Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Nash stability »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Nash stability"
Lensberg, Terje. « Stability and the Nash solution ». Journal of Economic Theory 45, no 2 (août 1988) : 330–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90273-6.
Texte intégralOsborne, Martin J., et Eric Van Damme. « Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria ». Canadian Journal of Economics 22, no 2 (mai 1989) : 447. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/135684.
Texte intégralMORGAN, JACQUELINE, et VINCENZO SCALZO. « VARIATIONAL STABILITY OF SOCIAL NASH EQUILIBRIA ». International Game Theory Review 10, no 01 (mars 2008) : 17–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908001741.
Texte intégralWang, Lei, Cui Liu, Juan Xue et Hongwei Gao. « A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games ». Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2018 (1 novembre 2018) : 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/3293745.
Texte intégralBhadury, J., et H. A. Eiselt. « Stability of Nash equilibria in locational games ». RAIRO - Operations Research 29, no 1 (1995) : 19–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/1995290100191.
Texte intégralAlós-Ferrer, Carlos. « Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria ». International Game Theory Review 05, no 03 (septembre 2003) : 263–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001057.
Texte intégralLiu, Chenwei, Shuwen Xiang et Yanlong Yang. « Existence and essential stability of Nash equilibria for biform games with Shapley allocation functions ». AIMS Mathematics 7, no 5 (2022) : 7706–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/math.2022432.
Texte intégralOKUGUCHI, KOJI, et TAKESHI YAMAZAKI. « GLOBAL STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES ». International Game Theory Review 16, no 04 (décembre 2014) : 1450014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198914500145.
Texte intégralYang, Guanghui, et Hui Yang. « Stability of Weakly Pareto-Nash Equilibria and Pareto-Nash Equilibria for Multiobjective Population Games ». Set-Valued and Variational Analysis 25, no 2 (12 octobre 2016) : 427–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11228-016-0391-6.
Texte intégralCalvó-Armengol, Antoni, et Rahmi İlkılıç. « Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation ». International Journal of Game Theory 38, no 1 (18 septembre 2008) : 51–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0140-7.
Texte intégralThèses sur le sujet "Nash stability"
Badasyan, Narine. « Game Theoretic Models of Connectivity Among Internet Access Providers ». Diss., Virginia Tech, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11193.
Texte intégralPh. D.
Chakrabarti, Subhadip. « Network Formation and Economic Applications ». Diss., Virginia Tech, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11256.
Texte intégralPh. D.
Melo, Mateus Moreira de 1991. « Estabilidade de folheações via teorema da função inversa de Nash-Moser ». [s.n.], 2015. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/306949.
Texte intégralDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Matemática Estatística e Computação Científica
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Resumo: Neste trabalho, estudamos o conceito de estabilidade para folheações. Com este objetivo, usamos um complexo não-linear formado por mapas e variedades na categoria Fréchet Tame. Aplicamos uma variação do Teorema da Função Inversa de Nash-Moser ao complexo não-linear obtendo uma relação entre estabilidade e a exatidão tame da linearização do complexo não-linear. Além disso, o complexo linearizado é identificado com um trecho do complexo de Rham da folheação, ou seja, transforma-se o estudo de estabilidade em analisar a exatidão tame de um grupo de cohomologia da folheação. Assim descrevemos uma família de folheações estáveis, chamadas folheações infinitesimalmente estáveis. Esta família dá uma direção para o estudo de estabilidade de folheações
Abstract: In this work, we study the concept of stability for foliations. With this aim we use a non linear complex formed by maps and manifolds in Fréchet Tame category. We apply a variation of The Nash-Moser Inverse Function Theorem to non-linear complex obtaining a relation between the stability and the tame exactness of the linearized complex. Moreover, the linearized complex is identified with a piece of the complex de Rham of the foliation, i.e., we transformed the stability study into a analysis of tameness vanishing on the cohomology group of the foliation. Thus we describe a family of stable foliations, called infinitesimally stable foliations. This family gives a direction for the study of stability of foliations
Mestrado
Matematica
Mestre em Matemática
VARRICCHIO, GIOVANNA. « Gathering Self-Interested People Together : a Strategic Perspective ». Doctoral thesis, Gran Sasso Science Institute, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12571/23261.
Texte intégralKim, Sunjin. « Essays on Network formation games ». Diss., Virginia Tech, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/104598.
Texte intégralDoctor of Philosophy
This dissertation focuses on studying various network formation games in Economics. We explore a different model in each chapter to capture various aspects of networks. Chapter 1 provides an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 studies the possible singed network configurations in equilibrium. In the signed network, players can choose a positive (+) relationship or a negative (-) relationship toward each other player. We study the case that the players are heterogeneous. We find 3 possible categories of networks in equilibrium: Utopia network, positive assortative matching, and disassortative matching. We derive the specific conditions under which they arise in equilibrium. In Chapter 3, we study a generalized model of signed network formation game where the players can choose not only positive and negative links but also neutral links. We check whether the results of the signed network formation model in the literature still hold in our generalized framework. Chapter 4 studies inequality in a weighted network formation model using the notion of Nash equilibrium. In this weighted network model, each player can choose the level of relationship. As a factor of inequality, there are two types of players: rich players and poor players. We show that both rich and poor players choose other rich players as their best friends. As a result, we present that nested split graphs are drawn from survey data because these social network data are censored due to the limit of the number of responses.
Delport, Jacques. « Critical Substation Risk Assessment and Mitigation ». Diss., Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/83444.
Texte intégralPh. D.
Lustosa, Bernardo Carvalho. « Precificação em orquestradores de informação : maximizando redes estáveis ». reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/11108.
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Em redes de inovação baseadas em trocas de informação, o agente orquestrador se apropria das informações dos atores periféricos, gera inovação e distribui em forma de valor agregado. É sua função promover a estabilidade na rede fazendo com que a mesma tenha taxas não negativas de crescimento. Nos mercados de análise de crédito e fraude, por exemplo, ou bureaus funcionam como agentes orquestradores, concentrando as informações históricas da população que são provenientes de seus clientes e fornecendo produtos que auxiliam na tomada de decisão. Assumindo todas as empresas do ecossistema como agentes racionais, a teoria dos jogos se torna uma ferramenta apropriada para o estudo da precificação dos produtos como mecanismo de promoção da estabilidade da rede. Este trabalho busca identificar a relação de diferentes estruturas de precificação promovidas pelo agente orquestrador com a estabilidade e eficiência da rede de inovação. Uma vez que o poder da rede se dá pela força conjunta de seus membros, a inovação por esta gerada varia de acordo com a decisão isolada de cada agente periférico de contratar o agente orquestrador ao preço por ele estipulado. Através da definição de um jogo teórico simplificado onde diferentes agentes decidem conectar-se ou não à rede nas diferentes estruturas de preços estipuladas pelo agente orquestrador, o estudo analisa as condições de equilíbrio conclui que o equilíbrio de Nash implica em um cenário de estabilidade da rede. Uma conclusão é que, para maximizar o poder de inovação da rede, o preço a ser pago por cada agente para fazer uso da rede deve ser diretamente proporcional ao benefício financeiro auferido pela inovação gerada pela mesma. O estudo apresenta ainda uma simulação computacional de um mercado fictício para demonstração numérica dos efeitos observados. Através das conclusões obtidas, o trabalho cobre uma lacuna da literatura de redes de inovação com agentes orquestradores monopolistas em termos de precificação do uso da rede, servindo de subsídio de tomadores de decisão quando da oferta ou demanda dos serviços da rede.
In innovation networks based on information exchange, the orchestrating actor, or hub, captures information from the peripherical actors, promotes innovation and then distributes it for the network in the form of added value. Orchestration comprises promoting the network’s stability in order to avoid negative growth rates. The credit and fraud agencies, for example, can be understood as orchestrating hubs, concentrating the historical information of the population generated by their clients and offering products that support decision making. Assuming all the companies of this ecosystem as rational agents, game theory emerges as an appropriate framework for the study of pricing as a mechanism to promote the network’s stability. The present work focuses on the identification of a relationship between the different pricing options that can be proposed by the orchestrating hub and the network’s stability and efficiency. Since the network power is given by the combined strength of its members, the innovation generated is a function of the isolated decision of each peripherical agent on whether to hire the orchestrating hub’s services for the price defined by the latter. Through the definition of a simplified theoretical game in which agents decide whether to connect or not to the network based on the pricing structure defined by the hub, the present study analyzes the equilibrium conditions and concludes that the Nash equilibrium entails the network’s stability. One of the conclusions is that in order to maximize the innovation power of the network, the agents should be charged a price that is proportional to the financial benefit obtained by the innovation generated by the net. The study presents as well a computer simulation of a fictitious market for a numerical demonstration of the observed effects. With these conclusions, the present study fills a gap in the literature on monopolistic orchestrated innovation in terms of the pricing structures of the network connection and its use. It can be used as a basis for decision making both on the supply and the demand sides of the services of the hub.
Dhif, Mohamed Adel. « Renégociation, stabilité et équilibres d'oligopole ». Toulouse 1, 1990. http://www.theses.fr/1990TOU10007.
Texte intégralThis work studies some problems related to the caracterization of the rational behaviour in oligopoly strategic interactions. The first part deals with the impact of renegotiation on the consistency of subgame perfect equilibria. We review the main results in the literture about this subject and we examine the possibilities of collusion in finite horizon repeated oligopoly games when players are able to renegociate their actions. In the second part we present the stable set concept suggested by Kohlberg and Mertens. We make use of it in the solution of a two step duopoly game and we compare this concept to other recent refinements of Nash equilibrium
Rossin, Samuel. « Steiner Tree Games ». Oberlin College Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=oberlin1464700445.
Texte intégralMasullo, Mariorosario. « Studies on the NADH oxidase from the thermophiles Sulfolobus acidcaldarius and solfataricus ». Thesis, Cranfield University, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.309679.
Texte intégralLivres sur le sujet "Nash stability"
van Damme, Eric. Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4.
Texte intégralvan Damme, Eric. Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2.
Texte intégralDamme, Eric van. Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria. 2e éd. Berlin : Springer-Verlag, 1991.
Trouver le texte intégralWenger, Andreas. Herausforderung Sicherheitspolitik : Europas Suche nach Stabilität. Zürich : Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zürich, 1999.
Trouver le texte intégralMiele, Alberto. Final report on NASA grant no. NAG-1-516, optimal flight trajectories in the presence of windshear, 1984-86. [Houston, Tex.] : Rice University, 1987.
Trouver le texte intégralGlenn, Lasseigne D., Hussaini M. Yousuff et Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering., dir. The effect of three-dimensional freestream disturbances on the supersonic flow past a wedge : NASA contract no. NAS1-19480. Hampton, VA : Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering, NASA Langley Research Center, 1997.
Trouver le texte intégralGlenn, Lasseigne D., Hussaini M. Yousuff et Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering., dir. The effect of three-dimensional freestream disturbances on the supersonic flow past a wedge : NASA contract no. NAS1-19480. Hampton, VA : Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering, NASA Langley Research Center, 1997.
Trouver le texte intégralGlenn, Lasseigne D., Hussaini M. Yousuff et Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering., dir. The effect of three-dimensional freestream disturbances on the supersonic flow past a wedge : NASA contract no. NAS1-19480. Hampton, VA : Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering, NASA Langley Research Center, 1997.
Trouver le texte intégralGlenn, Lasseigne D., Hussaini M. Yousuff et Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering., dir. The effect of three-dimensional freestream disturbances on the supersonic flow past a wedge : NASA contract no. NAS1-19480. Hampton, VA : Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering, NASA Langley Research Center, 1997.
Trouver le texte intégralUnited States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration., dir. Dynamic Stability Instrumentation System (DSIS)... NASA-TM-109156... Mar. 31, 1997. [S.l : s.n., 1998.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Nash stability"
van Damme, Eric. « Strategic Stability and Applications ». Dans Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 252–304. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2_10.
Texte intégralvan Damme, Eric. « 10 Strategic Stability and Applications ». Dans Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 259–317. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_10.
Texte intégralBilò, Vittorio, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco et Luca Moscardelli. « Nash Stability in Fractional Hedonic Games ». Dans Web and Internet Economics, 486–91. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_44.
Texte intégralvan Damme, Eric. « 1 Introduction ». Dans Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 1–21. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_1.
Texte intégralvan Damme, Eric. « 2 Games in Normal Form ». Dans Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 22–45. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_2.
Texte intégralvan Damme, Eric. « 3 Matrix and Bimatrix Games ». Dans Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 46–62. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_3.
Texte intégralvan Damme, Eric. « 4 Control Costs ». Dans Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 63–79. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_4.
Texte intégralvan Damme, Eric. « 5 Incomplete Information ». Dans Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 80–100. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_5.
Texte intégralvan Damme, Eric. « 6 Extensive Form Games ». Dans Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 101–29. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_6.
Texte intégralvan Damme, Eric. « 7 Bargaining and Fair Division ». Dans Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 130–65. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_7.
Texte intégralActes de conférences sur le sujet "Nash stability"
Ratliff, Lillian J., Samuel A. Burden et S. Shankar Sastry. « Genericity and structural stability of non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria ». Dans 2014 American Control Conference - ACC 2014. IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/acc.2014.6858848.
Texte intégralHarks, Tobias, et Konstantin Miller. « Efficiency and stability of Nash equilibria in resource allocation games ». Dans 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/gamenets.2009.5137425.
Texte intégralKhrustalev, M. M., et A. S. Khalina. « Nash equilibrium for quasi-linear stochastic systems operating on infinite time intervals ». Dans 2018 14th International Conference "Stability and Oscillations of Nonlinear Control Systems" (Pyatnitskiy's Conference) (STAB). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/stab.2018.8408363.
Texte intégralWang, Bin, Silian Sui et Hongliang Zhao. « Nash Equilibrium Stability of Rent-seeking Competition And Its Game Analysis ». Dans Eighth ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Networking, and Parallel/Distributed Computing (SNPD 2007). IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/snpd.2007.91.
Texte intégralDrighes, Benjamin, Walid Krichene et Alexandre Bayen. « Stability of Nash equilibria in the congestion game under Replicator dynamics ». Dans 2014 IEEE 53rd Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2014.7039679.
Texte intégralBasu, Srinka, Debarka Sengupta, Ujjwal Maulik et Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay. « A strong Nash stability based approach to minimum quasi clique partitioning ». Dans 2014 Sixth International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/comsnets.2014.6734943.
Texte intégralBilò, Vittorio, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco et Luca Moscardelli. « Optimality and Nash Stability in Additive Separable Generalized Group Activity Selection Problems ». Dans Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/15.
Texte intégralYan, Yuyue, Tomohisa Hayakawa et Nutthanun Thanomvajamun. « Stability Analysis of Nash Equilibrium in Loss-Aversion-Based Noncooperative Dynamical Systems ». Dans 2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc40024.2019.9030066.
Texte intégralKarafyllis, Iasson, Zhong-Ping Jiang et George Athanasiou. « Nash equilibrium and robust stability in dynamic games : A small-gain perspective ». Dans 2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2010.5717808.
Texte intégralInohara, Takehiro. « Refinement of Nash stability using reflexive list functions for the expression of preferences ». Dans 2006 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsmc.2006.385139.
Texte intégral