Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Multi-sided Market »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Multi-sided Market"
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Yang, Sung Yoon. « Rethinking Modes of Market Definition for multi-Sided Platforms ». International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance 9, no 4 (août 2018) : 164–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.18178/ijtef.2018.9.4.608.
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Holzweber, Stefan. « Market Definition for Multi-Sided Platforms : A Legal Reappraisal ». World Competition 40, Issue 4 (1 décembre 2017) : 563–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2017036.
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It is frequently assumed that the outcome of today’s most discussed competition law cases hinges on market definition. In the context of multi-sided platforms, delimiting the relevant product market is a particularly delicate and complex task. Thus, this article seeks to analyse, from both an economic and a legal perspective, how relevant product markets for multi-sided platforms are properly defined under European competition law. Multi-sided platforms act as intermediaries which enable distinct groups of customers (also called platform-sides) to interact with each other. Multi-sided platforms have the possibility to set different prices for each group of customers, therefore econometric tools such as the small-but-significant-non-transitory increase-in-price test (SSNIP-test) must be applied with caution. It is argued that multi-sidedness can be considered a question of degree, therefore, for the purpose of market definition, it is necessary to distinguish different types of multi-sided platforms. The stronger the indirect network effects involved, the more the market definition deviates from traditional approaches. Indeed, the established legal framework allows a sound categorization of various forms of multi-sided platforms. In the context of multi-sided platforms, markets are regularly closely interrelated, therefore, the competitive assessment would be incomplete without an intermarket-analysis.
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Hoppner, Thomas. « Defining Markets for Multi-Sided Platforms : The Case of Search Engines ». World Competition 38, Issue 3 (1 septembre 2015) : 349–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2015030.
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Despite the rise of two- or multi-sided platforms in the digital sector, there is not yet an established antitrust policy for defining relevant markets that involve such platforms. Difficulties arise in particular where services are granted for free to some users. This article explains which platform user groups form separate (sub-)markets and with which quantitative and qualitative methods substitution relationships can be assessed for each sub-market. Considering the need to take account of the interactions between all user groups of a multi-sided platform, it is suggested that separate relevant markets should be recognized for each user group with differing demands that individually interacts with the platform in order to procure a service. Such interaction requires direct contact and an exchange between user and platform. It does not, however, pre-suppose any payment stream as users may also ‘pay’ with personal data, their attention or the granting of usage rights. Consequently, search engines, for instance, form a three-sided market consisting of i) a market for online search advertising existing between search providers and advertisers, ii) a market for web search services existing between search providers and Internet users, and iii) a market for indexing content existing between search providers and website operators.
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Rayskin, Victoria. « Dynamics of Two-Sided Markets ». Review of Marketing Science 14, no 1 (1 janvier 2016) : 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/roms-2015-0001.
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AbstractThis paper considers a dynamical system, which models a two-sided market. I evaluate the volume of users from each side of the market as a function of time. I formulate and prove theorems describing the long-term behavior and tendency of the market. Even though I consider generic attachment functions, I obtain a concrete result, formulated in terms of properties of attachment functions. This result is followed by examples (defined by the most popular in economics attachment functions), which illustrate behavior of the two-sided markets. I also simulate some two-sided market scenarios, showing how adjustments of attachment functions can influence the users’ dynamics. The dynamical system’s approach to the study of two-sided market problem allows natural generalization to multi-sided market, where one can utilize the same technique and obtain similar results in higher dimensions.
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Holzmann, Thomas, Klaus Sailer et Bernhard R. Katzy. « Matchmaking as multi-sided market for open innovation ». Technology Analysis & ; Strategic Management 26, no 6 (2 mai 2014) : 601–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09537325.2014.913786.
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de Matta, Renato, Timothy J. Lowe et Dengfeng Zhang. « Competition in the multi-sided platform market channel ». International Journal of Production Economics 189 (juillet 2017) : 40–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.03.022.
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Weyl, E. Glen. « A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms ». American Economic Review 100, no 4 (1 septembre 2010) : 1642–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1642.
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I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. Platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocation. Profit maximization distorts in the spirit of A. Michael Spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users. Thus the empirical and prescriptive content of the popular Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2006) model of two-sided markets turns on the nature of user heterogeneity. I propose a more plausible, yet equally tractable, model of heterogeneity in which users differ in their income or scale. My approach provides a general measure of market power and helps predict the effects of price regulation and mergers. (JEL D42, D85, L14)
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Condorelli, Daniele, et Jorge Padilla. « Harnessing Platform Envelopment in the Digital World ». Journal of Competition Law & ; Economics 16, no 2 (18 avril 2020) : 143–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa006.
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Abstract We revisit the economics of “platform envelopment strategies,” whereby a dominant platform (the enveloper) operating in a multi-sided market (the origin market) enters a second multi-sided market (the target market) by leveraging the data obtained from its shared user relationships. In particular, we analyze the logic and effects of “privacy policy tying,” a strategy whereby the enveloper requests consumers to grant their consent to combining their data in both origin and target markets. This may allow the enveloper to fund the services offered to all sides of the target market by monetizing data in the origin market, monopolize the target market, and entrench its dominant position in the origin market. We conclude by considering a range of possible policy interventions that may serve to limit such potential anticompetitive effects, while preserving the efficiencies generated by conglomerate platforms.
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FRANCK, Jens-Uwe, et Martin PEITZ. « Market Definition in the Platform Economy ». Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 23 (décembre 2021) : 91–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cel.2021.13.
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AbstractThe article addresses the role market definition can play for EU competition practice in the platform economy. The focus is on intermediaries that bring together groups of users whose decisions are interdependent, which therefore are commonly referred to as ‘two-sided platforms’. We address challenges to market definition that accompany these cross-group network effects, assess current practice in a number of competition cases, and provide guidance for adapting practice to properly account for the economic forces shaping markets with two-sided platforms. We ask whether and when a single market can be defined that encompasses both sides. We advocate a multi-markets approach that takes account of cross-market linkages, acknowledges the existence of zero-price markets, and properly accounts for the homing behaviour of market participants.
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Jullien, Bruno. « Competition in Multi-Sided Markets : Divide and Conquer ». American Economic Journal : Microeconomics 3, no 4 (1 novembre 2011) : 186–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.4.186.
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This paper studies Stackelberg price competition in a multi-sided market. The second-mover can engage in divide-and-conquer strategies, which involve cross-subsidies between sides. The paper recovers bounds on profits, and refines the results with a selection criteria whereby consumers resolve coordination failure in favor of a focal platform. It then analyzes perfect price discrimination with network effects, and two-sided market, sheding lights on inefficiencies and strategic choices by platforms. A leading platform may refrain from selling to some side in order to soften competition, it tends to favor excessively balanced market shares and may prefer compatibility to reduce price competition. (JEL D43, D85)
Thèses sur le sujet "Multi-sided Market"
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Giesecke, Jacob. « Multiple Sides, Multiple Challenges : The Need for a Uniform Approach in Defining the Relevant Product Market in Abuse of Dominance Cases on Multi-Sided Markets ». Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-363381.
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The study shows that multi-sided markets pose difficulties when the relevant product market is to be defined. These difficulties pertain to two questions. The first question is whether one or several markets should be defined. In this regard, it is not easy to extract a coherent method from the cases examined. Instead, the methods applied give the impression of ad hoc-solutions, where similar circumstances result in dissimilar outcomes. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the different market definitions in Visa International MIF and MasterCard MIF. The uncertainties are not limited to these two cases, as the methods applied in Google Shopping too give rise to ambiguities. Why was the market for general search engine platforms separated into two distinct product markets, but the market for comparison shopping services encompassed both sides? Unfortunately, this discussion was not present in the decision. This only serves to reinforce the impression that these questions are solved on an ad hoc-basis. A clear method of approaching multi-sided markets is desirable, not least because the enforcement of competition rules must be characterized by consistency and foreseeability. Hopefully, the judgement in Google Shopping will bring further clarity to this. Nonetheless, the conclusion is that one market should be defined when differences between competitive constraints on the two sides are absent. E contrario, this means that two markets should be defined when such differences are present. This is true regardless of the market in question being a transaction or a non-transaction market. This method seems preferable to strictly adhering to the division of multi-sided markets into transaction or non-transaction markets. If the Commission’s analysis is correct in that there are no differences in competitive constraints on the two sides of comparison shopping services, in combination with crossing network effects, the platform’s multi-sidedness is a necessary trait for both sides. This means that a substitute has to be multi-sided in order for it to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false negatives. Vice versa, the definition of two markets allows for one-sided products to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false positives. This is important not only for the binary finding of dominance or non-dominance, but also the degree of dominance. As concluded above, incorrectly defining one market may artificially inflate the degree of dominance into false super-dominance, and incorrectly defining several markets may artificially dilute the degree of dominance. The second question is how substitutability should be measured. It is obvious from the cases examined that qualitative measures are used and not quantitative measures. The products’ characteristics, intended use, purpose, functionalities, users’ perceptions of the product, etc. were given much attention. The SSNIP test was not applied in any of the cases. The first conclusion to be drawn from the examination above is therefore that the difficulties regarding measuring substitutability on multi-sided markets mainly concern quantitative measures. The arguments against applying a SSNIP test related to the cellophane fallacy (in two different forms, one of which was deceivingly similar to the reverse cellophane fallacy) and differences in price sensitivities between the two sides. Network effects present an additional difficulty, which may lead to exaggerated results when measuring substitutability. The second conclusion to be drawn is that there exists a reluctance to apply a SSNIP test in a way that is tailored for multi-sided markets. One method that has been proposed is to apply the test on the total sum paid by both sides, while allowing the intermediary to adjust the increase in price in accordance with its price structure. The categorical dismissal of applying the test in this way suggests that adapted versions have some time to wait before being introduced into case law and decisional practice. If they, as their proponents argue, are a robust way of broadening the evidence of possible substitutability, this is unfortunate. The risk of defining the market overly narrow or overly broad is of course present in this regard as well. A broader spectrum of evidence therefore minimizes the risk of incorrectly finding both dominance and non-dominance.
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Strandberg, Anna. « Digitalizing the swapping process of rental housing : An exploratory study ». Thesis, KTH, Skolan för elektroteknik och datavetenskap (EECS), 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-299939.
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The societal problem regarding the housing shortage has made the housing market inaccessible. With the reduced number of rental apartments and longer housing queues, people face more challenges finding a suitable home. Swapping intermediaries have emerged over the years to facilitate the search process to swap apartments. However, tenants are still struggling to find apartments to swap with. Limited research has been conducted about tenants' experiences and perspectives regarding the swapping process. Through an exploratory approach, this study examines what problems tenants encounter during the swapping process. The research findings indicate several opportunity areas for improving and streamlining the swapping process. The made recommendations were regarding the search process, listing information, and apartment viewings. Further, to create an efficient market, the platform needs to consider thickness, overcome congestion, and make participation safe and simple.Det samhälleliga problemet gällande bostadsbristen har medfört en oåtkomlig bostadsmarknad. Med minskade antalet hyresrätter samt längre bostadsköer står människor inför större utmaningar att hitta ett passande boende. För att underlätta bytesprocessen av hyresrätter har antalet bytesplattformar ökat under åren. Dock kämpar fortfarande många hyresgäster med att hitta en lägenhet att byta med. Begränsat antal studier har genomförts på hyresgäster gällande deras upplevelser samt perspektiv på själva bytesprocessen. Genom användande av en undersökande metod, undersökte denna studie vilka problem hyresgästerna stöter på under bytesprocessen av hyresrätter. Forskningsresultatet indikerade att flera möjligheter finns för att förbättra och effektivisera bytesprocessen. De rekommendationer som gjordes inkluderade sökprocessen, annonssidan, samt lägenhetsvisningar. Vidare, för att skapa en effektiv bytesmarknad, måste plattformen beakta tjocklek, övervinna trängsel, samt göra användandet säkert och enkelt.
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Granath, Isabelle, et Kristin Holmlund. « Business Model Design for Digital Energy Trading Platforms : An Exploratory Study of Local Energy Market Designs ». Thesis, KTH, Skolan för industriell teknik och management (ITM), 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-279616.
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The traditional electricity market, holding centralized authority over consumers, is no longer adequate seeing a shift towards a more electrified, decentralized, and digitalized society. Increased energy prices, raising concerns about climate change, and tightening governmental regulations have resulted in that an extensive diffusion of renewable energy sources has evolved. This development is expected to change the structure of the sector, despite that an appropriate market design that can deal with these remains to be identified. The purpose of this study was to investigate how a business model of a digital platform, managing energy trading within a local community could be designed. This study contributes to a new dimension of energy transitions within a Multi-Level Perspective by studying a particular field of the transition in terms of flexibility market platforms. The rising need for flexible solutions, making the consumer a prosumer, and enabling shared energy through a digital platform involves uncertainty and challenges, where a suitable business model linking new technology to the emerging market needs to be defined. Despite the novelty of the research field of local energy markets, the aim of investigating business model designs for a local energy market platform has been reached through an exploratory case study and integration of theories from several fields. This study makes an analytical contribution of investigating five pioneering projects, all developing digital platforms enabling integration of flexibility into the electricity market. This further contributes to the design-implementation gap of theories when developing a local energy market, by suggesting the most vital parameters to take into account. Based on the findings, a suggestion on a suitable business model design and a corresponding market design was developed. The main objective of the proposed market design is to serve as a basis to bring forward flexibility available from prosumers and their controllable demand and supply arrangement, including renewable energy technology generation and storage devices. The intention is to maintain a balanced and transparent distribution network at the lowest possible costs, while, at the same time functioning as reserve storage towards the main grid, reducing the risk of capacity shortage. Additional insights were raised that can be helpful in the evaluation of utilizing flexibility energy assets before making grid investments, following the recently presented recommendation of the EU's Clean Energy package.Den traditionella elmarknaden, karaktäriserad av en centraliserad styrning, är inte längre hållbar då utvecklingen av marknaden går mot ett allt mer elektrifierat, decentraliserat och digitaliserat samhälle. Ökande energipriser, växande oro för klimatfrågor tillsammans med en allt snävare reglering av energimarknaden har resulterat i en omfattande ökning av förnybara energikällor. Denna utveckling förväntas förändra sektorns struktur, där en lämplig marknadsdesign som kan hantera detta återstår att identifiera. Syftet med denna studie var att undersöka hur en affärsmodell för en digital plattform, anpassad för att hantera lokal energidelning, kan utformas. Denna studie bidrar till en ny dimension av energitransformationen från ett multi-nivå-perspektiv genom att studera ett särskilt område av övergången i form av flexibla marknadsplattformar. Det ökande behovet av flexibla lösningar, där konsumenter blir prosumenter och energi delas lokalt via digitala plattform innebär osäkerheter och utmaningar. En lämplig affärsmodell som kan anknyta de nya tekniska lösningarna som krävs till lokala energimarknader bör därav definieras. Trots att forskningsområdet som berör lokala energimarknader kan anses relativt nytt och delvis outforskat, har målet att undersöka affärsmodellkoncept för en lokal energimarknadsplattform uppnåtts genom en fallstudie och iterationer av teorier inom flertalet områden. Denna studie bidrar med en analytisk undersökning av fem innovativa projekt som alla utvecklar digitala plattformar för att möjliggöra integrering av flexibilitet till elmarknaden. Detta bidrar även till det kunskapsgap som har identifierats mellan design och implementering fas vid utvecklandet av lokala energimarknader, genom föreslagna parameter som anses grundläggande och som bör tas hänsyn till. Baserat på resultatet presenterades ett förslag på en lämplig design för affärsmodell samt en tillhörande marknadsdesign. Huvudsyftet med den föreslagna marknadsdesignen är att utgöra en grund för gynnandet av en mer flexibel elektricitet hantering. Detta möjliggörs genom introduktionen av prosumenter till marknaden, där allt mer elektricitet produceras från förnybara källor och där konsumtion samt produktion regleras med hjälp av integrerade lagringsenheter. Målet är att upprätthålla ett balanserat och transparent distributionsnät till lägsta möjliga kostnad, medan marknaden även fungerar som ett reservlager mot kraftnätet, vilket minskar risken för kapacitetsbrist runt om i Sverige. Ytterligare insikter från denna studie påvisar hur de befintliga energitillgångarna kan utnyttjas på ett mer flexibelt och effektivt sätt, vilka stöds av de nyligen presenterade rekommendationerna från EU:s Clean Energy-paket.
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ZAKIPOUR, MAHMOUDI ANNA, et ARSHAM ATIGHECHI. « Innovations in the business model : Leapfrogging competitors in the Swedish rental housing market ». Thesis, KTH, Skolan för industriell teknik och management (ITM), 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-281972.
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A dilemma that has plagued the rental housing market (RHM) in Sweden is the lack of innovation and companies’ ability to disrupt the market. For start-ups with scarce resources, this becomes further problematic as they become limited in how they can approach disruption. In this study, the possibilities of reaching disruption, or further improving innovation within the Business Model (BM), is studied through the BM Canvas framework. Furthermore, action research was utilized, together with a case study, to create a realistic BM. A qualitative research approach was used with 17 interviews conducted amongst users of already existing platforms in the Rental Housing Swap Market (RHSM), namely the, landlords, politicians and academics within the field. This resulted in two subsequent themes being identified: building incentives for key partners to scale quicker and that a low resource approach requires a highly creative solution. These two themes indicate that if resources are available, innovating the BM through all the BM blocks creates better opportunities for an improved platform. Additionally, while both start-ups and incumbent firms can turn to BM innovation for disruption, the success rate is vastly different for the two. The stage of where a start-up is will determine the difficulty of BM innovation. However, if resources are unavailable, which is the case for some start-ups, it is seemingly better to turn to radical innovation through the use of key infrastructure partnerships – allowing new paradigms to emerge as a result. The results from this study implicate that there are possible gaps within BM innovation that should be studied further. More specifically, how the BM blocks should be prioritized and the differences between the prioritization among different industries.Ett dilemma som har besvärat den svenska hyresmarknaden är bristen på innovation och förmågan för företag att inträda den redan etablerade marknaden, vilket blir en förhöjd svårighet för nystartade bolag vid ett tidigt skede där det finns väldigt sköra resurser. Denna studie undersöker möjligheterna för en lansering som kan störa marknaden med hjälp av innovation av affärsmodellen där ramverket BM Canvas har använts. Forskningen har bedrivits med hjälp av aktionsforskning och ett tillvägagångssätt av en kvalitativ studie där 17 intervjuer utförts med användare på existerande plattformar i bytesmarknaden, hyresvärdar, politiker och akademiker. Resultatet indikerade framställningen av två teman: att bygga incitament för partnerskap med nyckelaktörer för att skala upp snabbt samt att ett kreativt tillvägagångssätt är nödvändigt om det finns låga resurser i bolaget. Studien illustrerar att en ömsesidig anpassning av alla bropelare i affärsmodellen är nödvändiga för att uppnå bästa möjligheter för en förbättrad plattform. Trots att både nystartade bolag och etablerade företag kan vända sig till BM innovation för disruption så varierar deras framgång mellan de två olika typerna av företag. Om det däremot inte finns tillräckligt med resurser, vilket är en sannolik position för ett nystartat bolag, skapar man bättre möjligheter för radikala innovationer genom användningen av innovation inom infrastrukturen av affärsmodellen som skapar nya paradigm att uppstå som resultat. Resultaten av denna studie visar på att det finns potentiella förbättringsområden inom ämnet av BM innovation som bör studeras vidare i framtiden. Mer specifikt, om hur de olika BM blocken bör prioriteras och hur denna prioritering varierar mellan olika industrier.
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Li, Yaxin. « Trois essais sur l'économie numérique et la concurrence entre plateformes ». Electronic Thesis or Diss., Toulouse 1, 2023. https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/49435/.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Au chapitre 1, je développe un modèle dynamique dans lequel deux plateformes axées sur les données se font concurrence pour l'attention des utilisateurs. La qualité du service sur chaque plateforme s'améliore à mesure que davantage de données utilisateur sont disponibles. À chaque période, les plateformes choisissent entre la monétisation actuelle par la publicité ou l'accumulation de plus d'utilisateurs et donc de plus de données à l'avenir. En conséquence, je relie les résultats du marché à l'équilibre aux parts de marché initiales des plateformes et à la productivité des données. Je montre que la co-participation au marché prévaut lorsque les productivités des données des deux plateformes sont faibles. Le basculement du marché est plus susceptible de se produire lorsque l'une des plateformes a une grande productivité des données et bénéficie d'une grande part de marché initiale. J'explore également les effets du partage obligatoire des données. Le basculement du marché est moins susceptible de se produire avec le partage des données. De plus, le partage des données par les deux plateformes ou par la plateforme ayant un avantage important de productivité des données augmente l'excédent des consommateurs. Au chapitre 2, motivé par plusieurs exemples, notamment la concession de licences de brevets pour l'Internet des objets, nous analysons un modèle dans lequel une ou plusieurs plateformes complémentaires choisissent les prix pour un groupe d'appareils en aval qui présentent des externalités de réseau. Nous montrons comment les prix dépendent de la centralité de Katz-Bonacich (ou du vecteur propre) de chaque appareil dans un réseau défini par les externalités de la demande, et comment le réseau pertinent diffère pour un monopole d'écosystème, un planificateur social ou un groupe de plateformes complémentaires. Dans le dernier cas, nous revisitons l'analyse de Cournot sur les monopoles complémentaires et montrons que, dans notre cadre, il est possible que le prix total d'un appareil particulier diminue lorsque le nombre de plateformes monopolistiques augmente. Enfin, nous analysons une fusion partielle qui laisse des monopoles complémentaires d'un seul côté d'une plateforme, créant un nouveau compromis entre l'intériorisation de la double marginalisation et l'externalisation des effets de réseau. Dans l'ensemble, cette étude offre un modèle exploitable des écosystèmes multi-produits et contribue à la littérature sur les marchés à deux faces en analysant les plateformes complémentaires dans un marché multi-latéral général. Au chapitre 3, j'étudie un jeu stratégique de réseau de recherche dans lequel M détaillants vendent un produit dont la qualité est inconnue sur un marché concurrentiel. Les consommateurs du réseau choisissent entre la recherche et le parasitisme, puis décident d'adopter ou non après la recherche. Les consommateurs équilibrent le coût de la recherche et l'efficacité de l'information. Les chercheurs acquièrent des informations sur la qualité et les prix, tandis que les parasites mettent à jour leurs croyances en observant le comportement d'adoption des voisins. À l'équilibre, la stratégie de recherche des consommateurs présente une propriété de seuil décroissant : les consommateurs ayant plus de voisins sont plus susceptibles d'être des parasites. Je montre qu'il existe plusieurs équilibres, mais lorsque le coût de la recherche est suffisamment faible, il existe un unique NEB intérieur tel que les chercheurs et les parasites coexistent sur le marché, et les prix sont supérieurs au coût marginal. J'étudie également l'impact de la structure du réseau sur les résultats de l'équilibre. Lorsque le réseau est plus connecté, les consommateurs effectuent moins de recherches, les prix sont plus élevés et l'excédent des consommateurs est réduitIn Chapter 1, I develop a dynamic model where two data-driven platforms compete for users' attention. The quality of the service on each platform improves as more user data is available. At each period, platforms choose between current monetization through advertisement, or the accumulation of more user and therefore more data, in the future. Accordingly, I relate the market outcomes in equilibrium to platforms' initial market shares and data productivities. I show that market co-participation prevails when data productivities of both platforms are small. Market tipping is more likely to occur when one of the platforms has a large data productivity and enjoys a large initial market share. I also explore the effects of compulsory data sharing. Market tipping is less likely to occur with data sharing. Besides, data sharing by both platforms, or by the platform with a large advantage of data productivity increases consumers' surplus. In chapter 2, motivated by several examples, including Internet of Things patent licensing, we analyze a model where one or more complementary platforms choose prices for a group of downstream devices that exhibit network externalities. We show how prices depend on each device's Katz-Bonacich (or eigenvector) centrality in a network defined by the demand externalities, and how the relevant network differs for an ecosystem monopolist, a social planner, or a group of complementary platforms. For the latter case, we revisit Cournot's analysis of complementary monopolies and show that in our setting, it is possible for the total price of a particular device to decline when the number of monopoly platforms increases. Finally, we analyze a partial merger that leaves complementary monopolies on just one side of a platform, producing a novel tradeoff between internalizing double marginalization and externalizing network effects. Oevrall, this study offers a tractable model of multi-product ecosystems, and contributes to the two-sided market literature by analyzing complementary platforms in a general multi-sided market. In chapter 3, I study a strategic network game of search, where $M$ retailers sell a product with unknown quality in a competing market. Consumers in the network choose between search and free riding, and choose to adopt or not after search. Consumers trade off between search cost and information efficiency. The searchers acquire information about the quality and prices, while free riders update their believes by observing the adoption behavior of neighbors. In equilibrium, consumers' search strategy exhibits non-increasing threshold property: consumers with more neighbors are more likely to be free riders. I show that although there exist multiple equilibria, when search cost is small enough, there exists a unique interior BNE such that both searchers and free riders coexist in the market, and the prices are larger than marginal cost. I also investigate the impact of network structure on equilibrium outcomes. When the network is more connected, consumers engage in less search, the prices are higher, and the consumers' surplus is reduced
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Marcinkowska, Anna. « Exploratory study of market entry strategies for digital payment platforms ». Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för ekonomisk och industriell utveckling, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-147994.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The digital payment industry has become one of the fastest evolving markets in the world, but in the wake of its rapid advancement, an ever increasing gap between academic theory and the actual reality of this market widens - and especially so when it comes to entry theory. It is widely acknowledged that the world is moving towards an ever more homogeneous economy, but despite the fact that payment preferences differ greatly from country to country - research on this subject continues to revolve mainly around localized efforts. But as historical inequalities between poor and rich societies continue to dissipate - learning from nations at the forefront of technological advancement increases the likelihood that the developed strategy becomes applicable to an increased number of countries. By selecting a nation most conducive to technological growth, the purpose of this report is to map the present dynamics in its digital payment industry using both recent and traditional market entry theory. However, studies geared towards globalized strategy formulation cannot be assumed as having guaranteed access to internal company-data at all times. So in order to facilitate such studies, the level of dependency on primary data required for conducting such research needs to be understood first, which is why the work in this report is constrained strictly to data of secondary nature. This, not only to further map the characteristics of this market, but also to see how open the market is to public inspection. Ultimately, the academic contribution becomes that of providing a road-map towards adapting currently available market entry theory to suit the rapidly evolving conditions of the digital payment industry from a global perspective and, when failing to do so, the aim is to also explore avenues for further research towards this end goal.
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Atay, Ata. « Essays on multi-sided assignment markets ». Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/402148.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This dissertation covers the study of assignment problems in a game theoretical framework, focusing on multi-sided assignment games and stability notions.
In Chapter 2, we provide some preliminaries on assignment markets and assignment games. We give some needed definitions and crucial results with their proof.
In Chapter 3, a generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.
In Chapter 4, we consider a multi-sided assignment game with the following characteristics: (a) the agents are organized in m sectors that are connected by a graph that induces a weighted m-partite graph on the set of agents, (b) a basic coalition is formed by agents from different connected sectors, and (c) the worth of a basic coalition is the addition of the weights of all its pairs that belong to connected sectors. We provide a sufficient condition on the weights to guarantee balancedness of the related multi-sided assignment game. Moreover, when the graph on the sectors is cycle-free, we prove the game is strongly balanced and the core is described by means of the cores of the underlying two-sided assignment games associated with the edges of this graph. Moreover, once selected a spanning tree of the cycle-free graph on the sectors, the equivalence between core and competitive equilibria is established.
In Chapter 5, we focus on two-sided assignment games. Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterizes the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graph-theoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002).
In Chapter 6, we study von Neumann-Morgenstern stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in this case, we focus on other notions of stability such as the notions of subsolution and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in case each sector of the market has only two agents. Furthermore, for any three-sided assignment market, we prove that the union of the extended cores of all mu- compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching mu, is the core with respect to those allocations that are compatible with that matching, and it is always non-empty.
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Forte, Manuela. « Access to broadcasting platforms in multi-sided markets ». Thesis, IMT Alti Studi Lucca, 2010. http://e-theses.imtlucca.it/40/1/Forte_phdthesis.pdf.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the dissertation.
Chapter 2 describes the functioning of the broadcasting market, with particular emphasis on the platforms involved, in order to prepare the reader for the analysis of platform competition strategies that follows. I discuss so-called “multi sided market theory”, and describe some examples of platforms. In this context I point out that the broadcasting sector involves both vertical integration, horizontal integration and multi-sided market platforms, and the theme of access to platforms is discussed with reference to all three types. In chapter 3 I stress that multi-sided platforms are pervaded by externalities. For this reason I deal with price allocation on the two sides of the market in order to demonstrate that price allocation by the platform is not neutral. Then I discuss the existence of price differences in one-sided and two-sided markets with both single homing and multihoming, and with exclusive and non-exclusive services. In chapter 4 under the leitmotiv of the evolution of pluralism of information, I review the main Italian Constitutional Court judgments on this topic and the ex ante regulation of the broadcasting sector in Italy, verifying whether the existing antitrust limits are still consistent with the current level of technology, considering the DVB-T broadcasting technique and the sale of frequencies on the secondary market.
In chapter 5 I describe the various relevant broadcasting markets in accordance with European Commission case decisions. I demonstrate that the activities of multi-sided broadcasting platforms are subject to Article 81 and 82 of the European Treaty, just like any other integrated platform, since in any case they can determine input or customer foreclosure. Furthermore I deal with the relationship between media broadcasting and the social value of sport with reference to the many antitrust cases in the broadcasting sector concerning the sale of sports event rights to media platforms, and I discus Italian Law 9/2008 which establishes the collective trading of such rights. Chapter 6 considers the issue of access to content by focusing on emerging multi-sided platforms. I compare them with the vertically integrated platforms and discuss the potential of multi-sided platforms to remove entry barriers to the sector by means of unbundling, which is made possible by the must-offer and must-carry obligations introduced into Italy by the most recent legislation.
Chapter 7 contains my conclusions.
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D'ANNUNZIO, Anna. « Multi-Product Firms and Quality Differentiation : Product Bundling and Content Provision in Two-Sided Media Markets ». Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Bergamo, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10446/879.
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Uhlenbrock, Jens [Verfasser]. « Pricing And Regulation In Multi-sided Markets - Implications for Payment Card Networks And Smart Metering / Jens Uhlenbrock ». Kiel, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1221618121/34.
Texte intégralLivres sur le sujet "Multi-sided Market"
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Evans, David S. The industrial organization of markets with two-sided platforms. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Multi-sided Market"
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Parker, Geoffrey, et Marshall Van Alstyne. « Platforms : Their Structure, Benefits, and Challenges ». Dans Introduction to Digital Humanism, 523–42. Cham : Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45304-5_33.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractIn this chapter, we describe platforms and their structure and how that structure differs from traditional linear value chains. We then discuss some of the key economic factors, including two-sided and multi-sided network effects, which underpin both the platform value proposition and the ability to create welfare for users. Platform and technology firms have grown to the point where their market capitalizations greatly exceed oil, gas, and financial services firms. We then explore some key governance and regulatory issues, including privacy, false information, and antitrust. We conclude with a discussion of emerging issues posed by Large Language Models such as ChatGPT, including their ability to create false information at scale and disrupt creative industries.
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Montero, Juan, et Matthias Finger. « Platforms in Multi-Sided Markets ». Dans The Rise of the New Network Industries, 18–26. New York : Routledge, 2021. : Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003141327-4.
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Gilor, Dvir, Rica Gonen et Erel Segal-Halevi. « Ascending-Price Mechanism for General Multi-sided Markets ». Dans Multi-Agent Systems, 1–18. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82254-5_1.
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Forrest, Jeffrey Yi-Lin, et Yong Liu. « Consumer Synergies : Simultaneous Utilities and Multi-Sided Markets ». Dans Contributions to Management Science, 191–214. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82898-1_9.
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Frank, Jonas Severin. « Competition Concerns in Multi-Sided Markets in Mobile Communication ». Dans Competition on the Internet, 81–99. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55096-6_7.
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Feldman, Moran, Gonen Frim et Rica Gonen. « Multi-sided Advertising Markets : Dynamic Mechanisms and Incremental User Compensations ». Dans Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 227–47. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01554-1_13.
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Feldman, Moran, et Rica Gonen. « Removal and Threshold Pricing : Truthful Two-Sided Markets with Multi-dimensional Participants ». Dans Algorithmic Game Theory, 163–75. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15.
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Sylos Labini, Giovanni, Cristoforo Abbattista, Vito Fortunato, Leonardo Amoruso, Remo Pareschi et Paolo Bottoni. « Blockchain-Enabled Satellite Onboard Computing for Smart Contract : Benefits for Multi-sided Markets and IoT Applications ». Dans Studies in Big Data, 69–87. Singapore : Springer Nature Singapore, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0041-7_4.
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Rippa, Alessandro. « The Travelling Carpet ». Dans Kultur und soziale Praxis, 93–112. Bielefeld, Germany : transcript Verlag, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.14361/9783839466773-007.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This chapter builds on ethnographic research with and among carpet dealers in Islamabad and Kashgar and aims to recount the little-known story of Xinjiang carpets from Khotan, as these have travelled between China, northern Pakistan and Afghanistan since the opening of the Karakoram Highway in the 1980s. As cross-border relations grew with the opening of the road, Pakistani carpet collectors and traders began looking for old Khotanese carpets. These collectors, besides selling such antiques on the well-known Islamabad carpet markets, brought Khotanese designs to carpet-makers in Afghanistan. From there, newly made carpets in the Khotanese style travelled back to Xinjiang, where they are now sold to tourists and collectors alike as a local, traditional product. Through this story, I show how Khotanese carpets have become both a symbol of local identity and an example of the transnational mobility of goods and capital - and how the Karakoram Highway features prominently in these narratives. I conclude by discussing how travelling Khotanese carpets can contribute to ongoing ethnographic studies of roads and by reflecting on the value of multi-sided ethnography.
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Anshari, Muhammad, Mohammad Nabil Almunawar et Patricia Ordóñez de Pablos. « Disruptive Innovation and a Multi-Sided Digital Marketplace ». Dans Handbook of Research on Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Management in Asia’s Digital Economy, 366–77. IGI Global, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-6684-5849-5.ch020.
Texte intégralRésumé :
A digital marketplace is a digital area or platform where demand and supply sides communicate and transact through the digital space or platform controlled by a digital marketplace provider. Digital marketplaces have become increasingly popular in recent years, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic while disruptive innovation is a term used to describe a technology that has a major impact on the way a market or industry operates. Disruptive innovation is a positive force and process that changes a market of sophisticated and expensive services and products into one with simplicity, ease, accessibility, and affordability. This study employs a qualitative methodology by undertaking assessment of the relevant literature to examine how digital marketplace becomes disruptive innovation for traditional marketplace. This study reveals that multi-sided market enables digital marketplace to expand multi values co-creations that could not be achieved via physical business. The multi values co-creations distinctively disrupt the conventional physical marketplace.
Actes de conférences sur le sujet "Multi-sided Market"
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Holzmann, Thomas, Klaus Sailer et Bernhard Katzy. « The matching process for innovation partnerships : A multi-sided market perspective ». Dans 2013 IEEE International Technology Management Conference & 19th ICE Conference (ITMC). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itmc.2013.7352664.
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Yang, Sung Yoon. « Rethinking modes of evaluation of market dominant power for multi-sided platforms ». Dans the 2nd International Conference. New York, New York, USA : ACM Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3234781.3234799.
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Landolfi, Giuseppe, Andrea Barni, Silvia Menato, Franco Antonio Cavadini, Diego Rovere et Giovanni Dal Maso. « Design of a multi-sided platform supporting CPS deployment in the automation market ». Dans 2018 IEEE Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icphys.2018.8390790.
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Segal-Halevi, Erel, Avinatan Hassidim et Yonatan Aumann. « Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods ». Dans Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/68.
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Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. However, existing mechanisms are either not truthful, do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, rely on a prior on the traders' valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single type of good. We extend the random-sampling technique used in earlier works to multi-good markets where traders have gross-substitute valuations. We show a prior free, truthful and strongly-budget-balanced mechanism which guarantees near-optimal gain from trade when the market sizes of all goods grow to infinity at a similar rate.
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Kong, Fang, Junming Yin et Shuai Li. « Thompson Sampling for Bandit Learning in Matching Markets ». Dans Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/439.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The problem of two-sided matching markets has a wide range of real-world applications and has been extensively studied in the literature. A line of recent works have focused on the problem setting where the preferences of one-side market participants are unknown a priori and are learned by iteratively interacting with the other side of participants. All these works are based on explore-then-commit (ETC) and upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithms, two common strategies in multi-armed bandits (MAB). Thompson sampling (TS) is another popular approach, which attracts lots of attention due to its easier implementation and better empirical performances. In many problems, even when UCB and ETC-type algorithms have already been analyzed, researchers are still trying to study TS for its benefits. However, the convergence analysis of TS is much more challenging and remains open in many problem settings. In this paper, we provide the first regret analysis for TS in the new setting of iterative matching markets. Extensive experiments demonstrate the practical advantages of the TS-type algorithm over the ETC and UCB-type baselines.
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Herschbein, Steven B., Carmelo F. Scrudato, George K. Worth et Edward S. Hermann. « Silicon and Package Preparation Options for Focused Ion Beam (FIB) Circuit Editing and General Packaging Failure Analysis ». Dans ISTFA 2013. ASM International, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.31399/asm.cp.istfa2013p0123.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract The Focused Ion Beam (FIB) technique of internal modification for chip repair, layout verification, and internal signal probe access has become an integral part of the process for bringing advanced products to market. The pervasive switch from wire bond connections to single component flipchip solder bump mounting on high value products has greatly aided the task of FIB editing by placing the bare backside silicon of the die within easy reach. FIB chip circuit access begins with task-specific sample preparation. The package opening and silicon prep process is well defined and quite robust when full thickness chips are mounted to simple ceramic carriers. Unfortunately, the introduction of flexible organic laminate substrates and the development of stacked die packaging has further complicated the process. Multi-chip packages containing combinations of full thickness and thinned chips may be present. They could be wire-bond connected, or use Through-Silicon Vias (TSV) for double sided attachment. Multiple heat treatment cycles joining together materials with vastly different coefficients of thermal expansion (CTE) may result in severe package warpage and stress. All of these conditions and possible combinations have served to invalidate key elements of the established sample preparation process, and made each presented case unique. As the FIB team works to develop new precision techniques for internal circuitry access, the greater semiconductor packaging development and failure analysis community has benefited from the introduction of new tooling and methodologies.
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Tereshkin, S. « Multi-Sided Platform For Instant Purchases And Sales In Commodity Markets ». Dans II International Conference on Economic and Social Trends for Sustainability of Modern Society. European Publisher, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2021.09.02.193.
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Wulfert, Tobias, Sarah Seufert et Christian Leyens. « Developing Multi-Sided Markets in Dynamic Electronic Commerce Ecosystems - Towards a Taxonomy of Digital Marketplaces ». Dans Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24251/hicss.2021.741.
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Keskin, Tayfun, et Deanna Kennedy. « Strategies in Smart Service Systems Enabled Multi-sided Markets : Business Models for the Internet of Things ». Dans 2015 48th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2015.176.
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Thekinen, J. D., Yupeng Han et Jitesh H. Panchal. « Designing Market Thickness and Optimal Frequency of Multi-Period Stable Matching in Cloud-Based Design and Manufacturing ». Dans ASME 2018 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2018-85801.
Texte intégralRésumé :
A central issue in two-sided matching markets such as Cloud-Based Design and Manufacturing (CBDM) where agents interact over a long period of time is the design of optimal matching period during recursive implementation. Existing literature provides mechanisms that satisfy useful properties such as stability in a single matching cycle, but they lack studies on the effect of the period of matching cycle on the optimality. To address this gap, we perform simulation studies on a synthetic CBDM scenario where service seekers arrive as a Poisson process with a fixed number of service providers offering resources. We identify the optimal matching period and assess its robustness using sensitivity studies. Optimality is measured in terms of utility obtained by the agents, the number of matches and fairness of the utility distribution. We show that a matching period equal to the ratio of the number of service providers to the arrival rate of service seekers is optimal.