Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Hedge funds. Corporate governance. Shareholders' activism »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Hedge funds. Corporate governance. Shareholders' activism"
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Bebchuk, Lucian A., Alma Cohen et Scott Hirst. « The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors ». Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no 3 (1 août 2017) : 89–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.3.89.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Financial economics and corporate governance have long focused on the agency problems between corporate managers and shareholders that result from the dispersion of ownership in large publicly traded corporations. In this paper, we focus on how the rise of institutional investors over the past several decades has transformed the corporate landscape and, in turn, the governance problems of the modern corporation. The rise of institutional investors has led to increased concentration of equity ownership, with most public corporations now having a substantial proportion of their shares held by a small number of institutional investors. At the same time, these institutions are controlled by investment managers, which have their own agency problems vis-à-vis their own beneficial investors. We develop an analytical framework for understanding the agency problems of institutional investors, and apply it to examine the agency problems and behavior of several key types of investment managers, including those that manage mutual funds—both index funds and actively managed funds—and activist hedge funds. We show that index funds have especially poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities that could improve governance and increase value. Activist hedge funds have substantially better incentives than managers of index funds or active mutual funds. While their activities may partially compensate, we show that they do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of other institutional investors.
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Shingade, Sudam, Shailesh Rastogi, Venkata Mrudula Bhimavarapu et Abhijit Chirputkar. « Shareholder Activism and Its Impact on Profitability, Return, and Valuation of the Firms in India ». Journal of Risk and Financial Management 15, no 4 (23 mars 2022) : 148. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm15040148.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The paper’s prime objective is to understand the impact of Shareholder activism on firm performance. This study is conducted in a unique setup where traditional activist investors such as pension funds and hedge funds are not present. However, the activism cases are increasing yearly in an emerging economy like India. We have created a comprehensive shareholder activism index (sha index) using multiple activisms and corporate governance factors. To measure firm performance, we have used valuation (Tobin’s Q and Market capitalization), profitability (operating profit margin and net profit margin), and return ratios (Return on capital and return on equity). Panel data analysis (PDA) is employed for the current study as it overcomes the shortcomings of the time series analysis and cross-sectional studies. The sample comprises 37 listed firms’ data for FY2017 to FY2020. Chosen firms have experienced activism instances at least once during the 2017–2020 period. As per our analysis, shareholder activism has a significant negative impact on valuation measured in market capitalization and profitability estimated by operating profit margin. Activism primarily impacts the other four parameters negatively, but it is insignificant. India is in the nascent stage of activism, partly explaining the insignificance of the effects of shareholder activism on firm performance. Also, activist investors are targeting companies. These attacks are not fructifying desired outcomes as promoters own over 50% stake in the listed companies. The latest data for FY2021 has not been considered for the study as covid-19 impacted the businesses during the financial year. Also, we cannot capture activism instances that are not reported in regulatory filings. Unlike past research in this area, we have used a comprehensive activism index as a proxy of activism and have employed PDA instead of event studies to assess the impact on firm performance. Also, this is the first such empirical study conducted in an emerging economy setup where neither large hedge nor pension funds are present.
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Gaitán, Sandra, et Jimmy A. Saravia. « Current state of corporate governance practices in Colombia ». Corporate Board role duties and composition 17, no 1 (2021) : 51–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv17i1art5.
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In this paper, we review the current state of corporate governance in Colombia. First, we discuss the evolution of the legal framework of corporate governance including the main changes in the code of best corporate governance practices that took place since the global financial crisis of 2008. After this, we discuss key corporate governance issues such as the ownership structure of listed corporations and the market for corporate control, we analyze the practices of corporate boards of Colombian listed companies and their remuneration systems and the role of pension funds and hedge funds as shareholder activists. We also review the evidence regarding corporate governance and firm performance. Finally, we discuss the current state of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and an assessment of corporate governance specifics by industry. We conclude that there are opportunities for future research in several of these fields of study, especially regarding boards of director practices, director remuneration, and corporate social responsibility.
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Diamond, Stephen F. « Exercising the ‘governance option’ : labour’s new push to reshape financial capitalism ». Cambridge Journal of Economics 43, no 4 (20 mai 2019) : 891–916. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bez016.
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Abstract New forms of stockholder activism call into question longstanding assumptions underpinning our system of corporate governance. Scholarship has largely failed to explain the basis for these new forms and, in particular, the differences among activists. Activists are not one undifferentiated mass. Both small activist hedge funds and large union-sponsored or -influenced pension funds use governance mechanisms to influence corporate behaviour. Pension funds, however, have a different set of incentives than hedge funds. The beneficiaries of these funds cannot easily switch between consumption and investment by buying or selling their holdings in firms. Thus, instead, institutional investors exercise an embedded ‘governance option’ found within shares of common stock to engage with firms. Organised labour, in particular, now uses its influence in pension funds to motivate progressive change by corporations. This form of activism has the potential to alter the balance of power between workers and capitalists in the era of financial capitalism.
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Carvalhal, Andre, et Luiz Souza. « Private equity and corporate governance in Brazil ». Corporate Ownership and Control 12, no 1 (2014) : 187–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv12i1c1p4.
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This work studies how the activism of institutional investors, specifically private equity funds, influences the development of corporate governance in Brazil. We analyze the control and ownership structure of Brazilian publicly listed companies in order to identify the presence of private equity funds as shareholders. Corporate governance is evaluated through three alternative proxies: a broad governance index, listing on Novo Mercado and presence of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Our results indicate a positive influence of private equity funds on the quality of corporate governance practices in Brazil. Firms with private equity tend to have better governance index, and list more on Novo Mercado. There is a moderate relation between the stake of private equity in a company and ADR listing
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Farrar, John H. « The Move from Private Enforcement to Public Enforcement and Now the Move to Litigation Funding of Shareholder Activism : Are We Entering a New Era of Access to Justice in Corporate Law ? » European Business Law Review 26, Issue 1 (1 février 2015) : 75–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2015005.
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The focus of this paper is on shareholder activism, concentrating on the UK and Australian experiences. The nature of shares, ownership and control are also addressed. The substance of the article examines the types of shareholder activism that exist. Two key questions are asked regarding shareholder activism: whether it gives rise to conflicts of interest and whether it adds value. The idea of value is an interesting one and gives rise to a discussion of when the activism of minority shareholders should be curbed, so as to prevent oppression through the use of legitimate forms of action for less-than-legitimate ends. The Australian and UK approaches to enforcement of shareholder rights through litigation are contrasted. The rise of class actions for shareholders in Australia, and the lack of equivalent actions in the UK, are discussed. Particular attention it paid to the reasons for the lack of enthusiasm for class actions in the UK. The differing positions and powers of powerful hedge-funds and superannuation investments in the relevant jurisdictions are noted. It is concluded that it is too soon to tell whether the new approach to enforcement of corporate interests through shareholder activism is an improvement over the old remedies which were available to shareholders.
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Del Guercio, Diane, et Tracie Woidtke. « Can Strong Corporate Governance Selectively Mitigate the Negative Influence of “Special Interest” Shareholder Activists ? Evidence from the Labor Market for Directors ». Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 54, no 4 (8 octobre 2018) : 1573–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109018001217.
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Union and public pension funds, the most prolific institutional activists employing low-cost targeting methods, are often accused of pursuing private benefits. Extant literature finds that unions representing workers, as stakeholders, are not aligned with shareholders. Limiting shareholder power may mitigate “special interest” activism but can also exacerbate managerial agency problems. In two different settings, majority approved and withdrawn shareholder proposals, we examine and find supportive evidence that the director labor market as a corporate governance mechanism can selectively mitigate the negative influence that conflicted stakeholder-shareholder union funds have over firms without stifling all influence of low-cost activists.
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Bianchi, Marcello, et Luca Enriques. « Corporate governance in Italy after the 1998 reform : What role for institutional investors ? » Corporate Ownership and Control 2, no 4 (2005) : 11–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv2i4p1.
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his paper tries to answer two questions: first, whether the changes in the law resulting from the 1998 reform are able to positively affect the attitude to activism of institutional investors in Italy; and second, whether, legal rules aside, it is reasonable to expect significant institutional investor activism in Italy. We provide both an empirical analysis of the factors affecting institutional investor activism in Italy and a legal analysis of the most relevant changes in the Italian mutual funds and corporate laws, following the 1998 reform. The empirical analysis shows that institutional shareholdings and investment strategies are compatible with the hypothesis that institutional investors can play a significant role in the corporate governance of Italian listed companies. However, a curb to their playing such an active role may derive from the predominance of mutual fund management companies belonging to banking groups (giving rise to conflicts of interest) and from the prevailing ownership structure of listed companies, which are still dominated by controlling shareholders holding stakes higher than, or close to, the majority of the capital (implying a weaker bargaining power of institutions vis-à-vis controllers). The analysis of the legal changes prompted by the 1998 financial markets and corporate law reform indicates that the legal environment is now definitely more favorable to institutional investor activism than before. However, the Italian legal environment proves still to be little favorable to institutional investor activism, when compared to that of the U.S. or the U.K.
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Gigante, Gimede, et Maria Vittoria Venezia. « Corporate ownership and shareholder activism : The case of Italy ». Corporate Ownership and Control 19, no 1 (2021) : 159–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv19i1art12.
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Over the last few years, shareholder activism has gained relevance, with new players increasingly looking to get involved in corporate influence and control. Born in America in the 1980s, with corporate raiders, the act of giving a voice to shareholders has spread from the United States to Europe. The aim of this research is to map this trend in the Italian territory, understanding the major current regulations, the biggest players involved, the target companies, the most frequently required objectives, and the overall success rate of such requests compared to other European countries’ neighbours. An analysis of the differences in terms of legal framework and minorities protection is provided as part of this paper, to give the reader the theoretical underpinnings for the subsequent analysis. Considerations on Italian activism follow, from the interpretation of data retrieved from Activistmonitor and Factiva that helped creating a database of 534 analyses of open and closed campaigning by activists throughout the European region since 2010. Italy turns out to be the fifth country in Europe per number of campaigns, with a few large international hedge funds and several smaller niche players. Campaigns tend to target mid and large capitalisation companies, mainly asking for changes in representation boards and having a success rate of over 50%. These findings suggest potential political implications for a successful Italian recovery in the post-COVID era. Further research on this topic and how activism impacts the performance of Italian firms would be invaluable
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Malinas, Mark. « The rise of shareholder activism—what you need to know ». APPEA Journal 55, no 2 (2015) : 448. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj14083.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The past few years have seen a dramatic rise in shareholder activism in Europe and the US and it is a trend becoming more common in Australia. Companies operating in the oil and gas sector have been subject to particular attention and there are a growing number of examples of this in Australia. The targets of shareholder activism range in size and performance, but are often companies with perceived board weakness, those that are considered to adhere to outdated corporate governance, those whose strategic direction is in question or those that have an under-performing share price, though other factors can also be relevant. Using these issues or concerns as a pretext, activists are increasingly focused on using tactics that allow them to exert control or exercise influence to realise returns or agitate for change in companies that: have significant assets (such as oil and gas reserves) relative to their market value; have high costs, large capital expenditures and long revenue generation lead time (such as exploration projects); or, operate in low growth or fluctuating markets (such as with the price of oil and gas). Unsurprisingly, the oil and gas sector is being increasingly seen by certain funds and investors as fertile ground for shareholder activism. The Australian legal landscape also presents shareholders with a platform from which to exert influence. For instance: shareholders are able to requisition general meetings (and resolutions to be put to those meetings) if they hold sufficient shares and put the entire board up for re-election following the introduction of the two strikes rule; and, directors are required to adhere to statutory and common law duties in responding to shareholders. Shareholder activist campaigns are often played out in public and can be highly disruptive to companies’ operations. Accordingly, directors and senior management of oil and gas companies should be aware of shareholder activism in Australia and, in the broader interests of all shareholders and their company, consider how they should respond or be ready to respond. This may be done through various processes, including testing the company’s perceived weaknesses and addressing them and having a plan to address activism should it arise.
Thèses sur le sujet "Hedge funds. Corporate governance. Shareholders' activism"
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LIBERATORI, FRANCESCO. « Gli hedge funds azionisti di società quotate ». Doctoral thesis, Luiss Guido Carli, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11385/201093.
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The thesis «Gli hedge funds azionisti di società quotate» discusses the role of activist hedge funds (“activists”).
These are funds, the legal nature of which is rather complex, that acquire minority interests in listed companies (“targets”) and try to exert an influence over the target’s insiders through requests for governance, financial and strategic changes in the policies of the target so as to gain a profit therefrom.
To be sure, hedge funds’ activism matters from an economic and financial standpoint. The most recent available estimates indicates that activist hedge funds, although they represent no more than 4% of the aggregate number of hedge funds worldwide, have assets under management (“a.u.m.”) approximately equal to $ 100 billion. In the cover story of its issue of February 7, 2015, The Economist depicted activist hedge funds as «Capitalism’s unlikely heroes», arguing «Why activist investors are good for the public company». In the last decade the number of activists’ interventions increased at a remarkable pace, often triggering long and contentious campaigns, in the United States as well as in Italy (although proportionally to the size of their capital markets).
Similarly, hedge funds’ activism matters from a legal standpoint. Activism triggers a number of complex legal issues across multiple fields of the law, including financial regulation, corporate and securities laws. The relatively recent emergence of hedge funds’ activism, coupled with a lack of legal precedents and studies, renders the analysis even more troublesome.
The thesis tackles the matter along a research path structured in three phases, each of which approximately represents a separate goal of the research (and a chapter of the thesis).
The first goal of the research, discussed in the first chapter, deals with the legal qualification and nature of hedge funds. The complex legal features of hedge funds, the intricacies associated with their underlying economics and the lack of a single, readily available legal regime applicable to them suggest to carry out a preliminary analysis on hedge funds. This analysis should clarify what a hedge fund is (and, within the hedge funds’ family, what an activist hedge fund is); what an activist hedge fund does, and how it exerts influence over the target’s insiders; and what the economic consequences, and side-effects, of hedge funds’ activism are. This should also allow to identify and describe the legal regime applicable to hedge funds.
The second goal of the research, discussed in the second chapter, deals with the possible correlation between the degree of activism of hedge funds and the regulatory regime applicable to them in an environment, such as Italy, where the ownership of listed companies is largely concentrated.5 In this context I will first identify and discuss the regulatory factors that, potentially, are capable of sustaining the emergence of activists. I will then assess whether, and to which extent, the reforms of Italian corporate law adopted in the 2004-2014 period had an impact (and, if so, of what sort) on hedge funds’ activism. Hardly is this the first time that a legal scholar attempts to assess the impact of such reforms. It is however the first time, at least to my knowledge, that a similar task is performed in the context and through the methodology I decided to follow. Notably, I will assess the impact of these reforms: (i) in relation to the possible, either supportive or depressing, effects they had on the emergence of hedge funds’ activism in Italy; and (ii) based on data, and not only on qualitative legal analysis, that I partly hand-collected and largely obtained courtesy of the authors, to whom I am deeply grateful, of a number of empirical studies on the Italian securities market supported by Georgeson/LUISS Ceradi/Fondazione Bruno Visentini.
The third goal of the research is to touch upon the legal consequences of hedge funds’ activism on the target companies they select. On the one hand, I will discuss whether hedge funds’ activism needs to be halted (assuming this is legally doable) or otherwise curbed by newly-approved statutes. On the other hand, I will delve into Italian corporate law to understand whether targets may use any existing corporate tools or devices to fend off activists. The aim of this analysis is, ultimately, to understand whether hedge funds activism might prove to be harmful or beneficial for the corporate governance of companies with a highly concentrated ownership structure.
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Katelouzou, Dionysia. « Hedge fund activism, corporate governance and corporate law : an empirical analysis across twenty-five countries ». Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/244631.
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This study investigates the brand of shareholder activism hedge funds deploy by reference to a unique hand-collected dataset of 11 years’ activist hedge funds’ campaigns across 25 countries. The analysis has two core elements, one of which is to chart the emergence of hedge fund activism outside the United States and the other being to account why hedge fund activism has developed differently across the sample countries. Both issues have been to date only tangentially explored. This study is the first one to seek to determine the extent to which corporate law is a determinant of the hedge fund activism phenomenon using a fresh approach which combines theoretical and comparative legal analysis with empirical methods. While a single variable is unlikely to account for the emergence of hedge fund activism, the study describes hedge fund activism as a game of three sequential stages as a heuristic device and identifies market and legal parameters for each stage. To test the hypotheses advanced for the emergence of hedge fund the study draws upon the law and finance literature. For instance, to account to what extent the rights bestowed on shareholders by corporate law influence hedge fund activism the study uses the CBR shareholder rights index. The results indicate that the extent to which law matters depends on the stage which activism has reached. The study also puts hedge fund activism in its corporate governance context. Activist hedge funds’ interventions have been envisioned as a mechanism for ensuring effective control of managerial discretion. Opponents of hedge fund activism contend, however, that this new breed of activists has a dark side that raises various concerns. Activist hedge funds have been considered: as exacerbating short-termism; as being mainly aggressive to the incumbents; as bearing similarities to the 1980s-raiders; and as engaging in distorting equity decoupling techniques. The study presents new empirical data that shows that the perceived negative side-effects of hedge funds activism are greatly exaggerated: they are myths. Cumulatively, these findings question whether hedge fund activism warrants any type of legislative response so far as the goal of shareholder value maximization is succeeded.
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Greenberg, Kendall. « You Can Run But You Can’t Hide : The Advance of Shareholder Activism ». Scholarship @ Claremont, 2018. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1970.
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Shareholder activism has exploded in popularity since the turn of the century, due in large part to impressive relative returns generated by its major participants. The result has thus been a surge in assets invested in the category, to in excess of $170 billion today up from less than $3 billion in 2000 (Inglis 2015; Romito 2015). This influx of capital, in absolute dollars and pace of growth, has caused many to wonder whether activists truly create shareholder value and, if so, if the value generated is sustainable. Numerous studies of activist interventions prior to 2009 reveal significant stock price gains around the time of activist arrival and positive longer term buy-and-hold abnormal returns as well. The question remains, however, whether those trends have continued as volume of transactions and number of activists have increased post the recent global financial crisis. In this report, we perform an empirical analysis focused on a hand-collected dataset of 1,088 activist interventions from 1995-present. This dataset includes all 13D filings, as well as Under the Threshold activist campaigns. First, we analyze stock price returns for this group over short- and long-term periods and find that activists continue to unlock shareholder value in recent deals comparable to that of earlier ones. We then perform a proprietary regression to identify which factors drive the most successful returns. Such insights should prove informative for investors employing an activist strategy and companies looking to manage areas of vulnerability.
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Watson, Justin. « Hedge fund activism, innovation and firm value ». Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2020. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/205534/1/Justin_Watson_Thesis.pdf.
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Using an endogenous growth framework, this thesis models and tests whether hedge fund activists add value by correcting inefficient R&D investment at their targets. While activists are more likely to target firms over-investing in R&D, I find no evidence that suggests they correct inefficient R&D investment despite decreasing R&D expenditure at target firms. Further robustness highlights the negative impact of hedge fund activism on value creation after controlling for the activist’s stated objectives and reputation, quantile treatment effects, and superior stock selection ability. Overall, my research offers new insights into the governance role and value implications of hedge fund activism.
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Baldin, Marta <1993>. « Hedge Funds activism and their impact on the corporate governance Evidences from European case-studies in the period 2013-2016 ». Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/8773.
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Although they are not a new phenomenon, hedge funds have experienced a boom during last years. They have gained momentum especially thanks to a particular strategy employed by some of them: activism. Following this strategy, hedge funds, after having built a stake on a company, try to influence its corporate governance, with either friendly or hostile campaigns. The phenomenon is widespread in the U.S.A. and recently it acquired a considerable importance also in Europe. The aim of this thesis is to illustrate the demands for changes issued by activist hedge funds to European companies and present the effects of the activist campaign also describing, if there was a change, the relative effects on the company governance. To this extent there will be presented first the main characteristics of the hedge fund industry and later an overview of hedge funds activism, with a focus on the main cases of hedge funds activism targeting European companies in the period 2013-2016.
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Aljahdali, Hani. « Building an effective framework for institutional investor activism and minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia : lessons from the UK ». Thesis, University of Manchester, 2014. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/building-an-effective-framework-for-institutional-investor-activism-and-minority-shareholder-protection-in-saudi-arabia-lessons-from-the-uk(23c54771-8219-4c55-8fee-7876c145fbcd).html.
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Corporate governance practice differs regionally and nationally, depending on how each legal environment protects minority investors, capital markets and company ownership structure. Governance can also change spectacularly in regions or countries with comparatively high levels of institutional investment. The notion of institutional investors' activism is increasingly important in developed markets as the ideal corporate governance mechanism to monitor corporate managers and overcome agency problems arising from dispersed corporate ownership in modern companies. These institutions can work together on an improved corporate governance framework more effectively than individual investors, monitoring corporate controllers of listed companies in emerging and developing markets, using their influence more vigorously and in ways more fitting to a concentrated ownership environment such as that in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the role of institutional investors in emerging and developing markets will depend strongly on institutional investors' activism and the arrangements determined and undertaken by the corporate governance regulatory framework in these markets. In considering the influential role of institutional investors to improve corporate governance practice, a high level of minority shareholder protection thus remains an indicator of good corporate governance and regulatory pressure of rights and incentives, which are necessary to empower non-controlling shareholders in these concentrated ownership markets to exert a strong activist influence in monitoring corporate activities, thus improving the corporate governance practices of investee companies. In this context, this thesis contends that in Saudi Arabia in particular, shareholder involvement in corporate governance is inadequate, as a result of a variety of economic and regulatory obstacles. It goes on to identify what improvements are necessary and where, to ensure a sound framework for effective institutional investor activism and to improve the level of minority shareholder protection. It also cautions Saudi legislators against erecting hurdles to the future engagement of Saudi and foreign institutional investors in monitoring corporate activities which may affect the conditions for access, allocation and monitoring of equity, which is so important for value creation and sustainable economic growth. The main benefit to be derived from this research is that it facilitates a fuller understanding of the Saudi approach to corporate governance, the corporate ownership environment and trends in the capital market. The analysis also deepens knowledge of corporate governance regimes, including the role of institutional investors, and of their characteristics and investment behaviours. In short, it considers whether institutional investors are willing or have been encouraged to use their power to engage in the companies in which they invest and whether they are qualified to solve the agency problem.
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Kim, Sehoon. « Three Essays in Finance ». The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1498750199681262.
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Ben, Arfa Nouha. « Activisme actionnarial des hedge funds et création de valeur dans le cadre de la gouvernance actionnariale et partenariale d'entreprise : application au cas des entreprises françaises ». Thesis, Bordeaux, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016BORD0154.
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L’étude du rôle de l’activisme actionnarial des hedge funds (HF) en matière de gouvernancedans la création de valeur des entreprises françaises constitue l’objet principal de cette thèse.Les réflexions menées, issues de la théorie de la gouvernance nous ont permis d’apporter lespremiers éléments de réponse à notre question centrale. L’approche exploratoire de cephénomène nous a conduits à déterminer un modèle français de l’activisme des HF. De notreapproche hypothético-déductive, nous avons pu élaborer un profil type des entreprises viséescotées et examiner les déterminants de la réaction du marché financier avant de mesurerl’effet de l’activisme des HF sur la création de valeur. Il en ressort que ce dernier est àl’origine de nouvelles situations d’équilibre organisationnel. Il est toutefois entravé par laréticence de la coalition de contrôle, renforcée par les caractéristiques spécifiques de lagouvernance et du contexte juridique en France, à entreprendre ces aménagements. Résultat,des coûts de conviction excessifs, des coûts d’enracinement et l’attentisme des investisseurssur le marché français. Contrairement aux investisseurs traditionnels, il est à admettre quel’activisme des HF est un mécanisme alternatif de contrôle efficient, là où certainsmécanismes de gouvernance actionnariale et partenariale semblent être insuffisammentdisciplinaires. Cependant, il est insuffisant pour inciter la coalition de contrôle à agir dansl’intérêt des différentes parties prenantes de l’entreprise. En France, la concentration et lanature actionnariale limitent, voire bloquent, les actions activistes des HF, contrairement auxentreprises américaines où le capital n’est pas verrouillé. La performance des entreprisesfrançaises est donc l’apanage du pouvoir managérial face à une influence activiste des HFThis research aims to analyse the role of hedge fund (HF) activism in corporate governanceand French firms value creation. The reflections devoted the theory of governance haveenabled us to provide first elements to our central question. The exploratory study allowed usto determine a French model of HF activism. Our hypothetical-deductive approach enabledus to develop a typical profile of a target-listed firm and to examine the determinants of themarket reaction before measuring the effect of HF activism on value creation. The resultsshow that HF activism is causing new organizational equilibrium situations. However, it isopposed by the reluctance of the control coalition due to French governance and legalcontext. Hence, the exorbitant costs of activism in addition to entrenchment problems andinvestors wait-and-see attitude on the French market. As opposed to traditional investors, HFactivism appears as an efficient alternative control mechanism, where some shareholder andstakeholder governance mechanisms seem to be insufficiently disciplinary. Still, HF activismis unable to encourage the reluctant control coalition to act in the firms’ stakeholders’interest. In France, the controlling and family shareholders are opposed to HF activism. It ismore difficult for them to act as they do in American firms where capital is not locked. Thevalue creation is thus confined to managerial power over HF activism
Livres sur le sujet "Hedge funds. Corporate governance. Shareholders' activism"
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Heesang, Chai Dominic, et Deakin, S. F. (Simon F.), dir. Hedge fund activism in Japan : The limits of shareholder primacy. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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Hedge Fonds im Spannungsfeld des Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrechts : Shareholder Activism und aktienrechtliche Corporate Governance. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2009.
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Buchanan, John, Simon Deakin et Dominic Heesang Chai. Hedge Fund Activism in Japan : The Limits of Shareholder Primacy. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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Buchanan, John, Simon Deakin et Dominic Heesang Chai. Hedge Fund Activism in Japan : The Limits Of Shareholder Primacy. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
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Buchanan, John, Simon Deakin et Dominic Heesang Chai. Hedge Fund Activism in Japan : The Limits of Shareholder Primacy. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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Buchanan, John, Simon Deakin et Dominic Heesang Chai. Hedge Fund Activism in Japan : The Limits of Shareholder Primacy. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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Buchanan, John, Simon Deakin et Dominic Heesang Chai. Hedge Fund Activism in Japan : The Limits of Shareholder Primacy. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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Ringe, Wolf-Georg. Shareholder Activism. Sous la direction de Jeffrey N. Gordon et Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.24.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This chapter examines the phenomenon of shareholder activism within the context of corporate governance and its place in today’s debate on shareholders and shareholder empowerment. It first reviews the concept of shareholder activism and emphasizes the importance of the shareholder structure under which it operates before turning to the historical developments of shareholder activism, with particular emphasis on the U.K., US, and continental Europe. It then describes the various methods employed by activist shareholders and the corresponding regulatory constraints. It also discusses the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007–2011 on shareholder activism. The chapter suggests that shareholder activism has been enjoying something of a renaissance lately, with hedge fund activism becoming more refined, as well as a surge in success following the global financial crisis.
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Institutional Investor Activism : Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation. Oxford University Press, 2015.
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Cox, James D., et Randall S. Thomas. The Evolution in the U.S. of Private Enforcement via Litigation and Monitoring Techniques. Sous la direction de Jeffrey N. Gordon et Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.38.
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This chapter examines the evolution of private enforcement in the United States and the lessons that can be learned by German public companies from the experiences of their US counterparts. It first looks at the place of representative shareholder litigation within the US corporate governance system before turning to the broad-based criticisms against all forms of representative shareholder litigation on the grounds of excessive litigation agency costs. It then discusses the role of shareholder derivative suits in remedying breaches of duty of loyalty, along with the use of hedge funds in shareholder monitoring. It explores the increasing role of appraisal remedy against the backdrop of developments in shareholder litigation focused on acquisitions, and highlights the limitations of hedge fund activism. Finally, it assesses the implications of shareholder monitoring mechanisms in the United States for shareholders in Germany.
Chapitres de livres sur le sujet "Hedge funds. Corporate governance. Shareholders' activism"
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Anand, Anita Indira. « Shareholder Democracy and Shareholder Activism ». Dans Shareholder-driven Corporate Governance, 35–52. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096533.003.0003.
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This chapter examines shareholder-driven corporate governance (SCG) through the twin concepts of shareholder democracy and shareholder activism. Taken together, these concepts are the vehicle through which SCG takes effect in practice. The term activist investor describes an institutional investor that seeks value-enhancing changes in the leadership, governance, capital structure, or strategy and operations of a corporation in which it is invested. There are two basic types of activism: offensive activism, in which a hedge fund takes over a poorly performing firm and then reforms it to enhance its performance; and defensive activism, in which the activist institution takes on an advocacy role when it is unhappy with a corporation of which it already holds a significant block. Meanwhile, shareholder democracy refers to the ability of shareholders to influence the corporation through their votes. It is an important concept in corporate law, one that underpins the legitimacy of shareholder activism.
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Connelly, Brian L. « Ownership and Governance ». Dans Strategic Management, 427–42. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190090883.003.0024.
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Shareholders have, in recent years, imposed considerable influence on firms and the managers that run them. Their role has become so prevalent that hedge funds, activist investors, and short sellers dominate the headlines of the popular business press. Academics are desperately trying to keep up with the furious pace of change and incorporate emerging phenomena into theories of corporate governance. To facilitate this process, this chapter reviews the key forms of corporate ownership and describes ways in which they affect firm-level outcomes. The chapter identifies five issues about which ownership scholars disagree: the competitive influence of common shareholding, the costs and benefits of excess control, the consequences of share repurchases, the threat of short sellers, and the value-creating prospects of shareholder-nominated directors. The chapter describes the state of each debate with the hope that strategy scholars, in the years ahead, will add nuance to what we know about these pressing matters.
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« McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Hedge Funds : Hamburger Hedging ? Hedge Fund Activism and Impact on Corporate Governance ». Dans Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity, 571–93. Elsevier, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-804723-1.15007-8.
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