Articles de revues sur le sujet « Islam and state – Arab countries »

Like all the elites of post-Soviet Muslim countries, the political elite and religious officials in Russia have been in the search of a moderate and strictly national Islamic identity, to keep the Muslim population of Russia separate from Arab or Turkish versions of Islam that could be politicised and thus had the potential to undermine the state structure. ‘Tatar traditional Islam’ emerged through this framework.

Khilafah concept became one of the discussions that stick out lately, not least in Indonesia. But how is this concept, especially that applied in the Islamic state? This article presents a comparison of Islamic governmentbased concepts with two different traditions, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The purpose of this paper is to show the differences between the two concepts as well as to discuss how the implementation carried out in the two countries that use Islam as the basis of the state. Conceptually Saudi Arabia and Iran have differences in the application of the state system and its government. Saudi Arabia with the monarchy concept and Iran with the concept of republic. But the similarity between the two is that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a state that ideally reflects the Khilafah state as established in the state system of the era of Khulafaur Rashidin.Keyword: : Khilafah; Imamah, Saudi Arabia, Iran, State and Islamic Government

Arabic education is a necessity for people who are Muslim. Islam is spreadthroughout the world including the Southeast Asian region. Southeast Asia, whichincludes the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singaporeand others who have a majority Muslim population. Islam entered the regionpeacefully, making it easier for development and its spread. The development andspread of Islam along with learning Arabic, because Arabic is the language of theMuslim holy book. However, the provision of education and learning in Arabicvaries from country to country even though it is still in one region of SoutheastAsia. The concepts of Arabic language education applied are strongly influencedby the state of government in these countries.

Judicial bodies in countries exhibit enormous differences and variations. The judicial system and its organization in countries are closely related to the history of the country concerned. The organizational structure of judicial power varies from one country to another. Differences in the composition of judicial power also occur because of the shape of the state, for example in the form of a federation and a royal state. The composition of judicial power in a federal state is reflected in the organizational structure and jurisdiction of the judiciary, such as in Malaysia, while the organizational structure of judicial power in a royal state is reflected in the organizational structure of judicial power, such as in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's judiciary can be one of the choices of the modern justice system and it is interesting to study because of several things, first of all, Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad SAW. and Islam is a role model for people around the world, but this country has a different government system from other Muslim countries.

Abstract: This article deals with analyzing the place and the political Islam occupies on the Palestinian territories. The author tries to prove that despite the “Arab spring” and growing popularity of Islamism in the neighbor Arab countries its popular support among Palestinians is low. The main reason for this is Israeli total control of political, economic and - partially - social processes taking place in the West Bank. Position of the officials in Ramallah who together with Tel-Aviv strictly contain spread of Islamism throughout the West Bank also has a strong suppressing effect. Central Palestinian leadership may be called one of the few secular political establishments that are still in power in the Arab countries. The main explanation for this is the desire to make a positive effect on the international community, which Palestine totally depends on in political and financial terms. Also one should keep in mind secular beliefs of the current political elite in Palestine. President Mahmoud Abbas with his counterparts from FATAH and PLO represent old type of Arab nationalist politicians, almost all of who were stripped from power after the beginning of “Arab spring” in 2011. Finally, Palestinian society itself still feels united by the idea of national liberation from the Israeli occupation. This helps Palestinians to put aside the issue of religious self-identification. According to the surveys, most of Palestinians still rank their national identity number while describing their identity, while religion comes only second (despite the strong stable tendency for growing Islamization of their views). The only Palestinian enclave where political Islam has gained ground is isolated Gaza Strip. However ruling there “Islamic Resistance Movement” (HAMAS), despite declared anti-Zionism and Islamism, in reality show pragmatic readiness for certain coordination of its actions with Israel and central government in Ramallah. Nowadays one can witness the deepening conflict within the Islamist camp - between HAMAS and more radical Salafists, who support “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria. In the final end the fate of Political Islam in Palestine will depend on the success of Middle East peace process.

This article looks at one important aspect of globalization in the Arab World, namely the provision of international finance by the US, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank in support of economic liberalization programs. This flow of international finance has been partly determined by geopolitical factors and in some countries has resulted in a decline in state provision of social welfare, increased poverty, and increased inequality. Not only has this form of globalization been increasingly challenged by Islamist groups, but many such groups have moved in to provide social capital and fill the welfare gap created by the gradual withdrawal of the state from socio-economic affairs. Globalization has thus strengthened the hand of political Islam and undermined the political legitimacy of incumbent regimes.

The subject of the army in the Fatimid period (296-567 AH) from the perspective of the mission in the life of the Arab Islamic state, the era of medieval Islam witnessed the emergence of one of the most powerful countries in the Arab Maghreb, which three centuries ago, presented the finest Islamic systems in all aspects , The Fatimid great state, and the mother is known, the Fatimid state has been subjected to Judean, and denial due to examinations. It consisted of three sections, dealing with human tissues in the Fatimid army.

The subject of the research is the degree of influence of Sunni and Shi’ism on political processes in Arab countries. The object of the research is Islam as the legal basis of the state. The authors examine in detail such aspects of the topic as the historical analysis of the origin of Islam, the reasons for the division of Islam into Sunnis and Shiites, a comparative analysis of the two branches of Islam, the peculiarities of the legal schools of Islam, the interaction of Sunnis and Shiites with state power. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of interpretations (kalams) of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The study is fundamental and is aimed at the historical and political analysis of Islam in the XXI century. The relevance of this topic is confirmed by numerous studies of the described problems. The main conclusions of the study are that one of the key problems in the Arab states is the issue of the origin of power, which remains relevant even in the XXI century. The authors’ special contribution to the study of the topic is the hypothesis that the radicalism of Islam is associated with its short history in comparison with Christianity. Thus, Islam in the XXI century. is still at an active stage of formation, which leads to the emergence of Islamic terrorist organizations. The novelty of this scientific study lies in the consideration of historical processes in the political discourse of the XXI century.

This article is dedicated to the issues of relations between the state and Islam in Arab countries (Algeria, Egypt, Syria) and in Russia in the contemporary era. Despite the fundamental diff erences between political systems and diff erent experiences in relations between the state and religion, all these societies are facing similar threats and challenges in recent years, causing certain parallels between policies towards Islam. This work is based on both published materials and around 20 interviews with experts, politicians and religious leaders from the researched countries recorded by the authors. The research allowed to defi ne common and diff erent traits of implemented political strategies, made it possible to show the infl uence of such processes as securitization of religion administrating, growing individualization of faith practicing, integration of religious institutions in the civil society structures on the transformation of StateIslam relationship models.

This study aimed to assess the term ‘civil state‘ by considering its origin, concept, as well as its most important principles. The focus was also to see the term’s consistency or inconsistency with the religion of Islam, or «whether the state in Islam is civil or religious». The study used the inductive descriptive method through tracking some Islamic evidence and contemporary jurisprudence opinions in this regard. The study pointed out that Islam started the notion of civil state long time ago before the Western civilization by calling for most of the essence of such principles called for by the West , although sometimes these principles are loosely used by the West. Also, sometimes western principles are not practiced in reality. However, most of them do not contradict the purposes of Islamic law if not called for by the Islam itself. In addition, Islam does not stop Muslims from benefiting from the civilization and cultural experiences of others, as long as that is in compliance with Islamic laws, and is intended to achieve the interests and progress of society. It is also possible to apply such experiences in our Islamic countries under the Islamic laws instead of indulging in a vicious circle of different ideological and sectarian conflicts that imposed heavy losses to the nation. The study concluded that there is no religious state «theocracy» of the Western meaning in Islam. The concept of ‘state’ in Islam is civil in terms of authority, religious in terms of legislation; or it is civil with religious reference. The study also indicated some obstacles and difficulties that hinder the application of such systems in our Arab and Islamic countries. Keywords: Civil state, Civil state in Islam, Islam’s view of civil state.

The political turmoil in Tunisia at the end of 2010 opened the door to the democratization of Arab countries. This event, widely known as The Arab Spring, presented a dream for the Arab community to live a better life under a democratic system. However, after a decade of progress, only Tunisia has succeeded in consolidating its democracy among the Arab countries that have been affected by the political turmoil. This paper tries to read the success factors for Tunisia in consolidating its democracy by using the theory of democracy from Robert Dahl, Jack Snyder, and Georg Sorensen. This study concludes that democracy in Tunisia is already included in the category of matured democracy according to Snyder's theory or has entered the category in which a democratic culture has begun to develop (Sorensen) and fulfills the elements of a democratic state according to Dahl. This success is inseparable from internal and external factors. The internal factor is the foundation of a civil society built before The Arab Spring and the openness of viewpoints of political actors after the political upheaval. Meanwhile, the external factor is the absence of America as the dominant actor in Tunisia because Tunisia is considered a ferry country. Tunisia also proves that Islam and democracy can go hand in hand, and this is a refutation of the pessimistic views of the scholars on Islam and democracy that can go hand in hand.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the features of a rather specifi c project of Islamism promoted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iranian Islamism is based on the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini about the ideal “Islamic state”, in which Islam has close contact with politics, with the government of the country. However, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the country’s new elite became more pragmatic about the mission of spreading the Shi‘ite version of Islam. In particular, emphasis was placed on rapprochement with those countries and groups that showed friendly feelings to Tehran. In many respects this concerned the countries of the Arab region in which the Shi‘a community was present or prevailed. One of these states is Yemen. In particular, Iran’s participation in the Yemeni crisis, in which Tehran is trying to strengthen its own positions and prevent the strengthening of Saudi positions in Yemen by means of the Zaydi group of the Houthi, is being considered.

The relation between Islam and modernity as modern civilization is frequently faced contradiction. The disclaimer of a secular state for instance, leads to the debate by which the articulation of some Muslims who reject it is much more than those who accept it. Another example is humanism such as religious freedom and capitalism, although the disclaimers of these two issues are softer than those who denied the nation-state. However, the conceptual analysis points out that Islam is compatible with modernity as modern civilization. The main reason is that Islam was first emerged as a critic against the previous religion that was not engage the social transformation for the Arab society before Islam. Islam is also encouraged contemporary thought and social reform with the concept of ishlah (reform) and tajdid (renewal). If this case is measured based on the dimension of modernity, it obvious that Islam Islam as a teaching/conceptual frame/mindset in this article does not have conflict with it. Islam is in line with the nation state, secular country or secularism itself, democracy as political system, rationalism and empirical science, and capitalism. This paper is expected to strengthen the Integration of Islam as society with the modernity as modern civilization in the East and West countries.

The article examines and analyzes the spread of Islamism or Political Islam movements in the Greater Mediterranean and their increasing influence on the socio-political situation in 2011-2021. The historical factors, which contributed to the emergence of the hearths of Islamic culture in the countries which entered the Arab Caliphate in the Greater Mediterranean parallel with the Antique centers of European civilization, are retrospectively exposed. The Islamist ideologues called the Ottoman Imperia the heir of the Arab Caliphate. The main doctrinal conceptions of Political Islam and its more influential movement Muslim Brotherhood (forbidden in Russia) are discovered. The factor of the Arab Spring, which considerably influenced the strengthening of the Islamist movements, as well as its continuation of the protests in the Arab countries in 2018-2021, is examined. The main attention is allotted to analyzing the actions of the Islamic movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and in the Libyan and Syrian conflicts too. The influence of external actors, the most active of which was Turkey, is revealed. The author also analyzes the situation in the Arab-Muslim communities in the European Mediterranean on the example of France, where social-economic problems, aggravated by COVID-19, have contributed to the activation of radical Islamist elements. It is concluded that confronting the Islamist challenge is a complex and controversial task. Its solution depends on both forceful opposition to radical groups and an appropriate foreign policy. An important negative factor is the aggravation of socio-economic problems and crisis phenomena in the institutions of Western democracy, in response to which the ideologues of Islamism preach an alternative world order in the form of an Islamic state. At the moment the Western society and the countries which repeat its liberal model do not give a distinct response to this challenge.

This article addresses the Egyptian Constitution issued in 2014 (dustūr ǧumhūriyyah miṣr al-ʿarabiyyah). Article 2 declares that Islam is the religion of the State and that the Sharīʿah is the main source of legislation. The aim of the author is to interpret this provision considering the role that the Islamic religion plays in the cultural and legal framework of Arab countries, notably in Egypt. Furthermore, this article tries to develop a pluralistic interpretation of the norm, taking into account some foundational aspects of the Egyptian legal system including the Civil Code of 1948, the particular tradition of Arab Constitutionalism, and the former jurisprudence of the Supreme Constitutional Court.

This study aims to determine the relationship of reciprocity between the transport sector and the GDP on the State member of the OIC. This study uses air transportation of cargo and passengers and GDP using the income calculations. The population in this study is a State member of the OIC, the number of samples used are15 countries in 1986-2015. The analytical method used in this research is by using the Granger Causality. The results showed that there is a reciprocal relationship between the transport sector and the GDP in two OIC member countries, there are Mozambique and Tunisia, and there is a unidirectional relationship in three OIC member countries,there are Egypt. Arab Rep, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and also 10 other OIC member countries, there are Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Sudan, Suriname, Turkey and Uganda there is no relationship between the transport sector and GDP.

يتناول هذا البحث بداية نشأة الخط العربي وانتشاره في الشرق والغرب حيث سجّله التاريخ في اختلاف الآراء عن أصالته القديمة. وهذا الاختلاف قائم على انتقال الخط العربي بادئ ذي بدء من الحيرة مثلاً أو اشتقاقه من الخط النبطي أو أصله من الآرامي، وهلمّ جرًا. فيجري الحديث حول ظهور الأبجدية التي استعملها العرب قبل الإسلام، سواء كان بالرموز أم بالتشفير، إلى فن جمالها في الكتابة كما قد تأثرت بالإسلام. فالإسلام إثر مجيئه قد فتح انتشار الخط العربي على مصراعيه حتى يعمّ جزيرة العرب كلها ويبلغ بلدان الأمم الإسلامية وغيرها في آسيا وأفريقيا وأوروبا. فهذا أمر جذّاب يقدّمه الباحث كشفًا عن الخطوط العربية وأنواعها ومسيرتها الطويلة عبر العصور. واستخدم هذا البحث منهج التحليل الوصفي في مجال البحث الاستقرائي للوصول إلى النتائج الموثوقة بها. ومن أهم النتائج أن الخط العربي فن من فنون الإسلام له أصول وجذور عريقة. إنه قد بلغ الذروة بشمول الإسلام وفضيلته الكبرى في جمال التعبير والكتابة. This research deals with the beginning of Arabic script and its spreading in the East and the West in a historical record of authenticity based on the difference of scholar’s views. For example, some ancient scholars claimed that Ḥīrah as the place where the Arabic script first evolved, some of them mentioned that it was derived from the Nabataean line, and others stated that Aramaic is the origin. The Discussion is started from the usage of the early alphabet in the Arabian Peninsula before Islam – by formulation or encryption – until the art of beautiful writing which more influenced by Islam. Obviously, Islam has opened widely the spreading of Arabic script in the Arabian Peninsula and also in Islamic countries such as Asia, Africa, and Europe. Therefore, the Arabic script, types, and the long journey through the ages become interesting to be disclosed by using the descriptive analysis method to get reliable results in the platform of qualitative research. The most important result is the Arabic script is Islamic art which has an ancient history and deep roots, while the Islamic virtue is the only reason for its spreading widely in the East and the West and it has reached the peak in both expression and writing. Kajian ini membicarakan tentang permulaan kemunculan khat Arab dan penyebarannya di Timur dan di Barat di mana terjadi perbedaan pendapat Ulama dalam rekaman sejarah mengenai keasliannya yang kuno. Perbedaan itu berkisar pada beberapa pandangan bahwa khat Arab itu pada mulanya berasal dari Ḥīra, sebagian lain menganggap khat Arab berakar dari khat Nabatī, bahkan ada yang mengklaim bahwa ia berasal dari bahasa Aram (Aramaik). Diskursus yang panjang ini dimulai dari kemunculan alfabet yang digunakan oleh bangsa Arab pra-Islam, dalam bentuk perlambangan ataupun penyandian, hingga kepada seni keindahan tulisan yang variatif yang banyak dipengaruhi oleh Islam. Kemunculan Islam telah membuka jalur penyebaran khat Arab seluas-luasnya di semenanjung Arab hingga ke negara-negara Islam, dan negara lainnya di Asia, Afrika, dan Eropa. Untuk itu, menjadi sangat menarik bagi pengkaji mengungkap khat Arab dan jenis-jenisnya, dan menelusuri perjalanannya yang panjang dalam lintasan waktu. Dalam penelitian kualitatif ini metode analisis deskriptif digunakan untuk memperoleh hasil penelitian yang dapat dipercaya. Studi ini memandang penting khat Arab sebagai sebuah seni Islam yang memiliki akar yang mendalam yang telah mencapai puncaknya dengan ke-syumul-an Islam pada aspek estetika ungkapan dan tulisan.

The article analyzes the current supranational regulation of the energy market in the EU in the light of the interrelations between Russia and the EU. It is focused on the description The article treats a phenomenon of Islamic state of Iraq and Levant (ISIL): its underground, ideological conception and ways for its combating as it is seen and handled by scientific-and-expert community of the Middle East. A nature of arguments and rhetoric propagated by local Islamists is closely examinated. The author esteems that within the concurrence on vision space in the region political Islam will be henceforth present. Consequently, differentiation of trends inside this phenomenon, alignment between its moderate and extreme fractions will be going on. The importance of so called Wassatiya –reasonable, Middle Way Islam combatting ISIL and other extreme streams takes more and more root in media and scientific-and-expert community in the Middle East. Secular-liberal thinking has not yet became an competitive power in arab countries due to arhaic social relations and excessive religion traditions which are very strong.

Islam entered the territory of Malaysia, especially in the Malacca kingdom, through Muslim merchants from India and Arab-Persia around the 7th century AD The broad development took place around the 13th century, with the discovery of inscriptions nuanced by Islam. Islamic political thought and movement was more intensive since the struggle for political compromise to gain independence from British colonialism. The Islamic political movement has a spectacular momentum when the Malaysian Constitution places Islam as the official religion of the state and makes ethnic Malays as a special group (special privileges) over other ethnic groups. The development of Islam is supported by an Islamic political movement that is controlled by political parties holding power, namely UMNO, even though Islam is inclusive and upholds the value of nationalism, its work still prioritizes Islamic values. Opposition parties such as PAS which are more fundamaentalist in their ethical sense have actually been adopted by the ruling party. This means that the two parties benefited the existence of Islam. Referring to the peaceful Islamic political movement in order to uphold the teachings of Islam in Malaysia, both legally and formally and constitutionally and culturally, it can be an inspiration to other Muslim-majority countries.

Is such phenomenon as Shadow Economy possible in the Arab (Muslim) countries? In terms of scientific approach as the presence of positive (legal) economy will always have its antipode – the presence of negative (shadow or illegal) economy and no matter which country will have these economic types. Of course, the percentage of legal and shadow economy varies in different countries. At the same time, the volumes of shadow economy are independent of the main religion professed by the population or of the part of the world where the country is situated (countries with Islam as the main religion have a less volume of shadow economy in comparison with countries having Christianity as a predominant religion, and the richest oil countries in the MENA region have bigger volumes of shadow economy than some Western European countries). The causes of shadow economy and the prerequisites of its inception are largely the same by its socio-economic nature. The sources of economical problems lie in the imbalance between limited resources at the disposal of people or a state and in the open-endedness of ever-growing needs of economic agents. It is precisely on these contradictions numerous financial and economic crises appear. It may also be noted that the wish to possess the largest possible quantity of resources leads to the foreignpolicy struggle between countries which results in wars, conflicts, economic sanctions. Recently, the countries of Arab East have been experiencing systemic crisis. Over the past 10 years economic benefits have been redistributed, the map of the region has been redrawn, and moral guidelines of the society have been shifting. This is acutely seen in the events taking place in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Islamic financial institutions and markets, which were less of a financial and more of moral and ethical basis of the Arab countries, currently are taking an exam on “stress tests”. Countries devastated by wars, crisis in oil monarchies, unemployment, enormous migration flows, “black market” growing at a geometric rate – can all these humanistic and social guidelines, which Islamic scientists focus on in the relationships between people, people and authorities, people and God, prevail all this? The transformation of shadow economy in the Arab Region sharply has taken place over the past 10 to 15 years, partly due to the interference of Major Powers (statistics on the economy clearly demonstrate that before the events of Arab Spring and military conflicts non-oil-producing Arab countries had an enormous potential of development on key indicators). The middle class, the business community of Arab countries adapts to circumstances arising in today’s realities carrying out its activities in the shadow or quasi-legal sector of the economy. They don’t feel support from the state concerned about issues of the maintenance of stability by introducing tough tax, control and restrictive measures. In this regard probably appropriate phrase: “One does what one must to survive!” Regional Powers fight for their political and economical independence, the population of these Powers live to work and secure any future to themselves and their families. The issues of the shadow economy do not fall within economic relationships, they are relevant to social or spiritual relationships which are transforming in the modern world regardless of the value of taxes collected or level of GDP.

Religion is at the heart of the lacerating conflicts in Iraq and Syria today. In both countries the matter at hand is the fracture between the two main branches of Islam. This fracture escalated into a religious war after the Arab Springs in 2011, even though the violent conflict between Shia and Sunni started in Iraq in 2003, after the American invasion of the ancient Mesopotamia. The reason for both the foreign occupation and the insurrection of the civil society leading to the same chaos is that, in both countries, the State does not raise enough legitimacy to open a public space able to welcome a unitary citizenship. Such a phenomenon calls back to the history of the two states and at the British (Iraq) and French (Syria) establishing mandates of the two institutions, which never succeeded in imposing their legitimacy for most people (Shia in Iraq and Sunni in Syria), left out of the ruling bodies for a long time. The Shia-Kurdish combination, which is the leading force in Iraq since 2003, conducted to the refusal of the Arab Sunni minority to live marginalized and powerless.

Arabic Language is a very rich and comprehensive Language culturally; religiously, educationally and historically. It is the state language of twenty-two Arab countries and one of the languages of U.N.O. After embracing Islam, Muslims showed their great interest to know the teachings of Islam. Arabic language has become a major language of the world having a great contribution of worldly renowned literatures. Apparently Arabic language seemed to be very difficult for those who wanted to know Arabic as well as Islamic studies. The fact is that Arabic language is very simple and easy to understand as compare to other major languages. Arabic language has international rules of pronunciation, when we compare it with English language, we have come to know that mostly alphabets of Arabic language are equivalent to English alphabets in their pronunciation. We can make transliteration of Arabic articles and words easily. The article presents a comprehensively and comparatively study of the pronunciation of Arabic articles and words

Concise, succinct, and informative, this book skillfully elucidates andassesses the patterns, prospects, and complexities of Arab-European relationscontextualized in a globalizing (read “Americanizing”) world. It alsoidentifies the ambiguities and limitations of social movements and struggleswithin the Arab world, as well as their implications for mutual relationships(p. vi). The authors’ main thesis is that both global capitalism and theAmerican determination to construct a “new” Middle East in its own imagehave undermined the possibilities of domestic reforms and external realignmentsin most Arab countries. American hegemonic influence, together withthe growing sway of politicized Islam on public life, have added more limitationsand constraints to other failures to transform the underlying economicand political structures defining the relations between members onboth sides of the Mediterranean.The book comprises four chapters: three written by Amin (chapters 1, 2,and 4), and one (chapter 3) by El Kenz. The first chapter is a critical surveyof conditions in the Arab world in general and that of the Arab “state” in particular.Amin designates the latter structure as a manifestation of “mamelukepower,” reflecting a complex traditional system that has merged the personalizedpower of warlords, businessmen, and men of religion (p. 3). The Arabstate, he argues, has never really embraced or understood modernity. Egypt,Syria, and the Ottoman Empire underwent a first phase of ineffective modernizationduring the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The secondphase was associated with the populist nationalism of Nasserism, Baathism,and the Algerian revolution between the 1950s and 1970s. With the end ofthis phase, a multiparty system gave way to a paradoxical regression into themameluke type of autocracy (pp. 10-12). Whereas Europe broke with itspast, which allowed for its modern progress, the Arabs have not. Amin identifiesmodernity with such a historical break as well as with secularism, thedifferentiation of religion and politics, the emancipation of women, and therest of the term’s conventional elements (pp. 2-3).He criticizes currents “claiming to be Islamic” (p. 6), particularly thoseof the Wahhabi type, viewing Islamic militant groups as manifestations of arevolt against “destructive” capitalism and “deceptive” modernity (p. 6),more interested in sociopolitical issues than in matters of theology. Amin dismissesIran as being no different, although he provides no details (p. 8), and ...

The formation of the Libyan state had an atypical chronology and history. It was not until the 1940s that the construction of the state and the formation of the Libyan nation took place, during the death throes of Italian colonial rule. The arrival of Idrīs on the throne was a compromise: although on the one hand it was the return to a pre-colonial and pre-modern political leadership, on the other this leadership lay within a modern institutional framework, derived from European constitutionalism. In the process of renewal of the tradition linked to the figure of Idrīs, the leader of the al-Sanūsiyyah, the Islam has been inestimably important. At the point of independence, the task was to transform Libya from an artifice of colonialism into a shared political and cultural reality; it was Islam, much more than Arabism, that was identified as the lowest common denominator. The twenty years of rule by Idrīs, from his appointment as Amīr of an autonomous Cyrenaica on 1 July 1949 to the revolution of 1 September 1969, can be summarized as a continual attempt at the opening-up and controlled reform of a strongly conservative political system, which, in view of a rapidly changing society, sought to move from a fragmented political perspective to a truly national one, without any conclusive success. Internal instability became increasingly related to external interference, not just by former colonial countries or the superpowers but also by other Arab countries such as Egypt, who were the purveyors of a project of militant nationalism: Libya became a zone of political and ideological conflict between the West and the Third World.

This paper offers a contextualized analysis of the way in which three Islamic constitutions—in Egypt (2014/2019), Tunisia (2014), and Yemen (2015)—came to a similar self-declaration of a “civil state” (dawla madaniyya), following the Arab uprisings. This self-expressive proclamation, which did not exist in their former constitutions, nor in any other constitution worldwide, is the product of the ongoing internal struggles of Muslim societies over the definition of their collectivity between conservatism and modernity, religiosity and secularism. In Egypt, the self-definition of a civil state enshrines the one-sided narrative of the June 2013 coup regime and the Armed Forces’ intrusive move into the field of state–religion relations; in Tunisia, the constitutionalization of the civil state reflects a settlement between Islamists and non-Islamists regarding the role of Islam in politics and legislation; in Yemen, it expresses an aspiration of detribalization and modernization within an Islamic model of statehood. The paper further seeks to trace the path of migration of this idea from one country to another, and the interconnectedness between the three cases, while pointing out possible implications on future constitution making in other Muslim countries.

The subject of this paper is a case study based on evidence gathered informally through delivery of a course at Birzeit University entitled ‘Modern and Contemporary European Civilization’ and from end-of-semester evaluations that asked students to reflect on the impact of the course on their lives. The author is, naturally, aware of the limitation of the methodology used in this study, and does not claim that its findings can be generalized authoritatively to a wider group of people in the Arab world. What is clear, however, if one considers reviews of internet blogs and media programme debates, is that extrapolations from this evidence have wider reference, revealing commonalities and similarities between Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories and Arab youth involved in the Arab Spring on the subject of political reform. The discussions engaged in by my students actually parallel the debates generated by traditionalists and secularists in post-revolution Egypt and Tunisia. These debates revolve around what it means to live in a civil, democratic state that grants social justice and freedoms, and crucially, at present led by scholars and politicians, address the possibility of reconciling the concept of modernity with Islam and the legislative framework of Islamic law (sharīʿah). It could be argued that the data collected are specific to this one case study, since Palestinians living under Israeli occupation form a unique group in the Arab world and probably are more concerned with basic issues of daily life and more sensitive to Western concepts of modernity. The significance of this data is, however, that gathered during the Arab Spring, they were based on reactions to material covered in a class which related to issues raised by the Arab revolutions, such as democracy, liberalism and revolution. Furthermore, these tentative findings suggest that more research is needed into issues such as the role of education, gender, tolerance and the reconciliation of Islam with modernity – areas of interest which are of particular importance at a time when Islamic groups are winning elections and debates on concepts of authority, democracy and liberalism occupy the foreground of media programmes in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia.

At a time when the global empire seems to show its naked aggression especially in North Africa and West Asia, as we have seen in Libya, and now in Syria, an aggression that has further dismembered these societies, manifested also in global debt, racism against immigrants, and attacks on workers’ rights, we have also been witnessing a type of ‘nativist’ violence wearing the garb of religion as reflected in the different militant groups in the region who claim to offer an alternative to corrupt and violent regimes, on the one hand, and to a violent racist global empire led by the United States, on the other. The claims of these nativist groups are that political Islam or the return to the true Islam is the only solution available, and that they want to duplicate an ideal Islamic State from the distant past. While doing so, they have further helped the global empire in further destroying local societies, and many of them have collaborated with the US and other western countries, and their proxies in the region. Worsening this situation is the neoliberal life/subject-hood that has become the spirit and norm in many societies and states in the Global South, whereby individualism and self-interest have displaced the collective/common good. In this article, and through a reading of the concept of Asabiyya as articulated by Ibn Khaldun, the author suggests an alternative response to the violent global empire, to violent religious militancy, and to neoliberalism, by discussing how the concept of Asabiyya can help in building internal solidarity within societies in the region, and possibly beyond.

The article describes the peculiarities of legal regulation of marriage in the UAE. The author notices that the religious provisions of Islam and the historical roots of this country have had a significant impact on the laws of this country, they have also influenced on the marriage registration procedure, which is of particular scientific interest. In particular, it concerns the procedure of marriage between citizens of the state and certain aspects of marriage with foreigners. Particular attention is paid to the religious rite of marriage. It is noted that the marriage and family relations are regulated by the Koran and certain legislative acts. The author separately discloses the practical aspects of marriage registration, including the conditions, which are mandatory for marriage registration. It is stated that marriage can take place only if the requirements are fulfilled: marriage contract, lack of close blood ties, compliance with the requirements of religion, attainment of marriage age, mutual consent of both parties, equality, presence of witnesses during marriage and marriage observance of folk traditions. For a direct marriage registration, couples also need to prepare a package of documents required by law. In addition to ID documents, you must also provide medical certificates from both brides, issued by a government hospital in a format approved by the UAE Ministry of Health. The article also outlines common and distinct features between the marriage process in Europe and the UAE. In common is the consent of both spouses is envisaged, whereby on such terms that do not degrade honor and dignity, that is, they do not run counter to human rights. The couple must also be of a certain age and be fully capable. Close relatives cannot be married. Distinctive features include, in particular, the possibility of entering into polygamous marriages. In addition, the obligation to conclude a marriage contract is not compulsory in the territory of European countries.

By late 1987 a wave of political changes appeared to be underwayin the Middle East and North Africa. A number of Arab regimes,manifestly incapable of coping with growing problems of debt, unemployment,and corruption, took different measures towards more politicalparticipation. These countries witnessed political openings of various types,some more apparently significant than others but all promising changes thatwould lessen repression and open the way for greater political participation.In 1991 Laurie A. Brand started her project to study the effect of thosechanges on women in the region. She was also interested in studyingthe situation of women under the similar political and economictransformations that swept Eastern Europe in 1989-1990. While the lattercontinue to unfold, the openings that appeared in the Middle East and NorthAfrica have in virtually all cases been closed.Despite that, the author pursued her project on women and politicalliberalization to explore the significance of culture - Islam as theomnipresent independent variable in Middle East politics - as opposedto structure. She also investigated the assumption that vibrant women'sorganizations can be important precursors to more democratic development,to determine what such organizations do and how they relate to thestate, other political actors, and each other during such periods.Brand spotted some phenomena, such as the drop in the number ofwomen legislators in local and national assemblies, changes in labor lawsor their implementation at women's expense, and attempts to restrictwomen's personal or political rights - phenomena that have accompaniedmost of the "democratic'' transitions unfolding in the Middle East & NorthAfrica region (MENA) ...

The research is aimed at identifying, describing and analyzing the problems of the formation and development of the modern Russian economy on the evolutionary and institutional basis of the Russian statehood and developing recommendations for the implementation of a promising state foreign and domestic economic policy. Goal. On the basis of historical and economic analysis, to identify the ways of further socio-economic development of Russia, the directions of the revival and strengthening of the Russian statehood, by activating the transport and transit direction «North-South», the formation of innovative and industrial belts of trade routes of the XXI century, connecting the country with the Islamic world. Tasks. Conducting historical and economic analysis of the evolutionary and institutional foundations of Russian statehood, forms of interstate and corporate partnership in the development, functioning and development of global trade routes in a broad sense. Substantiation of the Norman-Islamic theory of the origin of the Ancient Russian statehood based on the analysis of historical facts, as well as the logic of the origin, functioning and evolutionary development of trade routes. Identify the main areas of interaction and socio-economic development of Russia and the countries of the Islamic world and develop recommendations for political, economic, organizational and institutional changes. Methodology. The research uses the methods of evolutionary and institutional theory, the theory of production-technological balance, world system analysis and historical approach. The results of the study are based on the theory of transit economy developed by the authors, modeling the functioning of trade routes, and understanding the processes of formation and evolution of Global Eurasia. Results. It is determined that Islam became the state-forming factor of Ancient Russia through the displacement, the formation of new and the development of trade routes operated by the Normans. Three directions of the influence of the Islamic world on the formation of a united Ancient Russian state are identified: the search for new routes to Byzantium by the Normans after the expansion of the Arab Caliphate in North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula; establishment of direct relations with the Arab Caliphate along the Volga-Caspian water trade route; adoption of Islam by the neighbors of Ancient Russia - the Volga Bulgars, who have close trade relations with the Arab Caliphate and control the Volga-Caspian water trade route. Conclusions. The revival of modern Russia should and will be based on the functioning and evolutionary development of trade routes in the direction of «North-South» by establishing, expanding and strengthening contacts with the Islamic world. The creation and development of the Norman-Aryan Trade Route of the XXI century and its vast innovation and industrial belt should become a global political, economic, industrial and technological direction for ensuring interaction and socio-economic development of Russia and the countries of the Islamic world.

In this article, the author considers two most important, in his opinion, aspects of the activities of the Islamist movement «Muslim Brotherhood» (MB) in Europe today – a rupture that has emerged in the system of the highest governing bodies of the MB (the formation of two rival centers – in Istanbul and London) and the intensification of attempts of MB groups participation in the political life of European countries under the «banner of Islam». The author draws attention to the fact that the observed «renaissance of the brothers» in Europe not only clearly contrasts with the position of their associates in most Arab countries, in whose social and political life they are failing after failure, but can also be considered as an attempt to lead the MB precisely through his European experience to preserve the movement itself, to support the dynamics of its activity, to formulate its upcoming goals. In other words, to demonstrate the ability of the movement and its ideology to transform and adapt to the conditions of the 21st century. To do this, the Islamist «brotherhood» is actively exploiting the potential of the welfare state and political freedoms in the Old World. The author explores the mechanisms used by the Islamists of the BM to penetrate into state structures and influential layers of European societies. It is noteworthy that the activities of the MB are increasingly mentioned by European experts and politicians in the context of growing internal threats to their countries.

<p><em>Abstrak</em> - <strong>Musim Semi Arab adalah fenomena yang terjadi di negara-negara Timur Tengah yang timbul dari dinamika sosial yang menginginkan orde baru yang dapat mengubah keadaan suatu negara dalam bentuk protes atau pemberontakan yang dilakukan oleh pro-demokrasi di Timur Tengah dan Afrika Utara melawan rezim otoriter di wilayah yang dimulai sekitar tahun 2010 hingga 2011. Dalam studi Budaya Arab bukanlah fenomena baru di Timur Tengah, karena Hitti (2006) mengatakan bahwa budaya Arab egaliter dan geografi gurun tandus khas adalah faktor yang membentuk karakter dan kepribadian utama yang keras dan pantang menyerah. Analisis deskriptif tentang pendekatan kualitatif terhadap budaya Arab fenomena Musim Semi Arab sangat langka sehingga, penulis berharap tulisan ini bisa menggambarkan studi budaya Arab dalam fenomena Musim Semi Arab. Orde baru yang merupakan harapan utama dinamika sosial masih jauh dari harapan, sehingga dalam tulisan ini penulis memberikan alternatif untuk pembentukan sebuah teori berbasis masyarakat regional dan berbasis masyarakat masyarakat Arab pasca Islam.</strong></p><p><em> </em></p><p><strong><em>Kata Kunci</em></strong><em> – Arab Spring, Dinamik, Budaya, Arab</em></p><p> </p><p><em>Abstract</em> - <strong>Arab Spring is a phenomenon that occurs in the countries of the Middle East arising from a social dynamic who want a new order that can change the state of a country in the form of protest or rebellion committed by the pro-democracy in the Middle East and North Africa against authoritarian regimes in the region that started around the year 2010 up to 2011. In the Arab </strong><strong>C</strong><strong>ultur</strong><strong>al studies</strong><strong> is not a new phenomenon in the Middle East, because Hitti (200</strong><strong>6</strong><strong>) says that Arab culture egalitarian and typical barren desert geography is a factor which form the main character and personality are hard and unyielding. Descriptive analysis of the qualitative approach to the Arab culture of the Arab Spring phenomenon is so rare that, the author hopes this paper can describe the Arab culture studies in the phenomenon of the Arab Spring. New order which is the main hope of social dynamics is still far from the </strong><strong>hope</strong><strong>, so in this paper the authors provide an alternative to the establishment of a regional and community based theory of post-Islamic Arab society institutions.</strong></p><p> </p><p><strong><em>Keywords</em></strong> - <em>Arab Spring, Dynamics, Culture, Arab</em><em></em></p>

This article investigates the phenomena of a transnational Wahhabi movement particularly the Wahhabi local organization in Indonesia. Wahhabism is a puritan, textual, and reformist Islamic movement established in Nejd Saudi Arabia 18th century identified as part of the conservative Sunni orthodox tradition. It was determined as the major religious-state reference for shariah law formulation by the Saudi government and expanded to non-Arab countries around the world imposing reformation idea of Islamic religious tradition and academic culture. This article examines the expansion and growth of the Wahhabi local organization in Indonesia and the effort to perform deculturalization of Islam from the local religious tradition practices. Deculturalizing Islam or pulling out Islam from cultural mixture and absorption is not easy because Islam has integrated to the local religious tradition since its presence in the community around the 12th century, which shows a long negotiation and unification of those identities. In doing so, this article explores the response on Wahhabi deculturalization discourse and how the local people negotiate to this new identity and socio-religious transformation influenced by the Wahhabi’s teaching and ideology. The hypothesis of Wahhabi’s teaching position and role in shaping radicalism and terrorism has carried this research to understand the local context of Wahhabi in Indonesia, how the Wahhabi people understand and engage to radicalism and terrorism, the response to global jihadism propagation including Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and the production of Khilafah Islamiyah idea and mission. The aggressive approach of Wahhabi, which attacks a belief system of local Muslim practices and invigorates the new single identity of Islam, leads this article to investigate the patterns of Wahhabi socio-religious conflict in the communities and the influence to social disintegration existence.

On September 13, 1993, the Jewish state signed a peace agreement with the PLO dealing with the Gaza Strip and Jericho. This historic agreement quickly raised hopes throughout the world because it brought an end to relations of hostility between two peoples coveting the same land. On the ground, however, due to the intransigence of the israeli government, the situation has rapidly deteriorated between Muslim fundamentalists and Jewish settlers. The Islamic fundamentalist movement is attempting to hinder implementation of the Oslo agreement by acts of violence. A year after the signing of the Oslo agreement, it is worthwhile to begin with an overview of Palestinian Islamic fundamentalist groups and the many challenges of the "Gaza-Jericho" agreement. Such a study, in opposition to a simplistic view, does not allow us to perceive the Islamic fundamentalist movement as being a single homogeneous entity with a ready-made ideology and well-defined courses of action. The largest Islamic movement, Hamas, is willing, for example, to the part in the future election in contrast to the discourse it has held up to the present time. Hamas' opposition to the peace plan ultimately comes down to a struggle for control over the institutions of the future "Palestinian State". In the final analysis, the split between Fatah and Hamas, and between democrats and Islamic fundamentalists in Arab countries, reflects two populist variants arising from an authoritarian system.

This study explains how the influence of GDP, exports, HDI, corruption perception index and democracy index on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 15 OIC countries, namely Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Nigeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Albania in 2010-2019. The existence of Foreign Direct Investment in a country can be useful as state revenue from tax sources, as well as the relationship between technology transfer, transfer of management expertise, development of entrepreneurial output and increasing the rate of national income in the economy. This study uses quantitative methods with secondary data and data collection through the World Bank, Transparency International, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and The Economist Intelligence Unit. This study also uses panel data regression with the best model approach, namely the Random Effect Model (REM), to determine how much influence the independent variables such as GDP, exports, HDI, corruption perception index and democracy index have on the dependent variable (FDI). Based on the results of the F test obtained, it shows that in general the five independent variables have a positive and significant effect on FDI. Meanwhile, the T test results show that the GDP and export variables have a positive and significant effect on FDI. In the HDI variable, the corruption perception index and the democracy index have no effect on FDI.[Penelitian ini menjelaskan bagaimana pengaruh PDB, ekspor, IPM, indeks persepsi korupsi dan indeks demokrasi terhadap Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) di 15 negara OKI yaitu Kazakhstan, Arab Saudi, Indonesia, Turki, Malaysia, Uni Emirat Arab, Azerbaijan, Mesir, Nigeria, Libanon, Moroko, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Albania pada tahun 2010-2019. Adanya Foreign Direct Investment dalam suatu negara dapat bermanfaat sebagai penerimaan negara dari sumber pajak, serta adanya hubungan alih teknologi, transfer keahlian manajemen, perkembangan wirausaha output serta menaikkan laju pendapatan nasional dalam perekonomian. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kuantitatif dengan data sekunder dan pengambilan data melalui World Bank, Transparency International, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) dan The Economist Intelligence Unit. Penelitian ini juga menggunakan regresi data panel dengan pendekatan model terbaik yaitu Random Effect Model (REM), untuk mengetahui seberapa besar pengaruh variabel bebas seperti PDB, ekspor, IPM, indeks persepsi korupsi dan indeks demokrasi terhadap variabel terikat (FDI). Berdasarkan hasil uji F yang diperoleh, menunjukkan bahwa secara umum kelima variabel bebas berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap FDI. Sedangkan pada hasil uji T menunjukkan bahwa variabel GDP dan ekspor berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap FDI. Pada variabel HDI, indeks persepsi korupsi dan indeks demokrasi tidak memiliki pengaruh terhadap FDI.]

AbstractThis article starts with a sketch of the encounters and experiences of modern secularism in four areas of the Islamic world (Turkey, Arab world, South Asia and Southeast Asia); these point to the diverse conditions and constructions that have become central issues of regional and trans-regional discourse: laizism through reform, nationalism through decolonization, Islamic nationalism through state formation, and tolerance through traditional multi-ethnic environments. In analysing the basic writings of five exemplary modern Muslim thinkers, it is shown that modern Islamic thought, tied to the idea of mutual exclusive ideological constructions of secularism and Islamism, remains ambiguous while at the same time facing the factual unfolding of secularism in Muslim countries: the works of Mawdudi contain absolute denial of secularism; al-Qaradawi argues for the strict opposition and separation of the secular and the religious; al-Attas denies that Western processes of religious secularization are applicable to the development of Islam. On the other hand, Iqbal and Rahman, although maintaining a clear distinction between the secular and the religious, point to coinciding dimensions of religious and secular dimensions in modern political and social life. The reflection of the secular and the religious is highly shaped by historical and political influences as well as by ideologization, thus creating obstacles for fruitful conceptual reconstructions of the given dimensions of the coincidence of both — Islam and the secular conditions of modern society.

On April 19–21th, 2021, Institute of Oriental Manuscripts (Saint-Petersburg) hosted the 43rd Annual Session of St Petersburg Arabists in tribute to professor O. G. Bolshakov (1929 – 2020). The conference was held for two days under the chairmanship of Associate Professor S. A. Frantsuzov and included morning and afternoon sessions, which covered interesting reports by Arab scholars from St. Petersburg, Moscow and Kazan in person and online. Arabic messages were accompanied by scholarly discussions on various topics on the history of the Middle East and cultural linguistics. More than 35 speakers from different countries including Canada and Switzerland took part in the conference and were able not only to meet their colleagues, but also to take advantage of a spare day between the sessions and to visit unique sights St. Petersburg has to offer. MGIMO University was represented at the scientific conference by N. G. Antonova, lecturer of the Department of Middle East Languages, with a report on the topic The History of Arabisms in the Spanish Language devoted to the analysis of words borrowings, their introduction into the Spanish language, main groups and levels at which the linguistic process took place. A. O. Bolshakov and F. A. Asadullin delivered their reports about a prominent historian and Arabist O. G. Bolshakov who dedicated his life to the study of the history of Caliphate and Islam. Researchers in the field of linguistic cultural studies spoke about Moscow Arabs, development of the theory of jihad, and various aspects of the Arabic language. A lot of speakers touched upon the topic of religion, including pre-islamic beliefs, and the Quran, its translations and editions kept in the museum collections. The representatives of Saint Petersburg State University gave reports on a wide range of linguistic, historic and ethnographic issues. A. A. Mokrushina made an interactive presentation on the special aspects of commercials in Arab countries. Participation in the session of St. Petersburg Arabists served as a valuable opportunity to make a presentation of one’s current research to colleagues-Arabists, to carry out professional and scientific communication, to hold scientific discussions and to gain a deeper understanding of the history and culture of the Arabic language.

The great spread of the plague in the Arab countries and the severity of their fear of it and their feeling of helplessness in the face of its oppression made them attribute it to the jinn, and they preferred to live in the arid desert over the countries that they saw as humid as the Levant, fleeing from it because they believed that it was abundant in them, so the abundance of his names to them, perhaps the most prominent thing that appeared in the poetry of the plague is an emotion Sadness and pain for loved ones and relatives, and lamentations abounded in it, and a number of the most famous Arab lamentations were said because of it, and the lament included people and cities because of the devastation that befell them by plagues, almost all of the poetry dealt with the subject of the plague said after the emergence of Islam. Therefore, its impact was evident in it, such as the joy of dying from the plague because it is a testimony, and God collected the stabbing and plague on the nation influenced by the Prophet’s hadith, and others. Most of his poetic texts describe the state of loss and grief, in the face of the devastation and killing that the plague does, and it is rare to find a description of it, so the poet focused on the emotional side of this tragedy, were it not for the elegy poems we received. Short texts (syllables and plucking) would have been dominant, as they are partial glimpses and images that pass in front of the poet and record them. Poets used the image of the plague to express the pain of their love and spin, and in their sarcastic and serious humorous attacks, describing their brutality and the strength and intensity of their praises.

This article focuses on the Muslim Brotherhood and political Salafism, two influential currents of political Islam that formed a two-pronged political movement prevailing in Saudi Arabia over the past two decades. It examines how they have both influenced, in separate and distinct ways, the development of political Islam in that country. What began initially as a religious movement, striving to assert a national character, has subsequently over time separated itself from the political regime and the official religious establishment in a process that witnesses profound social change in Saudi society. It suffers from an inherent paradox linked to the context in which it developed; an organic relationship with the state in the 1980s, on the one hand, and a struggle against it in the 1990s, on the other. It enshrines the contradictory constraints with which it grapples with respect to government reluctance to modernize the society, on the one level, and popular, progressive aspirations linked to individual civil rights, on the another. In the opinion of the author, this religious movement has failed to comprehend and cope with the social change that has been taking place in Saudi society since 1994. The movement has suffered from an inability to set political priorities, and its ageing leadership has prevented it from keeping abreast with change and developments occurring within the society at large. With its uncompromising stance against women's rights, and most particularly their right to work, as one example, it has got bogged down on many issues – in blatant opposition to popular demand – and failed to take into account the transformation under way in the society. This paper argues that the outlook for Saudi political Islam, within the two groups under study in this article – the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist Islam – is bleak and does not augur well for its promising future. It is likely to be the same for other Arab countries.

The article reveals the basic principles of Turkey's foreign policy in the field of Sunni-Shiite confrontation in the Middle East at the beginning of the 21st century. In particular, the author of the article notes the recent trend of transforming the Shiite-Sunni conflict from a purely regional problem of Islamic countries into an object of world geopolitics. In such circumstances, an important place in the current religious confrontation is given to Turkey, which occupies a special place in the modern system of international relations. Implementing its neo-Ottoman doctrine in the region, the Turkish leadership considers Islam to be a key factor in uniting the Middle East, so it sees the future of the region in the creation of a world Islamic state (“ummah”). In order to implement this idea, Turkey sees the current Sunni-Shiite confrontation as a remnant. Therefore, it is considered acceptable to establish friendly relations with both the Sunni states in the region and with Shiite Iran. However, as political practice has shown, the Arab countries are not yet ready to recognize Turkey as the only center of gravity, a regional leader, due to strong religious positioning in the region of Saudi Arabia and Iran. All attempts by Turkey to resolve the Sunni-Shiite conflict, based on the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism, have so far failed.

The global spread of Salafism, though it began in the 1960s and 1970s, only started to attract significant attention from scholars and analysts outside of Islamic studies as well as journalists, politicians, and the general public following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda Central. After the attacks, Salafism—or, as it was pejoratively labeled by its critics inside and outside of the Islamic tradition, “Wahhabism”—was accused of being the ideological basis of all expressions of Sunni militancy from North America and Europe to West and East Africa, the Arab world, and into Asia. According to this narrative, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Za- wahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other Sunni jihadis were merely putting into action the commands of medieval ‘ulama such as Ibn Taymiyya, the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and modern revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. To eradicate terrorism, you must eliminate or neuter Salafism, say its critics. The reality, of course, is far more complex than this simplistic nar- rative purports. Salafism, though its adherents share the same core set of creedal beliefs and methodological approaches toward the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith and Sunni legal canon, comes in many forms, from the scholastic and hierarchical Salafism of the ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries to the decentralized, self-described Salafi groups in Europe and North America who cluster around a single char- ismatic preacher who often has limited formal religious education. What unifies these different expressions of Salafism is a core canon of religious and legal texts and set of scholars who are widely respected and referenced in Salafi circles. Thurston grounds his fieldwork and text-based analysis of Salafism in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and home to one of the world’s largest single Muslim national populations, through the lens of this canon, which he defines as a “communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation” (1). He argues fur- ther that in the history of Nigerian Salafism, one can trace the major stages that the global Salafi movement has navigated as it spread from the Arab Middle East to what are erroneously often seen as “peripheral” areas of the Islamic world, Africa and parts of Asia. The book is based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria including interviews with key Nigerian Salafi scholars and other leading figures as well as a wide range of textual primary sourc- es including British and Nigerian archival documents, international and national news media reports, leaked US embassy cables, and a significant number of religious lectures and sermons and writings by Nigerian Salafis in Arabic and Hausa. In Chapter One, Thurston argues that the Salafi canon gives individ- ual and groups of Salafis a sense of identity and membership in a unique and, to them, superior religious community that is linked closely to their understanding and reading of sacred history and the revered figures of the Prophet Muhammad and the Ṣaḥāba. Salafism as an intellectual current, theology, and methodological approach is transmitted through this can- on which serves not only as a vehicle for proselytization but also a rule- book through which the boundaries of what is and is not “Salafism” are determined by its adherents and leading authorities. The book’s analytical framework and approach toward understanding Salafism, which rests on seeing it as a textual tradition, runs counter to the popular but problematic tendency in much of the existing discussion and even scholarly literature on Salafism that defines it as a literalist, one-dimensional, and puritani- cal creed with a singular focus on the Qur’an and hadith canon. Salafis, Thurston argues, do not simply derive religious and legal rulings in linear fashion from the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna but rather engage in a co- herent and uniform process of aligning today’s Salafi community with a set of normative practices and beliefs laid out by key Salafi scholars from the recent past. Thurston divides the emergence of a distinct “Salafi” current within Sunnis into two phases. The first stretches from 1880 to 1950, as Sun- ni scholars from around the Muslim-majority world whose approaches shared a common hadith-centered methodology came into closer contact. The second is from the 1960s through the present, as key Salafi institutions (such as the Islamic University of Medina and other Saudi Salafi bodies) were founded and began attracting and (perhaps most importantly) fund- ing and sponsoring Sunni students from countries such as Nigeria to come study in Saudi Arabia, where they were deeply embedded in the Salafi tra- dition before returning to their home countries where, in turn, they spread Salafism among local Muslims. Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north, as with other regions such as Yemen’s northern Sa‘ada governorate, proved to be a fertile ground for Salafism in large part because it enabled local Muslims from more humble social backgrounds to challenge the longtime domi- nance of hereditary ruling families and the established religious class. In northern Nigeria the latter was and continues to be dominated by Sufi or- ders and their shaykhs whose long-running claim to communal leadership faced new and substantive theological and resource challenges following the return of Nigerian seminary students from Saudi Arabia’s Salafi scho- lastic institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In Chapters Two and Three, Thurston traces the history of Nigerian and other African students in Saudi Arabia, which significantly expanded following the 1961 founding of the Islamic University of Medina (which remains the preeminent Salafi seminary and university in the world) and after active outreach across the Sunni Muslim world by the Saudi govern- ment and Salafi religious elite to attract students through lucrative funding and scholarship packages. The process of developing an African Salafism was not one-dimensional or imposed from the top-down by Saudi Salafi elites, but instead saw Nigerian and other African Salafi students partici- pate actively in shaping and theorizing Salafi da‘wa that took into account the specifics of each African country and Islamic religious and social envi- ronment. In Nigeria and other parts of West and East Africa, this included considering the historically dominant position of Sufi orders and popular practices such as devotion to saints and grave and shrine visitation. African and Saudi Salafis also forged relationships with local African partners, in- cluding powerful political figures such as Ahmadu Bello and his religious adviser Abubakar Gumi, by attracting them with the benefits of establishing ties with wealthy international Islamic organizations founded and backed by the Saudi state, including the Muslim World League. Nigerian Salafis returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia actively promoted their Salafi canon among local Muslims, waging an aggressive proselytization campaign that sought to chip away at the dominance of traditional political and religious elites, the Sufi shaykhs. This process is covered in Chapter Four. Drawing on key sets of legal and exegetical writ- ings by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and other Salafi scholars, Nigerian Salafis sought to introduce a framework—represented by the canon—through which their students and adherents approach re- ligious interpretation and practice. By mastering one’s understanding and ability to correctly interpret scripture and the hadith, Salafis believe, one will also live a more ethical life based on a core set of “Salafi” principles that govern not only religious but also political, social, and economic life. Salaf- ism, Thurston argues, drawing on the work of Terje Østebø on Ethiopian Salafism, becomes localized within a specific environment.As part of their da‘wa campaigns, Nigerian Salafis have utilized media and new technology to debate their rivals and critics as well as to broad- en their own influence over Nigerian Muslims and national society more broadly, actions analyzed in Chapter Five. Using the Internet, video and audio recorded sermons and religious lectures, books and pamphlets, and oral proselytization and preaching, Nigerian Salafis, like other Muslim ac- tivists and groups, see in media and technology an extension of the phys- ical infrastructure provided by institutions such as mosques and religious schools. This media/cyber infrastructure is as, if not increasingly more, valuable as the control of physical space because it allows for the rapid spread of ideas beyond what would have historically been possible for local religious preachers and missionaries. Instead of preaching political revo- lution, Nigerian Salafi activists sought to win greater access to the media including radio airtime because they believed this would ultimately lead to the triumph of their religious message despite the power of skeptical to downright hostile local audiences among the Sufi orders and non-Salafis dedicated to the Maliki juridical canon.In the realm of politics, the subject of Chapter Six, Nigeria’s Salafis base their political ideology on the core tenets of the Salafi creed and canon, tenets which cast Salafism as being not only the purest but the only true version of Islam, and require of Salafis to establish moral reform of a way- ward Muslim society. Salafi scholars seek to bring about social, political, and religious reform, which collectively represent a “return” to the Prophet Muhammad’s Islam, by speaking truth to power and advising and repri- manding, as necessary, Muslim political rulers. In navigating the multi-po- lar and complex realm of national and regional politics, Thurston argues, Nigerian Salafi scholars educated in Saudi Arabia unwittingly opened the door to cruder and more extreme, militant voices of figures lacking the same level of study of the Salafi canon or Sunni Islam generally. The most infamous of the latter is “Boko Haram,” the jihadi-insurgent group today based around Lake Chad in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which calls itself Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad and is led by the bombastic Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram, under the leadership first of the revivalist preacher Mu- hammad Yusuf and then Shekau, is covered at length in the book’s third and final part, which is composed of two chapters. Yusuf, unlike mainstream Nigerian Salafis, sought to weaponize the Salafi canon against the state in- stead of using it as a tool to bring about desired reforms. Drawing on the writings of influential Arab jihadi ideologues including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the apocalyptic revolutionary Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the lat- ter of whom participated in the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Yusuf cited key Salafi concepts such as al-walā’ min al-mu’minīn wa-l-bara’ ‘an al-kāfirīn (loyalty to the Believers and disavowal of the Disbelievers) and beliefs about absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) as the basis of his revival- ist preaching. Based on these principle, he claimed, Muslims must not only fulfill their ritual duties such as prayer and fasting during Ramadan but also actively fight “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda) and bring about God’s rule on earth, following the correct path of the community of the Prophet Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm) referenced in multiple Qur’anic verses and outlined as a theological project for action by al-Maqdisi in a lengthy book of that name that has had a profound influence on the formation of modern Sunni jihadism. Instead of seeing Boko Haram, particularly under Shekau’s leadership, as a “Salafi” or “jihadi-Salafi” group, Thurston argues it is a case study of how a group that at one point in its history adhered to Salafism can move away from and beyond it. In the case of Shekau and his “post-Salafism,” he writes, the group, like Islamic State, has shifted away from the Salafi canon and toward a jihadism that uses only stripped-down elements from the canon and does so solely to propagate a militaristic form of jihad. Even when referencing historical religious authorities such as Ibn Taymiyya, Thurston points out, Boko Haram and Islamic State leaders and members often do so through the lens of modern Sunni jihadi ideologues like Juhay- man al-‘Utaybi, al-Maqdisi, and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, figures who have come to form a Sunni jihadi canon of texts, intellectuals, and ideologues. Shekau, in short, has given up canonical Salafism and moved toward a more bombastic and scholastically more heterodox and less-Salafi-than- jihadi creed of political violence. Thurston also pushes back against the often crude stereotyping of Af- rican Islamic traditions and movements that sees African Muslims as being defined by their “syncretic” mix of traditional African religious traditions and “orthodox” Islam, the latter usually a stand-in for “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” Islam. Islam and Islamic movements in Africa have developed in social and political environments that are not mirrors to the dominant models of the Arab world (in particular, Egypt). He convincingly points out that analysis of all forms of African Islamic social and political mobi- lization through a Middle East and Egypt-heavy lens obscures much more than it elucidates. The book includes useful glossaries of key individuals and Arabic terms referenced in the text as well as a translation of a sermon by the late, revered Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani that is part of the mainstream Salafi canon. Extensive in its coverage of the his- tory, evolution, and sociopolitical and religious development of Salafism in Nigeria as well as the key role played by Saudi Salafi universities and religious institutions and quasi-state NGOs, the book expands the schol- arly literature on Salafism, Islam in Africa, and political Islam and Islamic social movements. It also contributing to ongoing debates and discussions on approaches to the study of the role of texts and textual traditions in the formation of individual and communal religious identity. Christopher AnzaloneResearch Fellow, International Security ProgramBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University& PhD candidate, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

The global spread of Salafism, though it began in the 1960s and 1970s, only started to attract significant attention from scholars and analysts outside of Islamic studies as well as journalists, politicians, and the general public following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda Central. After the attacks, Salafism—or, as it was pejoratively labeled by its critics inside and outside of the Islamic tradition, “Wahhabism”—was accused of being the ideological basis of all expressions of Sunni militancy from North America and Europe to West and East Africa, the Arab world, and into Asia. According to this narrative, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Za- wahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other Sunni jihadis were merely putting into action the commands of medieval ‘ulama such as Ibn Taymiyya, the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and modern revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. To eradicate terrorism, you must eliminate or neuter Salafism, say its critics. The reality, of course, is far more complex than this simplistic nar- rative purports. Salafism, though its adherents share the same core set of creedal beliefs and methodological approaches toward the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith and Sunni legal canon, comes in many forms, from the scholastic and hierarchical Salafism of the ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries to the decentralized, self-described Salafi groups in Europe and North America who cluster around a single char- ismatic preacher who often has limited formal religious education. What unifies these different expressions of Salafism is a core canon of religious and legal texts and set of scholars who are widely respected and referenced in Salafi circles. Thurston grounds his fieldwork and text-based analysis of Salafism in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and home to one of the world’s largest single Muslim national populations, through the lens of this canon, which he defines as a “communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation” (1). He argues fur- ther that in the history of Nigerian Salafism, one can trace the major stages that the global Salafi movement has navigated as it spread from the Arab Middle East to what are erroneously often seen as “peripheral” areas of the Islamic world, Africa and parts of Asia. The book is based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria including interviews with key Nigerian Salafi scholars and other leading figures as well as a wide range of textual primary sourc- es including British and Nigerian archival documents, international and national news media reports, leaked US embassy cables, and a significant number of religious lectures and sermons and writings by Nigerian Salafis in Arabic and Hausa. In Chapter One, Thurston argues that the Salafi canon gives individ- ual and groups of Salafis a sense of identity and membership in a unique and, to them, superior religious community that is linked closely to their understanding and reading of sacred history and the revered figures of the Prophet Muhammad and the Ṣaḥāba. Salafism as an intellectual current, theology, and methodological approach is transmitted through this can- on which serves not only as a vehicle for proselytization but also a rule- book through which the boundaries of what is and is not “Salafism” are determined by its adherents and leading authorities. The book’s analytical framework and approach toward understanding Salafism, which rests on seeing it as a textual tradition, runs counter to the popular but problematic tendency in much of the existing discussion and even scholarly literature on Salafism that defines it as a literalist, one-dimensional, and puritani- cal creed with a singular focus on the Qur’an and hadith canon. Salafis, Thurston argues, do not simply derive religious and legal rulings in linear fashion from the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna but rather engage in a co- herent and uniform process of aligning today’s Salafi community with a set of normative practices and beliefs laid out by key Salafi scholars from the recent past. Thurston divides the emergence of a distinct “Salafi” current within Sunnis into two phases. The first stretches from 1880 to 1950, as Sun- ni scholars from around the Muslim-majority world whose approaches shared a common hadith-centered methodology came into closer contact. The second is from the 1960s through the present, as key Salafi institutions (such as the Islamic University of Medina and other Saudi Salafi bodies) were founded and began attracting and (perhaps most importantly) fund- ing and sponsoring Sunni students from countries such as Nigeria to come study in Saudi Arabia, where they were deeply embedded in the Salafi tra- dition before returning to their home countries where, in turn, they spread Salafism among local Muslims. Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north, as with other regions such as Yemen’s northern Sa‘ada governorate, proved to be a fertile ground for Salafism in large part because it enabled local Muslims from more humble social backgrounds to challenge the longtime domi- nance of hereditary ruling families and the established religious class. In northern Nigeria the latter was and continues to be dominated by Sufi or- ders and their shaykhs whose long-running claim to communal leadership faced new and substantive theological and resource challenges following the return of Nigerian seminary students from Saudi Arabia’s Salafi scho- lastic institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In Chapters Two and Three, Thurston traces the history of Nigerian and other African students in Saudi Arabia, which significantly expanded following the 1961 founding of the Islamic University of Medina (which remains the preeminent Salafi seminary and university in the world) and after active outreach across the Sunni Muslim world by the Saudi govern- ment and Salafi religious elite to attract students through lucrative funding and scholarship packages. The process of developing an African Salafism was not one-dimensional or imposed from the top-down by Saudi Salafi elites, but instead saw Nigerian and other African Salafi students partici- pate actively in shaping and theorizing Salafi da‘wa that took into account the specifics of each African country and Islamic religious and social envi- ronment. In Nigeria and other parts of West and East Africa, this included considering the historically dominant position of Sufi orders and popular practices such as devotion to saints and grave and shrine visitation. African and Saudi Salafis also forged relationships with local African partners, in- cluding powerful political figures such as Ahmadu Bello and his religious adviser Abubakar Gumi, by attracting them with the benefits of establishing ties with wealthy international Islamic organizations founded and backed by the Saudi state, including the Muslim World League. Nigerian Salafis returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia actively promoted their Salafi canon among local Muslims, waging an aggressive proselytization campaign that sought to chip away at the dominance of traditional political and religious elites, the Sufi shaykhs. This process is covered in Chapter Four. Drawing on key sets of legal and exegetical writ- ings by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and other Salafi scholars, Nigerian Salafis sought to introduce a framework—represented by the canon—through which their students and adherents approach re- ligious interpretation and practice. By mastering one’s understanding and ability to correctly interpret scripture and the hadith, Salafis believe, one will also live a more ethical life based on a core set of “Salafi” principles that govern not only religious but also political, social, and economic life. Salaf- ism, Thurston argues, drawing on the work of Terje Østebø on Ethiopian Salafism, becomes localized within a specific environment.As part of their da‘wa campaigns, Nigerian Salafis have utilized media and new technology to debate their rivals and critics as well as to broad- en their own influence over Nigerian Muslims and national society more broadly, actions analyzed in Chapter Five. Using the Internet, video and audio recorded sermons and religious lectures, books and pamphlets, and oral proselytization and preaching, Nigerian Salafis, like other Muslim ac- tivists and groups, see in media and technology an extension of the phys- ical infrastructure provided by institutions such as mosques and religious schools. This media/cyber infrastructure is as, if not increasingly more, valuable as the control of physical space because it allows for the rapid spread of ideas beyond what would have historically been possible for local religious preachers and missionaries. Instead of preaching political revo- lution, Nigerian Salafi activists sought to win greater access to the media including radio airtime because they believed this would ultimately lead to the triumph of their religious message despite the power of skeptical to downright hostile local audiences among the Sufi orders and non-Salafis dedicated to the Maliki juridical canon.In the realm of politics, the subject of Chapter Six, Nigeria’s Salafis base their political ideology on the core tenets of the Salafi creed and canon, tenets which cast Salafism as being not only the purest but the only true version of Islam, and require of Salafis to establish moral reform of a way- ward Muslim society. Salafi scholars seek to bring about social, political, and religious reform, which collectively represent a “return” to the Prophet Muhammad’s Islam, by speaking truth to power and advising and repri- manding, as necessary, Muslim political rulers. In navigating the multi-po- lar and complex realm of national and regional politics, Thurston argues, Nigerian Salafi scholars educated in Saudi Arabia unwittingly opened the door to cruder and more extreme, militant voices of figures lacking the same level of study of the Salafi canon or Sunni Islam generally. The most infamous of the latter is “Boko Haram,” the jihadi-insurgent group today based around Lake Chad in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which calls itself Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad and is led by the bombastic Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram, under the leadership first of the revivalist preacher Mu- hammad Yusuf and then Shekau, is covered at length in the book’s third and final part, which is composed of two chapters. Yusuf, unlike mainstream Nigerian Salafis, sought to weaponize the Salafi canon against the state in- stead of using it as a tool to bring about desired reforms. Drawing on the writings of influential Arab jihadi ideologues including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the apocalyptic revolutionary Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the lat- ter of whom participated in the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Yusuf cited key Salafi concepts such as al-walā’ min al-mu’minīn wa-l-bara’ ‘an al-kāfirīn (loyalty to the Believers and disavowal of the Disbelievers) and beliefs about absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) as the basis of his revival- ist preaching. Based on these principle, he claimed, Muslims must not only fulfill their ritual duties such as prayer and fasting during Ramadan but also actively fight “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda) and bring about God’s rule on earth, following the correct path of the community of the Prophet Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm) referenced in multiple Qur’anic verses and outlined as a theological project for action by al-Maqdisi in a lengthy book of that name that has had a profound influence on the formation of modern Sunni jihadism. Instead of seeing Boko Haram, particularly under Shekau’s leadership, as a “Salafi” or “jihadi-Salafi” group, Thurston argues it is a case study of how a group that at one point in its history adhered to Salafism can move away from and beyond it. In the case of Shekau and his “post-Salafism,” he writes, the group, like Islamic State, has shifted away from the Salafi canon and toward a jihadism that uses only stripped-down elements from the canon and does so solely to propagate a militaristic form of jihad. Even when referencing historical religious authorities such as Ibn Taymiyya, Thurston points out, Boko Haram and Islamic State leaders and members often do so through the lens of modern Sunni jihadi ideologues like Juhay- man al-‘Utaybi, al-Maqdisi, and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, figures who have come to form a Sunni jihadi canon of texts, intellectuals, and ideologues. Shekau, in short, has given up canonical Salafism and moved toward a more bombastic and scholastically more heterodox and less-Salafi-than- jihadi creed of political violence. Thurston also pushes back against the often crude stereotyping of Af- rican Islamic traditions and movements that sees African Muslims as being defined by their “syncretic” mix of traditional African religious traditions and “orthodox” Islam, the latter usually a stand-in for “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” Islam. Islam and Islamic movements in Africa have developed in social and political environments that are not mirrors to the dominant models of the Arab world (in particular, Egypt). He convincingly points out that analysis of all forms of African Islamic social and political mobi- lization through a Middle East and Egypt-heavy lens obscures much more than it elucidates. The book includes useful glossaries of key individuals and Arabic terms referenced in the text as well as a translation of a sermon by the late, revered Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani that is part of the mainstream Salafi canon. Extensive in its coverage of the his- tory, evolution, and sociopolitical and religious development of Salafism in Nigeria as well as the key role played by Saudi Salafi universities and religious institutions and quasi-state NGOs, the book expands the schol- arly literature on Salafism, Islam in Africa, and political Islam and Islamic social movements. It also contributing to ongoing debates and discussions on approaches to the study of the role of texts and textual traditions in the formation of individual and communal religious identity. Christopher AnzaloneResearch Fellow, International Security ProgramBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University& PhD candidate, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

The emergence of the major transnational terrorist movement called Al Qaeda became possible first and foremost because of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. A local peasant rebellion against the radical left wing regime in a faraway country was immediately transformed into jihad, a real crusade against the invading “infidels”. What followed was the gradual evolution of an insignificant group of young volunteers from the Arab countries who soon became the nucleus of a powerful global movement challenging the Western world. Bin Laden’s motto was: “After overcoming one superpower we will deal with another one”. The large scale terrorist campaign culminated in the 9/11 terrorist action called “the Manhatten operation” by its perpetrators. Summing up the results of the jihadists’ activities, the author comes to the conclusion that the terrorist network is probably in the initial stage of decline due not only to the leaders’ death but also to its failure to mobilize the world of Islam under its banner.

The Mediterranean has never been, conceptually or politically, a homogenous and organic space. From antiquity till the modern era, the surrounded littoral nations looked at their neighborhood through the lenses of a cooperative Euro-Mediterranean region, seeking to extend their norms, rules, and values through the deployment of soft power, from trade and aid to security cooperation and political dialogue. Today, instead, there is a great power competition that divided the region between North Africa and the Middle East especially in the eastern Mediterranean, heavily prioritizing the latter over the former in diplomatic and military outreach and viewing it through the prism of the strategic relationship, of EU nations and NATO allies. In addition, the Arab state system of the region is in standoff now, with many (if not most) states featuring existential fragilities or have collapsed altogether. State fragility has created areas of limited statehood, in which alternative forms of governance—from militias to municipalities, international donors to civil society—have stepped in and in which foreign powers have meddled. Through such interference, global and regional rivalries have exacerbated and have found fertile ground. All major global and regional cleavages are now tragically on display in the region: from the Russia-West and Israel-Iran confrontation in Syria to the Turkish-Greece tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, from the Turkey-UAE/Egypt struggle over political Islam in Libya, to the Iran-Saudi conflict in Yemen, or the Gulf and Israeli skepticism of the Iran nuclear deal. Also, energy has become a proxy for confrontation—as evident in the configuration of the East Med Gas Forum from which Turkey is excluded—and migration has become both a dramatic consequence of fragility and conflict, as well as a tool through which origin and transit countries have arm-twisted Europe. The only cleavage that appears to have temporarily abated is the Arab-Israeli one, with the Abraham accords crystallizing normalization between Israel and some Arab states. Consequently, the region has become far more porous than it once was. It has become impossible to read conflicts in the Mediterranean in isolation, as regional powers like Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, France, and Turkey weigh in across the region. Likewise, illegal migration, energy, security, terrorism, and climate dynamics have generated indissoluble ties to the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East.

Honor crime is a heinous global phenomenon occurring in several Arab and Islamic societies with varying magnitudes from one country to another. The growing number of honor crime cases, mostly in developing countries such as Jordan, demands serious academic investigation not only because the lives of the victims are at stake, but also because the phenomenon is still gravely overlooked and unaddressed due to socio-cultural norms branding it as a social taboo. Recently, there has been increasing interest among Arab and Jordanian writers in portraying honor killings against Jordanian women through their literary works (Fanous, 2018). Thus, in this paper, we shall examine the manifestations of honor crimes against women in the Jordanian context through a textual analysis of Tale of Tales by Sanaa Shalan, an author belonging to the Jordanian contemporary literary movement. Originally written in Arabic, this novella highlights the suffering of many Jordanian women due to honor crimes inflicted upon them by the poor and male-dominated society. Through an Islamic reading based on Quranic verses and Sunni Hadiths to read of Tale of Tales (2007), we shall examine Shalan’s depictions of honor crimes against women in the novella as an extremely engendered phenomenon resulting from male domination and power and gender inequity prevalent in the Jordanian society. This paper is premised based on two elements, namely: the misconception of honor and its association with the women’s body and its roots in Islam, as depicted in Tale of Tales through the novella’s female characters, notably the main protagonist.

Islamic ideology is the basis and source of Islamic state, which sets out the rights of Muslims as well as the Dhimmis. Islam teaches the tolerance and fairness to non-Muslims citizens. Islam gives the non-Muslims religious freedom. Quran says, “There is no compulsion in Faith”. Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) says, “If anyone wrongs a Mu'ahid, detracts from his rights, burdens him with more work than he is able to do, or takes something from him without his consent, I will plead for him on the Day of Resurrection”. Arab Muslims conquered Spain in 711 A.C. The Muslims defeated Christians there, while the Jews also existed there. When the Muslims (Moors) conquered this country, they behaved and treated the people here with fairness and tolerance. The tolerance of Muslims has had a profound impact on non-Muslims and the environment here. Many of non-Muslims converted to Islam with their own consent. Muslims gave them full enfranchise to worship according to their own religion; the priest did not need to hide their religious status. Muslim Spain had complete freedom of education which led to students coming from other countries for pursuit education. Non-Muslims adopted culture, living style and ways to dress of Muslims. They learned Arabic and began to read poetry in Arabic. Arabic literature translated into Hebrew and Latin by non-Muslims. In Muslim Spain there was freedom of expression. The Jewish scholar Ibn Naghrila spoke on the beliefs of Muslims under the Muslim rule in Spain.Hasdai ibn Shaprot (d.970) established a madrasa for Jews in Cordova to teach the Holy Scripture and Talmud. Katie Magnus (d.1924) says, “Like a dream in the night – Life in Spain”. Due to the tolerance of Muslims, Europeans became aware of civilization and from that time renaissance began. Muslims behaved non-Muslims with tolerance, contrary to non-Muslims, while they overcome on Muslims, wherever their attitude with Muslims is always regrettable. With the fall of the Muslim’s empire, Spain fell into the darkness of ignorance. Stanley lane-Poole (d.1931) says, “The Moors were banished, for a while the Christian Spain shone, like the Moon, with a borrowed light, then came the eclipse, and in that darkness Spain grovelled ever since”.

Major changes have taken place in Muslim societies in general during the last decades. Traditional family and social organizational structures have come into conflict with the perceptions and needs of development and modern state-building. Moreover, the international context of globalization, as well as changes in intercommunity relations through immigration, have also deeply affected social and cultural mutations by facilitating contact between different cultures and civilizations. Of the dilemmas arising from these changes, those concerning women’s and men’s roles were the most conflictive issues because of different interpretations and evaluations of historical, religious and/or cultural heritages. In the case of Morocco, for over 30 years, women’s and human rights NGOs have acted and advocated to promote women’s rights. The main disputes have concerned the distinction between what is within the requirements of Islam and what is the consequence of traditional social beliefs and practices. This ended nevertheless with the adoption by the Parliament of a new Family Law proclaimed in February 2004. This law was the result of a process of consultation and national debate, which made possible substantial progress in terms of proclaimed values of equality of rights between men and women, with the support of most national political and social leaders. Several lessons can be learned from the Moroccan experience. The crucial role of civil society, the political support of the state at its highest level, the working methodology of the Royal Advisory Commission and the final process for the adoption of the new code were from the most determinant parameters. In light of recent developments in some majority-Muslim countries, the future of women’s rights is a key issue of the so-called Arab spring. Muslim women’s challenges and struggles are not only ideological and legal battles, but they are also social and political struggles for which one of the major conditions is to prevent and prohibit the use of Islam as a political instrument. Muslim societies need to educate people properly and change their traditional representations and patterns of thought. To promote justice, equity and equality in general, as well as to protect women’s economic rights, they need appropriate economic and social policies. Then women can really promote, protect and benefit from the advances of their legal status.

The National Association of African American Studies and Affiliates[National Association of African American Studies, National Associationof Hispanic and Latino Studies, National Association of Native AmericanStudies and Affiliates, International Association of Asian Studies] held itsannual conference in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on 13-18 February 2006.The conference served as host to over 580 college and university professors,as well as members of professional organizations, from across theUnited States and several foreign countries. In addition to the speakerswho addressed issues related to the African-American, Hispanic/Latino,Asian and Native American experience, there were more than 1,200 otherattendees.A sampling of institutions represented included the University ofTennessee, six institutions from the California State system, HamptonUniversity, Yale University, Quinnipiac University, Howard University,George Mason University, Wesleyan University, University of Kansas, andPurdue University. Additional participants and attendees came from theUnited Arab Emirates University, the Sequoyah Research Center, the Centerfor the Christian-Muslim Engagement for Peace and Justice, Cubanet News,Stewart Associates, Erudite RPC Firm, the Economic Policy Institute, andImani Publications.The 2006 conference also involved the Islamic and Middle EasternStudies Association (IMESA). The participation from IMESA marks the firsttime this organization has held its meeting in conjunction with another organization.There were several outstanding papers presented by IMESA participants.Dr. Pisamai Vogulaar (The Center of Christian-Muslim Engagementfor Peace and Justice) presented a paper entitled “Living as MuslimMinorities: ACase Study of Thai Sunni Muslims in Bangkok and Arab SunniMuslims in Chicago.” The focus of this paper was of interest to many of theconference attendees. Other outstanding presentations included “FethullahGullen and Islam in the Contemporary World” by Dr. Yetkin Yildirin (TheInstitute of Interfaith Dialog), “That Which May Not Be Spoken: HomoeroticDesire in the Writings of Ismat Chugtai and Alifa Rifaat” by Dr. Indrani Mitra(St. Mary’s University), and “Seek What Brings Benefit: A Discussion ofContemporary Issues Involving Maslaha and a Few Theological Premises inIts Favor” by Mary C. Moorman (Yale University) ...

Relations between the Sultanate of Oman and the Islamic Republic of Iran extend back to the ancient civilisations that inhabited both regions. At first, trade was the only connection between the two countries. This later evolved into the Persian occupation of Oman which ended in the first century BC after the battle of Saloot. However, these ancient relations are irrelevant to this paper which seeks to examine the nature of the relations between the two states in current times. Oman recognizes Iran as an ancient civilization, not just a new or modernized state. Oman does not ignore the role of Iran in the region and gives it its deserved attention. This is because Oman understands Iran’s significant contemporary and historical position in the Middle East.It is undoubted that Omani influence reached the Iranian territories through the message of Islam. This was the result of Omani merchants and travelers who sailed through the golden strait (Hormuz) to the Iranian border. Moreover, some Persian and Arab tribes settled in the north cost of Oman and lived peacefully together till the modern days. Oman-Iran’s relationship is based on reciprocal respect and not interfering in the internal affairs of both states. The security and logistic cooperation between the two states was very strong in the 1970s and reached its peak in 1977, when the Shah of Iran visited Oman. In the 1970s, Oman signed several agreements, many of which were with Iran, to secure itself from communist threats.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the transformation of the concept of Islamic party in the Muslim political discourse. Considering the processes of separation of Islam and politics as the formation of independent communication systems, the authors try to find an answer to the question of how, despite doctrinal restrictions, the notion “Islamic party” managed to acquire the features of a stable political concept. The authors propose a hypothesis, according to which, as the socio-political modernization of the Arab countries proceeds, the political system appropriates this concept, thereby specifying Islamic values at the level that allows to combine these values with new power institutions and fulfill specific political actions with these values. To test this hypothesis, the authors turn to the analysis of the temporal structure of the concept of party in Quran (Sunnah), the texts of the first ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood and the rhetoric of the modern Islamic movements that occupy stable positions in the national parliaments. As a result of the study, the authors document the polysemantics inherent in the Islamic doctrine and identify the main parameters of the temporalization and pragmatization of the concept. According to their conclusion, the Islamic parties’ abandonment of Quranic time and placement in the national-historical contexts, as well as the erosion of their initial core values, determine the mo dern perception and functional significance of such parties: they act as an institution that differentiates Islamic norms and ensures their combination with the institutions of the nation state that emerged in the process of moder nization.