Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Ḫawaṣṣ »

Abstract Although the science of the occult properties of the Qurʾān (ʿilm ḫawāṣṣ al-Qurʾān) has been regarded by Muslim intellectuals as an independent discipline within the classification of the sciences and has generated an independent literary genre over the centuries, it has never been the subject of a specific survey within Islamic Studies. Often wrongly considered simply as a component of related disciplines, the most important texts belonging to this genre remain understudied and are not critically edited. Many reasons suggest that the study of the genesis of this concept, of the homonymous discipline and of its literary corpus represent an important desideratum for the history of magic and of the occult sciences in Islam. Based on philological examination of numerous primary sources, this article aims to situate the science of the occult properties of the Qurʾān and its literature within the History of ideas in the Muslim world.

The aim of this paper is to identify the position the ru'yat Allāh holds within the curriculum of sciences described by the Iḫwān al-Ṣafa'. Their concept of knowledge is first clarified. The Ihwan use the terminology of rational knowledge to describe items of faith too. But faith is only an introduction to a greater knowledge. Now: is the supreme knowledge to be considered as speculative and theoretical, or are the ḫawciṣṣ, the only ones entitled to the vision of God, eventually obliged to rely on a kind of divine “revelation” or “inspiration”? If the “vision of God” appears beyond any possible connotation of knowledge in “rational” terms, it is unclear, however, whether the Ihwan use the concepts of “revelation” and “inspiration” as a way of explaining in a theological terminology the utmost degree of human knowledge (perhaps according to the same analogical function waḥy and ilhām appear to have in Ibn Sīnā). Moreover, the qualities and moral dispositions attributed to the “Friends of God” remind us of Sufi doctrines. Consequently, the question of the relation between Sufism and imāmite theories could be re-opened: the Iḫwānian definition of the “science of the transcendent” shows that the gnoseological itinerary is not concluded even with the “vision of God.”

Le Coran affirme et nie à la fois la vision oculaire de Dieu. Différentes écoles théologiques se sont essayées à résoudre ce dilemme. Aucune n’est cependant parvenue à concilier ces deux positions. À son tour, Averroès se réapproprie le problème dans le Kašf. Il s’aide, pour le résoudre, des lumières de la philosophie qui rend intelligible toute chose, du fait qu’elle est la science des causes ; ce en quoi consiste la véritable la sagesse. Elle considère en outre dans leur existence réelle les êtres séparés dont Le Coran parle en usant des images. Aux yeux d’Averroès, Aristote est le plus parfait des philosophes. Aussi, résoudre la question de la vision de Dieu revient-il à se demander avec lui ce qu’il faudrait en comprendre ? L’opinion d’Averroès fondée sur les conclusions démonstratives d’Aristote est que la vision de Dieu, qui est incorporel, est du genre des formes séparées. Elle est intellection. Celle-ci convient, en raison du mode d’être de Dieu, à ceux parmi les hommes qui sont capables, par la spéculation rationnelle sur les étants, de s’élever jusqu’à la parfaite connaissance du Premier agent, qui est leur principe selon la forme et la fin. Le vulgaire en est exclu, du fait qu’il est incapable de spéculation. Le théologien également, parce que sa connaissance spéculative des choses est incertaine, du fait de son raisonnement non démonstratif. Cette vision de Dieu, qui occupe le sommet de la pyramide des êtres,est accroissement de savoir, parce que, dans l’ordre intelligible, l’Être Premier est connu le dernier, après tous les autres existants qui lui sont inférieurs par le rang et la nature. Ainsi, la vision de Dieu, c’est la pleine actualisation de l’intellect parvenu à ce qui est à son égard au plus haut point objet de science
The Quran both affirms and denies the eye sight of God. Different theological schools have tried to solve this dilemma. None, however, managed to reconcile these two positions. In turn, Averroes reappropriates the problem in the Kašf. To solve it, he helps himself with the lights of philosophy, which makes everything intelligible, because it is the science of causes; what true wisdom consisted of. It also considers in their real existence the separate beings of which The Koran speaks by using images. In the eyes of Averroes, Aristotle is the most perfectof philosophers. So, does solving the question of God's vision amount to asking with him what should be understood of it ? The opinion of Averroes based on the demonstrative conclusions of Aristotle is that the vision of God, who is incorporeal, is of the kind of separate forms. She is intellect. This is appropriate, because of the12mode of being of God, among men who are capable, by rational speculation on beings, of rising perfectly to the knowledge of the First agent, who is their principle according to the form and end. The vulgar are excluded from it, because they are incapable of speculation. So does the theologian, because his speculative knowledge of things is uncertain, due to his non-demonstrative reasoning. This vision of God, who occupies the summit of the pyramid of beings, is an increase in knowledge, because, in the intelligible order, the Prime Being is known last, after all the other existents who are inferior to him in rank and nature. Thus, the vision of God is the full actualization of the intellect which has reached what is to its survivor at the highest point an object of science