Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Monetary policy. Fiscal policy. International macro »

This paper focuses on assessing highlights in the managing monetary policy in post-crisis period from 2011 to present in Vietnam in order to identifies key messages which helped Vietnam overcome the financial crisis 2007-2008 and keep the growth rate stably at high level, to be one of highest growth rate in the world. The research used aggregated methods, descriptive statistics and analysis based on World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Central Bank of Vietnam data sources. The results shown that the monetary policy in Vietnam in this period had a flexible transition in its management objectives, coordinated in close with fiscal policy to achieve macro goals, besides changing the regulatory mechanism by volume to operating with interest rates and combined with other operating tools more diverse.

Under the background that the international economy is in great recession and the new development pattern of domestic and international double circulation has gradually become a consensus macro-economy new normal, this paper investigates 31 provinces and cities' policies and residents' leverage ratio in recent ten years, and analyzes the direction and extent of industrial policy, fiscal policy and monetary policy on residents' leverage ratio by using stata, matlab and other software. The quantitative indicators of panel data are used to simulate dynamic and static models, respectively, to solve the problems of internal lag and endogenous variables, and to some extent reflect the impact of household leverage ratio on the domestic double-cycle situation. Finally, it is concluded that the completion of real estate development investment and the sales area of residential commercial housing are the main indicators that affect household leverage ratio. The added value of financial industry, land policy and per capita income of residents have a certain positive impact on the leverage ratio. Population age structure, interest rates and other factors have a weak impact on the leverage ratio. At the end of the article, the author puts forward some policy suggestions, such as correctly guiding the supply and demand relationship in the real estate market, improving the land fiscal policy, and reasonably regulating the monetary structure, which has certain reference significance for the research on the double-cycle development pattern at home and abroad.

The article describes a concept of a long-term macro-economic policy based on a compromise between economic growth and inflation that accompanies this growth. This concept differs from the existing theoretical approaches supported by monetary authorities in that it does not rely on the notion of Russia as a small open economy and it does not focus on price volatility as the number one problem in the long-term perspective. The theoretical framework usually used to address the relationship between economic growth and inflation is the Phillips curve and its modifications. In our study, this problem is connected to the phenomenon of non-neutrality of money in the long term. The analysis uses the simulation model of the shifting mode of reproduction (SMR model) and econometric methods. It is shown that a compromise between economic growth and inflation can be achieved if the long-term monetary policy results in the approximately equal rates of real GDP and inflation. Such monetary policy is possible to realize provided that some important macro-economic conditions are fulfilled, for example, the rouble undervaluation coefficient is reduced, the debt-to-gross-domestic- product ratio is increased, the ratio of international (foreign exchange) reserves to GDP is decreased, and the transition to a fiscal deficit policy is implemented. In other words, a systemic approach is required. This is not an easy way but it will ensure a growth in GDP rates and lower inflation.

In a war economy, ensuring the stability of price dynamics by the regulation of money supply faces a number of fundamental obstacles that significantly reduce the effectiveness of traditional monetary instruments. During the war, the market principles of economy’s functioning weaken, the monetary transmission mechanisms do not work adequately, the role of the state in ensuring the functioning of commodity-monetary relations increases. This calls for a revision of the macro-stabilizing role of monetary policy. Taking into account the above, approaches to the formulation of monetary policy directions during martial law are summarized, relevant recommendations for the current conditions of Ukraine are substantiated using theoretical sources, advisory and research papers of international organizations and national macroeconomic regulators, as well as statistical databases. Based on the generalization of theoretical principles and world experience, the design of the wartime monetary regime is substantiated, which involves the modification of such aspects as: the target-oriented monetary policy; the composition of interest rates for the central bank’s basic operations; harmonization of monetary policy decisions with fiscal policy priorities; establishment of a fixed exchange rate regime; enhanced control over the cross-border movement of capital. It is concluded that in a war economy, the main contribution of monetary policy to the achievement of macroeconomic stability should be made by the effective interaction with the government in ensuring the stable functioning of government borrowing market, controllability of capital movements, support for the creation of new jobs and generators of new added value for effective closure of new money supply.

In a war economy, ensuring the stability of price dynamics by the regulation of money supply faces a number of fundamental obstacles that significantly reduce the effectiveness of traditional monetary instruments. During the war, the market principles of economy’s functioning weaken, the monetary transmission mechanisms do not work adequately, the role of the state in ensuring the functioning of commodity-monetary relations increases. This calls for a revision of the macro-stabilizing role of monetary policy. Taking into account the above, approaches to the formulation of monetary policy directions during martial law are summarized, relevant recommendations for the current conditions of Ukraine are substantiated using theoretical sources, advisory and research papers of international organizations and national macroeconomic regulators, as well as statistical databases. Based on the generalization of theoretical principles and world experience, the design of the wartime monetary regime is substantiated, which involves the modification of such aspects as: the target-oriented monetary policy; the composition of interest rates for the central bank’s basic operations; harmonization of monetary policy decisions with fiscal policy priorities; establishment of a fixed exchange rate regime; enhanced control over the cross-border movement of capital. It is concluded that in a war economy, the main contribution of monetary policy to the achievement of macroeconomic stability should be made by the effective interaction with the government in ensuring the stable functioning of government borrowing market, controllability of capital movements, support for the creation of new jobs and generators of new added value for effective closure of new money supply.

In a war economy, ensuring the stability of price dynamics by the regulation of money supply faces a number of fundamental obstacles that significantly reduce the effectiveness of traditional monetary instruments. During the war, the market principles of economy’s functioning weaken, the monetary transmission mechanisms do not work adequately, the role of the state in ensuring the functioning of commodity-monetary relations increases. This calls for a revision of the macro-stabilizing role of monetary policy. Taking into account the above, approaches to the formulation of monetary policy directions during martial law are summarized, relevant recommendations for the current conditions of Ukraine are substantiated using theoretical sources, advisory and research papers of international organizations and national macroeconomic regulators, as well as statistical databases. Based on the generalization of theoretical principles and world experience, the design of the wartime monetary regime is substantiated, which involves the modification of such aspects as: the target-oriented monetary policy; the composition of interest rates for the central bank’s basic operations; harmonization of monetary policy decisions with fiscal policy priorities; establishment of a fixed exchange rate regime; enhanced control over the cross-border movement of capital. It is concluded that in a war economy, the main contribution of monetary policy to the achievement of macroeconomic stability should be made by the effective interaction with the government in ensuring the stable functioning of government borrowing market, controllability of capital movements, support for the creation of new jobs and generators of new added value for effective closure of new money supply.

In a war economy, ensuring the stability of price dynamics by the regulation of money supply faces a number of fundamental obstacles that significantly reduce the effectiveness of traditional monetary instruments. During the war, the market principles of economy’s functioning weaken, the monetary transmission mechanisms do not work adequately, the role of the state in ensuring the functioning of commodity-monetary relations increases. This calls for a revision of the macro-stabilizing role of monetary policy. Taking into account the above, approaches to the formulation of monetary policy directions during martial law are summarized, relevant recommendations for the current conditions of Ukraine are substantiated using theoretical sources, advisory and research papers of international organizations and national macroeconomic regulators, as well as statistical databases. Based on the generalization of theoretical principles and world experience, the design of the wartime monetary regime is substantiated, which involves the modification of such aspects as: the target-oriented monetary policy; the composition of interest rates for the central bank’s basic operations; harmonization of monetary policy decisions with fiscal policy priorities; establishment of a fixed exchange rate regime; enhanced control over the cross-border movement of capital. It is concluded that in a war economy, the main contribution of monetary policy to the achievement of macroeconomic stability should be made by the effective interaction with the government in ensuring the stable functioning of government borrowing market, controllability of capital movements, support for the creation of new jobs and generators of new added value for effective closure of new money supply.

In a war economy, ensuring the stability of price dynamics by the regulation of money supply faces a number of fundamental obstacles that significantly reduce the effectiveness of traditional monetary instruments. During the war, the market principles of economy’s functioning weaken, the monetary transmission mechanisms do not work adequately, the role of the state in ensuring the functioning of commodity-monetary relations increases. This calls for a revision of the macro-stabilizing role of monetary policy. Taking into account the above, approaches to the formulation of monetary policy directions during martial law are summarized, relevant recommendations for the current conditions of Ukraine are substantiated using theoretical sources, advisory and research papers of international organizations and national macroeconomic regulators, as well as statistical databases. Based on the generalization of theoretical principles and world experience, the design of the wartime monetary regime is substantiated, which involves the modification of such aspects as: the target-oriented monetary policy; the composition of interest rates for the central bank’s basic operations; harmonization of monetary policy decisions with fiscal policy priorities; establishment of a fixed exchange rate regime; enhanced control over the cross-border movement of capital. It is concluded that in a war economy, the main contribution of monetary policy to the achievement of macroeconomic stability should be made by the effective interaction with the government in ensuring the stable functioning of government borrowing market, controllability of capital movements, support for the creation of new jobs and generators of new added value for effective closure of new money supply.

In a war economy, ensuring the stability of price dynamics by the regulation of money supply faces a number of fundamental obstacles that significantly reduce the effectiveness of traditional monetary instruments. During the war, the market principles of economy’s functioning weaken, the monetary transmission mechanisms do not work adequately, the role of the state in ensuring the functioning of commodity-monetary relations increases. This calls for a revision of the macro-stabilizing role of monetary policy. Taking into account the above, approaches to the formulation of monetary policy directions during martial law are summarized, relevant recommendations for the current conditions of Ukraine are substantiated using theoretical sources, advisory and research papers of international organizations and national macroeconomic regulators, as well as statistical databases. Based on the generalization of theoretical principles and world experience, the design of the wartime monetary regime is substantiated, which involves the modification of such aspects as: the target-oriented monetary policy; the composition of interest rates for the central bank’s basic operations; harmonization of monetary policy decisions with fiscal policy priorities; establishment of a fixed exchange rate regime; enhanced control over the cross-border movement of capital. It is concluded that in a war economy, the main contribution of monetary policy to the achievement of macroeconomic stability should be made by the effective interaction with the government in ensuring the stable functioning of government borrowing market, controllability of capital movements, support for the creation of new jobs and generators of new added value for effective closure of new money supply.

In a war economy, ensuring the stability of price dynamics by the regulation of money supply faces a number of fundamental obstacles that significantly reduce the effectiveness of traditional monetary instruments. During the war, the market principles of economy’s functioning weaken, the monetary transmission mechanisms do not work adequately, the role of the state in ensuring the functioning of commodity-monetary relations increases. This calls for a revision of the macro-stabilizing role of monetary policy. Taking into account the above, approaches to the formulation of monetary policy directions during martial law are summarized, relevant recommendations for the current conditions of Ukraine are substantiated using theoretical sources, advisory and research papers of international organizations and national macroeconomic regulators, as well as statistical databases. Based on the generalization of theoretical principles and world experience, the design of the wartime monetary regime is substantiated, which involves the modification of such aspects as: the target-oriented monetary policy; the composition of interest rates for the central bank’s basic operations; harmonization of monetary policy decisions with fiscal policy priorities; establishment of a fixed exchange rate regime; enhanced control over the cross-border movement of capital. It is concluded that in a war economy, the main contribution of monetary policy to the achievement of macroeconomic stability should be made by the effective interaction with the government in ensuring the stable functioning of government borrowing market, controllability of capital movements, support for the creation of new jobs and generators of new added value for effective closure of new money supply.

This thesis considers how fiscal and monetary policy should be conducted in resourcerich economies. It consists of three papers addressing: whether governments should spend, save or invest volatile oil income; the assets they should save in; and how monetary policy should respond. The first, “Eight principles for managing resource wealth”, shows that capital-scarce countries should save relatively less against oil price volatility, and invest more in domestic capital. They also should prepare for volatility in advance, and treat savings as a source of income rather than a temporary buffer. To show this the paper develops a framework that nests a variety of existing results, which are presented in eight principles. The second, “The Elephant in the Ground: Oil extraction and asset allocation in sovereign wealth funds”, shows that governments should use sovereign wealth funds to offset oil price risk, extract oil faster if its price is pro-cyclical, and use precautionary savings to manage any residual volatility. To do this it combines three strands of literature for the first time: on continuous-time portfolio theory, oil extraction and precautionary savings. The third, “Optimal monetary responses to oil discoveries”, addresses the anticipation effects around an oil discovery. It shows that the terms of trade will need to appreciate twice: once when oil is discovered and consumers anticipate future revenues; and again when the government begins spending the revenues. Oil wealth will give the monetary authority an incentive to appreciate the terms of trade, in addition to stabilising domestic inflation and the output gap. Optimal policy is well-approximated by a standard monetary rule that also responds to expected changes in the natural level of output.

This thesis consists of three essays in monetary economics and international macroeconomics.
Chapter one uses Canadian data to evaluate the performance of money growth targeting and inflation targeting policy rules, especially when they react to asset price changes. There are three important findings. First, estimates of the policy rules consistent with both regimes provide evidence that the Bank of Canada has systematically reacted to stock price bubbles and exchange rate changes. Second, a counterfactual experiment reveals that, the high inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s could have been avoided if the Bank of Canada had responded more strongly to inflation and growth in aggregate demand. Third, simulation experiments yielded two important results: For both the money growth targeting and inflation targeting policy rules, it is always desirable to react to changes in exchange rates and stock price bubbles: Contrary to established findings, the results indicate that the money growth targeting policy rules are more efficient than the inflation targeting policy rules.
Chapter two uses data on Ghana to test the validity of the intertemporal model of current account that allows for external shocks in the form of variable interest rates and exchange rates, and the existence of capital controls. We find that, irrespective of the degree of capital control, the basic model fails to predict the dynamics of the actual current account. However, we find that extending the model to capture variations in interest rates and exchange rates better explains the path of the actual current account balances only during the liberalized regime. When the model was adjusted to allow for credit constraints, there was some support for the proposition that the presence of capital controls prevented economic agents in Ghana to smooth their consumption path during the control regime.
Chapter three investigates the effect of trading block on Tanzania's bilateral trade. Using a fixed effects estimation technique, the results revealed that the East African Community (EAC) and the European Union (EU) have had significant positive effects on Tanzania's bilateral trade. We also find that there is a significant intra-trade relationship between Tanzania and its major trading partners in the manufacturing sector.

This thesis is comprised of six Chapters on US Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy and their interaction with fiscal policy, both domestically and internationally. Chapter 1 introduces the main themes of the thesis. Chapter 2 studies the theoretical background of the thesis. After setting out key themes and the theoretical background in the introductory Chapters, the first core Chapter, i.e. thesis Chapter 3, examines the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. Price puzzles are a repeated feature of empirical VAR models studying the effect of monetary policy. These price puzzles are often believed to appear due to the lack of information. However, we show that whether monetary and fiscal policy are active or passive influences the appearance of the price puzzle. This is because an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy can encourage private expenditure through a positive wealth channel. An active fiscal policy means fiscal authorities set expenditure regardless of tax revenues, while a passive monetary policy refers to a weak response of the policy interest rate to inflation. Finally, we find evidence in this Chapter that fiscal policy stimulates economic activity, i.e. it is non-Ricardian. Chapter 4 examines the effect of monetary and fiscal policy interactions in an international context. In particular, it considers the international spillovers of US monetary policy, whilst account for fiscal policy. This Chapter shows that US government debt influences the duration of the responses to a monetary contraction. Furthermore, it is shown that an increase in US government debt influences both the short and long-term interest rates, inflation, and output in the Euro Area and UK. This is through a positive wealth effect. In addition, the results of Persistence Profiles test, i.e. how fast we converge upon equilibrium following a shock, suggest that accounting for US government debt delays the return to equilibrium following monetary policy shocks. This may be due to the impact of fiscal policy on inflation and its persistence. Chapter 5 studies Unconventional Monetary Policy (UMP). It is shown that UMP increases output and inflation in the US, and generates spillovers to the Euro Area and UK. Furthermore, we present evidence that the portfolio balance is the transmission channel of UMP. That is UMP contributes to lowering the bound yields while it increases the price of assets. Chapter 6 concludes and summarizes the thesis, and provides a discussion of policy implications.

En esta tesis estudio varias cuestiones de política monetaria y fiscal usando modelos de equilibrio generales completamente micro-fundados. El primer capítulo de esta tesis trata la cuestión de cómo la políticas monetarias y fiscales se deben conducir en una unión monetaria donde hay un solo banco central que fija el tipo de interés común mientras que el gobierno todavía conserva independencia completa en las decisiones de políticas fiscales. En el segundo capítulo se dedica a estudiar si es posible racionalizar en un modelo keynesiano completamente micro-fundado la existencia de una unión monetaria. El último capítulo investiga en qué medida el incentivo de las autoridades de política económica en una economía abierta de mejorar los términos de intercambio en su favor se puede compensar por la externalidad de relocalización de la producción (home market effect).
In this thesis I study different kinds of monetary and fiscal policy issues by using fully microfounded general equilibrium models. The first chapter addresses the question of how monetary and fiscal policy should be conducted in a monetary union where there is a single central bank that sets the common interest rate while governments still retain full independence in fiscal policy decisions. The second chapter is devoted to study whether it is possible to rationalize, within a fully microfounded New Keynesian framework, the existence of a monetary union. The last chapter investigates to what extent the incentive of open economy policy makers to improve the terms of trade in their favour can be outweighed by the production relocation externality (the so called home market effect).

O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em analisar relações existentes entre a gestão da dívida pública e a condução das políticas monetária e fiscal, bem como examinar os efeitos da composição da dívida na trajetória de endividamento para o caso da economia brasileira. Com este foco, foi construído um modelo macro-estrutural que estabelece relações entre o processo de evolução da relação dívida/produto e a trajetória de variáveis macroeconômicas. Foram realizadas simulações utilizando a técnica de Monte Carlo para observar o impacto das trajetórias do hiato do produto e das taxas de câmbio, juros e inflação na evolução da relação dívida/produto em diferentes contextos de atuação das autoridades monetária e fiscal. No modelo estrutural a trajetória da dívida é função da participação dos instrumentos de financiamento na composição da dívida pública. Os instrumentos utilizados são: (i) títulos indexados à taxa Selic; (ii) títulos indexados a índices de preços; (iii) títulos prefixados; e (iv) títulos indexados à taxa de câmbio. O modelo permitiu captar que, quando a sensibilidade da inflação a mudanças na taxa de juros é pequena, os apertos monetários necessários ao cumprimento da meta produzem maior elevação na relação D/Y. Essa elevação se torna ainda mais acentuada quanto maior for a sensibilidade do produto a mudanças na taxa de juros. Os resultados permitem, ainda, analisar os trade-offs entre custo e risco oferecidos pelos instrumentos de financiamento em diferentes posturas das autoridades fiscal e monetária.
The aim of the present work consists in analyzing connections that exist between the management of public debt and the conduct of fiscal and monetary policies, as well as examining the effects of debt composition on the trajectory of the Brazilian Debt/GDP ratio. We propose a macro-structural model for the Brazilian economy to derive relations regarding debt management and the macroeconomic variables. Using Monte Carlo simulations we observed how inflation, GDP, interest rate and exchange rate alter their trajectories when we have changes in the conduct of fiscal and monetary policies. The impacts of these changes on Debt/GDP ratio depend on the debt composition. The funding instruments analyzed are: (i) Selic indexed bonds; (ii) inflation linked bonds; (iii) fixed-rate bonds; and (iv) dollar indexed bonds. The model captured that, the lower the sensibility of inflation associated with changes on interest rates, the higher the impacts on Debt/GDP consequences of a tightening in monetary policy The results allows to observe the tradeoffs between the risk and the cost associated with debt instruments for different scenarios of fiscal and monetary policies.

This thesis studies the optimal conduct of unconventional monetary policy in the form of purchases of long-term government debt by the central bank and, motivated by this policy tool, the evolution of long-term government debt holdings in household portfolios over the course of the life cycle. It is comprised of three self-contained chapters. The first chapter investigates whether it can be beneficial for central banks to use the unconventional tool even when the main policy rate is not constrained by the zero lower bound. A friction in the interaction between households and banks allows central bank purchases of long-term government debt to reduce long-term interest rates and thus to stimulate economic activity. If debt purchases and conventional short-term interest rate policy are coordinated in an appropriate way, the central bank is able to reduce the volatility of output and inflation. In the second chapter, the role that unconventional monetary policy can play in a currency union is analysed. A model is laid out, in which two countries form a currency union with a common central bank but separate and uncoordinated fiscal policy institutions. When monetary policy is implemented only through the common short-term interest rate, the central bank is unable to respond effectively to country-specific shocks. Due to segmentation in the market for long-term government debt, the yield on long-term debt can differ across countries. As a result, a monetary policy authority that can rely on bond purchases is able to address idiosyncratic shocks reflected in volatility of the natural terms of trade more effectively and to achieve higher welfare than one that cannot make use of this instrument. The final chapter studies the long-term government bond share in household portfolios over the course of the life cycle. US data from the Survey of Consumer Finances suggests that participation in the market for long-term government debt first increases and later decreases as agents approach the retirement age. The portfolio share conditional on participation is non-decreasing over the working life. These stylised facts can be explained by means of a portfolio choice model in which agents are subject to aggregate risk through asset returns as well as idiosyncratic risk through labour income and the stochastic events of retirement and death.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the leading international economic crisis manager, but the effects of its loans and conditionality reach far beyond overarching macroeconomic indicators. This paper will examine the consequences of IMF fiscal policy conditions on income inequality and poverty by examining cases in Latin America, and specifically Mexico during the 1980s. The role that internal politics within borrowing countries plays is also closely examined. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for the IMF to ensure the most equitable and effective means of overcoming balance of payments crises.

Thesis advisor: Fabio Ghironi
My dissertation develops a set of tools for introducing heterogeneity into economic models in an analytically tractable way. Many models use the representative agent framework, which greatly simplifies macroeconomic aggregation but abstracts from the heterogeneity we see in the real world. In my research, I move away from the representative agent framework in two key ways. First, my work in international macroeconomics incorporates heterogeneity via idiosyncratic shocks across countries. Second, my work on financial frictions employs asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. In both of these areas, my goal is to examine the implications of heterogeneity in the most tractable way possible. Crucially, these insights can be incorporated into the models currently used by academics and central banks for policy analysis. The first chapter of my dissertation, "Price Stability in Small Open Economies," joint work with Mikhail Dmitriev, studies the conduct of optimal monetary policy in a continuum of small open economies. We obtain a novel closed-form solution that does not restrict the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods to one. Using this global closed-form solution, we give an exact characterization of optimal monetary policy and welfare with and without international policy cooperation. We consider the cases of internationally complete asset markets and financial autarky, producer currency pricing and local currency pricing. Under producer currency pricing, it is always optimal to mimic the flexible-price equilibrium through a policy of price stability. Under local currency pricing, policy should fix the exchange rate. Even though countries have monopoly power, the continuum of small open economies implies that policymakers cannot affect world income. This inability to influence world income removes the incentive to deviate from price stability under producer currency pricing or a fixed exchange rate under local currency pricing, and prevents gains from international monetary cooperation in all cases examined. Our results contrast with those for large open economies, where interactions between home policy and world income drive optimal policy away from price stability or fixed exchange rates, and gains from cooperation are present. The second chapter of my dissertation, "The Optimal Design of a Fiscal Union'', joint work with Mikhail Dmitriev, examines the role of fiscal policy cooperation and financial market integration in an open economy setting, motivated by the recent crisis in the euro area. I show that the optimal design of a fiscal union is governed by the degree of substitutability between the export goods of different countries. When countries produce goods that are imperfect substitutes they should harmonize their income taxes to prevent large terms of trade externalities. On the other hand, when countries produce goods that are close substitutes, they should organize a contingent fiscal transfer scheme to insure against idiosyncratic shocks. The welfare gains from the optimal fiscal union are as high as 5\% of permanent consumption when countries are able to trade safe government bonds, and approach 20\% of permanent consumption when countries lose access to international financial markets. These gains are especially large for countries like Greece that produce highly substitutable export goods and who cannot raise funds on international financial markets to insure against downside risk. The results illustrate why federal currency unions such as the U.S., Canada and Australia, with income tax harmonization and built-in fiscal transfer arrangements, withstand asymmetric shocks across regions much better than the euro area, which lacks these ingredients at the moment. The third chapter of my dissertation, joint work with Mikhail Dmitriev, studies macro-financial linkages and the impact of financial frictions on real economic activity in some of my other work. Beginning with the Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist (1999) financial accelerator model, a large literature has shown that financial frictions amplify business cycles. Using this framework, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (AER, 2013) show that shocks to financial frictions can explain business cycle fluctuations quite well. However, this literature relies on two ad hoc assumptions. When these assumptions are relaxed and agents have access to a broader set of lending contracts, the financial accelerator disappears, and shocks to financial frictions have little to no impact on the economy. In addition, under the ad hoc lending contract inflation targeting eliminates the financial accelerator. These results provide guidance for monetary policymakers and present a puzzle for macroeconomic theory
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics

L’objet de cette thèse est de contribuer à l’analyse de l’effet des politiques visant à endiguer les risques d’instabilité financière. Les investigations menées sont d’ordre théorique (modèle DSGE) et empirique. En se plaçant dans un cadre macroéconomique d’un pays ouvert, deux dimensions doivent être prises en compte. La dimension externe est couverte par la politique de contrôles prudentiels des capitaux. De par son caractère sélectif, cette politique peut permettre de diminuer les déséquilibres externes qui ne rentrent pas dans le champ d’application macro-prudentielle. Cette dernière aborde la dimension interne et cherche à internaliser le risque global consécutif aux choix d’investissement desagents résidents. L’analyse de la coordination interne de ces deux types de mesures, macro-prudentielles et contrôles prudentiels, est essentielle pour garantir leur efficacité. En outre, les potentiels effets de débordements internationaux que peuvent entraîner les politiques de régulation prudentielle doivent être étudiés avant de valider l’utilisation de telles politiques.Voici les résultats que nous tirons de notre analyse. La politique macro-pudentielle semblent offrir de meilleurs résultats en termes de stabilité financière, des prix et de performance économique que les contrôles de capitaux. Toutefois, les contrôles prudentiels de capitaux ont leur rôle à jouer. Nos résultats montrent surtout une utilité envers la croissance excessive du crédit. L’application de contrôles prudentiels, lorsque la croissance du crédit devient excessive, peut permettre d’atténuer la surchauffe du système financier et de diminuer le décalage entre le cycle économique et financier. Par conséquent, si un choc négatif survient, les conséquences économiques devraient être amoindries. Ensuite, la politique optimale s’avère être celle combinant la politique monétaire et prudentielle, menée par une agence commune qui prend les décisions en matière de politique monétaire et prudentielle conjointement. Les politiques prudentielles s’avèrent d’autant plus nécessaires que les prêts transfrontaliers sont importants. Enfin, des effets de débordement des politiques prudentielles sur les autres pays incitent à davantage de coopération internationale ou régionale en la matière
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the analysis of the effect of policies aimed at curbing the risks associated with financial instability. The investigations carried out are theoretical (DSGE model) and empirical. In an open country macroeconomic framework, two dimensions must be taken into account. The external dimension is covered by the policy of prudential capital controls. Because of its selective nature, this type of policy can help reduce external imbalances that do not fall within the macroprudential scope. The latter addresses the internal dimension and seeks to internalize the overall risk resulting from the investment choices of resident agents. The analysis of the internal coordination of these two types of macro-prudential measures and prudential controls is essential to ensure their effectiveness. In addition, the potential effects of international spillovers that may result from prudential regulation policies must be studied before validating the use of such policies. We find that macroprudential policies seem to offer better results in terms of financial stability, price stability and economic performance than capital controls. However, prudential capital controls have their role to play, especially with regards to excessive credit growth. The application of prudential controls, when credit growth becomes excessive, can indeed help mitigating the overheating of the financial system and reducing the gap between economic and financial cycles. Therefore, as a negative shock occurs, its economic consequences should be lessened. Then, the optimal policy turns out to bethe one combining monetary and prudential policy, led by a joint agency that makes decisions on monetary and prudential policies. Prudential policies are all the more necessary as cross-border lending is important. Finally, the effects of prudential policies on other countries encourage more international or regional cooperation in this area

AbstractIn the wake of the “Great Recession” and its severe fiscal implications, many European countries enacted significant pension reforms aimed at reducing public spending and limiting contribution rates. Unlike most changes carried out before, they were implemented swiftly and without building a broad political and social consensus, usually being suggested or even mandated by inter- and supranational organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the European Union (EU). While some of these cuts were at least partly revoked during the following years of economic recovery, European welfare states still tend to face lower “pension burdens” in the upcoming decades than had been expected during the 2000s. Financial sustainability, however, puts adequacy at risk for present and future retirees, many of whom no longer achieve sufficient working careers anyway.

AbstractWestern economies are struggling to recover from a decade of Plagued by structural crises, an ongoing pandemic, high unemployment and sluggish growth. As progressively looser monetary and fiscal policies have not helped, both the EU and national governments have increasingly turned towards interventionist industrial policies. Mariana Mazzucato’s The Entrepreneurial State (2011) provided an intellectual justification for these efforts, and consequently gained popularity. The message was clear: in order to get more innovation, entrepreneurship, sustainable development and growth we need more government, not less. In this book, 30 international scholars address the core ideas underpinning the entrepreneurial state. We provide evidence of both historical and recent failures of “green deals” and similar efforts, while also developing novel directions for innovation policy. In many regards, this book is a warning: huge government schemes towards specific, noble outcomes have historically been plagued with failures. In sum, we argue that innovation policy needs to be inverted: instead of being specific and targeted, it needs to be broad and general, focusing on the general conditions for firms to operate. Instead of providing targeted support to certain firms, industries or even technologies, innovation policy needs to constructively deal with barriers to innovation, including the proactive handling of vested interest groups.

The Maastricht Treaty raised the standards for transparency in the European Union to new supranational levels. Prior to Maastricht, transparency in member-state budgeting depended largely upon domestic institutions, both public and private, to assess the size, composition, and quality of public finance. Transparency at the member-state level served the traditional functions of encouraging democratic political accountability, promoting political control over bureaucratic institutions, crafting fiscal policy, and ensuring probity in financial management. Transparency for ensuring macro-budgetary treaty compliance promotes EU integration while helping to assure an often doubtful European public, international financial markets, and world press that the Economic and Monetary Union's (EMU) convergence process and excessive deficit procedure rely on reasonably credible budgetary data. This chapter discusses macro-budgetary rules and the creation of compliance information systems, transparency through bureaucratic politics, and the role of Eurostat in budgetary surveillance. It also examines the twin challenges to EU budgetary transparency, those of disclosure and interpretation, faced by Greece.

After the global financial crisis, in addition to providing price stability, which was the primary objective of the Central Banks, the goal of maintaining financial stability has taken its place among the basic monetary policies all over the world. Because, with the effect of globalization, the aim of monetary policy to provide price stability alone is not enough to ensure sustainable growth and welfare. In this sense, macro prudential policies have been developed within the framework of Basel III, the basis of which is formed by BIS. These macro prudential policies are basically defined as precautionary policy tools that limit the disruption of financial services that create serious problems in the real economy by preventing all financial risks, whether systematic or unsystematic. The definition and scope of macro prudential policies will be discussed in the first part of the article. In the second part of the study, annual data will be presented within the framework of BIS on the scope and development of macro prudential policies implemented worldwide between 2000-2020. On the other hand, it is aimed to present a detailed analysis on the macro-prudential policies implemented in Turkey, which will include Central Bank data based on its development over the years. In the last section, it is aimed to provide macro-prudential policies accompanied by data, as well as its high role in determining systemic risks, and to present optimum policy recommendations that include monetary policy, fiscal policy, micro-prudential policies, competition policy and, when applied together, support the aim of financial stability.

The lessons learned from the crisis management of the 2008 Great Recession stem from significant structural differences between the two centers of the world, the United States and the eurozone. In the case of the United States, a monetary, fiscal and political union is realized, with a single economic policy, operates as a coherent unit, uniting the three ar­eas. In the case of the eurozone, we can talk about a monetary union. The crisis has highlighted the structural flaws of the eurozone because without a unified fiscal policy no effective economic policy can be achieved. The symp­toms of the euro area crisis weren’t the consequences of the global econom­ic downturn; rather the stalling of the integration process, the lack of real convergence, and the weaknesses of monetary and fiscal policy were the problems that have been brought to the fore and exacerbated by the crisis.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

In the second quarter, annual inflation (9.67%), the technical staff’s projections and its expectations continued to increase, remaining above the target. International cost shocks, accentuated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have been more persistent than projected, thus contributing to higher inflation. The effects of indexation, higher than estimated excess demand, a tighter labor market, inflation expectations that continue to rise and currently exceed 3%, and the exchange rate pressures add to those described above. High core inflation measures as well as in the producer price index (PPI) across all baskets confirm a significant spread in price increases. Compared to estimates presented in April, the new forecast trajectory for headline and core inflation increased. This was partly the result of greater exchange rate pressure on prices, and a larger output gap, which is expected to remain positive for the remainder of 2022 and which is estimated to close towards yearend 2023. In addition, these trends take into account higher inflation rate indexation, more persistent above-target inflation expectations, a quickening of domestic fuel price increases due to the correction of lags versus the parity price and higher international oil price forecasts. The forecast supposes a good domestic supply of perishable foods, although it also considers that international prices of processed foods will remain high. In terms of the goods sub-basket, the end of the national health emergency implies a reversal of the value-added tax (VAT) refund applied to health and personal hygiene products, resulting in increases in the prices of these goods. Alternatively, the monetary policy adjustment process and the moderation of external shocks would help inflation and its expectations to begin to decrease over time and resume their alignment with the target. Thus, the new projection suggests that inflation could remain high for the second half of 2022, closing at 9.7%. However, it would begin to fall during 2023, closing the year at 5.7%. These forecasts are subject to significant uncertainty, especially regarding the future behavior of external cost shocks, the degree of indexation of nominal contracts and decisions made regarding the domestic price of fuels. Economic activity continues to outperform expectations, and the technical staff’s growth projections for 2022 have been revised upwards from 5% to 6.9%. The new forecasts suggest higher output levels that would continue to exceed the economy’s productive capacity for the remainder of 2022. Economic growth during the first quarter was above that estimated in April, while economic activity indicators for the second quarter suggest that the GDP could be expected to remain high, potentially above that of the first quarter. Domestic demand is expected to maintain a positive dynamic, in particular, due to the household consumption quarterly growth, as suggested by vehicle registrations, retail sales, credit card purchases and consumer loan disbursement figures. A slowdown in the machinery and equipment imports from the levels observed in March contrasts with the positive performance of sales and housing construction licenses, which indicates an investment level similar to that registered for the first three months of the year. International trade data suggests the trade deficit would be reduced as a consequence of import levels that would be lesser than those observed in the first quarter, and stable export levels. For the remainder of the year and 2023, a deceleration in consumption is expected from the high levels seen during the first half of the year, partially as a result of lower repressed demand, tighter domestic financial conditions and household available income deterioration due to increased inflation. Investment is expected to continue its slow recovery while remaining below pre-pandemic levels. The trade deficit is expected to tighten due to projected lower domestic demand dynamics, and high prices of oil and other basic goods exported by the country. Given the above, economic growth in the second quarter of 2022 would be 11.5%, and for 2022 and 2023 an annual growth of 6.9% and 1.1% is expected, respectively. Currently, and for the remainder of 2022, the output gap would be positive and greater than that estimated in April, and prices would be affected by demand pressures. These projections continue to be affected by significant uncertainty associated with global political tensions, the expected adjustment of monetary policy in developed countries, external demand behavior, changes in country risk outlook, and the future developments in domestic fiscal policy, among others. The high inflation levels and respective expectations, which exceed the target of the world's main central banks, largely explain the observed and anticipated increase in their monetary policy interest rates. This environment has tempered the growth forecast for external demand. Disruptions in value chains, rising international food and energy prices, and expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have contributed to the rise in inflation and above-target expectations seen by several of Colombia’s main trading partners. These cost and price shocks, heightened by the effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have been more prevalent than expected and have taken place within a set of output and employment recovery, variables that in some countries currently equal or exceed their projected long-term levels. In response, the U.S. Federal Reserve accelerated the pace of the benchmark interest rate increase and rapidly reduced liquidity levels in the money market. Financial market actors expect this behavior to continue and, consequently, significantly increase their expectations of the average path of the Fed's benchmark interest rate. In this setting, the U.S. dollar appreciated versus the peso in the second quarter and emerging market risk measures increased, a behavior that intensified for Colombia. Given the aforementioned, for the remainder of 2022 and 2023, the Bank's technical staff increased the forecast trajectory for the Fed's interest rate and reduced the country's external demand growth forecast. The projected oil price was revised upward over the forecast horizon, specifically due to greater supply restrictions and the interruption of hydrocarbon trade between the European Union and Russia. Global geopolitical tensions, a tightening of monetary policy in developed economies, the increase in risk perception for emerging markets and the macroeconomic imbalances in the country explain the increase in the projected trajectory of the risk premium, its trend level and the neutral real interest rate1. Uncertainty about external forecasts and their consequent impact on the country's macroeconomic scenario remains high, given the unpredictable evolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, geopolitical tensions, the degree of the global economic slowdown and the effect the response to recent outbreaks of the pandemic in some Asian countries may have on the world economy. This macroeconomic scenario that includes high inflation, inflation forecasts, and expectations above 3% and a positive output gap suggests the need for a contractionary monetary policy that mitigates the risk of the persistent unanchoring of inflation expectations. In contrast to the forecasts of the April report, the increase in the risk premium trend implies a higher neutral real interest rate and a greater prevailing monetary stimulus than previously estimated. For its part, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed and expected output level that exceeds the economy’s productive capacity. The surprising accelerations in the headline and core inflation reflect stronger and more persistent external shocks, which, in combination with the strength of aggregate demand, indexation, higher inflation expectations and exchange rate pressures, explain the upward projected inflation trajectory at levels that exceed the target over the next two years. This is corroborated by the inflation expectations of economic analysts and those derived from the public debt market, which continued to climb and currently exceed 3%. All of the above increase the risk of unanchoring inflation expectations and could generate widespread indexation processes that may push inflation away from the target for longer. This new macroeconomic scenario suggests that the interest rate adjustment should continue towards a contractionary monetary policy landscape. 1.2. Monetary policy decision Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR), at its meetings in June and July 2022, decided to continue adjusting its monetary policy. At its June meeting, the BDBR decided to increase the monetary policy rate by 150 basis points (b.p.) and its July meeting by majority vote, on a 150 b.p. increase thereof at its July meeting. Consequently, the monetary policy interest rate currently stands at 9.0% . 1 The neutral real interest rate refers to the real interest rate level that is neither stimulative nor contractionary for aggregate demand and, therefore, does not generate pressures that lead to the close of the output gap. In a small, open economy like Colombia, this rate depends on the external neutral real interest rate, medium-term components of the country risk premium, and expected depreciation. Box 1: A Weekly Indicator of Economic Activity for Colombia Juan Pablo Cote Carlos Daniel Rojas Nicol Rodriguez Box 2: Common Inflationary Trends in Colombia Carlos D. Rojas-Martínez Nicolás Martínez-Cortés Franky Juliano Galeano-Ramírez Box 3: Shock Decomposition of 2021 Forecast Errors Nicolás Moreno Arias

1.1 Macroeconomic summary In September, headline inflation (11.4% annually) and the average of core inflation indicators (8.6% annually) continued on a rising trend, and higher increases than expected were recorded. Forecasts increased again, and inflation expectations remained above 3%. Inflationary surprises in the third quarter were significant and widespread, and they are the result of several shocks. On the one hand, international cost and price shocks, which have mainly affected goods and foods, continue to exert upwards pressure on national inflation. In addition to these external supply shocks, domestic supply shocks have also affected foods. On the other hand, the strong recovery of aggregate demand, especially for private consumption and for machinery and equipment, as well as a higher accumulated depreciation of the Colombian peso and its pass-through to domestic prices also explain the rise in inflation. Indexation also contributes, both through the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and through the Producer Price Index (PPI), which continues to have a significant impact on electricity prices and, to a lesser degree, on other public utilities and rent. In comparison with July’s report, the new forecast trajectory for headline and core inflation (excluding food and regulated items) is higher in the forecast horizon, mainly due to exchange rate pressures, higher excess demand, and indexation at higher inflation rates, but it maintains a trend of convergence towards the target. In the case of food, a good domestic supply of perishable foods and some moderation in international processed food prices are still expected. However, the technical staff estimates higher pressures on this group’s prices from labor costs, raw material prices, and exchange rates. In terms of the CPI for regulated items, the new forecast supposes reductions in electricity prices at the end of the year, but the effects of indexation at higher inflation rates and the expected rises in fuel prices would continue to push this CPI group. Therefore, the new projection suggests that, in December, inflation would reach 11.3% and would decrease throughout 2023 and 2024, closing the year at 7.1% and 3.5%, respectively. These forecasts have a high level of uncertainty, due especially to the future behavior of international financial conditions, external price and cost shocks, the persistence of depreciation of the Colombian peso, the pace of adjustment of domestic demand, the indexation degree of nominal contracts, and the decisions that would be made regarding domestic fuel and electricity prices. Economic activity continues to surprise on the upside, and the projection of growth for 2022 rose from 6.9% to 7.9% but lowered for 2023 from 1.1% to 0.5%. Thus, excess demand is higher than estimated in the previous report, and it would diminish in 2023. Economic growth in the second quarterwas higher than estimated in July due to stronger domestic demand, mainly because of private consumption. Economic activity indicators for the third quarter suggest that the GDP would stay at a high level, above its potential, with an annual change of 6.4%, and 0.6% higher than observed in the second quarter. Nevertheless, these numbers reflect deceleration in its quarterly and annual growth. Domestic demand would show similar behavior, with a high value, higher than that of output. This can be explained partly by the strong behavior of private consumption and investment in machinery and equipment. In the third quarter, investment in construction would have continued with mediocre performance, which would still place it at levels lower than those observed before the pandemic. The trade deficit would have widened due to high imports with a stronger trend than that for exports. It is expected that, in the forecast horizon, consumption would decrease from its current high levels, partly as a consequence of tighter domestic financial conditions, lower repressed demand, higher exchange rate pressures on imported goods prices, and the deterioration of actual income due to the rise in inflation. Investment would continue to lag behind, without reaching the levels observed before the pandemic, in a context of high financing costs and high uncertainty. A lower projected behavior in domestic demand and the high levels of prices for oil and other basic goods that the country exports would be reflected in a reduction in the trade deficit. Due to all of this, economic growth for all of 2022, 2023, and 2024 would be 7.9%, 0.5%, and 1.3%, respectively. Expected excess demand (measured via the output gap) is estimated to be higher than contemplated in the previous report; it would diminish in 2023 and could turn negative in 2024. These estimates remain subject to a high degree of uncertainty related to global political tension, a rise in international interest rates, and the effects of this rise on demand and financial conditions abroad. In the domestic context, the evolution of fiscal policy as well as future measures regarding economic policy and their possible effects on macroeconomic imbalances in the country, among others, are factors that generate uncertainty and affect risk premia, the exchange rate, investment, and the country’s economic activity. Interest rates at several of the world’s main central banks continue to rise, some at a pace higher than expected by the market. This is in response to the high levels of inflation and their inflation expectations, which continue to exceed the targets. Thus, global growth projections are still being moderated, risk premia have risen, and the dollar continues to gain strength against other main currencies. International pressures on global inflation have heightened. In the United States, core inflation has not receded, pressured by the behavior of the CPI for services and a tight labor market. Consequently, the U.S. Federal Reserve continued to increase the policy interest rate at a strong pace. This rate is expected to now reach higher levels than projected in the previous quarter. Other developed and emerging economies have also increased their policy interest rates. Thus, international financial conditions have tightened significantly, which reflects in a widespread strengthening of the dollar, increases in worldwide risk premia, and the devaluation of risky assets. Recently, these effects have been stronger in Colombia than in the majority of its peers in the region. Considering all of the aforementioned, the technical staff of the bank increased its assumption regarding the U.S. Federal Reserve’s interest rate, reduced the country’s external demand growth forecast, and raised the projected trajectory for the risk premium. The latter remains elevated at higher levels than its historical average, within a context of high local uncertainty and of extensive financing needs from the foreign sector and the public sector. All of this results in higher inflationary pressures associated to the depreciation of the Colombian peso. The uncertainty regarding external forecasts and its impact on the country remain elevated, given the unforeseeable evolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, of geopolitical tensions, and of the tightening of external financial conditions, among others. A macroeconomic context of high inflation, inflation expectations and forecasts above 3%, and a positive output gap suggests the need for contractionary monetary policy, compatible with the macroeconomic adjustment necessary to eliminate excess demand, mitigate the risk of unanchoring in inflation expectations, and guarantee convergence of inflation at the target. In comparison with the July report forecasts, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed output level that surpasses the economy’s productive capacity. Headline and core inflation have registered surprising rises, associated with the effects of domestic and external price shocks that were more persistent than anticipated, with excess demand and indexation processes in some CPI groups. The country’s risk premium and the observed and expected international interest rates increased. As a consequence of this, inflationary pressures from the exchange rate rose, and in this report, the probability of the neutral real interest rate being higher than estimated increased. In general, inflation expectations for all terms and the bank’s technical staff inflation forecast for 2023 increased again and continue to stray from 3%. All of the aforementioned elevated the risk of unanchoring inflation expectations and could heighten widespread indexation processes that push inflation away from the target for a longer time. In this context, it is necessary to consolidate a contractionary monetary policy that tends towards convergence of inflation at the target in the forecast horizon and towards the reduction of excess demand in order to guarantee a sustainable output level trajectory. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its September and October of 2022 meetings, Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR) decided to continue adjusting its monetary policy. In September, the BDBR decided by a majority vote to raise the monetary policy interest rate by 100 basis points (bps), and in its October meeting, unanimously, by 100bps. Therefore, the rate is at 11.0%. Boxes 1 Food inflation: a comparison with other countries

Macroeconomic summary Several factors contributed to an increase in projected inflation on the forecast horizon, keeping it above the target rate. These included inflation in December that surpassed expectations (5.62%), indexation to higher inflation rates for various baskets in the consumer price index (CPI), a significant real increase in the legal minimum wage, persistent external and domestic inflationary supply shocks, and heightened exchange rate pressures. The CPI for foods was affected by the persistence of external and domestic supply shocks and was the most significant contributor to unexpectedly high inflation in the fourth quarter. Price adjustments for fuels and certain utilities can explain the acceleration in inflation for regulated items, which was more significant than anticipated. Prices in the CPI for goods excluding food and regulated items also rose more than expected. This was partly due to a smaller effect on prices from the national government’s VAT-free day than anticipated by the technical staff and more persistent external pressures, including via peso depreciation. By contrast, the CPI for services excluding food and regulated items accelerated less than expected, partly reflecting strong competition in the communications sector. This was the only major CPI basket for which prices increased below the target inflation rate. The technical staff revised its inflation forecast upward in response to certain external shocks (prices, costs, and depreciation) and domestic shocks (e.g., on meat products) that were stronger and more persistent than anticipated in the previous report. Observed inflation and a real increase in the legal minimum wage also exceeded expectations, which would boost inflation by affecting price indexation, labor costs, and inflation expectations. The technical staff now expects year-end headline inflation of 4.3% in 2022 and 3.4% in 2023; core inflation is projected to be 4.5% and 3.6%, respectively. These forecasts consider the lapse of certain price relief measures associated with the COVID-19 health emergency, which would contribute to temporarily keeping inflation above the target on the forecast horizon. It is important to note that these estimates continue to contain a significant degree of uncertainty, mainly related to the development of external and domestic supply shocks and their ultimate effects on prices. Other contributing factors include high price volatility and measurement uncertainty related to the extension of Colombia’s health emergency and tax relief measures (such as the VAT-free days) associated with the Social Investment Law (Ley de Inversión Social). The as-yet uncertain magnitude of the effects of a recent real increase in the legal minimum wage (that was high by historical standards) and high observed and expected inflation, are additional factors weighing on the overall uncertainty of the estimates in this report. The size of excess productive capacity remaining in the economy and the degree to which it is closing are also uncertain, as the evolution of the pandemic continues to represent a significant forecast risk. margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. The technical staff revised its GDP growth projection for 2022 from 4.7% to 4.3% (Graph 1.3). This revision accounts for the likelihood that a larger portion of the recent positive dynamic in private consumption would be transitory than previously expected. This estimate also contemplates less dynamic investment behavior than forecast in the previous report amid less favorable financial conditions and a highly uncertain investment environment. Third-quarter GDP growth (12.9%), which was similar to projections from the October report, and the fourth-quarter growth forecast (8.7%) reflect a positive consumption trend, which has been revised upward. This dynamic has been driven by both public and private spending. Investment growth, meanwhile, has been weaker than forecast. Available fourth-quarter data suggest that consumption spending for the period would have exceeded estimates from October, thanks to three consecutive months that included VAT-free days, a relatively low COVID-19 caseload, and mobility indicators similar to their pre-pandemic levels. By contrast, the most recently available figures on new housing developments and machinery and equipment imports suggest that investment, while continuing to rise, is growing at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. The trade deficit is expected to have widened, as imports would have grown at a high level and outpaced exports. Given the above, the technical staff now expects fourth-quarter economic growth of 8.7%, with overall growth for 2021 of 9.9%. Several factors should continue to contribute to output recovery in 2022, though some of these may be less significant than previously forecast. International financial conditions are expected to be less favorable, though external demand should continue to recover and terms of trade continue to increase amid higher projected oil prices. Lower unemployment rates and subsequent positive effects on household income, despite increased inflation, would also boost output recovery, as would progress in the national vaccination campaign. The technical staff expects that the conditions that have favored recent high levels of consumption would be, in large part, transitory. Consumption spending is expected to grow at a slower rate in 2022. Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) would continue to recover, approaching its pre-pandemic level, though at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. This would be due to lower observed GFCF levels and the potential impact of political and fiscal uncertainty. Meanwhile, the policy interest rate would be less expansionary as the process of monetary policy normalization continues. Given the above, growth in 2022 is forecast to decelerate to 4.3% (previously 4.7%). In 2023, that figure (3.1%) is projected to converge to levels closer to the potential growth rate. In this case, excess productive capacity would be expected to tighten at a similar rate as projected in the previous report. The trade deficit would tighten more than previously projected on the forecast horizon, due to expectations of an improved export dynamic and moderation in imports. The growth forecast for 2022 considers a low basis of comparison from the first half of 2021. However, there remain significant downside risks to this forecast. The current projection does not, for example, account for any additional effects on economic activity resulting from further waves of COVID-19. High private consumption levels, which have already surpassed pre-pandemic levels by a large margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. External demand for Colombian goods and services should continue to recover amid significant global inflation pressures, high oil prices, and less favorable international financial conditions than those estimated in October. Economic activity among Colombia’s major trade partners recovered in 2021 amid countries reopening and ample international liquidity. However, that growth has been somewhat restricted by global supply chain disruptions and new outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff has revised its growth forecast for Colombia’s main trade partners from 6.3% to 6.9% for 2021, and from 3.4% to 3.3% for 2022; trade partner economies are expected to grow 2.6% in 2023. Colombia’s annual terms of trade increased in 2021, largely on higher oil, coffee, and coal prices. This improvement came despite increased prices for goods and services imports. The expected oil price trajectory has been revised upward, partly to supply restrictions and lagging investment in the sector that would offset reduced growth forecasts in some major economies. Elevated freight and raw materials costs and supply chain disruptions continue to affect global goods production, and have led to increases in global prices. Coupled with the recovery in global demand, this has put upward pressure on external inflation. Several emerging market economies have continued to normalize monetary policy in this context. Meanwhile, in the United States, the Federal Reserve has anticipated an end to its asset buying program. U.S. inflation in December (7.0%) was again surprisingly high and market average inflation forecasts for 2022 have increased. The Fed is expected to increase its policy rate during the first quarter of 2022, with quarterly increases anticipated over the rest of the year. For its part, Colombia’s sovereign risk premium has increased and is forecast to remain on a higher path, to levels above the 15-year-average, on the forecast horizon. This would be partly due to the effects of a less expansionary monetary policy in the United States and the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia. Given the above, international financial conditions are projected to be less favorable than anticipated in the October report. The increase in Colombia’s external financing costs could be more significant if upward pressures on inflation in the United States persist and monetary policy is normalized more quickly than contemplated in this report. As detailed in Section 2.3, uncertainty surrounding international financial conditions continues to be unusually high. Along with other considerations, recent concerns over the potential effects of new COVID-19 variants, the persistence of global supply chain disruptions, energy crises in certain countries, growing geopolitical tensions, and a more significant deceleration in China are all factors underlying this uncertainty. The changing macroeconomic environment toward greater inflation and unanchoring risks on inflation expectations imply a reduction in the space available for monetary policy stimulus. Recovery in domestic demand and a reduction in excess productive capacity have come in line with the technical staff’s expectations from the October report. Some upside risks to inflation have materialized, while medium-term inflation expectations have increased and are above the 3% target. Monetary policy remains expansionary. Significant global inflationary pressures and the unexpected increase in the CPI in December point to more persistent effects from recent supply shocks. Core inflation is trending upward, but remains below the 3% target. Headline and core inflation projections have increased on the forecast horizon and are above the target rate through the end of 2023. Meanwhile, the expected dynamism of domestic demand would be in line with low levels of excess productive capacity. An accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia and the increased likelihood of a faster normalization of monetary policy in the United States would put upward pressure on sovereign risk perceptions in a more persistent manner, with implications for the exchange rate and the natural rate of interest. Persistent disruptions to international supply chains, a high real increase in the legal minimum wage, and the indexation of various baskets in the CPI to higher inflation rates could affect price expectations and push inflation above the target more persistently. These factors suggest that the space to maintain monetary stimulus has continued to diminish, though monetary policy remains expansionary. 1.2 Monetary policy decision Banco de la República’s board of directors (BDBR) in its meetings in December 2021 and January 2022 voted to continue normalizing monetary policy. The BDBR voted by a majority in these two meetings to increase the benchmark interest rate by 50 and 100 basis points, respectively, bringing the policy rate to 4.0%.