Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Judicial dissent »

Many judicial scholars argue that judicial dissent stems from partisanship or political differences among judges on courts. These arguments are evaluated using the variation in political backgrounds on a constitutional court, Chile’s Constitutional Tribunal, using case-level and vote-level data from 1990 until 2010. The analysis shows that the rate of dissent rises after major reforms to the powers and judicial selection mechanism of the Tribunal in 2005 and that the dissent rate corresponds to periods of greater partisanship on the court. Further, decisions regarding the unconstitutionality of laws intensify the propensity to dissent at both the case and judge level. In further examination of variation across judges’ voting records, judges who have identifiable partisan associations of any kind are generally more likely to dissent than those with limited political backgrounds.

Political principals often face information deficits. This is especially true of the US judicial hierarchy; extant theories of ideological monitoring in this setting have therefore explored informational cues such as lower court ideology or dissent. Canonical models of this setting, however, have omitted litigants, implicity assuming they are not an important source of information. This paper develops a formal model that considers whether litigants can credibly signal information about noncompliance, and how litigants’ signals interact with the cues of ideology and dissent. The model shows that litigant signals can be highly informative about doctrinal compliance, sometimes even crowding out the need for other signals. By contrast, litigants face difficulty communicating information about case importance; dissent, however, can be highly informative on this dimension. Accordingly, some informational cues may only influence limited aspects of the high court’s case selection process.

Spanish Constitutional Court – Judicial behaviour – Mixed judicial selection – Empirical testing – Decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court, 1980-2018 – Judicial background – Government – Senate – Congress – Spanish Judicial Council – Invalidation of statutes –Dissent opinions – Shaping politicisation.

The mutual dependence between courts and their compliance constituencies is a fundamental feature of judicial power. Actors whose rights and interests are reinforced by court decisions may use these as legal ammunitions while contributing to ensuring that court decisions are effectively implemented. We argue that judgments that contain dissenting opinions are less powerful in this regard, compared with unanimous decisions. The reason is that dissent reduces the perceived legal authority of the judgment. Using data from the international human rights judiciaries in Europe and the Americas, we provide evidence of a negative relationship between judicial dissent and compliance. Our findings have important implications for questions relating to the institutional design of courts, for courts’ ability to manage compliance problems, and for understanding the conditions for effective international judicial protection of human rights.

If dissenting judgments perform a valuable function in the administration of justice, too little dissent may indicate that the administration of justice is not reaping the benefits of dissent. South Africa belongs to the common-law tradition, which has always allowed dissenting judgments. The civil-law system traditionally did not, and this is still the position in many countries. In the modern era, considerations of transparency and accountability favour the disclosure and publication of dissenting judgments. Although they can play a role in the development of the law, their most valuable function is to improve the quality of judicial output by requiring majority judgments to confront the dissenting judgments’ reasoning. Factors which may affect the extent of dissent in appellate courts include case complexity and control over rolls; panel sizes; judicial diversity, personality and turnover; court leadership; research resources; modes of judicial interaction; and protocols on the timeliness of judgments. Data on dissent in South Africa’s Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and Labour Appeal Court, as well as in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the United States, suggest that there is less dissent in our intermediate appellate courts than might be expected. Changes in work procedures could yield a healthier pattern.

This essay probes two matters. First, it establishes the extent and pattern of partisan-based dissent on the California Supreme Court during the so-called “party period” of American history, the years from roughly 1840 to 1920 (McCormick, 1979). It concludes that the concept of judicial independence retained great vitality despite a strongly partisan scheme of accountability. Second, it suggests that constitutional arrangements and environmental conditions were important in conditioningjudicial behavior. While these findings are preliminary, they nonetheless constitute an important first step toward unraveling the character of California’s and the nation’s judicial cultures during this extraordinary period of party development (Hall, 1984).

This article offers a theoretical discussion about courts in “hybrid regimes” that evolve from formerly democratic countries. The evolution toward authoritarianism typically allows governments more latitude to reduce judicial independence and judicial power. Yet, several reasons, including legitimacy costs, a tradition of using courts for judicial adjudication and social control, and even the use of courts for quenching dissent may discourage rulers from shutting down the judicial contestation arena and encourage them instead to appeal to less overbearing measures. This usually leads to a decline of the judiciary's proclivity to challenge the government, especially in salient cases. To illustrate these dynamics, I discuss the rise and fall of judicial power in Venezuela under Chávez's rule, focusing on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. Formerly the most powerful institution in the country's history, the Chamber briefly emerged as an influential actor at the beginning of the regime, but a comprehensive intervention of the judiciary in 2004 further politicized the court and effectively reduced its policy-making role.

Dissenting opinions, separate opinions and declarations are a familiar aspect of the international jurisprudential landscape. Despite this, in comparison to domestic judicial systems, there has been comparatively little by way of attempts to rationalise the institutional and systemic implications of this practice. While there is widespread agreement that the impact of additional opinions lies in their effect upon the authority of the court or tribunal and its decisions (‘institutional judicial authority’), the nature of that impact is open to greater contestation. How should additional opinions be viewed? An unnecessary and counterproductive distraction or an important mechanism of accountability for the exercise of judicial power? By conceiving additional opinions as the expression of individual judicial authority, this thesis examines the interplay between individual judicial authority and institutional judicial authority within two paradigms of international justice. The first – comprising the ICJ and PCIJ – represents the traditional paradigm of international justice wherein the culture of expressing individual judicial authority in international law was born. The second paradigm is international criminal justice as pursued by two institutions in particular, the ICTY and the ICC. By comparing these two paradigms, and the nature and purposes of judicial authority therein, this thesis considers how individual judges through their additional opinions have contributed to the evolving international judicial culture, and how that practice affects the manner in which the institutions in question advance the project of international justice. Drawing upon Mirjan Damaška’s work demonstrating how procedural choices and practices have implications upon authority, and the relationship between procedure and the purposes for which authority is claimed, this thesis demonstrates that not only is the expression of individual judicial authority consistent with institutional authority but it is constitutive of it. The final section of the thesis turns to consider a form of judicial expression – defined as judicial dissent – that places institutional and individual authority in conflict with one another. Despite the negative implications of judicial dissent upon judicial authority (both institutional and individual) and judicial collegiality, the final section considers whether such practice can play a legitimate systemic function.

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What do judges want? Although apparently a straightforward question, the motivations that underly judge’s decisions have been a persistent topic of debate in the literature. The discussion arises from the fact that judges, especially those in superior courts, are usually insulated from the ordinary incentives that other agents face. Most enjoy life tenure, their salaries cannot be decreased, and have no performance bonus. Hence, an assumption of economic self-interest would hardly provide useful insights into judicial preferences. In the three essays that form this thesis, I contribute to the judicial behavior literature by providing empirical evidence of at least three different vectors that govern judicial decision-making. In the first essay, I show that judges respond to transparency and scrutiny. The main idea is to explore how a shift in transparency – since 2002 the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) broadcasts its deliberations live on television – may alter behavior. Here, I employ a research design seldom used in the judicial behavior literature – Differences-in-Differences – to test how STF judges have responded to increased transparency. The main finding is that STF justices, when given free television time, act to maximize their individual exposure. They achieve that by writing longer votes and by engaging in more discussions with their peers. In the second essay, I show that political preferences matter. Here, in delving into the judicial activism literature, I test whether activism is related to politics in two ways. First, whether judges appointed by left-wing presidents are more (or less) likely to engage in activist voting than those appointed by right-wing presidents. Second, if judges appointed by presidents of either end of the political spectrum are sensitive to political context, that is, if they respond to the presence of their appointing party in the Executive. In doing so, I propose a new measure of judicial activism, which conditions votes to strike on the Prosecutor-General’s brief. The main result is that activism – both in the traditional and new measures – is associated with ideology measured by presidential appointment. Also, in the new measure, judges are sensitive to political context – they are less likely to engage in activist voting when their appointing party is incumbent in the Federal Executive. Lastly, career matters. Justices that are former politicians are less likely to be activist. Finally, in the third essay, I investigate the determinants of judicial dissent in the Brazilian Supreme Court. Particularly, I disentangle two features of judicial behavior that are known to affect the decision to dissent: ideological heterogeneity and dissent aversion. To do so, I explore the fact that voting in this Court is sequential, that there is a predetermined voting order that varies in nearly every case, to identify where dissent aversion will manifest. The main point is that after a majority has been formed, the justices who vote in sequence know that their votes cannot change the outcome of the case. Hence, they may deviate from their preferred votes and join the majority to avoid the costs of dissenting. Here, I find strong evidence of dissent aversion in the Brazilian Supreme Court. Judges who vote after the pivotal judge are significantly less likely to dissent. The evidence for ideology, however, does not survive all robustness checks.
O que os juízes querem? Embora uma pergunta aparentemente simples, as motivações subjacentes às decisões dos juízes têm sido um tópico persistente de debate na literatura. A discussão surge do fato de que os juízes, especialmente aqueles em cortes superiores, normalmente são isolados dos incentivos que outros agentes enfrentam. A maioria tem cargo vitalício, seus salários não podem ser reduzidos e não têm bônus por desempenho. Desta forma, uma suposição de auto interesse econômico dificilmente forneceria conclusões úteis sobre preferências judiciais. Nos três ensaios que formam esta tese, eu contribuo para a literatura de comportamento judicial, fornecendo evidências empíricas de ao menos três vetores diferentes que regem a tomada de decisões por juízes. No primeiro ensaio, mostro que os juízes respondem à transparência e ao escrutínio. A ideia principal é explorar como uma mudança na transparência - desde 2002, o Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) transmite suas deliberações ao vivo pela televisão - pode alterar o comportamento. Neste trabalho, emprego um método raramente utilizado na literatura de comportamento judicial - Diferenças-em-Diferenças - para testar como juízes do STF respondem a uma maior transparência. A principal conclusão é que ministros do STF agem para maximizar sua exposição individual quando lhes é dado tempo gratuito de televisão. Para isso, escrevem votos mais longos e interagem mais frequentemente com seus pares. No segundo ensaio, mostro que preferências políticas são relevantes. Aqui, ao investigar a literatura do ativismo judicial, testo se o ativismo está correlacionado com preferências políticas de duas maneiras. Primeiro, se juízes nomeados por presidentes de esquerda são mais (ou menos) propensos a votar de modo ativista do que aqueles nomeados por presidentes de direita. Segundo, se juízes indicados por presidentes de ambos os extremos do espectro político são sensíveis ao contexto político, isto é, se respondem à presença, no Executivo, do partido que os indicou. Aqui, proponho uma nova medida de ativismo judicial, que condiciona votos pela inconstitucionalidade das leis ao parecer do Procurador Geral da República. O principal resultado é que ativismo - tanto na medida tradicional quanto na nova que proponho - é associado à ideologia política medida pela indicação presidencial. Além disso, na nova medida, juízes são sensíveis ao contexto político - são menos propensos a votar de modo ativista se o incumbente no Executivo Federal foi o responsável por sua indicação à corte. Por fim, a carreira anterior também é importante. Juízes que foram políticos são menos propensos a serem ativistas. Finalmente, no terceiro ensaio, investigo os determinantes da divergência judicial no STF. Em particular, distingo duas características do comportamento dos juízes que reconhecidamente afetam a decisão de divergir: heterogeneidade ideológica e aversão à divergência. Com este objetivo, exploro o fato de que a votação nesta Corte é sequencial, ou seja, que há uma ordem de votação pré-estabelecida que varia em quase todos os casos, para identificar onde a aversão à divergência deve se manifestar. O ponto principal é que depois que a maioria foi formada, os juízes que votam na sequência sabem que seus votos não mudarão o resultado do caso. Logo, eles podem se desviar de seus votos preferidos e se unir à maioria para evitar os custos de divergir. Aqui, encontro fortes evidências de aversão à divergência no Supremo Tribunal Federal. Juízes que votam após o juiz pivotal são significativamente menos propensos a divergir. Evidências a favor da heterogeneidade ideológica, no entanto, não sobrevivem aos testes de robustez.

La presente tesi di dottorato intende analizzare, soprattutto in un’ottica di comparazione tra l’ordinamento spagnolo e quello italiano, l’istituto dell’opinione “non maggioritaria” (declinata nelle sotto-articolazioni dell’opinione dissenziente stricto sensu intesa e di quella concorrente) nei rispettivi sistemi giurisdizionali, con specifico riferimento ai modelli di giustizia costituzionale. Dopo aver inquadrato l’opinione dissenziente dal punto di vista etimologico-linguistico e di contenuto, si fornirà un quadro preliminare relativo alle diverse argomentazioni teoriche che sono state addotte tanto a favore quanto in detrimento della sua introduzione. In questi termini, il dibattito verrà ad intrecciarsi con ulteriori tematiche, dalla funzione della motivazione giudiziaria al ruolo pubblico e soggettivo-istituzionale del giudice, dalla percezione che il contesto sociale e politico può (o deve) avere dell’attività giurisdizionale alle possibili ricadute – di segno positivo o negativo – che potrebbero determinarsi in forza di un utilizzo costante del dissent. A seguire, ampio spazio sarà dedicato alle origini storiche del voto non maggioritario in alcuni ordinamenti costituzionali (Regno Unito, Stati Uniti, Germania), nonché in alcune esperienze di diritto internazionale e sovranazionale (Tribunali internazionali, Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo e, pur in assenza di una formalizzazione del dissenso, Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea). Una volta ricostruite le origini storiche del voto particular nell’ordinamento giurisdizionale spagnolo, attenzione specifica sarà dedicata alla sua introduzione e sviluppo nei corrispondenti organi di giustizia costituzionale, dal Tribunal de Garantias Constitucionales repubblicano al Tribunal Constitucional: quest’ultimo, in particolare, costituirà il fulcro centrale delle riflessioni del lavoro di tesi. In particolare l’obiettivo principale di tale sezione consisterà altresì in una rilettura “moderna” e contestualizzata, indicativamente all’ultimo decennio (2009-2019), di alcuni lavori sul tema di grandi Maestri del diritto (spagnoli e non), al fine di comprendere se ed in quale misura le riflessioni da costoro elaborate siano ancora attuali o impongano un riassestamento degli equilibri raggiunti in ordine agli sviluppi del voto “non maggioritario”. A seguire, l’analisi si concentrerà sull’esperienza italiana. Nel dettaglio, si ricostruiranno i corposi dibattiti dottrinali sviluppati sul punto, raffrontandoli con i numerosi tentativi che sono stati fatti (a distinti livelli normativi e sempre in modo infruttuoso) per un’introduzione dell’opinione dissenziente nel sistema di giustizia costituzionale. In tale direzione, un rilievo specifico verrà dedicato alle implicazioni derivanti dalla fondamentale sentenza n. 18/1989 della Corte Costituzionale – la quale sembrava avere finalmente aperto gli argini alla possibilità di un’introduzione "italiana" del dissent – nonché allo stimolante confronto di posizioni relativo alla tipologia di fonte normativa deputata alla realizzazione di una siffatta innovazione, oscillando tra stretta legalità ed opportunità. Da ultimo, si cercherà di sviluppare alcune riflessioni in un’ottica “prospettica”, che guardi cioè alle possibili evoluzioni dell’istituto (pubblico, motivato e nominativo) del dissenso giudiziario. In conclusione, traendo stimolo del recente quarantennale della Costituzione spagnola, si farà il punto sull’evoluzione e attuale vitalità del voto particular, in un’ottica che possa parallelamente fungere anche da stimolo per una ripresa del dibattito – e soprattutto, per una sua materiale implementazione – anche nell’ordinamento italiano, da sempre sospettoso (quando non contrario) di fronte all’introduzione dell’opinione dissenziente.
The present Ph.D. thesis wants to analyse the role of dissenting opinions in Spain and Italy, especially considering the functioning of their Constitutional Courts. The first Chapter will deal with the theoretical reasons both in favour of and against the dissenting opinions from a historical, legal, institutional and political point of view. In detail, it will consider how the presence or absence of dissent can influence other concrete topics, such as the public role of judges, the independence of the judiciary and the consequences on the way majorities are shaped and opinions of the Court are written. The second Chapter will explore the historical origins of the dissenting opinion in some legal systems that accept it (UK, United States, Germany), as well as in some international and supranational Courts (European Court of Human Rights and European Court of Justice). The third and fourth Chapter will reflect on the origins and development of the "voto particular" in the Spanish system of constitutional review, from the Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales (created by the Republican Constitution of 1931) to the Tribunal Constitucional of the democratic (and post-dictatorial) Constitution of 1978. In detail, the thesis will deal with the jurisprudence of the Tribunal Constitucional in the last ten years (2009-2019), looking at the impact of the dissenting opinion on its judgments. The fifth (and final) Chapter will consider the history and activity of the Italian Constitutional Court, starting from the reflections written by some of the most brilliant legal scholars and the legislative proposals that were (unsuccessfully) made in order to introduce the dissenting opinion in the Constitution or in ordinary laws. Finally, some thoughts will be written about the possibility of introducing the dissenting opinion also in Italy, considering in a comparative perspective how the Spanish legal system has dealt with it in the last forty years.

Conjuntamente con la propuesta curricular de educación moral para las edades 12-14 años - propuesta que se fundamenta tanto en su marco teórico, como en el proceso seguido de cara a su elaboración -, se pretende profundizar en el juicio moral y en el dit (Rest, 1990) como instrumento de evaluación del mismo por lo que respecta a las edades comprendidas entre 12 y 16 años. Para ello fue necesario traducir y adaptar el instrumento en cuestión a la población española como tarea previa al estudio del juicio moral en jóvenes de Barcelona de edades comprendidas entre 12 y 16 años en situación de educación formal. Los resultados obtenidos apuntan hacia una educación del instrumento como herramienta de investigación también en estas edades iniciales de aplicación.

On October 1, 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front launched a war from and with the support of the Republic of Uganda against Rwanda. This war was accompanied by unspeakable violations of International Humanitarian Law. Both conflicting parties violated the basic rules protecting the civilian population in situations of armed conflicts. The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, passed resolution 955 of November 8, 1994 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute alleged responsible of such violations. This study investigates the background of the ICTR and questions the nature of the conflict that prompted the Security Council to establish another ad hoc international criminal tribunal after the one established for the former Yugoslavia. It further inquires into its jurisprudence and reflects critically on the ICTR's approach to serious violations of IHL under Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II.
Jurisprudence
LL. M. (Law)

AbstractThis chapter reflects on the impact of Turkey’s authoritarian neoliberal governance on the transformation of civil society with a particular focus on latent counter-mobilisation. The first section focuses on how Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) has transformed civic space through a selective approach that switches between repression and facilitation. The AKP represses autonomous and dissident organisations and activists through judicial harassment and new regulations while facilitating the growth of a government-oriented civil society sector (GONGOs). The GONGOs fulfil two aims: softening the immediate effects of the state’s withdrawal from social provision and generating bottom-up consent for authoritarian neoliberal governance. The second section analyses resistance against the AKP’s authoritarian neoliberalism by focusing on the case of a unique social movement, Müslüman Sol hareket (Muslim Left movement), which fuses class politics with Islamic social justice. Based on insights from original fieldwork and interviews with activists conducted in 2018–2019 in Turkey, the discussion demonstrates that the syncretic amalgamation of socialism with Islamic justice has emerged at the unexpected intersections of ideologies and everyday experiences and challenges simultaneously the AKP’s neoliberal exploitation, instrumentalisation and politicisation of religion, and authoritarian governance.

Chapter 12 is about Justice Washington’s final years on the Supreme Court. His most notable opinion in this era came in Ogden v. Saunders, in which he upheld the constitutionality of prospective state bankruptcy laws over the dissent of Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story. Ogden provides a fine example of Washington’s judging method, and this chapter reviews his notes, his opinion, and his responses to the chief justice’s dissent. The chapter concludes with the justice’s death in 1829 and the tributes that followed.

This essay commences with a discussion of how Justice Chelameswar’s dissenting judgment in the NJAC Case understands the basic structure doctrine. Moving ahead, the essay dissects the methodology adopted by Justice Chelameswar for assessing the validity of a constitutional amendment tested against the basic structure, and its application for testing the validity of the 99th Amendment to the Constitution. This essay appreciates Justice Chelameswar’s understanding of the separation of powers principle insofar as he acknowledges that a strict insulation of the branches of the government is impractical. The author brings to light Justice Chelameswar’s careful understanding of the constitutional relationship between the executive and the judiciary in light of the separation of powers principle, and how that cannot be lost in an over-emphasis on select instances from constitutional history of executive interference in judicial appointments.