Livres sur le sujet « Multilevel governance systems »
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Spheres of governance : Comparative studies of cities in multilevel governance systems. Montréal, QC : [Published for the] Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University by McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007.
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(Editor), Harvey Lazar, et Christian Leuprecht (Editor), dir. Spheres of Governance : Comparative Studies of Cities in Multilevel Governance Systems. Queen's School of Policy Studies, 2007.
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(Editor), Harvey Lazar, et Christian Leuprecht (Editor), dir. Spheres of Governance : Comparative Studies of Cities in Multilevel Governance Systems. Queen's School of Policy Studies, 2007.
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Policy Governance In Multilevel Systems Economic Development And Policy Implementation In Canada. McGill-Queen's University Press, 2013.
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Egeberg, Morten, et Jarle Trondal. Colliding Coordination Structures in Multilevel Systems of Government (and How to Live with It). Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198825074.003.0005.
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This chapter discusses governance dilemmas that are often overlooked in studies that do not encompass the ecology of organization in public governance. The chapter discusses how coordination structures may counteract each other in multilevel systems of government. The ambition of the chapter is twofold: Firstly, a coordination dilemma is theoretically and empirically illustrated by the seeming incompatibility between a more direct (interconnected) and sectorally specialized implementation structure in the multilevel EU administrative system and trends towards strengthening coordination and control within nation states. Secondly, the chapter discusses organizational arrangements that may enable governance systems to live with the coordination dilemma in practice. This coordination dilemma seems to have been largely ignored in the literature on EU network governance and national ‘joined-up government’ respectively.
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Cseres, Katalin J. Rule of Law Values in the Decentralized Public Enforcement of EU Competition Law. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746560.003.0011.
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This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.
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Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich. Transforming World Trade and Investment Law for Sustainable Development. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192858023.001.0001.
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Abstract Transforming World Trade and Investment Law for Sustainable Development explains why the 2030 UN Sustainable Development Agenda for ‘Transforming our World’—aimed at realizing ‘the human rights of all’ and seventeen agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—requires transforming the United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organization (WTO) legal systems, as well as international investment law and adjudication. UN and WTO law protect regulatory competition between diverse neo-liberal, state capitalist, European ordo-liberal, and third-world conceptions of multilevel trade and investment regulation. However, geopolitical rivalries and trade wars increasingly undermine transnational rule of law and effective regulation of market failures, governance failures, and constitutional failures. For example, the intergovernmental negotiations in the context of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change have failed to prevent or considerably limit climate change. In order to prevent trade, investment, energy, and climate conflicts, sustainable development requires reforming trade, investment, and environmental rules and dispute settlement systems. The global health pandemics confirm the need for constitutional reforms of multilevel governance of global public goods. Investment law and adjudication must better reconcile governmental duties to protect human rights and decarbonize economies with the property rights of foreign investors. The constitutional, human rights, and environmental litigation in Europe enhances the legal accountability of democratic governments for protecting sustainable development, but European economic constitutionalism has been rejected by Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism, China’s authoritarian state capitalism, and many third-world governments. The more that regional economic orders (like the China-led Belt and Road networks) reveal heterogeneity and power politics block UN and WTO reforms, the more the US-led neo-liberal world order risks disintegrating. UN and WTO law must promote private–public network governance, civil society participation, and stronger judicial accountability in order to stabilize and depoliticize multilevel governance of the SDGs.
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Callaghan, Helen. Conclusion. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815020.003.0006.
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The final chapter highlights the theoretical significance of the findings, reflects on their generalizability, and outlines supplementary explanations. By identifying systematic differences in the policy feedback processes triggered by market-enabling and market-restraining rules, the book bridges a gap between abstract theories of institutional change and more specific theories on the dynamics of capitalist development. Apart from self-reinforcing and self-undermining feedback effects, several other features of economic governance in advanced industrialized democracies also shape pathways to marketization. These features include eventfulness and periodicity, economic interdependence, multilevel governance, the influence of ideas on the content and intensity of public debates, and institutional structures that mediate interests and ideas, including electoral systems, legal systems, and the division of regulatory competences between levels of government as well as between elected and unelected rule-makers.
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From Policy To Implementation In The European Union The Challenge Of A Multilevel Governance System. I. B. Tauris & Company, 2010.
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Deeg, Richard. Capitalisms : A Global System. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.377.
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The global political economy is a multilevel system of economic activities and regulation in which the domestic level continues to predominate—in other words, it is a global system comprising national capitalist economies. Nations differ in terms of the regulations and institutions that govern economic activity, an observation that is embodied in the so-called “varieties of capitalism” (VoC) literature. Contemporary VoC approaches highlight the significance of social and political institutions in shaping national economies, in stark contrast to neoclassical economics which generally ignores institutions other than markets or sees them as hindrances to the functioning of free markets. Three analytical premises inform the diverse conceptual frameworks within the VoC literature: the firm-based approach, national business systems approach, and the governance or “social systems of production” approach. The VoC literature offers three important contributions to our understanding of the global political economy. The first is that different sources of competitive advantage for firms and nations are institutionally rooted and not easily changed. The second contribution is that these distinct national arrangements give rise to different interests/preferences in how the global economy is constructed and managed. Finally, the VoC approaches provide a framework for analyzing long-term institutional changes in capitalist systems and the persistence of diverse forms of capitalism, including the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 that may usher in yet another epochal change in the “battle of capitalisms.”
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Sancak, Merve. Global Production, National Institutions, and Skill Formation. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198860655.001.0001.
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This book examines the political economy of skill formation and discusses the implications of skill systems for the development of middle-income countries (MICs). While it has been argued that skills are critical for continuous and inclusive development of MICs, there has been no extensive research on the skill systems of MICs. The book addresses this gap. It studies how the national and global dynamics interact and influence skill systems in Mexico and Turkey, two key MICs. It examines how the governance structures in global auto parts-automotive chains (AACs) and national institutions in Mexico and Turkey affect the hiring, training, and employee-development practices of supplier firms from these countries (i.e. skilling strategies), and the outcomes of these practices for firms and workers. The book offers a multilevel analysis, which includes a study of macro-level national institutions, macro/meso-level AAC governance structures, and firm-level skilling practices. The research in the book relies on extensive primary data, which include face-to-face semistructured interviews with representatives of supplier firms from the two countries, and policymakers, experts, and representatives of labour unions and business associations. The book suggests that the state plays the main role in skill systems. Although global AACs put pressures on suppliers, these pressures are filtered by national institutions that are shaped by the state. The skill systems with higher state involvement are more accessible for workers and smaller firms. Therefore, the book argues that skill systems with higher state involvement are more likely to promote high-road development in MICs.
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Huang, Xian. Social Protection under Authoritarianism. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190073640.001.0001.
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Why would authoritarian leaders expand social welfare provision in the absence of democratization? What are the distributive features and implications of social welfare expansion in an authoritarian country? How do authoritarian leaders design and enforce social welfare expansion in a decentralized multilevel governance setting? This book identifies the trade-off authoritarian leaders face in social welfare provision: effectively balancing coverage and benefits between elites and masses in order to maximize the regime’s survival prospects. Using government documents, field interviews, survey data, and government statistics about Chinese social health insurance, this book reveals that the Chinese authoritarian leaders attempt to manage the distributive trade-off by a “stratified expansion” strategy, establishing an expansive yet stratified social health insurance system to perpetuate a particularly privileged program for the elites while building an essentially modest health provision for the masses. In China’s decentralized multilevel governance setting, the stratified expansion of social health insurance is implemented by local leaders who confront various fiscal and social constraints in vastly different local circumstances. As a result, there is great regional variation in the expansion of social health insurance, in addition to the benefit stratification across social strata. The dynamics of central-local interaction in enforcing the stratified expansion of social health insurance stands at the core of the politics of health reform in China during the first decade of the 2000s. This book demonstrates that the strategic balance between elites and masses in benefit distribution is delicate in authoritarian and decentralized multilevel governance settings.
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Thurner, Paul W. Networks and European Union Politics. Sous la direction de Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Alexander H. Montgomery et Mark Lubell. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190228217.013.24.
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The European Union (EU) is a regional cooperation regime with a specific and still fluid governance structure. It constitutes the world’s largest and institutionally most deeply integrated system of international relations with supranational features. As a consequence, the literature on the EU often emphasizes informality, multilevel aspects, and its “network governance” character. Network analysis is therefore a promising perspective for the systematic investigation of complex networks of formalized actor relations as well as of informal and implicit political structures and processes in the EU. Applied network analysis is meanwhile used for the investigation of multi-level policy preparation, of collective decision-making in the political system in the EU, and of the implementation process of EU policies in the Member States.
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Ghahramani, Salar. Sovereign Wealth and the Extraterritorial Manipulation of Corporate Conduct. Sous la direction de Douglas Cumming, Geoffrey Wood, Igor Filatotchev et Juliane Reinecke. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198754800.013.27.
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Global legal harmonization is an aspect of transnational law whereby a family of norms is formed by a non-state legal order. Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—diverse in terms of their countries of origin, size, investment strategies, asset allocation tactics, and underlying purposes—contribute to the harmonization by setting and enforcing cross-border ethical norms and governance standards. This chaper examines aspects of SWFs as transnational lawmakers, a significant phenomenon for the global family of standards and a potential challenge for state-based legal orders. It examines SWF adoption of general legal principles and customs as advanced by a global civil society and through standardized contract forms and conduct codes; voluntary enactment of informal soft laws; and creation of norm-setting institutions. It concludes that SWFs are part of a diffused, multilevel, coordinated, political system that defies state-centric paradigms, contributing to the dynamism that defines transnational law while creating concerns related to legitimacy, democratic authority, and democratic deficit.
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Müller, Henriette. Political Leadership and the European Commission Presidency. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842002.001.0001.
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The EU’s pluralistic, nonhierarchical system of multilevel governance lacks clear structures of both government and opposition. According to the EU treaties, the presidency of the European Commission is thus not explicitly expected to exercise political leadership. However, the position cannot effectively be exercised without any demonstration of such leadership due to its many leadership functions. Examining this curious mix of strong political demands, weak institutional powers, and need for political leadership, this book systematically analyzes the political leadership performance of the presidents of the European Commission throughout the process of European integration. The basic argument is that Commission presidents matter not only in the process of European integration, but that their impact varies according to how the different incumbents deal with the institutional structure and the situational circumstances, and thus their available strategic choices. The primary research question is thus: What makes political leadership in European governance successful and to what extent (and why) do Commission presidents differ in their leadership performance? In addressing this question, this book departs from existing research on EU leadership, which has to date often analyzed either the EU’s institutional structure and its potential for leadership or mainly focused on only the most recent incumbents in case study analyses. Focusing on the multiterm European Commission presidents Walter Hallstein, Jacques Delors, and José Manuel Barroso, this book conceptualizes their political leadership as a performance, and thus systematically analyzes their agenda-setting, mediative-institutional, and public outreach performance over the entire course of their presidential terms.