Articles de revues sur le sujet « Injure vindicative »

Who was to blame when a labouring woman or her unborn child died during the early modern period? How was responsibility assessed, and who was charged with assessing it? To answer such questions, this article draws on French obstetrical treatises produced by male surgeons and female midwives between 1550 and 1730, focusing on descriptions of difficult deliveries. Sometimes the poor outcome of a labour was blamed on the pregnant woman herself, but more often a particular medical practitioner was implicated. Authors of obstetrical treatises were careful to assign fault when injuries or deaths occurred in cases concerning them. Chirurgiens accoucheurs (surgeon men-midwives) regularly accused female midwives of incompetence, yet also attacked fellow surgeons as well as those male physicians officially superior to them in the medical hierarchy. Female midwives similarly condemned the actions of male practitioners, without hesitating to censure other women when their mismanagement of deliveries had tragic consequences. Part of authors' eagerness to blame others stemmed from the fear of being held accountable for mistakes preceding practitioners had made. Ascribing responsibility usually went hand-in-hand with defensive claims of innocence, or boastful declarations of having saved a suffering woman from the bungling attempts of less skilled birth attendants.

Abstract Introduction: Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a major cause of disability. Assessment and treatment of TBI typically focus on physical and cognitive impairments, yet psychological impairments represent significant causes of disability. Depression may be the most common and disabling psychiatric condition in individuals with TBI. Objective: This cross-sectional study was design to investigate prevalence and risk factors of depression in Traumatic brain injury (TBI). Material and method: The Group studied consists of 204 patients of mild and moderate TBI between 14-days to one-year post injury. Demographic characteristics of the participants were assessed on a self-designed semi structured performa. Interviews focused on assessment of severity of TBI, depression and quality of life (Qol) using GCS, PHQ-9 and WHOBREF-QOL respectively. Results: Total 204 patients were included. 42.15% participants were found to have depression. None of the demographic variables were associated with depression except female sex, severity and time since injury. Moderate TBI patient (55.80%) had significantly higher occurrence of depression than the mild cases (44.2%). Patients with lesser duration (time since injury) of TBI had high incidence (50.2%) of depression compare to longer duration of TBI. Depressed patients also had poor Qol than those without depression in all domains except physical health domain. Neuroanatomical localization was also correlated with depression. Cerebral contusions were the most common (44.24%) lesions associated with depression. Conclusion: Depression is commonly associated, yet under diagnosed clinical entities in head injury and have tremendous impact in overall outcome measures. Every patient of head injury warrants psychiatric evaluation and concomitant treatment if required to ensure the attainment of not only neuroanatomical intact but overall productive and qualitative life vindicating the holistic and multidisciplinary treatment approach.

In response to Ken’s (1999) rejoinder to the International Society of Sport Psychology’s (ISSP) Position Stand (PS) on aggression and violence in sport (Tenenbaum. Stewart, Singer, & Duda, 1997), this reply refutes Kerr’s criticisms and further advocates the recommendations provided by the ISSP to drastically reduce aggression among athletes and spectators. Specifically, this paper answers Kerr’s (1999) accusations that the PS fails to provide an understanding of the motivation behind aggression in sport, does not distinguish between athlete and spectator violence, makes improper conclusions regarding the media’s influence, and incorrectly blames officials for inflaming aggressive acts. Support is offered to vindicate the PS. The example cited by Kerr to discredit the PS recommendations is shown to be congruent with the ISSP’s suggestions for reducing aggression and violence in sport. Readers are urged to approach with caution arguments that consider aggression an essential component of sport, as such views increase the risk of injury among participants and spectators. Additional suggestions for reducing the incidence of aggression and violence in sport are invited.

Federal law has long deprived American veterans of certain fundamental legal rights enjoyed by non-veterans and attributable to veteran sacrifice. Federal case law, for example, denies veterans the right to bring an action in tort against the federal government to vindicate in-service injuries. And the United States Code deprives veterans of their right to robust judicial oversight of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) service-connected benefit decisions. This pair of due process deprivations is compounded by the federal statute that prohibits veterans from exercising the fundamental right to counsel during the initial stage of the VA claims process. This Article examines the federal statutory scheme and pertinent case law that has long denied veterans the right to counsel throughout the VA veteran claims adjudication process, debunks the rationales underlying that law, and concludes by recommending that the federal government extend to veterans the right to counsel throughout the VA’s benefits adjudication proceedings.

Article III standing is a central requirement in federal litigation. The Supreme Court’s Spokeo decision marked a significant development in the doctrine, dividing the concrete injury-in-fact requirement into two subsets: tangible and intangible harms. While tangible harms are easily cognizable, plaintiffs alleging intangible harms can face a perilous path to court. This raises particular concern for the system of federal consumer protection laws where enforcement relies on consumers vindicating their own rights by filing suit when companies violate federal law. These plaintiffs must often allege intangible harms arising out of their statutorily guaranteed rights. This Note demonstrates that Spokeo’s standard for what constitutes a cognizable intangible harm has produced inconsistent and arbitrary results in such lower court cases. Courts have come to varying conclusions about which intangible harms are sufficiently concrete to confer standing under the Court’s new standard. This Note makes two contributions. First, it offers a novel taxonomy of these various intangible harms, sorted into five discrete categories. Once these categories are identified, the underlying inconsistencies, both between circuits and between similar consumer protection laws, become evident. Second, it proposes an approach to intangible harms that is more deferential to the judgment of Congress as revealed in its statutes.

AbstractLitigation has presented itself as a serious means to vindicate normative commitments about climate change by forcing governments to review their policy priorities. Today, the use of such litigation is not limited to the domestic arena. International law now provides the new principal avenue for such litigation. Two litigation strategies stand out: obligations strategy and rights strategy. Obligations strategy consists of bestowing an erga omnes character to existing obligations regarding the protection of the global environment, thereby providing standing for a non-injured party before international courts. Rights strategy, on the other hand, significantly increases in practice. It consists in the invocation, before national and international courts, of remedies for environmental damages through the legal categories of human rights law.This article sheds light on the potential and limits of these litigation strategies in international law. The argument builds on the specific evolution in the legal architecture of international obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The current structure of the UNFCCC now makes it substantially impossible to bring a claim against individual states regarding their specific measures against climate change. The article, by referring to the history of drafting which produced the specific structure, questions the ability of these litigation strategies to remedy the lack of international consensus and to accommodate the technical intricacy of how to turn normative commitments into actual action for climate change.

In today’s world, electric cars are gaining popularity as a mode of transportation due to their smooth and comfortable rides. Since electric cars/bikes do not emit exhaust emissions, environmental standards will improve; however, an unintended upcoming risk of accidents has been identified due to the quiet nature of electric vehicles. The increasing trend of road accidents is resulting in serious injuries or even severe disability. In view of this, it was intended to develop the smart control system by using neural network techniques to enhance safety, especially for electric vehicles. The obstacle detection and smart control strategy were achieved by employing a state flow network. Furthermore, The driver’s behavior was monitored with the aid of a web camera. If the drowsiness/fatigue state of the driver is being detected by the system, then immediate precautionary steps would be carried out such as warning indicators, emergency braking, and stop. To execute this method, the number of input processing hardware devices and software algorithms were used collaboratively. The prototype has been developed to conduct the necessary trials for vindication. The findings show that the control strategy of the proposed model was successfully incorporated on the test bed with consistent results concerning control in numerous situations. The proposed smart braking system would be beneficial to both road users and passengers for improving safety.

Introduction The standards for the management of open fractures of the lower limb published by the British Association of Plastic, Reconstructive and Aesthetic surgeons (BAPRAS) and British Orthopaedic Association (BOA) were introduced to improve the treatment received by patients after open injury to the lower limb. These Standards were released after BAPRAS/BOA published Guidelines for the management of open tibial fractures. Methods We wished to determine the impact of these Standards upon the surgical management of open tibial fractures by comparing patients admitted to an orthoplastic centre in the 45 months concluding December 2009 (the Guidelines era) with those admitted during 2011 (the Standards era). Surgical procedures required during the first 30 days and 12 months after injury were determined. Cases were divided into ‘directly admitted patients’ (DAP) and ‘transferred patients’ (TP). Standards-era patients were divided further into those who had surgery exclusively at the orthoplastic centre (orthoplastic patients (OPP)) and those transferred after surgery (TASP). Results The number of TP trebled in frequency in the Standards era, 25% of whom were transferred before surgery. Significantly fewer surgical procedures were required for DAP and OPP groups compared with TP (and TASP) groups in both eras (Mann–Whitney U-test, p=0.05). DAP and OPP groups during the Standards era underwent the fewest procedures, with the vast majority of cases treated with two or fewer procedures in the first 12 months (88% and 80%, respectively, compared with 61% in the Guidelines era). In the Guidelines era, 44% of TP cases and in the Standards era 39% of TP and 29% of TASP groups underwent two or fewer procedures. Approximately two-thirds of open tibial fractures managed in our orthoplastic centre were patients transferred after surgery. The greatest impact of the Standards was evident for those who underwent surgery exclusively in the orthoplastic centre, reflecting a more deliberate combined strategy. Conclusion These findings vindicate the Standards as well as mandating reorganisation and resourcing of orthoplastic services to ensure immediate transfer and early combined surgery. By increasing the capacity to deal with time-dependent initial surgery, the surgical burden that the patient must endure, and which the service must provide, are reduced.

There has been for some time a widespread view that anyone under investigation with regard to suspected wrongdoing should be entitled to anonymity prior to charge. Yet no attempt has been made to legislate. The matter is governed currently by the recently developed law of privacy, deriving from such cases as Campbell v MGN Ltd and culminating in the decision of the Supreme Court in ZXC v Bloomberg LP. It seems to be accepted, not only in England but under human rights law generally, that such information should be regarded as "private". This has not seriously been undermined in any of the leading cases. There is surely a serious question as to whether a suspect does indeed have a reasonable expectation that there should be such a blanket over his or her identity. This information is not purely personal. It relates to suspected wrongdoing – information which legitimately concerns not only any individual under suspicion but also, for example, "victims" and no doubt other fellow citizens interested in getting to the truth and in the administration of justice. Naturally, if a suspect's name leaks out, that individual's reputation may be seriously damaged. Some take the view that compensation should be recoverable specifically for injury to reputation – even though the claim would not be brought in defamation. Yet privacy and libel are distinct causes of action with different purposes to fulfil. If damages are to be sought to vindicate reputation, it is hard to see why a defendant should not have available the traditional defences and other principles applying in defamation. If a claimant wishes to demonstrate that the allegations are false, as well as intrusive, why should he not be subject to the same disciplines and risks as one who sues in libel?

The events of recent years have prompted a closer examination of the legal complexities arising from transnational armed conflicts pitting a state against a non-state organized armed group based outside the state's territory. For much of the Twentieth Century it remained unclear whether human rights law apply to a state's conduct during armed conflict or occupation. Despite continuing objections on the part of a handful of states, a consensus is evolving in favor of the view that human rights law applies in full alongside humanitarian law.Once it is settled that human rights law does not cease to apply by reason of the inception of a state of armed conflict, it is easy to see how this body of law would apply alongside humanitarian law in an internal armed conflict. The situation becomes more complex, however, when a state is engaged in a non-international armed conflict taking place outside of that state's territory.Unlike human rights law, the law of armed conflict was designed to apply primarily in an inter-state context. Thus, the vast majority of its provisions clearly apply to a state's extraterritorial conduct, specifically in the territory of the opposing state. But what of that branch of humanitarian law that developed to regulate non-international (i.e., non-inter-state) armed conflict? Recently, controversy arose as to whether Common Article 3 applies only to internal conflicts. The question of the extraterritorial application of Common Article 3 must be examined in light of the more general evolution in humanitarian law in favor of recognizing rights of individuals as such.There has been a substantial degree of convergence between the law of international armed conflict and the law of non-international armed conflict. A result of this convergence has been that individuals involved in a non-international armed conflict can now benefit from many of the protections once available only in the context of inter-state conflicts.At the same time, some have relied on this convergence to extend to non-international armed conflicts not only the prohibitions of the law of international armed conflict, but also, controversially, authorizations. In any event, notwithstanding continuing controversy over its content, there seems to be a general consensus supporting the proposition that the law of non-international armed conflict applies extraterritorially. As noted above, demonstrating the applicability of humanitarian law outside of a state's territory is facilitated by the fact that the bulk of the law of armed conflict was designed to apply in an interstate context, presupposing that states would be acting on each other's territory. That some of these rules are now deemed to apply even in an internal setting does not lessen the presumption that they will still apply extraterritorially, at least insofar as they consist of prohibitions and do not purport to impose obligations on third states.The situation is more complex under human rights law, which was not primarily designed to apply extraterritorially. In order to ascertain whether human rights law is applicable in the context of transnational conflicts with non-state groups, it is essential to consider the extent to which human rights law is applicable in relation to individuals outside the state's territory.Most of the jurisprudence of human rights bodies, which have greatly elaborated on the content of states' obligations under the various human rights treaties, has been developed in the context of alleged violations committed on the territory of the respective state party. Can these same standards be transposed onto the state's conduct abroad?Thus, it would seem that there may be an identifiable trend toward recognizing varying levels of obligation. In particular, it may be that negative obligations apply whenever a state acts extraterritorially (at least with respect to intentional human rights violations, as opposed to indirect consequences), but that the degree of positive obligations will be dependent upon the type and degree of control (or power or authority) exercised by the state. Such obligations are limited by a scope of reasonableness even when applied to a state's conduct within its territory; there is no reason why application to a state's extraterritorial conduct would not similarly be bounded by a scope of reasonableness, such that the adoption of affirmative measures is only required when and to the extent that the relevant party de jure or de facto enjoys a position of control that would make the adoption of such measures reasonable. This approach would preserve the integrity of the respective treaties and would vindicate the universal nature of human rights, which is proclaimed in the preambles of all of the human rights treaties considered in this analysis. At the same time, it would not place unreasonable burdens on states parties. From its inception, the international law of armed conflict followed the projection of power. The jus in bello would apply to armed conflicts irrespective of physical location, so long as opposability as between the warring parties was satisfied. The same could be said of the law of state responsibility for injury to aliens. While the application of both bodies of law clearly extended beyond the state's jurisdictional reach, neither could penetrate into the sphere of the state's domestic jurisdiction in the narrowest sense. Human Rights law was developed to fill that gap.But just as humanitarian law ultimately began to press inward against that external membrane of a state's domestic jurisdiction, human rights law has now begun to exert outward pressure against the inner wall of the state's jurisdiction. Indeed, these two processes—of inward penetration and outward projection—can be seen along a single continuum with a common seam. That seam is manifested in the structural evolution of the international legal system that was consolidated in the years immediately following World War II. The principal structural development of that period was the emergence of the individual human being as a subject of international law, capable of bearing international rights and duties.This structural development corresponded to a coalescence of values around a principle conceived as transcendental and universal—human dignity. Recognition by the newly reconceived international community that the dignity of the individual human being was something entitled to legal protection led to the transformation of this principle into positive law. It is this conception of human rights as both transcendental and universal that pushes against the concept of jurisdiction—pushing simultaneously into the domestic sphere and out of it—and underscores both its artificiality and diminished existence. It is this conception, far more than the force of legal reasoning from positive law that has enabled both human rights law and humanitarian law to grasp the outer and inner reaches of the power of the state.To the extent these rules are designed to protect individuals from abuses of state power, realization of that design entails application coextensive with the projection of that power. While the exact contours of their application may not be settled, the traditional principles of good faith and reasonableness in the circumstances provide ample guidance for shaping those contours.

What is group well-being? There is, as of yet, shockingly little philosophical literature explicitly aiming to answer this question. This essay sketches some of the logical space of possible answers, and nudges us to seriously consider certain overlooked options. There are several importantly different ways the well-being of a collective or a group could be related to the well-being of the individuals who constitute it: 1) eliminativism, 2) functionalism, 3) partialism, or 4) the independent view. If the relation between individual and collective well-being is either functional or partial, then we face a further question: What is the direction of constitutive dependence? Does the well-being of a group depend upon the well-being of the well-being of the individuals who compose it, or does the well-being of an individual depend upon the well-being of the groups to which they belong? Or both? These questions raise some puzzles that I begin to resolve. I conclude that there might be a wide variety of ways the well-being of a collective obtains, only some of which are related to the well-being of the individuals who are its members. In the end, I hope to vindicate the thought that an injury to one is an injury to all.

In two recent case-law dicta, one of the Constitutional Court, it was made perfectly clear that there is no room in the South African law of delict for awarding punitive damages. In Dikoko v Mokhatla (2006 6 SA 235 (CC) 263) Mokgoro J expressed it as follows:“Equity in determining a damages award for defamation is ... an important consideration in the context of the purpose of a damages award, aptly expressed in Lynch [1929 TPD 974 at 978] as solace to a plaintiff's wounded feelings and not to penalise or deter people from doing what the defendant has done. Even if a compensatory award may have a deterrent effect, its purpose is not to punish. Clearly, punishment and deterrence are functions of the criminal law. Not the law of delict ... In our law a damages award thereforedoes not serve to punish for the act of defamation. It principally aims to serve as compensation for damage caused by the defamation, vindicating the victim's dignity, reputation and integrity. Alternatively, it serves to console.” A similar approach is also apparent from Seymour v Minister of Safety and Security (2006 5 SA 495 (W) 500), where Willis J stated unequivocally that it “is trite that the primary function of awards for damages under the actio injuriarum is to compensate the victim for his or her injuriae, and is not exemplary”.It is, however, debatable whether this view accurately reflects the position in positive law, or, if it does, whether the de lege ferenda approach in our law should not be different. Under South African law there is consensus that the actio legis Aquiliae, in terms of which patrimonial damages may be claimed, and the action for pain and suffering aimed at non-patrimonial damages for bodily injuries, have purely compensatory functions - punitive damages are thus completely out of the question. But not so in the case of the actio iniuriarum which is traditionally directed at solatium (solace money) or (personal) satisfaction (sentimental damages) for an iniuria – that is, the wrongful and intentional infringement of an interest of personality.

AbstractDiabetes mellitus (DM) is a collection of metabolic disorder that is characterized by chronic hyperglycemia. Recent studies have demonstrated the crucial involvement of oxidative stress (OS) and inflammatory reactions in the development of DM. Curcumin (CUR), a natural compound derived from turmeric, exerts beneficial effects on diabetes mellitus through its interaction with the nuclear factor kappa B (NF‐κB) pathway. Research indicates that CUR targets inflammatory mediators in diabetes, including tumor necrosis factor α (TNF‐α) and interleukin‐6 (IL‐6), by modulating the NF‐κB signaling pathway. By reducing the expression of these inflammatory factors, CUR demonstrates protective effects in DM by improving pancreatic β‐cells function, normalizing inflammatory cytokines, reducing OS and enhancing insulin sensitivity. The findings reveal that CUR administration effectively lowered blood glucose elevation, reinstated diminished serum insulin levels, and enhanced body weight in Streptozotocin ‐induced diabetic rats. CUR exerts its beneficial effects in management of diabetic complications through regulation of signaling pathways, such as calcium–calmodulin (CaM)‐dependent protein kinase II (CaMKII), peroxisome proliferator‐activated receptor gamma (PPAR‐γ), NF‐κB, and transforming growth factor β1 (TGFB1). Moreover, CUR reversed the heightened expression of inflammatory cytokines (TNF‐α, Interleukin‐1 beta (IL‐1β), IL‐6) and chemokines like MCP‐1 in diabetic specimens, vindicating its anti‐inflammatory potency in counteracting hyperglycemia‐induced alterations. CUR diminishes OS, avert structural kidney damage linked to diabetic nephropathy, and suppress NF‐κB activity. Furthermore, CUR exhibited a protective effect against diabetic cardiomyopathy, lung injury, and diabetic gastroparesis. Conclusively, the study posits that CUR could potentially offer therapeutic benefits in relieving diabetic complications through its influence on the NF‐κB pathway.

Abstract Background In June 2017 the Italian government made childhood vaccination mandatory following a drop in immunization rates. In the years preceding, two court judgments affirmed a causal link between vaccines and autism. Studies have linked these decisions to internet searches about vaccine-autism, the popularity of 'no-vax' theories, and drops in immunization rates. This paper provides an in-depth case study of both decisions and their impact. Methods We use a synthetic research design reliant on: (i) a systematic collection of primary sources (publicly available and obtained via official access to information requests); (ii) interviews with key actors prominently involved in the two cases or privy to the Italian vaccine-injury compensation regime (iii) a systematic analysis of media coverage. Results Circumstantial and systemic flaws enabled these decisions. Poor trial strategies, insufficient resources and laborious communication practices between arms of government were facilitators. Lack of awareness of the social sensitivity of vaccine issues, underestimation of the phenomenon of vaccine hesitancy, and a tendency to 'think in silos' informed the lack of attention dedicated to the cases. The decisions created false expectations of economic benefits and vindication for families with autistic children, resulting in increased litigation. Systemic flaws exist in the process of appointment of expert consultants acting for the court leading to judicial reliance on false data. Conclusions Lessons learned include greater levels of attention to vaccine cases by the administration and a matured attitude of adjudicating bodies. Two issues remain: (i) the inability of government lawyers to disseminate positive results to counteract unfounded narratives; (ii) flaws in the process of appointing expert consultants advising courts, which remains focused on the fiduciary nature of the relationship, rather than scientific authority. Key messages The Milan and Rimini decisions that directly affected vaccine governance stemmed from a combination of circumstantial decision-making and systemic flaws that still lurk in public health governance. Strategic decision-making that overlooks lower levels of the adjudicative system can lead to significant public health consequences as courts of law and courts of public opinion obey different logics.

Public interest litigation (PIL) has a vital role in the civil justice system in that it could achieve those objectives which could hardly be achieved through conventional private litigation.PIL, for instance, offers a ladder to justice to disadvantaged sections of society, provides an avenue to enforce diffused or collective rights, and enables civil society to not only spread awareness about human rights but also allows them to participate in government decision making. PIL could also contribute to good governance by keeping the government accountable. This article will show, with reference to the Indian experience, that PIL could achieve these important objectives. However, the Indian PIL experience also shows us that it is critical to ensure that PIL does not become a facade to fulfil private interests, settle political scores or gain easy publicity. Judiciary in a democracy should also not use PIL as a device to run the country on a day-today basis or enter the legitimate domain of the executive and legislature. The challenge for states, therefore, is to strike a balance in allowing legitimate PIL cases and discouraging frivolous ones. One way to achieve this balance could be to build in economic (dis)incentives in PIL and also confine it primarily to those cases where access to justice is undermined by some kind of disability. Judiciary, being the sentinel of constitutional statutory rights of citizens has a special role to play in the constitutional scheme. It can review legislation and administrative actions or decisions on the anvil of constitutional law. For the enforcement of fundamental rights one has to move the Supreme Court or the High Court’s directly by invoking Writ Jurisdiction of these courts. But the high cost and complicated procedure involved in litigation, however, makes equal access to jurisdiction in mere slogan in respect of millions of destitute and underprivileged masses stricken by poverty, illiteracy and ignorance. The Supreme Court of India pioneered the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) thereby throwing upon the portals of courts to the common man. Till 1960s and seventies, the concept of litigation in India was still in its rudimentary form and was seen as a private pursuit for the vindication of private vested interests. Litigation in those days consisted mainly of some action initiated and continued by certain individuals, usually, addressing their own grievances/problems. Thus, the initiation and continuance of litigation was the prerogative of the injured person or the aggrieved party. However, these entire scenario changed during Eighties with the Supreme Court of India led the concept of public interest litigation (PIL). The Supreme Court of India gave all individuals in the country and the newly formed consumer groups or social action groups, an easier access to the law and introduced in their work a broad public interest perspective.