it was presented, including the following factors: effect of folk music styles documented in the field research of ethnomusicologists in Eastern Europe; topicality of subject matter in Yiddish opera as definition of the growing Jewish nationalist political movement; and identity and background of important composers and performers of the genre, and the effect of emigration to the United States on the style and content of their work.

Although the study of nationalism has expanded over the last decade as nationalist movements have increasingly resulted in violent conflict, constructions of gender have not been widely recognised as integral elements of these nationalist projects. Through an examination of nationalist movements in two case studies, this thesis found that gender constructions are vital to the legitimation of nationalist movements. The need to integrate gender (meaning the constructions of both men and women) into studies of nationalist movements stems from the fact that nationalism is a social phenomenon reliant on certain social norms and guidelines for its legitimacy. Nationalism and gender were examined through two thematic lenses, the politics of tradition and the politics of reproduction. The politics of tradition incorporates symbolic aspects of gender, in which the manipulation of tradition and history play a major part. The politics of reproduction are comprised of gender constructions based on the "natural" roles for men and women, such as father and mother. This section examines manifestations of gender constructions such as pronatalism and rape. These lenses were then used to examine two countries in which there were leadership legitimation crises, Romania and the former Yugoslavia. As socialist legitimacy was eroded in the 1980s, potential leaders in both countries sought to legitimate themselves through nationalist ideology. These nationalist movements, which occurred during both the late socialist and post-socialist periods, were highly gendered in their rhetoric and discourse. Gender constructions were found to be vital in the demarcation of difference between national groups, and in the mobilisation of communities to achieve national projects. The symbolic and emotive elements of these gender constructions were used to create the perception of internal and external threats. Additionally, gender constructions were found to have long-term effects on ethnic relations, and, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, on the nature of violent conflict and prospects for peace.

This thesis demonstrates the powerful relationship between ethnicity, culture, nation and state in the Basque Country and the Former Yugoslavia. In placing Basque and Yugoslav sub-state nationalism in comparative relief this study argues that political state or autonomy seeking behavior on the basis of an ethnically defined or imagined community continues to have powerful contemporary salience. Furthermore when situated within the literature on nationalism, these two cases suggest that the theoretical literature needs to be reworked beyond the positions of Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner. The endurance of cultural claims to a political state suggests that the connection between ethnicity and the nation is stronger then many contemporary observers have suggested. It is argued that the cultural, political and territorial rights of sub-state nations are likely to remain highly divisive sites of historical, cultural and political contestation. As a force, nationalism is by no means relegated to the past by cosmopolitanism or a ‘post-national’ shift as a number of high profile commentators in the contemporary social sciences have argued. Rather, it remains an active and powerful idea that will continue to shape the sociopolitical landscape of human societies into the twenty-first century as it has the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This study focuses on nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. Anchored in theories that this region historically has been characterized by a nationalism that is based on the ethnic group rather than on liberal or civic concepts, it is the purpose of this study to explore whether these theories still apply in recent times when the region has been liberalized, for example manifested in the entry to the European Union. The research question has been tested through analysis of the constitutions of a number of Central and Eastern European countries in order to investigate what type of nationalism that the states have codified in their basic political documents. The results show that some of the states give expression to the historical ethnic nationalism in their constitutions, which indicates that the theories still are relevant.

This thesis examines party-based Euroscepticism across four different national contexts in the period 2011-3 by bringing into focus right-wing populist parties. Understanding Europeanization as a label for the impact of engagement with the EU and its practical and normative influences on statecraft, policy-making, and the wider society, the thesis looks into the Europeanization of narratives of national identity, minority rights issues, immigration and citizenship. It discusses the way in which the impact of engagement with the EU is perceived as well as the nature of the arguments made against the EU’s involvement in associated policy processes. There has been a recent upsurge in Euroscepticism due to a combination of economic and political factors, on both the popular and party level in EU countries, as well as the increased blurring of the boundaries between mainstream and fringe Eurosceptics. Hence, it is important to analyze the precise reasons behind this phenomenon. The discussion focuses on “soft Euroscepticism” – the thesis is generally not interested in pondering the generic arguments against a country’s membership in supranational entities or shedding light on those parties who oppose the underlying values on which the EU project rests. The thesis therefore probes the attitudes of parties that – with the recent and partial exception of the PVV in the Netherlands – tend to emphasize relatively specific issue-areas as sources of concerns. This work is primarily based on qualitative methods - 32 elite interviews with nationalist-populist politicians including key figures such as party leaders (Rolf Schlierer, Gheorghe Funar), European Parliament representatives (Barry Madlener) and members of the National Parliament as well as of the general party councils (Ventsislav Lakov) in addition to detailed analysis of policy documentation and books authored by party representatives – and highlights and deconstructs these parties’ grievances attributable to nationalistically-oriented concerns. It includes a detailed literature review that clarifies the EU’s impacts and country-specific historical and contemporary differences in the four domains affected by “Europeanization” (Chapters 1-3) and then in Chapters 4-6 uses original empirical data to compare the attitudes of the four parties – Ataka, PRM, REP, and PVV – with regard to the issues already introduced. The thesis utilizes theoretical approaches drawn from several disciplines ranging from political science to sociology, though it mostly confines itself to those pertaining to core group or minority/ethno-regionalist nationalist mobilization, ethnic vs. civic nationalisms in Eastern vs. Western Europe, as well as the different role played by EU conditionality in relation to the political landscape on the two sides of the continent. Extrapolating from this body of research, it develops hypotheses and projections regarding the expected disconnect in viewpoints between Eastern and Western parties. The study finds that attitudes towards “Europeanized” issues areas diverge greatly and do not necessarily correlate with the extent to which EU membership as a whole is opposed by the party. In line with previous research findings, the EU’s capacity to create a super-order nationalism that could challenge conventional readings of patriotism is generally not conceptualized as a significant threat. However, the interviews did reveal that pre-existing transcendent identities – like Latin identity in the case of Romania or the Slavic one in Bulgaria - – are perceived as threatened or as being tacitly degraded due to assumed cultural biases within the EU. At the same time, the reduced salience of such identities among the members of the Western populist parties does not make them more sympathetic to Pan-Europeanism. EU effects on immigration are predictably rated as manifestly detrimental by the West European parties, because they distrust the professionalism of EU agencies and networks, dislike the Eastern Europeans’ increasing involvement in making higher-level decisions and perceive the EU as more liberally inclined than the national government in this realm (with the latter two points especially applicable to the PVV). However, it was interesting that the East Europeans also expressed some disquiet due to the EU’s supposed culpability in encouraging emigration of their own citizens and the presumed unwillingness of the EU organs to offer them the necessary financial means for combating immigration into Bulgaria across the Turkish border. However, contrary to theoretical expectations, the study suggests that there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to the populist party’s proclivity to regard the EU as an ally of “minority lobbies”, with the PVV (the most Eurosceptic party) assessing the relevancy of this aspect as minor, while it is gauged to be of fundamental importance by Ataka (less Eurosceptic than the PVV). Among CEE populists, the thesis shows how “privileged minorities” like Hungarians and Turks are viewed with alarm due to supposedly making use of the EU level in order to advance their secessionist ambitions (Hungarians in Romania) or improve their socio-economic prospects at the expense of the majority (Turks in ethnically mixed regions of Bulgaria). In short, the thesis establishes that there is still a strong dividing line between Eastern and Western populist parties in relation to the assessments made with regard to the impact of the EU on European identity, migration issues and majority-minority dynamics.

Conservative international thought in Victorian Britain is a prominent landmark in the landscape of international thought which has up to now gone unmapped. In illuminating this body of thought, the thesis addresses weaknesses present in three different historiographies. As the first detailed study of conservative international thought in Victorian Britain, the thesis rectifies a marked bias in Victorian intellectual history towards the study of liberal and radical thought. Furthermore, by analysing the political thought of major representatives of the conservative educated classes, this thesis provides context for the history of conservative high politics, thereby leading us to view these in a different light. Finally, this study, by providing a historically nuanced account of the evolution of major themes of international relations theory in mid-Victorian Britain, functions as a corrective to the self-history of the academic field of International Relations. The thesis makes its argument by analysing conservative contributions in periodicals, pamphlets, and newspapers to British public debates on international affairs, from the Crimean War (1854-56) until the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-80. The general claim of this thesis is that there existed a distinctly conservative perspective on the international sphere. The core elements of this conservative perspective were the primacy of statesmen in setting foreign policy; of interests, military force, and stature in determining the course of international politics; and of order and equilibrium as its normative content. Conservative authors used this constellation of ideas in the major debates of the mid-Victorian era on international affairs, both as a means to make sense of events, and as a counterpoint to liberal narratives - with which Victorian international thought is all too often identified. In recovering the international political thought of Victorian conservatives, this thesis illuminates an important but neglected aspect of how international relations were understood and conceptualised in mid-Victorian Britain.

Le thème que nous nous proposons d’aborder dans la présente thèse est celui du populisme comme idéologie avec ses manifestations dans le monde, en Europe et surtout en Roumanie, où ses amples développements ont été à notre avis insuffisamment explorés jusqu’ici. L’hypothèse que nous avançons et que nous essaierons de valider par notre étude est celle que le populisme roumain n’est pas récent ou de fraiche importation, mais qu’il est solidement enraciné dans l’histoire et que ses évolutions ont un intérêt académique certain. L’interrogation méthodique, approfondie de la bibliographie spécialisée nous a révélé l’existence d’un intérêt minimum pour les variantes roumaines du populisme. La bibliographie internationale sur le populisme roumain est restreinte (Ghiţă Ionescu, Aurel Braun, Vladimir Tismăneanu, tous d’origine roumaine, sont actuellement les références citables). En Roumanie, quelques recherches isolées, surtout des dix dernières années, ont abordé des aspects ponctuels.Notre démarche tient sur trois piliers. Un premier chapitre théorique vise à interroger et clarifier la notion de populisme. Nous sommes partis à la recherche du populisme en utilisant la méthodologie de Margaret Canovan et Guy Hermet. Nous avons donc entrepris de refaire l’histoire du concept (narodniki russes, populistes américains, agrariens est-européens de l’entre-deux guerres, populismes latino-américains et d’Europe occidentale d’après guerre. L’étude taxonomique s’est accompagnée d’un passage en revue des conditions locales ayant généré les avatars du populisme sur quatre continents. Nous avons par la suite procédé à un état de la recherche sur la notion de populisme pour aboutir à une définition propre qui intègre des éléments dus à Jaguaribe, Hermet, Albertazzi et Mc Donnel, Laclau.Forts de la définition, nous avons passé en revue les rapports entre populisme et les diverses variantes du nationalisme, en insistant sur le national-populisme théorisé en première par Gino Germani, fort présent en Europe centrale et orientale et sans doute en Roumanie. Nous avons insisté sur les spécificités et les variables (temps, existence d’un leader charismatique) du populisme dans cette région, en retraçant, à la manière de Hermet, l’histoire politique de ces pays (Bulgarie, Hongrie, Pologne, République Tchèque, Roumanie, Slovaquie) avec un accent sur les mouvements considérés (à raison ou à tort) comme populistes.Le premier chapitre constitue la trame de fond du second, qui fait un panorama des avatars du populisme roumain des origines et jusqu’au début de la seconde guerre mondiale. Nous y avons surtout utilisé des sources roumaines (monographies de courants idéologiques, biographies, études et synthèses historiques, collections de revues et journaux, documents d’archives). En Roumanie, le populisme s’est manifesté depuis les débuts de la modernité politique, au XIXe. Le problème paysan a représenté la matrice du populisme roumain et l’examen des solutions pour y répondre constitue le fil conducteur de ce chapitre. Nous en avons dressé l’inventaire :populisme d’État modernisateur à la Peron (prince Cuza), socialisme de Gherea avec la paysannerie en arrière-garde du prolétariat, radicalisme bourgeois de gauche (le poporanism de Stere), populisme romantique et passéiste (le semeurisme de Iorga), boulangisme tardif (général Averescu), paysannisme avec sa doctrine coopératiste (PNP de Maniu et Mihalache), mais aussi le fascisme déviant de la Garde de Fer, qui a ciblé elle aussi les campagnes. Tous ces projets politiques ont illustré l’échec du populisme face aux problèmes de la société roumaine en voie de modernisation.Le troisième chapitre est consacré à la récrudescence populiste après la longue parenthèse communiste. Une analyse du national-communisme de Ceauşescu nous permet d’identifier bien des facteurs ayant façonné la société roumaine de 1989. Le national-populisme a connu un important essor en Roumanie post-communiste. Nous avons mis à profit des recherches internationales (De Waele, Tismăneanu), mais aussi locales comme des discours, articles de presse, sondages, archives électroniques. Nous avons accordé une attention particulière au Parti de la Grande Roumanie de Corneliu Vadim Tudor, le cas typique auquel nous avons consacré une étude. D’autres formations (PUNR, PNG de George Becali, Parti du Peuple – Dan Diaconescu, les anémiques héritiers du Mouvement Légionnaire) ont été passées en revue, pour constater leur inconsistance doctrinaire et leur faible impact électoral. De même, nous avons conclu que le national-populisme roumain post-communiste s’inscrit dans la continuité du national-communisme et très marginalement dans celle de ‘entre-deux-guerres. S’adressant aux perdants de la transition, ces partis ont failli à laisser leur marque. Deux leaders ayant fini en prison, un autre mort, la voie populiste semble momentanément fermée, bien qu’elle ait réussi une percée récente dans le discours des partis mainstream. Notre thèse retient une fin qui saurait aussi bien s’avérer un nouveau commencement.
The theme we intend to investigate in this dissertation is populism as an ideology with its embodiments throughout the world, in Europe and most of all in Romania, where its vast developments have been in our view insufficiently explored until now. The hypothesis we submit and which we shall try to validate by our research is that Romanian populism is not recent or freshly imported, but it is deeply rooted in history and its evolutions are of undoubted academic interest. The deep, thorough examination of specialized bibliography revealed us a limited interest for the Romanian variants of populism. The international bibliography on Romanian populism is far from extensive (Ghiţă Ionescu, Aurel Braun, Vladimir Tismăneanu, all of Romanian origin, are now the quotable references). In Romania, the research is not abundant either, but over the ten last years some individual aspects of the topic have been investigated. Our approach is threefold. A first theoretical chapter aims to questioning and clarifying the notion of populism itself. We set off in search of populism making use of Margaret Canovan and Guy Hermet’s methodology. We have thus ventured to trace back the concept’s history (Russian narodniki, American populists, East-European agrarianisms in-between the world wars, Latin-American and Western European populisms after WWII. The taxonomic study was accompanied by a review of local contexts having generated the avatars of populism on four continents. We have subsequently drawn a state-of-play of the research on populism as a concept in order to come up with our own definition which integrates elements owed to Jaguaribe, Hermet, Albertazzi & Mc Donnel, Laclau.On the solid ground of the definition, we have reviewed the relationships between populism and the diverse variants of nationalism, focusing on the national-populism first theorized by Gino Germani. National-populism is to be widely encountered in Central and Eastern Europe and undoubtedly in Romania. We have insisted on the specificities and variables (time, existence of a charismatic leader) of populism in this region, by recounting in the manner of Hermet the political history of these countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) with special regard to movements rightly or wrongly considered as populist. The first chapter sets the framework of the second one, which brings about a panorama of the Romanian populist avatars from its origins to the start of WWIII. We have mostly made use of Romanian sources (monographs of ideological trends, biographies, historical studies, collections of magazines and newspapers, documents from the archives).Populism has been a constant presence in Romania, since the beginnings of the country’s political modernity in the 19th century. The peasant problem represents the matrix of Romanian populism and the review of the foreseen solutions to solve it represents the unifying thread of this chapter. We have proceeded to an inventory :modernizing state populism à la Peron (prince Cuza), Gherea’s socialism with the peasantry seen as the rearguard of the proletariat, left bourgeois radicalism (Stere and his poporanism), Romanticist & revivalist populism (Iorga and his sămănătorism), late boulangisme (General Averescu), agrarianism with the underlying cooperatist doctrine (National Peasant Party of Maniu and Mihalache), but also the Iron Guard’s deviant fascism, which targeted rural areas as well. All these political projects illustrated the failure of populism to address the problems of Romanian society on its way to modernity. The third chapter deals with the populist revival in Romania after the fall of communism in 1989. An analysis of Nicolae Ceauşescu’s national-communism enables us to identify many factors having shaped the Romanian society of 1989. National-populism enjoyed massive success in post-communist Romania. We took advantage of international (De Waele, Tismăneanu), but also local research and explored speeches, press items, polls, electronic archives.Particular attention was paid to Corneliu Vadim Tudor’s Greater Romania, the typical case which we studied. Other parties (PNUR, George Becali’s NGP, Dan Diaconescu’s People’s Party, the feeble heirs to the Legionary Movement) were reviewed, only to conclude to their doctrinal shallowness and weak electoral impact. We have come to the conclusion that Romania’s post-communist national-populism is based on the legacy of national-communism and only marginally on the heritage of Romania’s interwar populisms. Targeting the losers of transition, these parties failed to achieve major success. Two of their leaders ended up in prison, a third one is dead, so the populist path seems momentarily shut, though it has managed a recent breakthrough into the discourse of mainstream parties. Our dissertation closes on an end note which may well prove a new beginning.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

British imperialism of the Ottoman Empire is analyzed in terms of power and influence. Changes in gender roles, nationalism, and culture are all examined through the lens of imperialism. The discourse flows thematically and discusses brief histories of both Britain and the Ottoman Empire. The construction of the Imperial Museum created a unified image of the nation through the collection of material items. As a result of European imperialism, the Ottoman Empire developed a sense of national culture.

In recent years, the European Union has been facing a number of challenges that it is finding it increasingly difficult to overcome. Most EU member states are facing a crisis of confidence in Europe and its institutions, and at the same time nationalist political parties and ideas are developing more and more, leading to a weakening of European solidarity. Eastern European countries weakened awareness of the collective interest. The common values that existed until then have become “diluted”, because different understandings of the nature of the state have emerged, as well as different views on international politics. At the same time, support for European integration among citizens has been declining, and fewer and fewer have seen membership as good and can bring significant benefits. Today, the idea of a united EU is in crisis and that is precisely the cause of the crisis the Union is facing.