Articles de revues sur le sujet « Hedge funds. Corporate governance. Shareholders' activism »
Pour voir les autres types de publications sur ce sujet consultez le lien suivant : Hedge funds. Corporate governance. Shareholders' activism.
Créez une référence correcte selon les styles APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard et plusieurs autres
Consultez les 18 meilleurs articles de revues pour votre recherche sur le sujet « Hedge funds. Corporate governance. Shareholders' activism ».
À côté de chaque source dans la liste de références il y a un bouton « Ajouter à la bibliographie ». Cliquez sur ce bouton, et nous générerons automatiquement la référence bibliographique pour la source choisie selon votre style de citation préféré : APA, MLA, Harvard, Vancouver, Chicago, etc.
Vous pouvez aussi télécharger le texte intégral de la publication scolaire au format pdf et consulter son résumé en ligne lorsque ces informations sont inclues dans les métadonnées.
Parcourez les articles de revues sur diverses disciplines et organisez correctement votre bibliographie.
1
Bebchuk, Lucian A., Alma Cohen et Scott Hirst. « The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors ». Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no 3 (1 août 2017) : 89–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.3.89.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Financial economics and corporate governance have long focused on the agency problems between corporate managers and shareholders that result from the dispersion of ownership in large publicly traded corporations. In this paper, we focus on how the rise of institutional investors over the past several decades has transformed the corporate landscape and, in turn, the governance problems of the modern corporation. The rise of institutional investors has led to increased concentration of equity ownership, with most public corporations now having a substantial proportion of their shares held by a small number of institutional investors. At the same time, these institutions are controlled by investment managers, which have their own agency problems vis-à-vis their own beneficial investors. We develop an analytical framework for understanding the agency problems of institutional investors, and apply it to examine the agency problems and behavior of several key types of investment managers, including those that manage mutual funds—both index funds and actively managed funds—and activist hedge funds. We show that index funds have especially poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities that could improve governance and increase value. Activist hedge funds have substantially better incentives than managers of index funds or active mutual funds. While their activities may partially compensate, we show that they do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of other institutional investors.
2
Shingade, Sudam, Shailesh Rastogi, Venkata Mrudula Bhimavarapu et Abhijit Chirputkar. « Shareholder Activism and Its Impact on Profitability, Return, and Valuation of the Firms in India ». Journal of Risk and Financial Management 15, no 4 (23 mars 2022) : 148. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm15040148.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The paper’s prime objective is to understand the impact of Shareholder activism on firm performance. This study is conducted in a unique setup where traditional activist investors such as pension funds and hedge funds are not present. However, the activism cases are increasing yearly in an emerging economy like India. We have created a comprehensive shareholder activism index (sha index) using multiple activisms and corporate governance factors. To measure firm performance, we have used valuation (Tobin’s Q and Market capitalization), profitability (operating profit margin and net profit margin), and return ratios (Return on capital and return on equity). Panel data analysis (PDA) is employed for the current study as it overcomes the shortcomings of the time series analysis and cross-sectional studies. The sample comprises 37 listed firms’ data for FY2017 to FY2020. Chosen firms have experienced activism instances at least once during the 2017–2020 period. As per our analysis, shareholder activism has a significant negative impact on valuation measured in market capitalization and profitability estimated by operating profit margin. Activism primarily impacts the other four parameters negatively, but it is insignificant. India is in the nascent stage of activism, partly explaining the insignificance of the effects of shareholder activism on firm performance. Also, activist investors are targeting companies. These attacks are not fructifying desired outcomes as promoters own over 50% stake in the listed companies. The latest data for FY2021 has not been considered for the study as covid-19 impacted the businesses during the financial year. Also, we cannot capture activism instances that are not reported in regulatory filings. Unlike past research in this area, we have used a comprehensive activism index as a proxy of activism and have employed PDA instead of event studies to assess the impact on firm performance. Also, this is the first such empirical study conducted in an emerging economy setup where neither large hedge nor pension funds are present.
3
Gaitán, Sandra, et Jimmy A. Saravia. « Current state of corporate governance practices in Colombia ». Corporate Board role duties and composition 17, no 1 (2021) : 51–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv17i1art5.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In this paper, we review the current state of corporate governance in Colombia. First, we discuss the evolution of the legal framework of corporate governance including the main changes in the code of best corporate governance practices that took place since the global financial crisis of 2008. After this, we discuss key corporate governance issues such as the ownership structure of listed corporations and the market for corporate control, we analyze the practices of corporate boards of Colombian listed companies and their remuneration systems and the role of pension funds and hedge funds as shareholder activists. We also review the evidence regarding corporate governance and firm performance. Finally, we discuss the current state of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and an assessment of corporate governance specifics by industry. We conclude that there are opportunities for future research in several of these fields of study, especially regarding boards of director practices, director remuneration, and corporate social responsibility.
4
Diamond, Stephen F. « Exercising the ‘governance option’ : labour’s new push to reshape financial capitalism ». Cambridge Journal of Economics 43, no 4 (20 mai 2019) : 891–916. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bez016.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract New forms of stockholder activism call into question longstanding assumptions underpinning our system of corporate governance. Scholarship has largely failed to explain the basis for these new forms and, in particular, the differences among activists. Activists are not one undifferentiated mass. Both small activist hedge funds and large union-sponsored or -influenced pension funds use governance mechanisms to influence corporate behaviour. Pension funds, however, have a different set of incentives than hedge funds. The beneficiaries of these funds cannot easily switch between consumption and investment by buying or selling their holdings in firms. Thus, instead, institutional investors exercise an embedded ‘governance option’ found within shares of common stock to engage with firms. Organised labour, in particular, now uses its influence in pension funds to motivate progressive change by corporations. This form of activism has the potential to alter the balance of power between workers and capitalists in the era of financial capitalism.
5
Carvalhal, Andre, et Luiz Souza. « Private equity and corporate governance in Brazil ». Corporate Ownership and Control 12, no 1 (2014) : 187–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv12i1c1p4.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This work studies how the activism of institutional investors, specifically private equity funds, influences the development of corporate governance in Brazil. We analyze the control and ownership structure of Brazilian publicly listed companies in order to identify the presence of private equity funds as shareholders. Corporate governance is evaluated through three alternative proxies: a broad governance index, listing on Novo Mercado and presence of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Our results indicate a positive influence of private equity funds on the quality of corporate governance practices in Brazil. Firms with private equity tend to have better governance index, and list more on Novo Mercado. There is a moderate relation between the stake of private equity in a company and ADR listing
6
Farrar, John H. « The Move from Private Enforcement to Public Enforcement and Now the Move to Litigation Funding of Shareholder Activism : Are We Entering a New Era of Access to Justice in Corporate Law ? » European Business Law Review 26, Issue 1 (1 février 2015) : 75–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2015005.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The focus of this paper is on shareholder activism, concentrating on the UK and Australian experiences. The nature of shares, ownership and control are also addressed. The substance of the article examines the types of shareholder activism that exist. Two key questions are asked regarding shareholder activism: whether it gives rise to conflicts of interest and whether it adds value. The idea of value is an interesting one and gives rise to a discussion of when the activism of minority shareholders should be curbed, so as to prevent oppression through the use of legitimate forms of action for less-than-legitimate ends. The Australian and UK approaches to enforcement of shareholder rights through litigation are contrasted. The rise of class actions for shareholders in Australia, and the lack of equivalent actions in the UK, are discussed. Particular attention it paid to the reasons for the lack of enthusiasm for class actions in the UK. The differing positions and powers of powerful hedge-funds and superannuation investments in the relevant jurisdictions are noted. It is concluded that it is too soon to tell whether the new approach to enforcement of corporate interests through shareholder activism is an improvement over the old remedies which were available to shareholders.
7
Del Guercio, Diane, et Tracie Woidtke. « Can Strong Corporate Governance Selectively Mitigate the Negative Influence of “Special Interest” Shareholder Activists ? Evidence from the Labor Market for Directors ». Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 54, no 4 (8 octobre 2018) : 1573–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109018001217.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Union and public pension funds, the most prolific institutional activists employing low-cost targeting methods, are often accused of pursuing private benefits. Extant literature finds that unions representing workers, as stakeholders, are not aligned with shareholders. Limiting shareholder power may mitigate “special interest” activism but can also exacerbate managerial agency problems. In two different settings, majority approved and withdrawn shareholder proposals, we examine and find supportive evidence that the director labor market as a corporate governance mechanism can selectively mitigate the negative influence that conflicted stakeholder-shareholder union funds have over firms without stifling all influence of low-cost activists.
8
Bianchi, Marcello, et Luca Enriques. « Corporate governance in Italy after the 1998 reform : What role for institutional investors ? » Corporate Ownership and Control 2, no 4 (2005) : 11–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv2i4p1.
Texte intégralRésumé :
his paper tries to answer two questions: first, whether the changes in the law resulting from the 1998 reform are able to positively affect the attitude to activism of institutional investors in Italy; and second, whether, legal rules aside, it is reasonable to expect significant institutional investor activism in Italy. We provide both an empirical analysis of the factors affecting institutional investor activism in Italy and a legal analysis of the most relevant changes in the Italian mutual funds and corporate laws, following the 1998 reform. The empirical analysis shows that institutional shareholdings and investment strategies are compatible with the hypothesis that institutional investors can play a significant role in the corporate governance of Italian listed companies. However, a curb to their playing such an active role may derive from the predominance of mutual fund management companies belonging to banking groups (giving rise to conflicts of interest) and from the prevailing ownership structure of listed companies, which are still dominated by controlling shareholders holding stakes higher than, or close to, the majority of the capital (implying a weaker bargaining power of institutions vis-à-vis controllers). The analysis of the legal changes prompted by the 1998 financial markets and corporate law reform indicates that the legal environment is now definitely more favorable to institutional investor activism than before. However, the Italian legal environment proves still to be little favorable to institutional investor activism, when compared to that of the U.S. or the U.K.
9
Gigante, Gimede, et Maria Vittoria Venezia. « Corporate ownership and shareholder activism : The case of Italy ». Corporate Ownership and Control 19, no 1 (2021) : 159–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv19i1art12.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Over the last few years, shareholder activism has gained relevance, with new players increasingly looking to get involved in corporate influence and control. Born in America in the 1980s, with corporate raiders, the act of giving a voice to shareholders has spread from the United States to Europe. The aim of this research is to map this trend in the Italian territory, understanding the major current regulations, the biggest players involved, the target companies, the most frequently required objectives, and the overall success rate of such requests compared to other European countries’ neighbours. An analysis of the differences in terms of legal framework and minorities protection is provided as part of this paper, to give the reader the theoretical underpinnings for the subsequent analysis. Considerations on Italian activism follow, from the interpretation of data retrieved from Activistmonitor and Factiva that helped creating a database of 534 analyses of open and closed campaigning by activists throughout the European region since 2010. Italy turns out to be the fifth country in Europe per number of campaigns, with a few large international hedge funds and several smaller niche players. Campaigns tend to target mid and large capitalisation companies, mainly asking for changes in representation boards and having a success rate of over 50%. These findings suggest potential political implications for a successful Italian recovery in the post-COVID era. Further research on this topic and how activism impacts the performance of Italian firms would be invaluable
10
Malinas, Mark. « The rise of shareholder activism—what you need to know ». APPEA Journal 55, no 2 (2015) : 448. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj14083.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The past few years have seen a dramatic rise in shareholder activism in Europe and the US and it is a trend becoming more common in Australia. Companies operating in the oil and gas sector have been subject to particular attention and there are a growing number of examples of this in Australia. The targets of shareholder activism range in size and performance, but are often companies with perceived board weakness, those that are considered to adhere to outdated corporate governance, those whose strategic direction is in question or those that have an under-performing share price, though other factors can also be relevant. Using these issues or concerns as a pretext, activists are increasingly focused on using tactics that allow them to exert control or exercise influence to realise returns or agitate for change in companies that: have significant assets (such as oil and gas reserves) relative to their market value; have high costs, large capital expenditures and long revenue generation lead time (such as exploration projects); or, operate in low growth or fluctuating markets (such as with the price of oil and gas). Unsurprisingly, the oil and gas sector is being increasingly seen by certain funds and investors as fertile ground for shareholder activism. The Australian legal landscape also presents shareholders with a platform from which to exert influence. For instance: shareholders are able to requisition general meetings (and resolutions to be put to those meetings) if they hold sufficient shares and put the entire board up for re-election following the introduction of the two strikes rule; and, directors are required to adhere to statutory and common law duties in responding to shareholders. Shareholder activist campaigns are often played out in public and can be highly disruptive to companies’ operations. Accordingly, directors and senior management of oil and gas companies should be aware of shareholder activism in Australia and, in the broader interests of all shareholders and their company, consider how they should respond or be ready to respond. This may be done through various processes, including testing the company’s perceived weaknesses and addressing them and having a plan to address activism should it arise.
11
DesJardine, Mark R., Wei Shi et Zhihui Sun. « Different Horizons : The Effects of Hedge Fund Activism Versus Corporate Shareholder Activism on Strategic Actions ». Journal of Management, 18 juin 2021, 014920632110228. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/01492063211022831.
Texte intégralRésumé :
How do firms alter their strategic actions when targeted by different types of activist shareholders? We argue that hedge fund activists threaten firms in ways that lead them to conserve resources and to scale back and simplify their strategic actions, which refer to long-run competitive actions requiring substantial investment. By comparison, corporate shareholder activists bestow firms with new resources and freedoms that increase their flexibility to expand and complexify their strategic actions. Using a matched sample and difference-in-differences methodology, we find support for our theory: Firms targeted by hedge fund activists decrease the intensity and complexity of their strategic actions, while firms targeted by corporate shareholder activists increase the intensity and complexity of those actions. Our study contributes to research on shareholder governance and competitive dynamics by highlighting the differential effects of activist shareholders on targeted firms’ strategic actions.
12
Liu, Larry, et Adam Goldstein. « Labor’s Capital and Worker Well-Being : Do US Pension Funds Benefit Labor Interests ? » Social Forces, 31 mars 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/sf/soab025.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract Since the 1980s, the shareholder value revolution has undermined the position of workers and organized labor within US firms. At the same time, workers have paradoxically become one of the largest classes of shareholders through labor pension funds (LPF), including state public employee funds and private sector union-affiliated funds. Does workers’ concentrated ownership of capital in LPF represent a mechanism to advance worker interests against the prevailing wage, benefit, and jobs squeeze in publicly traded firms? This article links data on US state pension funds’ investments and shareholder activism to firm-level data on work and employment outcomes from 2001–2016. LPF shareholder proposals targeting large firms have declined over time. However, panel regression models show that intra-firm mobilization by LPF in the form of shareholder proposals is associated with modestly improved worker outcomes. There is no evidence that greater ownership share by public pension funds (PPF) is associated with more labor-friendly outcomes. This null association obtains even when focusing only on ownership by the most socially activist funds, or those from Democrat-controlled states. Nor does PPF ownership buffer workers from the negative impact of extractive hedge funds. Together, the results help reconcile contending accounts of pension fund capitalism’s effects on worker well-being. The analysis contributes to the sociological study of financialization, corporate governance, work and employment, and labor movements.
13
Brav, Alon P., et Wei Jiang. « Hedge Funds Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance ». SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.919300.
Texte intégral
14
Wu, Szu-Yin (Jennifer), et Kee H. Chung. « Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions ». Management Science, 31 mars 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3934.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper shows that hedge fund activism is associated with a decrease in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and offer premiums and an increase in stock and operating performance. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A performance by reducing poor M&A, diversifying M&A, and the M&A of firms with multiple business segments. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A decisions by influencing their governance practices. We show that our results are unlikely driven by selection bias. Overall, activist hedge funds play an important role in the market for corporate control by increasing the efficiency of target firms’ M&A activities through interventions. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
15
Zhu, Caroline Heqing. « The preventive effect of hedge fund activism : investment, CEO compensation and payout policies ». International Journal of Managerial Finance ahead-of-print, ahead-of-print (7 juillet 2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-04-2020-0181.
Texte intégralRésumé :
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of hedge fund activism (HFA) in preventing corporate policy deviations.Design/methodology/approachThis paper identifies HFA interventions through a hand-collected sample of Schedule 13D filings between 1994 and 2016, and uses mechanical mutual fund fire sales as the instrument variable (IV) for the likelihood of such interventions. Armed with the instrument, this paper estimates firm's distribution, managerial compensation and investment policies in response to a change in the perceived likelihood of HFA interventions.FindingsAn increase in the HFA intervention likelihood leads to increases in shareholder distribution, decreases in CEO pay and investments and increases in operating performance. Compared to the sample average, a one standard deviation increase in the intervention likelihood leads to a 9.29% increase in the firm's payout ratio, a 7.42% decrease in CEO compensation, a 2.67% decrease in capital expenditures and a 4.96% decrease in R&D expenses. These changes are consistent with the threat of intervention curbing managerial empire-building behaviors and improving firm operation. The relationships are causal, significant and robust to a variety of alternative specifications and sample divisions.Originality/valueResults of this paper suggest that as a mechanism for corporate governance, the threat of HFA is effective in preventing corporate policy deviations. They also demonstrate a stronger and broader impact of HFA on corporate policy than previously documented. By showing that HFA is an effective and viable mechanism for corporate governance, this study allows policymakers to make more informed decisions to whether increase hedge fund regulations or not.
16
Tomassetti, Paolo. « Between stakeholders and shareholders : Pension funds and labour solidarity in the age of sustainability ». European Labour Law Journal, 14 décembre 2022, 203195252211404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/20319525221140422.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article investigates the contribution of pension funds in harnessing the power of finance to achieve social and environmental objectives. After reviewing and discussing the potential and main hurdles to pension fund engagement in Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), the common law approach to shareholder activism is contrasted with the EU law on pension funds and on sustainability-related disclosures and taxonomies. Unlike the US and other common law jurisdictions, where the duties regarding retirement institutions are derived from trust law, EU rules on pension funds governance and investment policies are generally grounded on the more relaxed duties of corporate and financial law. On the one hand, this makes it easier for pension funds to consider the potential impact of environmental, social and governance factors (ESG) on investment decisions. On the other, social and environmental concerns are functionalised for economic purposes, thus reducing the possibilities for a more critical and strategical use of pension funds’ financial power by activists. This also explains why, despite being often participated in by trade unions, the existing governance of pension funds in Europe tends to outsource the management of investment policies to financial operators. While this takes responsibility away from the governing boards of pension funds in terms of their legal duties, the combination of decentralisation and the outsourcing of investment management undermines the possibility for unions to engage in shareholder activism, and to strike a balance between the position of workers as stakeholders and the position of workers as shareholders.
17
Pacces, Alessio M. « Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of Hedge Funds Activism in Corporate Governance ». Erasmus Law Review, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.5553/elr.000070.
Texte intégral
18
Pacces, Alessio M. « Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of Hedge Funds Activism in Corporate Governance ». SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2805982.
Texte intégral