Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Journalism – united states – style manuals »

For decades, product placement and branded content have invaded more entertainment-oriented media forms; today, the rise of brand journalism (i.e. native advertising and content marketing) suggests that advertisers are now targeting news as a genre for commercial schemes. This article examines that practice through a critical analysis of advertising industry discourse including 28 in-depth interviews with brand journalism practitioners in the United States along with a decade of trade press coverage. It sketches the first historical trajectory of brand journalism and contextualizes the media industry factors that motivate participants’ exploration of it as a promotional vehicle. Drawing upon guerrilla marketing theory, this article further documents how brand journalism evinces a fundamental commercial self-effacement at its core – in mimicking journalistic style and substance – and thus portends a redefinition of advertising as a visible mass communication form.

Spanish picaresque literature has an extensive literary tradition dating back to the SpanishGolden Age. While its development is associated primarily with Spain, its influence wasfelt in many Latin American countries, including in many texts in the past as well as in ourdays. The purpose of this essay is to show how Enrique´s Journey by Sonia Nazario retainsmany similar characteristics of the Spanish picaresque novel, while also distancing itselffrom this style through the use of testimonial discourse. The writer has used manytechniques from new journalism in order to paint a realistic picture of the social realityrelated to the mass immigration of Central Americans to the United States.

Probably, the beginning of the pro-American trend in the development of Korean media was the editorial policy of the Korean media in the middle of the 20th century. This assumption is tested with the help of historical and typological analysis of the Korean mass media during the period of the American military administration in 1945-1948. In in the context of the media, a characteristic of the political situation of that period is given. A comparative descriptive method and a classification method were applied. Previously unpublished information about the structure, language, and style, circulation, audience, thematic focus of two newspapers, the most popular at that time in Korea, is presented. In addition, the most significant personalities in the field of journalism of the designated period are identified. This study not only provides an insight into the political situation and journalism of 1945-1948 but also draws attention to the origins of the long-term influence that the United States of America had on the ideological transformation of the Korean media. It was discovered that at first the American military administration in Korea guaranteed and supported freedom of the press, then an anti-communist policy was inspired and mainly pro-American publications remained in Korea. Thus, it is from the time when Korea was ruled by the American military administration that the Korean media has been favorable to the United States and negative to its opponents.

Analysis of the text and the context of screen production is a necessary link for comprehending social processes. Capturing time through the screen and film images allows us to form an idea of the actual cultural, aesthetic, ideological (value) specificity of society. Whether cinema is a reflection of the truth of life, or a form of secondary communication, or a means of formation of viewers’ worldview positions, are the questions, the relevance of which has increased significantly against the geopolitical background of the first quarter of the 21st century. This article is an attempt to analyze how it works today in the US—using some examples of political cinema in conjunction with the media agenda. According to my study, the specific potential of cinema, combining different ways of communication and information, clearly highlights the American socio-political realities. As the traditional frameworks of filmmaking expand (meaning the Internetization of space and the possibility to shoot a movie on a mobile device), the specifics of filmmakers’ work are transforming too: a more active use of media principles of presenting socially significant information is noted, and the stylistics of materials change as well (shifting to journalism, keen satire or sharp documentary style). The article traces the influence of modern media on the film content and examines the most famous “politically charged” films against the background of the centerpiece of the American domestic politics—the presidential elections.

George Floyd’s fatal police encounter sparked the largest social justice movement in American history. Black press journalists in the United States found themselves documenting and coping with Black trauma as they performed their duties in pandemic-mandated isolation. Through semi-structured interviews with digital Black press journalists, this study, which was conducted between 2020 and 2021, explores the reporting and personal strategies these journalists deployed during tumultuous times. We found they (1) provided humanizing and ongoing social justice coverage; (2) relied on Black experts, activists, and their readers as sources; (3) created social media content that appealed to Black and non-Black audiences; and (4) cared for each other and readers to build intracultural support. Our findings illuminate how the digital Black press practiced “movement journalism,” an approach that centers oppressed people and counters protest paradigm-style coverage.

The research problem lies in the ambiguity of the usage of propaganda contents by two main media outlets (the Russian RT and American Alhurra) in their news coverage of the Syrian crisis through their websites and the methods used by them to convince users taking into account the mutual propaganda conflict between the United States and Russia in the war against Syria. The objectives of the research can be represented by the following: investigating the contents of American and Russian electronic propaganda towards Syrian crisis. • Identifying the contents that received most of the coverage in the Syrian crisis by the two news outlets. • Identifying the terms and phrases that have been most used by the websites of RT and Alhurra. • Investigating the diversity in the use of explanatory and persuasive techniques such as info graphic by both websites. The research can be classified under descriptive researches. The survey methodology has been adopted and the content analysis has been used. The research population consists of all the news reports that were published on RT and Alhurra websites on Syrian crisis from 11/ 01/ 2006 to 12/ 31/ 2006 according to the comprehensive sampling method. The number of the news reports that were analyzed was (466), (327) from RT website and (89) from Alhurrah. The research tools included (scientific observation), interview and (coding scheme). The most important results of the research are: 1. The Syrian president Bashar al-Asad: the Russian propaganda focused on supporting him, and to ensure that he remained in office, while US propaganda focused on removing him from power. 2. The characters of the presidents: the Russian propaganda focused on the character of the Russian president Vladimir Putin, while the American propaganda did not amplify the character of US president Barack Obama. 3. The style of repetition ranked first among the other Russian propaganda styles in support of its ally al-Asad in the battle of Aleppo, while the distortion style ranked first among the American propaganda styles to show a negative image of al-Asad and his allies. 4. The Russian propaganda described the Russian-Syrian operations as (liberation operations), while the American propaganda described it as (brutal murdering), (random bombing), (crimes against humanity), (war crimes), and (massacre). 5. Al-hurrah website has not used an infographic, while the RT website has published 3 info graphs that denote the Russian propaganda dependence on diversity in electronic journalism by following intimidation policy with the enemies to manifest the Russian military power during Aleppo battle.

The following press sections are a collection that emerged from an inductive-deductive analysis of 26 periodicals from Germany, South Africa and the US. Overlaps on big topics were found and sub-topics assigned accordingly (Pentzold & Knorr, 2024). Field of Application/Theoretical Foundation Journalists usually publish their articles in topic-specific sections. The decision on the section, i.e., the journalistic placement within a thematic context, can already be seen as part of framing (preframing) on the part of the publishers, journalists and the recipients (Scheufele, 2004). Example studies: Pentzold & Knorr (2024) & Wessler et al. (2016) Information on Wesser et al., 2016 Authors: Hartmut Wessler, Antal Wozniak, Lutz Hofer, and Julia Lück Research questions: Which topics and frames as well as which visual elements such as photos, diagrams and graphics are present in the press reporting on climate change in the context of four UN climate conferences (2010-2013), in different countries and coming from different journalists? Object of analysis: A comparative issue-specific multimodal news frame analysis of climate change coverage around the UN Climate Change Conferences in Cancún, Mexico (COP 16, 2010), Durban, South Africa (COP 17, 2011), Doha, Qatar (COP 18, 2012), and Warsaw, Poland (COP 19, 2013). Both textual and visual content elements were analyzed and then incorporated into a joint cluster analysis. Time frame of analysis: Event-based sampling around the UN Climate Change Conferences in Cancún, Mexico (COP 16, 2010); Durban, South Africa (COP 17, 2011); Doha, Qatar (COP 18, 2012); and Warsaw, Poland (COP 19, 2013). Analyzed media type: Newspapers from five countries: Brazil (Folha de Sao Paolo, O Globo), Germany (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), India (Times of India, The Hindu), South Africa (Daily Sun, The Star), the United States (New York Times, Washington Post) Information about variable: Variable/name definition: Section of newspaper / magazine / news website [Section] Scale: Nominal Level of analysis: News article Sample operationalization: The position of the press article was coded, referring to its placement in the overall press outlet (front page, inside the newspaper, commentaries etc. distinguishable by distinct layout features such as a different font for headlines and the naming of authors). Values: 1 Politics; 2 Economy / Business; 3 Opinion / Letters to the editor; 4 Culture & Arts / Feuilleton / Media; 5 Local news; 6 Science/Technology; 7 Environment; 8 Miscellaneous /Human interest; 9 Supplement with editorial responsibility of media outlet; 997 Other; 998 Unclear; 999 Not applicable Reliability: In sum, intercoder reliability achieved at least a .70 level (six coders). Codebook: Wessler et al. (2016) Information on Pentzold & Knorr, 2024 Authors: Christian Pentzold and Charlotte Knorr Research questions: With which imaginaries do journalistic reports make sense of Big Data? (RQ1) How do these imaginaries evolve over time? (RQ2) To what extent are the imaginaries similar or different across countries? (RQ3) Object of analysis [and analyzed media type]: The project Framing Big Data (DFG 2021-2024) analyzed the media-communicatively articulated frames on “Big Data” in online press aggregates of newspapers and magazines in three countries: South Africa, Germany and the United States. No visual material was collected or examined. In total, the coded press aggregates of 26 newspapers and magazines were analyzed. The period of collected press articles was from 2011 to 2020 (N=1,456 press articles). Hereby, the online press articles had to contain the keywords “big data” or “dataf*” (e.g., datafication, datafied) in the headline, sub-headline and/or first paragraph (inclusion criteria). Time frame of analysis: 2011, Jan 1 – 2020, Dec 31 Analyzed media type: Online press aggregates from newspapers and magazines in three countries: South Africa, Germany, and the United States. In sum, the coded press aggregates were sampled from 26 periodicals. Codebook: Public_Codebook_FBD_fin.pdf Information about the variable Variable name/definition: Press sections in online newspapers. This variable was created from a compilation of sections found in most newspapers, supplemented by newspaper-specific subsections. It is a comprehensive collection of all sections present in newspapers from three countries (Germany: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, ZEIT online, WirtschaftsWoche, Handelsblatt, taz, Welt online, Spiegel online, wired, c’t; South Africa: NAG, The Star, Financial Mail, Business Day, Sunday Times, Brainstorm Magazine, Tech Central, Mail & Guardian, Stuff Magazine; USA: New York Times, Washington Post, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Newsweek, Brainstorm). Since some newspapers – such as Süddeutsche Zeitung or The Star – have detailed sections for specific regions and others like Forbes, Stuff Magazine and Handelsblatt feature sections on specific technical/economic topics, all editorial sections were recorded by hand and manually bundled according to superordinate categories (e.g., Economics, Science, Success, Society) and subcategories to be able to map the characteristic sections across newspapers. The aim was to be able to also code sections that are specific to one magazine while assuring combability with the structure of other outlets. Scale: Nominal Level of analysis: Formal level (press article), coded as press product and as part of the discourse (formal variables, content variables; article unit) Sample operationalization: Code the press section that is depicted on the top of the article. Not every journal clearly depicts the section their articles are published in (especially online). Do not confuse key words with sections. Values: 1. Politics (domestic and foreign affairs, network policies, courts and law, fact checks); 2. Economics (Banks, Energy, Industry, Stocks, Taxes, Real Estate, Cars); 3. Technology/Science (Knowledge, Research, IT, Digital, Traffic and Mobility, Work, Ecology); 4. Business (Finances, Companies, Investments); 5. Culture (Media, Books, Movies, Art, Travel, Fashion, Food, Regional); 6. Society (Style, Discover, Research, Reports, Ideas, ZEITmagazin, ze.tt, Z2X, Podcasts, Feuilleton); 7. Opinion (Columns, Comments, Guest Articles, Debate) ; 8. Global Crisis (Ukraine, Covid-19, Climate change); 9. Success (Management, Coaching, Trends, Career, Job, Universities); 10. Health/Medicine; 11. Regional; 12. Headlines; 13. Sports; -97 not visible; -98 unclear; -99 not applicable (one code per news article) Reliability: α = 1.00 [Krippendorff’s alpha, intercoder reliability. A total of seven reliability tests were conducted, five of them during the coding phase and two as part of two pretests. Five coders were involved in four tests, four coders were involved in three tests. All tests were conducted in the period July 2022 to December 2022]. References Jasanoff, S. (2015). Future Imperfect. In S. Jasanoff & S. Kim (Eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity (pp. 1–33). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pentzold, C. & Knorr, C. (2024). Making Sense of “Big Data”: Ten Years of Discourse Around Datafication (ICA 2024, 74th Conference, Gold Coast, Australia). Pentzold, C., & Knorr, C. (2021-2024). Framing Big Data (DFG). Leipzig University. Scheufele, B. (2004). Framing-effects approach: A theoretical and methodological critique. Communications, 29(4), 401–428. Wessler, H., Wozniak, A., Hofer, L., & Lück, J. (2016). Global Multimodal News Frames on Climate Change: A Comparison of Five Democracies around the World. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 21(4), 423–445. doi: 10.1177/1940161216661848

History is not over and that includes media history. Jay Rosen (Zelizer & Allan 33) The media in their reporting on terrorism tend to be judgmental, inflammatory, and sensationalistic. — Susan D. Moeller (169) In short, we are directed in time, and our relation to the future is different than our relation to the past. All our questions are conditioned by this asymmetry, and all our answers to these questions are equally conditioned by it. Norbert Wiener (44) The Clash of Geopolitical Pundits America’s geo-strategic engagement with the world underwent a dramatic shift in the decade after the Cold War ended. United States military forces undertook a series of humanitarian interventions from northern Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1992) to NATO’s bombing campaign on Kosovo (1999). Wall Street financial speculators embraced market-oriented globalization and technology-based industries (Friedman 1999). Meanwhile the geo-strategic pundits debated several different scenarios at deeper layers of epistemology and macrohistory including the breakdown of nation-states (Kaplan), the ‘clash of civilizations’ along religiopolitical fault-lines (Huntington) and the fashionable ‘end of history’ thesis (Fukuyama). Media theorists expressed this geo-strategic shift in reference to the ‘CNN Effect’: the power of real-time media ‘to provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to both global and national events’ (Robinson 2). This media ecology is often contrasted with ‘Gateholder’ and ‘Manufacturing Consent’ models. The ‘CNN Effect’ privileges humanitarian and non-government organisations whereas the latter models focus upon the conformist mind-sets and shared worldviews of government and policy decision-makers. The September 11 attacks generated an uncertain interdependency between the terrorists, government officials, and favourable media coverage. It provided a test case, as had the humanitarian interventions (Robinson 37) before it, to test the claim by proponents that the ‘CNN Effect’ had policy leverage during critical stress points. The attacks also revived a long-running debate in media circles about the risk factors of global media. McLuhan (1964) and Ballard (1990) had prophesied that the global media would pose a real-time challenge to decision-making processes and that its visual imagery would have unforeseen psychological effects on viewers. Wark (1994) noted that journalists who covered real-time events including the Wall Street crash (1987) and collapse of the Berlin Wall (1989) were traumatised by their ‘virtual’ geographies. The ‘War on Terror’ as 21st Century Myth Three recent books explore how the 1990s humanitarian interventions and the September 11 attacks have remapped this ‘virtual’ territory with all too real consequences. Piers Robinson’s The CNN Effect (2002) critiques the theory and proposes the policy-media interaction model. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allan’s anthology Journalism After September 11 (2002) examines how September 11 affected the journalists who covered it and the implications for news values. Sandra Silberstein’s War of Words (2002) uncovers how strategic language framed the U.S. response to September 11. Robinson provides the contextual background; Silberstein contributes the specifics; and Zelizer and Allan surface broader perspectives. These books offer insights into the social construction of the nebulous War on Terror and why certain images and trajectories were chosen at the expense of other possibilities. Silberstein locates this world-historical moment in the three-week transition between September 11’s aftermath and the U.S. bombings of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. Descriptions like the ‘War on Terror’ and ‘Axis of Evil’ framed the U.S. military response, provided a conceptual justification for the bombings, and also brought into being the geo-strategic context for other nations. The crucial element in this process was when U.S. President George W. Bush adopted a pedagogical style for his public speeches, underpinned by the illusions of communal symbols and shared meanings (Silberstein 6-8). Bush’s initial address to the nation on September 11 invoked the ambiguous pronoun ‘we’ to recreate ‘a unified nation, under God’ (Silberstein 4). The 1990s humanitarian interventions had frequently been debated in Daniel Hallin’s sphere of ‘legitimate controversy’; however the grammar used by Bush and his political advisers located the debate in the sphere of ‘consensus’. This brief period of enforced consensus was reinforced by the structural limitations of North American media outlets. September 11 combined ‘tragedy, public danger and a grave threat to national security’, Michael Schudson observed, and in the aftermath North American journalism shifted ‘toward a prose of solidarity rather than a prose of information’ (Zelizer & Allan 41). Debate about why America was hated did not go much beyond Bush’s explanation that ‘they hated our freedoms’ (Silberstein 14). Robert W. McChesney noted that alternatives to the ‘war’ paradigm were rarely mentioned in the mainstream media (Zelizer & Allan 93). A new myth for the 21st century had been unleashed. The Cycle of Integration Propaganda Journalistic prose masked the propaganda of social integration that atomised the individual within a larger collective (Ellul). The War on Terror was constructed by geopolitical pundits as a Manichean battle between ‘an “evil” them and a national us’ (Silberstein 47). But the national crisis made ‘us’ suddenly problematic. Resurgent patriotism focused on the American flag instead of Constitutional rights. Debates about military tribunals and the USA Patriot Act resurrected the dystopian fears of a surveillance society. New York City mayor Rudy Guiliani suddenly became a leadership icon and Time magazine awarded him Person of the Year (Silberstein 92). Guiliani suggested at the Concert for New York on 20 October 2001 that ‘New Yorkers and Americans have been united as never before’ (Silberstein 104). Even the series of Public Service Announcements created by the Ad Council and U.S. advertising agencies succeeded in blurring the lines between cultural tolerance, social inclusion, and social integration (Silberstein 108-16). In this climate the in-depth discussion of alternate options and informed dissent became thought-crimes. The American Council of Trustees and Alumni’s report Defending Civilization: How Our Universities are Failing America (2002), which singled out “blame America first” academics, ignited a firestorm of debate about educational curriculums, interpreting history, and the limits of academic freedom. Silberstein’s perceptive analysis surfaces how ACTA assumed moral authority and collective misunderstandings as justification for its interrogation of internal enemies. The errors she notes included presumed conclusions, hasty generalisations, bifurcated worldviews, and false analogies (Silberstein 133, 135, 139, 141). Op-ed columnists soon exposed ACTA’s gambit as a pre-packaged witch-hunt. But newscasters then channel-skipped into military metaphors as the Afghanistan campaign began. The weeks after the attacks New York City sidewalk traders moved incense and tourist photos to make way for World Trade Center memorabilia and anti-Osama shirts. Chevy and Ford morphed September 11 catchphrases (notably Todd Beamer’s last words “Let’s Roll” on Flight 93) and imagery into car advertising campaigns (Silberstein 124-5). American self-identity was finally reasserted in the face of a domestic recession through this wave of vulgar commercialism. The ‘Simulated’ Fall of Elite Journalism For Columbia University professor James Carey the ‘failure of journalism on September 11’ signaled the ‘collapse of the elites of American journalism’ (Zelizer & Allan 77). Carey traces the rise-and-fall of adversarial and investigative journalism from the Pentagon Papers and Watergate through the intermediation of the press to the myopic self-interest of the 1988 and 1992 Presidential campaigns. Carey’s framing echoes the earlier criticisms of Carl Bernstein and Hunter S. Thompson. However this critique overlooks several complexities. Piers Robinson cites Alison Preston’s insight that diplomacy, geopolitics and elite reportage defines itself through the sense of distance from its subjects. Robinson distinguished between two reportage types: distance framing ‘creates emotional distance’ between the viewers and victims whilst support framing accepts the ‘official policy’ (28). The upsurge in patriotism, the vulgar commercialism, and the mini-cycle of memorabilia and publishing all combined to enhance the support framing of the U.S. federal government. Empathy generated for September 11’s victims was tied to support of military intervention. However this closeness rapidly became the distance framing of the Afghanistan campaign. News coverage recycled the familiar visuals of in-progress bombings and Taliban barbarians. The alternative press, peace movements, and social activists then retaliated against this coverage by reinstating the support framing that revealed structural violence and gave voice to silenced minorities and victims. What really unfolded after September 11 was not the demise of journalism’s elite but rather the renegotiation of reportage boundaries and shared meanings. Journalists scoured the Internet for eyewitness accounts and to interview survivors (Zelizer & Allan 129). The same medium was used by others to spread conspiracy theories and viral rumors that numerology predicted the date September 11 or that the “face of Satan” could be seen in photographs of the World Trade Center (Zelizer & Allan 133). Karim H. Karim notes that the Jihad frame of an “Islamic Peril” was socially constructed by media outlets but then challenged by individual journalists who had learnt ‘to question the essentialist bases of her own socialization and placing herself in the Other’s shoes’ (Zelizer & Allan 112). Other journalists forgot that Jihad and McWorld were not separate but two intertwined worldviews that fed upon each other. The September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center also had deep symbolic resonances for American sociopolitical ideals that some journalists explored through analysis of myths and metaphors. The Rise of Strategic Geography However these renegotiated boundariesof new media, multiperspectival frames, and ‘layered’ depth approaches to issues analysiswere essentially minority reports. The rationalist mode of journalism was soon reasserted through normative appeals to strategic geography. The U.S. networks framed their documentaries on Islam and the Middle East in bluntly realpolitik terms. The documentary “Minefield: The United States and the Muslim World” (ABC, 11 October 2001) made explicit strategic assumptions of ‘the U.S. as “managing” the region’ and ‘a definite tinge of superiority’ (Silberstein 153). ABC and CNN stressed the similarities between the world’s major monotheistic religions and their scriptural doctrines. Both networks limited their coverage of critiques and dissent to internecine schisms within these traditions (Silberstein 158). CNN also created different coverage for its North American and international audiences. The BBC was more cautious in its September 11 coverage and more global in outlook. Three United Kingdom specials – Panorama (Clash of Cultures, BBC1, 21 October 2001), Question Time (Question Time Special, BBC1, 13 September 2001), and “War Without End” (War on Trial, Channel 4, 27 October 2001) – drew upon the British traditions of parliamentary assembly, expert panels, and legal trials as ways to explore the multiple dimensions of the ‘War on Terror’ (Zelizer & Allan 180). These latter debates weren’t value free: the programs sanctioned ‘a tightly controlled and hierarchical agora’ through different containment strategies (Zelizer & Allan 183). Program formats, selected experts and presenters, and editorial/on-screen graphics were factors that pre-empted the viewer’s experience and conclusions. The traditional emphasis of news values on the expert was renewed. These subtle forms of thought-control enabled policy-makers to inform the public whilst inoculating them against terrorist propaganda. However the ‘CNN Effect’ also had counter-offensive capabilities. Osama bin Laden’s videotaped sermons and the al-Jazeera network’s broadcasts undermined the psychological operations maxim that enemies must not gain access to the mindshare of domestic audiences. Ingrid Volkmer recounts how the Los Angeles based National Iranian Television Network used satellite broadcasts to criticize the Iranian leadership and spark public riots (Zelizer & Allan 242). These incidents hint at why the ‘War on Terror’ myth, now unleashed upon the world, may become far more destabilizing to the world system than previous conflicts. Risk Reportage and Mediated Trauma When media analysts were considering the ‘CNN Effect’ a group of social contract theorists including Anthony Giddens, Zygmunt Bauman, and Ulrich Beck were debating, simultaneously, the status of modernity and the ‘unbounded contours’ of globalization. Beck termed this new environment of escalating uncertainties and uninsurable dangers the ‘world risk society’ (Beck). Although they drew upon constructivist and realist traditions Beck and Giddens ‘did not place risk perception at the center of their analysis’ (Zelizer & Allan 203). Instead this was the role of journalist as ‘witness’ to Ballard-style ‘institutionalized disaster areas’. The terrorist attacks on September 11 materialized this risk and obliterated the journalistic norms of detachment and objectivity. The trauma ‘destabilizes a sense of self’ within individuals (Zelizer & Allan 205) and disrupts the image-generating capacity of collective societies. Barbie Zelizer found that the press selection of September 11 photos and witnesses re-enacted the ‘Holocaust aesthetic’ created when Allied Forces freed the Nazi internment camps in 1945 (Zelizer & Allan 55-7). The visceral nature of September 11 imagery inverted the trend, from the Gulf War to NATO’s Kosovo bombings, for news outlets to depict war in detached video-game imagery (Zelizer & Allan 253). Coverage of the September 11 attacks and the subsequent Bali bombings (on 12 October 2002) followed a four-part pattern news cycle of assassinations and terrorism (Moeller 164-7). Moeller found that coverage moved from the initial event to a hunt for the perpetrators, public mourning, and finally, a sense of closure ‘when the media reassert the supremacy of the established political and social order’ (167). In both events the shock of the initial devastation was rapidly followed by the arrest of al Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiyah members, the creation and copying of the New York Times ‘Portraits of Grief’ template, and the mediation of trauma by a re-established moral order. News pundits had clearly studied the literature on bereavement and grief cycles (Kubler-Ross). However the neo-noir work culture of some outlets also fueled bitter disputes about how post-traumatic stress affected journalists themselves (Zelizer & Allan 253). Reconfiguring the Future After September 11 the geopolitical pundits, a reactive cycle of integration propaganda, pecking order shifts within journalism elites, strategic language, and mediated trauma all combined to bring a specific future into being. This outcome reflected the ‘media-state relationship’ in which coverage ‘still reflected policy preferences of parts of the U.S. elite foreign-policy-making community’ (Robinson 129). Although Internet media and non-elite analysts embraced Hallin’s ‘sphere of deviance’ there is no clear evidence yet that they have altered the opinions of policy-makers. The geopolitical segue from September 11 into the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq also has disturbing implications for the ‘CNN Effect’. Robinson found that its mythic reputation was overstated and tied to issues of policy certainty that the theory’s proponents often failed to examine. Media coverage molded a ‘domestic constituency ... for policy-makers to take action in Somalia’ (Robinson 62). He found greater support in ‘anecdotal evidence’ that the United Nations Security Council’s ‘safe area’ for Iraqi Kurds was driven by Turkey’s geo-strategic fears of ‘unwanted Kurdish refugees’ (Robinson 71). Media coverage did impact upon policy-makers to create Bosnian ‘safe areas’, however, ‘the Kosovo, Rwanda, and Iraq case studies’ showed that the ‘CNN Effect’ was unlikely as a key factor ‘when policy certainty exists’ (Robinson 118). The clear implication from Robinson’s studies is that empathy framing, humanitarian values, and searing visual imagery won’t be enough to challenge policy-makers. What remains to be done? Fortunately there are some possibilities that straddle the pragmatic, realpolitik and emancipatory approaches. Today’s activists and analysts are also aware of the dangers of ‘unfreedom’ and un-reflective dissent (Fromm). Peter Gabriel’s organisation Witness, which documents human rights abuses, is one benchmark of how to use real-time media and the video camera in an effective way. The domains of anthropology, negotiation studies, neuro-linguistics, and social psychology offer valuable lessons on techniques of non-coercive influence. The emancipatory tradition of futures studies offers a rich tradition of self-awareness exercises, institution rebuilding, and social imaging, offsets the pragmatic lure of normative scenarios. The final lesson from these books is that activists and analysts must co-adapt as the ‘War on Terror’ mutates into new and terrifying forms. Works Cited Amis, Martin. “Fear and Loathing.” The Guardian (18 Sep. 2001). 1 March 2001 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4259170,00.php>. Ballard, J.G. The Atrocity Exhibition (rev. ed.). Los Angeles: V/Search Publications, 1990. Beck, Ulrich. World Risk Society. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1999. Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. New York: Vintage Books, 1973. Friedman, Thomas. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999. Fromm, Erich. Escape from Freedom. New York: Farrar & Rhinehart, 1941. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Kaplan, Robert. The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War. New York: Random House, 2000. Kubler-Ross, Elizabeth. On Death and Dying. London: Tavistock, 1969. McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964. Moeller, Susan D. Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War, and Death. New York: Routledge, 1999. Robinson, Piers. The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention. New York: Routledge, 2002. Silberstein, Sandra. War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11. New York: Routledge, 2002. Wark, McKenzie. Virtual Geography: Living with Global Media Events. Bloomington IN: Indiana UP, 1994. Wiener, Norbert. Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1948. Zelizer, Barbie, and Stuart Allan (eds.). Journalism after September 11. New York: Routledge, 2002. Links http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0 Citation reference for this article Substitute your date of access for Dn Month Year etc... MLA Style Burns, Alex. "The Worldflash of a Coming Future" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture< http://www.media-culture.org.au/0304/08-worldflash.php>. APA Style Burns, A. (2003, Apr 23). The Worldflash of a Coming Future. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture, 6,< http://www.media-culture.org.au/0304/08-worldflash.php>

There was a moment just after September 11, 2001, that many commentators heralded the end of our celebrity obsessions and the emergence of a new sobriety in politics and culture. We had the mediated version of atonement when the famous presented their most serious sides for television specials in support of the families of the victims of the September 11 attacks. But within a matter of weeks the celebrity industry was back on its old track – salacious rumors about J-Lo and her movement through the entertainment industry A-List, further debates about the propriety of Michael Jackson’s behaviour, Demi Moore’s new love interest Ashton Kutcher – who is and was young enough to be her son and so on. The machine and industry that had been in place tested whether it could continue its dance with public intimacy and private turmoils of the rich and famed. Fame is both fickle and incredibly enduring. It relies on a public individual’s connection to an audience and how that persona can embody some form of affective investment (Marshall, Celebrity and Power). Audience’s loyalty can migrate, but the machinery of fame can produce new variations for newly minted moments of affection or even its opposite, intense dislike. What is enduring is the process. There is the manufacture of celebrities and stars that were produced with regularity by the old movie studios in the first half of the twentieth century that are now produced with astonishing levels of success through the current array of reality/game shows via television. Beyond these public variations, there is the will-to-fame that is expressed by the various webcam sites and weblogs where a new era of public narcissism is mutating with new media forms. This issue deals with fame; but it is not alone. The academy has embraced the study of celebrity and fame over the last decade and it has accelerated in recent years. Sport stardom (Andrews and Jackson), film stardom (Austin and Barker), literary celebrity (Moran; Glass), journalism and celebrity (Ponce de Leon; Marshall, “Intimately Intertwined”), the psychology of fame (Giles), and media and the celebrity (Turner; Marshall, Celebrity and Power) have appeared as full-fledged books with the regularity that echoes the celebrity system’s own production process. This burgeoning interest in fame cuts across disciplinary study in surprising ways. Chris Rojek’s discussion of religion and celebrity is but one interesting recent variation in the study of fame (Rojek). The interest in this issue has been impressive and, for an editor, at times overwhelming. Nonetheless, we have collected an intriguing array of articles to advance the study of fame and to engage with the way it reflects and refracts the complex crystalline structure of popular culture. Understanding fame demands a form of perceptive interdisciplinarity that our group of 18 authors has worked to achieve. Gerard Goggin and Christopher Newell’s article on how Christopher Reeve’s fame has transformed and disciplined international debates on disability to narrowly focus on the agenda of the “cure” serves as our feature article. The article paints a fascinating picture on the reconstruction of this particular dimension of the public sphere via the agency of a persona. Goggin and Newell’s writing is particularly valuable to understand the legacy of Reeve since his recent death and how it will continue to shape the concepts of disability for years if not decades to come. Dealing with Ziggy Stardust, the contrived fictional star that Bowie incarnated in the early 1970s, allows Suzanne Rintoul to work through how celebrity and fame provide a discursive narrative that can be the source for performance of the public self. Bowie plays with ironic distance that is understood as a debate about authenticity in a way that is implicitly understood as a trope of contemporary popular culture and the audience’s understanding of popular figures. William Tregonning explains that authenticity remains a central feature of how the famed – in popular music at the very least – refer to their identities. Via Britney Spears, Jennifer Lopez and Christine Aguilera, the author weaves a reading of their moments of their publicly reported self-reflection that entreats their audiences to understand their desire to be seen as real and identical to their pre-famous identities despite/because of their heavily hyped and inauthentic pop presence. Jonathan Goldman’s reading of Charlie Chaplin provides one of the more fascinating intertextual readings of how the famed persona can be used and turned back towards the production of the film narrative and how it can be read by audiences. Goldman deftly reads the closing image of the film Modern Times as an epigraph that identifies how the extratextual of celebrity and persona flow back into informing the reading of an actor’s work. And all of this “work” is done quite consciously by Chaplin as his own persona – his “trademark” as tramp – can work as a powerful shorthand for his films. Gordon Fletcher provides an entry point to determine the extent and reach of fame through a study of the frequency with which different public figures’ names are used in Internet searches. Fletcher’s work presents “an index of fame” as these particular personalities intersect with the promotional culture’s intentions via releases and with specific events that have clear connections to public individuals. The Web serves as a way to map these cultural trends in a manner that was more difficult to undertake in the past. Reality television internationally has produced famous people with astounding regularity and three of our authors have tried to address the way in which television practices have articulated fame and celebritydom. Su Holmes’s inspection of reality television programmes explicates that the production of the celebrity is revealed as much as traditional notions of earning one’s acclaim through talent, hard work and understanding the industry. Tom Mole’s “hypertrophic celebrity” refers to the way that the entertainment industry via reality television has engaged in many more ways of promoting and cross-promoting individuals through a variety of technologies and “intertextual networks”. Ultimately, it is the formats that have been more successful and sustained than any individual star that is created and quickly disappears. Mole indicates that observing this element of celebrity culture reveals a great deal about the new machinations of sophistication of the entertainment industry. Douglas Fairchild’s study of Australian Idol dovetails into Mole’s insights. One of the lacunae of research in popular music, according to Fairchild, is the operation of public relations in musical cultural production. Fairchild draws on research that discusses how the “attention economy” wraps around contemporary cultural production through the techniques of publicity and public relations to deepen their significance and play in popular culture. The decline in recorded music – or its change to downloading – has demanded a refocusing of an industry to make particular individuals as entertainment stars that move between the media of television and music (and other cultural forms and venues if possible) and thereby produce a strong divertissement for the attention economy. Fame and infamy blur in David Schmid’s study of the collection of serial killer memorabilia online. Collectors are condemned for their fascination, but contemporary culture’s relationship to the fetish objects of infamy demands a more careful reading. Schmid relates the fascination with how central serial killers are to the celebrity system and “America” and become prominent idols for consumption – to paraphrase Leo Lowenthal. In three of our articles, artistic practices are investigated but from quite different perspectives. It seems almost de rigeur to have some mention of Andy Warhol in an issue devoted to fame. Michael Angelo Tata’s work moves laterally (which is always appropriate for Warhol…) along the surface of Warhol to debate his ruminations of the fabrication of the self through his fascination and play with the world of modeling. Davin Heckman explores the production of persona not through the extensions of fame provided by contemporary mass media, but rather through the intensive production of graffiti tags in Los Angeles by the irrepressible “Chaka”. Heckman’s study of fame makes us think how the enigmatic can be played out in a geographical space (contemporary Los Angeles) that is inundated with the production of other images of fame. Carrie LeBlanc’s analysis of the British celebrity-artist Damien Hirst attempts to tread the line between the value of the artist persona to the meaning of artistic practice and what we could now call – thanks to Fairchild’s article in this issue – the ‘attention economy’ that circulates around the meaning of the artist and art work. Celebrity is integral to the interpretation of Hirst and his working class persona is integral to his play in British media as much as the meaning of his shock-art. The Harry Potter phenomenon has produced a number of famed individuals, from its author to the actors associated with the three principal roles; but this fame presents an elaborate textual field that becomes the territory of fan fiction. Lelia Green and Carmen Guinery investigate the permutations of fame that envelope fan fiction and provide one of the motivations for fan fiction authors and the expansion of their influence among fan groups. Fame is a kind of moving signification system that draws on popular culture fragments and elements to buttress the centrality of its various personalities. Mohmin Rahman has posited that David Beckham’s fame in both photos in magazines and in descriptions of his body rely knowingly on queer iconography but only as a surface meaning system. Ultimately, Beckham after playing with the codes of queer must reassert the bedrock of his identity through heterosexuality; nonetheless, Rahman identifies the uses made of queer representations in displaying the male sporting hero in the most coded way. The last two articles deal with the politics of fame and its projections on to obvious personas. Paul Allatson writes a wonderful review of the existent but non-existent Elián Gonzalez and how the virtual Elián is deployed as a persona for all sorts of positions in the United States and Cuba for specific political ends. As much as Elián was converted and passed between countries, the virtual Elián becomes a vessel for the construction of a variety of political postures that can be framed in national desires and ethnic ambitions. Kevin Howley, drawing insights from the remarkable reincarnation of the legacy of Reagan through his death and funeral, provides an outline of how the myth of the famed president is maintained and actively fostered by a variety of groups. Embedded in the production of Reagan in death is his originary filmic persona, transplanted into the Teflon presidency and finally into a conservative politics of the future of the right. This collection on the concept of fame provides an intellectual gestalt of the some of the tropes that circulate around the production of public personalities. The ephemeral nature of fame means that it can be attached to and detached from individuals relatively easily. Fame is surface meaning that may correlate with deeper issues and more profound essences, but fundamentally fame is designed to be a play on the surface and to allow that surface pattern to circulate widely across a culture or, on occasion, transculturally. Fame moves readily and easily between the domains of the public and the private for public consumption. Reading the production of fame is a reading of popular culture itself as it is reproduced and expanded via its various forms of mediation. In this issue of M/C Journal, we can see the dispositifs of how public identities – the material instances of fame production – refract publics and popular desires. Dig into the various narratives of fame that these 16 articles present – they are both intellectually challenging and – in the wonderful tradition of M/C Journal – great reads as well. References Andrews, David, and Steven Jackson (eds.). Sport Stars: The Cultural Politics of the Sporting Celebrity. London: Routledge, 2001. Austin, Thomas and Martin Barker (eds.). Contemporary Hollywood Stardom. London: Edward Arnold, 2003. Glass, Loren. Authors Inc: Literary Celebrity in the Modern United States. New York: New York UP, 2004. Marshall, P. David. “Intimately Intertwined in the Most Public Way: Celebrity and Journalism.” Journalism: Critical Issues. Ed. Stuart Allen. Maidenhead, Berkshire, UK: McGraw-Hill/Open UP, 2005. 19-29 Marshall, P. David. Celebrity and Power: Fame in Contemporary Culture. U of Minnesota P, 1997. Moran, Joe. Star Authors: Literary Celebrity in America. Pluto Press, 2000. Ponce De Leon, Charles S. Self-Exposure: Human Interest Journalism and the Emergence of Celebrity in America, 1890-1940. Chapel Hill, N.C.: U of North Carolina P, 2002. Rojek, Chris. Celebrity. London: Reaktion, 2001. Turner, Graeme. Understanding Celebrity. London: Sage, 2004. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Marshall, P. David. "Fame's Perpetual Moment." M/C Journal 7.5 (2004). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0411/01-editorial.php>. APA Style Marshall, P. (Nov. 2004) "Fame's Perpetual Moment," M/C Journal, 7(5). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0411/01-editorial.php>.

Disinformation can appear in various forms. Firstly, different formats can be manipulated, such as texts, images, and videos. Secondly, the amount and degree of falseness can vary, from completely fabricated content to decontextualized information to satire that intentionally misleads recipients. Therefore, the forms and format of disinformation might vary and differ not only between the supposedly clear categories of “true” and “false”. Field of application/theoretical foundation: Studies on types of disinformation are conducted in various fields, e.g. political communication, journalism studies, and media effects studies. Among other things, the studies identify the most common types of mis- or disinformation during certain events (Brennen, Simon, Howard, & Nielsen, 2020), analyze and categorize the behavior of different types of Twitter accounts (Linvill & Warren, 2020), and investigate the existence of serveral types of “junk news” in different national media landscapes (Bradshaw, Howard, Kollanyi, & Neudert, 2020; Neudert, Howard, & Kollanyi, 2019). References/combination with other methods of data collection: Only relatively few studies use combinations of methods. Some studies identify different types of disinformation via qualitative and quantitative content analyses (Bradshaw et al., 2020; Brennen et al., 2020; Linvill & Warren, 2020; Neudert et al., 2019). Others use surveys to analyze respondents’ concerns as well as exposure towards different types of mis- and disinformation (Fletcher, 2018). Example studies: Brennen et al. (2020); Bradshaw et al. (2020); Linvill and Warren (2020) Information on example studies: Types of disinformation are defined by the presentation and contextualization of content and sometimes additionally by details (e.g. professionalism) about the communicator. Studies either deductively identify different types of disinformation (Brennen et al., 2020) by applying the theoretical framework by Wardle (2019), or additionally inductively identify and build different categories based on content analyses (Bradshaw et al., 2020; Linvill & Warren, 2020). Table 1. Types of mis-/disinformation by Brennen et al. (2020) Category Specification Satire or parody - False connection Headlines, visuals or captions don’t support the content Misleading content Misleading use of information to frame an issue or individual, when facts/information are misrepresented or skewed False context Genuine content is shared with false contextual information, e.g. real images which have been taken out of context Imposter content Genuine sources, e.g. news outlets or government agencies, are impersonated Fabricated content Content is made up and 100% false; designed to deceive and do harm Manipulated content Genuine information or imagery is manipulated to deceive, e.g. deepfakes or other kinds of manipulation of audio and/or visuals Note. The categories are adapted from the theoretical framework by Wardle (2019). The coding instruction was: “To the best of your ability, what type of misinformation is it? (Select one that fits best.)” (Brennen et al., 2020, p. 12). The coders reached an intercoder reliability of a Cohen’s kappa of 0.82. Table 2. Criteria for the “junk news” label by Bradshaw et al. (2020) Criteria Reference Specification Professionalism refers to the information about authors and the organization “Sources do not employ the standards and best practices of professional journalism, including information about real authors, editors, and owners” (pp. 174-175). “Distinct from other forms of user-generated content and citizen journalism, junk news domains satisfy the professionalism criterion because they purposefully refrain from providing clear information about real authors, editors, publishers, and owners, and they do not publish corrections of debunked information” (p. 176). Procedure: - Systematically checked the about pages of domains: Contact information, information about ownership and editors, and other information relating to professional standards - Reviewed whether the sources appeared in third-party fact-checking reports - Checked whether sources published corrections of fact-checked reporting. Examples: zerohedge.com, conservative- fighters.org, deepstatenation.news Counterfeit refers to the layout and design of the domain itself “(…) [S]ources mimic established news reporting by using certain fonts, having branding, and employing content strategies. (…) Junk news is stylistically disguised as professional news by the inclusion of references to news agencies and credible sources as well as headlines written in a news tone with date, time, and location stamps. In the most extreme cases, outlets will copy logos and counterfeit entire domains” (p. 176). Procedure: - Systematically reviewed organizational information about the owner and headquarters by checking sources like Wikipedia, the WHOIS database, and third-party fact-checkers (like Politico or MediaBiasFactCheck) - Consulted country-specific expert knowledge of the media landscape in the US to identify counterfeiting websites. Examples: politicoinfo.com, NBC.com.co Style refers to the content of the domain as a whole “ (…) [S]tyle is concerned with the literary devices and language used throughout news reporting. (…) Designed to systematically manipulate users for political purposes, junk news sources deploy propaganda techniques to persuade users at an emotional, rather than cognitive, level and employ techniques that include using emotionally driven language with emotive expressions and symbolism, ad hominem attacks, misleading headlines, exaggeration, excessive capitalization, unsafe generalizations, logical fallacies, moving images and lots of pictures or mobilizing memes, and innuendo (Bernays, 1928; Jowette & O’Donnell, 2012; Taylor, 2003). (…) Stylistically, problematic sources will employ propaganda and clickbait techniques to varying degrees. As a result, determining style can be highly complex and context dependent” (p. 177). Procedure: - Examined at least five stories on the front page of each news source in depth during the US presidential campaign in 2016 and the SOTU address in 2018 - Checked the headlines of the stories and the content of the articles for literary and visual propaganda devices - Considered as stylistically problematic if three of the five stories systematically exhibited elements of propaganda Examples: 100percentfedup.com, barenakedislam.com, theconservativetribune.com, dangerandplay.com Credibility refers to the content of the domain as a whole “(…) [S]ources rely on false information or conspiracy theories and do not post corrections” (p. 175). “[They] typically report on unsubstantiated claims and rely on conspiratorial and dubious sources. (…) Junk news sources that satisfy the credibility criterion frequently fail to vet their sources, do not consult multiple sources, and do not fact-check” (p. 178). Procedure: - Examined at least five front page stories and reviewed the sources that were cited - Reviewed pages to see if they included known conspiracy theories on issues such as climate change, vaccination, and “Pizzagate” - Checked third-party fact-checkers for evidence of debunked stories and conspiracy theories Examples: infowars.com, endingthefed.com, thegatewaypundit.com, newspunch.com Bias refers to the content of the domain as a whole “(…) [H]yper-partisan media websites and blogs (…) are highly biased, ideologically skewed, and publish opinion pieces as news. Basing their stories on the same events, these sources manage to convey strikingly different impressions of what actually transpired. It is such systematic differences in the mapping from facts to news reports that we call bias. (…) Bias exists on both sides of the political spectrum. Like determining style, determining bias can be highly complex and context dependent” (pp. 177-178). Procedure: - Checked third-party sources that systematically evaluate media bias - If the domain was not evaluated by a third party, the authors examined the ideological leaning of the sources used to support stories appearing on the domain - Evaluation of the labeling of politicians (are there differences between the left and the right?) - Identified bias created through the omission of unfavorable facts, or through writing that is falsely presented as being objective Examples on the right: breitbart.com, dailycaller.com, infowars.com, truthfeed.com Examples on the left: occupydemocrats.com, addictinginfo.com, bipartisanreport.com Note. The coders reached an intercoder reliability of a Krippendorff’s kappa of 0.89. The label of “junk news” is defined by fulfilling at least three of the five criteria. It refers to sources that deliberately publish misleading, deceptive, or incorrect information packaged as real news. Table 3. Identified types of IRA-associated Twitter accounts by Linvill and Warren (2020) Category Specification Right troll “Twitter-handles broadcast nativist and right-leaning populist messages. These handles’ themes were distinct from mainstream Republicanism. (…) They rarely broadcast traditionally important Republican themes, such as taxes, abortion, and regulation, but often sent divisive messages about mainstream and moderate Republicans. (…) The overwhelming majority of handles, however, had limited identifying information, with profile pictures typically of attractive, young women” (p. 5). Hashtags frequently used by these accounts: #MAGA (i.e., “Make America Great Again,”), #tcot (i.e. “Top Conservative on Twitter), #AmericaFirst, and #IslamKills Left troll “These handles sent socially liberal messages, with an overwhelming focus on cultural identity. (…) They discussed gender and sexual identity (e.g., #LGBTQ) and religious identity (e.g., #MuslimBan), but primarily focused on racial identity. Just as the Right Troll handles attacked mainstream Republican politicians, Left Troll handles attacked mainstream Democratic politicians, particularly Hillary Clinton. (…) It is worth noting that this account type also included a substantial portion of messages which had no clear political motivation” (p. 6). Hashtags frequently used by these accounts: #BlackLivesMatter, #PoliceBrutality, and #BlackSkinIsNotACrime Newsfeed “These handles overwhelmingly presented themselves as U.S. local news aggregators and had descriptive names (…). These accounts linked to legitimate regional news sources and tweeted about issues of local interest (…). A small number of these handles, (…) tweeted about global issues, often with a pro-Russia perspective” (p. 6). Hashtags frequently used by these accounts: #news, #sports, and #local Hashtag gamer “These handles are dedicated almost entirely to playing hashtag games, a popular word game played on Twitter. Users add a hashtag to a tweet (e.g., #ThingsILearnedFromCartoons) and then answer the implied question. These handles also posted tweets that seemed organizational regarding these games (…). Like some tweets from Left Trolls, it is possible such tweets were employed as a form of camouflage, as a means of accruing followers, or both. Other tweets, however, often using the same hashtag as mundane tweets, were socially divisive (…)” (p. 7). Hashtags frequently used by these accounts: #ToDoListBeforeChristmas, #ThingsYouCantIgnore, #MustBeBanned, and #2016In4Words Fearmonger “These accounts spread disinformation regarding fabricated crisis events, both in the U.S. and abroad. Such events included non-existent outbreaks of Ebola in Atlanta and Salmonella in New York, an explosion at the Columbian Chemicals plan in Louisiana, a phosphorus leak in Idaho, as well as nuclear plant accidents and war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine. (…) These accounts typically tweeted a great deal of innocent, often frivolous content (i.e. song lyrics or lines of poetry) which were potentially automated. With this content these accounts often added popular hashtags such as #love (…) and #rap (…). These accounts changed behavior sporadically to tweet disinformation, and that output was produced using a different Twitter client than the one used to produce the frivolous content. (…) The Fearmonger category was the only category where we observed some inconsistency in account activity. A small number of handles tweeted briefly in a manner consistent with the Right Troll category but switched to tweeting as a Fearmonger or vice-versa” (p. 7). Hashtags frequently used by these accounts: #Fukushima2015 and #ColumbianChemicals Note. The categories were identified qualitatively analyzing the content produced and were then refined and explored more detailed via a quantitative analysis. The coders reached a Krippendorff’s alpha intercoder-reliability of 0.92. References Bradshaw, S., Howard, P. N., Kollanyi, B., & Neudert, L.?M. (2020). Sourcing and automation of political news and information over social media in the United States, 2016-2018. Political Communication, 37(2), 173–193. Brennen, J. S., Simon, F. M., Howard, P. N. [P. N.], & Nielsen, R. K. (2020). Types, sources, and claims of covid-19 misinformation. Reuters Institute. Retrieved from http://www.primaonline.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/COVID-19_reuters.pdf Fletcher, R. (2018). Misinformation and disinformation unpacked. Reuters Institute. Retrieved from http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/misinformation-and-disinformation-unpacked/ Linvill, D. L., & Warren, P. L. (2020). Troll factories: Manufacturing specialized disinformation on Twitter. Political Communication, 1–21. Neudert, L.?M., Howard, P., & Kollanyi, B. (2019). Sourcing and automation of political news and information during three European elections. Social Media + Society, 5(3). https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119863147 Wardle, C. (2019). First Draft's essential guide to understanding information disorder. UK: First Draft News. Retrieved from https://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Information_Disorder_Digital_AW.pdf?x76701

The Devil in the White City is a nonfiction novel based on true events set in Chicago, Illinois, United States, in the late 19th century. Author Erik Larson, drawing from his background in journalism, transforms the findings of his historical research into a literary work without breaking the connection of events with reality. The plot of the novel proceeds with non-linear time oscillations on two main axes. The first of the axes follows the struggle of Daniel Hudson Burnham, appointed in 1890, when the events began, as the chief architect of the World's Fair to be held in Chicago three years later. His dramatic struggle is full of ambition and competition in the areas of architecture, engineering, economy, and politics. The other axis, to the extent, permitted by the evidence and testified to by witnesses, traces the murders committed by Henry Howard Holmes, the first known serial killer in the history of the United States, who took advantage of the construction of the World’s Fair to plan and execute his nefarious deeds in the same place and in the same time frame. The sections presenting the design and construction process of The White City by Burnham are, to a large extent, technical in themselves and will potentially attract those readers who are particularly interested in the history of architecture. The chapters where the spatial reasoning underlying the design of the World's Fair Hotel, known as “The Murder Castle of Holmes”, designed and modified by Holmes specifically to facilitate the murders he had planned and committed, are also quite interesting. The non-linear narrative of the novel between parallel lives is dominated by the direct narrative technique based on documents, instead of indirect narration, which gives weight to the literary style. The author does not aim to create a connotation in the mind of the reader through images, but to make the reader connect with reality through uninterrupted descriptions throughout the novel. Thus, the novel, The Devil in the White City, documents the historical background of “The City Beautiful” movement, which is among the theories of architecture and urbanism, where Burnham's Chicago is its very first example. On the other hand, it documents a distinct historical event by focusing on the first known representative of the serial killer phenomenon that has inspired many horror-thriller novels even to this day.