Articles de revues sur le sujet « Kosovo (Serbia) – Economic policy »

For the last few years, the German foreign policy has been under constant temptations and substantial reconsideration. The key role in resolving the difficult economic and financial crises in the EU, the development of close economic ties with the Russian and other rising world economic powers, the decision to sustain in the UN Security Council in deciding to authorise the use of force in Libya, as well as the dominant attitude towards the crises in Greece and Kosovo clearly shows the wish of Germany to pursue a more independent foreign policy. In spite of all these efforts and its huge economic power, Germany has failed to become a global political power. Moreover, in order to protect and develop its trade interests Germany must remain within the frameworks of the EU and the NATO. For a long time, Germany has been one of Serbia?s most important economic and political partners. Since it is realistic to expect that Germany will be more oriented towards developing its economic ties with the new world economic powers, the Western Balkans and Serbia will not be in the focus of its foreign and economic policies. Therefore, for Serbia, it will be useful to concentrate on the cooperation with the mighty German provinces that have their interests in developing this cooperation. In the future, the Kosovo issues will remain the main obstacle to it.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the Serbia — EAEU relations development through the prism of the Agreement on the Free Trade Area (FTA) — between the integration association and the separate economy / country. The purpose of this study is to identify the prospects of the FTA taking into account Serbia’s desire to integrate into the European Union. The author come to the conclusion that intensive interaction, primarily between Serbia and Russia through the FTA between Serbia and the EAEU, is explained, on the one hand, by Serbia’s multi-vector foreign policy, and, on the other hand, by Russia’s attentive attitude to the course of the conflict over Kosovo. Russia has economic interests in this region, as well as the region is people-related value for Russia within which it has used and will intensively utilize of soft power mechanisms.

The article deals with consequences of the parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia (May 6–20, 2012), which led to a reversal power shift. Preconditions of the old cabinet reversal as well as domestic and foreign policy problems, the stance on the independence recognition of Kosovo and on accession to the EU are analyzed.

Since the early 1990s Italy has been engaged in promoting peace and stability in the Balkans with a growing amount of political, economic and military resources. At the beginning of the process of Yugoslav dissolution, the Italian polity was torn apart by a set of political and financial scandals that prevented the development of an assertive foreign policy. Over time, however, Italy was able to play a more relevant and constructive role. This article traces Italy's policy towards the Balkans from its modest beginnings to the present day, focusing on four key political/economic events: the war in Bosnia, the Telekom Serbia affair, the war in Kosovo and the support given to the nascent Albanian democracy. Generally speaking, Italy has provided a positive, although modest, contribution to bringing peace and stability to the region.

Abstract. This article challenges the dominant view that the European Union (EU) acted as a neutral broker in the negotiations over the Kosovo status issue. It also questions some of the critical arguments that the EU behaved as a neo-colonial power. The article suggests that EU policy towards Kosovo was shaped by a ‘victors peace’ approach but it was non-strategic, that is, it was not based on a long-term assessment of how best to foster reconciliation in the region while at the same time safeguarding the EU’s economic, political and security interests. In fact, although a consensus had emerged in 2004–2005 that appeared to favour an imposed solution around the concept of ‘supervised independence’, this was rivalled by tensions cutting across the traditional ‘Europeanists’ and ‘transatlanticists’ divide. The latter got the upper hand as the Kosovo status issue soon became caught up in the ‘second Cold War’, which is the controversy between the United States and Russia over North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement and the deployment of the anti-missile defence shield in Eastern Europe. In the short-to-medium term, the EU has, unintentionally, entrenched divisions among local actors, contributed to the proliferation of external security missions with competing objectives and most EU Member States have undermined international law by recognizing Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence.

AbstractThis article critically examines contemporary narratives which frame Serbian politics as a conflict between supporters of a pro-European Union (EU) policy and supporters of closer ties with Russia. Contrary to this narrative, contemporary Serbian political actors increasingly present policies and platforms oriented towards both the European Union and Russia. These developments reflect the contradictory legacies arising from the history of Serbian and Russian diplomatic relations along with the sometimes ambivalent implications of Russia's stance on the issue of Kosovo's independence, Serbian public attitudes towards Russia, and recent developments in Serbian-Russian economic relations. Given the long time frame for EU membership and the current impasse over issues like Kosovo and Serbia's potential NATO membership, Serbia's leaders currently enjoy the luxury of simultaneously deepening ties with both the EU and Russia. However, a future linkage between Kosovo's independence and EU membership and/or the possibility of Serbia's joining NATO will likely present Serbian political elites with mutually-exclusive choices bearing important implications for their relations with either Russia or the EU.

This paper presents a brief outline of the foreign policy aims of the People's Republic of China. Brought into focus is the principle of multilateralism, the basic guiding principle of China, which is aware of the effects of globalization. The principle needs to be applied to the response to the COVID-19 epidemic. Stressed in the paper are the principles that China follows in its relations with the USA, the EU and Serbia, and the importance of the Belt and Road initiative and Cooperation 17+1. The paper states that the question of Kosovo and Metohija should be resolved within the framework of Resolution 1244 passed by the UN Security Council. Hongkong is an integral part of China and the questions regarding this matter are to be resolved by China. Hongkong is a territory with a large degree of autonomy and the recent legislation aims to protect the security of China and Hongkong and do not contradict the policy "One Country - Two Systems", but rather confirm it. The paper also presents new data on the economic development of China and progress made in its economic relations with the EU and the countries participating in the Cooperation 17+1 program.

Nearly ten years since the 1999 NATO military intervention against Serbia and the establishment of UN administration, Kosovo and Metohija has resurfaced as a topical issue in international politics, separating the positions of the USA and Russia, and becoming a precedent in international relations, possibly with far-reaching consequences not only for the future of the western Balkans but also for many territorial disputes worldwide. Russia has only recently pulled herself out of the years-long Chechnya crisis, and facing similar problems in her 'new neighborhood' (Abkhazia, South Ossetia Transdniestria), is among the countries that might be affected by this precedent. Secondly, with her bad experience in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Russia has become sensitive not only to any disturbance in the balance of power in the Balkans but also to any change to the existing international order. Moscow has not forgotten that during the 1990s many Westerners saw Serbia as a 'metaphor for Russia' and that the NATO interventions against the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) and against Serbia (1999) revealed Russia's weakness, sending her the message to give up her interests in the Balkans and Europe. Thirdly, diverging American and Russian policies on Kosovo and Metohija coincide with their strained relations over the deployment of an antimissile 'shield' in Poland and the Czech Republic, the war in Iraq, policy towards Iran and other issues currently at the top of the list of international problems. Fourthly, meanwhile Russia has managed to recover from the disintegration of the USSR and to consolidate her economic and political power in Europe and the world, owing above all to oil and gas exports, but also to the export of industrial products (military in particular). The precedent that an independent Kosovo and Metohija would constitute in international relations is therefore a test of Russia's role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. She has found herself in the role of the defender of the fundamental principles of international law such as the inviolability of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the UN members.

Trade in modern market conditions has a complex and very important role in economic and social development. In Serbia, trade and market issues are gaining importance with the beginning of the approach toward the single European market. In parallel, the first modern strategic directions in the field of market development and trade policy have been created. Trade Development Strategies of the Republic of Serbia were the basis for the preparation and enactment of trade laws. The 2019 Trade Act in a modern and comprehensive way regulates the area of trade and markets in the Republic of Serbia. However, after its adoption, a timely and intensive implementation of the created resolutions is necessary. Also, a firm commitment is needed towards future amendments to this act, as it is a very dynamic area that requires close monitoring and a full understanding of the changes that are happening in the environment. Special attention should be focused on analysing the current situation, further developments and regulating the trade of goods with the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija.

This study aims to investigate some of the main macroeconomic determinants that have influenced the economic growth in 6 Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia). Data are taken for 18 years (2000-2017) from the World Bank database. Determinants included are inflation, foreign direct investment, interest rate, unemployment (percentage of the total labor force) and government spending (as a percentage of GDP). In the early 2000s, the region experienced rapid growth and faced many economic challenges but it still suffers from weak institutional reforms that prevent the region to reach high living standards of European countries. Because of previous studies by different authors, it is obvious that FDI is positively and significantly correlated with economic growth while in the other hand most of the studies found a negative but significant relationship between inflation, unemployment and government spending with GDP. As the results from VAR model indicate, macroeconomic determinants affects in different ways economic growth.

After a characterization of contemporaneity (dominance of the financial sector and high technology, politicization of economy, ideological use of culture and thought control) and a brief analysis of expansionism (political, economic, cultural) on the eve of the Great War, the author gives a more detailed description of the spiritual situation in the wake of the Great War: in philosophy, literature, and art, as well as the national political programmatic texts and war propaganda publications of German intellectuals of the time. The continuity of the Austro-Hungarian colonial policy towards the Balkans and Serbia culminated in instigation of a preventive war against Serbia by the elites in Berlin and Vienna, which is important for the question of responsibility for the war, with concrete war aims which reflected in the causes of the war. These war elites wanted to declare the assassination in Sarajevo as the cause of war, which in fact was a political assassination and tyrannicide. The liberation movement of democratic youth Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) needs to be viewed both in the European context and inspired by the Serbian tradition of Kosovo cult and the ethics of Vidovdan (St Vitus Day) speaking about the sacrifice as sublimation of history and about honorable suffering as element of identity. Historical memory suggests that historical responsibility is transgenerational. The epic proportions of Serbian suffering in the Great War have additionally incited the idea of the Temple of St Vitus Day (Vidovdanski Hram) conceived by Ivan Mestrovic. The bases of this idea were shaken by Milos Crnjanski in his Lyrics of Ithaca where he succeeded to bring back to Vidovdan (St Vitus Day) its inexhaustible national power of validity. Because of enormous Serbian military and civilian casualties in recent history, the establishing of a Victims of War Memorial today would have identity, existential, ethical and ontological significance for the Serbian people.

The 1990s represent an exceptionally complex period for the population of Serbia. In addition to the impact of long-term factors, various tumultuous events affected its demographic development, such as breaking apart of former Yugoslavia, armed conflicts in the neighboring countries, sanctions imposed by the international community, social changes (transition transformation or regression), deep economic crisis, collapse of social stratification political problems, institutional crisis, and NATO military intervention. Maladjustment to the changed system of values and norms, lower level of personal attainment, feeling of insecurity, and living under permanent stress are the main features of life at an individual psychological level. Deprivation or living at the subsistence level are the main elements of the economic cost sustained by the majority of the population. How have these changes affected an individual's decision to have children? The analysis of futility indicators points to an obvious decline in the number of births across low fertility regions of Serbia. Also, the analysis has raised the question why the decline in population fertility in the low fertility regions was not even higher, bearing in mind the experiences undergone by the countries with economy in transition as well as the depth of the crisis in society. In that sense several factors come to mind. The most important are the universality of marriage socio-psychological investigations confirmed domination of the traditional character or mentality in Serbia during the 1990s, and the government?s approach to the issue of fertility improved during this time. Besides demographic needs were carefully taken into account in all amendments to the old and formulation of the new measures in the area of social policy. Mention should be made of measures ensuring employment rights of women and their entitlement to maternity leave, maternity pay, and provision of institutionalized care for the children. On the other hand under-reporting of live births, lack of knowledge on the size and characteristics of emigration flows limited the analysis of population fertility in Kosovo and Metohia. But, registered data as well as survey results show to the perseverance of the fertility model of transitional type displaying obvious traditional elements.

A democracy is considered to be consolidated when no major political grouping attempts to overthrow the democratic regime or promote violence in order to seize any part of the territory from the existing state. Democracy becomes 'the only game on the town’ even when the state faces economic and political difficulties and challenges, all political groups believe and seek to find a solution within the constitutional order and democratic procedures. Namely, before any situation and difficulty in the state, the political forces in the country do not seek to solve problems by undemocratic means. In addition to the main factors mentioned by various authors, in the case of Kosovo, a key problem for the consolidation of democracy, consolidation and positioning in the international arena is the process of normalization of relations with Serbia and cooperation and effective functioning of the three main constitutional institutions; The Assembly, the President and the Prime Minister of Kosovo, as the main pillars of the system policy based on the principle of separation of powers. In principle, their greatest contribution to the consolidation of democracy in Kosovo is, the election and exercise of constitutional functions is done in accordance with the principles and norms set by the Constitution, enjoys the confidence of the majority of the population in the country, and there are no significant political forces and nor the attitudes of the public trying to replace democracy with authoritarian forms of government. In other words, echoing the metaphorical expression of American scientist Juan Linz, a consolidated democracy emerges when democracy is the only game in town.

Abstract The underying idea behand the foundation of the European Union is a single, integrated and competitive market. The future of the entire Western Balkans region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) lies within the European Union. The main purpose of this paper is to explore the multiplicative effects of the alignment of European Union regulations with the competition policy in Western Balkan countries. In addition, the paper is designed to highlight the specific issues, challenges in this field, and provides an overview of empirical trends. A combination of qualitative and quantitative approach proposes methodological framework which recognizes different economic environments and regulatory frameworks. By comparing selected economic indicators related to competiton authorities (number of staff in the national authorities, annual budget of the national authorities, number of prohibited agreements, abuse of dominant position, notification of concentrations, opinions), the authors give a reliable basis for comparative progress analysis in this filed. Using multi-criteria optimization as a key method, as well as network and input-output display, the obtained results suggest country whose competition authority is efficient frontier. The significance of this research stems from the current debate whether the harmonized competition policy should speed up and facilitate the process of the accession of new member states to the European Union.

The choice between modern nation-building and integration into supranational European and Euro-Atlantic structures remains a strategic challenge for the Balkan countries. Success in solving this problem of predominantly mono-ethnic Croatia and Slovenia has not yet become a model to follow. Serbian and Albanian national issues cannot be resolved. Serbia's defeat in the Balkan wars of 1991–1999 over the creation of a "Greater Serbia" led to the country's territorial fragmentation. Two Albanian national states emerged in the Balkans. Attempts to create a union of Kosovo and Albania could turn the region into a whirlpool of ultra-nationalist contradictions. The European Union has started accession negotiations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Northern Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. The success of these negotiations depends on the readiness of the EU and the ability of these Balkan states to adopt European norms and rules. The accession of all Balkan nation-states to the European Union must finally close the "Balkan window" of the vulnerability of the united Europe. Nation-building in the Balkans on the basis of ethnic nationalism sharply contradicts the purpose and current values of the European integration process. For more than three decades, the EU has been pursuing a policy of human rights, the rule of law, democracy and economic development in the Balkans. The region remains vulnerable to the influences of non-European geopolitical powers: the United States, Russia, Turkey, and China. The further scenario of the great Balkan geopolitical game mainly depends on the pro-European national consolidation of the Balkan peoples and the effectiveness of the European Union's strategy in the Balkans.

The authors present results of researches whose aim was to determine the factors that may substantially influence population reproduction in the Republic of Serbia, taking into consideration all specific factors, like cultural background, economic situation, health education, health service organization, religious and historical factors, etc. The research was based on the population census from 1981. Seventeen regions of the inner part of the Republic of Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo were included in this research. Stratification was made according to the place of living (village, town) age, occupation (farmer, housewife, non and half-qualified, qualified and highly qualified workers) and education (without education, with unfinished or finished primary school, with secondary school, with college or university degree). In this way 2,141 women were questioned with 101 questions by the method of interview. Interviews were conducted exclusively by doctors - gynaecologists. We determined the frequency of the use of contraceptives, intentional abortions, spontaneous abortions, pre-term deliveries, marriage infertility and term deliveries. Thus, 57.4% of women had basic knowledge of contraception, but only 15.9% of them used it; 58.9% of women had intentional abortions; 16.2% of women had spontaneous abortions, 5.1% of them had pre-term deliveries, and 67% of women had term deliveries. Marriage infertility was found in 8.6% of women. When evaluating population health and behavior, we obtained some information and data concerning addicted diseases (alcohol, smoking, drugs, tranquilizers) homosexuality and ways of sexual intercourse. It was concluded that enormous differences existed among certain regions in the Republic of Serbia, which were conditioned by the diversity of the above mentioned influences. Proposals for the measures to be undertaken in the Republic of Serbia in order to regulate population policy, are given.

In the initial phase after the collapse of the USSR, Russian diplomacy lacked vision and initiative, generally following the West's lead, including its policy towards the Yugoslav crisis (1991-95). It was only from about 1994 and as a result of the decision to expand NATO into Eastern Europe, that it sought to become more synchronized with the prevailing mood in Russian society, increasingly disillusioned with Western policies. There was a change in the phrasing of official statements, but the Russian Foreign Ministry in fact continued to follow the West and supported the severe anti-Serbian sanctions regime. Russia played merely a supporting role in the Bosnian crisis, which led to the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers. The only Russian initiative in the period was Putin's proposal to hold a Balkan conference to discuss the inviolability of borders and human rights, but it was left out in the open. Recently, however, Russia has become more active in connection with the Kosovo status talks, as a result of her aspiration to translate her newly-gained economic strength into political power, but also of the fact that there are in the post-Soviet territory some unrecognized self-proclaimed states, moreover, for the most part pro-Russian. What is vital for Russia is that she is now seeking to develop a conceptual framework for past events and to prevent any breach of international law in the future. Hence the emphasis on the necessity of laying down 'universal principles' applicable in any situation, not just in the case of Kosovo. Furthermore, a de facto independence for Kosovo, as envisaged by the Martti Ahtisaari plan, cannot resolve the problem of Serbo-Albanian conflict in a sustainable way, and remains a dangerous precedent both regionally and globally.

Kosovo is one of several Western Balkan countries that are part of the next round of accession to the EU. Like Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia, it is also a country in which the history of conflict is recent and the benefits of EU membership ought to be a strong economic and political enticement to meet the standards necessary for membership. Yet, instead of major transformation of the post-conflict society towards democratization, economic development, and a robust human rights regime, the prospect of European Union membership appears to be leading to superficial legal changes without enforcement. This article investigates the tensions between internal challenges to legal change and external pressures for reform, adding to the literature on the decoupling of Europeanization and domestic change in candidate countries. A short analysis of one policy area, women’s property rights, illuminates the gaps between legal change and enforcement processes. The article also considers how and when a change in law can lead to social change. It is argued here that legal change in response to EU conditionalities may begin superficially, but creates an opportunity for collective action that can eventually lead to democratic change and a more robust enforcement of law.

Recognition of regional features, outlining of the contours of regions, tendency to regionalize ethnic, economic, cultural and state-administrative space, and strengthening the ideology of regionalism in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is Serbia and Montenegro, appear as a practical and political but also as a theoretical problem which includes and combines several scientific disciplines. The phenomenon of regionalism is not contradictory although it is primarily expressed through the numerous conflicts of interests rivalry and antagonisms of political subjects. The problematic side of the phenomenon of regionalism includes the result of an extremely negative and existentially tragic experience of the several years-long disintegration of the complex Yugoslav state. During the partition and disintegration of the second Yugoslavia, there also happened the disintegration of the Serbian ethnic area Growth, support and instigation of regional tendencies occurred in the historical circumstances of secession and did not stop in the post-secession period. Particularization and segmentation of political area, as well as the disintegration of the former state, did not occur in accordance with the norms of internal and international law. Legality was late and was achieved within the transformation of power reflected in the changed territorial policy of the dominant alliance of great powers. The entire past decade was characterized by an extraordinary metamorphosis of political space. Secession trend had the territorial features which included the change of borders and had been long in the focus of the global geopolitical attention. Territories were divided and made smaller. Intensive territorial dynamics within the external silhouette of the de-stated SFR of Yugoslavia resulted in the creation of several state and quasi-state political formations. Former republics became semi-sovereign states. Dispersed and displaced Serbian ethnos was configured in the three territories: in the Republic of Serbia - from which Kosovo and Metohia were amputated and placed under the UN protectorate - in the entire Republic of Montenegro and in the Republic Srpska, located in one part of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demopolitical result of the geopolitical destruction of the Serbian ethnos was a great movement of the Serbian population from the west to the east, and its concentration in the territory of the Republic of Serbia this implied that the Serbs were expelled from their millennia-long abodes in Croatia, parts of Bosnia and from Kosmet. The geo-economic result of the same process was the devastation of the national economic strength west of the Drina and in the southern province. Economic regression occurred also in the national parent-land state. Balkan re-arrangement of the spheres of interest in the post-bipolar period was in 1995. fixed by the interest arrangement of the great powers known under the name Dayton Peace Agreement. Redistribution of the territories from the destroyed state occurred in the post-communist period with the expansion of west-civilization structures to the European east Westernization of the eastern part of Europe, or entire Europe as the other pole of the global West, could be characterized as a dual mega-regionality. Namely, the west is composed of Europe and America; on the other side, there is the global East or its hybrid variation Eurasia. With the disappearance of their common state and its framework, south Slavs found themselves in the seemingly independent, and actually client states. Western delimitation of the south Slavic area moved from the Yugoslav borders towards a wider Balkan demarcation. One could say that the revitalized notion of the Balkans became a new, in many aspects obligatory framework for regional thinking. The Balkan macroregion is further determined by the intentions to expand the European Union. One of the Euro-centric concepts, which is being experimentally employed precisely in the Balkans, is the establishment of the so-called Europe of regions in the peripheral areas. On the other hand, even though the process of the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation appears to be irreversible, the superordinate Euro-American factor does not give up the possibility of the mezzo-regional initiatives, cooperations, associations and integrations. This "middle" level of dealing with the specificities of the Yugoslav region is related to the states and nations from the former Yugoslavia, or the so-called West Balkans. Naturally, it is not the tendency to revive the silhouette of the previous state, but certainly there is a noticeable intention to achieve a regional linking of the related, now semi-sovereign territories which sometimes belonged to the same state framework. The fourth level deals with microregionalism, that is the relation between the different areas in the newly-created states. It is interesting that the regionalist discourse is mostly cherished exactly in the ethno-heterogeneous Serbian area, although other Yugoslav states also have or had regional tradition and mixed population, like, for example, Slovenia and Croatia Nevertheless, these former Yugo-republics are structured as mono-national states, so the regional policy and ideology of regionalism are still not in the first plane. Regionalism within the newly-formed states could be supplemented with the micron level implying specific sub-regionalism of the highest degree, within the larger regions in the same state. This could be illustrated with Backa, Banat and Srem inside Vojvodina, understood as the northern Serbian region, or Kosovo and Metohia in the south of Serbia, in the province with the same name. In the part of Serbia outside the provinces, similar things could be said for Belgrade with its surroundings, Macva, Podrinje, Sumadija, Raska District etc. Thus, when it comes to the present FR of Yugoslavia, all five levels of regional dynamics have a principled, but insufficiently studied significance. Mega-regional level is related to the mark denoting the global belonging to the West. Macroregional level deals with the European loyalty, that is inclusion of the FR of Yugoslavia into the continental European trends. This trans-continental and continental direction of inclusion implies a historical teleology of the relative eastern belonging to the absolute West, that is Euro-America, and the entrance into the full structure of the European Union. All the mentioned problems of recognition and characterization of the regional phenomenology in the political topography of the world are motivated by the tendency to achieve as clear as possible spatial-temporal national and state orientation The direction is related to the so-called safety dilemma of the nation and the country faced with the change of size and essence of one's own state, with the different geopolitical position and redefined foreign-policy priorities. It is also the case of the changed alliance policy, and the innovated strategy of integration into the old and new global and regional political structures. On the basis of the indicated components of geopolitical context, one could say that the phenomenon of regions and their cognate correlates {regionally regionalization and regionalism) should not be understood exclusively through the legal categories of international law and the so-called constitutional solutions, that is administrative division of the state territory. Actually in the analysis of regions and regionalism in Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia it is necessary first to discuss the pre-normative or meta-le-gal factors in the creation of the regional issue within the national and state issue, which have the form of the unsolved political problem. Meta-legality is located within the domain of the international relations and geopolitic. Meta-legal or pre-normative factors of the formation or recognition of regions and regionalisms deal with the possibility of the political constitution of the Serbian, that is Serbian / Montenegrin (still Yugoslav) society. Since the unique state area was destroyed in the four-year secession wars and there occurred significant demopolitical changes, war migrations, forceful displacements and expulsion of the population - the ethnic character of many areas was also drastically changed. At the same time, the post-secession existence of the FR of Yugoslavia could be also viewed through the optics of the state residuum. The remaining Serbia or Serbia (temporarily) without Kosovo is certainly not an equivalent for the Serbian ethnic space, nor for the entire Serbian lands. It is not even the FR of Yugoslavia, as a dual con federation of the Serbian / Montenegrin nation. Geopolitical reduction of the SFR of Yugoslavia to a residual creation of the FR of Yugoslavia was not deduced from the legality sui generis, but resulted from a conflict, the defeat of integralism and the victory of separatism, as well as from a new triumphal configuration of power. The impulse implying the statism of the collective rights from the former complex federal necessarily-multinational level was transferred to a lower mononational level. Therefore, the regionalist ideology in the post-secession reality of the residual state almost inevitably, as a tendency, nears the separatory particularism. Even the lost national state and the state entirety are openly denied within the requests for the territorization of the collective rights of various minorities. Naturally these requests do not carry the primary features of the development of democracy. On the contrary, in the majority of cases this implies the rise of parish and tribal consciousness prone to narrow-minded separation. Thus the post-secession requests for the regionalization are often just a slight rhetorical mask for real separatism. For example, they are expressed through the pseudo-national separation of Vojvodina from Serbia, as well as Montenegro from Serbia, or through the establishment of state-like entities in the territorial tissue of Serbia Alleged arguments are found in the unfinished disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia on the one hand, and in the prevention of the creation of the so-called Greater Serbia, even within the diminished Serbia That way, even in the post-secession, reduced Serbia one could easily recognize the tendencies of federalization and confederalization, even the amputation of its remaining state space. Additional arguments for the crawling secession and prolonged territorial destruction are found in the ideology of globalization and world trends of relativizing territorial integrity and state sovereignty. On the other hand, the idea about the principled insignificance of borders in Europe without borders, as well as Europe of regions, is emphasized. Thus, it is obvious that the new state and regional delimitations and demarcations are in contradiction with the vision of the trans-statal and trans-national integrity of the European continent. In Serbia itself, me problem of the restructuring of regions is determined by the inherited and unchanged triple division of its territory into the central part and two autonomous provinces in the north and south. Thus every idea for regionalization (expert, party, leader's, NGO and the like) faces the inherited, too narrow constitutional framework and easily slides to the federalization or confederalization of the Republic, and in extreme cases to the independence and sovereignty of ethnic, religious, linguistic and other minorities. Roughly put, the tendencies for territorial separation from the Republic of Serbia still exist in several neuralgic and unstable areas or regions. In Vojvodina, the presented tendencies have the character of a meaningless internal - Serbian autonomy, autonomism, latent separatism. Authentic Serbian autonomy lost its original character long ago and deteriorated into an internal national re-statism. On the other hand, in the furthest south of Serbia, in Kosmet, the UN protectorate is established, but the region is actually occupied and thus the status of the Province is "frozen". In the three municipalities in the south of Serbia, with the relative Albanian majority, Albanian separatism smolders within the platform of the so-called east Kosovo. In the Raska region (Sandzak) there are also strong tendencies for separateness on the religious-ecclesiastical, so-called Bosniac platform, with religious solidarity, and ethnic and territorial unity of all Bosniacs. In the meta-legal or pre-normative situation - which most often denotes political and geopolitical context implying interests, power and force - the inclinations for territorial design are faced with the conflicting ideology of regionalism. Therefore, the constitutional-legal solutions of the former, present and future regions, generated within the self-created legality which does not respect meta-legal, political and geopolitical impulses regardless of how aestheticized and "humanized" they may be - at the end face the practical impossibility of realization.

The European Union (EU) represents a certain partnership and alliance between states and countries. It is not governed as the United States of America, nor intergoverned as the United Nations. Member States of the EU are sovereign countries united to become privileged and globally successful. Every enlargement of the Union is significant, but the fifth enlargement has been recognised, so far, as the most significant, showing the unification of Eastern and Western Europe. However, the most significant enlargement is yet to come with the Western Balkan countries becoming Member States of the EU (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia), considering the political and economic situation of the region. The European Commission has proposed the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for South East Europe, as the most significant frame for the EU to ensure relations with the Western Balkan countries and to direct its overall enlargement policy to this part of Europe. Associations of the Western Balkans are usually negative, referring to weak economic development, wars and political instability, which have led to the pre-accession strategy for the EU membership known as the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). The aim of this paper is to present the progress of the Western Balkan countries towards the EU membership, their current state, and the problems they face on that path and to explain the SAP and the SAA.

Abstract Institutional theory has explained informal employment to result from formal institutional failings. The aim of this paper is to identify the formal institutional failings associated with informal employment so that action can be taken by governments. Using the Tobit model for econometric analysis and reporting conditional and unconditional marginal effects of the 2021 Balkans Business Barometer survey conducted in six Western Balkan economies (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia), the contribution of this paper is to reveal that the perceived incidence and share of informal employment is significantly associated with businesses perceiving governance, public integrity and corruption as very negative or negative, the perception that the government does not consider business concerns and business dissatisfaction with public services. However, the perceived incidence and share of informal employment is not significantly associated with the views of business on tax rates and tax administration, or the perceived instability and lack of predictability of government. The theoretical and policy implications are then discussed.

In 2005 the relations of EU and Western Balkan countries were passed from “External Relations” to “Enlargement” policy. As WB countries make steps forward in the future membership of the EU, the diversity in society within the WB is expected to further increase. The aim of this paper is to find out the relationship between cultural diversity and ethnic fractionalization from one side and governance, competitiveness and human development from the other side. The paper opted to explore the ethnic diversity within the Western Balkan countries based on the latest data of census for each country and on the Distance Adjusted Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index proposed by Kolo (2012). Furthermore, it compared the economic performance of these countries with the indicators of the ethnic diversity. Even though the literature argues that cultural diversity has negative impact on countries’ performance, the study finds out that highly homogenous societies in WB are no more prone to good governance, global competitiveness and human development than highly heterogeneous societies within the region. In other words, countries with lower fractionalization index (such as Kosovo and Serbia) do not show a significantly higher performance than countries with higher fractionalization index (such as Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). To sum up, the influence of regional geographic distance seems to be much more significant compared to cultural diversity because the economic capacity and performance of WB countries are found to be positive but still modest. The Western Balkan countries are having a considerable mixture of ethnicities, languages and religions. These varieties can push this group of countries to have a consensus among them in the economic aspects or to increase the gap among each other.

There are over 5 million Muslims representing 25 % of the region's population living on the territory of former Yugoslavia which had roughly 20 million citizens. By comparison, there are also around 5 million Muslims living in France, a country that had several colonies in the Muslim world, but the population ratio is different compared to the 60 million of the French population. Unlike the developed countries of Europe, the economies of the Balkan countries were destroyed by numerous interethnic conflicts. After the war of the '90s, the Balkans were living in a longtime economic and social crisis and a state of organized crime. With the beginnings of party pluralism, the different religions gained their former religious identity back.In Croatia and Slovenia, the Catholicism experienced a renaissance, same as the orthodoxy did in Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro and the Islam did in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Western Macedonia and Sandzak. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the fall of communism in the Balkans, the opportunity for increased foreign religious influence became a reality.Today, the image of a tolerant, open Islam from the communist era is still present, although it too is affected. During the several decades of communist rule, the traditional religious networks that affirmed an Islam shielded from Wahhabist and Salafist influences were disintegrated.108The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina intensified the implantation of the mujahidin in Bosnia in 1995. The traditional Muslim imams gradually lost their authority to the newcomers in a large number of mosques. At the same time, in light of its powerlessness, the state began to lose control in the field. It is estimated that some 67 mosques are controlled by radical Islam today, especially in rural and mountainous regions.109Under the pressure of great financial resourced which flowed in from Gulf countries, the education of Bosnian imams in Egypt and Saudi Arabia began. Step by step, Salafist imams were installed in the region preaching a more radical Islam. In such a situation, it was easier to recruit future Jihadists, especially among the socially vulnerable population.110 For example, one graffiti in Pristina (Republic of Kosovo) states: "Every woman will receive 200 euro a month if she wears a niqab".111 The radicalization spread in Bosnia and Kosovo with the greatest intensity. "Bosnia and Kosovo remain the most dangerous countries in Europe due to their political weakness and the high corruption rate. More than 75.000 weapons circulate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one Kalashnikov can be bought for the price of 200 euro and easily brought into the Schengen region", a former police officer of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina points out

The presented work is an attempt to compare the quality of governance in non-EU states in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe with which the EU Association Agreements have been concluded, and Ukraine, including aspects of the impact of the DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas). The most important issues are the interpretation of the results, the equality of countries, and the political consequences that may arise after the progression and the rapid pace of the member countries of the DCFTA towards the countries of the Balkan region. The identified countries seek full membership in the EU. Although the EU distinguishes between these countries, it recognizes “European prospects”, that is, membership in the EU, the commitments to adopt or approach EU laws and policies, made by both groups of countries, have much in common. This makes the comparison between the countries of the Balkan region and the member states of the DCFTA a sound and politically significant one. Such comparison is facilitated by numerous sources, qualitative assessments, and official ratings. Figuratively by analytical indicators, the countries can be divided into the first group of leading countries (Serbia and Montenegro) for which in February 2018 the European Commission proposed to consider 2025 as the possible date of accession to the EU. The second group (Albania and Macedonia), for which the date of accession negotiations is conditionally open in 2019. The third group includes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, for which there are no dates, and Turkey, the negotiations with which are suspended. For comparison, if we take both political and economic indicators of Ukraine, it is approximately equal to the Balkan states of the second group and outstrips the states of the third group. The prospect of EU membership was recognized as the strongest external factor of internal political changes in the countries surrounding the EU. One of the most striking trends is the steady decline in the standards of political governance in all countries, for which the EU expands its membership perspective. One of the main manifestations of poor governance in the broader neighbourhood is the widespread corruption and impunity of officials. Weak rule of law and ineffective law enforcement bodies have become common practice in all different states and have allowed current officials to act impunity during their term of office. The identified results challenge the assumption dominating in political and scientific circles that a credible prospect of EU membership is steadily generating an internal environment conducive to democratic changes. The effectiveness of economic governance was assessed by the indicators of competitiveness of the national economy (Global Competitiveness Index, Corruption Perceptions Index, Human Development Index, Ease of Doing Business Index, Index of Economic Freedom, Index of Globalization, SEDA (Sustainable Economic Development Assessment)); GDP dynamics; the volume of foreign direct investment; economic activity of the population. In practice, the EU applies an increasing number of common economic policy instruments for the Balkans and member countries of the DCFTA, in spite of the political (or rhetorical) differentiation between countries, given the categorization of membership prospects. The convergence of the actual EU policy has taken place. The Association Agreements and the DCFTA have raised the level of political and economic governance in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine at the level of the Balkan countries while the expansion process for the Balkan countries has not advanced.

Combustible renewable energy can be an effective instrument to confirm sustainable development in reducing CO2 emissions to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in developing countries. However, connecting to some developing regions, the main research question is to what extent, in EU post-communist fast-developing countries (Visegrad Countries/Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland), will meeting the climate change preferences affect the use of biomass for energy and waste incineration, and how will this affect GDP growth? In addition, of course, what the Balkan countries can learn from this is also very important. The study investigates the relationship between GDP per capita, CO2 emissions, and Combustible Energy and Waste Consumption (CEWC). According to the Hausman test, the regression model along with random effect is the appropriate method for panel-balanced data as of 2008 to 2020 concerning Balkan countries. The data was divided into three categories: 10 Balkan countries, 4 countries without access to the sea (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Macedonia), and Visegrad countries. The study discovered a substantial positive influence of CEWC on GDP per capita and a significant negative influence of CO2 emissions. The cointegration test confirms the cointegration of all three variables. This means that all three variables have a long-term relationship concerning the sense of each three forms of the chosen panel. The Granger causality findings shows the variables have a two-way causative relationship. The biomass energy use can dramatically hamper GDP growth in Visegrad and less developed Balkan countries without sea water, due to low energy productivity and a lack of technical innovation. The study recommended that instead of using energy production from simple biomass, these countries can use other circular, platform-based models to prevent unexpected rises in CO2 emissions and achieve Green House Gas (GHG) reductions. Therefore, this should be given more attention when setting climate and renewable energy policy targets, because they can significantly slow down economic growth.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the consequences of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) into crime-fighting and present new criminal landscapes in the Western Balkans Six (WB6) (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) at the beginning of the pandemic crisis.Design/methodology/approachThe paper builds on the content analysis of legal acts, strategic documents, academic articles, media reporting, official documents, four semi-structured interviews with civil society organisations, two consultations with police officers and two consultations with civil society organisations.FindingsIn the first nine weeks of the spread of COVID-19, the WB6 experienced a small rise in the price of marijuana. The same applied to stimulant drugs like ecstasy and amphetamines. However, very little heroin was available. Prices of protective face masks, disinfectants and medicinal alcohol skyrocketed due to attempts at price gouging. There were cases of scams using mobile and digital technologies, as well as burglaries of newspaper or cigarette kiosks, shops, pharmacies and exchange offices. It was difficult to determine whether the smuggling of and trafficking in human beings experienced a decline or increase. No cases of sexual exploitation for providing online services were noted, although the number of calls made to organisations that assist in the area of human trafficking increased. People with drug and alcohol problems, persons living with HIV, those susceptible to stress, citizens with mental health problems, pensioners, the poor, the homeless and recently released prisoners were the biggest potential victims of crime at the onset of the crisis brought by the pandemic.Research limitations/implicationsThe research findings are limited to specific forms of crime (illicit drug trade, economic crime, fraud, scams, theft, smuggling of and trafficking in human beings) in the WB6 and based on findings from four interviews and four consultations, together with available secondary data.Originality/valueThis is the first overview of criminal activities occurring in the WB6 during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis.

As global markets continue to expand and competition continues to hasten, it is imperative that global business managers explore all potential investment opportunities. A country of potential foreign direct investment that may not be obvious to many global business managers is Kosovo. Kosovo is a small, sovereign nation located in a strategic area of the Balkan Peninsula, bordered by Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Kosovo serves as the gateway from the Balkan Peninsula to central and southern Europe. While securing its independence from Serbia in 2008, Kosovo has worked to attract foreign direct investment and be a contender in the global economy. This paper explores the cultural and social environment, the economic and political environment, and the business and market environment in Kosovo and provides an overview and evaluation of the foreign direct investment potential of Kosovo.

The Washington Agreement on Kosovo and Serbia economic normalisation (2020) is the subject of this enquiry, while its aim is to examine the role of news media in Serbia in the discourse on normalisation between Belgrade and Pristina. The main hypothesis is that the Washington Agreement was manipulatively used for self-promotion of political elites that negotiated in Washington. The research relies on Critical Discourse Studies, instrumentalist approaches to secession, media framing and agenda-setting theories. We conclude that the issue of Serbia and Kosovo normalisation in Serbian media is mostly framed with aim to mobilises citizens’ support for executive authorities. The media thus reproduce political hegemony within Serbian society, while pluralism is obstructed in a manner characteristic for competitive authoritarianism.

Influence of Yugoslavia’s collapse, as well as of external factors on Kosovo’s separation from Serbia is explored in this article. Particular features of Kosovo’s internal policy development and problems with a full international recognition of its independence are also highlighted. The problem of Kosovo’s status within the diplomacy of “power poles” in modern international relations system in the context of NATO’s war against Yugoslavia in 1999 is underlined. Kosovo is a multi-party parliamentary representative democratic republic. The State is governed by legislative, executive and judicial institutions which derive from the Constitution adopted in June 2008, although until the Brussels Agreement, North Kosovo was largely controlled by institutions of the Republic of Serbia or parallel institutions, funded by Serbia. The legislative power in Kosovo is held by Parliament. The executive authority is vested in the Government, headed by Prime Minister. The President is Head of State and represents the unity of the people, elected every five years, indirectly by the National Assembly, in a secret ballot by a two thirds majority of all deputies of the Assembly. Key trends in Serbian policy towards Kosovo after the democratic transformation of its political system and in conditions of Serbia’s aspirations for European integration was examined. The process of Kosovo’s recognition has shown that Kosovo is an irreversible reality and an essential factor for peace and stability in the Balkan region. This could be best proved by the recognition of Kosovo among all neighboring countries (except Serbia), by the vast majority of the countries in the region and the Euro-Atlantic community.

Peace building, as part of conflict resolution strategy, is challenged by several internal factors with socio-economic, political, governmental nature, and factors coming from outside the country and violent past under governance of ex Yugoslavia/Serbia. This process becomes more difficult by the transition from socialist to free economy.Kosovo independence undermines taking responsibilities by institutions on peace building perspective which will bring to the gradual reconciliation with neighbors, including Serbia. Growing authoritarian tendencies on decision making mechanisms chock already existing fragile democracy. Enhancing the rule of law and system of justice will create a good basement for elimination of corruption and increase the quality of governance as strengthening elements of the social peace and reconciliation between the communities inside Kosovo. Even that, Kosovo institutions have made huge efforts in building the state mechanisms in preparation for the country’s independence phase. Rise of care in the rule of law, legislation implementation, efforts for combating corruption as a major source of state vulnerability, democratic institution building, and economic development, will be the challenges faced Kosovo’s future.

Fiscal policy represents one of the most important components of economic policy and as such it should be treated in its context.For this there are at least two reasons:First, economic policy defines the goals and criteria of fiscal policy in order to assess its contribution to the implementation of economic policies, andSecond, defining the connection between the objectives and instruments, theory of economic policy explains the process of fulfilling the objectives of economic policy, part of which process is fiscal policy itself. Therefore, in the following, in a quite direct manner, we will address the interdependence between economic policy and fiscal policy.The word policy, in everyday life is used to clarify the principles on which various activities run, in order to realize the goals set by the designated authorities by determining the holders of those activities, their size as well as means by which those goals should be realized.In order to achieve prosperity and political stability, national governments aim at achieving economic equilibrium. Kosovo is one of the last countries in Europe to transition to a market economy. The transition process has begun from a very difficult starting point.During the years after the war, a symbolic economic growth occurred, which has been attributed mainly to remittances, investments in infrastructure and privatization. Investments, despite continuous growth, are considered insufficient to boost domestic production.This pattern of growth has not been able to meet the development needs of the state and failed to translate into a better standard of living for citizens, given that neither unemployment nor poverty are reduced. (The Progress Report on Kosovo, European Commission 2011).

“We Serbs must militarily defeat our enemies and conquer the territories we need.”Vojislav Maksimovic, MemberBosnian Serb Parliament“I don't see what's wrong with Greater Serbia. There's nothing wrong with a greater Germany, or with Great Britain.”Bosnian Serb LeaderRadovan KaradžićThe break-up of Yugoslavia has come about as a result of national, economic and political conflicts which by the end of 1987 had taken on unprecedented dimensions. At that point, latent political conflicts between various republics came into the open. More specifically, the conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo had turned into a low-intensity war. Under Slobodan Miloševićs leadership in Serbia, the Serbo-Slovenian conflict over Kosovo deepened, forcing other republics and provinces to take sides. The Slovenian leadership opposed a military solution to the Serbo-Albanian conflict in Kosovo. By 1990 the Serbo-Slovenian conflict had spilled over into Croatia, completely polarizing the Yugoslav political elite into two distinct camps; one encompassed Slovenia and Croatia, the other Serbia and Montenegro, with Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina playing the role of unsuccessful mediators.

Within a decade, Kosovo has compromised twice: accepting the process of decentralization in order to achieve independence and international recognition, through the President Martti Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (2 February 2007), and finally, by approving to offer autonomy for Kosovo Serbs for the sovereignty, but still within the limits of the Ahtisaari Plan.Coincidentally, the same Serbian political parties which had fought three wars, resulting in dissolution of the state (Former Yugoslavia) at that time (the Socialist Party and the Serbian Radical Party), now are in power in the Republic of Serbia, and have the possibility to finally solve the Kosovo case, and to open the perspective for this part, Europe’s black hole, to be engaged in global integration. Statements by senior Serbian politicians are positively shifting, compared to the radicalization of the relations between Albanians and Serbs three decades ago and it is believed that the developments will evolve towards rational choice and acceptance by the parties. Being under pressure by difficult socio-economic situation and need for integration processes, both sides undertake risky and unpopular steps by signing unclear political and verbal agreements on normalization of relations, which may produce difficult solving externalities in the future. The risk lies in the possibility of further damaging the Kosovo’s “piece of the cake”, after every refusal step by the Serbian side, which will damage the interest of Kosovo side according to the “zero sum” game. Analyses of the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia reflect the mixed benefits to the parties, resulting in not very soon European integration, and with hope on difficult but necessary reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs in the region. The broken, after the war established, status quo is better than entering into a protracted conflict in the middle of Europe.

The aim of this article is to analyse the international legal and political process of reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo in terms of its impact on the scope of development directions and strategies of the European Union countries as well as Russia and the USA. Particular emphasis was placed on the treatment of these issues in the light of the activities of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. The main theses assumed for the purposes of this article are as follows: firstly, that the policy of reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo is multidimensional, including the necessity of the process of international criminal liability for the crimes committed by both states, while at the same time influencing the dilemmas of the development directions of individual European countries, but also of the European Union and the United States. In addition, the legal and political stabilization of the Balkan region, especially in the context of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and the possibility of cooperation with these states as part of intergovernmental international organizations, is strategically extremely important for the EU, the USA, as well as for Russia. The Author critically analyses issues using polemics with the standpoint presented in the doctrine of the subject as well as interpreting selected instruments of international law and Kosovo’s national law. The deliberations resulted in conclusions as to the determinants in terms of the directions of the legal and political development of the EU and Russia resulting from the complicated process of reconciliation and mutual settlement of sins by Serbia and Kosovo.

By researching various literature and publications we have managed to summarize a proper structure related to this topic. CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) is a free trade agreement in which eight countries of the Western Balkans region participate. CEFTA was established with the aim of eliminating payments for mutual trade between member states; creating favorable conditions for the development and diversification of trade; promoting trade and economic cooperation; intensification of economic relations for mutual benefit and for the contribution to the EU integration process; contribution to the development of EU trade relations and integration into the multilateral trading system. in the EU. Although not mandatory, CEFTA is the inevitable path for all EU aspiring countries. It is also one of the conditions for Kosovo to integrate into the EU, but from the research we reach a conclusion that the Cefta Agreement was not favorable for Kosovo and the Trade that it conducts with the Balkan countries. Also, the presence of Kosovo in Cefta as a representative of UNMIK and not as an independent state like the Republic of Kosovo provides an overview that Kosovo in Cefta is conditional starting from its absence as a state and then in the space provided in market, states that do not recognize Kosovo's citizenship are a barrier to Kosovo's integration into this agreement. In terms of trade, Kosovo is obliged to start these barriers set by non-recognizing states of its citizenship and to act with the same currency, these states especially Serbia and Bosnia have constantly hindered the development of Kosovo economy which aim only to benefit from Kosovo which trade policies link to the political status that these countries develop towards each other. As Kosovo does not have the expected benefits from this agreement, some advice and recommendations are given to change the situation, but it is not a solution to set obstacles, as the very purpose of integration in this agreement has been the release of barriers and cooperation between member countries. Since the commitment to implement CEFTA is also included in the Stabilization and Association Agreement signed between Kosovo and the European Union, the opportunity for Kosovo is to renegotiate this agreement together with other member states. Keywords: Tax (tarrif), Export, Import, Market, Economic Report, Domestic Products, Competition

This paper, using the operational method of content analysis, gives an overview of the programmatic attitudes of the parties in Serbia about the province of Kosovo and Metohija. We have used internet presentations of the parties in our case, but in some cases this meant that these were outdated programs from the period of diametrically opposed political circumstances in the country and the world, or general presentations without stating when and where the program was adopted. In any case, the Kosovo and Metohija issue is recognized by most parties, especially those with the most numerous membership and a long tradition, as an issue of first-class state importance. The parties are almost unanimous when it comes to protecting the rights of Serbs, their cultural heritage, and the economic interests of Serbia in the province. However, the positioning of the parties with regard to the final status of the province has brought major differences. Some parties stand firmly on the position of Resolution 1244 and the 2006 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia in relation to this matter, while on the opposite side are those political factors advocating for a permanent solution based on compromise. The statements of contemporary political actors in Serbia about the province of Kosovo and Metohija are not the subject of this paper, but we are exclusively focused on programs as a permanent testimony to the attitude of political circles in Serbia towards the aforementioned issue to this day.

Due to the intertwined and parallel interests of the great powers in Kosovo and Metohija, a kind of geopolitical knot has been created, as a field of aggressive geopolitical actions by non-Balkan and Balkan neighbouring political factors, which is reflected in current events, making them politically and security complex. After 2008, we have witnessed the unilaterally recognized so-called independence of Kosovo, which continued the process of internal transition and territorial fragmentation of Serbia that is clearly marked as a challenge and threat even in the current geopolitical and security context. Therefore, the paper has tried to show and explain the importance of the southern Serbian province, first of all emphasizing its geographical and geopolitical importance as a central area on the Balkan Peninsula, which makes it very important for the control of traffic, economic, communication, strategic and other corridors. The second part of the paper presents a geopolitical analysis of the current events in the south of Serbia and the consequences for the country's internal political structure and international position. In addition, the security aspects of the Kosovo-Metohija knot have been analysed, with a focus on national security and security problems caused by the violent exclusion of the Serbian territory and the self-proclamation of the so-called independence of Kosovo, in order to find sustainable solutions for the security situation in the south of Serbia.

Fiscal policy in Kosovo (1999) is based on government revenue and expenditure for achieving certain economic and social goals, and to influence macroeconomic indicators.Fiscal policy in this direction should be in the function of development and economic growth, with a high employment rate and protected from inflation.After the war in Kosovo, an UNMIK mission was set up, which from June to September 1999 was designated to provide donations in order to meet the emergency needs for financing and activating public administration, infrastructure rehabilitation and public services.In September 1999, the United Nations Civilian Administration established the Central Fiscal Authority (CFA) in Kosovo to build fiscal policy.Fiscal policy under specific conditions in Kosovo was tightened to mobilize financial means to cover public needs. So initially it was determined to collect funds for the Treasury bypassing the aspect of development of Kosovo. No mitigating administrative measures have been taken for economic development.

Abstract The aim of the present study is to review the definitions of the enterprises in the European Union, Western Balkans and Kosovo. The study also proposes the classification and comparison of small, medium-sized and large enterprises in the European Union, Western Balkan countries, such as Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and in Kosovo. The study has been performed using the legal, economic, comparative and practice methodology. The results of the study suggest that states should have control over the categorization of enterprises, so the enterprises with higher economic power cannot have the opportunity to hurt those with lesser economic power, all based on the regulation law and its implementation in practice.

In Kosovo and in the new consolidating countries the fiscal policy plays the primary role in the functioning of the state, its institutions and economic growth in general. In the lack of monetary policy instruments, fiscal policy remains the only means available to the Kosovo Government for promoting investments in the private sector. Therefore, sound and prudent fiscal policies is key to maintaining macroeconomic stability, particularly when considering that fiscal policy is the main instrument of economic policy in Kosovo. Special emphases is given fiscal policies applied in Kosovo, its reforms, actions to be taken on the occasion of the policy-making reforms and finally are given appropriate recommendations.

The article is devoted to one of the most dramatic events in the history of Serbia - the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, in terms of analyzing two key aspects. Firstly, numerous inconsistencies, discrepancies, contradictions and outright falsifications were revealed on the part of the official investigation and the official version of the attentate, in which it was not possible to reliably establish the motives, methods of committing the crime and the true perpetrators of the prime minister's death. Consequently, the reason for the murder of the prime minister, which, no doubt, lies precisely in the politics, remains hidden. In the Serbian political dimension, Kosovo and Metohija have long been the main stumbling blocks. Secondly, the authors of the article analyze the radical change in Zoran Djindjic's policy, which took place in general across a wide range of issues, and in particular, on the indicated "Kosovo problem". The Serbian prime minister had a sharp change in political orientations due to specific measures taken by the US, the EU and the "world community" towards Serbia, among which there were extremely destructive tendencies covered by double standards and humanistic rhetoric. The West did not need a "renewed Serbia", moreover, Serbia, renewed on the basis of a combination of democratic and national-state principles, which, in fact, became the policy of Zoran Djindjic a few months before the attentate, was a direct threat to the West. In particular, it hindered the implementation of the plans to build a certain order (characterized through the formula "constant chaos of low intensity"). Pax Americana, or the "new globalized order", can only be established in the Balkans on the rubble of Serbia, with dysfunctional state institutions, a devastated economy and destroyed national consciousness. The West needs Serbia only in the form of a failed state. The key point is the deprivation of its main attribute of statehood - sovereignty, inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. The withdrawal from Serbia of its southern region, Kosovo and Metohija, occurred contrary to the UN Charter, the entire complex of international legal acts on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states, a number of UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution No. 1244, the Constitution and legislation of Serbia. Without idealizing or romanticizing the image of this Serbian statesman, the authors consistently identify the steps taken by Zoran Djindjic in the Kosovo direction at the international and regional levels, testifying to his firm desire to implement the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, to reconsider relations with the West in general and build democratic Serbian state on national basis. All undertakings were interrupted by an unknown sniper's bullet fired on March 12, 2003. English version of the article on pp. 402-409 at URL: https://panor.ru/articles/role-of-zoran-dindic-in-resolving-the-kosovo-issue/66002.html

Since it declared its independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia has faced several problems of key importance. Apart from the economic underdevelopment, this country has been characterised by bad ethnic relations between the two most numerous communities in the country - the Macedonian and Albanian ones. The Albanian community, which makes approximately one fourth of the total population in Macedonia, has tended to define itself as a "constitutive nation" within the newly formed and independent Macedonia. The outstanding ethnic tensions present in 1990s turned into open armed conflicts in the February-August 2001 period. More than 200 people were killed, while 100,000 people were displaced from their homes in the conflicts between the Albanian militia and regular Macedonian police and armed forces. After the USA and EU had made pressures on the conflicting parties, they adopted the Framework Agreement on 13 August 2001 in Ohrid. It proposed the amendments to the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. The amendments have brought out changes in the constitutional and political system of Macedonia - "double majority" in the Parliament, increased number of members of ethnic communities in the police and administration, Albanian language as an official, strengthening of the local self-rule, etc. Apart from the Macedonian people as a holder of sovereignty, the preamble of the Constitution of Macedonia includes the Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Serbs, Romans and members of other peoples who live in Macedonia. In September 2002, parliamentary elections took place in Macedonia. The coalition For Macedonia Together headed by the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia won half of the seats in the Macedonian parliament. Then were defeated the nationalistic parties VMRO-DPMNE and Democratic Party of Albanians that had been in power during the ethnic conflicts. The Democratic Union for Integration (established in 2002) won almost 70 per cent of the Albanian votes while the Party for Democratic Prosperity and People's Democratic Party were defeated at the elections. After the September elections, the new government was forded and it embraced the members of the coalition For Macedonia Together and Democratic Union for Integration - with five Albanian ministers. The Ohrid Agreement is a step forward in settling the ethnic relations in Macedonia. Apart from the fact that it was adopted under the pressure of the international community, it is a basis for constitutional and political reforms, improving the position of the Albanians as the most numerous non-Macedonian community. However, it should be said that even today there are two parallel "societies" - Macedonian and Albanian ones, with no common touch between them, living separately from each other. In spite of all obstacles, it is necessary to insist on building of confidence and reconciliation between the Albanians and Macedonians. This can be achieved by repatriation of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, by implementation of the law that includes the provisions on the positive discrimination of the Albanian community and by strengthening of security and stability in the region. As the author assesses, the bad economic situation in Macedonia could set new priorities to the government and it would include improvement of living conditions for its citizens. On the other hand, the greatest danger to the peaceful development of Macedonia is the Albanian National Army (ANA) whose substantial aim is to achieve unification of the "Albanian" territories in Western Macedonia with Kosovo and "Albanian parts" of Montenegro and southern Serbia.

This article suggests a rethinking of Serbian-Albanian relations. Contemporary research tends to reduce this problem exclusively to the Serbia-Kosovo issue, which is usually regarded with a value-based approach. As a result, the issue of Serbia’s foreign policy strategy in the south-west and south direction, which also includes the Republic of Albania and other states (Montenegro, North Macedonia), where the role of the Albanian factor is signifi cant, remains outside the scope of the analysis. The purpose of this article is to examine more closely the logic of Serbia’s foreign policy activities in the south-western (Albanian) direction, taking into account the historical context and current trends associated with the active implementation of infrastructure projects in the entire Balkan region. Given that these projects cover both Serbia and Albania, it is appropriate to assume that Belgrade and Pristina have a mutual interest in forming a predictable non-confl ict space and in certain coordination of their approaches to conducting politics in their border area. This, in turn, requires a rethinking of Serbia’s foreign policy strategy in the southwestern (Albanian) direction. To this end, the author analyzes both the historical evolution of Belgrade’s position on the Albanian-Kosovo issue and considers it in the context of modern regional infrastructure projects. Considering the structural regional changes, taking place since the second half of the 2010s, the author comes to the conclusion that Belgrade is facing a dilemma between the self-signifi cant signifi cance of the Kosovo issue and the interest in forming a predictable and stable space to the southwest of its own borders. This dilemma determines the logic of modern Serbia’s foreign policy actions.

AbstractAs a political scientist with expertise in human rights and the Balkans, I was invited to provide critical commentary and analysis of Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008 for CNN International. I offered an analysis rooted in the understanding and interpretation of international law, foreign policy, and domestic politics of Serbia and Kosovo. While I was not surprised that my analysis was not popular in Serbia—after all, I did argue that the independence of Kosovo was legitimate—I was surprised at the level of ethnic intensity and the broad-based hostile reaction to my CNN appearance in Serbia. This article first documents the harassment campaign I experienced. I then conduct textual analysis of the hate mail and online postings to offer insights about ethnicity's relation to identity, gender, and political analysis in the public sphere. I conclude by discussing how identities of researchers—as crafted by themselves and others—help define analytical tools we use in scholarly inquiry.

Major changes in the position of Kosovo and Metohija’s autonomy in the late 1960s affected the province’s relations with Albania. In 1967, the Yugoslav State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council began to encourage cultural and economic ties between Kosovo and Metohija and Albania, justifying this as a strategy for the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Albania. Following the joint commemorations of the anniversary of Skanderbeg’s death in Priština and Tirana, an agreement was reached on the use of textbooks from Albania in the Kosovo and Metohija school system. The two sides organized mutual visits of folklore and art groups, as well as friendly matches of soccer teams. Kosovo companies were allowed small border traffic with Albania without any prior interstate agreements between Belgrade and Tirana. Constitutional changes in Serbia in 1969 enabled the expansion of economic and cultural cooperation between Kosovo and Albania. The University of Priština and the University of Tirana signed an agreement to hire professors from Tirana as lecturers at Priština faculties. In 1971, scientists from Tirana participated in the work of the Kosovo Archives, the Provincial Library, and the Priština Museum, while 41 Albanian professors gave lectures at the University of Priština. Reports by Albanian lecturers from Kosovo enabled the Albanian state leadership to be acquainted in detail with the political situation in Yugoslavia.

The paper analyses the role of soft and smart power as a strategic means by which it is possible to defend the vital national interests of the Republic of Serbia regarding Kosovo and Metohija. These means of foreign policy gain particular importance in the context of turbulent and dynamic changes at global level, primarily in the sense of rearranging global power relations and shifting power towards new, growing centres, along with the reshaping of the world order towards multipolarity. In the introductory part of the paper, a theoretical approach is taken to consider the main terms and concepts covered by the subject of the research. The central part analyses the elements that make up the Serbian soft and smart power in the light of the aforementioned changes in international relations. In this regard, the most important documents related to the resolution of the issue of Kosovo and Metohija have been analysed. The position of Serbia in relation to the key factors at international level is also discussed, as well as their positioning in relation to this problem. In the final part of the paper, an effort has been made to clarify to what extent it is possible to combine hard and soft power in the issue of Kosovo and Metohija, viewed primarily through the prism of the strengthening influence of forces in favour of Serbia, primarily China and Russia, and also the still non-existent recognition of the so-called Kosovo as an independent state by five EU members.

This paper deals with the problem of political clientelism in Serbia broadly defined as the selective distribution of benefits (money, jobs, information, a variety of privileges) to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support. The main objective is to explain why political clientelism is widespread in Serbia and which key factors determine its shape and intensity. The explanation is based on the analysis of historical factors of development of clientelism in Serbia, as well as on analysis of data from a recent research on informal relations between political and economic elites in Serbia and Kosovo. The paper concludes that clientelism and informality have represented one of the structuring principles of socioeconomic and political development of Serbian society under the conditions of weak formal institutions and socio-historical heritage of late modernization. On the other hand, since 2000 economic and political sphere in Serbia became more open and competitive which influenced change in the character of clientelism in Serbia - the increased rivalry among different clientelistic (sub)networks heightened the chance of opportunistic defection even at the top level, which made political power of patrons more tradable and the relation inside the power network less asymmetric.

The article is devoted to the transport and mining structure in the Balkans at the beginning of the twentieth century, primarily in Serbia. The author pays particular attention to Serbia’s plan to incorporate Kosovo into its economic system in the context of diplomatic tensions in Europe on the eve of the First World War. The research is based on unpublished diplomatic documents.

One of the most remarkable features of contemporary international relations is the new prestige accorded universal standards of human rights. However, NATO's attempt to redeem the promise of human rights by way of military intervention during the recent Kosovo crisis may have established a disturbing precedent for humanitarianism. The Alliance exploited the capabilities of precision weaponry and digital information systems to wage war with air power alone, thus avoiding entirely the deployment of ground troops and the domestic political exposure such a deployment inevitably involves. The best available evidence is that this approach had little immediate effect on the atrocities carried out by Serbian troops in Kosovo and that NATO's overriding concern with casualty-avoidance in war undermined both the effectiveness and the moral legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Even more disturbing is the question whether NATO's action implies that states endowed with the advanced military assets that were brought to bear against Serbia will adopt a casual policy on the conduct of limited war, a policy at odds with the lessons of the twentieth century.

Abstract Kosovo celebrated ten years of fraught independence in February. While there were some good reasons to celebrate, Kosovo still hovers between a failed and a functioning state. Its main economic indicators are extremely bad with no signs of improving. Unemployment, particularly among its youth, is feeding an ongoing brain drain. The legacy of the United Nations Mission (UNMIK) and now the European Union Mission (EULEX) is mixed, but neither was successful in creating the conditions for Kosovo to function as a normal state. Agreements between Belgrade and Prishtina to provide more rights to the Serb communities especially in the north have undermined Kosovo’s sovereignty. Now, the buzz in Prishtina speaks of a territorial swap between Serbia and Kosovo that would pave the way for mutual recognition. The domestic elite have proven more interested in short term survival and profit than in making historic progress. A stale consensus prevails that maybe this is the best that can be hoped for.