Thèses sur le sujet « Military operations, Aerial – American »
Créez une référence correcte selon les styles APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard et plusieurs autres
Consultez les 32 meilleures thèses pour votre recherche sur le sujet « Military operations, Aerial – American ».
À côté de chaque source dans la liste de références il y a un bouton « Ajouter à la bibliographie ». Cliquez sur ce bouton, et nous générerons automatiquement la référence bibliographique pour la source choisie selon votre style de citation préféré : APA, MLA, Harvard, Vancouver, Chicago, etc.
Vous pouvez aussi télécharger le texte intégral de la publication scolaire au format pdf et consulter son résumé en ligne lorsque ces informations sont inclues dans les métadonnées.
Parcourez les thèses sur diverses disciplines et organisez correctement votre bibliographie.
Laine, Howard David. « AWPD-1 : America's pre-World War II plan for bombing Germany / ». Thesis, This resource online, 1991. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-11072008-063613/.
Texte intégralGarner, Christian A. « Forgotten Legacies : The U.S. Glider Pilot Training Program and Lamesa Field, Texas, During World War II ». Thesis, University of North Texas, 2016. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc849715/.
Texte intégralDeThomas, Scott V. « Aerial humanitarian operations delivering strategic effects / ». CLICK HERE TO VIEW:, 2004. https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2004/ari/DeThomas.pdf.
Texte intégralHoward, Stephen P. « Special Operations Forces and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Sooner or Later ? / ». Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Research Coordinator Office, 1998. http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/research/ay1995/saas/howardsp.htm.
Texte intégralSubject: An analysis of whether Special Operations Forces should use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to support intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications and re-supply capability deficiencies. Cover page date: June 1995. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
Butner, Joseph C. « Experimental analysis of integration of tactical unmanned aerial vehicles and Naval Special Warfare Operations Forces / ». Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2002. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA409922&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
Texte intégralNagl, John A. « British and American army counterinsurgency learning during the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War ». Thesis, University of Oxford, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.339868.
Texte intégralFridriksson, Fridrik. « Marine Corps operations in failing states ». Quantico, VA : Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA490952.
Texte intégralWarman, Steven A. « Transforming the American soldier educating the warrior-diplomat ». Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2133.
Texte intégralHudson, Jeff D. Warman Steven A. « Transforming the American soldier : educating the warrior-diplomat / ». Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2005. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/05Jun%5FHudson.pdf.
Texte intégralCalland, Brett M. « Marine close air support on the Pusan perimeter during the early months of the Korean War ». Virtual Press, 2002. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/1246468.
Texte intégralDepartment of History
Muse, Robert C. « Advising foreign forces force structure implications of the indirect approach to irregular warfare / ». Quantico, VA : Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA491120.
Texte intégralCheater, Julian C. « The war over Warrior : unmanned aerial vehicles and adaptive joint command and control / ». Maxwell AFB, Ala. : School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&mode=user&action=downloadpaper&objectid=042cf9f2-33d9-4545-b101-f894b89842e0&rs=PublishedSearch.
Texte intégralParker, Matthew Austin Parrish T. Michael. « The Philippine Scouts and the practice of counter-insurgency in the Philippine-American War, 1899-1913 ». Waco, Tex. : Baylor University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2104/5214.
Texte intégralAlfonso, Kristal L. M. « Femme fatale : an examination of the role of women in combat and the policy implications for future American military operations / ». Maxwell AFB, Ala. : School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&mode=user&action=downloadpaper&objectid=9fa236b6-82fe-4be7-951f-1f172da0dcdf&rs=PublishedSearch.
Texte intégralMelendez, Barbra Sue. « Versatility and applicability of dynamic help in army installation support modules ». Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/24249.
Texte intégralButsky, Chris. « Cultural Factors and How They Shape Military Sustainment and Transition Operations in a Theater of War ». University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1353030200.
Texte intégralDenehan, Kieran T. « Victory by proxy ? : American air power, the secret war in Laos, and the future of the Global War on Terrorism / ». Maxwell AFB, Ala. : School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&mode=user&action=downloadpaper&objectid=dd53c1a0-358d-4e44-9b7b-e54bd8d5f227&rs=PublishedSearch.
Texte intégralBaumann, Andrea Barbara. « Clash of organisational cultures ? : a comparative analysis of American and British approaches to the coordination of defence, diplomacy and development in stability operations, 2001-2010 ». Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:80c8f9c6-fb4f-4c03-9f8f-26d89fcb8339.
Texte intégralRable, Kyle K. « "One to the Head, Two to the Heart" : The Failure of Psychological Warfare Doctrine and Understanding in The Vietnam War ». Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1616336908093754.
Texte intégralTaillon, Joseph Paul de Boucherville. « International co-operation in the use of elite military forces to counter terrorism : the British and American experience, with special reference to their respective experiences in the evolution of low-intensity operations ». Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1993. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2592/.
Texte intégralBentley, Caitlin T. « Linking Communications : the Philippine Regional Section of the Allied Intelligence Bureau's Operations in the Occupied Islands,1942-1945 ». Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1449235520.
Texte intégralHunt, Andrew W. « Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resource (BEAR) Requirements Analysis Tool (BRAT) ». Quantico, VA : Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA491134.
Texte intégralJahnke, Todd Eric. « By Air Power Alone : America's Strategic Air War in China, 1941-1945 ». Thesis, University of North Texas, 2001. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc2800/.
Texte intégralSambaluk, Nicholas Michael. « The Actions and Operational Thinking of Generals Stratemeyer and Partridge during the Korean War : Adjusting to Political Restrictions of Air Campaigns ». Thesis, University of North Texas, 2008. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc6056/.
Texte intégralSimpson, Patrick B. (Patrick Brent). « The History of the 389th Bombardment Group (H) : a Study of the Use and Misuse of Strategic Bombers in the Second World War ». Thesis, University of North Texas, 1994. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc278883/.
Texte intégralJorge, Bernardo Wahl Gonçalves de Araújo [UNESP]. « As forças de operações especiais dos Estados Unidos e a intervenção no Afeganistão : um novo modo de guerra americano ? » Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/96024.
Texte intégralA reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da “transformação militar” que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um “novo” modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de “guerra ao terror”, as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas.
The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the “military transformation” that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a “new” american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of “global war on terror”, went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions.
Tsukayama, John K. « By any means necessary : an interpretive phenomenological analysis study of post 9/11 American abusive violence in Iraq ». Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4510.
Texte intégralTruxal, Luke. « Command Unity and the Air War against Germany ». Thesis, University of North Texas, 2018. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1404524/.
Texte intégralJorge, Bernardo Wahl Gonçalves de Araújo. « As Forças de Operações Especiais dos Estados Unidos e a intervenção no Afeganistão : um novo modo de guerra americano ? » São Paulo : [s.n.], 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/96024.
Texte intégralBanca: Oliveiros S. Ferreira
Banca: Shiguenoli Miyamoto
O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas"
Resumo: A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da "transformação militar" que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um "novo" modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de "guerra ao terror", as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas.
Abstract: The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the "military transformation" that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a "new" american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of "global war on terror", went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions.
Mestre
Stables, Gordon Wilson. « The discourse of war in a time of peace : representations of American military operations in the 1990s ». 2002. http://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga%5Fetd/stables%5Fgordon%5Fw%5F200208%5Fphd.
Texte intégralSampson, Gary J., et 沙普瑞. « AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL CAPABILITIES : IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC ». Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/41503853449482513091.
Texte intégral國立中山大學
中國與亞太區域研究所
99
The post-Cold War world has created a number of important new challenges to the United States’ power projection capabilities. The worldwide network of bases and stations that enabled the U.S. to contain the Soviet Union have, in many cases, been made into liabilities. U.S. dependence on fixed, vulnerable ports and airfields for the buildup of combat power, as seen in the 1990-91 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War, have shown potential foes like China and Iran that it doesn’t pay to allow penalty-free access and freedom of action in maritime, air, and space commons. In the Western Pacific, China has pursued an anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, developing capabilities designed to deny U.S. freedom of movement in the region. This study examines U.S. perceptions of China’s growing A2/AD capabilities and their implications for U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific through the analysis of authoritative official and unofficial U.S. documents and studies. This work establishes a comprehensive, up-to-date picture of Chinese A2/AD capabilities through American eyes, updating previous comprehensive works in key areas such as the status of China’s anti-ship ballistic missile, conventional ballistic and cruise missile capabilities and their implications for key U.S. facilities in the region, and new technology and platforms like China’s first aircraft carrier and stealth aircraft. The thesis concludes that the U.S. has been slow in reacting to Chinese A2/AD developments and that it is unlikely that continued Chinese military modernization (including the refinement and development of additional A2/AD capabilities) will end in the near future. For the U.S., this means that development and implementation of a truly joint concept for counter-A2/AD operations, as well as the right mix of military capabilities to carry out such operations, cannot be delayed any longer.
Hawkins, John Michael. « The Limits of Fire Support : American Finances and Firepower Restraint during the Vietnam War ». Thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/151185.
Texte intégral