Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Manchester Cotton Association »

David Gwynne Evans was born in Atherton, near Manchester, on 6 September 1909 of Welsh parents; his father, a schoolmaster, was from Pembrokeshire and his mother from Bangor, North Wales. He was the third of four children in a distinguished family. His older brother, Meredith Gwynne, became Professor of Physical Chemistry in Leeds and later in Manchester and was a Fellow of the Royal Society. His sister, Lynette Gwynne, took a degree in modern languages at Manchester University and taught in girls’ high schools. His younger brother, Alwyn Gwynne, after holding a lectureship in Manchester University was appointed to the Chair of Physical Chemistry in Cardiff University. David left Leigh Grammar School in 1928 at the age of 18 years and worked for two years in a junior capacity for the British Cotton Growers’ Association at the Manchester Cotton Exchange. However, when Alwyn went up to Manchester University in 1931, David decided to go with him and both graduated B.Sc. in physics and chemistry three years later and M .S c. after a further year. At this time Professor Maitland in the Department of Bacteriology wanted a chemist to help in the public health laboratory which was run by his department. Professor Lapworth recommended David for the post and thus David entered the field of bacteriology and immunology, to which he was to contribute so much. He was appointed Demonstrator and soon afterwards Assistant Lecturer in the University Department. During these early years he worked with Professor Maitland on the toxins of Haemophilus pertussis (now Bordetella pertussis ) and related organisms, work that provided a sound basis for his subsequent interest in whooping cough immunization and later for his abiding interest in vaccination against other diseases and in the standardization of vaccines and antisera.

En 1894 est inauguré le Manchester Ship Canal qui relie la métropole industrielle du Lancashire à la mer, la transformant ainsi en ville portuaire. A travers la formulation de paradoxes liés au commerce du coton anglo-américain, l'auteur analyse les raisons qui ont poussé la capitale industrielle de Cotonnia à se donner un destin maritime, alors que le 2ème port d'Angleterre n'est situé qu'à une trentaine de miles de Manchester ? Notre argument repose sur l'hypothèse que l'industrie cotonnière locale est à l'origine du projet dont la promotion a débuté au début des années 1880. Ce point de vue va à l'encontre de l'opinion de spécialistes du Ship Canal tels que Douglas Farnie et Ian Harford qui estiment que l'influence du lobby cotonnier de Manchester a été longtemps surestimée. Pourtant, nos recherches sur le canal nous ont conduits à conclure que l'industrie cotonnière, et en particulier les filateurs, sont les catalyseurs du projet. Ces derniers étaient très mécontents de la commercialisation du coton aux États-Unis et à Liverpool. Le 2nd port de l'Empire, où se trouvait le siège, qui réglemente à l'époque le commerce du coton local et international, ne parvenait pas à réguler les dysfonctionnements qui minaient le négoce du coton, conduisant à la dégradation du coton brut expédié aux filatures. Cette thèse rend compte des problèmes endémiques qui affectent chaque étape du commerce du coton, depuis la culture de la matière brute jusqu'à son acheminement aux filatures anglaises. C'est l'insatisfaction des filateurs qui a conduit ces derniers à vouloir s'émanciper du port de Liverpool en créant un port à Manchester, ainsi que des institutions commerciales capables d'amener les importations de coton jusqu'à la "Rome de la Cotonnie"
In 1894, the Manchester Ship Canal, linking the manufacturing metropolis to the sea, is inaugurated, thus transforming Manchester into a port city. Through the formulation of paradoxes relating to the Anglo-American cotton trade, the author analyses the reasons that led Cotonnia's industrial capital to follow a maritime destiny, whereas England's 2nd largest harbour is only 30 miles away.Our argument relies on the hypothesis that the Lancashire cotton industry is at the origin of the canal project whose promotion started at the beginning of the 1880s. This point of view contrasts with the opinion of two Ship Canal specialists, namely Douglas Farnie and Ian Harford, who posit that the influence of the Manchester cotton lobby has long been overestimated. However, our research on the canal drove us to the conclusion that the cotton industry, and spinners in particular, have been the catalysts of the project. They were infuriated by the deficient marketing of cotton in the USA and in Liverpool. The second port in the Empire was the seat of the institution (the Liverpool Cotton Association) that regulated the local and international cotton trade in those days. This association could not settle the dysfunctions that undermined the raw cotton flows, which led to the adulteration of the cargoes shipped to the mills. This thesis accounts for the endemic problems that plagued every stage of the commerce of cotton, from the cultivation of the fiber to the delivery of the raw material at the English mills. The spinners' exasperation, originating from the trade's dysfunctions, led them to seek emancipation from the port of Liverpool, by creating a harbour in Manchester, as well as commercial institutions capable of attracting the raw cotton imports to the industrial capital of Cotonnia

This chapter describes how the raw cotton trade was financed, before showing that – despite a drastically reduced volume – the vast rise in price meant that the value of raw cotton imports was greater than at any time in the 19th century and, in terms of the cotton traded, possibly the greatest ever. The implications for the earnings of the cotton brokers are demonstrated, together with the fury in Manchester that Liverpool was enriching itself while the rest of the industry starved. Two elements of Thomas Ellison’s etiquette are considered: that cotton brokers were not simultaneously buying and selling brokers, and that they did not trade cotton on their own account. Evidence is produced to suggest that both contentions are false. The chapter shows how cotton speculation infested the market during the war, but also how the spinners were implicated in it themselves. It concludes with the conflict that erupted towards the end of the war between the Liverpool Cotton Brokers’ Association and the Cotton Spinners’ Association, led by Hugh Mason.