Articles de revues sur le sujet « Legislative power – Spanish autonomous communities »

The following pages explore the evolution of the regional participation through different modalities for legislative purposes in the European arena. The case of Spain, where the Autonomous Communities have increased their powers in the search of a true fiscal federalism, with pros and cons, may serve as a reference for policy–makers and researchers. Nowadays, the degree of participation in tax matters is kept lower than in other policy areas. In the whole process, a serious risk of lack of co–ordination is to be avoided

Catalonia and the Valencian Country are characterized by a very special sociolinguistic situation, which consists in the coexistence of the Castilian language as the official language of the Spanish state and the regional languages as co-official languages in the respective Autonomous communities. This constellation holds the potential for political tension, since in the past ‒ but still today ‒ it lead/leads to linguistic conflicts, whose origins lie in the political history of Spain, during which the regional languages time and time again were subject to repressions and prohibitions, that came to a head during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. Since the beginning of the Spanish transition to democracy it was possible to work towards a resolution of the linguistic conflicts by means of legal norms and a corresponding language legislation. Especially the language teaching policy is an important area of language policy, since it has a long-lasting influence on the language skills of the citizens. The present article gives a detailed description of the measures taken in Catalonia and the Valencian Country concerning the language teaching policies since the beginning of the Spanish transition to democracy. Furthermore, it analyzes, in what way the language skills of the citizens of the Autonomous communities of Catalonia and Valencia have been improved through the applied language teaching policies and finally offers a comparison between the two Regions in this respect. The analysis is based on statistical surveys realized by the Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya (IDESCAT) and the Generalitat Valenciana.

LABURPENA: Espainiako Konstituzioak eta autonomia-estatutuek zedarritzen duten esparruan, estatu soziala, neurri handi batean, estatu autonomikoaren bidez josten da. Artikulu honen bidez, ikusi eta erakutsi nahiko nuke konstituzio-jurisprudentziak zenbateraino eta zer tresna erabiliz jo duen balekotzat krisi ekonomikoak iraun duen bitartean boterea zentralizatzeko eta arauak homogeneizatzeko egon den joera; azkenean, eskumenen antolamendua beste era batera diseinatu baita, autonomia-printzipioaren kaltetan eta autonomia-erkidegoek gizarte-politikak garatzeko duten ahalmenaren kaltetan. Oinarri modura, bi kasu aztertuko ditut: osasuna babesteko eskubidea, eta etxebizitza duina. Bai arlo batean zein bestean, alde batetik, estatuak lege batzuk sortu ditu krisiari erantzuteko; eta, bestetik, autonomia-erkidegoek zenbait politika garatu dituzte, beren eskumenak baliatuz. Ondorioz, liskar asko piztu da konstituzioaren inguruan, sokatik hainbat norabidetan tira egiten denean bezala: autonomia politikoa, berdintasuna eta estatu soziala, eta, gainera, krisialdi ekonomikoan. RESUMEN: En el marco establecido por la Constitución española y los Estatutos de Autonomía, el Estado social se articula en gran medida a través del Estado autonómico. El objetivo de este trabajo es determinar en qué medida y a través de qué instrumentos la jurisprudencia constitucional ha avalado una tendencia a la centralización del poder y homogeneización normativa en el contexto de la crisis económica, de tal modo que se opere un rediseño del orden competencial en perjuicio del principio de autonomía y la capacidad de las Comunidades Autónomas de desarrollar políticas sociales. Este análisis se basará en dos casos de estudio: el derecho a la protección de la salud y la vivienda digna. En ambos ámbitos materiales, por un lado, el Estado central ha adoptado legislación en respuesta a la crisis, y por el otro las Comunidades Autónomas han desarrollado políticas diversas en ejercicio de sus competencias propias. Como consecuencia, se ha producido un elevado grado de conflictividad constitucional en un contexto en el que se entrelazan diversos ejes: autonomía política, igualdady Estado social en el marco de la crisis económica. ABSTRACT: Within the framework set by the Spanish Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy, the social state is developed to a great extent through the autonomic state. The goal of this work is to understand the extent to which and through what mechanisms the constitutional case-law has endorsed the trend towards the centralization of power and normative homogenization in the context of the economic crisis, in such a way that the allocation of powers has been redesigned to undermine the principle of autonomy and the capacity of the Autonomous Communities to develop social policies. This analysis will focus on two case studies: the right to health and to housing. In both fields, on the one hand, the central state has adopted legislation in response to the crisis, and on the other the Autonomous Communities have developed diverse policies in the exercise of their respective powers. As a consequence, constitutional conflicts have increased in a context in which several core elements are intertwined: political autonomy, equality and the social state in the framework of theeconomic crisis.

The article examines the local self-government legislation of Spain and legal positions of the Constitutional Court of Spain. The norms of the Constitution of Spain regulating the issues of the organization of local self-government are analyzed. The influence of various aspects on their content is studied. The authors also studied the problem of distribution of legal regulation of the local government powers between the state and the autonomous communities taking into consideration the features of the administrative-territorial structure of Spain. The study appears to be relevant due to the fact that the issues of legal regulation of local government in Spain within the Russian science of municipal law are practically not studied. The study of foreign experience in this field helps to expand the scope of scientific researches. Spanish experience in this area also seems relevant due to the relatively recent change in the political regime. The aim of the work is to identify the features of the legal regulation of local government in Spain. As a result of the study, it was established that in Spain the subsidiary procedure for the legal regulation of local self-government by the state and autonomous communities is applied. The content of the norms of the Spanish Constitution on local self-government is determined. The distinctive features of the Spanish legislation on local self-government are identified.

The trans phenomenon is part of the Spanish social life, its diffusion and its treatment by different media becoming more and more explicit. The publication of news, emission of debate programs, documentaries, books and articles of opinion or study, in which the situation of trans people is addressed, is not sporadic. The social, political and cultural transformations that have taken place during the process of establishing and consolidating a parliamentary democracy in our country have contributed to this. In this context, the greater presence and prominence of girls and boys who are dissatisfied with their assigned gender has generated an acceptance on the part of their families, constituting associations to defend the rights of their daughters and sons. For this the requirement of legislative policies that contemplate the agreements of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and its legislative application in the Spanish territory, will be the basis to promote legislative initiatives in the various autonomous communities that exceed the established in the law 3/2007 regarding the trans question. These autonomous laws have been approved and are valued from family associations in an unequal manner, while still claiming a law of state implementation. This, together with their daily work, will be what will shape the analysis of this text.

This article contests the view of Spain as a federation based solely on the notion of the constitutionally entrenched devolution of powers through the rigidity of the national and regional constitutions. To that effect, the article looks at the broader system of the distribution of competences from a legal perspective, an aspect which has been neglected in comparative studies on the nature of Spanish decentralization. The analysis concludes, firstly, that the powers of autonomous communities are not enshrined in the same way as in federal models; secondly, that their Statutes of autonomy are not above the legislation of the central government; and, lastly, that the constitution is not rigid enough to prevent the intrusion from the centre on regional competences.

Abstract: The Spanish Constitution grants Catalonia, one of the Spanish so-called Autonomous Communities, power to legislate on private law. The power is not unlimited, being the “bases of contractual obligations” one of the main restrictions. Nowadays, the Catalan Department of Justice fosters the enactment of a Civil Code for Catalonia. Until now, the Family Code and the Succession Code, a range of statutes and the First Act of the Catalan Civil Code have been passed. This paper analyses the Catalan codification process within the framework of the European harmonisation of private law. The author stresses the necessity of taking into account the developments of the new ius commune europaneum and points out the possible Catalan contribution to the process of harmonisation.

The European Union advocates for legislative support to local energy communities. Measures include the promotion of dynamic energy allocation and discriminatory electricity tariffs such as the recent Spanish framework. However, the impact of these normative changes is not yet evaluated. This paper inquires into the impact of dynamic allocation coefficient and different electricity tariffs on the profitability of local energy communities. To do so, a linear optimisation model is developed and applied to real consumer data in Spain around a variable capacity photovoltaic generation plant. Comparing the economic performance of the static or variable power allocation under the effect of changing electricity tariffs. While both measures are beneficial, the new electricity tariffs result in larger profitability increases than the planned variable coefficients. The combination of measures allows for profitability improvements of up to 25% being complementary measures. However, installations that maximise the potential for electricity generation are still not as profitable due to the low purchase price of surplus energy. While discriminatory electricity price tariffs and variable allocation coefficients are positive measures, further measures are needed for these communities to install generation plants as large as the potential that each case allows.

Un rasgo distintivo del Estado de las Autonomías es el reconocimiento de la autonomía política de las CCAA y, consustancial a ella y a la vez instrumento necesario para hacerla posible sobre todo en su vertiente de la potestad de gasto, también la autonomía financiera. El ordenamiento constitucional español ha amparado esta autonomía, tanto a nivel textual como a través del moldeamiento del Tribunal Constitucional. Sin embargo, la Unión Económica y Monetaria (UEM) ha comportado una transformación sustancial de la perspectiva constitucional de la autonomía financiera, en su vertiente de la potestad de gasto, de las CCAA. Este artículo explora esta transformación, identificando tres etapas distintas —UEM precrisis, UEM en crisis y los intentos actuales de reforma de la UEM y la gestión de los fondos europeos de rescate— que han ido moldeando el principio constitucional de autonomía financiera de las CCAA. Se analiza la interacción entre el ordenamiento constitucional español y el Derecho de la Unión y se señala a este último como motor de transformación constitucional y como un factor decisivo en cuanto a la evolución de la organización territorial del estado español.A distinctive feature of the State of Autonomies is the recognition of political autonomy of the Autonomous Communities and, inherent to it and at the same time a necessary instrument to make it possible, the financial autonomy. The Spanish constitutional system provides protection to that autonomy, both at the textual and case-law levels. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), however, has led a substantial transformation of the financial autonomy as a constitutional value, from the perspective of the spending power, of the Autonomous Communities. This article explores this transformation and identifies three stages —EMU precrisis, EMU in crisis and the current efforts of reforming the EMU and the allocation and management of the European funds for recovery— which have shaped the financial autonomy of the Autonomous Communities. The article analyzes the interaction between the Spanish constitutional system and the European Union Law and points out the latter as an engine of a constitutional transformation and as a decisive factor in the evolution of the State of Autonomies.

AbstractNineteenth-century republicans across the political spectrum agreed: the Spanish monarchy produced ‘miserable Indians’. Abolishing tribute and privatising communal lands, known as resguardos in New Granada (roughly today's Panama and Colombia), would transform that wretched class into equal citizens. Drawing on late eighteenth-century privatisation efforts by the Spanish Crown, early republican leaders in Gran Colombia inaugurated an era seeking equal access to wealth from communal land for all indigenous community members. After Gran Colombia (the first Colombian Republic, 1819–30) dissolved into New Granada, Ecuador and Venezuela in 1830, New Granada's experiments with indigenous resguardo policies went further. By then, legislative efforts considered the needs of all resguardo members, including unmarried mothers and their illegitimate children. Complex laws, diverse ecological terrain and nuanced social realities required well-trained surveyors to ensure each eligible indigenous family received a fair share of land. Whereas indigenous communities in Pasto, Santa Marta and the Cauca river valley resorted to armed insurrection against liberal policies through the War of the Supremes (1839–42), those in the highlands near Bogotá did not. Instead, these republican indígenas – with their greater access to the levers of power housed in the national capital – chose to engage in the reforms of a decentralising state. This article reveals how contentious experiments seeking republican equality within indigenous resguardos as a path towards abolishing the institution were consistently stymied by efforts to ensure that indigenous community governance and communal landholding remained intact.

Resumen: Pese a que la Constitución española no contiene previsión alguna respecto a lo que coloquialmente conocemos ya como la limitación de mandatos, y a que tampoco hasta hoy ha considerado oportuno el legislador introducir en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico estatal este tipo de restricciones, lo cierto es que de un tiempo a esta parte la cuestión ha ido ganando gradualmente relevancia en el debate político, habiendo sido regulada ya en varias comunidades autónomas, siendo objeto de debate en otras, y figurando como parte del acuerdo político de investidura sobre el que se sustenta el actual Gobierno de la nación. En este trabajo empezaremos pasando revista al estado de la cuestión en España, así como a los numerosos cambios constitucionales que a lo largo de las dos últimas décadas se han verificado a este respecto en los países latinoamericanos, marco tradicional de esta práctica; para acto seguido debatir en torno a la conveniencia y a la constitucionalidad de la introducción en España de la limitación de mandatos, en su doble dimensión: respecto de los miembros del legislativo, y respecto del responsable máximo del poder ejecutivo. En esta línea analizaremos con especial detalle la idoneidad del instituto para erradicar la corrupción y asegurar la renovación de las elites políticas, la adecuación del mismo a los perfiles netamente parlamentarios de nuestro sistema, y su compatibilidad con los derechos consagrados en nuestra Carta Magna.Summary:1. Some considerations on the topicality of the debate in Spain. 2. The changing reception of the limitation of mandates in comparative constitutionalism. 3. Would be useful introduce the limitation of mandates in Spain? 4. Would be constitutional introduce the limitation of mandates in Spain? 5. Conclusions.AbstractDespite the fact that the Spanish Constitution does not contain any provisions regarding what we colloquially know as term limits, nor has Parliament deemed it appropriate to introduce such restrictions in our legal system, the fact is that for some years now the issue has being gaining relevance in the Spanish political debate, having already been regulated in several autonomous communities, being discussed in others, and appearing as part of the political agreement on which the current Government of the nation is based. In this paper we will begin by reviewing the state of the question in Spain, as well as the numerous constitutional amendments introduced in this respect in several Latin American countries —the traditional framework of this practice— during the last two decades; only to follow with the discussion of the convenience and the constitutionality of the introduction of term limits in Spain, in its twofold dimension: in relation to the members of the legislature and to the head of theexecutive branch. More specifically, we will pay close look to the suitability of the institute to eradicate corruption and ensure the renewal of political elites, to its adequacy to the declared parliamentary nature of our system, and to its compatibility with the rights enshrined in our Basic Law.

This study argues that western societies have to learn from the cosmological vision of first peoples. In the Brazilian context, despite the genocide of these peoples, there still remains a rich variety of cultures, keeping their traditions and lifestyles based on the concept of buen vivir, in Spanish, or Tekó Porã as the Guarani people say. From a decolonial intercultural approach, we can learn a sustainable way of life from indigenous peoples, and create relevant policies and educational frameworks. Principles of buen vivir such as cooperation and reciprocity are incorporated by Paulo Freire in his dialogic pedagogy. Freire has incorporated these principles due to his engagement with social and communitarian movements. For this reason, his pedagogical proposal is not limited to school contexts only; it is rather linked to community and social praxis. This political transformation of educational praxis involves changes in the modern-colonial matrix of power and knowledge. Deconstructing racism and the myth of universality is necessary for recognizing epistemic rationalities developed by indigenous communities, in order for us to establish with them critical dialogue and mutually enriching interaction. In this sense, the newly introduced term neologism ‘conversity’ indicates intercultural dialogue resulting from the recognition of indigenous peoples and social movements as producers of legitimate knowledge and autonomous organisation.

Resumen:En el actual contexto de profunda crisis del modelo territorial diseñado por la Constitución Española de 1978, son muchos los autores que han abogado por una reforma del Estado de las Autonomías en clave federal. Bien para transformarlo plenamente en un Estado federal, bien para corregir en un sentido más federal algunos de sus instrumentos disfuncionales. Uno de ellos es, sin duda, la colaboración entre Comunidades Autónomas y, en particular, los convenios de cooperación interautonómicos.La doctrina ha venido manifestando que el muy escaso número de convenios celebrados entre Comunidades Autónomas trae causa de la rigidez de su régimen jurídico, recogido en el artículo 145 CE y en los correspondientes Estatutos de Autonomía. En consecuencia, se ha venido proponiendo, de manera mayoritaria y reiterada, la reforma del citado artículo 145 CE en la dirección de eliminar el control que las Cortes Generales ejercen sobre la celebración de estospactos interautonómicos, en el entendido de que, además, así se le daría a este precepto constitucional una configuración más cercana a la que tendría en un verdadero Estado federal. En este trabajo se intenta justificar, sin embargo, que el régimen jurídico del artículo 145 CE no es la causa del deficiente funcionamiento de la colaboración horizontal en nuestro sistema, que el alcance de la potestad de control de las Cortes sobre estos convenios es muy distinto al descrito por la doctrina y que, además, la formulación actual del artículo 145 CE es plenamente compatible con la reconsideración en clave federal del resto del modelo territorial. Por todo ello, se defiende finalmente la improcedencia de lareforma constitucional propuesta.SummaryI. The failure of our model of territorial power distribution and the discussion on its alternatives. II. The federal «solution»: its political and technical legal dimension. 2.1. The federalism as an exit to the crisis of the model. 2.2. The technical aspects of an eventual federal or federalizing reform. III. Federal amendment of Article 145 of Spanish Constitution: the scholar diagnosis to the problem and the proposals of review. IV. Diagnostic errors and unsuitability of the proposed reform. 4.1. The «rigidity» of Article 145 of Spanish Constitution neither is a cause nor a concurring cause. 4.2. The federal nature of this constitutional provision. 4.3. The real extent of Article 145 of Spanish Constitution and the authorizing control of the Cortes Generales. 4.4. The intervention of the parliament of the State as an act reviewable by the Constitutional Court. V. Concluding remarks. VI. References. Abstract:In the current context of serious crisis of the territorial pattern envisaged by the 1978 Spanish Constitution, many authors have advocated for a reform of the State of the Autonomies in federal terms, either for transforming it fully into a Federal State, or for correcting some of its most dysfunctional instruments towards a more federal orientation. One of them is certainly the cooperation between Autonomous Communities and, in particular, agreements on inter-autonomic cooperation. The scholars have pointed out that the cause of the low number of agreements between Autonomous Communities is the rigidity of theirlegal regime, contained in Article 145 of the Spanish Constitution and the corresponding Statutes of Autonomy. Consequently, it has been repeatedly and mostly proposed to amend the mentioned Article 145 in the sense of removing the control of the Cortes Generales over the establishment of these autonomic agreements, on the understanding that, moreover, this constitutional provision would receive a configuration closer to a real federal state. Notwithstanding, this paper attempts to justify that the legal regime of Article 145 of the Spanish Constitution is not the cause of the insufficient functioning of the horizontal cooperation in our system; that the scope of the powers of control of the Cortes on these agreements is very different to the described one by the authors; and, moreover, that the current wording of Article 145 is fully compatible with the review in federal terms of the rest of the territorial pattern. Thus, it is finally defended the unsuitability of the proposed constitutional reform.

In Letters from England, written ostensibly from Don Manuel Espriella to his family at home in Spain, Southey declares he will also incorporate ‘what I think respecting this country and these times’ (‘Letter to Charles Watkin Williams Wynn’). One of the aspects of society that concerned Southey was the state of the labouring classes and the detrimental effect of industrialisation on rural life. His Spanish tourist, who is ‘bigoted to his religion, and willing to discover such faults and such symptoms of declining power here as may soothe or gratify [his] natural inferiority’, makes a comparative study of the treatment of the poor in England and Spain (‘Letter to Charles Watkin Williams Wynn’). Espriella comments negatively on the growth of manufacturing industries, the effects of the enclosure acts, and the migration of rural communities to the cities. He suggests that the English nation has lost its once stable social order, when landowners and religious institutions felt a moral obligation for the welfare of the peasantry. And, despite Southey's antipathy towards the Catholic faith after his visits to Spain (in 1795–6 and 1800–1), he states Espriella's conviction that shared religious belief is a cohesive force that binds hierarchical society together. With the help of his Spanish alter-ego, Southey invokes an idealised, English feudal past to oppose contemporary legislative solutions to rural poverty, such as workhouses and poor laws. Espriella's reverence for ancient historical sites, his criticism of commercialism, and his concern that new religious sects will imperil the religious and social order, would seem to belie his nationality and his youth. However, they complement Southey's argument that the treatment of the rural poor is one more symptom of how far England has travelled from its Arcadian past. In this article, the ‘double vision’ of Letters from England is examined to demonstrate how Southey interweaves the observations of his European commentator into the British social politics that he seeks to present.

El urbanismo no es una competencia compartida entre el Estado y las Comunidades Autónomas al modo bases-desarrollo. A las Comunidades Autónomas les corresponde el modelo de ciudad y de territorio, de creación de ciudad y de adquisición de facultades urbanísticas. Al Estado la determinación de un marco común a través de elementos puntuales. Tres son las competencias estatales más importantes mediante las cuales puede el Estado incidir sobre el urbanismo: la propiedad urbana, tanto en su vertiente jurídicopública de delimitación de su contenido y su protección frente al poder público, cuanto en su dimensión civil o de relaciones entre particulares; la expropiación forzosa y los respectivos criterios de valoración; así como la responsabilidad administrativa. El marco legislativo del Estado se debe integrar por piezas generales y abstractas, pero no pueden imponer, ni pensar en un único modelo de urbanismo posible. Hirigintza ez da Estatuaren eta autonomia-erkidegoen artean oinarriak-garapena moduan partekatutako eskumena. Autonomia-erkidegoei, hiriko eta lurraldeko eredua dagokie, hiri-sorrerakoa, eta hirigintza arloko gaitasunen eskurapenekoa. Estatuari, berriz, esparru erkide bat finkatzea, osagai zehatz batzuen bidez. Estatuak, esan bezala, hirigintzan eragin dezake hainbat eskumenen bitartez; hiru dira eskumen estatal nagusiak: hiri-jabetza, dela alderdi juridiko-publikoan (jabetza horren edukia eta babesa zedarritzea, aginte publikoaren aurrean), dela izari publikoan edo partikularren arteko harremanetan; nahitaezko desjabetzea eta desjabetze bakoitzaren balioespeneko irizpideak, bai eta administrazioaren erantzukizuna ere. Estatuaren legegintza-esparrua pieza orokor eta abstraktuek osatu behar dute, baina ez dezake ezarri edo pentsatu hirigintzako eredu posible bakar batean. City planning is not a power shared between State and Autonomous Communities according to a basic legislation-implementation scheme. Autonomous Communities job is to establish the model of city and land, the configuration of cities and acquisition of planning faculties. The State¿s job is to determine a common frame through detailed elements. The most important State powers by means of whom it can affect city planning are three: urban property, either in its public-legal side definition of its content and protection vis-à-vis public authorities, either in its civil side or in relationships between particulars; expropriation and the respective criteria of valuation; and also administrative liability. The State legislative frame is to be integrated by general and abstract parts but they cannot impose or think about a unique possible model of city planning.

The primary objective of the present study is to describe the reality of single-parent families in Spain and to identify their recognition and protection in legislation. To this effect, firstly, a review of the scholarly literature and legislative documents has been carried out, which has delineated the conceptualization, has identified the access paths, has determined the number of single-parent families among Spanish households, and has made visible the characteristics, needs, and difficulties of single-parent families in Spain. Secondly, a regulatory review was performed of a state and autonomous community nature with the purpose of confirming the identification of single-parent families in legislation, recognition of their needs, and government support in light of their difficulties in varying regulations. The results reveal the lack of specific legislation at the state level pertaining to single-parenthood in Spain, an unequal recognition on the part of the different Autonomous Communities, and distinct approaches in each of them. It is proposed that it is essential to enact a state law or a frame of reference about single-parent families that grants them equal rights in any part of the country, and with regard to other families, that especially protects minors. El presente estudio tiene como objetivo principal caracterizar la realidad de las familias monoparentales en España e identificar su reconocimiento y protección en la legislación. Para ello, en primer lugar, se ha realizado una revisión bibliográfica y documental que ha delimitado la conceptualización, identificado las rutas de acceso, el número de familias monoparentales entre los hogares españoles, y visibilizando las características, necesidades y dificultades de las familias monoparentales en España. En segundo lugar, se ha llevado a cabo una revisión normativa, de carácter estatal y autonómico, cuya finalidad ha sido constatar la identificación de las familias monoparentales en la legislación, el reconocimiento de sus necesidades y el apoyo gubernamental ante sus dificultades. Los resultados muestran la inexistencia de legislación específica de carácter estatal sobre la monoparentalidad en España, un desigual reconocimiento por parte de las distintas Comunidades Autónomas, y un abordaje diferenciado en cada una de ellas. Se postula como fundamental la promulgación de una ley estatal o un marco referencial sobre familias monoparentales que les otorgue entre sí iguales derechos, en cualquier parte del territorio, y respecto del resto de familias, protegiendo especialmente a los menores de edad.

La reciente modificación de la regulación del Tribunal Constitucional (TC) hecha por la Ley Orgánica 15/2015 pretende implementar en esta jurisdicción mecanismos para asegurar la efectividad de sus sentencias. No obstante, los motivos expuestos en su defensa, el perentorio procedimiento utilizado para vehicularla, junto al hecho de que los nuevos instrumentos previstos se dirigen, singularmente, a controlar las medidas adoptadas por las Comunidades Autónomas, remiten a la voluntad deliberada de afrontar con las nuevas herramientas jurídico-constitucionales el proceso secesionista abierto en Catalunya. Se trata de una modificación legislativa ad casum que, por este camino, no sólo refuerza la vertiente judicialista del Tribunal, ajena al orden constitucional español, sino que incorpora instrumentos de orden procesal que facultan al TC, y subsidiariamente al gobierno del Estado, para alcanzar efectos análogos a los de las sanciones del orden penal o de los derivados de la ejecución forzosa del artículo 155 CE. Duela gutxi, 15/2015 Lege Organikoaren bidez Konstituzio Auzitegiaren araudia aldatu da, jurisdikzio horretan epaien eraginkortasuna ziurtatuko duten mekanismoak inplementatzeko. Hala ere, aldaketa hori defendatzeko azaldutako arrazoiak, aldaketa bideratzeko hain larritasun handiz erabilitako prozedura, eta horrez gain, aurreikusitako tresna berrien helburua bereziki Autonomia Erkidegoek hartutako neurriak kontrolatzea izatea, epaitegi eta konstituzio tresna berri batzuen bidez Katalunian irekitako prozesu sezesionistari aurre egiteko borondatea gogora ekartzen diguten osagaiak dira. Ad casum egindako legegintza-aldaketa da. Bada, aldaketa horren bidetik, Auzitegiaren alderdi judizialista indartzen da, Espainiako ordena konstituzionalarekin zerikusirik ez duen alderdia; baina horrez gain, prozedura arloko tresna batzuk txertatzen ditu, Konstituzio Auzitegiari eta, subsidiarioki, Estatuko gobernuari gaitasunak ematen dizkiotenak ordena penaleko zehapenen edo Espainiako Konstituzioaren 155. artikuluaren nahitaezko betearazpenaren antzeko ondorioak lortzeko. The recent amendment to the regulation of the Constitutional Court (TC) made by the Organic Law 15/2015 addressed in this jurisdiction implement mechanisms to ensure the effectiveness of their sentences. However, the reasons given in its defense, the procedure peremptory used to convey it and the fact that the new instruments provided uniquely addressed control measures adopted by the Autonomous Communities refer to deliberate with new face legal and constitutional tools secessionist process open to Catalonia. It is a legislative amendment ad casum that this path not only strengthens slope judicialist Court, strange Spanish constitutional order, it incorporates procedural tools that enable the TC and the Government of subsidiary State to achieve effects similar to those of criminal sanctions, or arising from the enforcement of article 155 of the Spanish Constitution.

LABURPENA: Espainiako Konstituzio Auzitegiak, duela gutxi eman dituen ebazpenetan, berrikusi egin du Estatuaren gastu ahalmenari eta diru-laguntzen arloko eskumen-banaketari buruz zeukan doktrina tradizionala, Konstituzio Auzitegiaren otsailaren 6ko 13/1992 Epaian kodetuta zegoena. Auzitegiak ekainaren 4an eta 6an emandako 130 eta 135/2013 epaiek berretsi egin dute 2003ko Diru-laguntzen Lege Orokorraren konstituzionaltasuna, eta modu zabalagoan interpretatu dituzte Estatuak arlo finantzarioan, ekonomikoan eta herri-administrazioen prozeduran zein araubide juridikoan dituen ahalmenak. Horrenbestez, aldaketa larriak eragin ditu autonomia-erkidegoen eskumen banaketaren eta ahalmenen sisteman. RESUMEN: Recientes pronunciamientos del TC español revisan su doctrina tradicional sobre el poder de gasto estatal y la distribución de competencias en materia de subvenciones codificada en la STC 13/1992, de 6 de febrero. Las recientes SsTC 130 y 135/2013, de 4 y 6 de junio respectivamente, además de sancionar la constitucionalidad de la Ley General de Subvenciones (LGS) de 2003, reinterpretan en clave expansiva títulos estatales en materia financiera, económica y de procedimiento y régimen jurídico de las administraciones públicas alterando gravemente el sistema de distribución de competencias y la posición de las Comunidades Autónomas. ABSTRACT: Recent judgments by the Spanish Constitutional Court go through its traditional standpoint over the State power of expenditure and the allocation of powers regarding the field of subsidies as established by the Constitutional Court judgment 13/1992 from February 6th. The recent rulings of the Constitutional Court 130 and 135/2013 from June 4th and 6th respectively, as well as approving the constitutionality of the General Act for Subsidies (from 2003), reinterpret in a more expansive way the State powers in finance and economic matters and in the procedure and legal regime of the public administrations by changing critically the system of allocation of powers and the position of the Autonomous Communities.

El debate sobre la utilización de los símbolos religiosos en el ceremonial público español no es nuevo. Desde que la Constitución de 1978 acuñara el Estado aconfesional, se renueva periódicamente la controversia sobre la presencia de los símbolos religiosos en los actos oficiales, principalmente en la toma de posesión de cargos públicos, tanto en el ámbito del Estado, como en el de las comunidades autónomas o las administraciones locales, sin que exista, hasta el momento, una directriz unívoca o un criterio único a seguir.Defensores y detractores argumentan, cada cual con sus razones, tanto en los medios de comunicación como en las cámaras legislativas, pretendiendo unos legislar en contra del uso de los símbolos religiosos y otros en favor de su permanencia.El tema, que no es meramente formal, resulta complejo, ya que pone en juego sentimientos religiosos, intereses políticos y tradiciones históricas y culturales. Todo ello en un contexto sociopolítico convulso que no se presta precisamente a la reflexión pausada y ponderada.Con la intención de plantear el debate desde el análisis de la situación en que se encuentra, lo abordaremos desde diferentes perspectivas: el punto de vista conceptual, que nos acercará al verdadero papel que juegan los símbolos en el ceremonial público; el punto de vista legal, que nos situará en el marco normativo de aplicación, y el punto de vista comparativo, que nos permitirá relativizar al comparar el caso español con el de otros países de nuestro entorno geopolítico.Nos ceñiremos al caso de las tomas de posesión de cargos públicos, que es suficientemente amplio y representativo de la situación actual.________________________The debate about the use of religious symbols in the Spanish public ceremonial is not new. Since the Constitution of 1978, the non-denominational state has coined, the controversy over the presence of religious symbols in official acts, especially in the taking of public office, both at the State level and in the autonomous communities or local administrations, without a single guideline or a single criterion to follow.Defenders and detractors argue, each with their reasons, both in the media and in the legislative chambers, pretending to legislate against the use of religious symbols and others in favor of their permanence.The issue, which is not merely formal, is complex, since it involves religious feelings, political interests and historical and cultural traditions. All this in a convoluted sociopolitical context that does not lend itself to deliberate and thoughtful reflection.With the intention of raising the debate from the analysis of the situation in which it is, we will approach it from different perspectives: the conceptual point of view, which will bring us closer to the true role of symbols in public ceremonial; The legal point of view, which will place us in the normative framework of application, and the comparative point of view, which will allow us to relativize when comparing the Spanish case with that of other countries in our geopolitical environment.We will stick to the case of the taking of public office, which is sufficiently broad and representative of the current situation.

Laburpena: Gizarte honetan, biztanleria gero eta zaharragoa da, eta bizi-itxaropena gora egiten ari da; beraz, botere publikoek esku hartu behar dute, eta kolektibo zaurgarrienei laguntzeko gizarte-zerbitzu hurbilen eskaintza egokia eskaini. Besteak beste, etxez etxeko laguntza-zerbitzua da eskari handienetakoa duten zerbitzuetako bat, berekin datozen ezaugarriak erakargarriak direlako (zerbitzu publikoa da, etxekoa, prebentziozkoa, teknikoa eta errehabilitatzailea, eta herritarrengandik hurbil dago). Alabaina, autonomia-erkidegoaren beraren eskumenak garatzeko esparru legitimoan, lurralde batzuetatik besteetara aldeak daude laguntza-eremuan zerbitzua emateko orduan. Hala, desberdintasunak daude intentsitatean nahiz zerbitzuetan beraietan, sartzeko bidea Mendekotasunari buruzko Legetik kanpo dagoenean eta, autonomia-erkidegoen eskumen esklusibo gisa, sarbide hori toki-erakundeen mende geratzen denean. Resumen: En una sociedad marcada por el envejecimiento poblacional y el incremento de la esperanza de vida es precisa la mayor intervención de los poderes públicos mediante una adecuada oferta de servicios sociales de proximidad que presten apoyo a los colectivos más vulnerables. Entre varios, el servicio de ayuda a domicilio se erige como uno de los más demandados por el atractivo de las propias características que le acompañan —servicio público, de carácter domiciliario, preventivo, técnico y rehabilitador, y cercano al ciudadano—. Sin embargo, en el marco legítimo del desarrollo competencial propio autonómico subyacen diferencias territoriales en la prestación de un servicio que, a su vez, tiene un doble anclaje en el ámbito asistencial, marcando diferencias de intensidad y servicios cuando su vía de acceso queda se encuentra al margen de la Ley de Dependencia y como competencia exclusiva de las Comunidades Autónomas queda en última instancia a merced de las Entidades Locales. Abstract: In a society characterized by population ageing and the increase in life expectancy, there is a need for greater intervention by the public institutions, providing local social services in order to support the more vulnerable. Among others, homecare is recognized as one of those in greatest demand due to its attractive characteristics, standing out for its public nature, as well as for being a home-based, preventive and technical service close to the citizen. However, in the Spanish autonomous framework and in the legitimate exercising of exclusive powers, there are underlying territorial differences in the provision of a service with its own duality relative to the healthcare field. Furthermore, there are profound differences in intensity and services when its access route is not contemplated by the Dependency Law, and, as an exclusive power reserved to the autonomous communities, it remains, as a last resort, at the mercy of local entities.

The article explores the main aspects of legal consolidation of constitutional legal responsibility on Ukrainian lands in 1917-1920. In this case, the main attention is paid to the legislation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) on this issue. On the author’s conviction, the responsibility of state authorities and local selfgovernment of the UPR was characterized by the following features: 1) the consolidation at the level of the Constitution of the general and specific features of the constitutional and legal responsibility of the parliament of the UPR (NationalAssembly ofthe UPR). In particular, the common features ofthe constitutional legal responsibility of the Parliament of the UPR are their clear correspondence with the main functions: law-making (responsibility for the exercise of the functions of the legislative power) and personnel (constitutional and legal responsibility for the formation of executive and judicial authorities). Specific features of constitutional legal responsibility were expressed in the functions of exclusive constitutional rulemaking (amending the Constitution of the UPR by at least 3/5 of the votes of the present deputies; the authority to approve political and economic treaties concluded in the name of the UPR and to be responsible for their content and execution); economic and fiscal functions (the impossibility of collecting taxes without a decision of the National Assembly; the impossibility of establishing loans and pledging state property without a resolution of the National Assembly) emergency functions (responsibility for the National Assembly to form troops and law enforcement agencies of the state, for declaring war and peace) 1) legal consolidation in relation to the government (Council of People’s Ministers) of sole retrospective (negative) constitutional legal responsibility, which provides for constitutional legal sanctions against the ministers themselves, as well as collective retrospective (negative) constitutional legal responsibility, which provides for constitutional legal sanctions against the entire government; 2) Determination of constitutional legal responsibility (both positive and negative) for the administration of justice in the state by the General Court of the UPR; 3) approval of the constitutional and legal responsibility of local authorities for the control function of the ministers of the UPR in relation to the elected Councils and Administrations of communities, volosts and lands, as well as through the jurisdictional function of the justice authorities; 4) Conditionality of the constitutional and legal responsibility of the autonomous rights of national Unions with the exclusive competence of the National Unions and bodies representing them with functions of a fiscal and economic nature. So, the basic principles of competence and constitutional legal responsibility of the organs of state power and local self-government of the UPR according to the Constitution of the UPR were closely related to the principle of separation of powers and other leading principles, corresponding models of a democratic, social and legal state. It should also be noted that the normative consolidation of the foundations of constitutional legal responsibility (as well as other institutions of constitutional law of Ukraine) at the present stage of development of Ukrainian constitutionalism should be based not only on the current needs of state and law-making, but also certain positive historical and legal traditions, earlier existed on Ukrainian lands.

En este artículo se analiza la devolution escocesa y la repercusión potencial en España del referéndum consultivo sobre la independencia de Escocia que tendrá lugar en 2014. Este referéndum podría ser percibido como uno de los muchos efectos del reciente resurgimiento nacionalista y su resultado es todavía objeto de especulaciones. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de asistir a la disolución de una de las más antiguas democracias occidentales como resultado de un referéndum es motivo de gran preocupación para los constitucionalistas en España. Se argumentará que el riesgo de un referéndum similar en España es bajo. Los procesos que han impulsado el referéndum sobre la independencia de Escocia son el resultado de un discurso pragmático que se produjo dentro de una historia constitucional específicamente británica. Por ejemplo, tanto las tradiciones constitucionales escocesa como británica consideran a sus parlamentos respectivos como los depositarios del poder constitucional soberano. El artículo se divide en tres partes, precedidas por una introducción y seguidas de una conclusión. La primera parte contiene una discusión metodológica preliminar que explica el elemento distintivo del Sistema de Derecho Público del Reino Unido. La segunda explica las características distintivas de la devolution escocesa. En particular, se aclaran los efectos de tener dos parlamentos (el escocés y el del Reino Unido) que se aferran a dos conceptos diferentes de soberanía legislativa. En la tercera sección se compara el proceso constitucional a seguir para la celebración del referéndum escocés y un pretendido referéndum sobre la secesión de una de las Comunidades Autónomas españolas.This article discusses the Scottish Devolution and the potential repercussion of the 2014 consultative referendum over Scottish independence in Spain. The 2014 referendum might be perceived as one of the many effects of the recent nationalist revival and its result is still a matter of speculations. However, the possibility of seeing the dissolution of one of the oldest western democracies as the result of a referendum is of great concern for constitutional lawyers in Spain. I would argue that a risk of an analogous referendum in Spain is low. The processes that were the proxy for the Scottish referendum over independence are the result of a pragmatic discourse that took place within a distinctively British constitutional history. For instance, both the Scottish and UK constitutional traditions consider their respective parliament the repository of sovereign constitutional power. The article is divided in three parts, preceded by an introduction and followed by a conclusion. The first part is a preliminary methodological discussion that explains the distinctive element of the UK Public Law System. The second explains the distinctive features of the Scottish Devolution. In particular, I will elucidate the effects of having two parliaments (the Scottish and the UK ) that hold on to two different concepts of legislative sovereignty. The third section compares the constitutional process required for the Scottish referendum and a putative referendum over a region secession in Spanish autonomous regions.

De Gaulles “Communaute”. A Bridge from Colonialism to Paternalism in Afrika. The importance of the French-African Communauté is more than just historical. Indeed, the present French-African relationship is not completely understandable without a knowledge of the Community, which was created by the constitution of the fifth French Republic (1958). President de Gaulle, who was its inspirator, realised that in the changing world the relationship between France and its colonial territories had to be adapted. The French-African Community was a federal structure in which the French-speaking territories south of the Sahara became autonomous republics. Yet their autonomy was substantially restricted: foreign affairs, defense, the economic and financial policy, justice, higher education, the policy concerning raw materials (e.g. uranium and oil), and the organisation of international transport and telecommunication were reserved for the federal institutions. Although four institutions were created within the Community (the Presidency, the Executive Board, the Senate and the Court of Arbitration), only the Presidency had real power: the exclusive legislative and executive competence in all Community matters. The function of Community President was reserved for the French President. Therefore it can undoubtedly be said that the French-African Community was not a genuine federal structure, but merely a constitutional arrangement which ensured France the exclusive control over its former African colonies. The African political leaders were also aware of this and claimed the abolition of the French-African Community. Using the possibility for change, provided by the 78th article of the constitution, they demanded independence by the transfer of all reserved competences (1960). In order to avoid any rupture, France accepted on the condition that bilateral cooperation agreements would be signed simultaneously. These agreements, which were revised halfway the seventies and which are still in force today, provide France with an unique position in Africa. No former metropole has a comparable influence in Africa. Besides, the French-African Conference, which is organised anually since 1973, gives France an excellent forum to influence and control the policy of African states. At this Conference almost every former French colonie in Africa is present, some Belgian, British, Spanish and Portuguese territories participate as well. Moreover, the cooperation agreements explicitly allow France to maintain large troups in Africa and to give support by military intervention whenever it is necessary. France's strict control over one of the most important attributes of state sovereignity, namely defense, increases largely the already acuted dependency on Paris. Yet, the economic position of most of the former French colonies and territories in Africa is the best illustration of their present dependence. Still today more than 40% of their trade is realised with the former metropole (export: raw materials; import: finished goods). Moreover, most of them are members of the so-called “zone franc”, a monetary zone which is completely controlled by the French authorities. The good relationship between France and Africa remained as a result of which extensive bilateral cooperation agreements could be signed within the framework of the French-African Community. This continuity has always been one of the main characteristics of the French policy in Africa.

Resumen:En este artículo se abordan dos elementos que han estado presentes en la conformación de nuestra identidad nacional: la bandera y la capitalidad.En primer lugar, se analiza el papel de los símbolos en la relación entre socialización e individualidad, entre lo racional y lo emocional, lo mítico o lo intuitivo, algo esencial en los Estados democráticos para alejarnos de los totalitarismos, teniendo en cuenta la capacidad de los nacionalismos, los fascismos y los populismos de manipular en ese espacio. En segundo lugar se estudia la bandera como símbolo del Estado tanto desde una perspectiva de derecho comparado y de historia constitucional como teniendo en cuenta su actual regulación constitucional. Igualmente se analiza la exhibición de la bandera como elemento de integración voluntaria y consciente de los ciudadanos en la comunidad y como defensa de la unidad de España y de reivindicación de la CE y de las libertades de todos, también de los ciudadanos catalanes, ante el problema de libertad que ha supuesto la declaración unilateral de independencia, como ha ocurrido recientemente con la presencia masiva de la bandera española en los balcones. También se estudia la constitucionalización de las banderas autonómicas y el establecimiento de una obligación de utilización conjunta de éstas junto a la bandera de España, símbolo de una España constitucional y democrática, que reconoce un alto nivel de autogobierno a sus nacionalidades y regiones. Asimismo se abordan los conflictos por el uso de las banderas —la llamada guerra de las banderas— , analizándose las Sentencias más recientes, que ponen de manifestó la crisis en el sentido de pertenencia a España derivada de nuestra diversidad territorial. Así, se analiza el incumplimiento de la obligación de utilizar la bandera de España en edificios públicos y actos oficiales. También se aborda la bandera como bien jurídico merecedor deprotección penal y el cuestionamiento del delito de ultrajes a la bandera, un límite a la libertad de expresión querido por el legislador, lo que proscribe una conducta expresiva como la quema de la bandera. Igualmente se analiza la doctrina de la JEC sobre la prohibición de la exhibición de banderas esteladas en edificios públicos en aplicación del principio de neutralidad política de la Administración Pública, sin perjuicio de su uso legítimo por entidades privadas en virtud de la libertad de expresión, así como la prohibición de la utilización de la bandera de España como símbolo oficial de un partido político, que traslada a la sociedad la idea de que la bandera es patrimonio de una parte de la población. En tercer lugar, se analiza el concepto constitucional de capitalidad. La capitalidad no es en puridad un símbolo aunque tiene un importante componente simbólico. Atribuir a una ciudad la capitalidad significa convertirla en cabeza política de un territorio y concederle una posición central dentro del Estado. Igualmente la capitalidad hace referencia a un lugar fijo donde se ejerce la soberanía y, por tanto, sede de los órganos de poder del Estado. Este estudio aboga por una interpretación flexible que no vacíe de contenido constitucional la noción de capitalidad y que al mismo tiempo permita un margen de maniobra al legislador en el marco de un Estado fuertemente descentralizado. Así, los órganos de poder del Estado y los órganos constitucionales deben tener su sede en Madrid, si bien la existencia de alguna excepción no vulneraría el precepto constitucional. Finalmente el trabajo aborda cuáles son las materias objeto del régimen de capitalidad y las otras singularidades de Madrid.Summary:I. The symbols. II. The flag. 1. The flag as a symbol of the State and as an element of integration of citizens in the community and the constitutionalization of regional flags 2. The conflicts over the use of the flags: the flags war. a) The obligation to use the Spanish flag in public buildings and official acts and their non-compliance. b) The criminal protection of the flag and its questioning as a limit to freedom of expression. c) The prohibition of the display of partisan flags in public buildings and the partisan use of the Spanish flag. d) Conflicts over the use of the flags of the Autonomous Communities. III. The capital. 1. The constitutional concept of the capital: the seat of the general institutions of the State. 2. Competences regulated by the Capital Law. The singularity of Madrid.Abstract:This article deals with two elements that have been present in the shaping of our national identity: the flag and the capital. Firstly, it analyzes the role of symbols in the relationship between socialization and individuality, between the rational and the emotional, the myth or the intuitive, something essential in democratic states to steer ourselves away from totalitarianism, taking into account the capacity of the nationalisms, fascism and populisms to manipulate in that space. Secondly, it studies the flag as a symbol of the State, both from the point of view of Comparative Law and constitutional history, as well as considering its current constitutional regulation. Thus, the display of the flag is also analyzed as an element of voluntary and conscious integration of citizens in the community, and as a defense of Spain`s unity and the Constitution and the freedoms of allcitizens, including Catalan citizens, in response to the problem of freedom that the unilateral declaration of independence of Catalonia has implied, as we have seen recently with a massive presence of the Spanish flag on the balconies. The article also studies the constitutionalization of the regional flags and the establishment of an obligation of the joint use of these together with the flag of Spain, which is a symbol of a constitutional and democratic Spain, that recognizes a high level of self-government towards its nationalities and regions. Furthermore, it also studies the conflicts that arise from the use of flags —the so-called «war of the flags»— , analyzing the most recent cases, which highlights the crisis in the sense of belonging to Spain derived from our territorial diversity. In the same manner, it also examines the breach of the obligation to use the Spanish flag in public buildings and official acts. Moreover the flag is also analysed as a constitutional value worthy of criminal protection; this also study the crime for flag desecration as a limit on the freedom of speech, which outlaws the burning of the flag as expressive conduct. It also discusses the JEC doctrine on the prohibition of the display of the «estelladas» in public buildings as a result of the application of the principle of political neutrality of the Public Administration, even though they can be used legitimately under the freedom of expression by private entities. Furthermore, the article also examines the prohibition of the use of the flag of Spain as an official symbol of a political party, which consequently conveys to society the idea that the flag belongs to a part of the population rather than to the entire country. Thirdly, the study analyzes the constitutional concept of the capital. The capital is not strictly speaking a symbol, but it has an important symbolic meaning. To attribute to a city the capitality means to turn it into the political head of a territory and to grant it a central position within the State. Likewise, the capital status refers to a fixed place where sovereignty is exercised and, thus, is the seat of the general institutions of the State. This study pleads for a flexible interpretation that does not empty the constitutional content of the notion of capital and at the same time allows a margin of freedom to the legislator in the framework of a strongly decentralized State. Therefore, the organs of state power and constitutional bodies must have their headquarters in Madrid, although the existence of any exception would not violate the constitutional provision. Finally, the paper addresses which the competences regulated by the Capital Law are as well as other singularities of Madrid.

Abstract Background Waste disposal is an activity that pollutes the environment. The European Union has developed different legislative measures which are based on the circular economy (CE) to avoid this negative externality. The management of agricultural packaging (fertilizers and phytosanitary products) is carried out through Collective Deposit, Return, and Refund Systems (CDRRS). New regulations on waste tax the consumption of non-recyclable plastic in packaging, but also reward the use of plastic by-products from packaging. The administrations recommend using biodegradable plastic in the means of production, as well as establishing a traceability system (TS) to control the proper management of all the generated waste. The proposed measures can affect producer cost accounts. This work aimed to identify and evaluate the existing agricultural packaging management system in Spain. It also studied the influence of the price of a barrel of oil, crop surface, irrigation regime, and the type of subsectors on CDRRS, and quantified the impact of the latest fiscal measures and initiatives proposed by Spanish administrations. Results The generation of agricultural packaging is influenced by variables including the cultivated area, irrigation regime, and agricultural subsector. The price of a barrel of oil directly influences the current by-product utilization system. Using biodegradable plastic or implementing a TS can increase production costs by up to 9.80%. The current system of subsidies to producers can soften the economic impact caused by the additional cost of biodegradable plastic (4.03%), but no subsidies have been foreseen to encourage the use of environmentally friendly alternatives. Conclusions Findings indicate that public administrations should be guided by the specific characteristics of the different agricultural systems when defining regulations on agricultural waste management. The fixed rate in the current system of subsidies for using plastic by-products obtained from packaging should be substituted for a variable rate. Transferring powers to autonomous communities to define by-products may lead to heterogeneity in the Spanish territory. New measures derived from the recent environmental agreements to comply with the 2030 Agenda will increase production costs even after considering the current aid scheme. The subsidy coefficient should be increased to 80% of the purchase invoice.

Even though the Spanish Constitution establishes that Spain is structured into Autonomous Communities and that the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity govern the relationship between the different regions, very often Spanish media publish news about territorial inequality, conflicts, and independency velleity. The objective of this investigation, avoiding digging into the reasons for these claims, is to identify whether the region of residence influences the legitimacy of the Spanish state. The legitimacy of the state is the degree of citizen’s support to the institutions. This support ensures the law compliance, the proper functioning of the country and citizen commitment with the social system. State’s legitimacy is very much linked with the trust on politics and politicians. In the regions characterized by independency issues and conflicts, state’s legitimacy will be limited, and the perception of the state’s meaning and power will be more fragile and instable. The effective and appropriate management of the state and the relevancy of the central politics would be complex in these regions and, finally, regional inequality and fragmentation will increase. To achieve this research objective, we carried out an analysis of the state’s legitimacy of each Spanish region considering the data extracted from the European Social Survey. The results of this research provide valuable information useful for regional political decision making and dig into the reasons why regional conflicts are rooted in the state’s institutions.

In 1992 73rd Constitution Amendment Act was enacted which came into force in 1993 in whole Indian states to promote rural governance and rural development with the help of community participation and 11thschedule was incorporated in Indian Constitution which provides 29 subjects. This act provides autonomous power to enact welfare policy in favour of all community within their jurisdiction subjects. This act provides good governance through people participation and people are directly involved in the decision making the process of rural government with the help of most disadvantaged communities such as women and women are among the most disadvantaged community in India in terms of their education and political participation. Why governments are providing reservation for women in local body election? What is the role and responsibilities of women panchayat president to the strengthening good governance? Whether 73rd constitution amendment act provides full power to reserved categories like women? Whether Women Panchayat Women are acting independently without any barrios from others? The study assumes that Women Panchayat President in Tamil Nadu is performing better way to promote good governance at the local level. Secondary data are using this study. Secondary data collected from the various government documents and Local Body Election Result – 2019, Tamil Nadu State Election Commission, Chennai, Tamil Nadu. The main Objectives of the study are; To critically examine women political representation in village panchayat, To understand age group distribution of women political representation in village panchayat, To find out women and men difference point among elected representatives of village panchayat presidents in Tamil Nadu, and To find out the progress of women’s political participation in rural local government. The study found that the 73rd constitution amendment act has given power to the people particularly women with 33% of reservation. The 73rd Amendment is a milestone in empowering women which pushed to participate or contest in state legislative assembly or parliament election. This act makes them participate in decision making process in their house as well as public. Keywords: Political Representation: Body Election: State Election Commission: Panchayat Presidents: Tamil Nadu; India

The importance of the French-African Communauté is more than just historical. Indeed, the present French-African relationship is not completely understandable without a knowledge of the Community, which was created by the constitution of the fifth French Republic (1958). President de Gaulle, who was its inspirator, realised that in the changing world the relation- ship between France and its colonial territories had to be adapted. The French-African Community was a federal structure in which the French-speaking territories south of the Sahara became autonomous republics. Yet their autonomy was substantially restricted: foreign affairs, defense, the economic and financial policy, justice, higher education, the policy concerning raw materials (e.g. uranium and oil), and the organisation of international transport and telecommunication were reserved for the federal institutions. Although four institutions were created within the Community (the Presidency, the Executive Board, the Senate and the Court of Arbitration), only the Presidency had real power: the ex- clusive legislative and executive competence in all Community matters. The function of Community President was reserved for the French President. Therefore it can undoubtedly be said that the French-African Community was not a genuine federal structure, but merely a constitutional arrangement which ensured France the exclusive control over its former African colonies.The African political leaders were also aware of this and claimed the abolition of the. French-African Community. Using the possibility for change, provided by the 78th article of the constitution, they demanded independence by the transfer of all reserved competences (1960). In order to avoid any rupture, France accepted on the condition that bilateral cooperation agreements would be signed simultaneously. These agreements, which were revised halfway the seventies and which are still in force today, provide France with an unique position in Africa. No former métropole has a comparable influence in Africa. Besides, the French-African Conference, which is organised anually since 1973, gives France an excellent forum to influence and control the policy of African states. At this Conference almost every former French colonie in Africa is present, some Belgian, British, Spanish and Portuguese territories participate as well. Moreover, the cooperation agreements explicitly allow France to maintain large troups in Africa and to give support by military intervention whenever it is necessary. France's strict control over one of the most important attributes of state sovereignity, namely defense, increases largely the already acuted dependency on Paris. Yet, the economic position of most of the former French colonies and territories in Africa is the best illustration of their present dependence. Still today more than 40% of their trade is realised with the former métropole (export: raw materials; import: finished goods). Moreover, most of them are members of the so-called "zone franc", a monetary zone which is completely controlled by the French authorities. The good relationship between France and Africa remained as a result of which extensive bilateral cooperation agreements could be signed within the framework of the French-African Community. This continuity has always been one of the main characteristics of the French policy in Africa. KEYWORDS:-Decolonisation -Francophone Africa-the French-African Community - French policy in Africa - 'La Communauté'

Introduction How do we measure intimacy? What are its impacts on our social, political and personal lives? Can we claim a politics to our intimate lives that escapes the normative confines of archaic institutions, while making social justice claims for relationship recognition? Negotiating some of these disparate questions requires us to think more broadly in contemporary public debates on equality and relationship recognition. Specifically, by outlining the impacts of the popular "gay marriage" debate, this paper examines the impacts of queer theory in association with public policy and community lobbying for relationship equality. Much of the debate remains polarised: eliminating discrimination is counterposed to religious or reproductive narratives that suggest such recognition undermines the value of the "natural" heterosexual family. Introducing queer theory into advocacy that oscillates between rights and reproduction problematises indexing intimacy against normative ideas of monogamy and family. While the arguments circulated by academics, lawyers, politicians and activists have disparate political and ethical impacts, when taken together, they continue to define marriage as a public regulation of intimacy and citizenship. Citizenship, measured in democratic participation and choice, however, can only be realised through reflexive politics that value difference. Encouraging critical dialogue across disparate areas of the marriage equality debate will have a significant impact on how we make ethical claims for recognising intimacy. (Re)defining Marriage In legislative terms, marriage remains the most fundamental means through which the relationship between citizenship and intimacy is crystallised in Australia. For example, in 2004 the Federal Liberal Government in Australia passed a legislative amendment to the Marriage Act 1961 and expressly defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman. By issuing a public legislative amendment, the Government intended to privilege monogamous (in this case understood as heterosexual) intimacy by precluding same-sex or polygamous marriage. Such an exercise had rhetorical rather than legal significance, as common law principles had previously defined the scope of marriage in gender specific terms for decades (Graycar and Millbank 41). Marriage as an institution, however, is not a universal or a-historical discourse limited to legal or political constructs. Socialist feminist critiques of marriage in the 1950s conceptualised the legal and gender specific constructs in marriage as a patriarchal contract designed to regulate female bodies (Hannam 146). However, Angela McRobbie notes that within a post-feminist context, these historical realities of gendered subjugation, reproduction or domesticity have been "disarticulated" (26). Marriage has become a more democratic and self-reflexive expression of intimacy for women. David Shumway elaborates this idea and argues that this shift has emerged in a context of "social solidarity" within a consumer environment of social fragmentation (23). What this implies is that marriage now evokes a range of cultural choices, consumer practices and affective trends that are incommensurable to a singular legal or historical term of reference. Debating the Politics of Intimacy and Citizenship In order to reflect on this shifting relationship between choice, citizenship and marriage as a concept, it is necessary to highlight that marriage extends beyond private articulations of love. It is a ritualised performance of heterosexual individual (or coupled) citizenship as it entrenches economic and civil rights and responsibilities. The private becomes public. Current neo-liberal approaches to same-sex marriage focus on these symbolic and economic questions of how recognising intimacy is tied to equality. In a legal and political context, marriage is defined in s5 Marriage Act as "the union between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life." While the Act does not imbue marriage with religious or procreative significance, such a gender dichotomous definition prevents same-sex and gender diverse partners from entering into marriage. For Morris Kaplan, this is a problem because "full equality for lesbian and gay citizens requires access to the legal and social recognition of our intimate associations" (201). Advocates and activists define the quest for equal citizenship by engaging with current religious dogma that situates marriage within a field of reproduction, whereby same-sex marriage is seen to rupture the traditional rubric of monogamous kinship and the biological processes of "gender complementarity" (Australian Christian Lobby 1). Liberal equality arguments reject such conservative assertions on the basis that desire, sexuality and intimacy are innate features of human existence and hence always already implicated in public spheres (Kaplan 202). Thus, legal visibility or state recognition becomes crucial to sustaining practices of intimacy. Problematising the broader social impact of a civil rights approach through the perspective of queer theory, the private/public distinctions that delineate citizenship and intimacy become more difficult to negotiate. Equality and queer theory arguments on same-sex marriage are difficult to reconcile, primarily because they signify the different psychic and cultural investments in the monogamous couple. Butler asserts that idealisations of the couple in legal discourse relates to norms surrounding community, family and nationhood (Undoing 116). This structured circulation of sexual norms reifies the hetero-normative forms of relationships that ought to be recognised (and are desired) by the state. Butler also interrogates this logic of marriage, as a heterosexual norm, and suggests it has the capacity to confine rather than liberate subjects (Undoing 118-20). The author's argument relies upon Michel Foucault's notion of power and subjection, where the subject is not an autonomous individual (as conceived in neo liberal discourses) but a site of disciplined discursive production (Trouble 63). Butler positions the heterosexuality of marriage as a "cultural and symbolic foundation" that renders forms of kinship, monogamy, parenting and community intelligible (Undoing 118). In this sense, marriage can be a problematic articulation of state interests, particularly in terms of perpetuating domesticity, economic mobility and the heterosexual family. As former Australian Prime Minister John Howard opines: Marriage is … one of the bedrock institutions of our society … marriage, as we understand it in our society, is about children … providing for the survival of the species. (qtd. in Wade) Howard's politicisation of marriage suggests that it remains crucial to the preservation of the nuclear family. In doing so, the statement also exemplifies homophobic anxieties towards non-normative kinship relations "outside the family". The Prime Ministers' words characterise marriage as a framework which privileges hegemonic ideas of monogamy, biological reproduction and gender dichotomy. Butler responds to these homophobic terms by alluding to the discursive function of a "heterosexual matrix" which codes and produces dichotomous sexes, genders and (hetero)sexual desires (Trouble 36). By refusing to accept the binary neo-liberal discourse in which one is either for or against gay marriage, Butler asserts that by prioritising marriage, the individual accepts the discursive terms of recognition and legitimacy in subjectifying what counts as love (Undoing 115). What this author's argument implies is that by recuperating marital norms, the individual is not liberated, but rather participates in the discursive "trap" and succumbs to the terms of a heterosexual matrix (Trouble 56). In contradistinction to Howard's political rhetoric, engaging with Foucault's broader theoretical work on sexuality and friendship can influence how we frame the possibilities of intimacy beyond parochial narratives of conjugal relationships. Foucault emphasises that countercultural intimacies rely on desires that are relegated to the margins of mainstream (hetero)sexual culture. For example, the transformational aesthetics in practices such as sadomasochism or queer polyamorous relationships exist due to certain prohibitions in respect to sex (Foucault, History (1) 38, and "Sex" 169). Foucault notes how forms of resistance that transgress mainstream norms produce new experiences of pleasure. Being "queer" (though Foucault does not use this word) becomes identified with new modes of living, rather than a static identity (Essential 138). Extending Foucault, Butler argues that positioning queer intimacies within a field of state recognition risks normalising relationships in terms of heterosexual norms whilst foreclosing the possibilities of new modes of affection. Jasbir Puar argues that queer subjects continue to feature on the peripheries of moral and legal citizenship when their practices of intimacy fail to conform to the socio-political dyadic ideal of matrimony, fidelity and reproduction (22-28). Puar and Butler's reluctance to embrace marriage becomes clearer through an examination of the obiter dicta in the recent American jurisprudence where the proscription on same-sex marriage was overturned in California: To the extent proponents seek to encourage a norm that sexual activity occur within marriage to ensure that reproduction occur within stable households, Proposition 8 discourages that norm because it requires some sexual activity and child-bearing and child-rearing to occur outside marriage. (Perry vs Schwarzenegger 128) By connecting the discourse of matrimony and sex with citizenship, the court reifies the value of marriage as an institution of the family, which should be extended to same-sex couples. Therefore, by locating the family in reproductive heterosexual terms, the court forecloses other modes of recognition or rights for those who are in non-monogamous relationships or choose not to reproduce. The legal reasoning in the case evinces the ways in which intimate citizenship or legitimate kinship is understood in highly parochial terms. As Kane Race elaborates, the suturing of domesticity and nationhood, with the rhetoric that "reproduction occur within stable households", frames heterosexual nuclear bonds as the means to legitimate sexual relations (98). By privileging a familial kinship aesthetic to marriage, the state implicitly disregards recognising the value of intimacy in non-nuclear communities or families (Race 100). Australia, however, unlike most foreign nations, has a dual model of relationship recognition. De facto relationships are virtually indistinguishable from marriage in terms of the rights and entitlements couples are able to access. Very recently, the amendments made by the Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws - General Reform) Act 2008 (Cth) has ensured same-sex couples have been included under Federal definitions of de facto relationships, thereby granting same-sex couples the same material rights and entitlements as heterosexual married couples. While comprehensive de facto recognition operates uniquely in Australia, it is still necessary to question the impact of jurisprudence that considers only marriage provides the legitimate structure for raising children. As Laurent Berlant suggests, those who seek alternative "love plots" are denied the legal and cultural spaces to realise them ("Love" 479). Berlant's critique emphasises how current "progressive" legal approaches to same-sex relationships rely on a monogamous (heterosexual) trajectory of the "love plot" which marginalises those who are in divorced, single, polyamorous or multi-parent situations. For example, in the National Year of Action, a series of marriage equality rallies held across Australia over 2010, non-conjugal forms of intimacy were inadvertently sidelined in order to make a claim for relationship recognition. In a letter to the Sydney Star Observer, a reader laments: As a gay man, I cannot understand why gay people would want to engage in a heterosexual ritual called marriage … Why do gay couples want to buy into this ridiculous notion is beyond belief. The laws need to be changed so that gays are treated equal under the law, but this is not to be confused with marriage as these are two separate issues... (Michael 2) Marriage marks a privileged position of citizenship and consumption, to which all other gay and lesbian rights claims are tangential. Moreover, as this letter to the Sydney Star Observer implies, by claiming sexual citizenship through the rubric of marriage, discussions about other campaigns for legislative equality are effectively foreclosed. Melissa Gregg expands on such a problematic, noting that the legal responses to equality reiterate a normative relationship between sexuality and power, where only couples that subscribe to dyadic, marriage-like relationships are offered entitlements by the state (4). Correspondingly, much of the public activism around marriage equality in Australia seeks to achieve its impact for equality (reforming the Marriage Act) by positioning intimacy in terms of state legitimacy. Butler and Warner argue that when speaking of legitimacy a relation to what is legitimate is implied. Lisa Bower corroborates this, asserting "legal discourse creates norms which universalise particular modes of living…while suppressing other practices and identities" (267). What Butler's and Bower's arguments reveal is that legitimacy is obtained through the extension of marriage to homosexual couples. For example, Andrew Barr, the current Labor Party Education Minister in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), noted that "saying no to civil unions is to say that some relationships are more legitimate than others" (quoted in "Legal Ceremonies"). Ironically, such a statement privileges civil unions by rendering them as the normative basis on which to grant legal recognition. Elizabeth Povinelli argues the performance of dyadic intimacy becomes the means to assert legal and social sovereignty (112). Therefore, as Jenni Millbank warns, marriage, or even distinctive forms of civil unions, if taken alone, can entrench inequalities for those who choose not to participate in these forms of recognition (8). Grassroots mobilisation and political lobbying strategies around marriage equality activism can have the unintentional impact, however, of obscuring peripheral forms of intimacy and subsequently repudiating those who contest the movement towards marriage. Warner argues that those who choose to marry derive pride from their monogamous commitment and "family" oriented practice, a privilege afforded through marital citizenship (82). Conversely, individuals and couples who deviate from the "normal" (read: socially palatable) intimate citizen, such as promiscuous or polyamorous subjects, are rendered shameful or pitiful. This political discourse illustrates that there is a strong impetus in the marriage equality movement to legitimate "homosexual love" because it mimics the norms of monogamy, stability, continuity and family by only seeking to substitute the sex of the "other" partner. Thus, civil rights discourse maintains the privileged political economy of marriage as it involves reproduction (even if it is not biological), mainstream social roles and monogamous sex. By defining social membership and future life in terms of a heterosexual life-narrative, same-sex couples become wedded to the idea of matrimony as the basis for sustainable intimacy and citizenship (Berlant and Warner 557). Warner is critical of recuperating discourses that privilege marriage as the ideal form of intimacy. This is particularly concerning when diverse erotic and intimate communities, which are irreducible to normative forms of citizenship, are subject to erasure. Que(e)rying the Future of Ethics and Politics By connecting liberal equality arguments with Butler and Warner's work on queer ethics, there is hesitation towards privileging marriage as the ultimate form of intimacy. Moreover, Butler stresses the importance of a transformative practice of queer intimacy: It is crucial…that we maintain a critical and transformative relation to the norms that govern what will not count as intelligible and recognisable alliance and kinship. (Undoing 117) Here the author attempts to negotiate the complex terrain of queer citizenship and ethics. On one hand, it is necessary to be made visible in order to engage in political activism and be afforded rights within a state discourse. Simultaneously, on the other hand, there is a need to transform the prevailing hetero-normative rhetoric of romantic love in order to prevent pathologising bodies or rendering certain forms of intimacy as aberrant or deviant because, as Warner notes, they do not conform to our perception of what we understand to be normal or morally desirable. Foucault's work on the aesthetics of the self offers a possible transformational practice which avoids the risks Warner and Butler mention because it eludes the "normative determinations" of moralities and publics, whilst engaging in an "ethical stylization" (qtd. in Race 144). Whilst Foucault's work does not explicitly address the question of marriage, his work on friendship gestures to the significance of affective bonds. Queer kinship has the potential to produce new ethics, where bodies do not become subjects of desires, but rather act as agents of pleasure. Negotiating the intersection between active citizenship and transformative intimacy requires rethinking the politics of recognition and normalisation. Warner is quite ambivalent as to the potential of appropriating marriage for gays and lesbians, despite the historical dynamism of marriage. Rather than acting as a progressive mechanism for rights, it is an institution that operates by refusing to recognise other relations (Warner 129). However, as Alexander Duttmann notes, recognition is more complex and a paradoxical means of relation and identification. It involves a process in which the majority neutralises the difference of the (minority) Other in order to assimilate it (27). However, in the process of recognition, the Other which is validated, then transforms the position of the majority, by altering the terms by which recognition is granted. Marriage no longer simply confers recognition for heterosexual couples to engage in reproduction (Secomb 133). While some queer couples may subscribe to a monogamous relationship structure, these relationships necessarily trouble conservative politics. The lamentations of the Australian Christian Lobby regarding the "fundamental (anatomical) gender complementarity" of same-sex marriage reflect this by recognising the broader social transformation that will occur (and already does with many heterosexual marriages) by displacing the association between marriage, procreation and parenting (5). Correspondingly, Foucault's work assists in broadening the debate on relationship recognition by transforming our understanding of choice and ethics in terms of "queer friendship." He describes it as a practice that resists the normative public distinction between romantic and platonic affection and produces new aesthetics for sexual and non-sexual intimacy (Foucault, Essential 170). Linnell Secomb argues that this "double potential" alluded to in Foucault and Duttman's work, has the capacity to neutralise difference as Warner fears (133). However, it can also transform dominant narratives of sexual citizenship, as enabling marriage equality will impact on how we imagine traditional heterosexual or patriarchal "plots" to intimacy (Berlant, "Intimacy" 286). Conclusion Making an informed impact into public debates on marriage equality requires charting the locus of sexuality, intimacy and citizenship. Negotiating academic discourses, social and community activism, with broader institutions and norms presents political and social challenges when thinking about the sorts of intimacy that should be recognised by the state. The civil right to marriage, irrespective of the sex or gender of one's partner, reflects a crucial shift towards important democratic participation of non-heterosexual citizens. However, it is important to note that the value of such intimacy cannot be indexed against a single measure of legal reform. While Butler and Warner present considered indictments on the normalisation of queer intimacy through marriage, such arguments do not account for the impacts of que(e)rying cultural norms and practices through social and political change. Marriage is not a singular or a-historical construction reducible to state recognition. Moreover, in a secular democracy, marriage should be one of many forms of diverse relationship recognition open to same-sex and gender diverse couples. In order to expand the impact of social and legal claims for recognition, it is productive to rethink the complex nature of recognition, ritual and aesthetics within marriage. 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