Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Memorials – Political aspects – Estonia »

From “Museum of Occupations” to “Vabamu”: Analysis of Naming Policy This article focuses on the debate around the name Vabamu and is aimed at discussing whether and how the culture of remembering the Soviet era can change in today’s Estonia. In February 2016, the Estonian Museum of Occupations announced its plans to refresh its identity and change the name of the museum to the Museum of Freedom Vabamu. The planned name change sparked controversy in society about the meaning of the (Soviet) military occupation, the sufferings of that period and ways of commemorating them. Over 60 stories were published in the Estonian media from February to August 2016, accompanied by lively discussion on social media. Estonia’s Russian-language media did not participate in the discussion. The article analyses the Vabamu name debate in the context of naming policy and Estonian 20th century historical memory. First of all, the term of “occupation” is explained from the aspect of Estonia’s political identity and Baltic, Russian and European relations. Secondly, the article analyses the main voices and topics in the debate and which of the current memory regime’s models and frameworks of memory policy emerged. It asks, from the perspective of memory studies, why the name change to “Vabamu” was not carried out according to original plans. The main sources of the analysis were texts in the media; including social media; interviews with the museum director, participatory observations at meetings of the museum’s advisory board, and at meetings and temporary exhibitions organized by the museum. In addition to documenting the development of the name debate, the participation, observation and interviews made it possible to explore the conceptual objectives behind the name “Vabamu”. The following opinions resonated in discussions: (1) opinions of the Memento organization (which advocates for the rights of those who suffered persecution by the Soviet regime) and Soviet-era dissidents in media opinion pieces and segments and public statements; (2) statements made by politicians (mainly rightconservatives); (3) opinions from members of the Estonian émigré community; (4) statements from museum managing director Merilin Piipuu and the chairwoman of the Kistler-Ritso foundation Sylvia Thompson, which reflected the museum’s intentions; and (5) the public discussion initiated by the museum. A key date in the development of the debate was 25 March 2016, the anniversary of mass deportations in 1949 when also the representatives of Memento organization voiced their opinion. Giving up “occupation” in the name of the museum occasioned property claims of the generation of victims of communism. The repressed people considered the Museum of Occupation their symbolic place. For this group, the disappearance of the word “occupations” from the museum name actualized the complexity of policy of recognizing their experience ever since the late 1980s. The debate regarding the establishing of a memorial to victims of communism in Tallinn also had an influence. The discussions over “Vabamu” were held in a transnational context, pertaining mainly to neighbouring Russia, and the global Holocaust memory culture. The name change was perceived above all as an adoption of Russian memory politics, not just in the context of the Baltic states but in the broader geopolitical context. Giving up the word “occupation” was seen by critics – and at the outset of the debate by the museum as well – as a national security issue. As the discussion evolved, the museum distanced itself from the security discourse and cited Russian tourists and Estonian Russians as target groups that needed to be reached and included. The comparison to the Holocaust memory culture was also used as an argument by both parties. The opponents of the new name used international comparisons to stress the remembering of the violent past in similar (national) threat contexts. On the other hand, the museum used the Holocaust argument from the standpoint of Jewish identity to justify its intention to move further past the national narrative of occupation. The debates over the name Vabamu were also related to a perception of intergenerational changes in memory work. The museum was reconceptualising the past and future to reach out to younger generations whose experience horizon is radically different from that of the generation of the victims of repressions and whose sense of freedom is more individualized. For opponents of “Vabamu”, the museum staff themselves represented the younger generation who no longer had a link to Estonia’s past ordeals and for whom intergenerational memory and solidarity had become interrupted. Their preference for a multiperspective narrative in place of a narrative of victimhood and resistance was interpreted as an ethical softening toward the victims and trivialization of trauma. As a result of the name debate, the museum decided to forgo a radical change in the name and opted for a compromise: Vabamu, the Museum of Occupations and Freedom. The debate over the concept of occupation showed the importance of linguistic definitions in a more extensive battle over how the past is represented. The concept of occupation has been the core of political identity both in postcommunist Estonia and the other two Baltics. The term “occupation” is related to all of the key elements in Estonia’s postcommunist narrative. Associating the memory of the (Soviet) occupation with security policy in the Vabamu debate points to a main reason for persistence of Estonian current memory culture – the so-called Russian threat, which is perceived as an existential danger, a constant challenge to the survival of the Estonian state. Earlier studies have shown that for Estonians, personal, social, cultural and political memory is strongly interwoven when remembering the 20th century: the national story is strongly supported by family stories. This makes the national narrative personal. When central symbols of the historical memory come under fire, fears are stoked and appeals to a moral duty to preserve a common past are heard.

On August 31, 2021, Alar Karis, with support of the governing coalition, won the second round of presidential elections in Estonia. The authors analyze the elections in the framework of institutional and procedural contexts as well as formal and informal stances taken by political parties on the event’s eve. A. Karis became the most appropriate candidate proposed by the ruling coalition, after gaining certain advantage over another “intelligent” candidate T. Soomere, president of the Academy of Sciences. The institute of presidency and election procedure form a subject for permanent discussion in Estonian society, because of the authoritarian experience of the 1930s.

Abstract Recent literature on modern martyrdom and memory has focused on cases in which individual groups remember martyrs’ sacrifices by making similar memorials to them. However, this article argues that even if members of a group agree on a martyr narrative, different memorials with diverse meanings can still be erected in memory of the martyrs concerned. This article supports its argument by exploring the case of twenty members of the Holy Ghost Fathers (Spiritans) who were killed on 1 January 1962 in Kongolo in southeastern Congo-Kinshasa. The memorials dedicated to these Spiritans differ substantively with each other by emphasizing different aspects of sacrifice and memory. This article concludes by arguing that the diversity of memorials involved in this case alerts us to the fact that the traditions associated with martyrdom do not always dominate the public memory of those who sacrifice their lives for a cause.

The article cosiders the phenomenon of the "monument fall" in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and outlines the main stages of this process as well as the key factors that have intensified the dismantling of Soviet memorial heritage and contributed to the spread of vandalism against it. The "monument fall" began in the first half of the 1990s when, in the absence of a legislative framework providing protection and legal status for memorial objects, numerous acts of vandalism and isolated cases of demolition of monuments by official decision were carried out in the Baltic States. The second wave of demolition actions (from 2014) took place in different circumstances, when memorial legislation was already in place (from the second half of the 1990s), the international cooperation between Russia and the Baltic states regarding the protection of Soviet memorials could be seen, and on the domestic political level Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia supervised the condition of the monuments. Like the previous one, the third wave (from 2022) was related to the aggravation of international relations against the background of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, and here the particular feature was the change in legislation by the Baltic states authorities with a general vector towards stripping Soviet memorials of their special status and legalising their dismantling. At the same time, the "monument fall" in the Baltic states poses something of a paradox: the cleansing of the collective memory of Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians from the Soviet presence, aimed among other things at consolidating these peoples, is accompanied by the destruction of memory of their representatives, who in one way or another were identified with the Soviet presence in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Abstract The article gives an overview of general trends in media use in Estonia over the last 15 years, making some comparisons with Nordic countries. Since the beginning of postcommunist transformation in 1991, the media landscape in Estonia has faced substantial changes. A completely renewed media system has emerged, characterized by a diversity of channels, formats, and contents. Not only the media themselves, but also the patterns of media use among audiences, their habits and expectations, have gone through a process of radical change. Changes in the Estonian media landscape have some aspects in common with many other European countries, such as the impact of emerging new media and global TV; others are specific features of transition to a market economy and democratic political order. Besides discussing general trends, the article gives insights into some audience- related aspects of changes, more specifically age and ethnicity.

The past two decades have witnessed a reassessment and broadening of conceptions of identity among both the ethnic Estonian and Russian populations in Estonia. In addition to a continuing focus on aspects of national distinctiveness, emphasizing their small numbers, language, culture, territorial homeland, and—as a new factor—the state, the Estonians have increasingly engaged with a wider range of identities (local, regional, and European). Among these, the regional level has been the most productive, enhancing Estonia’s already strong ties to Finland but also fostering closer connections to its other Nordic and Baltic neighbors. Although integration into NATO and integration into the European Union continue to receive strong approval, a European identity is still in the process of formation. For the Russian community, the fall of communism led to a full reevaluation of the bases of its identity. The major trend has seen a shift from a political consciousness (loyalty to the Soviet Union) to a greater emphasis on the Russian language and ethnicity. In spite of the general peacefulness of ethnic relations, any meaningful integration of the two major nationalities in Estonia remains incomplete, as graphically demonstrated in the Bronze Soldier affair in April 2007. Russians, especially younger ones, increasingly know the Estonian language, but views of history, especially regarding World War II, and attitudes toward Russia still differ markedly between the Estonian and Russian populations. The process of integration is further complicated by the neighboring and still powerful kin-state of the local Russian population.

The authors examine and compare the rules on consumer insolvency in Estonia and Norway. Under Estonian law, consumers may obtain debt adjustments under the 2003 Bankruptcy Act (in the form of a debt release) or under the 2010 Debt Restructuring and Debt Protection Act (in the form of debt restructuring). These two acts apply to both entrepreneurs and consumers. In Norway, a Debt Settlement Act was introduced in 1992, allowing for debt settlements for consumers. Debt adjustment under general insolvency legislation is not regarded as a viable option for consumers in Norway, it being a rather costly and cumbersome procedure. In Norway, each municipality is obliged to offer debt counselling services to consumers, while in Estonia, debt counselling services are available through non-governmental organization (NGOs) and through some municipalities on a voluntary basis. The number of instituted proceedings for debt settlements (Norway) and for debt restructuring (Estonia) are relatively low: in 2014, the numbers stood at 57 per 100 000 inhabitants in Norway and 2 per 100 000 inhabitants in Estonia. The difference between the two countries may to some extent be explained by differences in legislation and in organization of debt counselling, but the authors conclude that the explanation must probably be found also in cultural, sociological and political factors.

Memorials have become increasingly relevant in societies seeking to come to terms with the past of mass violence and there is a growing body of academic scholarship that scrutinises the politics of memory in divided societies. This article takes a different approach to the politics of memorials: it does not focus on what is remembered, that is, to what a memorial testifies, but how memory at a memorial (supposedly) takes place through the aesthetic strategies put to work. It contributes to emerging literature which explores aspects of performativity and the politics of affect. The objective is, however, to take it one step further by not only shifting attention to studying the engagement with, experience and performance at these sites but also to the politics of the aesthetics choice that promote this engagement. To do so, it differentiates between three aesthetic styles of memorials: imposing, counter and affirmative memorials that were all developed at a particular time in order to pursue particular political and social objectives. The current phenomenon, affirmative memorials, holds that there is a duty to remember and is firmly embedded in efforts to build peace, advance liberal norms and contribute to transitional justice. Pursuing this strategy is however at odds with the aesthetic style of these affirmative memorials that is derived from counter memorials and celebrates plurality and openness rather than wanting to affirm one message.

This article aims to reflect on the creation of new digital memorials and obituaries to preserve and tell the story of people who were victims of the coronavirus, and the political and cultural aspects of these projects of patrimonialization of mourning.

AbstractAfter a genocide, leaders compete to fill the postwar power vacuum and establish their preferred story of the past. Memorialisation, including through building memorials, provides a cornerstone of political power. The dominant public narrative determines the plotline; it labels victims and perpetrators, interprets history, assigns meaning to suffering, and sets the post-atrocity political agenda. Therefore, ownership of the past, in terms of the public account, is deeply contested. Although many factors affect the emergence of a dominant atrocity narrative, this article highlights the role of international interactions with genocide memorials, particularly how Western visitors, funders, and consultants influence the government's narrative. Western consumption of memorials often reinforces aspects of dark tourism that dehumanise victims and discourage adequate context for the uninformed visitor. Funding and consultation provided by Western states and organisations – while offering distinct benefits – tends to encourage a homogenised atrocity narrative, which reflects the values of the global human rights regime and existing standards of memorial design rather than privileging the local particularities of the atrocity experience. As shown in the cases of Rwanda, Cambodia, and Bosnia, Western involvement in public memory projects often strengthens the power of government narratives, which control the present by controlling the past.

Ghost Wars: the politics of war commemoration: research into dissenting views to war and other aspects of the Australian experience of war that are marginalised by the Australian War Memorial. A study taking the form of an exhibition of a filmic (video) essay, which comprises the outcome of the Studio Practice component, together with the Exegesis which documents the nature of the course of study undertaken, and the Dissertation, which comprises 33% of the Thesis.

Defence date: 30 June 2016
Examining Board: Professor Pavel Kolár (EUI) - Supervisor; Professor Alexander Etkind (EUI); Professor Siobhan Kattago (University of Tartu); Professor Jörg Hackmann (University of Szczecin, University of Greifswald).
This thesis examines the monumental landscapes and historical culture in 20th century Estonia. It considers a network of three major socio-political upheavals and mnemonic 'ruptures' in the society's path for an exploration of how memory places and the memories they represent survived, responded to, or drew upon the political changes. The study follows Estonian monuments to the War of Independence (1918-1920), and proposes discourse units such as freedom and nation as a basis for interrogating the processes of their construction, destruction, altering, and eventual reconstruction. It examines the mechanisms of a mnemonic rupture, and searches for breaks alongside continuities in its aftermath. More generally, the thesis proposes a triple-change argument for the investigation of an Eastern European memory landscape, and poses a question of cross-rupture permanences in such borderland memory sites.

This study examines the ways in which museums and memorials within South African society commemorate events of the past. Various examples of museums and memorials are chosen and identified according to the ways in which they embody postmodern or modern thought. Postmodern and modern museums are deconstructed according to various post-structural tenets so as to arrive at a broader understanding on how they are able to remain a continuously relevant and vital part of contemporary society.
Art History, Visual Arts and Musicology
M.A. (Art History)

本研究以一个曾经在文革中施暴的红卫兵──李乾的生命传记为个案，以布迪厄的社会实践理论为理论框架，探讨主体参与文革与记忆、反思文革的实践，以及对文革意义的理解，进而理解一系列红卫兵实践（尤其是暴力实践）的逻辑。不同于已有文革研究的精英史和社会史路径，本研究试图发展一种传记取向的文革研究路径，分析个体生命经验与其所处社会情境，红卫兵的惯习与其所处的场域的复杂关系，由此更深刻地理解文革以及无产阶级专政的政治文化。
首先，本研究聚焦这些红卫兵文革初期对文革的认知、情感机制与行动策略，指出其实践如何受制于无产阶级专政场域与惯习的作用，如何再生产无产阶级专政的政治文化，即再生产无产阶级专政的象征秩序、权力技术、话语方式与组织机制，如何再生产文革"武斗"的直接暴力与"文斗"的话语暴力。并且，本研究试图说明早期"造反者"的"造反"动力来自其与老红卫兵在革命资格竞争中的"相对剥夺感"；这种"造反"并不是为了反抗主流的象征秩序，而是努力争取自身在这套象征秩序中的优势位置和资本。
其次，本研究探讨主体生命经验中关键性的暴力事件──"一二.五"事件的实际发生过程，分析"一二.五"事件中这些红卫兵对暴力的认知与情感，以及暴力如何被合法化及赋权，其中的专政对象──"流氓"是如何被建构与想象的，由此揭示特定的政治文化脉络中主体的贱斥动力以及这一暴力实践的逻辑。红卫兵暴力惯习的形塑，不仅受制于文革的革命场域的作用，更受制于建国以来历时性的无产阶级专政场域的作用；同时，这一惯习的运作又在维持和再生产无产阶级专政的政治文化。
此外，本研究探讨主体在"一二.五"事件后，如何在一系列社会互动的过程中，逐步实现了意识的转化和主体性变迁，如何从符号中介的生命经验中引入新的认知与情感机制重新理解"一二.五"事件、文革以及无产阶级专政的政治文化。这种批判性的反思实践与主体所处行动场域中的社会位置以及所能接收的多元的、异质性的符号资源密切相关，可以形塑主体惯习的转化，生产新的社会实践以及相应社会关系的改变。
最后，本研究试图将当下民间文革记忆与反思实践置于文革与后文革、毛时代与后毛时代的连续性与转型的关系之中，指出为民间记忆与反思实践赋权的政治文化意义。这一反记忆实践不仅打捞普通人被遗忘的、被边缘化的文革记忆，也介入对历史与现实的批判，积极争取个体对历史的话语权，与对现实政治、文化的参与权。
Taking the life biography of a former Red Guard Li Qian who committed violence during the Cultural Revolution (CR) as a case, this research employs Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social practice to explore the Red Guards’ participatory, mnemonic and reflective practices during the CR, as well as their understanding of the CR, with the aim of further understanding the logics of the Red Guards’ practices (especially their violent practices). Different from the traditional approaches of political history and social history, this study attempts to develop a biography approach to study the CR. It analyzes the complex relations between individuals’ life experiences and their social contexts, between the Red Guards’ habitus and the specific field, to understand the political culture of the CR and the Proletarian Dictatorship.
First, this study focuses on the Red Guards’ cognitive and emotional mechanism and action strategy during the early days of the CR. It investigates how their practices are subject to the conditioning of the field and habitus of the Proletarian Dictatorship, how they reproduce the political culture of Proletarian Dictatorship in terms of its symbolic order, power technology, discourse mode, and organizational mechanism, and how they reproduce the physical and discursive violence of the CR. This thesis also maintains that the dynamics of the early "rebels" were derived from their feelings of relative deprivation in the contest with the old Red Guards for revolutionary recognition. These "rebels" did not aim to resist the mainstream symbolic order, but to strive for the dominant position and capitals in the symbolic order of the CR.
Second, this study probes into the actual process of the "December Fifth" Event that was the most important life experience of Li Qian. It analyzes the Red Guards’ cognitive and emotional mechanism towards violence, how the violence was legitimized and empowered in this event, and how the images of the so-called "hooligan" were constructed and imagined. It reveals the dynamic of the subject’s abjection in the context of the specific political culture, and the logic of the violent practice. On the one hand, the Red Guards’ violent habitus was not only subject to the conditioning of the field of the Proletarian Dictatorship but also to the conditioning of the field of the CR. On the other hand, the operation of the violent habitus also maintained and reproduced the political culture of the Proletarian Dictatorship.
Third, this study examines how Li Qian realized the transformation of the consciousness and subjectivity through a series of social interaction. It also taps into his new cognitive and emotional mechanism developed under the symbolic mediation of his actual life experiences, thus understanding the "December Fifth" Event, as well as the political culture of the CR and the Proletarian Dictatorship. The critical reflective practice was closely related to the subject’s social position in the specific field and the diverse, heterogeneous symbolic resources that he absorbed. They shaped the transformation of the habitus, producing new social practices and the corresponding changes of social relations.
Finally, by putting the practices of popular memory and reflection on the CR into the continuity and the transformation between the CR and the Post-CR, and between the Maoist era and the Post-Mao era, this thesis emphasizes the political and cultural significance of these practices. These counter-memory practices not only dig into and revive the forgotten and marginalized memories of the CR, but also engage with historical and contemporary criticism, and actively assent the ordinary people’s rights to speak their histories and to participate in the current politics and culture.
Detailed summary in vernacular field only.
Detailed summary in vernacular field only.
Detailed summary in vernacular field only.
Detailed summary in vernacular field only.
Detailed summary in vernacular field only.
袁梦倩.
Parallel title from added title page.
Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 268-283).
Abstracts also in English.
Yuan Mengqian.