Articles de revues : « Nash-bargaining model »

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Maude-Griffin, Roland, Roger Feldman * et Douglas Wholey *. « Nash bargaining model of HMO premiums ». Applied Economics 36, n^o 12 (10 juillet 2004) : 1329–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0003684042000238938.

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Chan, Kenneth S. « Trade negotiations in a Nash bargaining model ». Journal of International Economics 25, n^o 3-4 (novembre 1988) : 353–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(88)90060-8.

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Hema, P., N. R. Rejin Paul, Lenka Čepová, Bhola Khan, Kailash Kumar et Vladimira Schindlerova. « Complexity and Monitoring of Economic Operations Using a Game-Theoretic Model for Cloud Computing ». Systems 11, n^o 2 (17 janvier 2023) : 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems11020050.

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In this study, a model is presented for allocating cloud computing resources based on economic considerations using tools from game theory. The model, called the Non-Cooperative Game Resource Allocation Algorithm (NCGRAA), is designed to achieve the optimum stage in cloud computing. In addition, the Bargaining Game Resource Allocation Algorithm (BGRAA) is introduced to the existing system to develop the billing process within the constraints of availability and fairness. This system-based algorithm implements methods for converging on and improving the Nash Equilibrium and Nash Bargaining solutions. While the Nash equilibrium helps to develop decision-making concepts with game theory, one of its main goals is to achieve the desired outcome and avoid deviation from the working stage. Nash Bargaining is a unique solution that occurs between two parties and takes into account the process of bargaining to provide a fair solution that is scale invariant and independent. In recent years, cloud computing has become a popular way to manage computing services and enable producers and consumers to interact. This process allows users to obtain goods at an affordable cost from sellers according to their expectations. This research investigates the economic operation monitoring of cloud computing using the gaming theory model. A Static Negotiation Analysis Method with a Bargaining Process (SNAM-BP) for a dynamic conceptual framework is presented to display the weighted relationship between primary issues and keywords used to evaluate the potential partnership of each country.

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Feng, Zhongwei, Fangning Li et Chunqiao Tan. « Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns ». Behavioral Sciences 13, n^o 2 (1 février 2023) : 124. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/bs13020124.

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The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. The objective of this paper is to explore the impact of fairness concerns in the alternating-offer bargaining game. Alternating-offer bargaining with fairness concerns is developed. We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium and show its uniqueness. Then, it is shown that players’ payoffs in the subgame perfect equilibrium are positively related to their own fairness concern coefficient and bargaining power and negatively to the opponents’ fairness concern coefficient. Moreover, it is shown that the limited equilibrium partition depends on the ratio of discount rates of the two players when the time lapse between two offers goes to zero. Finally, the proposed model is applied to the bilateral monopoly market of professional basketball players, and some properties of equilibrium price are shown. Our result provides the implication that players should carefully weigh their own fairness concerns, bargaining power and fairness concerns of their opponents, and then make proposals, rather than simply follow the suggestion that the proposal at the current stage is higher than that at the past stages.

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Bastianello, Lorenzo, et Marco LiCalzi. « The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining ». Econometrica 87, n^o 3 (2019) : 837–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta13673.

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We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability‐based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers' individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability.

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Demougin, Dominique, et Carsten Helm. « Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power ». German Economic Review 7, n^o 4 (1 décembre 2006) : 463–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2006.00130.x.

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Abstract We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent’s outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent’s bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game.

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L.A, Papakonstantinidis. « The “Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model” : from Social Welfare’s Philosophy towards a Rural Development Concept by Rural Tourism Approach : The WERT Case Study ». INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3, n^o 1 (2017) : 7–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.18775/ijied.1849-7551-7020.2015.35.2001.

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The article is dealing with two interconnected problems based on the conjectures: a) social welfare is a condition for rural development and not the prerequisite for it; b) shape a new landscape (the “win-win-win”) based on critique of the “Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow 1951) through the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, John 1950). Specifically, this article discusses and analyses social welfare and rural development objectives integrating elements from the impossibility theorem, the bargaining theory, and the theory of agency by (a) reviewing the literature on coordination “social welfare” and “rural development” (b) reversing the focus from “voting” to “bargaining” and (c) underlining that Social choice is the perquisite of social welfare, using the “win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model’s solution as the bridge between “voting”(Arrow) and “bargaining”(proposal). This solution highlights the Role of Rural Community as an “Aggregation” corresponding to its “sensitization process”.

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Wang, Meiqiang, et Yongjun Li. « Supplier evaluation based on Nash bargaining game model ». Expert Systems with Applications 41, n^o 9 (juillet 2014) : 4181–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2013.12.044.

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Braun, Norman, et Thomas Gautschi. « A Nash bargaining model for simple exchange networks ». Social Networks 28, n^o 1 (janvier 2006) : 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2004.11.011.

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Fallahnejad, Reza, Mohammad Reza Mozaffari, Peter Fernandes Wanke et Yong Tan. « Nash Bargaining Game Enhanced Global Malmquist Productivity Index for Cross-Productivity Index ». Games 15, n^o 1 (24 janvier 2024) : 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g15010003.

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The Global Malmquist Productivity Index (GMPI) stands as an evolution of the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI), emphasizing global technology to incorporate all-time versions of Decision-Making Units (DMUs). This paper introduces a novel approach, integrating the Nash Bargaining Game model with GMPI to establish a Cross-Productivity Index. Our primary objective is to develop a comprehensive framework utilizing the Nash Bargaining Game model to derive equitable common weights for different time versions of DMUs. These weights serve as a fundamental component for cross-evaluation based on GMPI, facilitating a holistic assessment of DMU performance over varying time periods. The proposed index is designed with essential properties: feasibility, non-arbitrariness concerning the base time period, technological consistency across periods, and weight uniformity for GMPI calculations between two-time versions of a unit. This research amalgamates cross-evaluation and global technology while employing geometric averages to derive a conclusive cross-productivity index. The core motivation behind this methodology is to establish a reliable and fair means of evaluating DMU performance, integrating insights from Nash Bargaining Game principles and GMPI. This paper elucidates the rationale behind merging the Nash Bargaining Game model with GMPI and outlines the objectives to provide a comprehensive Cross-Productivity Index, aiming to enhance the robustness and reliability of productivity assessments across varied time frames.

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Zhang, Jin, Cungang Hu, Changbao Zheng, Tao Rui, Weixiang Shen et Bo Wang. « Distributed Peer-to-Peer Electricity Trading Considering Network Loss in a Distribution System ». Energies 12, n^o 22 (13 novembre 2019) : 4318. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12224318.

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In this paper, a distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity trading model was proposed to study economic interactions between load aggregators (LAs) and microgrid operators (MGOs) considering network losses in a distribution system. In this model, the economic interactions among market participants were formulated as a Nash bargaining game, where LAs and MGOs can bargain with each other on the trading volume of electricity and payment. To achieve the Nash bargaining solution, the game was divided into two sub-problems: social welfare maximization and payment bargaining. Then, the alternating direction method of multipliers was used to solve the two sub-problems with limited information exchange. Finally, we tested the proposed model on a 12 × 12 km2 distribution system, and the results verify its effectiveness.

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Zhang, Weizhong, Yuchen Zhang, Ping Gu, Pei Yang, Yahua Chen, Siqi Zheng et Kunyang Li. « Coordinated operation optimization strategy for multiple microgrids considering uncertainties in renewable energy output ». Journal of Physics : Conference Series 2814, n^o 1 (1 août 2024) : 012054. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2814/1/012054.

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Abstract In the process of constructing a new power system with a focus on new energy sources, microgrids will be vigorously developed as an effective means of accommodating renewable resources. The synergistic operation of multiple microgrids, merging into a multi-stakeholder framework, is a method to strengthen the overall effectiveness of the system. However, existing Nash bargaining models consider relatively fewer influencing factors. To enhance the reliability and economic viability of microgrids, this paper effectively proposes a model that combines Nash bargaining with two-stage robust optimization. Specifically, the optimization model is divided into two stages. In the first stage, equipment configuration is optimized with the objective of system economy. In the second stage, uncertainties arising from renewable energy sources are considered. Subsequently, the two-stage robust model utilizes C&CG to obtain energy exchange values between microgrids. The Nash bargaining model is then addressed using the ADMM algorithm. Finally, through case simulations, the improvement in the benefits of different microgrids is verified to be in the range of 13% to 24%.

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Chang, Tian Tian, Li Li Wang, Ji Hui Zhang et Qing Yue Ma. « Bargaining Based Supply Chain Scheduling ». Applied Mechanics and Materials 220-223 (novembre 2012) : 299–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.220-223.299.

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Coordination across the supply chain improves the manufacturing efficiency a lot. To provide a rational cooperation mechanism for supply chain scheduling, a bargaining model was established on the basis of the Nash bargaining theory. The solution of the model draws forth a new scheduling problem with multi-objective product. A polynomial heuristic was designed to find the near-optimal bargaining solution under the assembly circumstance.

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Yao, Mingzhu, et Donggen Wang. « Modeling household relocation choice : An egalitarian bargaining approach and a comparative study ». Journal of Transport and Land Use 14, n^o 1 (20 juin 2021) : 625–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5198/jtlu.2021.1733.

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Accompanying the rapid urban expansion and fast population growth is a progressive trend of residential relocation in developing countries, which necessitates a thorough understanding of households’ relocation decisions. Previous studies generally treated home relocation as an individual or unitary household decision, ignoring the interactive and collaborative decision-making mechanisms that household members may adopt when making group decisions. In view of this research gap, this study examines the feasibility of applying the egalitarian bargaining approach to simulating households’ group decisions concerning residential relocation and further compares its performance with the Nash bargaining and the conventional utilitarian approach. Moreover, the study experiments with the possibility of accommodating three possible group decision-making mechanisms using the latent class modeling framework. The proposed modeling approaches are applied to an empirical case study in Beijing. Results show that models based on the egalitarian and Nash bargaining principles have better model fits than the utilitarian principle, suggesting the importance of considering egalitarianism when modeling household members’ collaborative choice on residential relocation. Moreover, the model based on Nash bargaining has the best model fit, indicating that instead of merely seeking egalitarianism or utilitarianism, household members are more likely to strike a balance between fairness and efficiency.

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Zhu, Bao Lin, et Shou Feng Ji. « The Master Production Scheduling Model for Buyer and Vendor Based on Bargaining Game ». Advanced Materials Research 860-863 (décembre 2013) : 3073–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.860-863.3073.

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Master production scheduling plays an important role in planning levels. The scheduling without coordination will lead to an unsatisfied result. In this paper, the master production scheduling model based on bargaining game between buyer and vendor is established to realize integrated management. The improved solution of Nash equilibrium is achieved by the bargaining game. The simulation results verified the model and algorithms effectiveness.

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Schofield, Norman, et Robert Parks. « Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining ». Mathematical Social Sciences 39, n^o 2 (mars 2000) : 133–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00027-x.

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SHOKOOHI, ZEINAB, AMIR HOSSEIN CHIZARI et MAHDI ASGARI. « INVESTIGATING BARGAINING POWER OF FARMERS AND PROCESSORS IN IRAN'S DAIRY MARKET ». Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 51, n^o 1 (13 septembre 2018) : 126–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aae.2018.26.

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AbstractThe farm-gate price of raw milk in Iran is determined annually in negotiations among representatives of dairy processors, milk producers, and government officials. This study estimates the average bargaining power of dairy farmers and processors, through applying the generalized axiomatic Nash approach in a bilateral bargaining model. We employ annual data from 1990 to 2013 to estimate econometric representation of a bilateral bargaining model using a Monte Carlo expectation maximization algorithm. Results imply a higher bargaining power of 0.69 for processors, compared with 0.31 for farmers. This asymmetry of bargaining power causes unequal allocation of gains in the milk market.

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Gauthier, David. « Bargaining and Justice ». Social Philosophy and Policy 2, n^o 2 (1985) : 29–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003204.

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My concern in this paper is with the illumination that the theory of rational bargaining sheds on the formulation of principles of justice. I shall first set out the bargaining problem, as treated in the theory of games, and the Nash solution, or solution F. I shall then argue against the axiom, labeled “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” which distinguished solution F, and also against the Zeuthen model of the bargaining process which F formalizes.

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Qin, Jianan, Xiang Fu, Shaoming Peng, Yuni Xu, Jie Huang et Sha Huang. « Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Water Resource Allocation over Transboundary Rivers ». International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, n^o 10 (16 mai 2019) : 1733. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16101733.

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Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mathematical framework to simulate strategic interactions among involved agents by considering individual rational benefits. Given that river-sharing problems often involve multiple self-interested agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) could be used to describe agents’ powers, as determined by disparate social, economic, and political as well as military status, and ensure win–win strategies based on individual rationality. This paper proposed an asymmetric bargaining model by combining multi-criteria decision making, bankruptcy theory, and the ANBS for water distribution in the transboundary river context. The Euphrates River Basin (ERB) with three littoral states was used as a case study. Turkey has the highest bargaining power in ERB negotiation since it dominates in terms of economic strength, political influence, and military capacity, whereas in the two downstream countries these aspects are limited due to their internal political fragmentation and weaker military status. The water satisfaction percentages of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq under the best alternative are 96.30%, 84.23%, and 40.88%, respectively. The findings highlight the necessity for synthetically considering the agent’s disagreement utility and asymmetrical power when negotiating over water allocation.

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KÖHLER, WOLFGANG R. « UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX ». International Game Theory Review 08, n^o 03 (septembre 2006) : 469–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001028.

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I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff set that guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining model. The conditions encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. Roughly speaking, the equilibrium is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.

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Madden, Paul. « Collective Bargaining in a Basic North American Sports League Model With Broadcasting Revenue ». Journal of Sports Economics 20, n^o 8 (20 mai 2019) : 1088–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527002519851156.

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The general firm/trade union bargaining literature is brought to bear on a specific North American sports league model, where talent supply is perfectly inelastic and profit-maximizing clubs receive local (gate) revenue plus an equal share of league broadcasting revenue. Club and player representatives negotiate a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on the levels of local revenue sharing, salary cap, and salary floor. Results characterize the set of efficient bargains and the Nash bargaining solution and show how they are affected by increases in broadcasting market size, focusing on player salaries, competitive balance, the content of CBA documents, and comparisons with laissez-faire.

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Yi, Wentao, et Chunqiao Tan. « Bertrand Game with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concern ». Complexity 2019 (19 août 2019) : 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/1253092.

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The classical Bertrand game is assumed that players are perfectly rational. However, many empirical researches indicate that people have bounded rational behavior with fairness concern, which is important in the two-person game and has attracted much attention. In this paper, fairness concern is incorporated into the Bertrand game with two homogeneous products and the effect of fairness concern on this extended Bertrand game is explored. Nash bargaining solution of player is applied to be his own fairness reference point. Then, a Bertrand game model with fairness concern is established, and its equilibrium price is also derived and analyzed. It is shown from some numerical examples that fairness concern and bargaining power of players have a significant influence on their equilibrium price, expected profits, and utilities. As a player gets more fair-minded, if the other player has a less focus on fairness, the price competition between them will be intensified and both of them suffer loss. Thus, fairness concern may be advantageous or disadvantageous for players. In most situations, the fairness concern behavior is not beneficial for players. Additionally, the effect of bargaining power is relative to fairness concern. A player who manufactures a low-cost product should have a weak bargaining power if he terribly focuses on fairness and should have a strong bargaining power if he pays little attention to fairness. However, a player who manufactures a high-cost product should have a weak bargaining power if he is rarely concerned about fairness. Anyway, the same bargaining power is the best for two players.

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Wang, Hanwen, Xiang Li, Haojun Hu et Yizhou Zhou. « Distributed Dispatch and Profit Allocation for Parks Using Co-Operative Game Theory and the Generalized Nash Bargaining Approach ». Energies 17, n^o 23 (5 décembre 2024) : 6143. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17236143.

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To improve the regulatory capacity of distributed resources within the park and enhance the flexibility of market transactions, this paper introduces a distributed dispatch and profit allocation method grounded in cooperative game theory and the generalized Nash bargaining framework. Initially, models for individual park equipment are established. Subsequently, a distributed dispatch model is constructed, followed by the development of a profit allocation strategy based on contribution levels, using the generalized Nash bargaining method. The model is solved using the alternating direction method of multipliers. The results show that the proposed approach achieves fast convergence, optimizes resource sharing and mutual support within the park, lowers operational costs, ensures a fairer distribution of profits, and promotes increased cooperation among park entities.

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Ambrus, Attila, et Shih En Lu. « A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining ». American Economic Journal : Microeconomics 7, n^o 1 (1 février 2015) : 208–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20100029.

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We propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for coalitional bargaining, in which players can make offers at random discrete times. In our model: (i) expected payoffs in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics; and (ii) MPE are the only subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) that can be approximated by SPNE of nearby discrete-time bargaining models. We investigate the limit MPE payoffs as the time horizon goes to infinity and players get infinitely patient. In convex games, we establish that the set of these limit payoffs achievable by varying recognition rates is exactly the core of the characteristic function. (JEL C78)

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Liu, Wei, Mengxing Huang et Wenlong Feng. « Optimized Profit Allocation Model for Service Alliance Transactions Considering Risk ». Electronics 13, n^o 23 (25 novembre 2024) : 4648. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics13234648.

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In service alliances, where multiple service providers collaborate to complete service transactions, the equitable allocation of profits based on their respective contributions and risk-bearing capacities is paramount. This paper introduces an optimized profit allocation game model that integrates risk considerations into the Nash bargaining framework. Initially, the study established a service alliance transaction model that considered the interactions among multiple participants, providing a robust theoretical foundation for cooperation. Subsequently, the concept of marginal risk was introduced, and a unique calculation method based on the Shapley value was devised to quantify risk contributions. Finally, an improved Nash bargaining model was proposed, which introduced a risk adjustment factor, explicitly addressing the impact of each participant’s risk on profit allocation. Through computational cases and result analyses, this model demonstrated its ability to balance profit and risk and to optimize outcomes for all participants, and it validated the fairness and rationality of the proposed allocation method.

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Pan, Chih-Min. « Research Note : A Nash Bargaining Model for Average Daily Rates ». Tourism Economics 12, n^o 3 (septembre 2006) : 469–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5367/000000006778493655.

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Boonen, Tim J., Ken Seng Tan et Sheng Chao Zhuang. « PRICING IN REINSURANCE BARGAINING WITH COMONOTONIC ADDITIVE UTILITY FUNCTIONS ». ASTIN Bulletin 46, n^o 2 (8 avril 2016) : 507–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asb.2016.8.

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AbstractOptimal reinsurance indemnities have widely been studied in the literature, yet the bargaining for optimal prices has remained relatively unexplored. Therefore, the key objective of this paper is to analyze the price of reinsurance contracts. We use a novel way to model the bargaining powers of the insurer and reinsurer, which allows us to generalize the contracts according to the Nash bargaining solution, indifference pricing and the equilibrium contracts. We illustrate these pricing functions by means of inverse-Sshaped distortion functions for the insurer and the Value-at-Risk for the reinsurer.

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Al-Najjar, Nabil I., et Robert J. Gary-Bobo. « Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement ». American Economic Journal : Microeconomics 15, n^o 3 (1 août 2023) : 387–425. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210392.

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A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts’ disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution. Experts bargain after disclosure of the dataset. Bargaining may lead to an inefficient use of information in a strong sense: experts receive a lower payoff in every state and for any prior belief (i.e., inadmissibility). Bargaining exhibits underreaction to information as compared to the normative solution in which experts bargain ex ante on the procedure used to exploit the data. (JEL C78, D82, D83)

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Kalinowski, Sławomir. « Alternative bargaining solutions in asymmetric tariff rates negotiations ». Economics and Business Review 7, n^o 2 (30 juin 2007) : 41–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.18559/ebr.2007.2.539.

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The article was dedicated to the application of cooperative games tools to the particular bargaining problem. The bargaining is about tariffrates between two countries. Analysis was performed on the framework of simple market model with perfect competition within countries and bilateral monopoly relation between them. There were two bargaining schemes applied in order to calculate cooperative solutions. First was Nash bargaining solution, the second was Kalai and Smorodinsky proposition. Both methods successfully indicated cooperative solutions. Application of chosen bargaining schemes brought the conclusion that outcome of the indications of cooperative solutions strongly depends on the nature of explored economic model. The examination of influence parameters' changes proved that worsening the situation of the subject led to the decrease of its benefit in every case. In one case it also caused the decrease of benefit of the other party. (original abstract)

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Janjua, Shahmir, Muhammad Umair Ali, Karam Dad Kallu, Amad Zafar, Shaik Javeed Hussain, Hasnain Gardezi et Seung Won Lee. « An Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Natural-Gas Distribution ». Applied Sciences 12, n^o 11 (2 juin 2022) : 5677. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app12115677.

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For the sustainable socio-economic growth, the energy supply is one of the foundations for any country. The gas shortage is one of the most significant impediments to any emerging country’s economic progress, making it a contested and disputed resource. In the middle of a supply–demand mismatch, distributing limited available gas across administrative units/provinces with competing requirements is a key challenge. In this work, an asymmetric gas allocation bargaining model is proposed under gas shortage to resolve natural gas-related disputes among Pakistan’s administrative units/provinces. Each administrative unit/province is characterized by its gas demand. Results show that the Nash bargaining theory, when applied under equal and bargaining weights, can address the supply–demand mismatches of the gas sector in Pakistan. Such an approach could help policymakers to make a fair gas-supply management system during gas shortage periods and would help in resolving the disputes between the provinces.

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Laengle, Sigifredo. « Articulating bargaining theories : movement, chance, and necessity as descriptive principles ». Central European Journal of Operations Research 29, n^o 1 (18 janvier 2021) : 49–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10100-020-00729-y.

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AbstractThe Nash Demand Game (NDG) has been one of the first models (Nash in Econometrica 21(1):128–140, 1953. 10.2307/1906951) that has tried to describe the process of negotiation, competition, and cooperation. This model has had enormous repercussions and has leveraged basic and applied research on bargaining processes. Therefore, we wonder whether it is possible to articulate extensive and multiple developments into a single unifying framework. The Viability Theory has this inclusive approach. Thus, we investigate the NDG under this point of view, and, carrying out this work, we find that the answer is not only affirmative but that we also advance in characterising viable NDGs. In particular, we found foundations describe the distributive Bargaining Theory: the principle of movement and the principle of chance and necessity. Finally, this initial work has many interesting perspectives. The probably most important idea is to integrate developments of the Bargaining Theory and thus capture the complexity of the real world in an articulated way.

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Prasertsri, Peerapon, et Richard L. Kilmer. « The Bargaining Strength of a Milk Marketing Cooperative ». Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 37, n^o 2 (octobre 2008) : 204–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500003002.

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As a result of economies of size, food processors are generally large and few in number. These characteristics put processors at a bargaining advantage over independent farmers. Marketing cooperatives were established to counter the uneven bargaining position of individual farmers. This article investigates the relative bargaining strength of one milk marketing cooperative and several fluid milk processors. The Nash bargaining model can be used to analyze the negotiated price in the Florida fluid milk market which acts like a bilateral monopoly. The milk marketing cooperatives have bargained well with the milk marketing processors; The monthly bargaining strength of the Southeast Dairy Cooperative, Inc. (SDC), exceeds the monthly bargaining strength of the processors in all twelve months, ranging from a low of 0.6664 in January to a high of 0.7831 in September. The monthly average bargaining strength across all months for SDC is 0.7326.

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Solow, John L., et Anthony C. Krautmann. « A Nash Bargaining Model of the Salaries of Elite Free Agents ». Journal of Sports Economics 12, n^o 3 (12 avril 2011) : 309–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527002511404781.

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DINAR, ARIEL. « SCALE AND EQUITY IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT : A NASH BARGAINING MODEL ». Natural Resource Modeling 14, n^o 4 (28 juin 2008) : 477–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.2001.tb00070.x.

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NAKAMOTO, Kunihiro, Yasuo KONISHI, Katsuya KONDO et Hiroyuki ISHIGAKI. « Control Optimization for a Designer's Intention Through the Nash Bargaining Model. » Transactions of the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers Series C 66, n^o 644 (2000) : 1223–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1299/kikaic.66.1223.

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Zhao, Qian, Zhengkai Wang et Kaiming Zheng. « Order or Collaborate ? Manufacturers Utilize 3D-Printed Parts to Sustainably Facilitate Increased Product Variety ». Sustainability 16, n^o 13 (28 juin 2024) : 5561. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su16135561.

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3D printing (3DP) has garnered significant attention from industries, prompting traditional manufacturers to adopt 3DP to sustainably facilitate increased product variety. Observing manufacturers’ two adoption strategies, ordering parts and collaboratively printing 3DP parts, in a real-world setting, we utilize a wholesale price contract and a Nash Bargaining contract to describe these two strategies and then develop a supply-chain model including a 3DP supplier (Supplier) and a traditional manufacturer (Manufacturer). Further, we employ backward induction to solve the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the model to reveal differences between these two strategies and the impact of 3DP’s improved resource efficiency. According to equilibrium outcomes, analytical results show that first, as long as the unit cost of each 3DP part is not overly high and 3DP’s resource efficiency is not extremely low, the Manufacturer is willing to implement 3DP to increase product variety. Second, a rise in the resource efficiency can create a “win-win” scenario for the Manufacturer and the Supplier. Third, supply-chain collaboration can be achieved when the Manufacturer’s and the Supplier’s bargaining powers approach equality. Interestingly, a Nash bargaining contract can incentivize the manufacturer to substitute a base product with a variety of products, a change facilitated by an increase in the retail price of this base product. The managerial implication of this research is that enhanced resource efficiency can lead to less environmental pollution in the collaboration model by resulting in the sale of lower quantities of the base product, which would otherwise consume more resources and generate greater environmental pollution.

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Liu, Tao, Shou Xu Song, Hai Hong Huang et Guang Fu Liu. « A Bargaining Theory-Based Conflict Resolution Method in Design for Remanufacturing ». Advanced Materials Research 443-444 (janvier 2012) : 643–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.443-444.643.

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In order to solve the potential conflict problem of product design factor optimization in design for remanufacturing, an idea to transform design conflict problem into mathematical model based on game theory was proposed. In the process of design for remanufacturing, a bargaining theory-based conflict resolution method was established by improving the theory of Nash-Zesen bargaining. Energy consumption and cost were analyzed by the given conflict resolution method, and the validity of the method was verified.

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Huo, Hong, Dan Luo, Zhanghua Yan et Hao He. « Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain considering Different Fairness Preferences and Low-Carbon Advertising Level ». Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2022 (20 septembre 2022) : 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/4589681.

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Countries around the world advocate low-carbon, green, and environmentally friendly lifestyles to combat climate change, which provides clear direction for enterprise decisions. This paper studies a low-carbon dual-channel supply chain based on behavioral economics, incentive theory, and optimization models to better formulate pricing decisions. This paper constructs a fair and neutral decentralized decision-making model (FNDD), a decentralized decision-making model considering Nash bargaining fairness concerns (NBFDD), a decentralized decision-making model considering absolute fairness concerns (AFDD), and a fair and neutral centralized decision-making model (FNCD) considering consumer preferences and the situations where supply chain members are fairness concerns or fairness neutrality. This paper analyzes the effect of low-carbon advertising level on pricing strategies of online retailers and offline stores and compares pricing strategies of online retailers and offline stores in four decisions. The results show that Nash bargaining fairness concerns of supply chain members could effectively reduce the retail price of low-carbon products and increase their sales volumes. Absolute fairness concerns intensify the dual marginal effect of decentralized decision-making.

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Fan, Bo, Hui Tian, Yuan Zhang et Xiao Yan. « Resource Allocation in a Generalized Framework for Virtualized Heterogeneous Wireless Network ». Mobile Information Systems 2016 (2016) : 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/8570568.

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As a prevailing concept in 5G, virtualization provides efficient coordination among multiple radio access technologies (RATs) and enables multiple service providers (SPs) to share different RATs’ infrastructure. This paper proposes a generic framework for virtualizing heterogeneous wireless network with different RATs. A novel “VMAC” (virtualized medium access control) concept is introduced to converge different RAT protocols and perform inter-RAT resource allocation. To suit the proposed framework, a virtualization based resource allocation scheme is devised. We formulate the problem as a mixed combinatorial optimization, which jointly considers network access and rate allocation. First, to solve the network access problem, “adaptability ratio” is developed to model the fact that different RATs possess different adaptability to different services. And a Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) method is adopted to calculate the adaptability ratio. Second, services are modeled as players, bargaining for RAT resources in a Nash bargaining game. And a closed-form Nash bargaining solution (NBS) is derived. Combining adaptability ratio with NBS, a novel resource allocation algorithm is devised. Through simulation, the superiority and feasibility of the proposed algorithm are validated.

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Liu, Jinbo, Lijuan Duan, Jian Chen, Jingan Shang, Bin Wang et Zhaoguang Pan. « A Cooperative Operation Strategy for Multi-Energy Systems Based on the Power Dispatch Meta-Universe Platform ». Electronics 13, n^o 15 (31 juillet 2024) : 3015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics13153015.

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To meet the challenges of renewable energy consumption and improve the efficiency of energy systems, we propose an intelligent distributed energy dispatch strategy for multi-energy systems based on Nash bargaining by utilizing the power dispatch meta-universe platform. First, the operational framework of the multi-energy system, including wind park (WP), photovoltaic power plant (PVPP), and energy storage (ES), is described. Using the power dispatch meta-universe platform, the models of WP, PVPP, and ES are constructed and analyzed. Then, a Nash bargaining model of the multi-energy system is built and transformed into a coalition profit maximization problem, which is solved using the alternating direction multiplier method (ADMM). Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed strategy is verified. The results show that the strategy greatly improves the consumption of renewable energy sources and the profit of the overall system.

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PAUWELS, WILFRIED, PETER M. KORT et EVE VANHAECHT. « R&D INVESTMENTS AS PREBARGAINING STRATEGIES ». International Game Theory Review 16, n^o 03 (6 mai 2014) : 1450003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198914500030.

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This paper analyzes a semicollusive, differentiated duopoly. Firms first compete in cost reducing R&D and then cooperate on the output market. The sharing of the joint profit on the output market is modeled as a Nash bargaining game. We study an asymmetric setting in which one firm has a lower unit cost of production than the other firm, before any R&D expenditures. If firms do not agree on how to share their joint profit, they play a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Assuming linear demand functions, we show that the Nash bargaining outcome is independent of whether firms play a Cournot or a Bertrand Nash equilibrium, as long as both firms supply positive outputs in these equilibria. If the two products are sufficiently differentiated, there is a unique equilibrium in which both firms supply a positive output, and in which the low cost firm always invests more in R&D than the high cost firm. If the two products are not very differentiated, and if the difference in unit costs between the two firms is not too large, there exist two equilibria. In each of these equilibria only one firm supplies a positive output. This can be the low cost or the high cost firm. In the latter case, the initially high cost firm invests so much in R&D that its unit cost after R&D is lower than that of the other firm. This firm then leapfrogs the other firm. If the two products are very similar and if firms apply Bertrand strategies when disagreeing, there exist equilibria in which only one firm supplies a positive output, while in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium that same firm can prevent the other firm from entering the market. We show that, in the context of the Nash bargaining model, this latter firm still has the power to claim a share of the joint profit.

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Malik, Asif Iqbal, et Biswajit Sarkar. « Coordination Supply Chain Management Under Flexible Manufacturing, Stochastic Leadtime Demand, and Mixture of Inventory ». Mathematics 8, n^o 6 (3 juin 2020) : 911. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math8060911.

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The necessity of coordination among entities is essential for the success of any supply chain management (SCM). This paper focuses on coordination between two players and cost-sharing in an SCM that considers a vendor and a buyer. For random demand and complex product production, a flexible production system is recommended. The study aims to minimize the total SCM cost under stochastic conditions. In the flexible production systems, the production rate is introduced as the decision variable and the unit production cost is minimum at the obtained optimal value. The setup cost of flexible systems is higher and to control this, a discrete investment function is utilized. The exact information about the probability distribution of lead time demand is not available with known mean and variance. The issue of unknown distribution of lead time demand is solved by considering a distribution-free approach to find the amount of shortages. The game-theoretic approach is employed to obtain closed-form solutions. First, the model is solved under decentralized SCM based on the Stackelberg model, and then solved under centralized SCM. Bargaining is the central theme of any business nowadays among the players of an SCM to make their profit within a centralized and decentralized setup. For this, a cost allocation model for lead time crashing cost based on the Nash bargaining model with the satisfaction level of SCM members is proposed. The cost allocation model under Nash bargaining achieves exciting results in SCM coordination.

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Du, Shaofu, Tengfei Nie, Chengbin Chu et Yugang Yu. « Newsvendor model for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns ». International Journal of Production Research 52, n^o 17 (14 mars 2014) : 5070–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2014.895446.

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Melendez, Kevin A., Tapas K. Das et Changhyun Kwon. « A Nash-bargaining model for trading of electricity between aggregations of peers ». International Journal of Electrical Power & ; Energy Systems 123 (décembre 2020) : 106185. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2020.106185.

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Peng, Shiyong, Qingren He, Fei Xu et Wanhua Qiu. « Modeling Dynamic Bargaining and Stability in a Star-Shaped Trans-Shipment Network ». Systems 12, n^o 4 (23 mars 2024) : 108. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems12040108.

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The star-shaped trans-shipment network causes the retailer’s bargaining power to be different, which leads to the misalignment of trans-shipment profit. Aimed at this, we take retailers and the trans-shipment paths as the nodes and edges of the trans-shipment network. Based on this, we model the multilateral negotiations between the central retailer and the local retailer and adopt the Generalized Nash Bargaining game to derive the optimal solution of the value function for the incomplete trans-shipment network under the bargaining mechanism. Furthermore, we reveal the convexity of the optimal trans-shipment value function and give the condition that the allocation of the bargaining mechanism is in the core. Based on this, we introduce the concept of pairwise Nash equilibrium and show the star-shaped trans-shipment network is the optimal endogenous formation of the trans-shipment network. In practice, the central retailer should introduce as many local retailers as possible to join this trans-shipment alliance, which will achieve Pareto improvement. Meanwhile, the central retailer should order as many as possible. Finally, it is more appropriate to establish a star-shaped trans-shipment network when one retailer has stronger negotiation power compared to other retailers in a distribution system, which not only ensures the stability of the allocation of trans-shipment profits but also the stability of the trans-shipment network.

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Li, Guoyan, Kaixin Li, Yi Liu et Yuheng Pan. « An Efficient Dynamic Load Balancing Scheme Based on Nash Bargaining in SDN ». Future Internet 11, n^o 12 (5 décembre 2019) : 252. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/fi11120252.

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Static multi-controller deployment architecture cannot adapt to the drastic changes of network traffic, which will lead to a load imbalance between controllers, resulting in a high packet loss rate, high latency, and other network performance degradation problems. In this paper, an efficient dynamic load balancing scheme based on Nash bargaining is proposed for a distributed software-defined network. Firstly, considering the connectivity of network nodes, the switch migration problem is transformed into a network mapping relationship reconstruction problem. Then, we establish the Nash bargaining game model to fairly optimize the two contradictory goals of migration cost and load balance. Finally, the model is solved by an improved firefly algorithm, and the optimal network mapping state is obtained. The experimental results show that this scheme can optimize the migration cost and load balance at the same time. Compared with the existing research schemes, the migration process of the switch is optimized, and, while effectively balancing the load of the control plane, the migration cost is reduced by 14.5%.

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Fanti, Luciano, et Luca Gori. « Codetermination, Price Competition and the Network Industry ». German Economic Review 20, n^o 4 (1 décembre 2019) : e795-e830. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12190.

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Abstract This research develops a tractable two-stage non-cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price-setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity-setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price-setting non-network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm’s bargaining strength is exactly the profit-maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non-network duopoly.

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Piluso, Nicolas, et Gabriel Colletis. « A Keynesian reformulation of the WS-PS model : Keynesian unemployment and Classical unemployment ». Economia Politica 38, n^o 2 (16 mars 2021) : 447–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40888-021-00222-y.

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AbstractThe orthodox theory of wage negotiations considers that the trade union monopoly causes a rigidity of real wages which is, itself, the cause of unemployment. The model of this negotiation ("Nash bargaining") only considers situations where negotiations between union and firm succeed. In this article, we attempt to read the WS-PS model from a Keynesian point of view. Our model reflects the fact that successful negotiation is only one case among other situations, including failure where the union expresses a claim that is not necessarily satisfied. Although, in situations close to full employment, there is a bargaining mechanism by which unions and firms reach an agreement, this is not the case in times of massive unemployment. In the latter situation, employment is unilaterally determined by firms, on the basis of previous demand.

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Vanderschraaf, Peter. « LEARNING BARGAINING CONVENTIONS ». Social Philosophy and Policy 35, n^o 1 (2018) : 237–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052518000110.

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Abstract:I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive learning to specific bargaining problems to show that agents can learn from repeated experience to follow a variety of bargaining conventions in a given problem. I conclude that such agents can come to regard two such conventions as focal for the bargaining problem, one that assigns claimants equal shares of a good and another egalitarian solution of equal payoff gains, and that the egalitarian solution tends to prevail when these two solutions differ. I conclude further that the above analysis lends support for admitting interpersonal utility comparisons into the analysis of fair division problems, and also suggests a focal point explanation of the wide acceptance of the Aristotelian proportionality principle of distributive justice.

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Li, Haitao, Jie Xiong, Jianhui Xie, Zhongbao Zhou et Jinlong Zhang. « A Unified Approach to Efficiency Decomposition for a Two-Stage Network DEA Model with Application of Performance Evaluation in Banks and Sustainable Product Design ». Sustainability 11, n^o 16 (14 août 2019) : 4401. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11164401.

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Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a data-driven tool for performance evaluation, benchmarking and multiple-criteria decision-making. This article investigates efficiency decomposition in a two-stage network DEA model. Three major methods for efficiency decomposition have been proposed: uniform efficiency decomposition, Nash bargaining game decomposition, and priority decomposition. These models were developed on the basis of different assumptions that led to different efficiency decompositions and thus confusion among researchers. The current paper attempts to reconcile these differences by redefining the fairness of efficiency decomposition based on efficiency rank, and develops a rank-based model with two parameters. In our new rank-based model, these three efficiency decomposition methods can be treated as special cases where these parameters take special values. By showing the continuity of the Pareto front, we simplify the uniform efficiency decomposition, and indicate that the uniform efficiency decomposition and Nash bargaining game decomposition can converge to the same efficiency decomposition. To demonstrate the merits of our model, we use data from the literature to evaluate the performance of 10 Chinese banks, and compare the different efficiency decompositions created by different methods. Last, we apply the proposed model to the performance evaluation of sustainable product design in the automobile industry.

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