Thèses sur le sujet « Freedom of speech – Law and legislation »

In public schools, student expression commonly calls for the attention of school staff in one form or another. Educators have a practical interest in understanding the boundaries of student freedom of speech rights and are often directed to the four student speech cases decided to date by the Supreme Court (Tinker v Des Moines (1969), Bethel v Fraser (1986), Hazelwood v Kuhlmeier (1988), and Morse v Frederick (2007)). Sources about these cases abound, but most focus on legal reform issues such as the political arguments of opposing preferences for more student freedom or more school district control or the lack of clear guidance for handling violations

I propose an alternative approach to understanding the Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence focusing not on its correctness but on cultural influences which have worked and continue to work on the Court both from without and within. This approach may lead to a new understanding of Court decisions as legally binding on educators and an appreciation of the necessary rhetorical artistry of the Justices who write them. Not intended in any way as an apologetic of the Court’s decisions on student speech, this study is based particularly on the work of Strauber (1987), Kahn (1999) and Mautner (2011). It takes the form of a cultural history going back to the Fourteenth Amendment’s influence on individual rights from its ratification in 1868 to its application in Tinker in 1969 and beyond.

Seen as cultural process which begins with the Amendment’s initial almost complete ineffectiveness in restricting state abridgment of fundamental rights including speech to its eventual arrival, fully empowered, at the schoolhouse gate, this study attempts to make student speech rights more accessible to educators and others. The tensions between the popular culture which espouses the will of the people and the internal legal culture of the Court itself and its most outspoken and articulate Justices resolve into decisions which become the law of the land, at least for the moment. The study also offers implications for administrators together with suggestions on how to stay current with free speech case law applicable to the schools.

Abstract

The freedom of establishment in Articles 43 and 48 EC is a fundamental freedom within the EU meaning that companies are free to set up secondary establishments in any other Member State. The freedom of establishment is an important means to achieve the com-pletion of the internal market and therefore it is important that this freedom is protected. Member States are obliged to legislate in accordance with the objectives of the fundamental freedoms, still Member States are restricting Articles 43 and 48 EC by applying discrimina-tory national legislation regarding direct taxation. In the Cadbury Schweppes judgment from September 2006 the ECJ found the British CFC legislation to be contrary to Community law. The purpose of CFC legislation is to prevent tax avoidance by conferring additional tax upon companies having subsidiaries in low tax states. According to the judgment in Cadbury Schweppes, if the CFC rules are too general in its application they are violating the freedom of establishment. Hence, the CFC legislation must be aimed specifically at “wholly artificial arrangements” aimed at circumventing national tax normally payable. Therefore it is of importance, in the context of applying CFC rules, to clarify the difference between use and abuse of freedom of establishment. It is also important to note that the CFC rules ap-ply even when a subsidiary is established outside the EU.

The concept of abuse of Community law has been developed through case law and prohib-its companies to improperly use the provisions of Community law in order to circumvent national legislation. Even if an establishment in another State is made to avoid tax in the State of origin, it is not necessarily abuse of the freedom of establishment since companies are allowed to choose to establish subsidiaries in the Member States with least restrictive rules. The ECJ stated that establishing subsidiaries with the sole purpose to benefit from the lower tax regime do not constitute an abuse of the freedom of establishment as long as the subsidiaries pursue genuine economic activity. The criteria for what is regarded as eco-nomic activity has been discussed in both value added tax and direct tax cases. The re-quirements so far is that the subsidiary established has to be physically present in the host State on a durable basis and have staff and equipment to a certain degree. The ECJ has as-sessed the criteria similarly in value added tax and direct tax cases and stated that the activ-ity has to be considered per se and without regard to its purpose or result. The activity also has to be based on objective factors and be ascertainable by third parties.

The Cadbury Schweppes case is the first case in the area of CFC legislation and the Court has provided little guidance regarding what constitutes a “wholly artificial arrangement”. As a consequence of this judgement some Member States have already changed their CFC legis-lation to comply with Community law. Nevertheless, there are cases pending before the ECJ that are further questioning the application of CFC rules and how to define a “wholly artificial arrangement”. The judgement of these cases may result in more changes in the na-tional legislation of the Member States. The future development of the difference between use and abuse of freedom of establishment is important for the protection of the principle of legal certainty. A clarification of what constitutes a “wholly artificial arrangement” will improve the foreseeability for companies and their cross-border transactions will be more efficient.

Sammanfattning

Etableringsfriheten i artiklarna 43 och 48 EG är en av de grundläggande friheterna inom EU som innebär att företag är fria att etablera dotterbolag i andra medlemsländer. Etable-ringsfriheten är ett viktigt medel för att uppnå målen med den gemensamma marknaden och därför är det viktigt att denna frihet respekteras. Medlemsländerna är skyldiga att lag-stifta i ljuset av de grundläggande friheterna, trots det finns diskriminerande skattelagstift-ning som strider mot artiklarna 43 och 48 EG. I Cadbury Schweppes domen från september 2006 fann EG-domstolen att de brittiska CFC reglerna strider mot gemenskapsrätten. Syf-tet med CFC regler är att förhindra skatteundandragande genom att löpande beskatta in-komster från dotterbolag etablerade i lågbeskattade länder. CFC regler som tillämpas gene-rellt är enligt Cadbury Schweppes domen i strid med etableringsfriheten. Därmed måste CFC reglerna tillämpas specifikt på ”konstlade upplägg” som har som enda syfte att undvika na-tionell skatt. Det är därför viktigt att klargöra skillnaden mellan bruk och missbruk av eta-bleringsfriheten. I detta sammanhang är det viktigt att poängtera att CFC reglerna är till-lämpliga även på dotterbolag som är etablerade i ett icke-medlemsland.

Konceptet om missbrukande av EG-rätten har utvecklats i praxis och förbjuder företag att missbruka bestämmelserna i gemenskapsrätten för att kringgå nationell lagstiftning. Även om ett dotterbolag har etablerats i ett medlemsland enbart för att utnyttja den låga skatteni-vån är det nödvändigtvis inte missbruk av etableringsfriheten eftersom företag har rätt att etablera dotterbolag i det land som är mest fördelaktigt ur skattehänseende. EG-domstolen har fastställt att etablering av dotterbolag enbart för att utnyttja en mer fördelaktig skattere-gim inte utgör missbruk av etableringsfriheten om dotterbolaget bedriver verklig ekono-misk verksamhet. Kriterierna för vad som anses utgöra verklig ekonomisk verksamhet har diskuterats i såväl mervärdesskatterättsliga som företagsskatterättsliga mål. Hittills uppställ-da krav är att det etablerade dotterbolaget måste vara varaktigt fysiskt närvarande i värdsta-ten samt till en viss grad ha personal och utrustning så att tredje part kan förvissa sig om dess ekonomiska verksamhet. Utvärderingen av den ekonomiska verksamheten måste ske självständigt utan hänsyn till dess syfte och resultat.

Cadbury Schweppes är det första målet angående CFC lagstiftning och EG-domstolen har endast tillhandahållit begränsad vägledning om vad som utgör ett ”konstlat upplägg”. Som en konsekvens av denna dom har några medlemsländer redan ändrat sin CFC lagstiftning så att den överensstämmer med EG-rätten. Icke desto mindre finns det en del oavgjorda mål som ytterligare ifrågasätter CFC reglernas tillämpning och definitionen av ”konstlade upplägg”. Avgöranden i dessa mål skulle kunna resultera i att medlemsländerna måste göra ytterligare ändringar i sin lagstiftning. Den framtida utvecklingen av vad som är skillnaden mellan bruk och missbruk av etableringsfriheten är viktig för rättssäkerheten. Ett klargö-rande om vad som utgör ett ”konstlat upplägg” kommer att öka förutsebarheten för före-tag vilket leder till en effektivisering av deras gränsöverskridande transaktioner.

While justices of the U.S. Supreme Court routinely claim they do not deliver speeches to audiences outside the Court, or that the content of their remarks is unimportant, scholars have long recognized that the justices speak frequently off the bench. Despite this recognition, studies of judicial speech view it largely as a potential transgression of legal norms, risking the images of neutrality and independence that are widely seen as the primary bases of the Court’s legitimacy; few studies have explored judicial speech in any detail, and surprisingly little is known about the actual content of the justices’ speeches. In this dissertation, I pose two primary questions: first, what do the justices say, and second, what does the content of judicial speech tell us about institutional legitimacy? Reviewing approximately 400 speeches by the justices of the Warren Court (1953–1969), I find the justices’ speeches generally appear as any one of four primary themes: advocating future policy and signaling outside actors to prepare for implementation, in advance of a major ruling by the Court; defending the Court’s rulings on the basis of projecting favorable images of democracy abroad; defending the Court’s rulings on the basis of constitutional claims and understandings and defending against broader attacks on judicial authority, such as court-curbing legislation; and last, articulating idealized visions of democracy and future politics. Further, I find evidence of these themes in the speeches of the justices of the Roberts Court in 2012. Contrary to the judicial “lockjaw” conception of speech as a threat to neutrality and legitimacy, I find judicial speech, while shaped by legal norms, frequently draws upon values and structures associated with democracy, enabling the justices to rework and construct political narratives about the Court and its rulings in speeches that attend to the Court’s institutional legitimacy.

On January 1, 2010, the Swedish government changed the national rule on taxation of loans between Swedish companies and their shareholders to also comprise loans granted by foreign companies. By changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies, the government aimed to eliminate the newly discovered tax planning which is carried out by an owner establishing a holding company in another Member State from which he lends tax-free means for private consumption. These proceedings result in major tax revenue losses for Sweden since the shareholder’s income was not taxable in Sweden before the change. This change has been subject for criticism by the consultative bodies in the government bill and in the legal debate. The expression of discontent is due to the fact that the changes do not comply with the freedom of establishment. As far as is known, no one has analyzed whether this statement is correct. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide an answer to whether the changes of the rule on taxation of prohibited loans are compatible with the freedom of establishment and consequently whether the Swedish government made a mistake when changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies. Due to the freedom of establishment, it is prohibited for the Member States to take measures which restrict or make nationals refrain from establishing abroad. Intra-state loans are prohibited why they hardly ever occur and the taxation on loans therefore in practice only applies to foreign companies. Legislation in a Member State which only applies to foreign persons constitutes prohibited discrimination. Further, the high tax burden hinders nationals from taking advantage of another Member State’s more favourable legislation and makes the nationals refrain from establishing in other Member States. It is therefore considered that the rule is restrictive to the freedom of establishment. However, such a restrictive rule as in this case is justified by the aim of preventing tax avoidance taken together with the balanced allocation of taxing power between the Member States. Thus, the government makes Sweden breach EU law since the rule is not proportionate despite the justifications. The rule is too general designed since it is restrictive to all foreign undertakings and not just the holding companies with which the tax planning are performed. Further, there are other less restrictive solutions to the problem which have the same effect as the rule in question.

CFC legislation has become an instrument to protect national tax bases and minimize the abusive effects of international tax planning. The Swedish CFC legislation is found in chapter 39a of the ITA whereas it is established under what circumstances CFC taxation can arise. If a shareholder of a foreign legal entity is liable of CFC taxation in Sweden such a holder is also entitled to deduct tax paid by the CFC abroad. The purpose of the granted tax credit is to avoid double taxation, although if foreign tax is paid by another entity than the foreign entity in question such CFC-tax cannot be credited. The situation at hand can result in that the holder is liable of paying double CFC tax, contrary to the purpose of tax credit.

The freedom of establishment is part of the fundamental freedoms concluded in the EC Treaty. The general goal of the Community is to establish an internal market. The freedom of establishment, stated in Article 43 EC stipulates that restrictions on the freedom of establishment on nationals shall be prohibited. However, restrictions on the freedom of establishment can be justified under certain circumstances. The ECJ has developed a rule of reason test which can justify prohibited restrictions if certain criterias are fulfilled. Concerning tax matters the grounds of justification that have been accepted by the ECJ are the cohesion of the tax system, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the counteraction of tax avoidance, the need to safeguard the balanced allocation of the power to tax between the Member States and a combination of grounds of justification.

An exemplification scheme serves as a mean to illustrate in what instance double CFC taxation can arise. The scheme concerns a corporate group whereas a Swedish parent company owns a subsidiary in the U.K. through which the parent company plans to establish another subsidiary in the UAE. Swedish tax legislation provides that the Swedish parent company is subject to corporation tax on its worldwide profits in Sweden. However, the parent company is generally not taxed on the profits of its subsidiaries as they arise nor is it taxed on dividends distributed by a subsidiary established in Sweden. Although, when subsidiaries are not resident in Sweden and CFC legislation applies tax exempt according to the intercorporate share holding legislation will not be applicable. Therefore, in order for double CFC taxation to arise it is established that CFC legislation will be applicable to the exemplified scheme. Profits accrued in the UAE will be subject to CFC taxation in both the U.K. and Sweden and double taxation relief will not be granted in Sweden for the CFC tax paid in the U.K. It is questionable if double CFC taxation and the lack of tax relief in such a situation is in compliance with the freedom of establishment.

The analysis, whereas the purpose of this thesis is concluded, follows the reasoning of the ECJ in accordance with the rule of reason. The purpose is to examine if the lack of double CFC tax relief is in compliance with Community law. It is established that since relief is not granted for double CFC taxation, national legislation hinders the freedom of establishment by forcing a parent company to avoid or modify an intra group structure which leads to the unfavorable consequences in taxation. The tax disadvantage must be seen as making it less attractive for Sweden’s own resident to establish in another Member State and the hindering nature of the lack of double CFC taxation relief constitutes a prohibited restriction to the freedom of establishment. The grounds of justification previously accepted by the ECJ are examined in order to establish if such grounds can justify the lack of double CFC tax relief as a prohibited restriction on the freedom of establishment. None of the acknowledged grounds of justification are able to justify the lack of double CFC tax relief and such a restricted measure is therefore not found to be in compliance with Community Law. Lastly, potential adjustments to CFC legislation, regarding the lack of double CFC tax relief, are discussed to enable compliance with Community law.

Abstract

This essay begins with a presentation of the complex set of problems which relate to the interaction between freedom of speech and the ban against discrimination based on a person's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith or sexual preference (BrB 16:8, incitement to racial hatred). Can conflicts arise between freedom of speech and the ban against discrimination? To shed light on this question, we have chosen to look at the issue from a new perspective. This perspective is based on the new challenges faced by Swedish society as a result of the changed composition of our population, our membership in the EU and our acknowledgment of certain international conventions concerning human rights.

Fifty years ago our population almost solely comprised of “native Swedes”. Today, because of massive immigration, our country can be described as multiracial and multicultural. This gives rise to questions concerning protecting minority groups from discrimination whilst also attempting to ensure that the non-discrimination acts do not compromise our freedom of speech. Our membership in the EU and our acknowledgement of certain international conventions means that European law and international law sometimes override Swedish law. This restricts our freedom to decide the extent of our non-discrimination statutes, but can have positive effects on the right to freedom of speech and religion.

The arguments that are put forward in our essay may give rise to many questions but we will focus on two major issues. First, where does the law draw the line between the freedom of speech and the ban against discrimination based on a person's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith, or sexual preference? Second, are there inherit flaws in the law as a result of both the inner changes our society has gone through and our new responsibilities due to our membership in the EU and our acknowledgement of certain international conventions?

The purpose of this essay is to answer these questions through studying and reflecting on the theory of law (doctrine). We will also analyse the existing written law and its sources, and consider court rulings and related judicial decisions. This analysis will enable us to make the following conclusion concerning the previously mentioned questions.

The freedom of speech is extensive and is not explicitly defined. Without explicit definition, no specific statements automatically become illegal. Therefore a person's freedom to express his own opinion in public is wide-ranging. Unfortunately our freedom of speech is not guaranteed for ever and therefore we have to both treasure and guard it from potential threats. Popular public opinion, populist interests or other specific interests may seek changes, which might effect our freedom of speech. The ban against discrimination based on a person's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith, or sexual preference is a specific interest of this kind. The purpose of this ban is based solely on good intentions. None the less, this ban could be a wolf in sheep’s clothing, as it might have a negative influence on the freedom of speech. When two justifiable causes come into conflict with one another – in this case the freedom of speech versus non-discrimination – a society must make difficult choices. Do we sacrifice part of our freedom of speech which will effect the whole population in order to protect minority groups, or do we sacrifice the rights of the minority in order to secure freedom of speech for all?

During the last few years there has been an increase in Nazi-organisations in Sweden, which have grown strong in terms of both the number of their supporters and the amount of attention which is paid to them by the press. These groups have used our democratic rights – which includes our freedom of speech – in order to spread their scornful opinions based on a person's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith, or sexual preference. Through our study of court rulings concerning Nazis, we came to the conclusion that there is a strong tendency to convict Nazis. This is certainly the case if they call out “Sieg Heil” or salute Hitler. They are also often convicted if they are wearing the Nazi cross.

When the courts find that they are unable to convict a Nazi for the actions just mentioned, they often base their judgement on either one or two premises. If the prosecutor can not prove that it has been the Nazi's intention to spread a scornful message concerning a group defined by it's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith, or sexual preference, he can not be convicted with reference to the non-discrimination act (uppsåtsrekvisitet). Moreover, if it can not be proven that the message has reached a considerable number of people and not just the Nazis private sphere, this also warrants the verdict of acquittal (spridningsrekvisitet). From our study of court rulings however, we found that the non-discrimination statute does fulfil its purpose. Most scornful or hate-filled messages are in fact disseminated to the wider public. This being the case, the Nazi is almost certain to be convicted.

Religious fundamentalism is not something entirely new in our society. Sweden has always had a few religious groups free from the state church and the members of the free churches have often held conservative religious beliefs, much like some Muslim movements today. Freedom of speech and religious freedom are of course two important elements of any democratic society, but through a court case concerning a Christian priest in a free church, the freedom of speech related to preaching has arguably become unacceptably extensive. In effect this court case means that as long as you can relate your scornful statement about a specific group included in the non-discrimination statute to a religious scripture like the Bible or the Koran, you can not be prosecuted.

This somewhat unsatisfactory conclusion is a result of Sweden adopting the European Convention of Human Rights. In this case the European Rights Law overrides the Swedish non-discrimination law and this leads to a flaw in our legal system relating to the protection of certain minority groups. It must be mentioned, however, that the European Convention of Human Rights is part of Swedish law, and therefore Swedish law can not contradict European law, RF 2:23. Given that we are bound by the European Rights Law, there is nothing Sweden can do about this flaw, which in the future might have even greater consequences in and on our multicultural society. For instance, what would happen if messages filled with hatred were spread by priests from the Christian free churches and fundamentalist Muslims. If these statements concerned the other group and the origin of the statements could be traced to the Bible and the Koran, the courts would have no way of convicting the preachers as this would go against the European Convention on Human Rights. This could result in serious social instability. Indeed, riots could break out as a result of such religious propaganda. The law would be powerless to halt the dissemination of the religious scorn which caused the riots.

We have come to three conclusions concerning intrinsic flaws in the law concerning the ban against discrimination based on a person's race, the colour of their skin or ethnic origin, confession of faith or sexual preference. We therefore recommend that the following changes should be made:

1. Concerning BrB 16:8, this act should include an unmistakable and transparent definition of the word “missaktning” (scornfulness or disrespect).

2. With reference to the High Court’s ruling regarding the priest and the European Convention on Human Rights, we recommend that Sweden should attempt to find a legal solution which will enable our courts to more easily convict scornful statements regarding certain minority groups, even if the origin of the statement can be traced to religious writings.

3. With reference to the instruction in the Freedom of Press Act (TF 1:4), we find it necessary to clarify which statements that can be looked upon as legal and which statements are unlawful.

Den första svenska CFC-lagstiftningen trädde i kraft den 1 januari 1990 och har sedan dess genomgått flera omarbetningar. Syftet med de svenska CFC-reglerna är att förhindra skatteplanering med bolag i lågbeskattade länder och på så sätt försvara den svenska skattebasen. I kort innebär de svenska CFC-reglerna en möjlighet att beskatta ägaren till ett i utlandet beläget CFC-bolag löpande för dess inkomster från CFC-bolaget.

EG-domstolens dom Cadbury Schweppes föranledde att flera av medlemsländerna, däribland Sverige tvingades ändra sina CFC-lagstiftningar. EG-domstolen konstaterade att CFC-lagstiftning utgör en inskränkning av etableringsfriheten och skall förbjudas såvida CFC-bolaget inte utgör ett rent konstlat upplägg och då etableringen sker i syfte att undvika nationell skatt. CFC-beskattning får inte vidtas om det kan visas att det föreligger en verklig etablering från vilken det bedrivs en faktisk ekonomisk verksamhet. Bedömningen om en sådan etablering föreligger, skall grundas på objektiva omständigheter som kan kontrolleras av utomstående, däribland i vilken grad CFC-bolaget existerar fysiskt i form av lokaler, personal och utrustning.

Den svenska regeringen valde att införliva utgången av målet genom en ny kompletteringsregel i 39a kap. 7a § IL. Regeringen valde att formulera lagstiftningen som att en inkomst hos en utländsk juridisk person som hör hemma i en stat inom Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet inte anses lågbeskattad om den utländska juridiska personen i den stat där den hör hemma utgör en verklig etablering från vilken en affärsmässigt motiverad verksamhet bedrivs. För att göra denna prövning listar regeringen tre omständigheter som särskilt skall beaktas. Den utländska juridiska personen skall för det första förfoga över egna resurser i form av i form av lokaler och utrustning i den utsträckning som är nödvändig för dess verksamhet. För det andra skall den förfoga över personal med den kompetens som är nödvändig för att självständigt bedriva verksamheten och slutligen skall den utländska juridiska personens personal självständigt fatta beslut i den löpande verksamheten. Formuleringen av lagstiftningen har fått mycket kritik i förarbetena och i doktrinen framförallt eftersom den svenska lagstiftningens formulering avviker från EG-domstolens formulering i domen.

Magisteruppsatsen syftar till att utreda och analysera den nya kompletteringsregelns i 39a kap. 7a § IL förenlighet med etableringsfriheten med särskilt beaktande av utgången i målet Cadbury Schweppes. Dessutom kommer eventuella tillämpnings- och tolkningsproblem att klargöras och analyseras. Slutsatsen är att den nya kompletteringsregeln löper stor risk att anses som oförenlig med etableringsfriheten samt att formuleringen skapar tolkningsproblem och väcker osäkerhet inför framtida tillämpning. Eftersom den nya kompletteringsregeln syftar till att förena den svenska CFC-lagstiftningen med EG-rätten borde det mest förnuftiga istället varit att den nya kompletteringsregeln endast innehöll grundelementen som kommer till uttryck i EG-rättens dom, medan detaljerna istället överlåts till rättsutvecklingen.

The first Swedish CFC legislation came into force on January 1^st 1990 and has since undergone several revisions. The purpose of the Swedish CFC rules is to prevent tax avoidance by companies located in low tax countries and thus defend the Swedish tax base. In short, the Swedish CFC legislation implies an opportunity to tax the owner of a foreign located CFC of its revenue from the CFC.

The ECJs ruling in the Cadbury Schweppes case caused several of the member states, including Sweden to change its CFC legislation. The ECJ ruled that the CFC legislation constitutes a restriction on the Freedom of Establishment and should be prohibited unless the CFC does not constitute a wholly artificial arrangement intended to escape the national tax normally payable. CFC-taxation may not be made if it is proved that there is an actual establishment intended to carry on a genuine economic activity. The finding if such an establishment exists must be based on objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment.

The Swedish government chose to incorporate the outcome of the ruling by implementing a new CFC-legislation - 39a. 7a § IL. The government chose to formulate the legislation so an income of a foreign legal entity which belongs in a state within the European Economic Area is not considered to be low taxed if the foreign legal entity in the home State is an actual establishment from which a commercially motivated business is managed. To make this finding, the government lists three factors that require specific consideration. The foreign legal entity must according to the first factor have their own resources in the form of in the form of premises and equipment to the extent necessary for its activities. The second factor sates that the control of staff with the skills necessary to independently carry out the activity and finally shall the staff independently make decisions in the ongoing activities. The wording of the legislation has received much criticism in the preparatory work and in the literature especially since the wording of the Swedish legislation differs from the one made by the ECJ.

This Master's thesis aims to investigate and analyze the new Swedish CFC-legislation in 39a. kap. 7a § IL and to analyze if it is compatible with the Freedom of Establishment with specific regard to the outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case. Moreover, any application or interpretation problems will be clarified and analyzed. The conclusion is that the new Swedish CFC legislation threatens to be incoherent with the freedom of establishment and that the wording creates problems of interpretation and raises uncertainty about the future application. As the new CFC legislation intends to reconcile the Swedish CFC legislation with EC law it should be more reasonable if the new rule only contained the basic elements as reflected in the ruling, while details instead were left to the legislative development.