Articles de revues sur le sujet « Maritime piracy, high seas, insurance »

Maritime commerce in world commerce. Each year, vessels carry more cargo at higher costs and faster speeds. Insurance is an integral part of shipping, as it protects cargoes and crews against the perils of the sea. This article focuses on the peril of piracy, a criminal practice that has evolved significantly throughout history. Pirates today, as pirates of the past, prey upon the unprotected. Yet, modern piracy, unlike historical piracy, is essentially non-violent. The modern pirate profits from ransom, not theft. Today, piracy is a monetary risk with compu­­­table consequences: an insurable threat. Anti-piracy methods, including insurance, impose steep costs to world trade. In the past decade, pirate activity has declined while piracy insurance has grown more expensive. This phenomenon is problematic, but an industry-wide solution is a challenging construct. To handle the costly risks of piracy is to balance the distinct and competing interests of ship-owners, insurers, operators, and governments. As this Article argues, insurance can more efficiently mitigate piracy’s puzzling risk. After discussing maritime piracy and maritime insurance, this Article outlines the legal and regulatory schema for a system to mandate the speeds of vessels that transit pirate-prone waters. The proposed regulation is mechanically sound, logistically feasible, cost-effective, and enforceable. To diminish the costly risk of piracy, this Article proposes revising a treaty to afford the International Maritime Organization (IMO) jurisdiction to regulate vessel speeds on the high seas.

These days, one of the most significant issue is maritime piracy and armed robbery; it poses a high threat against international peace and security. These crimes can occur anywhere on the high seas, but the most infected areas are the western basin of the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, Southeast Asia, or the Gulf of Guinea, where piracy causes many troubles to world trade. The crime of piracy calls for a strong and substantive answer. In this paper, the author tries to look for legal and non-legal devices against piracy and tries to give an answer to the question whether we can take a failed state to account in international law?

AbstractThe rise of Somali piracy in the beginning of the 21st century led to a swift response by the international community. Suspects were arrested by naval forces in the high seas exercising universal jurisdiction. As there is no international tribunal for maritime piracy, the suspects were prosecuted in national courts using domestic laws. The United States prosecuted a handful of cases using its piracy statute passed in 1909, which incorporates international law but prescribes mandatory life imprisonment for those convicted. Although the definition of the crime of piracy in the United States evolves along with developments in international law, the punishment is an outlier that deviates from global norms. This article argues that the punishment for piracy in the United States must also evolve with international practice because a changing definition of a crime coupled with a fixed punishment may lead to rule of law violations and other undesirable results.

Due to the increasing rate of economic damages of insecurity to the Nigerian maritime industry with cases of loss of revenue to the federal government occasioned by; high freight charges for Nigeria bound cargoes, high insurance premium changeable on both ships and cargoes, coming to Nigerian and total boy-cut of the Nigerian ports by most shipping lines. The researchers were motivated to carry out a research on economic implications of maritime piracy related attacks on Nigeria’s maritime industry. This research was set out to realize some specific objectives while research hypotheses were formulated in this regard to address the objective of this study. Related literatures were reviewed and the research adopted ex-post facto design. Isan E. et al (2004) pointed out that ex-post factor design in research is the type of research in which there is a systematic empirical inquiring in which the researcher does not have direct control of independent variables because their manifestations have already occurred. Data were sourced through secondary means while the hypotheses were tested at 5% level of significance. The result of the analyses indicated that there is no significant relationship between poor performance of maritime industries in Nigeria and piracy activities. It also revealed that there is significant relationship between Nigerian piracy and revenue generation in the oil and maritime sector, also that piracy has recorded significant success in Nigerian territorial waters and that there is significant relationship between Sea piracy and methods of curbing the menace in Nigeria. Based on the revelations of this study, the researchers recommended that radar surveillance of recommended anchorages seaward access to berth, increased random patrols by fast police or coastguard crafts or helicopters be organized, ensuring alignment terminal security staff and port security forces among many others.

AbstractPiracy holds a special place within the field of international law because of the universal jurisdiction that applies: any state may seize a pirate ship on the high seas and decide upon the penalties to be imposed, as is currently the case with Somali and West African pirates. Unlike today, piracy was the norm in pre-modern times. Maritime trade and piracy went hand in hand. At the same time, kings and emperors recruited their admirals from among pirates. This raises the question of how princes, states and cities distinguished between legal and illegal violence at sea. How did they deal with maritime conflict among themselves and among their respective subjects and citizens? This article puts maritime conflict management in a European, global and long term perspective while avoiding anachronistic and teleological approaches. Finally, it argues that pre-modern conflict management is relevant to understand maritime security in the twenty-first century.

AbstractPiracy holds a special place within the field of international law because of the universal jurisdiction that applies: any state may seize a pirate ship on the high seas and decide upon the penalties to be imposed, as is currently the case with Somali and West African pirates. Unlike today, piracy was the norm in pre-modern times. Maritime trade and piracy went hand in hand. At the same time, kings and emperors recruited their admirals from among pirates. This raises the question of how princes, states and cities distinguished between legal and illegal violence at sea. How did they deal with maritime conflict among themselves and among their respective subjects and citizens? This article puts maritime conflict management in a European, global and long term perspective while avoiding anachronistic and teleological approaches. Finally, it argues that pre-modern conflict management is relevant to understand maritime security in the twenty-first century.

This article presents some reflections on the impact on the law of the sea of the Security Council resolutions on piracy off the coasts of Somalia. Although they extend the powers concerning the repression of piracy all States enjoy on the high seas under UNCLOS and customary international law to the territorial sea of Somalia, these resolutions explicitly exclude that such extension modifies the customary rule that limits piracy to the high seas. As such exclusion does not encompass other general rules of the law of the sea relevant for piracy, the resolutions may be read as relevant elements illuminating the meaning of these rules. The rules of UNCLOS on which the Security Council resolutions shed light include Article 3, setting 12 miles as the maximum width of the territorial sea, Article 77, which, read a contrario sensu, states the requirement of express proclamation for the exclusive economic zone, Article 105, second sentence, as regards the States that may establish judicial proceedings against pirates. The peculiar situation of ineffectiveness of governmental authority in Somalia and uncertainty about the maritime zones of this country explain many aspects of the Security Council’s attitude.

Although universal jurisdiction over piracy has long existed in customary international law and international conventions, such as the Convention on the High Seas (HSC) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the piracy situation has been changing. The subsidence of Somali piracy provides an opportunity for rethinking how to strengthen universal jurisdiction for maritime piracy trials to enhance a sustainable anti-piracy legal system. The incidents of Somali piracy have resulted in some new developments in exercising universal jurisdiction: the separation of seizing, prosecuting, and imprisoning States; the consideration of creative piracy prosecution mechanisms; the increased focus on land-based facilitation of piracy; enhanced international cooperation; and expanded universal jurisdiction. This leads to several main challenges in existing legal frameworks, including weaknesses in UNCLOS, the disharmony among international instruments, and defects in domestic piracy legislation. In order to sustain and improve the anti-piracy legal system, universal jurisdiction over piracy should be incrementally strengthened to support the prosecution of pirates by States. To address the trends and challenges, this article explores how the legal system can be enhanced in two respects: adjusting the basic provisions of universal jurisdiction over piracy and refining the relevant measures in exercising that jurisdiction to prosecute pirates.

This article aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the maritime patrol regime (Indomalphi regime) in reducing piracy cases of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Sulu Sea and Sulawesi Sea involving Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Referring to the concept of regime effectiveness, it was found that the Indomalphi regime was proven effective in reducing the number of maritime cases in the Sulu and Sulawesi seas. The effectiveness of the regime is formed by a combination of four positive factors: (1) the regime is not classified as benign, indicating no inconsistencies, asymmetries, and cumulative splits in the formation of the Indomalphi regime; (2) the regime has a good problem-solving capacity because of epistemic community support that tightly integrated into the regime; (3) level of collaboration between the regime members is high, indicated by member’s compliance to the standard operating procedure (SOP) of the Indomalphi’s patrols even though there is no sanctions mechanism; (4) the regime facing a political context which provides an advantage with indicated by smooth cooperation during the process of Indomalphi cooperation even the three countries have sovereign sentiments and maritime territorial conflicts.KEYWORDSAbu Sayyaf Group; Indomalphi; Maritime Piracy; Regime Effectiveness; Sulu-Sulawesi Sea

On October 7, 1985, the Achille Lauro, an Italian-flag cruise ship, was seized while sailing from Alexandria to Port Said. The hijackers, members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), had boarded the ship in Genoa, posing as tourists. They held the ship’s crew and passengers hostage, and threatened to kill the passengers unless Israel released 50 Palestinian prisoners. They also threatened to blow up the ship if a rescue mission was attempted. When their demands had not been met by the following afternoon, the hijackers shot Leon Klinghoffer, a Jew of U.S. nationality who was partly paralyzed and in a wheelchair, and threw his body and wheelchair overboard. The United States characterized the seizure as piracy, a position that has been supported by some commentators and opposed by others.

The article focuses on international shipping governed by regulatory sources of a dual nature. This circumstance is due to the fact that international shipping is regulated both by international legal sources, for example, conventions, international treaties and customs, and by domestic legislation and judicial practice of the countries participating in international transportation. The research findings have indicated that, unfortunately, in practice there are often cases when the norms of national or international law have loopholes. Thus, a number of provisions of the International Shipping Rules do not coincide with the Russian Charter of Water Transport. In addition, the concept of “bill of lading” is often used in international law and is absent in Russian legislation. Therefore, the author proposes to eliminate the existing loopholes causing either high costs or litigation by finalizing national and international legislation. In this regard, the author considers specific examples and makes appropriate proposals aimed to close the identified loopholes in international and national legislation in order to minimize the costs and losses of the parties to the international transport agreement, and to reduce the number of controversies. Such urgent problems as the problem of piracy and the problem of pollution of the seas and oceans by ships also arise in freight forwarding business. The author proposes to toughen measures of responsibility for maritime piracy and for pollution of the seas and oceans by ships at the legislative level.

Shipping trade commodities using commercial ships through the sea that are safe and free from security disturbances is a prerequisite for spinning a country's economy. However, not all seas in this world are safe. There are many areas of waters categorized as high-risk areas. UNCLOS regulates that a safe sea implies that the sea is free from threats or disruptions to the activities of peaceful sea use or utilization, among others, free from threats of violence in the form of piracy, sabotage, and armed terrorism at sea. Conditions gave rise to private security services on board called PCASP (Private Contracted Armed Security Personnel). This article aims to find out how to set up PCASP internationally and according to Indonesian law. This research uses secondary data materials, namely books, journal articles, and papers relevant to this research obtained from print and internet media. The use of PCASP supports the safety and security clause in UNCLOS 1982. IMO as an instrument of the United Nations in charge of maintaining and controlling international regulations on the safety and security of ships and ports. The maritime transportation authority in Indonesia does not require PCASP service nor approves commercial shipping companies to present PCASP on board.

The supposed ice melting process leads to a fundamental change in the geopolitical status of the Arctic region: it is becoming more open to different kinds of maritime activities implementation, including navigation, commercial fishing, mineral and energy resources extraction. Not only the Arctic Five (A5) countries, whose coasts are directly washed by the Arctic Ocean, are interested in their realization, but non-regional states also. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives them such opportunities. According to UNCLOS, the central part of the Arctic Ocean beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of the Arctic countries can be considered as a high seas enclave, with all freedoms of the high seas: of navigation; of overflight; of fishing; of scientific research; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; to construct artificial islands and other installations. The high seas are open to all states, whether coastal or land-locked, which have equal rights here. In addition, it should be noted that other countries have a right to carry out certain practical activities associated with three (out of six) freedoms named above: of navigation (with some restrictions under Article 234 of UNCLOS); of overflight; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines – within the Arctic states EEZ. The appearance of new Arctic players interested in its spaces and resources is connected with significant increase in risks and threats, primarily non-military. This is largely due to fundamental differences between the Arctic Ocean and other sea areas, such as the Indian or Atlantic Ocean. Among these differences: only five Arctic states are washed by the Arctic Ocean’s waters; shallow depth; small total area; a significant length of the shelf zone; special climate conditions, including ice cap; finally – ecological vulnerability. In this regard, the process of the Arctic region’s opening for different kinds of maritime activities implementation poses a problem of the environmental security, protection and preservation of the marine environment and its biological diversity. Despite the fact that security issues in their traditional interpretation are not under the jurisdiction of the Arctic Council, its primary environmental focus indicates that these issues are directly correlated with the main area of its activities. Anyway, the modern interpretation of the "security" concept includes not only a "military", but also an “environmental” component. For the Arctic states, whose geographical position makes them the first victims of any environmental disaster in the region, the provision of environmental security should be the main priority in their mutual policies. The most effective model for the non-military security threats response in the Arctic is cooperation and coordination between all Arctic states at the regional level. One of the problems in the way is that the Arctic Ocean could not be compared with the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, to which the Article 123 of the UNCLOS "Cooperation of States Bordering Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas" provides the states' right to “coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea”, and to “coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment”. However, the recent transformation of the international maritime law gives Arctic countries some opportunities in this area. First, the regime of the high seas is becoming less conducive for implementation of specific types of maritime activities. In the future, we can expect that the extent of regulation in this area of the World ocean will be significantly increased. The implementation of the high seas freedoms is largely conditioned by the realization of the tasks to protect and preserve the marine environment and its biodiversity. Second, there is a continuing practice of expanding the authority of coastal states in their jurisdiction zones, especially in the EEZ. Despite the fact that the coastal state is not granted any competence in the field of the EEZ security, the practice of a broad interpretation of the “security” concept includes food, resource and environment security. The enforcement of such security regimes is becoming an increasingly common practice, even though it imposes certain restrictions for third countries’ rights in these sea areas. Finally, the adoption of security measures in the EEZ, on one hand, and at the high sea, on the other, should be recognized interdependent and considered all together. In the near future, the number of potential security threats can be significantly expanded due to the increase in the number of maritime activities participants. In addition to the already existing non-military threats (pollution of the marine environment; illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing), new threats may appear: armed robbery of ships (piracy); acts of terrorism affecting both the shipping and offshore installations (oil and gas platforms); illegal transportation of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD); illegal transportation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; illegal movement of people by sea, including illegal migration. An effective response to these types of threats requires not only individual efforts of the Arctic Five countries, but also collective security measures. In this regard, in order to create a regional security model, the development of collaboration and cooperation between the Arctic countries is essential. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the Russian Humanitarian Scientifi c Foundation Project No. 14-07-00050 “Institutions and Principles of Supranational Governance Formation in World Politics: Concepts and Activities”.

INTRODUCTION. Currently, states can apply a whole range of law enforcement measures at sea in order to prevent such unlawful phenomena as piracy, slave trade, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, etc. However, the problem of the exercise of jurisdiction by states within various maritime areas is the main sticking point during the implementation of these measures. In an attempt to exercise the law enforcement function at sea, the state can't ignore the fact that its ability to create legal norms and ensure their effective implementation depends not only on its will as a sovereign, but also on the restrictions imposed by international law. Therefore, maintaining a balance between limiting the “territorialization” of maritime areas and the need to carry out a law enforcement function logically entails the need to determine the nature and content of the concept of “jurisdiction of the state” within different maritime areas, as well as to identify specific features of this legal category. The present article focuses on this and other related issues.MATERIALS AND METHODS. Historical and comparative analysis along with dogmatic research approach were used in the research process and the entire research is well grounded in focusing on the norms of international treaty law and customary law. In addition to that this research focuses on the norms of national law governing issues related to the application of law enforcement measurement at the sea. Apart from those given material and methodical inputs, the doctrinal works of the relevant jurists have been used in this research.RESEARCH RELULTS. The author comes to an alternative conclusion that territorial jurisdiction within the maritime territory is not absolute, which is due, apparently, the principle of freedom of the high seas which have a longer support by the international community. The definition of jurisdiction as extraterritorial is not self-sufficient, since in case of conflict of jurisdictions, additional legal criteria are required to resolve such a conflict. The classification of extraterritorial jurisdiction depending on the principles on which it is based also does not solve the problem, since some principles, such as protective or universal, in turn, require additional criteria in order to become a self-sufficient tool to overcome legal uncertainty. The author notes that the ability to exercise territorial jurisdiction within maritime areas, as a rule, determines the ability to exercise legislative and executive jurisdiction, which are also not absolute. The exercise of extraterritorial legislative or executive jurisdiction at sea is potentially permissible only on the basis of international law to solve a specific function, for example, law enforcement.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION. The main problem of the varieties of jurisdiction proposed by in- ternational legal science is that each of them only supplements each other, describing a possible choice, but not explaining why a particular choice should be preferred in case of conflict. It is obvious that current uncertainty has created some severe impacts upon the institution of law enforcement measures at sea as a result of the absence of standards for enforcement measures that could make a balance to the mechanism. Hence the law enforcer has to be cautious with a number of factors in deciding the implementation of law enforcement measures within the sea.

AbstractThe purpose of the present study is the understanding of Gentili's position on the law of the sea as expressed in his classic De iure belli (Hanoviae 1598). The key constitutive elements turn out to be: 1) the idea of the sea as 'res communis' to all mankind, which amounts to the concept of 'freedom of the sea'; 2) 'jurisdiction' of the coastal state on the adjacent sea, even on the high seas, in order to police crime and prevent/punish piracy. As such these two key elements, if taken in isolation, are rooted in the civil law tradition, but their true meaning can only be captured by placing them in the intellectual framework of which they constitute an integral part. Firstly, the epistemic structure of discourse hinges on the new science of natural jurisprudence, as applied to the subject of 'ius gentium bellicum'; secondly, the constituent theoretical languages emanate from a distinctive combination of civil law, scholastic-theological and humanist traditions. This procedure enables us to highlight the strikingly original and distinctly modern traits of Gentili's perspective on the law of the sea, which emerges as a corollary of his project of international/global order. A project that is based on the crucial notion of 'respublica magna' of mankind, a notion encompassing the two notions of 'freedom' and 'jurisdiction' that constitute and define the legal regime of the sea.The Stoic humanist notion of universal human society as 'corpus unum' implies, first of all, 'freedom of intercourse', or 'ius communicationis', to start from 'free passage' and 'freedom of commerce'. It is in the context of his argument about these basic freedoms that Gentili is finally led to discuss the subject of the 'law of the sea'. But, not only the concept of 'res communis', or 'freedom of use', but also the concept of 'jurisdiction', or 'protection', are strictly related to the same foundational concept of 'respublica magna'. This is a crucial characteristic of Gentili's approach to world order that is proved by reference to two cardinal points of his new 'cosmopolitan justice': 1) the 'international right to punish', as exemplified by the legitimacy of the wars of 'humanitarian intervention' and of the wars in support of the 'common law of mankind'; 2) the 'occupation of vacant land', which again underlines the relevance of the principle of 'jurisdiction' by striking a balance between the principle of 'free use' of nature and the 'jurisdiction' of the local ruler.Such a reconstruction definitely rejects the traditional image of Gentili as a supporter of 'maritime protectionism', on the ground of his Advocatio Hispanica published posthumously in 1613 and containing his pleadings as Spanish advocate before the Court of Admiralty. The guiding assumption here is that the book is strictly of a forensic character and as such devoid of any coherent theoretical substance. To the contrary, in his De iure belli, far from anticipating the English position in favour of 'mare clausum', Gentili tends to anticipate the essentials of Grotius' position, especially at the level of the ethic of the 'modern cosmopolis' and the related theme of colonial empire. On this very plane of discourse, Gentili's thinking transcends the so-called battle of the books and emerges as especially significant in illuminating the wider and deeper intellectual currents that contributed to the development of what were to become basic standard positions of modern international theory.

Weak coastal states often lack an adequate, sustained naval presence to monitor and police their territorial waters. Unpatrolled waters, both territorial and otherwise, may provide pirates with substantial financial opportunities that go far beyond any single country. Maritime piracy costs the global economy on average USD 24 billion per year. This research explores the impact of naval bases on acts of piracy to determine if naval presence can decrease the likelihood of piracy. To examine this important economic and national security issue, our research employs a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model. We also rely upon a newly constructed time-series dataset for the years 1992–2018. Our study shows that the presence of naval bases is essential in helping maritime forces combat piracy. Policymakers searching for options to combat piracy should find the results of this study especially useful in creating prescriptive approaches that aid in solving offshore problems.

AbstractIn this paper, three steps are made. First, an effort is made to show a consequential effect of maritime insecurity on seafarers and marine professionals; they are at risk of a complicated string of processes that impact their lives. Second, there is the risk to the environment and property. Third, the economic cost of traditional maritime crimes is examined against the potential maritime trade expansion from implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Third, the policy and regulatory measures implemented in the region against piracy are assessed to propose additional measures for improvement. Essentially, the study deploys a case study approach with a three-year field observation over the Gulf of Guinea region and is supported by outcomes of various remote interviews, in addition to online surveys conducted over three months—findings are juxtaposed with the estimated cost of piracy and potential implications for policies driving economic advancement. The results showed inadequate maritime surveillance despite enormous legal frameworks amidst the current structures of regional and international corporations. The piracy cost is high and inevitable as a factor of insurance coverage passed onto end consumers. Response to piracy has been reactionary rather than proactive, as attacks have continued in territorial and offshore areas into 2021. The impact will be visible on AfCFTA post-COVID-19. The study highlights the need for a community-based approach to surveillance modelled after the community policing model currently implemented in Ghana.

AbstractThe maritime zones recognized under international laws – are formed from the highseas, with the riches at the bottom of the oceans and seas from this perimeter – which isregulated by international conventions, whose infringement may lead to the application ofsanctions in conformity with the dispositions stipulated, or, in the lack of such dispositions, totaking other measures, such as repression or retaliation, which are considered, in the publicinternational law, as being general sanctions included in the category of countermeasures.At high seas serious acts of a criminal character are also committed, such as: piracy,illicit traffic of narcotics and psychotropic substances, etc., thus all states must cooperate inview of repressing these acts and sanctioning the culprits.

<p align="center"><strong><em>Abstract</em></strong></p><p><em>This research aims to determine the jurisdiction concerning piracy on the high seas by international law. This research is a legal research with prescriptive characteristic use a statute approach and conceptual approach. The legal sources used are primary and secondary materials later are analyzed by a deductive method and legal interpretation. The results show that there has been international law rules which can be used as the basis for all states to apply their jurisdiction to the piracy. These rules are the convention on the high Seas 1958 (chS 1958), United Nations convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNcLOS 1982)</em><em>, and the convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 (SUA 1988). Instead of these international rules, some codes and guidances concerning combating piracy are also concluded by international organizations.</em></p><p><strong><em>Keywords : </em></strong><em>International Jurisdiction, Piracy, Law of The Sea</em></p><p align="center"><strong>Abstrak</strong></p><p>Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui penerapan yurisdiksi terhadap perompakan di laut lepas menurut hukum internasional. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum yang bersifat preskriptif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan konseptual. Bahan hukum yang digunakan adalah bahan hukum primer dan bahan hukum sekunder yang selanjutnya dianalisis secara deduktif dan menggunakan interpretasi hukum. Hasil penelitian menjelaskan bahwa terdapat aturan-aturan hukum internasional yang dapat digunakan sebagai yurisdiksi untuk penegakan perompakan yaitu <em>convention on the high seas </em>1958 (CHS 1958), <em>United Nations convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 </em>(UNCLOS 1982), <em>convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation </em>1988 (SUA 1988), dan beberapa pedoman dan aturan yang dikeluarkan oleh organisasi internasional untuk penegakan perompakan.</p><p><strong>Katakunci : </strong>yurisdiksi Internasional, Perompakan, Hukum Laut Internasional</p>